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1. Beltran vs.

In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but after 24 years of marriage Beltran
filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felixs PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home
to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable
cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that
the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may
issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans
petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar.
HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said
civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a
previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce
evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and
void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

2. Te v. Choa (Te v. CA)G.R. 126746
1.Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on 1988 (Sept. 14). They did not live together after marriage although they
would meet eachother regularly.
2.1989, Liliana gave birth to a girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her.3.1990 (May 20) Arthur contracted a second marriage
while marriage withLiliana was subsisting.
4.Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently anadministrative case (revocation of engineering license for grossly
immoralact) against Arthur and Julieta Santella (2ndwife of Arthur)
5.Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his marriage with Liliana.
6.RTC and Board rendered decision while the petition for annulment of firstmarriage was pending
Issue: Marriage annulment case had to be resolved first before criminal andadministrative case be rendered judgment?
NO.1.P. v. Mendoza and P. v. Aragon ruling (no judicial decree is necessary toestablish the invalidity of a marriage which is ab
initio) was overturned.
2.Family Code Art. 40 is the prevailing rule: the absolute nullity of a previousmarriage may not be invoked for purposes of
remarriage unless there is afinal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
3.Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
RD: Absence of Impediment.FC. Art. 5: any male or female of the age of 18yrs or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned under art. 37 & 38, may contract marriage.Case: Since it was deemed that the marriage of Arthur and Liliana was
valid,bigamous marriage between Arthur and Julieta is void. (see. NCC Art. 80)

3. Quimiguing vs Icao
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential
relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force
and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a
consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The
complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to
amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was
allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive
donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does
not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this
constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.


Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot.
In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her
parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she
again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient,
she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On
February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's
clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a
two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in
the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the
abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application
of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child?

No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth determines
personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child should
be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn
child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can
recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral
damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on
the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.

5. PT&T vs. NLRC272 SCRA 596
:Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as areliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifically as a Supernumerary
ProjectWorker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee whos having amaternity leave. Under the agreement she signed, her
employment was toimmediately terminate upon the expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever
for the succeeding periods,this time as a replacement to an employee who went on leave. Thereliever status was then formally
completed until she was asked again to join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In the jobapplication form, she
indicated in the portion of the civil status therein thatshe was single although she had contracted marriage a few months
earlier.Grace has also made the same representation on her two successivereliever agreements. The branch supervisor of PT&T
having discovered thediscrepancy sent Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the saiddiscrepancy and she was reminded
about the companys policy of notaccepting married women for employment. In her reply, she stated thatshe wasnt aware of such
policy at that time and all along she hadntdeliberately hidden her true civil status. However, PT&T remainedunconvinced of this
reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was dismissedfrom the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for
illegaldismissal and with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances.
Issue:Whether or not PT&T is liable against Graces illegal dismissal dueto certain company policy.
Ruling:Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted bydiscriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Wheres
acompany policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contractsmarriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it
not only runsafoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on thefundamental policy of the State toward marriage.
The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T isthat it strike at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as
aninviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of the nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for
Graces illegal dismissaland the latter shall claim for damages.

G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
Petitioner: Eduardo P. Manuel
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Callejo, Sr.

November 7, 2001, complaint was filed in the RTC of Baguio City. The following facts were presented:
(a) On April 22, 1996, Baguio City, Philippines, Eduardo P. Manuel, respondent, contracted a second marriage with Tina Gandalera-
Manuel, complainant, in RTC of Baguio City. It so appeared in the marriage contract that Manuel was single.
(b) Eduardo P. Manuel was previously legally married to Rubylus Gana without the said marriage having been legally dissolved
before the second marriage.
(c) Tina Gandalera-Manuel did not know the existence of the first marriage of the respondent to Rubylus Gana.
(d) On July 28, 1975, Makati, Eduardo was married to Ruby.
(e) On January 1996, Eduardo met Tina in Dagupan City. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio to visit her and he proposed
assuring her that he was single.
(f) Starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year.
(g) Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. He stopped giving financial support.
(h) Sometime in August 2001, Tina learned that Eduardo had been previously married.
(i) Eduardo testified that he declared that he was single because he believed in good faith that his marriage was invalid. He said he
did not know he had to go to the court to seek for nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. Ruby was jailed and he had
not heard from her for more than 20 years.

On July 2, 2002, RTC found Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC, and sentenced him
an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to
indemnify the private complainant, Tina Gandalera, the amount of P200,000 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.

Manuel appealed the decision to the CA. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the RPC, there must be malice for one to be
criminally liable for a felony. He posited that the RTC should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification to indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision coreccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and
affirmation in all other respect, as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of
bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply.

The issues of the petition are:
(1) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioners first wife cannot be legally presumed dead
under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the
Family Code; and
(2) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of P200,000 as moral damages as it had no
basis in fact and in law.

(1) No. The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced. The
presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, is created by law and arises without necessity of judicial
declaration. However, Article 41, of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, provides that for
the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage (under its preceding paragraph), the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
(2) No. The Court rules against the petitioner. The petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article
2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public
policy as they undermine, and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals, and the interest, and general welfare of
society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral
damages. Even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery as held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald.

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
Ponente: J. Mendoza

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's
knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and
his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;
Held:(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

8. Ong v. Ong

On February 25, 1976, Imelda Ong, for and in consideration of P1.00 and other valuable considerations, executed a quitclaim over a
parcel of land in Makati in favor of Sandra Maruzzo, then a minor. On November 19, 1980, Imelda revoked the quitclaim and
donated the property to her son Rex. On June 20, 1983, Sandra, through her guardial ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed an action to
recover the land and to declare the donation to Rex null and void. In their responsive pleading, petitioners claimed that the quitclaim
is equivalent to a donation which requires acceptance by the donee, and since Sandra was a minor, there was no valid acceptance.
The trial court ruled that the quitclaim is equivalent to a sale. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision.
Issue:Whether the quitclaim is equivalent to a deed of sale or to a deed of donation
The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima facie evidence of the existence of a valuable
consideration, the party alleging lack of consideration has the burden of proving such allegation. Even granting that the Quitclaim
deed in question is a donation, Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that the requirement of the acceptance of the donation in favor
of minor by parents of legal representatives applies only to onerous and conditional donations where the donation may have to
assume certain charges or burdens. Donation to an incapacitated donee does not need the acceptance by the lawful representative
if said donation does not contain any condition. In simple and pure donation, the formal acceptance is not important for the donor
requires no right to be protected and the donee neither undertakes to do anything nor assumes any obligation. The Quitclaim now in
question does not impose any condition.

G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
Petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Corona
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
(a) Petitioner filed to present petition! solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex;
(b) Granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
(c) Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
(d) The court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition as it
would only grant the petitioner his much awaited happiness and the realization of their (his fiance) dreams.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. On February 23, 2006, the CA rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic, thus, this petition.
The issue raised in this petition is:
(1) Whether or not the change of the petitioners name and sex in his birth certificate are allowed under Articles 4007 to 413 of the
Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
(1) No. It is not allowed. A persons name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment. No law allows the change of
entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Statutes
control petitions for change of name. Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of
equity. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. Article 412
provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
The petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Jennifer B. Cagandahan
Ponente: J. Quisimbing

The respondents petition was granted by the RTC on January 12, 2005. The following facts were presented by the respondent to
the RTC:
(a) She was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as female in the Certificate of Live birth.
(b) While growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics because of CAH, which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.
(c) Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH and the
latter issued a medical certificate. Such document testified respondents claim.
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling had been filed.
The issue raised in this petition is:
(1) Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or
gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition knows as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
(1) No. The trial court did not err in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent. The court considered the
unique circumstance in this case where nature had taken its course.

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of
respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

11. Go vs. Ca
Family Code Article 73 Exercise of Profession of Either Spouse

In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film their wedding. After the wedding, the
newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go said its not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video
after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding video
because the copy has been erased.

The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the
spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that
they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape
within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their claim
after two months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.

HELD: Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim after the wedding but were advised
to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their honeymoon is to be done abroad and wont be able to return for
two months. It is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact
that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that
the event therein recorded a wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered could no
longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the
mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could
be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.

Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family
Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it
was shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the
damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.

12. Balogbog vs. CAG.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
Facts:Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in
1951 and1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private
respondents Ramonito andGeneroso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting againstpetitioners, claiming that they
were the legitimate children of Gavino byCatalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third shareof Gavino in the
estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitionersdenied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brotherGavino
died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City
rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render anaccounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to
partition theestate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilioand Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and
costs. On appeal, the Courtof Appeals affirmed.
Issue:Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valideven in the absence of marriage certificate.
Ruling:Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and awoman conducting themselves as husband and wife are
legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. Inthis case, petitioners' claim that the
certification presented by privaterespondents, to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost ordestroyed during the war,
was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitionersargue that this
book does not contain any entry pertaining to the allegedmarriage of private respondents' parents. This contention has no
merit.Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
The failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Otherevidence may be presented to prove marriage.Here, private
respondents proved, through testimonial evidence,that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had threechildren, one
of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private
respondentsherein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as thelegitimate children of Gavino. Hence, the marriage
between Gavino andCatalina is valid.

13. Cosca vs. Palaypayon237 SCRA 249
Facts:Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrativecomplaint to the Office of the Court Administrator against
Judge LucioPalaypayon and Nelia Baroy, respondents, for the following offenses:
1.Illegal solemnization of marriage
2.Falsification of the monthly reports of cases3.Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court4.Non-issuance of receipt for cash
bond received5.Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and6.Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriageseven without the requisite of marriage license. Thus, several
couples wereable to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees torespondent Baroy, despite the absence of
marriage license. As aconsequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage licensenumber. In addition, the respondent
judge did not sign their marriagecontracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason beingthat he allegedly had to
wait for the marriage license to be submitted bythe parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably,the
marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Issue:Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage.
Ruling:On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Codepertinently provides that the formal requisite of marriage, inter
alia, a validmarriage license except in the cases provided for therein.Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the
essential orformal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio andthat, while an irregularity in the formal requisites
shall not affect thevalidity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularityshall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. Thus, respondent judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage
14. Alcantara vs. Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007; 531 SCRA 446PAFR Topic: Marriage license, absence of it, certification of Civil Registrar
Chico-Nazario, J

Restituto Alcantara (petitioner) filed a petition for annulment of his marriage withRosita Alcantara (respondent) before the RTC of
Manila alleging that onDecember 8, 1982, without securing the required marriage license, he andrespondent went to the City Hall of
Manila to look for a person who could arrangea marriage for them.

They met a fixer who arranged their wedding before Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel. They got married on that same day, December 8, 1982.The wedding took place at the stairs in the Manila
City Hall and not in the CDCCBR Chapel where Rev. Navarro belongs.
They also got married at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila onMarch 26, 1983.
The alleged marriage license, appearing on the marriage contract, was procuredin Carmona, Cavite, neither party was a resident of

On the request of the respondent, the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,Cavite issued a certification that Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued infavor of the parties on December 8, 1982. However, the marriage contract statesthat the Marriage License
No. is 7054033.
The petition for annulment was dismissed by the RTC of Manila and was affirmedby the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage is void ab initio on the ground that no valid marriagelicense existed during the solemnization of the
No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the CivilCode, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio. To beconsidered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requiresthat the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriagecontract or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local
civilregistrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. TheCertification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite enjoysthe presumption that official duty was performed and the issuance of themarriage license was done in the
regular conduct of official business.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite theabsence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered
mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of themarriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does
notaffect its validity but the party/ies responsible for the irregularity are civilly,criminally and administratively liable.
A closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers0 and 1, such that the marriage license may either
read as 7054133 or 7054033.It does not detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license
to the parties.

15. Wassmer vs. Velez12 SCRA 648
Facts:Francisco Velez, defendant, and Beatriz Wassmer, plaintiff-appellant, following their mutual love, decided to get married
onSeptember 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, defendant left a note toBeatriz stating therein the postponement of their
wedding due toopposition of defendants mother and that he will be leaving. But onSeptember 3, 1954, defendant sent another
telegram stated that he will bereturning very soon for the wedding. However, defendant did not appearnor was he heard from
again.Beatriz sued defendant for damages and in silence of thedefendant, trial court granted the petition and ordered the defendant
topay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. On June 21, 1955defendant filed a petition for relief from orders, judgments
andproceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration. Beatriz movedto strike it cut but the court ordered the parties and
their attorneys toappear for the stage of possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement.Defendant wasnt able to appear but instead
on the following day hiscounsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendantspetition for relief. It was granted
but again defendant and his counsel failedto appear. Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the courtbut this time
defendants counsel informed the court that chances of settling case amicably were nil.
Issue:Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the defendant topay plaintiff damages.
Ruling:The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry becauseit is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact
the couple havealready filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, weddingapparels, gives the plaintiff reason to
demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant topay the plaintiff moral
damages for the humiliation she suffered, actualdamages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because thedefendant
acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he willcome back and the wedding will push through.

Complainant: Rodolfo G. Navarro
Respondent: Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy, MCTC
Ponente: J. Romero

The complainant submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by the respondent with the following facts:
(a) On September 27, 1994, respondent solemnized wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife;
(b) On October 27, 1994, the respondent allegedly performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma
G. Del Rosario outside of the respondents courts jurisdiction. Such wedding was solemnized at the respondents residence in
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within the respondents jurisdictional area of Sta. Monica Burgos.
Respondent, in his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA):
(a) Seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Tagadan and Borga by stating that he merely relied
on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming that Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for
almost seven (7) years.
(b) Maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph one (1) of
the Family Code, which states that Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction.; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a
resolution of the case. In the foregoing the other facts are present in relation to the first marriage solemnized by the respondent as
stated herein:
(a) The affidavit was not issued by the judge of Basey, Samar. It was, however, merely acknowledged before him;
(b) The affiants stated in their affidavit that they knew Tagadan who was left by his wife, Ida Penaranda and she has not returned
nor been heard for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
The issues are:
(1) Whether or not the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Penarandas presumptive death and ample reason for
the respondent to proceed with the marriage ceremony of Tagadan and Borga;
(2) Whether or not the solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was within the respondents courts jurisdiction.
(1) No. The joint affidavit is not a sufficient proof of Penarandas presumptive death. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly
provides as quoted, !the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death or the absentee! Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage.
(2) No. The solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was not within the respondents courts jurisdiction. He was
not clothed to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. As such, there are only three instances, which
the law provides, wherein a judge may solemnize a marriage as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code:
(2.1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
(2.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written
request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
(Re: Sumaylo and Del Rosario - Under the Family Code, even if the solemnizing officer is not authorized, the marriage would be
valid if either or both parties believe in good faith in his authority to solemnize the marriage.)
Respondent was ordered a suspension for a period of six (6) months.

17. Sy vs. Court of Appeals
The case:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, denying the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.

The facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of
Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983,
Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody of their
mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was
later amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and
approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 1988,
Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime
of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity
of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the
petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage
being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage
certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage
certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.

The Issues:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the
time of the ceremony?
Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration
of its absolute nullity?

A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by
petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. The marriage contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet
neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued
almost one year after the ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim of
exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between petitioner and private respondent is
void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the
marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time heir marriage was solemnized.
Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando
Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.

18. Republic vs. Orbecido472 SCRA 114
Facts:Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. Villanueva were marriedwith two children. Lady Myros the left for the United States
with one sonand 1st became a naturalized American citizen, 2nd obtained a validdivorce decree in 2000 capacitating her to remarry,
and 3rd contracted amarriage with Innocent Stanley, an American.Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under
Article26(2) of the Family Code The Office of the Solicitor General contends thatthe invoked article was not applicable and raises
this pure question of law,they further posit that Orbecido should file for Legal Separation orAnnulment instead.
Issue:Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).
Ruling: YES. Article 26(2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenshipand remarried, also to remarry. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice .For the application
of Article 26(2), there must have been (1) avalid marriage celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner, and that (2) a valid divorce
decree is obtained by the alien spouse capacitating her toremarry.Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
owncourts, the following must be proven: (1) divorce as a fact, (2) foreign law,(3) divorce decree capacitated one to remarry. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the timeof the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained by the alien spouse .Annulment or Legal Separation need not be the proper remediesfor such would be in
the case of the former, long, tedious, and infeasible,and in the case of the latter, is futile to sever marital ties.

19. BAYOT VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 155635,

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On November 27,
1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's
marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.

Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was
duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96. On March 21, 2001,
Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground
of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss. To the motion to dismiss,
Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that,
therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. RTC ruled against Vicente. CA ruled in favor of Rebecca stating that the marriage
between the spouses was already dissolved upon the grant of divorce since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for
such decree.
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Guam was sufficient to dissolve the marriage bond between them.

Thus, the application for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC was no longer needed.


Petitioner: On March 21, 2001, Rebecca sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support
pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter
Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
Respondent: On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
Supreme Court Ruling:

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American
citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling
circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed
in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an
American passport.
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen,
particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured
the divorce from the Dominican Republic.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact
later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she
chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship.
Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees.
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows
Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement executed on December
14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on
March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party
and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by
his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued
by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or
invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in
determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce,
the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

20. Republic vs. Dayot
GR No. 175581,
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a
sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for
bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint
on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham
and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage
license requirement.

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit
and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact
that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void
ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not
prescribe and may be raised any time.

21. Nial vs. Bayadog328 SCRA 122
Facts:Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Pepito resultingto her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 monthsthereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito
and respondent NormaBayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepitoand Norma executed an affidavit
dated December 11, 1986 stating thatthey had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and werethus exempt from
securing a marriage license.After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed apetition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Normaalleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
Issue:What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant
the countingof the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing amarriage license.
Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted backfrom the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal unionhad it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period shouldbe the years immediately before the
day of the marriage and it should be aperiod of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third partywas involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of thefirst spouse shall
be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in casesof absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.In this
case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, itcannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wifefor at
least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos firstmarriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, onlyabout 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the timewhen he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that whenthey lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact fromhis lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actualseverance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
makeany cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one ashusband and wife.Having determined that the second
marriage involve in this case isnot covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it isvoid ab initio because of
the absence of such element.