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Cornell d'Echert, B. (2010). Five Ways OBTE Can Enable the Army Leader Development Strategy. In: Riccio, G.

, Diedrich, F., & Cortes, M.
(Eds.). An Initiative in Outcomes-Based Training and Education: Implications for an Integrated Approach to Values-Based Requirements
(Chapter 15). Fort Meade, MD: U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group. [Cover art by Wordle.net represents word frequency in text.]

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Chapter 15. Five ways OBTE can enable the Army Leader Development Strategy
Blaise Cornell d’Echert
The Wexford Group International
15.1 Background

Since the release of the “Adapt or Die” TRADOC White Paper subsequently published in Army
magazine (Fastabend & Simpson, 2004), there has been extensive discussion and other activity
related to training (and educating) Soldiers differently for challenges in the contemporary
operational environment (COE). Senior leader calls to accelerate change and transform
notwithstanding, the emergent changes have not, so far, been as effective, durable, or as
appropriate as they could have been. The delays and many draft revisions of FM 7-0 are
symptomatic of the divergence of opinions about what needs to be changed in Army training. The
same is true of both the Army Training & Leader Development Strategy (ATLDS) and the Army
Leader Development Strategy (ALDS). There are, within all of those documents and expressions
of a new vision, common and recurring themes but they are over-shadowed by retaining too much
legacy content from prior expressions of how the Army trains (United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command [TRADOC], 2009).
The seeming slow pace of change has less to do with the quality of leader vision than it has to do
with the details of implementation. It is not for any lack of understanding that the COE has
imposed a requirement for change in both how and what we train. The COE has changed the
operational Army, making it adapt and evolve in different, sometimes difficult and unexpected
ways. Even as this forced adaptation occurs, everyone continues to urge the Army to be more
adaptive, agile, and innovative. Even a shallow understanding of the Army operational concept of
Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) makes it clear that the way we used to train will no longer
suffice. Army senior leadership insists that there be a fundamental difference of thought about
how the Army trains. It seems clear that everyone understands this. The awkward remaining
obstacle is how can it be done? A call for new thinking may be insufficient to bring about the
kinds of change in training and education that is required to support the Army’s operational
concept.
How does the Army change the thinking about the way it trains when the people who will be
doing it are emotionally attached to what made them successful? Where is the incentive to
change an entire system if the Army still is accomplishing its missions?
The Army fundamentally has a task training culture that both permeates and resonates throughout
the activities that prepare Soldiers, units and formations for the kinds of missions envisioned in
FSO. This culture and the associated behavior, attitudes, and beliefs are deeply rooted and cannot
be undone quickly. Yet the Army has an opportunity to turn in a new direction if they offer an
alternative that more closely aligns with experiences of operating in the COE.
The battalion commanders of today were “formed and normed” as lieutenants in the 1990s. This
followed the phenomenal successes of Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm, a period of
constrained resources, of non-traditional stability operations, of prescriptive training strategies,
pre-deployment training checklists and other mandatory training requirements. Even for company
commanders, little imagination was required or expected. Training management skill was valued
more highly than any evidence of innovation in designing or executing training. Leaders became

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if not comfortable with, then conditioned to, someone else deciding what training they should do.
The rapidly evolving conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003-2007 reinforced this
expectation of being told what to train. Clearly, there was justifiable need to provide rapid
training solutions to forces deploying to fight in a new way with new equipment and new threats.
However, because of their experiences, this generation of leaders may not view all training
challenges as their own to solve. They may depend upon others to provide the approved solution.
These same commanders have also experienced the power that our doctrine of battle and mission
command envisions. The requirement for greatly decentralized operations, mission-type orders
that still embody ambiguity with the latitude to do what is necessary, has become the new norm,
if not the reality. Commanders increasingly comment on the disparity observed between the
qualities needed in their Soldiers and leaders and what they received from the training base. As
some of these same commanders subsequently returned to CONUS to fill positions in TRADOC
schools and centers they had two choices. They could make the changes they felt were necessary
and were empowered to do, or they could become defenders of the organizations they were now
part of. For those that pursue change, the “system’s” resilience and resistance to change proves
daunting and frustrating unless the most senior leaders intervene.
The duration of our current “persistent engagement,” and the constancy of senior leader urgings
to change, to adapt, to think differently is making a difference. A growing population of leaders
in the training base is no longer content to find a way to make the system work, but is instead
seeking to change the system altogether. The revised FM 7-0 (Headquarters Department of the
Army [HQDA], 2002), a new AR 350-1 (HQDA, 2009), new thinking in the ATLDS and ALDS,
even the revision of TR 350-70 (United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
[TRADOC], 1999) and its associated pamphlets will assist, albeit slowly. Other associated
components of the system must be compelled to change as well, such as the accreditation focus
on compliance that could be changed to focus on identifying impediments to change. Local
bureaucracies and their associated over-reaching regulations need restraint from a controlling
relationship over unit training desires to a more supporting relationship. Overall, the training
“system” needs change – there is much inertia to overcome. This will require extensive leader
involvement that may be hard to achieve. Transformation challenges, solving ARFORGEN
puzzles, contending with BRAC issues, and the constant balancing act of operating below
authorizations with no diminution of requirements consume much of available leader time.
Trainers, course managers and leaders need a comprehensive and holistic solution that can help
change their mind-set, yet does so in a way that does not discard the mechanics of the system the
Army depends on for readiness reporting and forecasting training resources. The solution can
account for the current operational experiences, and the impressions they made, as well as
recognizing the significance of the requirements of FSO. The solution can be both new and old at
the same time. It can focus most of its attention on influencing the thinking of those that will plan,
support, execute, and evaluate training and education.
For many of the reasons cited above, a solution known as Outcomes Based Training & Education
(OBTE) continues to attract attention and interest. Originally conceived as a solution to
commanders’ concerns about training effectiveness, especially in weapons and small unit tactics,
more practice and experience implementing the OBTE solution led to a deeper exploration of
where, why and how effectiveness in OBTE differed from the traditional training approaches.
Under the aegis of the Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), the program known as the
Combat Applications Training Course (CATC) migrated from assisting pre-deploying units to
assisting Basic Combat Training at Fort Jackson, then to Fort Benning and elsewhere (see
Chapter 1). From early 2006 until today, Soldiers, leaders and training specialists all describe
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how familiar the experience in the CATC is to other good training yet just how different the
results prove to be. Most of the difference and the change that they sense and experience is the
result of a change of focus that forces changes in how they think about what they are doing.
This paper will try to describe briefly that change of focus and the different thinking that
emerges. It will also show OBTE as a way to provide the new thinking desired about how we
train and educate Soldiers and develop leaders. Accordingly, implementing OBTE can also
potentially enable the Army Leader Development Strategy through the broad coincidence of
purpose.
15.2 An Emerging Consensus
Sometimes key studies, working groups, and panels produce interesting work revealing possible
futures; they do not receive much attention, but can be persuasive years later in unplanned or
unexpected ways. In 2003, the Defense Science Board (DSB) released the second portion of a
study of military training titled “Training for Future Conflicts” (DSB, 2003). The DSB expressed
a concept they called training surprise, evidence that we have seen affecting two allies: the 2006
Hezbollah – Israeli Defense Force clash and the 2008 Russian incursion in Georgia. In 2006, the
Army Research Institute hosted for TRADOC a science of learning workshop (Quinkert,
Morrison, Fletcher, Moses, & Roberts, 2007) that validated such TRADOC initiatives as dL
(distance learning), leveraging social networking and the use of competencies in development and
life-long learning. Many of these ideas found their way into the latest iteration of FM 7-0
describing what training should do to Soldiers, leaders and units in preparing them for the FSO
expected to be the new norm.
FM 7-0 also continued to make a distinction between training’s effect on doing and education’s
affect on thinking even though it can be argued that such distinctions are neither accurate nor
useful. That idea was a feature in the USMC Training and Education Command and USNA 2007
conference on teaching irregular warfare (Salmoni, 2008). One recommendation was to achieve a
better balance between training and education, rather than considering them as distinctly different
activities, because thinking (what we really mean is judgment) is an essential requirement at all
echelons in almost every conceivable military environment (see Chapters 3, 4, 5).
There is a reason for citing these particular conference proceedings. While there may be others,
these in particular are future oriented but framed from a context of analyzing what is and is not
working within the COE. Our military is not alone in finding the traditional mode of training
soldiers and armies to perform tasks inadequate. Throughout the world, the need for thinking
soldiers demanding new methods of preparation and development are underway. We should
expend the effort necessary now when we can, rather than find ourselves in a position where we
must.
“Adaptability is therefore one of the goals of our training policies. More than
ever before we will be stressing versatility in individuals and units.”
“Your Training Job,” The Officer Journal, June 1950
15.2.1 What Part to Balance?
Operational experience reinforced with a balanced portion of training and education enhances
military versatility in action and agility of thought. Such appears to be the thrust of thinking in
both FM 7-0 and the ALDS. For the most part, operational experience is what it is, and

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opportunity to influence what occurs (that shapes, forms or develops) is minimal. Purposefully
balancing the blend of training and education should be easier to achieve and should be a key
component of any development strategy.
Army leaders, training developers and educators struggle to find any balance when considering
the differing requirements of training (for certainty) and educating (for uncertainty). While newer
definitions of training and education may minimize the debate between trainers and educators,
they may be insufficient to achieve the new thinking (and new action) that is required. It might
prove more useful to bring the two ideas together. Changing the argument from either training or
education to one that is “both, and” could make the difference. The description of “paradigm
shifts” in the ALDS seems to offer this opportunity. Given that every Soldier is a potential future
leader, the Army Leader Development Strategy essentially describes the ends and ways for
preparing all Soldiers for full spectrum operations by providing training and education leavened
with operational (or some kind of relevant) experience. This also offers a way to re-direct
thinking away from training for task performance and toward development for broader
competence.
The training and education system that most Army leaders experienced in the past two decades
filled a particular function to prepare them for an offense-oriented doctrine. Over the past eight
years, what has become more evident with this new operational environment of persistent
engagement is that former distinctions of relevance are much less clear. Traditional distinctions
between conventional and unconventional, regular and irregular, war and peace, even between
winning and losing all have different meanings. Expectations about traditional threats, how an
enemy will fight and how our Army needs to be organized, trained and equipped to counter
possible threats have become much less certain. Our Army, instead of training for “a” war, is
learning that it must prepare for not just for war, but also for “anything.”
Any viable solution to help change thinking or execution of Army training should recognize that,
over time, the current training system evolved extensive controlling systems. To move beyond
that system requires a loosening of controls. Such loosening depends upon two key concepts -Trust and Confidence (see Appendix C). The current generation of commanders does not have
this experience in training settings, but they do in combat. Leaders need to return to the business
of being trainers themselves, rather than just training managers. Combat conditions of this decade
have made true many of our beliefs about mission and battle command. Counter Insurgency
(COIN) success begins with a controlling idea but demands a vastly decentralized execution.
Preparing the Army for success in FSO will require the same kind of commitment.
15.2.2 Improving Training, by Design
OBTE is a comprehensive approach that conjoins training and education practices within the
context of operational requirements that either exploit past experience or prepare for experiences
still to come (see Chapter 3). The balance leaders are asking for should not be about how much
training or what to educate because both are required. The balance is to ensure that education is
about solving problems without describing solutions, about teaching skills instead of just training
tasks, and to do these things at the same time.
Achieving this balance does not happen without some thoughtful effort. Design is a critical
element. Just as we have experienced with operations over extended time, preparing Soldiers and
leaders for FSO success will take time and requires a design perspective. Such a perspective
offers opportunity to consider purpose, to prioritize and link activities and to leverage
opportunities on tangents or in the margins. Most importantly, it makes clear that every action (or
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inaction) has consequence, either positive or negative, so the designer will seek ways to maximize
the positive (see Chapter 3).
The manner by which such design occurs depends upon certain elements of information or
guidance. The ALDS contains some descriptions of what the Army “wants” of or from various
leader cohorts. Without further elaboration, schools and their course managers will generate lists
and attempt to crosswalk desired attributes (or outcomes) to the training and education tasks that
already exist. While that is efficient, it will do very little to achieve the qualitative improvement
the new thinking about training envisions. More importantly, lacking sufficient design guidance
and continued dependence upon the uncertain efficacy of critical task analysis training developers
will be unable to leverage the potential of the new instructional media the Army continues to
make investments in (see Epilogue).
15.2.3 Increased Use of dL and Dependence on Self-Development
In the past decade, the Army has invested millions building the infrastructure to support dL.
Recent adoption of knowledge management and social networking increases the availability of
information and learning portals. As dL technology and the content offered continue to improve,
it is equally important that future users be, in fact, ready to take full advantage of what will be
available. Making Soldiers ready to learn by dL and self-development does not mean just
exposing them to those mediums. Developing their awareness of what they need (as an
individual) to learn is, and is a second way that OBTE can enable the ALDS and improve changes
in training and education (see Chapter 5 and Epilogue).
Some of that readiness begins in a Soldier’s earliest exposures to Army training and education.
Formative experiences in initial military training establish foundations that sustain and support
future enlargement, or prove unsound and require extensive re-building. The effectiveness of dL,
self-development, or lifelong learning as a development strategy requires that Soldiers have
mostly positive experiences. Leaders and trainers should promote the value of self-awareness,
increase opportunities to practice self-development, and teach how to respond to or act as a coach
and mentor.
Self-awareness, increased efficacy and protégé behavior emerge or are evident when training and
education are designed, developed and implemented using OBTE principles (see Chapter 3).
When Soldiers have the opportunity to learn by solving problems, to recognize the relatedness of
various tasks in the context of a mission setting, to continue to strive for their personal best
without an over reliance on contrived metrics, the result is that they begin to understand how they
themselves learn. This is significant and most leaders quickly realize that it is not something that
routinely occurs in the current training and education environment. However, it is something that
can and does occur in units where leaders and their subordinates enjoy a more natural coachplayer relationship.
OBTE Principles (Broad & Programmatic)
Principle 1. Leadership and enculturation of Soldiers
Principle 2. Integrated understanding of basic Soldier skills in Full Spectrum Operations
Principle 3. Collaborative reflection and problem solving
Principle 4. Soldier motivation and development of intangibles

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15.2.4 Future Orientation, Unknown Requirements
There is another reason to favor an approach that encourages self-development and learning how
to learn. Training in the Army today has to account for unknown work performed in the future
whereas in the past Army training was mostly focused on a specific job or function, much as
training in industry does. FSO argue strongly for more broadly gauged generalists to handle the
ambiguities and uncertainties of a future operating environment. However, core competencies
still call for if not expertise, at least abilities beyond proficiency in the critical skills of a military
specialty (or unit type). Soldiers who understand how they learn (even with predominantly handson kinds of tasks) can more rapidly improve their abilities to perform in either environment (see
Chapter 3).
Yet another benefit of self-aware Soldiers is that they can develop multifunctional skills. The
increasing complexity of tasks, and the equipment or concepts to accomplish them, portends far
more essential training occurring in units because there will not be enough time in school courses.
Soldiers empowered by awareness of how to learn will be able to develop a degree of mastery in
a specialized task as and when needed when using new equipment or implementing new
concepts. Finally, Soldiers that understand how to develop their own skill mastery can
dramatically improve the collective performance of the unit when operating in a command
climate that supports innovation. It can be argued that this is characteristic of high performing
units. Such inherent flexibility and versatility can potentially immunize expeditionary formations
from the effects of training surprise.
15.2.5 The Quality Instructor Challenge
The relative importance of education and the instructors that provide it is a feature of the ALDS
as a major component of improving leader development. High quality instructors are necessary to
provide the kinds of educational outcomes needed for high performing units. Evidence of
selecting high quality instructors is most apparent in some Captain Career Courses but the “high
quality” population is small and in high demand throughout the Army. Arguably, all schools and
courses should have the most qualified, the most experienced and the highest quality leaders to
serve as instructors. After all, these are the people that build our bench. Fixing quality education
by making instructor duty attractive, desirable or beneficial in building a career profile, while
useful, seldom remains a durable solution. There will always be a new, more pressing situation
demanding the “highest quality” to implement some new program or initiative.
OBTE offers a third way to enable the ALDS by making qualitative improvements in military
instruction with whatever instructors are available. One way to improve military instruction is to
stop believing that Army instructors are some separate species that require special preparation.
Clearly, there are activities that will help prepare leaders in their transition from leadership in
units to their new role as instructors. What should not happen, however, is for these instructors to
discard everything they have learned about developing Soldiers. The same skills and many of the
same techniques apply as equally in the classroom or on the training field as they do in the squad
bay, motor pool, or Forward Operating Base. Too many great leaders, after indoctrination in the
“system”, believe their requirement is merely to present instruction, or impart information for
knowledge transfer. Leaders that attend the mandatory Army Basic Instructor Course rarely
emerge with a sense that their mission is to teach. We should not compel new instructors to
forego all that they have learned (through experience) about teaching, coaching and mentoring
Soldiers just because they are now in a school setting (see Chapter 4).

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All the same, exceptional operational experience and practical leadership does not guarantee a
leader will be a good teacher. Part of the rationale supporting the production of training products
and their method of presentation is meant to negate this possible shortcoming. The training
developers’ goal is to provide a product that is useful for an inexperienced instructor the first time
in front of students. The problem, as with all such universal solutions, is that the bar is often set
too low. More options, better tools, and a range of learning activities will serve a broader range of
instructors and allow achieving more, rather than fewer learning objectives per session. Arguably,
such an approach will also ensure training products have broader utility to different learning
locales such as in schools, mobile training teams, or in unit-based training (see Epilogue).
Training and education using the principles of OBTE encourages trainers and instructors to take
ownership of their instructional content to the extent that they have a responsibility to ensure
students going to the operating force are immediately useful rather than an added training burden.
When instructors believe the idea, when their leaders endorse this approach, when measures of
effectiveness account for what matters rather than quantitative and statistical measures, then
instruction invariably shows significant quality differences. A sign that such practice is occurring
is the extent and quality of the instructor-student interaction and communication (see Chapters 2
and 3). In traditional methods of “presenting instruction” such interaction is very limited. An
OBTE aware instructor assumes a role similar to a coach or mentor, and instructor-student
interactions increase (see Chapters 8 and 9). Clearly this is only proportionally effective; the
greater the student-to-instructor ratio, the less opportunity for such interactions to occur. We all
know this intuitively and this is why most professional development courses stipulate small group
instruction.
15.2.6 Purpose and Design are Key
OBTE principles aid course managers and training developers in their analysis, design and
development activities as they prepare material for instructor use (see Chapter 3). The traditional
application of Instructional Systems Design (ISD) views learning as a sequential and progressive
execution of learning objectives linked to critical tasks associated with particular occupational
specialties. Evaluation tends to focus on the ability to accomplish the task (or action) consistent
with a pre-determined standard of performance. The inevitable result of such a system is that
success in evaluation is more important than what is taught (and learned); this is training to the
test. It is why Drill Sergeants may think that the purpose for training basic rifle marksmanship is
for the Soldier to qualify, not to be confident using the weapon. This is why cadre may believe
the purpose for teaching troop leading procedures (TLP) is to ensure leaders know the steps and
proper sequence of TLP, but new officers cannot plan or execute a mission without extensive
coaching. This is why NCO can describe terrain features and plot grid coordinates but many
cannot pass a land navigation course on the first attempt.
If course managers and training developers instead focused their analysis on how to achieve
outcomes aligned with a particular course, they could use this as a guidepost to check the validity
of learning activities within a current or planned POI. Further, use of outcomes guides design and
development by viewing all learning activities as opportunities to develop the student toward
achieving the desired course outcomes. Outcomes and objectives are not synonymous. Outcomes
broadly describe a design goal, objectives shape the means to achieve those goals, and the
training developer can then choose learning activities that purposefully achieve those objectives.
The developer can view every activity from the context of relatedness to other activities and all
guided by the holistic perspective of the outcome desired. With this design approach, learning
activities selected will use appropriate learning strategies to meet objectives, goals and outcome.
If a particular objective requires a particular training technique, educational strategy, or some
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blending of the two, the training developer is better able to provide the instructor an appropriate
training support package (TSP). The one-size fits all TSP template, while efficient for rapid
training development, does not always lead to positive outcomes or always assure meeting the
objective (see Chapter 3).
There is no intent to discard the elaborate architecture that has grown to make training
management and training development efficient, nor to denigrate the role of standards in
measuring skills and abilities. Tasks and their associated standards are essential components to
allow the Army to make readiness and resource forecasting decisions. Their use to develop
training has become less than optimal given the new requirements and challenges Soldiers face
today (see Epilogue).
New technologies inevitably displace and make what they replace obsolete. The new
characteristics of warfare and the capabilities required for success in FSO are making traditional
notions of training and education, if not obsolete, at least unproductive. The dependence on tasks
and drills as the basis of designing, executing and evaluating training is seriously at odds with the
requirements of preparing Soldiers and units for FSO. The drills and standards that have stood our
Army in such good stead since Valley Forge, through the mass mobilizations of two world wars,
and eventually creating the irresistible force of Desert Storm have to be re-examined in light of
their influence on the thinking of their practitioners.
15.2.7 A Natural Advantage
American military forces already enjoy an unprecedented advantage over allies and competitors
without doing any training or education. The cultural implication of living free in the United
States and all that it entails brings tremendous benefit to an environment where adaptability,
creativity and versatility are required (see Chapter 4). It is unfortunate then that much of the
Army’s training culture unintentionally negates this unique American characteristic. In
operational environments, some leaders that acquired their skills in a more stable place and time
cannot abide friction, organized chaos, or questioning attitudes and impose requirements that
diminish the qualities that provide our Soldiers and units a qualitative advantage over any
adversary. Desires to impose artificial controls, minimize the incidence of chance, and eliminate
the threat of risk serve only to create a climate where doing nothing is the safest course of action.
On the contrary, leaders get the best performance from American Soldiers when they give
mission orders and allow themselves to be surprised with the results. Such a climate can only
survive when nourished by trust and confidence. The conditions of creating that climate must
begin early and be reinforced often.
Quite simply, the biggest problem getting in the way of creating this climate is how we train.
Baldly stated, task and standards-based training is insufficient to develop Soldiers or to encourage
their natural adaptability. If anything, unthinking and rigid adherence to training to tasks and
standards exclusively seems based upon unfounded assumptions about the role of discipline and
standards on the modern battlefield. It also assumes that the tasks are the right tasks and the
standards are applicable to battlefield conditions, right now. Our training should seek to exploit
the inherent versatility and adaptability of our Soldiers. Confident leaders can do this.
15.2.8 Task Specialization or Generalized Competency
Task-centric and standards based training and education does a superb job of presenting fact
based and procedural information. It has served our Army well for almost 100 years. It even
assures a highly reproducible occurrence of and evidence of “learning” through performance
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measure validation of task execution. Without additional intervention, such training and
education fails to provide the Soldier opportunity to organize newly acquired information or to
link a new understanding to subsequent action. Trainers frequently observe this with newly
trained (and technically task proficient) Soldiers confronted with typical problems in mission (or
simulated but highly realistic) environments. Their learning was superficial. While the Soldier
had amassed information, lack of action and reflection with that information rendered it inert.
Many Army schools and courses suffer the same defect, and the generational evolution of the
systems approach to training made it that way.
Integrating OBTE principles in training and education is a way to meet the Army’s need for
broadly gauged generalists able to acquire rapid mastery of specific skills. From an OBTE
perspective, tasks are always taught with a contextual nature that helps explain why tasks should
be learned rather than practicing the task in isolation (see Chapter 3). Designing and executing
learning activities use standards as the baseline performance measure and when executed
appropriately, student performance usually exceeds the standard, often by a significant margin.
More importantly, because their learning includes action, reflection, feedback, and practice,
Soldier knowledge is activated rather than passive or inert. Such knowledge enables Soldiers to
leverage what they know so that they respond positively to the conditions of an altered situation
(see Chapter 4). This is the essence of adaptability in a military context.
The realization that it is impossible to train Soldiers for every task they might need to perform is
perhaps the most powerful inducement to transform Army training and education. The training
system as it exists today will prove resistant to this reality (see Chapter 14). The idea of training
only the most important tasks is commendable but probably unmanageable. The nature of critical
task lists and how they are compiled almost guarantees that the lists will grow rather than remain
small and focused. An unintended consequence of task lists is that accounting for the tasks (with
their associated standards) becomes the objective rather than achieving the more desirable
intangible attributes that will prove valuable to the Soldier and their unit.
Current efforts with automating the Combined Army Training Strategy (CATS), the Digital
Training Management System (DTMS) and the Training Development Capability (TDC) as tools
designed to improve training management and development can potentially make the problem
worse and harder to circumvent. Training tasks derived from a DA approved unit-type Mission
Essential Task List (METL) depend first upon the tasks chosen being “right enough.” In terms of
missions for units as designed, the chances are good that missions and the task groups will be
correct. Where it becomes murky is in the selection and specification of collective and individual
tasks as determining elements of preparing units and Soldiers for FSO. Rather than starting by
asking ‘what tasks must my Soldiers be able to perform’ if might be better to ask ‘what
capabilities do I want my Soldiers to have at the end of training’ (see Appendix C; Perry &
McEnery, 2009).
The key perhaps is using capabilities to determine what is important. Describing desired
capabilities in terms of outcomes allows commanders the flexibility and latitude to make
judicious selection of the tasks that will, aggregated, generate capabilities. Commanders, in dialog
with their employing commander, can defend their training decisions. Training managers then use
TDC and CATS to determine the resource requirements and the means available to design a
training program to meet the commander’s intent. This approach effectively reverses the way
most people view training management. It also places responsibility and accountability for the
preparation of Soldiers and units where it belongs, with the commander (see Chapter 3; Appendix
C).

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Trying to manage training by accounting for all the individual tasks that need to be trained to
enable the collective tasks that are essential to mission tasks is too often a frustrating exercise.
Combat experienced leaders do not want to design training by task selection because missions are
not a series of tasks executed in some sequence and success does not always depend upon exact
execution of performance measures. Soldiers do not want to train to perform tasks, they want to
be capable and accomplish the mission. As an Army, we train Soldiers to fight and win the
nation’s wars or to be successful in any activity charged to complete. Training and education that
prepares Soldiers who are confident and will take initiative and not solely conditioned to respond
to particular situations will certainly prove more resilient in more occasions. They will be
responsible to others, be accountable for their actions, and not overwhelmed when faced with a
new or unexpected situation (see Chapter 3). Perhaps, instead of trying to develop an allencompassing listing of tasks designed to prepare forces for “anything” there is a better way to
state what results training should produce. The METL can be used to assure a level of proficiency
in core competency tasks because they may be required. Without exception, though, training
guidance should stipulate that Soldiers have the capacity to adapt to any circumstance without
loss of capability. Then leave it to commanders to develop a plan to accomplish this based on
their own units’ conditions and situation.
15.3 Conclusion
The Army will always go to war, or support operations, with what it has, as it is. That is why
flexibility, adaptability and mental agility are highly valued traits. Many of the recent demands
that the Army increase its ability to adapt are somewhat short sighted. From a broader
perspective, seeking only to promote adaptability will establish unnecessary limits for what could
and should be a much more ambitious goal. Adaptability alone suggests reaction to events that
have already occurred, useful to a point. It would be far better to develop Soldiers and leaders
with enough training, education and experience to be able to anticipate, and be ready for what
might come next. This seems to be the real essence of our operational imperative to seize, retain
and exploit initiative in any military operation.
As the Army seeks ways to achieve balance, especially in sustainment of core competencies
while maintaining current operational requirements, there will be arguments for and against
objectives at each end of the balance beam. The ALDS, enabled by implementing OBTE
principles, can serve as a counterpoise that makes the arguments about training versus education
lose power.
The training “system” needs a radical course correction without delay. Elements of radical change
thread throughout both the ALDS and the observations of OBTE. Fundamentally, the Army can
no longer think in terms of training the force. In the past we could train the force to fight and
prevail in a war. Today we must prepare for anything. That preparation demands that we develop
Soldiers of character, imbued with the warrior ethos and empowered with a service ethic (see
Chapter 3 and Epilogue). Such development is not the sole province of schools and centers, nor is
it left to unit leadership. It is an all-encompassing task. The time for arguments about what should
be training and what should be education is behind us. Similarly, the notion that we train Soldiers
and develop leaders is short sighted. All Soldiers are potential future leaders and they are equally
deserving of development.
An inescapable reality is that any new solution must be unequivocal on training resources and
time. We cannot ask for more. Leaders will be compelled to find ways to do more with less, an
unfortunate and impractical oxymoron. Rather than doing more with less, it will be better for the
Army when leaders with the moral certitude are encouraged, supported and rewarded to do less,

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better. Examples of such leadership will diminish systemic resistance and encourage support for
such a change (see Chapter 14).
Soldiers and leaders require training, education and experiences that prepare them to be
successful in the uncertainties and ambiguities of operating in and across the full spectrum of
operations. The training should provide opportunities for mastery of fundamental and essential
skills. The education should provide opportunities to relate those skills to myriad possibilities of
threats and challenges. Experience should provide opportunities to translate information into
knowledge of human dynamics, materiel shortcomings, and the vagaries of translating decision to
action in time and space (see Chapter 5). When using the principles of OBTE to analyze, design,
develop and execute development of Soldiers, all these things occur.
Whether applied to unit pre-deployment training, or training in the institutional domain, there is
enough evidence of the results of OBTE to state that the benefits are real. Leaders gain
confidence in their units, Soldiers gain confidence in themselves. Soldiers are more confident
because:
• Having done something with what they learn, they know what they can do
• They are practiced in solving relevant problems, tactical and otherwise
• They know what they must learn
• They understand the value and utility of initiative
• They become accountable for their own performance and as part of a team
Ultimately, this is why we are compelled to transform Army training to the broader requirements
of preparation and development. Our Soldiers, trained, educated and experienced, can be ready
for anything. They provide America an unmatchable asymmetric advantage. Even though our
technology continues to outpace both allies and potential adversaries, technology alone will never
be enough to assure operational dominance. Outcomes Based Training and Education, linked with
the Army Leader Development Strategy is the new thinking needed to produce those highly
competent individuals and teams.
15.4 References
Defense Science Board Task Force (2003). Training for future conflicts. Washington, DC: Office
of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
Fastabend, D., & Simpson, R. (2004). The imperative for a culture of innovation in the U.S.
Army: Adapt or die. Army Magazine, 54(2). Retrieved January 2010 from
http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCSBU
Headquarters Department of the Army (2002). Training the Force. (Revised 2008, Training for
Full Spectrum Operations). Field Manual No. 7-0. Washington, DC: Headquarters
Department of the Army.
Headquarters Department of the Army (2009). Army training and leader development. Army
Regulation No. 350-1. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army.
Quinkert, K., Morrison, J., Fletcher, J., Moses, F. & Roberts, E. (2007). The Army Science of
Learning Workshop (RN 2007-02). Washington, DC: Army Research Institute for Behavioral
and Social Sciences.
Perry, R. & McEnery, K. (2009). Army reconnaissance course: Defining the aim point for
reconnaissance leader training. Armor, July-August, 14-20.
Salmoni, B. (2008). Pedagogy for the long war: Teaching irregular warfare. Quantico, VA: U.S.
Marine Corps Training and Education Command.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
.

page
Prologue: A Programmatic View of the Inquiry into Outcomes-Based Training & Education.......1

Historicity of our Research on OBTE ..........................................................................................1

The Approach and Lessons Learned from the Research..............................................................3

Documentation of the Research ...................................................................................................4

Section I. Development of Stakeholder Requirements for OBTE..............................................6

Chapter 1. Preparation for Full Spectrum Operations ......................................................................7

1.1 Requirements of Full Spectrum Operations ...........................................................................8

1.2 Outcomes-Based Training and Education (OBTE)..............................................................10

1.2.1 Exemplar of OBTE: Combat Applications Training Course........................................11

1.2.2 OBTE as a Multifaceted Instructional System .............................................................12

1.3 An Appraisal of Instruction with Respect to OBTE ............................................................13

1.3.1 A Systems Engineering Framework for Integration and Development of OBTE ........13

1.3.2 Preparation for Validation and Verification .................................................................14

1.4 References ............................................................................................................................17

Chapter 2. Formative Measures for Instructors ..............................................................................20

2.1 Development of Formative Measures ..................................................................................20

2.1.1 The COMPASS Methodology ......................................................................................20

2.1.2 Development of Measures for OBTE ...........................................................................21

2.2 Description of Formative Measures .....................................................................................21

2.2.1 Results of the COMPASS Process................................................................................21

2.2.2 Elaboration on the Description of Measures.................................................................23

2.3 OBTE Performance Measures: Planning for Training.........................................................23

2.3.1 Define Outcomes ..........................................................................................................23

2.3.2 Create a Positive Learning Environment ......................................................................25

2.3.3 Create the Parameters of Learning................................................................................27

2.4 OBTE Performance Indicators: Training Execution............................................................28

2.4.1 Communicate the Parameters of Learning....................................................................28

2.4.2 Training Emphasizes Broad Combat or Mission Success ............................................29

2.4.3 Customize Instruction When Possible Based on Constraints/Conditions ....................31

2.4.4 Facilitates Learning of Concepts ..................................................................................32

2.4.5 Creates a positive learning environment.......................................................................34

2.4.6 Instructors Utilize Measures of Effectiveness & Self-Evaluation ................................36

2.4.7 Uses scenarios to facilitate learning..............................................................................38

2.4.8 Instructors exhibit intangible attributes in own actions ................................................40

2.4.9 Hotwashes and Mini-AAR............................................................................................42

2.5 Uses of the Measures ...........................................................................................................43

2.5.1 Formative Measures for Instructors ..............................................................................44

2.5.2 Quality Assurance and Instructor Education ................................................................44

2.5.3 Continuous Improvement of Assessments....................................................................45

2.5.4 Program Evaluation and Organizational Change..........................................................46

2.6 References ............................................................................................................................46


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Chapter 3. Principles and Practices of Outcomes Based Training & Education............................50

3.1 Multifaceted Inquiry.............................................................................................................50

3.1.1 Interaction with Progenitors of OBTE..........................................................................51

3.1.2 AWG Documents on OBTE .........................................................................................52

3.1.3 Collaborative Reflection on Participant Observation in CATC ...................................52

3.1.4 Interaction with Stakeholders .......................................................................................53

3.2 Essential Characteristics of OBTE.......................................................................................53

3.2.1 The Meaning of Developmental is a Critical Difference..............................................53

3.2.2 The Definition of Outcomes is a Critical Difference....................................................56

3.2.3 The Emphasis on Values and Causally Potent Intangibles is a Critical Difference .....58

3.2.4 The Meaning of Experience is a Critical Difference ....................................................61

3.2.5 The Emphasis on Instructor-Student Interactions is a Critical Difference ...................62

3.2.6 The Emphasis on Learning to Learn is a Critical Difference .......................................63

3.2.7 The Emphasis on Collaborative Design and Development is a Critical Difference.....65

3.3 Toward a Grounded Theory for OBTE ................................................................................66

3.3.1 Need for an Integrated Interdisciplinary Framework ...................................................66

3.3.2 Formative Measures of Instructor Behavior as Evolving Best Practices of OBTE......67

3.4 Emerging Best Practices in OBTE for a Community-Centered Environment.....................68

3.4.1 Leadership and Enculturation of Soldiers.....................................................................68

3.4.2 Robust and Adaptable Plan...........................................................................................70

3.4.3 Instructors as Role Models ...........................................................................................70

3.4.4 Collaborative Identification of Outcomes and Measures .............................................71

3.5 Emerging Best Practices in OBTE for a Knowledge-Centered Environment .....................71

3.5.1 Integrated Understanding of Basic Soldier Skills in Full Spectrum Operations ..........72

3.5.2 Task Relevance of Planned Instructional Events..........................................................72

3.5.3 Reveal Operational Relevance of Training...................................................................73

3.5.4 Incorporate Stress into Instructional Events .................................................................73

3.5.5 Identify General Lessons Learned and Extrapolate to New Situations ........................74

3.6 Emerging Best Practices in OBTE for an Assessment-Centered Environment ...................74

3.6.1 Collaborative Reflection and Problem Solving ............................................................75

3.6.2 Communication.............................................................................................................75

3.6.3 Nature and Extent of Guidance.....................................................................................76

3.6.4 Establish a Pervasive Mindset of Collaborative Reflection..........................................76

3.7 Emerging Best Practices in OBTE for a Learner-Centered Environment ...........................77

3.7.1 Soldier Motivation and Development of Intangibles....................................................77

3.7.2 Plan for Development of the Individual .......................................................................78

3.7.3 Get Students to Take Ownership ..................................................................................78

3.7.4 Collaborative Reflection as a Means to Develop Self Efficacy....................................79

3.8 References ............................................................................................................................79

Chapter 4. Grounded Theory for Values-Based Training & Education .........................................86

4.1 Exploration of Holistic and Functionalistic Underpinnings for OBTE ...............................86

4.1.1 Fundamental Units of Analysis.....................................................................................87

4.1.2 Nested Time Scales and Adaptability ...........................................................................88

4.1.3 Adaptability and Ambiguity .........................................................................................90

4.1.4 Mechanistic Analogies and Predominant Experimental Paradigms .............................92

4.2 Three Pillars for the Scientific Foundation of OBTE ..........................................................93

4.2.1 Ecological Psychology..................................................................................................93

4.2.2 Self-Efficacy Theory.....................................................................................................97

4.2.3 Positive psychology ......................................................................................................98

4.3 A More Integrated Scientific Infrastructure .......................................................................101

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4.3.1 Self Determination Theory .........................................................................................101

4.3.2 Situated Learning Theory ...........................................................................................103

4.3.3 Existential Psychology................................................................................................105

4.4 Building on the Scientific Infrastructure for OBTE...........................................................109

4.4.1 Triadic Frameworks ....................................................................................................109

4.4.2 Further Development ..................................................................................................112

4.5 References ..........................................................................................................................112


Chapter 5. Passion and Reason in Values-Based Learning & Development ...............................118

5.1 The Nested Self ..................................................................................................................118

5.1.1 An Alternative to Individual versus Collective ..........................................................118

5.1.2 Cognition and Reality .................................................................................................119

5.2 Conscious Experience and the Dynamics of Thinking ......................................................122

5.3 Emotion, Information, and Engagement ............................................................................125

5.3.1 Ecological Perspective on Emotion ............................................................................125

5.3.2 Emotion as Engagement .............................................................................................126

5.3.3 Implications for Training and Education ....................................................................129

5.4 Emotion, Decision-Making, and Inter-Temporal Choice...................................................129

5.4.1 Toward a More Integrated Theory..............................................................................129

5.4.2 Emotion and Decision-Making ...................................................................................130

5.4.3 Emotion and Nested Time Scales ...............................................................................131

5.4.4 Neuroeconomics and Inter-Temporal Reasoning .......................................................132

5.5.5 Inter-Temporal Reasoning and Adaptive Dynamical Systems...................................133

5.5 Beyond Science ..................................................................................................................134

5.5.1 Existentialism..............................................................................................................134

5.5.2 The Soldier-Scholar as an Emergent Property of a Collective Pursuit.......................135

5.6 References ..........................................................................................................................137

Section II. Verification and Validation of OBTE as a Service System ..................................142

Chapter 6. Initial Impressions of Participation in CATC .............................................................143

6.1 Methods..............................................................................................................................143

6.1.1 Participants..................................................................................................................143

6.1.2 Procedure ....................................................................................................................143

6.1.3 Analyses......................................................................................................................144

6.2 Results ................................................................................................................................144

6.3 Implications for Service System Development: Peer Review ...........................................146

6.4 References ..........................................................................................................................147

Chapter 7. Local Development of Measures of Effectiveness .....................................................149

7.1 What do Instructors Believe Soldiers Should Learn in Initial Entry Training? .................149

7.2 Measure Development Process ..........................................................................................150

7.3 What do OBTE-Trained DS Believe is Important to Assess in BRM/ARM? ...................151

7.4 Implications........................................................................................................................156

7.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................158

7.6 References ..........................................................................................................................159


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Chapter 8. Observations of Behavior and Communication in Rifle Marksmanship Training .....160

8.1 Methods..............................................................................................................................160

8.1.1 Participants..................................................................................................................160

8.1.2 Procedure ....................................................................................................................160

8.1.3 Analyses......................................................................................................................161

8.2 Results ................................................................................................................................163

8.2.1 Behavior of DS ...........................................................................................................163

8.2.2 Behavior and Performance of Privates .......................................................................165

8.2.3 Patterns of Communication ........................................................................................168

8.2.4 Potential Influence of Instructor Behavior on Performance of Privates .....................170

8.3 Implications for Service System Development..................................................................171

8.3.1 Verification of OBTE .................................................................................................171

8.3.2 Validation of OBTE....................................................................................................172

8.4 References ..........................................................................................................................173

Chapter 9. Impact on Rifle Marksmanship Training....................................................................174

9.1 Behavioral Data Collection During Basic Rifle Marksmanship ........................................174

9.1.1 Method ........................................................................................................................174

9.1.2 Assessment..................................................................................................................175

9.1.3 Results – An Overview ...............................................................................................177

9.1.4 Evidence for Influence of OBTE ................................................................................178

9.1.5 Behavior of Drill Sergeants after Exposure to OBTE ................................................180

9.1.6 Behavior of Privates....................................................................................................182

9.1.7 Patterns of Communication ........................................................................................186

9.1.8 Summary .....................................................................................................................186

9.2 Attitudes Toward an OBTE in Basic Training...................................................................187

9.2.1 Method ........................................................................................................................187

9.2.2 Results.........................................................................................................................187

9.4 References ..........................................................................................................................191

Chapter 10. Influence of CATC in an Operational Setting ..........................................................192

10.1 Methods............................................................................................................................192

10.1.1 Participants................................................................................................................192

10.1.2 Procedure ..................................................................................................................192

10.1.3 Analyses....................................................................................................................193

10.2 Results ..............................................................................................................................193

10.2.1 Downstream Impact on Marksmanship ....................................................................193

10.2.2 Downstream Impact on Training in the Units ..........................................................194

10.2.3 Downstream Impact on Self Efficacy .......................................................................195

10.3 Implications for Service System Development: Validation.............................................196

10.4 References ........................................................................................................................197

Chapter 11. Implications for Service System Development.........................................................198

11.1 Lessons Learned about Transfer of OBTE.......................................................................198

11.2 Implications for Service System Development................................................................199

11.2.1 Further Development and Analysis of Stakeholder Requirements for OBTE..........199

11.2.2 Further Development of OBTE as a Service System ...............................................199

11.2.3 Further Verification and Validation of OBTE ..........................................................201

11.3 References ........................................................................................................................203


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Section III. Further Development of OBTE as a Service System ..........................................206

Chapter 12. Development of General Measures for Students ......................................................207

12.1 Intent ................................................................................................................................207

12.2 Performance Measure Development Process...................................................................207

12.2.1 Phase One: Define Performance Indicators (PI).......................................................207

12.2.2 Phase Two: Translate PI into performance measures ...............................................208

12.2.3 Phase Three: Measure refinement.............................................................................208

12.2.4 Phase Four: Retranslation of Measures ....................................................................208

12.3 Product of Measure Development....................................................................................209

12.3.1 Learner Perception of the Instructor and Course ......................................................209

12.3.2 Learner Engagement .................................................................................................211

12.3.3 Student Relationship with Teacher ...........................................................................212

12.3.4 Student Results .........................................................................................................214

12.3.5 Self-Report Measures ...............................................................................................216

12.4 Conclusion........................................................................................................................217

12.5 References ........................................................................................................................217

Chapter 13. Adapting OBTE in a Classroom Environment .........................................................219

13.1 Intent ................................................................................................................................219

13.2 Observing OBTE in the Classroom Environment............................................................219

13.2.1. Participants...............................................................................................................219

13.2.2. Procedure .................................................................................................................220

13.2.3. Measures ..................................................................................................................220

13.3 Utility of OBTE Measures in a Classroom Environment ................................................220

13.3.1 Generality of Measures .............................................................................................220

13.3.2. Implications for Improvement of Measures.............................................................221

13.3.3 Implications for improvement of course design .......................................................222

13.4 Use of 360° Reviews for Collaborative Reflection..........................................................223

13.4.1 The Role of a 360° Review in OBTE .......................................................................223

13.4.2 Narrative of a Participant Observer ..........................................................................225

13.5 Learning, cognitive load and motivation..........................................................................228

13.5.1 The NASA Task Load Index as a subjective measure of student workload.............228

13.5.2 Results.......................................................................................................................229

13.5.3 Implications ..............................................................................................................230

13.6 Conclusions ......................................................................................................................230

13.7 References ........................................................................................................................231

Chapter 14. Organizational Climate and Creation of Durable Change ........................................233

14.1 The Need ..........................................................................................................................233

14.2 Initial Indications of Possible Resistance to Change .......................................................234

14.3 Models and Considerations for Sustainable Change........................................................235

14.3.1 The Change Transition Period ..................................................................................235

14.3.2 Organizational Culture..............................................................................................237

14.3.3 Clarity of Mission and Shared Understanding..........................................................237

14.3.4 Relevant Observations During the Current Investigation.........................................238

14.3.5 Organizational Support and Incentives.....................................................................238

14.4 Conclusions ......................................................................................................................239

14.5 References ........................................................................................................................239


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Chapter 15. Five ways OBTE can enable the Army Leader Development Strategy....................242

15.1 Background ......................................................................................................................242

15.2 An Emerging Consensus ..................................................................................................244

15.2.1 What Part to Balance?...............................................................................................244

15.2.2 Improving Training, by Design ................................................................................245

15.2.3 Increased Use of dL and Dependence on Self-Development ...................................246

15.2.4 Future Orientation, Unknown Requirements............................................................247

15.2.5 The Quality Instructor Challenge .............................................................................247

15.2.6 Purpose and Design are Key .....................................................................................248

15.2.7 A Natural Advantage ................................................................................................249

15.2.8 Task Specialization or Generalized Competency .....................................................249

15.3 Conclusion........................................................................................................................251

15.4 References ........................................................................................................................252

Epilogue. Integration of Leader Development, Education, Training, and Self-Development .....254

Toward Values-Based Standards for Army Doctrinal Requirements ......................................254

Nested Standards and Quality Assurance.................................................................................256

Needs and Opportunities for Staff & Faculty Development ....................................................259

A Role for Science and Measurement .................................................................................259

Toward Best Practices in Instructor Education....................................................................260

Critical Considerations for Further Scientific Investigation ....................................................263

The Necessity of Long-Term Studies ..................................................................................263

False Dichotomy of Objective-Subjective ...........................................................................264

Clarity About What Is Evaluated.........................................................................................265

Next Steps ............................................................................................................................266

References ................................................................................................................................268

Section IV. Appendices...............................................................................................................270

Appendix A. OBTE Principles & Practices: Instructor Measures................................................271

A.1 Genesis of Formative Measures for Instructors ................................................................271

A.2 Principles of Outcomes-Based Training & Education ......................................................272

A.3 Guide to Using Measures of Instructor Behavior..............................................................276

A.4 Complete Menu of Instructor Measures............................................................................279

Appendix B. OBTE Principles & Practices: Student Measures ...................................................318

B.1 Guide to Using Measures of Student Behavior .................................................................318

B.2 Complete Menu of Student Measures ...............................................................................319

Appendix C: A Commander’s View of Outcomes-Based Training and Education .....................340

Summary ..................................................................................................................................340

Definition .............................................................................................................................340

Description...........................................................................................................................340

Elements of OBTE. ..................................................................................................................341

Developing the Outcomes....................................................................................................341

Developing the Training Plan ..............................................................................................341

Conducting Training ............................................................................................................342

How Training is Assessed....................................................................................................344

Conclusion................................................................................................................................344


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Appendix D: Warrior Ethos..........................................................................................................345

Analysis of the Concept and Initial Development of Applications..........................................345

Current Understanding of Warrior Ethos.............................................................................345

Purpose.................................................................................................................................348

Approach..............................................................................................................................348

Expansion of the Definition of Warrior Ethos.....................................................................348

The Tenets of Warrior Ethos ...............................................................................................349

Clarifying the Definition of Warrior Ethos..........................................................................351

Warrior Attributes Derived from the Tenets of Warrior Ethos ...........................................353

References ................................................................................................................................355

Supplementary Work Product from Warrior Ethos Project .....................................................355

Appendix E: Indicators of Warrior Ethos.....................................................................................356

Methods....................................................................................................................................356

Participants...........................................................................................................................356

Instruments and Facilities ....................................................................................................356

Procedure .............................................................................................................................356

Results ......................................................................................................................................358

Qualitative Findings.............................................................................................................358

Quantitative Findings...........................................................................................................358

Discussion ................................................................................................................................359


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Evolution  of  the  investigation  as  reflected  in  the  chapters  of  this  monograph.