Summary: Turkey realizes that

the Russia-Ukraine crisis has

to be dealt with through the
involvement of the major powers,
and it is acting accordingly.
Turkey has warned against
the domino effects of the
Crimean crisis, refecting its
deep fears that the crisis might
infame other frozen conficts
in the region. Though objecting
to the Russian annexation of
Crimea, Turkey has stopped
short of actions that may lead to
severing of the political ties, and
it is realistic to expect the same
approach to continue to prevail.
However, Turkey will not simply
appease the Russian moves.
Rather, it will seek to work out
its differences through bilateral
channels.
Analysis
The Russia-Ukraine Crisis: Preliminary
Refections on Turkeys Policy
by aban Karda
June 6, 2014
Washington, DC Berlin Paris
Brussels Belgrade Ankara
Bucharest Warsaw Tunis
OF F I C E S
Analysis
Introduction
Te unfolding crisis sparked by
Russias annexation of Crimea has
raised many questions. Participants
at the GMFs ninth Trilateral Strategy
Group, held in Washington on May
18-20, debated some of them: What
drives the behavior of Russian elites?
Can the West contain the resurgent
Russia? Have we just entered a new
Cold War or returned to the 19
th

century geopolitics? How can the
Europeans bolster their energy secu-
rity in the wake of this crisis? Te
answers were preliminary at best, and
the discussions gave way to new ques-
tions. Turkey ofen fgured in those
discussions, but its policy needs to be
understood properly.
As viewed from Ankara, the current
crisis is essentially one that is
unfolding at the international level,
reminding one of a critical argu-
ment ofen stated by Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutolu: the structure of the
post-Cold War international order has
yet to be defned. Notwithstanding
its aspirations for regional leader-
ship and quest for proactive foreign
policy, Turkey realizes that the Russia-
Ukraine crisis has to be dealt with
through the involvement of the major
powers, and it is acting accordingly.
Moreover, the outbreak of the crisis
also has been attributed largely to
the international communitys failure
to bring resolution to the confict in
Syria. Tis inability and the failure to
punish the regimes violation of various
international norms is believed to have
given Russia the wrong signals that led
to its moves toward Ukraine. As such,
the crisis has added further credence
to Turkeys recent criticism of the UN
collective security system on the basis
of its inadequate confict resolution
mechanisms to address regional crises.
To the extent that it afects Turkeys
immediate interests, in other words,
the Ukraine crisis stems largely from
a leadership void and the incomplete
post-Soviet transformation, which
lef many potential crisis spots in the
region. For its part, Turkey has for
long been sensitive to those frozen
conficts, which have remained an
element of instability in its neighbor-
hood to the north, around the Black
Sea and the Caucasus. Turkey has
warned against the domino efects
of the Crimean crisis, refecting its
deep fears that the crisis might infame
other frozen conficts in the region,
most notably in Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, or lead
to the emergence of new potential fash
Analysis
2
Analysis
points. Just as was the case in the 2008 Russian-Georgian
war, consequently, Turkey has had many reasons to avoid
a vocal criticism of Russia, formulate its policy within the
broader transatlantic framework, and, where necessary,
convey its concerns to Russia through bilateral mechanisms.
Constraints on Turkey
As much as it is troubled by the steps undertaken by a
resurgent Russia, Turkey has walked and will continue to
walk a very fne line. Most remarkably, though objecting
to the Russian annexation of Crimea, Turkey has stopped
short of actions that may lead to severing of the political
ties, and it is realistic to expect the same approach to
continue to prevail.
First, Turkey has refrained from challenging Russia directly
because it is inclined to be cautious and risk-averse in vola-
tile situations; this is indeed an essential feature of Turkeys
security culture. In the current crisis, this caution trans-
lates into Ankaras rational calculation and recognition of
limits to its power. Te government realizes that in a crisis
involving Russia as the chief culprit, as a regional actor,
Turkey alone will have limited instruments at its disposal;
the crisis frst and foremost will be within the purview of
international actors, most notably the United States and the
EU. Te trajectory of the crisis so far has laid it bare that the
issue of Ukraine has been mismanaged for a long time, and
the United States will fnd it difcult to mobilize a coalition
against Russia or issue credible commitments to Ukraine
and other actors feeling threatened by Russia. Nor have the
Europeans, whose miscalculations were seen as one of the
instigating factors of the current crisis, developed a cred-
ible response to Moscow. Overall, the sanctions felded by
the United States and EU have been viewed as inefective to
address the root causes of the current crisis. In this environ-
ment, Ankara will be further inclined to maintain caution,
lest it is drawn into an unwarranted bilateral confrontation.
Second, Russia is Turkeys major supplier of natural gas
and oil, which will be difcult to replace in the short term.
Overall, Russia has acted as a reliable partner, and even at
times of heightened political tensions has not threatened
openly to use energy as a weapon. Nonetheless, given its
current level of dependence, which is higher than that of
many European countries, Ankara cannot invite a bilateral
crisis with Moscow that may eventually harm its energy
security. As it did in the previous instances of divergence,
even in the case of their disagreements over Syria, Turkey
will continue to separate this crisis from the broader stra-
tegic relations with Russia.
Tird, beyond energy, however, Turkey sees itself in a
complex interdependent relationship with Russia that has
been forged around multiple issues. Te bilateral trade
volume, mutual investments, tourism, partnership in
energy, and the need for cooperation on various issues in
the shared neighborhoods ranging from the Balkans to
Central Asia inextricably tie them together. Ankara again
has every reason to act with caution when it comes to
joining sanctions against the country that is its number
two trading partner and whose cooperation is essential in
neighborhood issues. Turkey, in particular, is careful not
to undermine the relative stability in the Black Sea formed
around the Montreux Convention.
Fourth, Turkey continues to warn against a return to the
Cold War mentality of polarization and the drawing of new
lines of division. Tis is understandable, given that in the
post-Cold War era, Turkey has worked hard to avoid being
stuck between the West and Russia. Given Turkeys recent
search for multi-dimensionality and market diversifca-
tion strategy, it will further distance itself from a coercive
approach that intends to isolate Russia. Turkish leadership
The crisis so far has laid it bare
that the issue of Ukraine has
been mismanaged for a long time,
and the United States will fnd
it diffcult to mobilize a coalition
against Russia or issue credible
commitments to Ukraine and
other actors feeling threatened by
Russia.
Analysis
3
Analysis
has continuously argued that their country is part of Europe
and Asia simultaneously and needs to maintain a balanced
relationship with both. It was largely for these reasons that
they sought both membership in the European Union
and closer ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion, which occasionally sparked intense debate among
observers. As Davutolu emphasized in the initial weeks of
the crisis, Turkey still subscribes to the same multi-regional
perspective, whereby since it will continue to live with
Russia in the shared neighborhoods in Asia, it will work
to sustain its economic and political ties. Such thinking is
shared by Turkish business interests as well, which continue
to express enthusiasm for cooperation with Russia in
various projects.
Lastly, Turkey has worked diligently to revitalize the Tatar
presence in Crimea by assisting their return to the historic
homeland. Trough the work of Turkish Cooperation and
Coordination Agency (TIKA) and other channels, Turkey
has invested heavily in the Tatars well-being and regaining
of status on the peninsula. Although Turkey, along with the
Tatar leadership, has underscored the territorial integrity
of Ukraine, it also realizes that any miscalculations may
have unwanted repercussions for the Tatars cause, undoing
their gains. Te protection of the Tatars rights and status
also motivates Turkey to act with self-restraint and leave the
doors open to political dialogue with Russia.
Turkeys Room to Maneuver
Tis, however, does not suggest that Turkey will simply
appease the Russian moves. Indeed, when it has a solid
argument, Ankara can go to great lengths to defend it, as
was the case with forcing the landing of the Russian airliner
carrying military equipment to the Syrian regime. In the
current crisis, Turkey has repeatedly underscored that
it recognizes Ukraines territorial integrity, and perhaps
it will maintain its position on Crimea in the realm of
international law. At the same time, it has demonstrated
willingness to use all its leverage within the limits of the
Montreux Convention. For instance, Turkey openly refuted
the claims coming from Russian ofcials when they tried to
spread confusing messages about Ankaras adherence to the
convention as regards the presence of non-littoral ships in
the Black Sea. As a result of Turkeys determined reaction,
Russian ofcials stepped back from their charges regarding
U.S. warships.
Second, Turkey, like other Western countries, will under-
take steps to bolster its position in the longer term. Te
projects intended for the diversifcation of energy supplies,
a process that is already under way, might receive a renewed
push from the current crisis. Tere may now be new
urgency to the energy projects in Iraq or Eastern Mediter-
ranean, which may also force a rethinking of the Turkish
position on the political disputes underpinning them. To
the extent that the European actors could demonstrate some
strategic action toward the realization of supply diversifca-
tion projects, the chances for enhanced Turkish-European
strategic partnership will be increased.
Tird, Turkey will coordinate its policy with that of its
transatlantic partners, and will go along with measures initi-
ated by the NATO mechanisms, though they may signify
the lowest common denominator. Turkeys contribution
to the OSCEs mission in Ukraine, where former Turkish
diplomat Erturul Apakan is heading the mission, bodes
well for its transatlantic approach to the crisis through the
utilization of cooperative security instruments. For its part,
Russia might also be recognizing that Turkey will adhere
to the collective decisions of such transatlantic institutions,
and that it cannot challenge Turkeys actions within those
platforms.
Beyond that, Ankara will be unlikely to subscribe to the
unilateral sanctions imposed by some Western countries.
Nor will Turkey raise its concerns about Russian actions in
international fora. Rather, it will seek to work out its difer-
ences through the bilateral channels of strategic dialogue it
has forged meticulously over recent years, and also take care
to not undermine them in this process. Davutolus visit
to Moscow on May 27, 2014, as part of the consultations
This, however, does not suggest
that Turkey will simply appease the
Russian moves. Indeed, when it
has a solid argument, Ankara can
go to great lengths to defend it.
Analysis
4
Analysis
About the Author
Dr. aban Karda is an associate professor of international relations
and is the department chair at the Department of International Rela-
tions at TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara.
He is also the president of the Ankara-based think-tank, ORSAM.
About GMF
Te German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by
supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic
sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business
communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic
topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed
commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-proft organization through a gif from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Tunis. GMF
also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.
About the On Turkey Series
GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkeys
current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular
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and intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground
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www.gmfus.org/turkey.
for the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council summit
meeting later this year demonstrated once again that
Ankara will work to preserve and deepen its strategic coop-
eration with Moscow, a move that has been reciprocated.