Electronically Filed 10/17/2013 12:13:18 PM ET

RECEIVED, 10/17/2013 12:13:44, Thomas D. Hall, Clerk, Supreme Court

INTHESUPREMECOURTOFAPPEALOFFLORIDA
CASENO.:SC13-1080
L.T.NO.:4D10-4237
RONALDWILLIAMS,
Appellant,
v.
STATEOFFLORIDA,
Appellee.
APPELLANTSINITIALBRIEF
ONAPPEALFROMANAPPEALAFFIRMINGTHEFINALJUDGMENT
OFCONVICTIONANDSENTENCEFROMTHEFOURTHDISTRICT
COURTOFAPPEAL
RICHARDG.LUBIN,P.A.
SecondFloor,FlaglerPlaza
1217S.FlaglerDrive
WestPalmBeach,FL33401
Telephone:(561)655-2040
Facsimile: (561)655-2182
CounselforAppellant,
RONALDWILLIAMS
CERTIFICATEOFINTERESTEDPERSONS
Thefollowingpersonsmayhaveaninterestinthiscase:
RonaldWilliams,Appellant
JonathanR.Kaplan,CounselforAppellant
EdwinFerguson,TrialCounselforAppellant
AletheaMcRoberts,AssistantStateAttorney
ChristopherKeeler,AssistantStateAttorney
DavidAronberg,StateAttorney
HonorableJosephMarx,CircuitCourtJudge
MitchellEgber,AssistantAttorneyGeneral
FourthDistrictCourtJudges:Gerber,C.J.May,Warner,Polen,
Stevenson,Gross,Taylor,Conner,Damoorgian,Ciklin,andLevine
i

TABLEOFCONTENTS
CERTIFICATEOFINTERESTEDPERSONS..................... i
TABLEOFCONTENTS...................................... ii
TABLEOFAUTHORITIES................................... iii-iv
PRELIMINARYSTATEMENT................................ v
REQUESTFORORALARGUMENT........................................................... 1
JURISDICTION............................................................................................. 1
STANDARDOFREVIEW........................................................................ 1
STATEMENTOFTHECASE................................. 1- 2
STATEMENTOFTHEFACTS................................ 3- 6
SUMMARYOFTHEARGUMENT............................ 5
ARGUMENT .............................................. 6
POINTI................................................... 7-17
StatutoryLanguageofSection775.087(2)(d),thatTheCourt
Shall Impose Any Term Of Imprisonment Provided For In
This Subsection Consecutively to any Other Term Of
Imprisonment Imposed For Any Other Felony Offense is
Ambiguous Requiring Court to Look at Legislative Intent,
WhichDoesNotProhibitConcurrentSentencesArisingFrom
OneCriminalEpisode.
CONCLUSION................................................ 17
CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE................................... 17
CERTIFICATEOFCOMPLIANCE............................... 18
ii

TABLEOFAUTHORITIES
CASES
Arutyunyan v. State,863So.2d(Fla.4thDCA2003) 14
Bautista v. State,863So.2d1180(Fla2003) 13
Christian, v. State 692So.2d889(Fla.1997) 10
Gomez v. Vill of Pinecrest,41So.3d180(Fla.2010) 13,14
Hargrove v. State 905So.2d275(Fla.2dDCA2005) 15
Johnson v. State,78So.3d101(Fla.2012) 1
Larimore v. State,2So.3d101(Fla.2008) 13
Modesir v. State 814So.2d1172(Fla.3rdDCA2002) 12
Scott v. State 42So.2d923(Fla.2nDCA2010) 7,9,10,15
Sousa v. State 903So.2d927(Fla.2005) 10-12,14-16
Walton v. State, 106So.3d522(Fla1
st
DCA2013) 14,15
Williams v. State,2073WL1748687,So.3d(Fla4
th
DCA2013) 1,2,10,11
Velez v. Miami-Dade County Police Dept,934So.2d1162 14
(Fla.2006)
STATUTES
775.087(2)(d),Fla.Stat. 1-3,5-9,10-13,15
775.087(2)(a)(c)&(d),Fla.Stat.(2007) 8
iii
RULES
Rule3.800(b)(2)Fla.R.Crim.P. 3
Rule9.020(h)Fla.R.App.P. 1
Rule9.030(a)(2)(A)(v)Fla.R.App.P. 1
OTHERAUTHORITIES
CS/CS/HB113(SB194) 15
iv

PRELIMINARYSTATEMENT
Thefollowingsymbols,abbreviationsandreferenceswillbeutilizedthroughout
thisInitialBriefofAppellant,RonaldWilliams:
The term "Appellant" shall refer to the Defendant, Ronald Williams, in the
DistrictCourtbelow. Theterm"Appellee"shallrefertothePlaintiff,theStateof
Florida, in the District Court below. The Record on Appeal in this case contains
pleadingsandtranscriptsfromthetrialcourt.Therecordonappealconsistedofa
totalofsixvolumeswhichincludedthepleadings,trialandsentencingtranscripts,
evidence log and a one volume supplement. Citations to the pleadings and trial
exhibitsarecontainedinvolumes1and2oftherecord. Thoseportionsoftherecord
shall be referred by Volume number and page. (i.e., V-1, p.33) The trial and
sentencingtranscriptscontainedintheRecordonAppealshallbereferredtoas(R)
followedbytheappropriatepagenumber.Referencetothesupplementalrecordwill
becitedasSRfollowedbytheappropriatepagenumber.
v

REQUESTFORORALARGUMENT
Appellant,RONALDWILLIAMS,hasbeensentencedto80yearsinprison.
Giventhegravityofthesentence,thecomplexityoftheissueraisedhereandtheon-
goingcontroversyamongstthedistrictcourtswiththestatutorylanguageinsection
775.087(2)(d),Mr.Williams,throughundersignedcounselrespectfullyrequeststhis
CourttograntOralArgument.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to Rule 9.020(h) & 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v),
Fla.R.App.P.,discretionaryjurisdictionoftheSupremeCourttoreviewthedecisions
oftheFourthDistrictCourtofAppealrenderedonApril24,2013.Thedecisionis
withintheSupremeCourtsjurisdictionbecausethedecisionoftheFourthDistrict
Court of Appeal certified the question to be of great public importance. (See rule
9.030(a)(2)(A)).
STANDARDOFREVIEW
th
Reviewisdenovo.Williams v. State,2013WL1748687,--So.3d--(Fla4 DCA
2013) citing Johnson v. State, 78 So.3d 1305, 1310 (Fla.2012) (Judicial
interpretationsofstatutesarepurequestionsoflawsubjecttodenovoreview.).
STATEMENTOFTHECASE
Thisisanappealfromanappealaffirming:(a)ajuryverdictandjudgmentof
1

convictionandsentenceoffour(4)countsofAggravatedAssaultwithaFirearmand
one(1)countofResistingOfficerWithoutViolence.
AppellantwaschargedbyInformationwithfourcountsofAggravatedAssault
withaFirearmandonecountofResistOfficerwithoutViolence.(V-1,p.28).The
InformationchargedAppellantwithdischargingafirearmduringthecommissionof
aggravatedassaultoffenses.AppellantproceededtotrialonSeptember15,2010.The
juryreturnedaguiltyverdictonSeptember16,2010,toallcountsasallegedinthe
Information.(V-1,p.65).Aspecialverdictformwassubmittedtothejuryspecifically
relatedtothedischargeofafirearmelement.Thejurymadeafindingthatthefirearm
hadbeendischargedoneachoftheaggravatedassaultwithafirearmcounts.(V-1,
pp.65-67).
The trial court immediately proceeded to sentencing after the verdict on
September16,2010,adjudicatingAppellantguiltyonallcountsandsentencinghim
toconsecutiveminimummandatorytermsoftwentyyearsinprisononcounts1-4,(V-
1,pp.68-74).Appellantpursuantwassentencedundersection775.087(2)(a)(c)&(d),
Florida Statutes (2007).Appellantwassentencedoncount5,resistingarrestwithout
violence, to one yearin jail, to run concurrent with count 1. (V-1, p. 69, R- 457).
Appellantwascreditedwith776daysoncounts1and5.(R-457)
AppellantfiledatimelyNoticeofAppealonOctober12,2010.(V-1,p.110).
2

Afterfilingthenoticeofappeal,AppellantfiledaMotiontoCorrectSentencingErrors
WhileAppealispendingpursuanttoRule3.800(b)(2),Fla.R.Crim.P,inthetrialcourt
onMay27,2011andacorrespondingNoticeinthiscourt. Thetrialcourtenteredan
OrderdenyingAppellantsmotiontocorrectsentencingerroronAugust9,2011.
TheFourthDistrictCourtofAppeal,inanEn BancopiniondatedApril24,
2013, affirmed Appellants conviction and sentence and certified the following
questiontobeofgreatpublicimportance:
Doessection775.087(2)(d)'sstatementthatThecourtshallimposeanyterm
ofimprisonmentprovidedforinthissubsectionconsecutivelytoanyotherterm
of imprisonment imposed for any other felony offenserequire consecutive
sentenceswhenthesentencesarisefromonecriminalepisode?
Williams v. State,2013WL1748687(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.Apr.24,2013).
OnMay21,2013,Appellantfiledanoticetoinvokediscretionaryjurisdiction
withthisCourt.OnJuly16,2013,thisCourtacceptedjurisdiction.
STATEMENTOFFACTS
The information alleged that Appellant threatened Jeremy Hoggins, Javaris
Allen,LatoddDavisandBenjaminButlerwithafirearmandduringthecourseofthe
offenseAppellantdischargedthefirearm.(V-1,pp.28,29).
th
OnFebruary12,2008,JeremyHogginswaslivingon10339 StreetApartment
B,RivieraBeach,FloridawithhisthreeroommatesJavarisAllen,LatoddDavisand
3

BenjaminButler.(R-183).Sometimeduringthedaythefourroommatesleftthe
apartmentandreturnedhometogether.Davistestifiedthatherememberedfinishing
hisworkshiftwhenthefourreturnedhomeinthesamevehicle.AsDavisexitedthe
vehicle,herecalledhearingsomeonenamecallingfromtheparkinglotatortowards
him. (R-212,213). Although Hoggins vaguely remembered the incident, he
rememberedthattherewasaverbalaltercationwithAppellantwheretherewasan
exchangeofwordsaboutoursexuality.(R-187).HogginsdidnotknowAppellant,
buthadseenhiminthepastandknewhewasfriendswithhisneighbor.(R-189).He
heard Appellant yell punk, faggot, and other homosexual gestures. (R-191).
Appellantstayedbyhisparkedcarintheparkinglotduringtheentireincidentasthe
fourcontinuedtowalktowardstheirapartment.(R-192).
After the exchange of words between Appellant and the four, Hoggins
rememberedseeingAppellantpointagunintheirdirection.(R-195). Hogginsthen
observedAppellantpointthegunintheairandfireit.Whenthegunwasdischarged,
itwasneverpointedinthedirectionofthefouroratanyoneperson.(R-195,196).
Asthegunfired,allfourrantothedoorwayoftheapartment.(R-196).Hogginsalso
statedthatAppellantcouldnthaveshotinourdirectionbecauseitwouldhavehitthe
walloroneofus.
LatoddDaviswasunabletoseeifthegunwaspointedathim,ashewasthefirst
4

onethroughthedoorwhenthefirstgunshotswerefired.(R-215,216).Duringhis
depositionandlaterattrial,DavistestifiedthathedidseeAppellantshootthegun
straight in the air. (R-229). Davis was not sure as to the number of shots, but
rememberedAppellantleavingtheareaafterfiringtwo.(R-230).
JavarisAllentestifiedthatasheapproachedthedoortohisapartmentheheard
someonecalloutpunk.(R-307).AllenrecognizedAppellantashehadseenhim
severaltimesattheneighborsapartment.(R-308).AsAllenapproachedthefront
doorheturnedtowardsAppellantandsawasilvershiningobject.(R-309).Allensaw
Appellantraisethegunandfireitintheairwithoutpointing it at them.(R-312).
AfterhearingthethreegunshotsAllenbecamefrightened.(R-312).
AfterAppellantwastakenintocustody,heprovidedDetectivePatrickWalsh
fromtheRivieraBeachPoliceDepartmentwithatapedstatement.(R-352).Appellant
statedthathewasupsetwiththefourastheywereflirtingwithhimandgivinghimthe
eye.(R-362). Appellantstatedthathehadremainedinthecar,pointedthegunupand
outwhenfiring,andneverpointeditanyoneofthem.(R-363,366).Thegunwas
dischargedfivetimes.Appellantstatedthatitwashisintentiontoonlyscarethemand
at no point did he ever intend to harm anybody. (R-369). Appellant had told
DetectiveWalshthathehaddranksomeginearlierintheday.(R-366).
BenjaminButlerdidnottestifyattrial.AttorneyforAppellantmovedfora
5

judgment of acquittal as to the count related to Benjamin Butler. (R-372). Court
denied the motion and the jury returned a guilty verdict on all five counts of the
information.ThetrialcourtthenproceededtosentenceDefendanttofourconsecutive
twentyyearsentences,foratotalofeighty(80)yearsonthefourthirddegreefelonies
ofaggravatedassaultwithafirearm.
SUMMARYOFARGUMENT
AppellatecourterredbyholdingthatSection775.087(2)(a),Florida Statutes,
also known as the 10-20-Life Statute, required it to affirmthe imposition of four
consecutive minimum mandatory sentences of twenty years for each offense of
aggravated assault with a firearm where the conduct giving rise to the offenses
occurredinasingleepisodeagainstmultiplevictimsandnoonevictimsustainedany
injuries.LanguageinHouseBill113,whichinitiatedtheamendmenttothe10-20-
Lifestatutestatedthefollowing:Thisprovisiondoesnotexplicitlyprohibitajudge
from imposing the minimum mandatory sentences concurrent to each other.Said
provisionmadeitclearthattrialjudgesweretohavediscretiontosentencedefendants
toconcurrentsentenceswhendefendantfacedmultiplecountsarisingfromthesame
criminalepisode.
6

ARGUMENT
POINTI
STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF SECTION 775.087(2)(d) THAT
THE COURT SHALL IMPOSE ANY TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT PROVIDED FOR IN THIS SUBSECTION
CONSECUTIVELY TO ANY OTHER TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT IMPOSED FOR ANY OTHER FELONY
OFFENSEISAMBIGUOUSREQUIRINGCOURTTOLOOK
AT LEGISLATIVE INTENT, WHICH DOES NOT PROHIBIT
CONCURRENTSENTENCESFOROFFENSESARISINGFROM
ONECRIMINALEPISODE.
On appeal the Fourth District Court addressed the issue of whether section
775.087(2)(d),Fla.Stat.,requiredittosentenceAppellanttoconsecutiveminimum
mandatory sentences or did the statute allow concurrent sentences for the same
offenses.
Atsentencing,theStatearguedthattherecentdecisionofScott v. State,42
So.2d923(Fla.2nDCA2010)wasonpointandrequiredthetrialcourttosentence
Appellanttoconsecutivesentences. AfterreviewingScott,thetrialcourtpronounced
thefollowingsentence:
Giventhelanguageofsubsection(2)(d),aswellasthisScott opinion
from the 2
nd
District, I believe that the this is not a its not a
permissiblestackingsituation,itsamandatorystackingsituation.
Pre-amendment, it would appear that it would have been merely
permissible. But again, in this amendment to the statute, and the
languageintheScottopinion,itappearstobemandatory.
(R-457).
7

ThetrialcourtproceededtosentenceAppellanttofourconsecutivetwentyyear
sentences, for a total of eighty (80) years on four third degree felonies. Appellant
argued that under section 775.087(2)(a)(c)(d), Fla.Stat., the trial court was not
required,buthadthediscretiontosentenceAppellanttoconcurrenttermsandthefacts
ofthecasewarrantedconcurrentsentenceswheretherewerenophysicalinjuriesto
anyofthevictimsandAppellantnevershotandordischargedthefirearmatanyone
victim. Appellant does concede that the sentencing judge had the discretion to
sentencetoconcurrent,consecutiveorahybridofthetwosentences.JudgeJoseph
1
Marx,sittinginas thesentencingjudgeatthemotiontocorrectsentencingerror,
statedthefollowing:
IstillstandbywhatIsaidearlier,isthisthingstilldoesntseem
completely resolved in my mind, but lets tee it up right so
somebodysgoingtogetitresolvedonewayortheother...(SR-
40).
Mr.Williams,Iwouldnevergiveyoueightyyearsonthiscase...
Wehavefirstdegreemurdercasesthatpeoplegetlessthanthis.
(SR-41).
1
JudgeJohnJ.Hoypresidedoverthetrialandtheinitialsentencing.
Subsequently,JudgeHoytransferredoutofthedivisionandintoacivildivision.
JudgeMarxwasthentransferredintothedivision.
8

ButhereswhatImgoingtodo,becauseeitherwayhesgoingto
beincustody.SoImnotcompletelysure,butitwouldmakeno
senseformewhenImcompletelyunsureandIvegotthis4
th
DCA
PCA here and uncertainty of it, lets tee it up for the 4
th
District
CourtofAppealtomakearuling...Iamgoingtodenythemotion,
becauseweregoingtohavethe4
th
DistrictCourtofAppealtellus
isitrequiredinacasethatthereareseparateconvictions?Wehave
multiple victims...and there are multiple injury. Well call it a
mental injury. So we have separate and distinct, so the court
certainlycouldhaveimposedaconsecutivesentence.
WhatIwantthe4
th
DistrictCourtofAppealtotellmeismust
I? Isitrequired,andisthatwhatthestatuteandtheresadispute
over the House Bill, and that House Bill language was in one of
thosecases,too...(SR-44).
InScott,42So.2d923,thedefendanthadsprayedbulletsfromanautomatic
weapon at nine people during a single episode, none of the nine were hit. A jury
founddefendantguiltyofninecountsofattemptedsecond degreemurder.Thetrial
court sentenced Scott to consecutive twenty-year minimum mandatory prison
sentencesoneachcount.Id. TheScott Courtaddressedtheissueofwhetherthetrial
9

courtwaspermittedtorunthesentencesconsecutivetoeachother. Inaffirmingthe
trialcourtsconsecutivesentences,theSecondDistrictCourtheldthatconsecutive
minimummandatorysentencesunderthe10-20-Lifestatutewerepermissible.The
Scottcourt,throughoutitsopinion,usedwordssuchaspermissibleandallows
whendiscussingthesentencingstatute,evidencingthediscretiongiventothejudge
whensentencingundersection775.087(2)(d).
ThisdiscretionarylanguageappearstohaveitsoriginsinState v. Christian692
So.2d889,890(Fla.1997),wheretheFloridaSupremeCourtstatedthat,[a]sa
generalrule,foroffensesarisingfromasingleepisode,stackingispermissiblewhere
theviolationsoftheminimummandatorystatutescauseinjurytomultiplevictims,or
multiple injuries to one victim. The injuries bifurcate the crimes for stacking
purposes.
Inthepresentcase,theFourthDistrictCourtheldthatthestatutorylanguage
andcaselaw,specificallyState v. Sousa,903So.2d923(Fla.2005)(hereinSousa
II),didnotprovideasentencingcourtwiththediscretiontosentencetoconcurrent
sentences under section 775.087(2)(d), but required the imposition of consecutive
minimummandatorysentences.
Inaddressingtheissueofwhetherstackingminimummandatorysentenceswas
permissible,theFourthDistrictCourtstatedthefollowing:
10

We answer that question yesafter applying the plain language of
section775.087(2)(d),asinterpretedbythesupremecourtinSousa II.
Section775.087(2)(d)'slastclausestates:Thecourtshallimposeany
termofimprisonmentprovidedforinthissubsectionconsecutivelyto
any other term of imprisonment imposed for any other felony
offense.(emphasisadded).ThesupremecourtheldinSousa IIthatany
other felony offensemay include offenses falling under section
775.087(2)(a)'smandatoryminimumprovisionsandoccurringduringthe
same criminal episode. Thus, when a defendant is convicted of such
offenses, as occurred in this case, the word shallprefacing section
775.087(2)(d)'s last clause requires that a court impose consecutive
sentencesforeachofthoseoffenses.
Williams v. State,13WL1748687.so.3d(2013). AlthoughtheWilliams courtheld
that section 775.087(2)(d), required it to reach the conclusion of mandatory
consecutivesentences,itdidrecognizethatSousa IIonlyansweredthequestionof
whetherconsecutivemandatoryminimumsentenceswerepermissibleundersection
775.087(2)(d). Sousa II left unanswered the question of whether consecutive
mandatoryminimumsentencesarerequiredbysection775.087(2)(d)underthesame
circumstances.Id. Basedontheforegoing,theFourthDistrictCourtcertifiedthe
followingquestiontobeofgreatpublicimportance:
Doessection775.087(2)(d)'sstatementthatThecourtshallimposeany
termofimprisonmentprovidedforinthissubsectionconsecutivelyto
any other term of imprisonment imposed for any other felony
offenserequireconsecutivesentenceswhenthesentencesarisefromone
criminalepisode?
The Fourth District Court concluded that the plain language of section
775.087(2)(d) coupled with the term shall impose made it clear that any felony
11

offense would require consecutive sentences. Although the statutory language is
plain,itisfarfromclear.Appellanthasarguedthatthelanguageanyotherfelony
offense means any felony offenseother than a section 775.087(2)(d) enumerated
offense. Thefocushereisonthephraseanyother. Appellantarguesthatabetter
readingofthestatuteisthecourtshallimposeanytermofimprisonmentprovided
forinthissubsectionconsecutivelytoanyothertermofimprisonmentimposedfor any
other felony offense not included in this subsection. Thiswouldthenallowacourt
discretion to sentence consecutively on the mandatory minimum offenses and no
discretion on other offenses that fall outside section 775.087(2)(d). A similar
interpretationofthestatutewasfirstrecognizedbytheSecondDistrictCourtinSousa
v. State(Sousa I),868So.2d538,540(Fla.2dDCA2003)whenitreversedthe
consecutive sentences, holding that section 775.087(2)(d) did not provide the
legislativeauthorizationnecessarytorequireconsecutivesentencing.Tosupportthat
holding,theSecondDistrictagreedwiththeholdinginMondesir v. State, 814So.2d
1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) that section 775.087(2)(d)'s last clause, requiring
consecutivesentencesforanyotherfelonyoffense,meansthatsentencesreceived
pursuanttosection775.087(2)(d)mustonlybeconsecutivetootherfelonysentences
not subject tosection775.087(2)(d). Sousa I, 868So.2dat539(citingMondesir,814
So.2dat1173).
12

InSousa II,thisCourtdidnotagreewiththereasoninginMondesir onlytothe

extentitconstruesthestatutetomeanthattheanyotherlanguageonlyrefersto
crimeswhichtookplaceatdifferenttimes.Sousa II,903So.2dat927.Appellanthere
agreeswiththisCourtsinterpretationofthestatute thatanyotheralsoincludes
crimesthatoccurredwithinthesameepisode.Accordingly,Appellantcontendsthat
the language of the statute does not require or mandate consecutive sentences on
offensesarisingfromthesameepisodeandfallingundersection775.087(2)(d).
Because this caseinvolves statutory interpretation, this Court's review is de
novo.Gomez v. Vill. of Pinecrest,41So.3d180,185(Fla.2010)quoting Larimore
v. State,2So.3d101,106(Fla.2008).Acourt'spurposeinconstruingastatuteisto
giveeffecttolegislativeintent,whichisthepolestarthatguidesthecourtinstatutory
construction.Id. (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla.2003)). To
discernlegislativeintent,acourtmustlookfirstandforemostattheactuallanguage
usedinthestatute.Id.
AsthisCourthasoftenrepeated,whenthelanguageofthestatuteisclearand
unambiguousandconveysaclearanddefinitemeaning...thestatutemustbe
givenitsplainandobviousmeaning.Further,wearewithoutpowertoconstrue
an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its
expresstermsoritsreasonableandobviousimplications.Todosowouldbean
abrogation of legislative power. A related principle is that when a court
interpretsastatute,itmustgivefulleffecttoallstatutoryprovisions.Courts
shouldavoidreadingsthatwouldrenderpartofastatutemeaningless.
13

Gomez v. Vill. of Pinecrest,41So.3dat185quoting Velez v. Miami-Dade County
Police Dept,934So.2d1162,116-65(Fla.2006).See also Sousa II, 903So.2dat
928(Thefundamentalruleofconstructionindetermininglegislativeintentistofirst
giveeffecttotheplainandordinarymeaningofthelanguageusedbytheLegislature.
Courtsarenottochangetheplainmeaningofastatutebyturningtolegislativehistory
ifthemeaningofthestatutecanbediscernedfromthelanguageinthestatute.)
InSousa II,theFloridaSupremeCourt,ininterpretingthestatuteunderthe
1999amendment,cametotheconclusionthatstackingminimummandatorysentences
werepermissible.TheCourtstated:
Wedisagreethatsection775.087asamendedstilldoesnotpermitconsecutive
sentences. To draw that conclusion we would have to find that the 1999
amendment to section 775.087 overrules our decisions in Christian and
Thomas. We do not agree. Rather we conclude that this amendment to the
statuteisconsistentwiththedecisionsinChristianandThomas.
Sousa II, 903 So.2d at 927. The Fourth District Court now reads the statute as
requiringconsecutivesentenceswherethereisoneepisodeandmorethanoneinjury.
SuchaholdingbytheFourthDistrictCourtrequiredittorecedefromitsprevious
holdinginArutyunyan v. State,863So.2d410(Fla.4thDCA2003)(Courtprevious
heldthatconsecutiveminimummandatorysentences were not required where offenses
occurred in same criminal episode.)(emphasisadded).
InWalton v. State,106So.3d522,527(Fla.1
st
DCA2013),theFirstDistrict
14

Court recently addressed defendants consecutive sentences under section
775.087(2)(d). There the court stated that section 775.087(2)(d) authorizes
consecutiveminimummandatorysentencesformultipleoffensescommittedduring
asingleepisode,involvingmultiplevictimswherethedefendantdischargesafirearm.
TheFirstDistrictCourtsholdingthatthestatuteauthorizesconsecutive...,suggests
thatitisnotrequiredormandatorytosentencetoconsecutivesentencesunderthe
circumstances,butitisdiscretionarywiththetrialcourt.SeealsoScott v. State,42
So.3d923(Fla.2nDCA2010)(SecondDistrictCourtsuseofthewordallowsinits
opinionevidencesthatthetrialcourthadthediscretiontoimposeeitherconsecutive
orconcurrentsentences);andHargrove v. State,905So.2d275,276(Fla.2dDCA
2005)(Stackingofminimummandatorysentencesapprovedwherethedefendantshot
thedriverofacarandshotatapassengerbutmissed).Hargrove, Scott and Walton
wereafterSousa II.Withsuchvariationsinthelanguageoftheholdingsfromthis
States District Courts, it can not be said that the statute in question is clear and
unambiguous.
A review of the legislative history of the statutes amendment is not only
instructivebutnecessarytosettletheongoingcontroversy.Inthecommentstoits
FinalAnalysisofCS/CS/HB113(SB194),whichbecameChapter99-12,Lawsof
Florida,andsubsection775.087(2),theCommitteeonCrimeandPunishmentinthe
15

HouseofRepresentativessostated:
ConsecutiveSentences
The bill provides that the Legislature intends for the new minimum
mandatorysentencebeimposedforeachqualifyingcount,andthecourtis
requiredtoimposetheminimummandatorysentencesrequiredbythebill
consecutive to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any other
felonyoffense.This provision does not explicitly prohibit a judge from
imposing the minimum mandatory sentences concurrent to each other. [emphasis]
IfthisCourtspriorholdinginSousa II standsandthisCourtsstatementnor
dowefindthelanguageofthestatutetobeambiguousnegatinganyreviewofthe
legislative history, then its holding would allow a court discretion to sentence
concurrentlyor consecutively. Courts are not to change the plain meaning of a
statutebyturningtolegislativehistoryifthemeaningofthestatutecanbediscerned
fromthelanguageinthestatute. Sousa,903So.2d923,927-28.However,ifthis
Courtbelievesclarificationisneededtosettletheongoingcontroversy,thenareview
ofthelegislativehistoryalsoleadstothesameconclusion.
Itisinterestingtonotethatthecasescitedwithinthisbriefaddressedtheissue
fromtheperspectiveofconsecutivesentences(asthedefendantswereallsentenced
to minimum mandatory consecutive sentences). It is unfortunate that none of the
appealsaddressedtheissueofwhetherthestatueallowedconcurrentsentences.This
argumentmaybemoresemanticsthanalegaldifference,butthesentenceimposed
hereseemstoruncontrarytotheruleoflenity. Moreandmoreoffensesarefalling
16

under minimum mandatory sentences and taking discretion away from judges for
sentencing.Publicpolicydemandsthattrialcourtsbegivensentencingdiscretionto
avoidtheextremeandharshsentencesthatcanyieldresultsthatAppellantnowfinds
himselfin.
CONCLUSION
Re-sentencing is required under section 775.087(2)(d), Fla. Stat. Statutory
languageprovidestrialcourtswithdiscretionto sentencedefendantschargedwith
multiplecountsunderSection775.087(2)(d),toconcurrentorconsecutivesentences.
CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE
IHEREBYCERTIFYthatatrueandcorrectcopyoftheforegoingRequestto
TollTimehasbeenservedviaU.S.MailandemailtoMitchellEgber,OFFICEOF
th
THEATTORNEYGENERAL,9 Floor,515N.FlaglerDrive,WestPalmBeach,FL
33401,atmitchell.egber@myfloridalegal.comonthe17
th
dayofOctober,2013.
RICHARDG.LUBIN,P.A.
SecondFloor,FlaglerPlaza
1217SouthFlaglerDrive
WestPalmBeach,FL33401
Tele:561/655-2040
Fax:561/655-2182
AttorneysforAppellant
17



By /s/ Jonathan R. Kaplan
JonathanR.Kaplan
Fla.BarNo.0910759
CERTIFICATEOFCOMPLIANCE
IHEREBYCERTIFYTHATtheforegoingPetitionisincompliancewithRule
9.210(2), Florida Rules Of Appellate Procedure and the font contain herein is in
TimesNewRoman-14point.
RICHARDG.LUBIN,P.A.
SecondFloor,FlaglerPlaza
1217SouthFlaglerDrive
WestPalmBeach,FL33401
Tele:561/655-2040
Fax:561/655-2182
AttorneysforDefendant
/s/ Jonathan R. Kaplan
JonathanR.Kaplan
Fla.BarNo.0910759
18