JS 44 (Rev.

12/12)
CIVIL COVER SHEET
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as
provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the
purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff County of Residence of First Listed Defendant
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Attorneys (If Known)
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an “X” in One Box Only) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an “X” in One Box for Plaintiff
(For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box for Defendant)
’ 1 U.S. Government ’ 3 Federal Question PTF DEF PTF DEF
Plaintiff (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State ’ 1 ’ 1 Incorporated or Principal Place ’ 4 ’ 4
of Business In This State
’ 2 U.S. Government ’ 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State ’ 2 ’ 2 Incorporated and Principal Place ’ 5 ’ 5
Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) of Business In Another State
Citizen or Subject of a ’ 3 ’ 3 Foreign Nation ’ 6 ’ 6
Foreign Country
IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an “X” in One Box Only)
CONTRACT TORTS FORFEITURE/PENALTY BANKRUPTCY OTHER STATUTES
’ 110 Insurance PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY ’ 625 Drug Related Seizure ’ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 ’ 375 False Claims Act
’ 120 Marine ’ 310 Airplane ’ 365 Personal Injury - of Property 21 USC 881 ’ 423 Withdrawal ’ 400 State Reapportionment
’ 130 Miller Act ’ 315 Airplane Product Product Liability ’ 690 Other 28 USC 157 ’ 410 Antitrust
’ 140 Negotiable Instrument Liability ’ 367 Health Care/ ’ 430 Banks and Banking
’ 150 Recovery of Overpayment ’ 320 Assault, Libel & Pharmaceutical PROPERTY RIGHTS ’ 450 Commerce
& Enforcement of Judgment Slander Personal Injury ’ 820 Copyrights ’ 460 Deportation
’ 151 Medicare Act ’ 330 Federal Employers’ Product Liability ’ 830 Patent ’ 470 Racketeer Influenced and
’ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Liability ’ 368 Asbestos Personal ’ 840 Trademark Corrupt Organizations
Student Loans ’ 340 Marine Injury Product ’ 480 Consumer Credit
(Excludes Veterans) ’ 345 Marine Product Liability LABOR SOCIAL SECURITY ’ 490 Cable/Sat TV
’ 153 Recovery of Overpayment Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY ’ 710 Fair Labor Standards ’ 861 HIA (1395ff) ’ 850 Securities/Commodities/
of Veteran’s Benefits ’ 350 Motor Vehicle ’ 370 Other Fraud Act ’ 862 Black Lung (923) Exchange
’ 160 Stockholders’ Suits ’ 355 Motor Vehicle ’ 371 Truth in Lending ’ 720 Labor/Management ’ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) ’ 890 Other Statutory Actions
’ 190 Other Contract Product Liability ’ 380 Other Personal Relations ’ 864 SSID Title XVI ’ 891 Agricultural Acts
’ 195 Contract Product Liability ’ 360 Other Personal Property Damage ’ 740 Railway Labor Act ’ 865 RSI (405(g)) ’ 893 Environmental Matters
’ 196 Franchise Injury ’ 385 Property Damage ’ 751 Family and Medical ’ 895 Freedom of Information
’ 362 Personal Injury - Product Liability Leave Act Act
Medical Malpractice ’ 790 Other Labor Litigation ’ 896 Arbitration
REAL PROPERTY CIVIL RIGHTS PRISONER PETITIONS ’ 791 Employee Retirement FEDERAL TAX SUITS ’ 899 Administrative Procedure
’ 210 Land Condemnation ’ 440 Other Civil Rights Habeas Corpus: Income Security Act ’ 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff Act/Review or Appeal of
’ 220 Foreclosure ’ 441 Voting ’ 463 Alien Detainee or Defendant) Agency Decision
’ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment ’ 442 Employment ’ 510 Motions to Vacate ’ 871 IRS—Third Party ’ 950 Constitutionality of
’ 240 Torts to Land ’ 443 Housing/ Sentence 26 USC 7609 State Statutes
’ 245 Tort Product Liability Accommodations ’ 530 General
’ 290 All Other Real Property ’ 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - ’ 535 Death Penalty IMMIGRATION
Employment Other: ’ 462 Naturalization Application
’ 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - ’ 540 Mandamus & Other ’ 465 Other Immigration
Other ’ 550 Civil Rights Actions
’ 448 Education ’ 555 Prison Condition
’ 560 Civil Detainee -
Conditions of
Confinement
V. ORIGIN (Place an “X” in One Box Only)
’ 1 Original
Proceeding
’ 2 Removed from
State Court
’ 3 Remanded from
Appellate Court
’ 4 Reinstated or
Reopened
’ 5 Transferred from
Another District
(specify)
’ 6 Multidistrict
Litigation
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):

Brief description of cause:
VII. REQUESTED IN
COMPLAINT:
’ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION
UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.
DEMAND $ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
JURY DEMAND: ’ Yes ’ No
VIII. RELATED CASE(S)
IF ANY
(See instructions):
JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER
DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE
STACEY POMALES
Marion
Christopher R. Dillingham II, Esq. The Dillingham Law Firm PLLC
900 Plymouth Sorrento Road # 593 Plymouth FL 32768
407-463-3506
CHRIS BLAIR, in his official capacity as SHERIFF OF THE MARION
COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; LISA AZURE, THOMAS NEWBANKS,
and JARRETT LEEDY, in their individual capacities.
Marion

42 U.S. Code § 1983
3.Plaintiff brings this action for violations of civil rights and related state law torts.

06/05/2014 s/Christopher R. Dillingham II, Esq.
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JS 44 Reverse (Rev. 12/12)
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44
Authority For Civil Cover Sheet
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as
required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is
required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of
Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:
I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants. Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use
only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and
then the official, giving both name and title.
(b) County of Residence. For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the
time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land
condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)
(c) Attorneys. Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting
in this section "(see attachment)".
II. Jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X"
in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.
United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here.
United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.
Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment
to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes
precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.
Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the
citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity
cases.)
III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties. This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this
section for each principal party.
IV. Nature of Suit. Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If the nature of suit cannot be determined, be sure the cause of action, in Section VI below, is
sufficient to enable the deputy clerk or the statistical clerk(s) in the Administrative Office to determine the nature of suit. If the cause fits more than
one nature of suit, select the most definitive.
V. Origin. Place an "X" in one of the six boxes.
Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts.
Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441.
When the petition for removal is granted, check this box.
Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing
date.
Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.
Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or
multidistrict litigation transfers.
Multidistrict Litigation. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1407.
When this box is checked, do not check (5) above.
VI. Cause of Action. Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. Do not cite jurisdictional
statutes unless diversity. Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service
VII. Requested in Complaint. Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.
Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.
Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.
VIII. Related Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket
numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.
Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.
JS 44 Reverse (Rev. 12/12)
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44
Authority For Civil Cover Sheet
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as
required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is
required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of
Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:
I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants. Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use
only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and
then the official, giving both name and title.
(b) County of Residence. For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the
time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land
condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)
(c) Attorneys. Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting
in this section "(see attachment)".
II. Jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X"
in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.
United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here.
United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.
Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment
to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes
precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.
Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the
citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity
cases.)
III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties. This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this
section for each principal party.
IV. Nature of Suit. Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If the nature of suit cannot be determined, be sure the cause of action, in Section VI below, is
sufficient to enable the deputy clerk or the statistical clerk(s) in the Administrative Office to determine the nature of suit. If the cause fits more than
one nature of suit, select the most definitive.
V. Origin. Place an "X" in one of the six boxes.
Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts.
Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441.
When the petition for removal is granted, check this box.
Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing
date.
Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.
Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or
multidistrict litigation transfers.
Multidistrict Litigation. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1407.
When this box is checked, do not check (5) above.
VI. Cause of Action. Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. Do not cite jurisdictional
statutes unless diversity. Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service
VII. Requested in Complaint. Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.
Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.
Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.
VIII. Related Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket
numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.
Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
STACEY POMALES
Plaintiff, Civil Action No.
v.
CHRIS BLAIR, in his official capacity as
SHERIFF OF THE MARION COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE; LISA AZURE,
THOMAS NEWBANKS, and JARRETT
LEEDY in their individual capacities.
Defendants.
___/


COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF STACEY POMALES (“Pomales” or “Plaintiff”) sues Chris Blair (“Blair”
or “Defendant(s)”); Lisa Azure (“Azure” and/or “Defendant(s)”); Thomas Newbanks
(“Newbanks” and/or “Defendant(s)”); and Jarrett Leedy (“Leedy” and/or “Defendant(s)”), and
states the following in support of this complaint:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. This is a 42 U.S. Code § 1983 federal civil rights case under the First, Fourth,
Fifth, and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution as applied to the States under
the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment for the Defendants’ individual and

2

collective personal, malicious, willful, and unlawful violations under color of state law of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to free speech, protection against unreasonable search and
seizure of Plaintiff’s liberty and personal property, and procedural due process, and Florida state
law tort claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
2. Defendants committed these unlawful violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional and
state rights under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton,
and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of civil rights
under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution as well as for the state law tort claims of malicious prosecution, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and defamation per se.
4. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law tort claims which arose from the same common
nuclei of facts.
5. Venue is proper in this judicial district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b) and M.D. Fla. Loc. R. 1.02 (c). Defendants’ primary employment is in this district and
division, and Defendants’ independent and collective malicious and unlawful violations under
color of state law of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights giving rise to the claims herein accrued
within this district and division.

3

6. At all material times, Defendants committed these unlawful violations under
color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and willful
disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
PARTIES
7. Plaintiff Stacey Pomales is a Florida resident residing within this Court’s
jurisdiction.
8. Defendant Chris Blair is now and has been at all material times Sheriff of Marion
County, Florida, and the constitutional officer of Marion County Sheriff’s Office. Blair is
ultimately responsible for supervision, direction, control, and training of all Marion County
deputies and the Marion County Sheriff’s Office.
9. Defendant Lisa Azure is now and has been at all material times a Marion County
deputy sheriff. Azure at all times relevant hereto was acting in and continues to act under color
of state law.
10. Defendant Thomas Newbanks is now and has been at all material times a Marion
County deputy sheriff. Newbanks at all times relevant hereto was acting in and continues to act
under color of state law.
11. Defendant Jarrett Leedy is now and has been at all material times a Marion
County deputy sheriff. Leedy at all times relevant hereto was acting in and continues to act under
color of state law.
12. Defendant John Doe, whose true name is currently unknown, is now and has been
at all material times a Marion County deputy sheriff. Doe at all times relevant hereto was acting
in and continues to act under color of state law.

4

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
13. On or around April 5, 2014, Azure, Newbanks, and Leedy went to the 15600
block of Southwest 15
th
Avenue in Ocala, Florida, within Marion County, FL. Azure, Newbanks,
and Leedy were driving marked Marion County Sheriff’s Office patrol vehicles and wearing
Marion County Sheriff’s Office uniforms and equipment, including weapons and restraint
devices. Defendants identified themselves as Marion County deputies and acted under Blair’s
constitutional authority. The purported reason for Defendants’ visit to this location was a large
party. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit A.
14. Plaintiff was a guest at this party, but Plaintiff did not own the land or house
where the party was located. Plaintiff had no control over the party or other citizens at the party.
15. Azure, Newbanks, and Leedy, upon arrival, unlawfully stopped vehicles and
shouted at the partygoers; profanely daring partygoers to come out to the road so Azure,
Newbanks, and Leedy could arrest those partygoers.
16. When Plaintiff’s spouse verbally and peacefully protested Defendants’ activities
that Plaintiff believed to be unprofessional and unconstitutional, Defendants arrested Plaintiff’s
spouse.
17. Plaintiff video-recorded Defendants’ arrest of Plaintiff’s spouse and then asked
Defendants for Defendants’ badge numbers and why Defendants arrested Plaintiff’s spouse.
18. Plaintiff complied every time Defendants ordered Plaintiff to move away from
Defendants. Plaintiff is even on video telling other partygoers to move away from Defendants.
19. When Plaintiff continued to exercise Plaintiff’s free speech rights to protest
Defendants’ activity peacefully, Azure, Newbanks, and Leedy then arrested Plaintiff for

5

Resisting without Violence, § 843.02 Fla. Stat. (2012) even though Plaintiff clearly stated
Plaintiff merely wanted information and was only attempting to discuss the issue with Azure.
20. Azure charged Plaintiff with two counts of Resisting without Violence, § 843.02
Fla. Stat. (2012) despite the video evidence depicting only one chronological event.
21. Plaintiff’s verbal First Amendment free speech activity in no way interfered with
Defendants’ ability to conduct any investigation.
22. Defendants curtailed Plaintiff’s free speech and stifled it even though Plaintiff
was not inciting imminent lawlessness or doing anything but voicing Plaintiff’s opposition to
Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff disturbed no one but Defendants with Plaintiff’s peaceful protest of
Defendants’ actions. Defendants never alleged in the criminal case that Plaintiff’s words or
actions caused an unlawful disturbance or incited imminent lawlessness.
23. Video evidence of Plaintiff’s arrest shows Defendants were the only ones inciting
the crowd gathered to watch Defendants arrest Plaintiff. Azure, in particular, shouted several
times to the crowd that was demanding a rationale for Defendants’ arrest of Plaintiff, “Who’s
next? Who’s next? Who’s next? Who’s next? Those cameras don’t scare us! Who’s next to go to
jail?”
24. Despite Defendants’ individual and collective aggressive behavior, the crowd
never turned violent, and was in many ways, highly respectful to Defendants.
25. Azure, who had a Facebook social media account at the time Defendants arrested
Plaintiff, and for some time thereafter, changed her Facebook profile picture to Plaintiff’s and
Plaintiff’s spouse’s “mug shots,” and the accompanying picture referred to Plaintiff and
Plaintiff’s spouse as “monsters.” See Plaintiff’s Exhibit B.

6

26. Defendant’s seized Plaintiff’s cellular phone as “evidence” despite lacking any
nexus to a crime or probable cause to believe Plaintiff’s cellular phone contained the fruits of a
crime. In fact, Plaintiff’s cellular phone contained only exculpatory evidence that is highly
unfavorable to Defendants. Defendants refused to return Plaintiff’s cellular phone until Plaintiff
allowed the Marion County Sheriff’s Office to review the video contained within its memory.
27. On May 28
th
, 2014, The State Attorney’s Office for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of
Florida formally entered a nolle prosequi for Plaintiff’s criminal charge. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit
C.
28. When the Florida Legislature passed § 843.02 Fla. Stat. (2012), the Legislature
gave law enforcement officers unfettered discretion to decide when citizens violate this statute
by not narrowing the defintion of what constitutes “resisting without violence” or “obstructing
without violence.” Nothing in the statute defines or addresses verbal protests of law
enforcement activities when officers are in public.
29. Defendants applied § 843.02 Fla. Stat. (2012) with unbridled discretion in the
instant case, allowing Defendants to arrest Plaintiff without probable cause and merely for
Plaintiff’s lawful exercise of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights to free speech to video-record
and protest State action peacefully.
30. Defendants have willfully and maliciously under color of state law,
unconstitutionally caused Plaintiff to suffer physical and emotional harm, permanent injury,
social embarrassment, reputational damages, and loss of liberty and property.
COUNT I: § 1983 CLAIM OF SUPPRESSION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTED
FREE SPEECH AGAINST DEFENDANT AZURE

7

31. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
32. Defendant personally, maliciously, and under color of state law deprived Plaintiff
of Plaintiff’s rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which are
secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by maliciously prosecuting Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s
exercise of the constitutional right of free speech to video-record and protest government activity
of great public interest of which Plaintiff disapproved and protested peacefully without
interferring with the State’s investigation.
33. Defendant failed to conduct herself as would a reasonably prudent law
enforcement officer and obey firmly established law.
34. In depriving Plaintiff of these rights, Defendant committed these unlawful
violations under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless,
wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
35. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
COUNT II: § 1983 CLAIM OF SUPPRESSION OF FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTED FREE SPEECH AGAINST DEFENDANT NEWBANKS
36. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
37. Defendant personally, maliciously, and under color of state law deprived Plaintiff
of Plaintiff’s rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which are
secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by maliciously prosecuting Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s

8

exercise of the constitutional right of free speech to video-record and protest government activity
of great public interest of which Plaintiff disapproved and protested peacefully without
interferring with the State’s investigation.
38. Defendant failed to conduct himself as would a reasonably prudent law
enforcement officer and obey firmly established law.
39. Defendant failed to conduct himself as would a reasonably prudent law
enforcement officer and obey firmly established law.
40. In depriving Plaintiff of these rights, Defendant committed these unlawful
violations under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless,
wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
41. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
COUNT III: § 1983 CLAIM OF SUPPRESSION OF FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTED SPEECH AGAINST DEFENDANT LEEDY
42. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
43. Defendant personally, maliciously, and under color of state law deprived Plaintiff
of Plaintiff’s rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which are
secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by maliciously prosecuting Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s
exercise of the constitutional right of free speech to video-record and protest government activity
of great public interest of which Plaintiff disapproved and protested peacefully without
interferring with the State’s investigation.

9

44. Defendant failed to conduct himself as would a reasonably prudent law
enforcement officer and obey firmly established law.
45. In depriving Plaintiff of these rights, Defendant committed these unlawful
violations under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless,
wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
46. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
COUNT IV: § 1983 CLAIM OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF
PLAINTIFF’S LIBERTY AND PROPERTY AGAINST DEFENDANT AZURE
47. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
48. Defendant personally, recklessly, maliciously, and under color of state law
deprived Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s liberty rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which are secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by assisting and
directing Defendants to maliciously and unconstitutionally detain, handcuff, arrest, and
incarcerate Plaintiff without a warrant or any probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed
any crime.
49. Defendant failed to conduct herself as would a reasonably prudent law
enforcement officer and obey firmly established law.
50. Defendant personally, recklessly, maliciously, and under color of state law
deprived Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s property rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which are secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by assisting and
directing Defendants to maliciously and unconstitutionally deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s

10

personal property without a warrant or any probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed any
crime or that Plaintiff’s property, a cellular phone, had any nexus to or contained the fruits of
a crime.
51. In depriving the Plaintiff of these rights, Defendant committed these unlawful
violations under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless,
wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
52. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
COUNT V: § 1983 CLAIM OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF
PLAINTIFF’S LIBERTY AND PROPERTY AGAINST DEFENDANT NEWBANKS
53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
54. Defendant personally, recklessly, maliciously, and under color of state law
deprived Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s liberty rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which are secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by assisting and
directing Defendants to maliciously and unconstitutionally detain, handcuff, arrest, and
incarcerate Plaintiff without a warrant or any probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed
any crime.
55. Defendant personally, recklessly, maliciously, and under color of state law
deprived Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s property rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which are secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by assisting and
directing Defendants to maliciously and unconstitutionally deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s

11

personal property without a warrant or any probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed any
crime or that Plaintiff’s property, a cellular phone, had any nexus to or contained the fruits of
a crime.
56. Defendant failed to conduct himself as would a reasonably prudent law
enforcement officer and obey firmly established law.
57. In depriving the Plaintiff of these rights, Defendant committed these unlawful
violations under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless,
wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
58. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
COUNT VI: § 1983 CLAIM OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF
PLAINTIFF’S LIBERTY AND PROPERTY AGAINST DEFENDANT LEEDY
59. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
60. Defendant personally, recklessly, maliciously, and under color of state law
deprived Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s liberty rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which are secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by assisting and
directing Defendants to maliciously and unconstitutionally detain, handcuff, arrest, and
incarcerate Plaintiff without a warrant or any probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed
any crime.
61. Defendant personally, recklessly, maliciously, and under color of state law
deprived Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s property rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United

12

States Constitution, which are secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by assisting and
directing Defendants to maliciously and unconstitutionally deprive Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s
personal property without a warrant or any probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed any
crime or that Plaintiff’s property, a cellular phone, had any nexus to or contained the fruits of
a crime.
62. Defendant failed to conduct himself as would a reasonably prudent law
enforcement officer and obey firmly established law.
63. In depriving the Plaintiff of these rights, Defendant committed these unlawful
violations under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless,
wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
64. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
COUNT VII: § 1983 CLAIM OF FIFTH AMENDMENT DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AGAINST DEFENDANT AZURE
65. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
66. Defendant personally, maliciously, and under color of state law deprived
Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which are secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by personally,
recklessly, maliciously, and unconstitutionally seizing and retaining the Plaintiff’s personal
property without any probable cause, warrant, or judicial review.

13

67. Defendant gave Plaintiff no means of contesting the unconstitutional seizure of
Plaintiff’s cellular phone, and even when Defendant should have known these actions were
illegal and unconstitutional.
68. Defendant’s “double-charging” of Plaintiff further demonstrates malice and
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
69. Defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would
and obey firmly established law.
70. In depriving Plaintiff of these due process rights, Defendant committed these
unlawful violations under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in
reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
71. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
COUNT VIII: § 1983 CLAIM OF FIFTH AMENDMENT DENIAL OF
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AGAINST DEFENDANT
NEWBANKS
72. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
73. Defendant personally, maliciously, and under color of state law deprived
Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which are secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by personally,

14

recklessly, maliciously, and unconstitutionally seizing and retaining the Plaintiff’s personal
property without any probable cause, warrant, or judicial review.
74. Defendant gave Plaintiff no means of contesting the unconstitutional seizure of
Plaintiff’s cellular phone, and even when Defendant should have known these actions were
illegal and unconstitutional.
75. Defendant’s “double-charging” of Plaintiff further demonstrates malice and
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
76. Defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would
and obey firmly established law.
77. In depriving Plaintiff of these due process rights, Defendant committed these
unlawful violations under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in
reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
78. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
COUNT IX: § 1983 CLAIM OF FIFTH AMENDMENT DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL
DUE AND SUBSTANTIVE PROCESS AGAINST DEFENDANT LEEDY
79. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
80. Defendant personally, maliciously, and under color of state law deprived
Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which are secured through the Fourteenth Amendment, by personally,

15

recklessly, maliciously, and unconstitutionally seizing and retaining the Plaintiff’s personal
property without any probable cause, warrant, or judicial review.
81. Defendant gave Plaintiff no means of contesting the unconstitutional seizure of
Plaintiff’s cellular phone, and even when Defendant should have known these actions were
illegal and unconstitutional.
82. Defendant’s “double-charging” of Plaintiff further demonstrates malice and
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
83. Defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would
and obey firmly established law.
84. In depriving Plaintiff of these due process rights, Defendant committed these
unlawful violations under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in
reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
85. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
COUNT XI: STATE TORT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT AZURE
86. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
87. Defendant, under color of state law, personally, recklessly, maliciously, and
unconstitutionally and without the barest scintilla of probable cause, maliciously prosecuted
Plaintiff, commencing and continuing a criminal judicial proceeding against Plaintiff.

16

88. The State of Florida made a bona fide termination of that judicial proceeding.
See attached hereto Plaintiff’s Exhibit C.
89. Defendant lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
90. Defendant acted with malice and under color of law.
91. Plaintiff suffered general and special damages conforming to the law.
92. Defendant committed the tort of malicious prosecution under color of state law
in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of
Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
93. Defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would
and obey firmly established law.
94. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.
COUNT XII: STATE TORT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT NEWBANKS
95. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
96. Defendant, under color of state law, personally, recklessly, maliciously, and
unconstitutionally and without the barest scintilla of probable cause, maliciously prosecuted
Plaintiff, commencing and continuing a criminal judicial proceeding against Plaintiff.
97. The State of Florida made a bona fide termination of that judicial proceeding.
See attached hereto Plaintiff’s Exhibit C.
98. Defendant lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.

17

99. Defendant acted with malice and under color of law.
100. Plaintiff suffered general and special damages conforming to the law.
101. Defendant committed the tort of malicious prosecution under color of state law
in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of
Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
102. Defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would
and obey firmly established law.
103. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.
COUNT XIII: STATE TORT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT LEEDY
104. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
105. Defendant, under color of state law, personally, recklessly, maliciously, and
unconstitutionally and without the barest scintilla of probable cause, maliciously prosecuted
Plaintiff, commencing and continuing a criminal judicial proceeding against Plaintiff.
106. The State of Florida made a bona fide termination of that judicial proceeding.
See attached hereto Plaintiff’s Exhibit C.
107. Defendant lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
108. Defendant acted with malice and under color of law.
109. Plaintiff suffered general and special damages conforming to the law.

18

110. Defendant committed the tort of malicious prosecution under color of state law
in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of
Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
111. Defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would
and obey firmly established law.
112. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.
COUNT XIV: STATE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS AGAINST DEFENDANT AZURE
113. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
114. Defendant committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and
willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
115. The Plaintiff’s emotional distress was and is severe in nature.
116. Plaintiff suffered severe social and personal embarrassment, pain, suffering,
and emotional distress at the time of Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and afterward.
117. Defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would
and obey firmly established law.
118. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.

19

COUNT XV: STATE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS AGAINST DEFENDANT NEWBANKS
119. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
120. Defendant committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and
willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
121. The Plaintiff’s emotional distress was and is severe in nature.
122. Plaintiff suffered severe social and personal embarrassment, pain, suffering,
and emotional distress at the time of Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and afterward.
123. Defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would
and obey firmly established law.
124. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.
COUNT XVI: STATE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS AGAINST DEFENDANT LEEDY
125. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
126. Defendant committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
under color of state law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and
willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.

20

127. The Plaintiff’s emotional distress was and is severe in nature.
128. Plaintiff suffered severe social and personal embarrassment, pain, suffering,
and emotional distress at the time of Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and afterward.
129. Defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would
and obey firmly established law.
130. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.
COUNT XVII: STATE TORT OF DEFAMATION PER SE AGAINST DEFENDANT
AZURE
131. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
132. Defendant committed the state tort of defamation per se under color of state
law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of
Plaintiff’s human rights, safety, and property.
133. Defendant accused Plaintiff of committing a misdemeanor when absolutely no
probable cause existed that Plaintiff did anything other than exercise Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights to free speech under the United States Constitution.
134. Defendant published this defamation to numerous third parties.
135. Defendant described Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s spouse as “monsters” on
Defendant’s Facebook Page and coupled this defamatory statement with Plaintiff’s booking
photograph.

21

136. Plaintiff need not prove damages to recover under the state claim of
defamation per se. Damages are assumed under Florida common law.
137. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.
COUNT XVIII: STATE TORT OF DEFAMATION PER SE AGAINST DEFENDANT
NEWBANKS
138. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
139. Defendant committed the state tort of defamation per se under color of state
law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of
Plaintiff’s human rights, safety, and property rights.
140. Defendant accused Plaintiff of committing a misdemeanor when absolutely no
probable cause existed that Plaintiff did anything other than exercise Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights to free speech under the United States Constitution.
141. Defendant published this defamation to numerous third parties.
142. Plaintiff need not prove damages to recover under the state claim of
defamation per se. Damages are assumed under Florida common law.
143. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.
COUNT XIX: STATE TORT OF DEFAMATION PER SE AGAINST DEFENDANT
LEEDY

22

144. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
145. Defendant committed the state tort of defamation per se under color of state
law in bad faith and with malicious purpose in reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of
Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
146. Defendant accused Plaintiff of committing a misdemeanor when absolutely no
probable cause existed that Plaintiff did anything other than exercise Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights to free speech under the United States Constitution.
147. Defendant published this defamation to numerous third parties.
148. Plaintiff need not prove damages to recover under the state claim of
defamation per se. Damages are assumed under Florida common law.
149. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.
COUNT XX: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 MONELL CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT BLAIR AS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICER OF MARION COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE
150. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint.
151. Blair’s written and unwritten policies and customs of Marion County Sheriff’s
Office encouraged, caused, and/or enabled Defendants to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional and
state rights.
152. Blair is responsible for Defendants’ supervision, training, and discipline as
well as Defendants’ actions through Blair’s policy-making powers and personnel decisions,

23

and there is an obvious need Blair to have trained and train all Defendants on First
Amendment rights and clearly established law to protest law enforcement actions peacefully.
153. Blair has failed to train Defendants adequately on First Amendment rights and
ensure citizens can protest law enforcement actions peacefully without fear of arrest.
154. Blair has failed to train Defendants on Fourth Amendment rights and enact
safeguards against unconstitutional searches and seizures despite clearly established law.
155. Blair has failed to train Defendants on Fifth Amendment rights and enact
safeguards against denial of procedural and substantive Due Process despite clearly
established law.
156. Blair has failed to train Defendants on Eighth Amendment rights and enact
safeguards against cruel and unusual punishment despite clearly established law.
157. Blair has and continues to demonstrate reckless, callous, and bad faith
indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional and state rights.
158. Only irrational, imprudent, irresponsible, and unreasonable executive agencies
of municipalities and political subdivisions would fail to train its law enforcement officers on
the constitutional law issues concerning and arising out of § 843.02 Fla. Stat. (2012).
159. Blair had and has an affirmative duty to ensure all Defendants, including Blair,
know and obey firmly established laws. Proper supervision, training, and discipline are
paramount to protecting Plaintiff’s and all other citizens’ constitutional and state rights.
160. Blair failed and continues to fail to safeguard citizens’ constitutional rights,
freedoms, and liberties interests by not properly training, supervising, and disciplining
Defendants as well as all other Marion County Sheriff’s Office deputies.

24

161. Blair’s callous, reckless, wanton, and malicious actions under color of state
law before, during, and after this loss, has caused Plaintiff to suffer and continue to suffer the
damages Plaintiff has described.
162. Blair unlawfully deprived Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s constitutional and state rights,
and did so under color of state law in bad faith, with malicious purpose, and in callous,
reckless, wanton, and willful disregard of Plaintiff’s human, safety, and property rights.
163. Blair, through the Marion County Sheriff’s Office, has explicitly adopted,
endorsed, and defended Defendants’ individual and collective unconstitutional actions against
Plaintiff.
164. The Marion County Sheriff’s Office has a well-documented history of
engaging in civil rights abuses that have culminated in successful lawsuits.
165. These deprivations under color of state law are actionable under and may be
redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §1367.
RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the following relief:
A. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
paragraphs in this complaint,
B. Trial by jury on all issues so triable;
C. General and special compensatory damages;
D. Punitive damages;

25

E. Award to Plaintiff of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in
connection with this action from the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988;
F. Pretrial interest on compensable attorney’s fees;
G. Injunctive relief declaring § 843.02 Fla. Stat. (2012) to be facially and as
applied unconstitutional because it grants Florida law enforcement officers unfettered
discretion; and,
H. Such further and different relief as is just and proper or that is
necessary to make the Plaintiff whole.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
with the Federal Clerk of the Court for the Middle District of Florida using the CM/ECF system,
which will send notification of such filing to all persons registered for this case, including the
Defendants’ counsel(s).
s/Christopher R. Dillingham II, Esq.
__________________________
Plaintiff’s Counsel
FL Bar Number 98382
The Dillingham Law Firm PLLC
900 Plymouth Sorrento Road #593
Plymouth, FL 32768-0593
Email: Chris@DillinghamLawFirm.com
Phone: 407-463-3506
Offices: Apopka

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I electronically filed today, on June 10, 2014 the foregoing
DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT A
14009185
REPORT NUMBER
Marion Gounty
Sheriff's Office
INCIDENT REPORT
NARRATIVE
REPORTED BY 5'I96 MURE, LISA REPORTFILED 0410612014
ON 4-5-14 AT APPROXIMATELY 2330 HOURS, WRITER AND DEPUTY NEWBANKS, ID 5715, RESPONDED TO THE 15600
BLOCK OF SW 16 AVENUE, IN REFERENCE TO A COMPLAINT OF A LARGE PARTY.
UPON ARRIVAL, THREE SUBJECTS WERE LOCATED WITH MARIJUANA REFERENCE TO THIS AGENCY'S CASE NUMBER 514-
09175. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS INVESTIGATION, WRITER WAS ATTEMPTING TO HAVE TWO PARTY GOERS MOVE
THEIR VEHICLES FROM THE ROADWAY, DUE TO THEM BLOCKING TRAFFIC. WHILE INSTRUCTING PERSON TO DO SO, THE
DEFENDANT, JASON POMALES, APPEARED FROM THE CROWD AND ADVISED NO ONE HAD TO LISTEN TO WRITER AND NO
ONE HAD TO MOVE THEIR VEHICLES. BOTH DEPUTIES TOLD DEFENDANT JASON POMALES SEVERAL TIMES TO WALK
AWAY AND NOT TO INTERFERE, WHICH HE FAILED TO COMPLY. BOTH DEPUTIES STARTED WALKING TOWARDS
DEFENDANT JASON POMALES TO DISCUSS WITH HIM THE LAW OF ABIDING OUR COMMANDS AND DEFENDANT JASON
POMALES YELLED, SEVERAL TIMES, TO GET OFF PRIVATE PROPERTY, DUE TO HAVING NO LAWFUL RIGHT TO BE AT THE
LOCATION. AS WRITER WAS EXPLAINING TO DEFENDANT JASON POMALES, WE WERE INVESTIGATING AN OPEN HOUSE
PARTY WHERE A COVER CHARGE WAS BEING COLLECTED TO ENTER THE PARTY, THE DEFENDANT KEPT ARGUING WITH
WRITER;THEREFORE, WRITER TOLD DEFENDANT JASON POMALES TO WALK AWAY OR HE WOULD BE ARRESTED, THE
DEFENDANT STATED HE DID NOT HAVE TO LISTEN TO WRITER. WRITER TOLD DEFENDANT JASON POMALES HE WAS
UNDER ARREST AND PLACED HIM INTO HANDCUFFS.
WHILE WALKING THE DEFENDANT TO WRITER'S PATROL VEHICLE, A LARGE CROWD FORMED AROUND THE DEPUTIES.
SEVERAL PARTY GOERS WERE YELLING AND SCREAMING AT THE DEPUTIES. SEVERAL TIMES, ALL DEPUTIES GAVE
VERBAL COMMANDS FOR THE CROWD TO DISPERSE. CO.DEFENDANT STACEY POMALES, REFUSED TO LISTEN TO
COMMANDS TO BACK AWAY FROM DEPUTIES. CO-DEFENDANT STACEY POMALES CONTINUED TO STAND AND YELL AT
WRITER, DEMANDING TO KNOW WHY THE DEFENDANT WAS BEING ARRESTED. CO DEFENDANT POMALES WALKED
AROUND DEPUTY'S PATROL VEHICLE WHERE DEFENDANT POMALES WAS. SHE HAD TO BE TOLD TO BACK AWAY FROM
WRITER'S PATROL VEHICLE. WRITER DID TELL TO THE CO-DEFENDANT, THE DEFENDANT IS AN ADULT AND SHE NEEDED
TO BACK AWAY FROM THE SCENE OR SHE WOULD BE ARRESTED ALSO, AT WHICH TIME, SHE FAILED TO COMPLY. THE
CO-DEFENDANT LEANED AGAINST DEPUry NEWBANKS' PATROL VEHICLE AND CONTINUED TO DISOBEY COWANDS TO
BACK AWAY FROM THE PATROL VEHICLE. WRITER TOLD HER AGAIN AND WHEN SHE DID NOT COMPLY, WRITER TOLD
HER TO TURN AROUND AND PLACED HER HANDS BEHIND HER BACK BECAUSE SHE WAS ALSO UNDER ARREST, WHEN
WRITER GRABBED THE CO-DEFENDANT'S LEFT HAND, SHE TOOK A STEP BACK AND ATTEMPTED TO PULL OUT OF
WRITER'S GRIP SAYING "NO.'' THE CO-DEFENDANT WAS SECURED INTO HANDCUFFS AND PLACED IN THE BACK OF
DEPUTY NEWBANKS' VEHICLE.
IT SHOULD BE NOTED, IT APPEARED THE CO-DEFENDANT WAS VIDEO RECORDING THIS ENTIRE INCIDENT;THEREFORE,
HER CELL PHONE WAS COLLECTED AS EVIDENCE. DEPUTY NEWBANKS PLACED THE CELL PHONE INTO LATENT LOCKER
AT THE SOUTHWEST DISTRICT OFFICE.
WHILE ON THE WAY TO THE MARION COUNTY JAIL, THE DEFENDANT TOLD WRITER ''YOU ARE MESSING WITH THE
WRONG GUY TONIGHT.' 'YOU ARE GOING TO BE SORRY.'' 'YOU BETTER BE REALLY SCARED." AND STATED HE WAS
GOING TO REPORT ME TO 'COPBLOCK". THE DEFENDANT ADVISED HE PROTECTS OTHERS FROM WRITER AND 'THUG"
DEPUTIES. THE DEFENDANT STATED HE WOULD HAVE WRITER'S HEAD AND HER JOB AND PREPARE FOR AN "I.4.'
(TNTERNAL AFFAIRS).
WRITER DELIVERED THE DEFENDANT TO THE MARION COUNTY JAIL WITHOUT INCIDENT.
CASE STATUS: CLOSED BY ARREST
TIME: 0435-0441 I IBC 521 1
TIME: 1957-20AYNCll5209 - AMENDED
Pintecl 4/9/2014 2:34 28 PM FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Page 4
DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT B
DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT C
IN THE COUNTY COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY
STATE OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 2014-MM-002738-A
AGENCY #: MCSO S149185
VS.
STACEY A POMALES/
CHARGE: I RESIST LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER W/OUT
VIOLENCE; II RESIST LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER W/OUT
VIOLENCE
ANNOUNCEMENT OF NO INFORMATION
Comes now the State of Florida, by and through its undersigned Assistant State Attorney, and
announces that it will file no information in the above entitled cause based on the following grounds:
Under the facts and circumstances of the case the likelihood of conviction at trial is minimal.
DATED this the 28th day of May, 2014.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above has been furnished to Christopher R
Dillingham II, 900 Plymouth Sorrento Rd #593, Plymouth, FL 32768-0593, by hand or mail delivery
or electronic service this 28th day of May, 2014.
BRAD KING
STATE ATTORNEY
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA
BY /s/
Melissa Amy Thibeault
Assistant State Attorney
Fla. Bar # 0085513
110 N.W. 1 Ave, Suite 5000
st
Ocala, FL 34475
(352) 671-5800
EServiceMarion@sao5.org
M-2014-17119
Filing # 14144528 Electronically Filed 05/28/2014 02:01:50 PM

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