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i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1) Was minor entitled to due process under the 14
th
Amendment, including legal
representation and notice to someone in her family, before being locked away by Ar-
lington County for an indeterminate period in a secure psychiatric institution for
the primary purpose of limiting AOB’s freedom and communications with others?

2) Did the Virginia Trial Court err in ruling that any non-parent lacks standing to
bring a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on behalf of a parentless child in Virgin-
ia Courts?
.

ii
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Pursuant to Rule 14.1(b), the following list identifies all of the parties appear-
ing here and before the Supreme Court of Virginia.
The Petitioner is Delores O’Brien Heffernan (“Grandmother”), the grand-
mother and Maryland Circuit Court appointed guardian of now, 14 year old, AOB.
Respondent are the Arlington County Department of Human Services (“Ar-
lington DHS”) and former Guardian Ad Litem Karen Grane (“GAL”).
CORPORATE DISCLOSURES

Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Petitioner states:

None
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented ......................................................................................... i
List Of Parties To The Proceeding ............................................................... ii
Corporate Disclosures ..................................................................................... ii
Table Of Contents ........................................................................................... iii
Table Of Citations ............................................................................................ v
Opinions Below ................................................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................... 2
Constitutional And Statutory Provisions ................................................... 2

• US CONSTITUTION FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: SECTION 1
• US CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, SECTION 9:
• VIRGINIA CODE § 1-200. THE COMMON LAW.
• VIRGINIA CODE § 1-201. ACTS OF PARLIAMENT.
• VIRGINIA CODE § 8.01-8. HOW MINORS MAY SUE.
• VIRGINIA CODE § 8.01-654. WHEN AND BY WHOM WRIT GRANTED;
WHAT PETITION TO CONTAIN.
Statement Of The Case .................................................................................... 6
Reasons To Grant The Petition ................................................................... 11

1) WAS MINOR ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 14
TH

AMENDMENT, INCLUDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND NOTICE
TO SOMEONE IN HER FAMILY, BEFORE BEING LOCKED AWAY BY
ARLINGTON COUNTY FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIOD IN A SECURE
PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTION FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF LIMITING
AOB’S FREEDOM AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH OTHERS? ..................... 11

2) DID THE VIRGINIA TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT ANY
NON-PARENT LACKS STANDING TO BRING A PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ON BEHALF OF A PARENTLESS CHILD
IN VIRGINIA COURTS? ............................................................................ 16

iv
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 21

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................... 22
DECISIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ..................................... APPENDIX A
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO TRANSFER TO
SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA .............................. APPENDIX B
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA DENYING
PETITION FOR APPEAL ........................................... APPENDIX C
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA DENYING
REHEARING OF DENIAL OF APPEAL ....................... APPENDIX D
MATERIAL REQUIRED BY RULE 14.1 (F) AND 1 (G)(I) ..... APPENDIX E
OTHER MATERIAL ESSENTIAL TO UNDERSTANDING
THE PETITION .......................................................... APPENDIX F


v
TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804 (1979) ............................................ 13
Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 374 S.E.2d 301 (1988) .................................... 17
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kinzer, 206 Va. 175, 142 S.E.2d 514 (1965). ............. 16
Herndon v. St. Mary's Hosp. Inc., 587 S.E.2d 567, 266 Va. 472 (Va., 2003) ....... 16, 19
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1048 (1972) ..................................... 13
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401 (1977) ........................................... 13
Isbell v. Commercial Investment Assocs., Inc., 273 Va. 605, 644 S.E.2d 72 (2007) ... 17
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U. S. 407 (2002). ........................................................................ 11
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997) .................................................................. 11
Morris v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 720 (ED Va. 1975), ......................................... 18
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486 (1975) ...................................... 13
Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 600, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979) .................................... 12-13
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976) ................................................................................................. 12
Shivaee v. Com., 613 S.E.2d 570, 270 Va. 112 (Va, 2005) .......................................... 12
Smith ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Comm'n v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050
(CA8), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987) ................................................................ 17
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
89 S. Ct. 733 (1969) ................................................................................................... 12
Troxel et vir. v Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000) .................................... 12
US v Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705 (2013) .......................................................................... 16
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 at 491, 100 S.Ct. 1254 (1980) .................................. 12, 14
Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511 (CA5 1978) ................................................................... 17
Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250 (CA7 1989) .................................................................. 17
Womble v. Gunter, 198 Va. 522, 95 S.E.2d 213 (1956) ................................................ 19
Statutes
31 Car. II, ch. 2 ............................................................................................................. 17
47 USC 42 U.S.C. 5101 et seq (CAPTA) ...................................................................... 21
Virginia Code § 1-200 ............................................................................................... 2, 16
Virginia Code § 1-201 ............................................................................................... 3, 16
Virginia Code § 8.01-8 ....................................................................................... 3, 18 - 20
Virginia Code § 8-87 ..................................................................................................... 20
Virginia Code § 8.01-654 .......................................................................................... 3, 15

Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Constitution Article I Section IX ....................................................................... 2, 8
U.S. Constitution Fourteenth Amendment ............................................................ 2, 7-8
Virginia Constitution Article I Section IX ................................................................. 2, 8

1
OPINIONS BELOW

Writ of Certiorari is sought for the denial of a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, upon which the Supreme Court of Virginia issued its final denial for rehear-
ing by on March 7, 2014. (Appendix E - 15)
On January 4, 2013, the Arlington Circuit Court (“Trial Court”) issued its
opinion denying the “Emergency Petition for Habeas Corpus,” filed pro se by
Grandmother on September 4, 2012. (“Grandmother’s Petition,” Appendix A - 2)
Grandmother’s Petition sought to free her granddaughter, AOB (for whom she was
also the Maryland Circuit Court Appointed Guardian), from being held in a secure
psychiatric facility for months without any due process hearing, legal representa-
tion, or notification of any next of kin.
The Trial Court denied rehearing of its January 4, 2013 opinion on January
14, 2013. (Appendix A-9)
Timely appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals of Virginia. On July 13,
2013, the Court of Appeals of Virginia sua sponte, referred the matter along with
the briefs of the parties to the Supreme Court of Virginia on jurisdictional grounds.
(Appendix B-11) The Supreme Court of Virginia issued a summary denial of the
Petition on December 18, 2013. (Appendix C- 13) It denied rehearing on March 7,
2014. (Appendix D-15)
All of the opinions below were unpublished.
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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Virginia issued its final decision denying the last re-
hearing of the opinions on the lower court decisions on March 7, 2014. This Court
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S. Code § 1257.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

This case involves the following constitutional provisions:
US Constitution Fourteenth Amendment:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.

US Constitution Article I, Section 9:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

Virginia Constitution Article I, Section 9. Prohibition of excessive bail
and fines, cruel and unusual punishment, suspension of habeas corpus, bills
of attainder, and ex post facto laws.

That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted; that the privilege of the writ of ha-
beas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of invasion or rebel-
lion, the public safety may require; and that the General Assembly shall not
pass any bill of attainder, or any ex post facto law.

This case involves the following statutory provisions:
Virginia Code § 1-200. The common law.
The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles
of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue
3
in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by
the General Assembly.

Virginia Code § 1-201. Acts of Parliament.
The right and benefit of all writs, remedial and judicial, given by any statute
or act of Parliament, made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year
of the reign of James the First, of a general nature, not local to England, shall
still be saved, insofar as the same are consistent with the Bill of Rights and
Constitution of this Commonwealth and the Acts of Assembly.

Virginia Code § 8.01-8. How minors may sue.

Any minor entitled to sue may do so by his next friend. Either or both parents
may sue on behalf of a minor as his next friend.

Virginia Code § 8.01-654. When and by whom writ granted; what peti-
tion to contain.

A. 1. The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum shall be granted forthwith by
the Supreme Court or any circuit court, to any person who shall apply for the
same by petition, showing by affidavits or other evidence probable cause to
believe that he is detained without lawful authority.

2. A petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, other than a petition
challenging a criminal conviction or sentence, shall be brought within one
year after the cause of action accrues. A habeas corpus petition attacking a
criminal conviction or sentence, except as provided in § 8.01-654.1 for cases in
which a death sentence has been imposed, shall be filed within two years
from the date of final judgment in the trial court or within one year from ei-
ther final disposition of the direct appeal in state court or the time for filing
such appeal has expired, whichever is later.

B. 1. With respect to any such petition filed by a petitioner held under crimi-
nal process, and subject to the provisions of subsection C of this section and of
§ 17.1-310, only the circuit court which entered the original judgment order of
conviction or convictions complained of in the petition shall have authority to
issue writs of habeas corpus. If a district court entered the original judgment
order of conviction or convictions complained of in the petition, only the cir-
cuit court for the city or county wherein the district court sits shall have au-
thority to issue writs of habeas corpus. Hearings on such petition, where
granted in the circuit court, may be held at any circuit court within the same
4
circuit as the circuit court in which the petition was filed, as designated by
the judge thereof.

2. Such petition shall contain all allegations the facts of which are known to
petitioner at the time of filing and such petition shall enumerate all previous
applications and their disposition. No writ shall be granted on the basis of
any allegation the facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of fil-
ing any previous petition. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a
petitioner's first petition for a writ of habeas corpus when the sole allegation
of such petition is that the petitioner was deprived of the right to pursue an
appeal from a final judgment of conviction or probation revocation, except
that such petition shall contain all facts pertinent to the denial of appeal that
are known to the petitioner at the time of the filing, and such petition shall
certify that the petitioner has filed no prior habeas corpus petitions attacking
the conviction or probation revocation.

3. Such petition may allege detention without lawful authority through chal-
lenge to a conviction, although the sentence imposed for such conviction is
suspended or is to be served subsequently to the sentence currently being
served by petitioner.

4. In the event the allegations of illegality of the petitioner's detention can be
fully determined on the basis of recorded matters, the court may make its de-
termination whether such writ should issue on the basis of the record.

5. The court shall give findings of fact and conclusions of law following a de-
termination on the record or after hearing, to be made a part of the record
and transcribed.

6. If petitioner alleges as a ground for illegality of his detention the inadequa-
cy of counsel, he shall be deemed to waive his privilege with respect to com-
munications between such counsel and himself to the extent necessary to
permit a full and fair hearing for the alleged ground.

C. 1. With respect to any such petition filed by a petitioner held under the
sentence of death, and subject to the provisions of this subsection, the Su-
preme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to consider and award writs of
habeas corpus. The circuit court which entered the judgment order setting
the sentence of death shall have authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing
on such a petition only if directed to do so by order of the Supreme Court.

2. Hearings conducted in a circuit court pursuant to an order issued under
the provisions of subdivision 1 of this subsection shall be limited in subject
matter to the issues enumerated in the order.
5

3. The circuit court shall conduct such a hearing within 90 days after the or-
der of the Supreme Court has been received and shall report its findings of
fact and recommend conclusions of law to the Supreme Court within 60 days
after the conclusion of the hearing. Any objection to the report of the circuit
court must be filed in the Supreme Court within 30 days after the report is
filed.

6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Delores O’Brien Heffernan, now 68 years old (hereinafter,
“Grandmother”), was granted custody of her, now 14-year-old, granddaughter, AOB,
by the Maryland Circuit Court on September 19, 1999 only three days after AOB
was born in Maryland. (“Maryland Custody Order”) (Appendix F-49) In 2005,
Grandmother was additionally granted permanent guardianship of AOB by the
Maryland Circuit Court. (“Maryland Guardianship Order,” Appendix F-47).
In 2010, Respondent Arlington County Department of Human Services (here-
inafter, “Arlington County” or “Arlington DHS”) placed AOB in foster care, after ab-
ruptly taking her away from Grandmother.
In June 2012, Arlington County locked up AOB in Hallmark Youthcare
Richmond, which is a walled secure psychiatric facility. Arlington County placed
AOB in the facility because AOB had complained, to no avail, about the abominable
conditions in an over populated foster home/day care facility where Arlington Coun-
ty had placed her, and she finally, in desperation, ran away from that foster home in
April 2012. (See, Grandmother’s Petition at Appendix F-34) In an unrelated case,
a Hallmark Youthcare social worker testified that there was nothing psychologically
wrong with AOB and that she was placed in that secure psychological facility pri-
marily because she had run away from the overcrowded foster child day care/foster
care home.
1
Arlington County incarcerated her in Hallmark Youthcare without any

1
When a Hallmark Youthcare social worker was asked on the witness stand on
June 21, 2012 in another circuit court case why AOB was admitted to Hallmark
7
proper due process, including failing to provide her legal representation, having a
hearing before a non-conflicted judge, and failing to notify anyone in her family.
Grandmother filed an Emergency Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus on
September 4, 2012 (hereinafter, “Petition”) in the Arlington County Circuit Court
(“Trial Court”). (Appendix F-19) Grandmother swore to the facts set forth in the
Petition. The Petition asked the Trial Court to order Arlington County to:
a) produce AOB before that Court,
b) release her from incarceration in the psychiatric institution, Hallmark
Youthcare Richmond,
c) place her in a proper foster care facility in Arlington County,
d) allow her to go to her Arlington County school,
e) allow contact between AOB and her family in order to afford her pro-
tection from further abuse and neglect by Arlington DHS to assure
her safety,
f) keep her family informed of her placement and condition, and
g) cease their effective abandonment of A.O.B.

- Appendix F - 29
The Petition objected to the violation of AOB’s due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution by the state agency when incarcer-
ating this minor foster child in the secure psychiatric facility.
The constitutional issues were again raised by Grandmother in a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Emergency Status filed on October 1, 2013 ("The writ [of ha-
beas corpus] is guaranteed by U.S. Constitution Article I Section IX and by Virginia

Youthcare, she replied:
“10 Q Oh, okay. And are you aware of how -- or I
11 guess why she was admitted into your facility?
12 A Yes.
13 Q And what were those reasons?
14 A She was admitted following detention due to
15 AWOL. “[Absent without leave]

8
Constitution Article I Section 9."). (Appendix F-42) It was further raised in
Grandmother’s December 4, 2012 “Response to Opposition [to Petition for Habeas
Corpus] Filed by Respondent [Arlington County],”:
Respondent obviously did not read the Petition very carefully, as numerous
constitutional violations were alleged, including, that [AOB] was, and contin-
ues to be:

a) held against her will based on fraudulent grounds (violation of due process,
liberty, and freedom of association),

b) committed without representation of counsel even though she requested
counsel on more than one occasion, including on June 7, 2012 (violation of
right to counsel),

c) committed before JDR Judge Varoutsos, who had admitted in writing he
had conflicts of interest in the matter, (violation of due process);

d) illegally administered adult drugs (not approved for children) without
proper authority, bullied, and a victim of violence while being held in total
isolation from the outside world in Hallmarks high security facility, (violation
of due process, freedom of speech, liberty, and freedom of association)

e) that the Arlington Department of Human Services was isolating [AOB] by
said incarceration to cover up her being abused and neglected, medically ne-
glected, as well as beaten and tasered by Arlington County Sheriff's deputies,
while she was in the Department's care and custody, (violation of due process,
freedom of speech, and liberty)
and,

f) was held in an effective incarceration/warehousing condition that was cruel
and unusual punishment where she had not been found to have committed
any crime, (violation of cruel and unusual punishment, freedom of speech,
due process and liberty)

- all being paid for using fraudulently obtained Medicaid funds. (violation of
state and federal Medicaid statutes; and the federal False Claims Act);

- Id. at 6

The above points were raised again in the “Petitioner’s Motion for Judgment
9
on the Pleadings, Or, In the Alternative, for Leave to Conduct Discovery,” Grand-
mother filed December 7, 2012, at 2-3.
On January 4, 2013, the Trial Court ruled that the placement of AOB in a se-
cure psychiatric institution is not incarceration, and thus, she was not entitled to
due process:
“This Court finds that, even if Petitioner had standing to bring this petition,
the minor child is not actually or "effectively" incarcerated. The child is not
serving a detention sentence, and she is not in the custody of the Department
of Juvenile Justice or a local juvenile detention facility. Petitioner offers no
legal authority for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to address a decision
by Arlington DHS to place the child in a residential setting of its choosing.”

- Trial Court Order at ¶18 (Appendix A -7).


As to standing, the Trial Court Order concluded that only a parent can bring
a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with regard to a child:
Petitioner lacks standing to file a legal action on the child's behalf. Section
8.01-8 of the Code of Virginia (1950), as amended, states that "either or both
parents" may sue on behalf of a child as next friend. However, termination of
parental rights renders the parent “a legal stranger to the child' and severs
'all parental rights.'" Weaver v. Roanoke Dep't of Human Resources, 220 Va.
921, 926, 265 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1980) (citation omitted).

- Trial Court Order at ¶14 (Appendix A-6).


Under the Trial Court’s reasoning, because the residual parental rights of
both of AOB’s parents had been terminated in July 2012, AOB would be parentless,
leaving no one who could file a legal action on her behalf.
Based on this reasoning, the Trial Court Order of January 4, 2013 dismissed
the Grandmother’s Petition for Habeas Corpus.
10
On January 14, 2013, the Trial Court summarily denied reconsideration.
Appeal was taken by Grandmother to the Court of Appeals of Virginia and
briefs were filed. The assignments of error addressed in the briefs raised to the
constitutional deprivation of due process when AOB was incarcerated and Grand-
mother’s standing issue, [“2) The Trial Court erroneously dismissed the Petition
based on the erroneous finding that being locked up indefinitely in a psychiatric in-
stitution without a valid medical reason, and for the purpose of limiting a person’s
freedom and communications is not “incarceration.” [entitled to due process] (Pre-
served App-51, 65-66, 77-78, 89-92).”] [“1) The Trial Court erroneously dismissed
Appellant as having no standing to bring the Petition, misapplying VA Code §8.01-8
(Preserved at App-65, 78, and 89 - 90)”; and “4) The Court’s Legal Analysis Regard-
ing Guardianship Is Clearly Erroneous and Not Supported by Any Court Order
(Preserved at App-58, 65-66, 72, 75, 78, 89 through 90).”] Grandmother’s Brief to
Court of Appeals, Record No. 0214-13-4, filed May 28, 2013, at 5 (Assignments of
Error)]
The Court of Appeals sua sponte transferred the case, along with the briefs
and record, to the Supreme Court of Virginia without ruling on the matter. Their
reasoning was that jurisdiction over appeals of Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus
lie only with the Supreme Court of Virginia. (Appendix B – 11)
On December 18, 2013, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued a summary de-
nial of the Petition. (Appendix C – 13) On March 7, 2014, the Supreme Court re-
hearing of that denial was also summarily denied. (Appendix D – 18)
11
REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION

1) WAS MINOR ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 14
TH
AMENDMENT, INCLUDING LEGAL
REPRESENTATION AND NOTICE TO SOMEONE IN HER FAMILY, BEFORE BEING LOCKED AWAY BY
ARLINGTON COUNTY FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIOD IN A SECURE PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTION
FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF LIMITING AOB’S FREEDOM AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH
OTHERS?

The Trial Court Order took the view that a teenager (here 13 years old) is not
entitled to due process protections except when he/she is serving a “detention sen-
tence” in a Department of Juvenile Justice or a local juvenile detention facility.
Trial Court Order at ¶18 (Appendix A -7) The Virginia Court’s view deviates from
this Court’s view that due process protections are generally required when a person
is involuntarily committed, with loss of liberty, to a psychiatric facility.
This Court has firmly established, "commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection." (emphasis
added) Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d 323
(1979).
Due process protections are not only required for commitment for criminal
punishment, they are also required for civil commitment to mental institutions for
mental illness. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 356-358 (1997); Kan-
sas v. Crane, 534 U. S. 407 (2002).
Until its recent upholding of the Trial Court Order in this case, the Supreme
Court of Virginia appeared to agree that civil commitment requires constitutional
due process protections as requiring by both the Constitutions of US and Virginia.
See, e.g. Shivaee v. Com., 613 S.E.2d 570 at 575, 270 Va. 112 (Va, 2005).
12
Minors are no less entitled to constitutional protections of their rights and
liberties despite their age. See, e.g., Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 600, 61 L. Ed.
2d 101, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979) (liberty interest in avoiding involuntary confinement);
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788,
96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well
as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights");
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-507,
21 L. Ed. 2d 731, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969) (First Amendment right to political speech);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967) (due process
rights in criminal proceedings).” As noted by Justices Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy
at note 9 of their dissent in Troxel et vir. v Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054,
147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000): “This Court has on numerous occasions acknowledged that
children are in many circumstances possessed of constitutionally protected rights
and liberties.”
This Court has specifically found that in cases where an individual is trans-
ferred to a psychiatric facility from a criminal prison, it involves a “massive cur-
tailment of liberty” and thus due process protections are required for such a trans-
fer to occur.
As this Court stated in in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 at 491, 100 S.Ct. 1254,
63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980):
We have recognized that for the ordinary citizen, commitment to a mental
hospital produces "a massive curtailment of liberty," Humphrey v. Cady, 405
13
U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 1052, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972), and in consequence
"requires due process protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99
S.Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 580, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2496, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975) (BURGER, C. J.,
concurring). The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is
more than a loss of freedom from confinement. It is indisputable that
commitment to a mental hospital "can engender adverse social consequences
to the individual" and that "[w]hether we label this phenomena 'stigma' or
choose to call it something else . . . we recognize that it can occur and that it
can have a very significant impact on the individual." Addington v. Texas,
supra, at 425-426, 99 S.Ct., at 1809. See also Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584,
600, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2503, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979). Also, "[a]mong the historic
liberties" protected by the Due Process Clause is the "right to be free from,
and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security."
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711
(1977). Compelled treatment in the form of mandatory behavior modification
programs, to which the District Court found Jones was exposed in this case,
was a proper factor to be weighed by the District Court. Cf. Addington v.
Texas, supra, at 427, 99 S.Ct., at 1810.

Vitek at 491-492


This Court went on to say:

The transfer of a prisoner from a prison to a mental hospital must be accompa-
nied by appropriate procedural protections. Involuntary commitment to a men-
tal hospital is not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a
prison sentence subjects an individual. … the stigmatizing consequences of a
transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled
with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a
treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that
requires procedural protections.

Vitek at 491-494

Vitek set out a list of the minimum procedures before transferring a prisoner to
a mental hospital:
"A. Written notice to the prisoner that a transfer to a mental hospital is being
considered;
"B. A hearing, sufficiently after the notice to permit the prisoner to prepare,
at which disclosure to the prisoner is made of the evidence being relied upon
14
for the transfer and at which an opportunity to be heard in person and to
present documentary evidence is given;
"C. An opportunity at the hearing to present testimony of witnesses by the
defense and to confront and cross-examine witnesses called by the state,
except upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting
such presentation, confrontation, or cross-examination;
"D. An independent decisionmaker;
"E. A written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the
reasons for transferring the inmate;
"F. Availability of legal counsel, furnished by the state, if the inmate is
financially unable to furnish his own; and
"G. Effective and timely notice of all the foregoing rights."

Vitek at 494-495


Just as a criminal who is being forcibly transferred to a psychiatric institution
is entitled to due process, so too is a foster child, like AOB, who is forcibly trans-
ferred from a foster home environment to a psychiatric institution. Both transfers
constitute the deprivation of liberty. Both transfers carry the stigmatizing conse-
quences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment.
Both call for procedural protections.
There was no disputing by Arlington DHS that AOB, who was a teenager in
foster care, was forcibly placed in a secure psychiatric facility, Hallmark Youthcare
Richmond without procedural due process protections. There was also no disputing
the allegations that Hallmark is a completely walled-in facility, like a high security
prison, completely isolated from the outside world, with no ability to communicate
with others the outside, subjected to involuntarily administered drugs, no freedom
to leave, no access to personal personal belongings, etc. When placed in Hallmark,
a child loses her liberty as if they were incarcerated in juvenile jail. As the Hall-
15
mark social worker testified, AOB was placed in Hallmark as punishment for run-
ning away (“AWOL”) from her overcrowded foster care/child care home. She had no
serious psychological problems that would warrant being placed in Hallmark.
The Trial Court, without any legal basis, below found no need for due process
protections for foster children when they are forcibly committed to psychiatric insti-
tutions for indefinite periods.
A Petition for Writ Habeas Corpus provided the only remedy in this situation.
There was no other procedural vehicle available to Grandmother to urge the Trial
Court to examine the unconstitutional incarceration of AOB. Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus is provided for in the Virginia Code for this very situation. Virginia
Code § 8.01-654. The statute does not limit the filing of such petitions to incar-
ceration for a criminal offense. The statute specifically contemplates such a petition
being used in a non-criminal commitment situation, such as this. See, e.g., VA Code
§ 8.01-654(2) [“A petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, other than a
petition challenging a criminal conviction or sentence, shall be brought within one
year after the cause of action accrues.”].
This case provides the Court the unique opportunity to clarify that due process
procedural protections must apply to foster children forcibly transferred to psychi-
atric facilities.
2
Given the family court “Kids for Cash” abuses that recently came

2
AOB has since been moved to another psychiatric institution after spending 10
months at Hallmark. While she has some greater freedoms at the new psychiatric
facility, the problems remain of her having been committed to Hallmark and then to
another psychiatric institution, all without due process procedural safeguards. If
16
to light (and prosecuted) where judges accepted bribes for the unwarranted place-
ment of thousands of juveniles in certain private facilities, the need for procedural
protections for juveniles could not be greater than any other time. See, e.g., US v
Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705 (2013)
Grandmother urges this Supreme Court to grant this petition in order to clar-
ify that foster children forcibly placed in psychiatric facilities are entitled to due
process protection rights under the US Constitution.

2) DID THE VIRGINIA TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT A NON-PARENT HAS NO STANDING TO
BRING A PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ON BEHALF OF A PARENTLESS CHILD IN
VIRGINIA COURTS?

In Virginia, the common law of England applies in so far as it is not repug-
nant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth,
or altered by the General Assembly. Virginia Code § 1-200. Writs also survived
and remain within the Virginia common law. Virginia Code §1-201.
Virginia’s well-established canons of construction with regard to the common
law are:
When construing a statute in derogation of the common law, we apply several
established principles. “[A] statutory provision will not be held to change the
common law unless the legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested.”
Herndon v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 266 Va. 472, 476, 587 S.E.2d 567, 569
(2003). “Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed
and not to be enlarged in their operation by construction beyond their express
terms.” Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kinzer, 206 Va. 175, 181, 142 S.E.2d
514, 518 (1965). Accordingly, “[a] statutory change in the common law is lim-
ited to that which is expressly stated in the statute or necessarily implied by
its language because there is a presumption that no change was intended.”

the court does not address the matter in this situation, then it will be repeated
again and again by Virginia.
17
Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 186, 523 S.E.2d 246, 250 (2000). “When an
enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the common law,
it abrogates the common-law rule only to the extent that its terms are direct-
ly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule.” Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va.
346, 349, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988).

Isbell v. Commercial Investment Assocs., Inc., 273 Va. 605, 613-14, 644
S.E.2d 72, 75 (2007) (some internal citations omitted).

As early as the 17th century, the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 author-
ized complaints to be filed by "any one on . . . behalf" of detained persons, see 31
Car. II, ch. 2. In 1704, the House of Lords resolved "[t]hat every Englishman, who
is imprisoned by any authority whatsoever, has an undoubted right, by his agents,
or friends, to apply for, and obtain a Writ of Habeas Corpus, in order to procure his
liberty by due course of law." See, Ashby v. White, 14 How. St. Tr. 695, 814 (Q. B.
1704).
The courts have found that filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as
“Next Friend” requires, first, inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disabil-
ity that explains why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to
prosecute the action. Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (CA7 1989); Smith ex rel.
Missouri Public Defender Comm'n v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050, 1053 (CA8), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987); Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513-514 (CA5 1978).
Here the first condition is clearly satisfied because AOB is a minor who is
under the control of Arlington County which was holding her in a secure psychiatric
facility.
Second, the "next friend" must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the
person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, see, e. g., Morris v. United States, 399 F.
18
Supp. 720, 722 (ED Va. 1975), and have some significant relationship with the real
party in interest.
This second condition is also easily satisfied here, as Grandmother is the
grandmother of AOB, brought her home from the hospital under a temporary custo-
dy order within three days of her birth, and then raised her as her own child. (Ap-
pendix F – 22-23) In 2005, the Maryland Circuit Court found Grandmother quali-
fied to be AOB’s guardian. (Appendix F – 49)
The Trial Court Order misinterpreted Virginia Code § 8.01-8 as limiting to a
child’s parents who may sue on behalf of a child to protect their constitutional
rights. The applicable code reads as follows:
§ 8.01-8. How minors may sue.
Any minor entitled to sue may do so by his next friend. Either or both
parents may sue on behalf of a minor as his next friend.
(Code 1950, § 8-87; 1977, c. 617; 1998, c. 402.)

- Virginia Code § 8.01-8

Under this provision, when a suit is filed for a minor, it must be styled in the
infant's name by his or her next friend. See, Rivera v. Nedrich, 259 Va. 1, 529 S.E.2d
310 (Va., 1999), citing Womble v. Gunter, 198 Va. 522, 530, 95 S.E.2d 213, 219
(1956); Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111, 116-17, 28 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1943).
Inconsistent with the principles of statutory construction and the caselaw,
the Trial Court Order erroneously concluded that the second sentence of Virginia
Code §8.01-8 – which was added in a 1998 amendment – limited who may file as
“next friend” to only parents. The illogical result of the Trial Court Order’s posi-
tion is that no party could sue on behalf of a child who was parentless child, wheth-
19
er they were parentless in fact or by termination of residual parental rights. In oth-
er words, under the Trial Court Order, no one could sue as “next friend” of AOB to
protect her due process rights after her parent’s residual parental rights were ter-
minated!
The better view is that which the Supreme Court of Virginia took in Herndon
v. St. Mary's Hosp. Inc., 587 S.E.2d 567, 266 Va. 472 (Va., 2003). In Herndon the
second sentence added to Virginia Code §8.01-8 was only intended to clarify that,
when a parent desires to bring a next friend suit, it may be brought by either or both
parents on behalf of a minor. The Supreme Court of Virginia explained:

The first sentence of the statute authorizes a minor child to bring an ac-
tion by his next friend. The second sentence, when considered together
with the first sentence, does not plainly manifest an intent to authorize
parents to bring a child's action in the parents' own name, but merely
specifies that either or both parents may act as next friend on behalf of
their minor child. Thus, we hold that the 1998 amendment to Code §
8.01-8 reflects the General Assembly's intent to clarify the fact that ei-
ther or both parents may initiate a single action as their child's next
friend.

- (emphasis added) Herndon at 570.

The first sentence of Virginia Code §8.01-8 leaves intact the Common Law
concept that any third party with enough may sue on behalf of a minor. If a person
is a “near relative,” guardian, or otherwise has enough interest in a minor’s welfare,
he or she can file a lawsuit in the name of a minor without seeking permission of the
court. Womble 219, 198 Va. 522 (1956) (analyzing 8.01-8 when its original cite ref-
erence was VA Code § 8-87), Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111 at 117, 28 S.E.2d 40 (Va,
1943), Rivera v. Nedrich, 259 Va. 1, 529 S.E.2d 310, 311-312 (Va., 1999).
20
Virginia’s well-established canons of construction dictate that the interpreta-
tion of second sentence Virginia Code § 8.01-8 not limit the common law right to a
next friend to bring a habeas corpus, leaving intact the common law view that any
person with enough interest in a minor’s welfare to file in that child’s name without
seeking permission of the court.
Thus, Grandmother had standing to bring the Petition below as next friend of
AOB because she certainly was AOB’s Maryland Circuit Court appointed guardian,
she was a near relative, and she certainly had enough interest in the minor’s wel-
fare. The Trial Court Order identifies no other person who was in a better position
to bring the petition for writ of habeas corpus against Arlington DHS to protect
AOB. Certainly, the alternative that the Trial Court Order leaves AOB with
(namely, no one to fend for her rights as next friend) is unacceptable.
Regardless of who brings the constitutional violations to the attention of a
court, the court should be under an affirmative obligation per parens patriae to in-
vestigate, protect and defend the child’s constitutional rights. If the trial court finds
that the person who brought the suit does not have standing, then it should appoint
an attorney to represent the child to bring the case.
The standing issue in the states with regard to who may sue on behalf of a
minor is critically important. With sky high divorce rates, non-traditional living,
upbringing, and birthing arrangements, and with newer federal programs that give
financial incentives to states to encourage removals and placements of children
(Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 47 USC 42 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.), there
21
are growing number of legally “parentless” children. This honorable Court is called
upon to address this issue so that those children will not be left out in the cold with
no one to protect their constitutional rights in state courts.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, and good cause shown, Grandmother urges
that this Petition be granted.

Respectfully submitted,




Roy L. Morris, Esq.* David Helfrey, Esq.
Offices of Roy Morris Sandberg Phoenix
PO Box 100212 & von Gontard
Arlington, VA 22210 600 Washington Ave. 15th
202 657 5793 St. Louis, MO 63101
*Counsel of Record 314-425-4914


Pro Bono Counsel for Petitioner Delores O’Brien Heffernan

June 4, 2014
22
Table of Contents of Appendix
Delores O’Brien Heffernan v Arlington DHS
June 4, 2014
APPENDIX A: Decisions of the State Trial Court ............................................... 1
January 4, 2013: Trial Court Order Denying “Emergency Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus” and Request for Discovery (Unpublished) .... 2
January 14, 2013: Trial Court Order Denying “Emergency Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus” and Request for Discovery .......................... 9
APPENDIX B: Decision of the Court of Appeals Decision Transferring
to Supreme Court of Virginia ...................................................................... 10
July 12, 2013: Court of Appeals of Virginia Order Transferring Case
to Supreme
Court of Virginia ............................................................................................. 11
APPENDIX C: Decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia Denying
Petition for Appeal .......................................................................................... 12
December 18, 2013: Order of Supreme Court of Virginia Refusing
Petition for Appeal ......................................................................................... 13
APPENDIX D: Decision of the Virginia Supreme Court Final Denial of
Rehearing .................................................................................................................... 14
March 7, 2014: Order of Supreme Court of Virginia Refusing Petition
for Rehearing to Set Aside Its December 18, 2013 Judgment .............. 15
APPENDIX E: Material Required by Rule 14.1 (f) and 1 (g)(i) ...................... 16
APPENDIX F: Other Material Essential to Understanding the Petition ..... 18
September 4, 2012: Grandmother’s EMERGENCY PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS to the Arlington Circuit Court ............... 19
October 1, 2012: Grandmother’s Motion for Reconsideration of
Emergency Treatment of Petition for Habeas Corpus, Filed In
Circuit Court ................................................................................................... 40
September 20, 1999: Order Granting Custody to Grandmother,
Maryland Circuit Court ................................................................................ 47
September 20, 2005: Order Granting Guardianship to Grandmother,
Maryland Circuit Court ................................................................................ 49
22


Appendix A - 1





















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Appendix A - 2
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V I R G I N I A :

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Civil Division
IN RE: [AOB]
V. Case No. 12-2170
Petitioner: Delores O'Brien
ARLINGTON DHS Heffernan
ORDER

CAME THIS DAY the Petitioner, Delores O'Brien Heffernan, appearing pro
se; and the Arlington County Department of Human Services ("Arlington DHS"), by
counsel, Jason McCandless.
Petitioner moved this Court to enter "judgment on the pleadings, or in the
alternative, for leave to conduct discovery." Arlington DHS moved for dismissal of
the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Upon consideration of the arguments and written pleadings of Petitioner and
Arlington DHS, this Court dismisses the petition, and in so doing, makes the follow-
ing findings:
1. On July 22, 2010, [AOB] ("child") was removed from the custody of her mater-
nal grandmother, Delores O'Brien Heffernan ("Petitioner"). An emergency re-
moval order had already been entered by the Arlington Juvenile Domestic Re-
lations District Court ("JDR Court") in 2009; however, Petitioner left Arling-
ton County with the child prior to the hearing. 2. On August 19, 2010, the JDR

Appendix A - 3
Court conducted a thirty-day adjudicatory hearing pursuant to Code Section
16.1-252(G), and determined that allegations of abuse and neglect had been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
3. On September 30, 2010, the JDR Court conducted a seventy-five-day disposi-
tional hearing pursuant to Code Section 16.1-278.2. At that time, the JDR
Court approved the first foster care plan with a goal of return home to Peti-
tioner. Both the biological father and Patricia Tackett, the biological mother,
had made it clear to Arlington DHS that neither of them was in a position to
take care of the child. The case was continued for a foster care review hearing
to be held on March 24, 2011, pursuant to Code Section 16.1-282.
4. Petitioner did not exercise her statutory right to appeal the September 30,
2010, dispositional order within ten days, pursuant to Code Section 16.1-
278.2(D) and Section 16.1-296.
5. On March 24, 2011, the JDR Court conducted a six-month foster care review
pursuant to Code Section 16.1-282. The JDR Court approved Arlington DHS's
proposed foster care goal of "return to own home," ordered Petitioner to comply
with the service plan, and scheduled a permanency planning hearing to be
conducted within five months.
6. On August 4, 2011, the JDR Court conducted a permanency planning hearing
pursuant to Code Section 16.1-282.1. Petitioner, who at the time was incarcer-
ated in Montgomery County, Maryland, was absent. A court-appointed guard-
ian ad litem, George W. Dodge, appeared on her behalf. At that hearing, the

Appendix A - 4
Arlington DHS requested approval of a change in goal from "return to own
home" to "adoption." After reviewing the foster care plan and hearing argu-
ments of counsel, the JDR Court approved the goal of adoption and scheduled
a termination of parental rights ("TPR") hearing for December 7, 2011. On
August 5, 2011, Mr. Dodge filed a notice of appeal on Petitioner's behalf.
7. On December 7, 2011, the JDR Court conducted a TPR trial and subsequently
ordered, inter alia, that the residual parental rights of both the biological
mother, Patricia Tackett, and the biological father, Sean Swartz, be terminat-
ed. The termination orders were formally entered on December 26, 2011. Peti-
tioner and Ms. Tackett appealed the maternal TPR order to this Court. Sean
Swartz did not appeal.
8. While the appeals from JDR were pending in this Court, the child left the foster
home in Fairfax County without her foster parents' or Arlington DHS's permis-
sion and was later withheld by Petitioner in Montgomery County, Maryland, for
several days. Petitioner, who had been ordered by this Court to have no contact
with the child, ignored attempts by Arlington DHS and this Court to have the
child returned. Law enforcement ultimately located the child with Petitioner and
returned the child to Virginia. The child was held in juvenile detention pursuant
to a Child in Need of Services (CHINS) petition before being placed at Hallmark
Youthcare to address her mental health and behavioral concerns.
9. The child is neither actually nor "effectively" incarcerated. Instead, child has been
placed in a residential treatment setting by her legal custodian, Arlington DHS.

Appendix A - 5
Code Section 16.1-278.2 states that once a dispositional order directs that a child
be placed in foster care, "[title board or public agency that places the child shall
have the final authority to determine the appropriate placement for the child."
10. A consolidated TPR/custody/permanency planning trial was held in this Court
on June 20, 2012. After five days of testimony, this Court approved the perma-
nency goal of adoption and terminated the residual parental rights of Ms. Tackett.
This Court also denied a separate custody petition filed by Petitioner.
11. Petitioner and Ms. Tackett appealed this Court's orders to the Court of Appeals
of Virginia, where the matters remain pending.
12. Petitioner filed an "Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" on Septem-
ber 4, 2012. The heading of Petitioner's pleading recites the child's name, accom-
panied by the following language: "Who Petitions by Delores O'Brien Heffernan,
Her Maryland Circuit Court Appointed Guardian and Grandmother and Next
Friend."
13. Petitioner concludes her pleading with a request of this Court "to produce
[AOB] , to release her from effective incarceration in a psychiatric institution
(Hallmark Youthcare Richmond), place her in a proper foster care in Arlington
County, allow her to go to her Arlington school, to allow contact between [AOB]
and her family, to keep them informed on her placement and condition, and to
cease the abandonment, abuse and neglect that she has experienced under the
care of Arlington DHS which is destroying her life and threatening her safety."


Appendix A - 6
14. Petitioner lacks standing to file a legal action on the child's behalf. Section 8.01-
8 of the Code of Virginia (1950), as amended, states that "either or both parents"
may sue on behalf of a child as next friend. However, termination of parental
rights renders the parent '"a legal stranger to the child and severs all parental
rights."' Weaver v. Roanoke Dep't of Human Resources, 220 Va. 921, 926, 265
S.E.2d 692, 695 (1980) (citation omitted).
15.Although Petitioner maintains that her 2005 guardianship order from Montgom-
ery County, Maryland, is unaffected by the removal orders of the Arlington JDR
Court and the TPR / custody / permanency planning orders of this Court, she of-
fers no authority to support her position. The Annotated Code of Maryland per-
mits an order such as Petitioner's 2005 order to be superseded by that of another
court:
§ 3-804. Continuing jurisdiction; termination of jurisdiction.

(a) Jurisdiction where CINA or child in a voluntary placement is un-
der 18.- The court has jurisdiction under this subtitle only if the al-
leged CINA or child in a voluntary placement is under the age of 18
years when the petition is filed.
(b) Duration.- If the court obtains jurisdiction over a child, that juris-
diction continues in that case until the child reaches the age of 21
years, unless the court terminates the case.
(c) Custody order.- After the court terminates jurisdiction, a custody
order issued by the court in a CINA case:
(d) Remains in effect; and
(e) May be revised or superseded only by another court of competent
jurisdiction.
(emphasis added)


16. The petition fails to identify a legally cognizable basis for relief. Petitioner
makes numerous factual allegations; however, she identifies no constitutional

Appendix A - 7
provision, statutory section, or common law principle that Arlington DHS has al-
legedly violated. "The function of a writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into juris-
dictional defects amounting to want of legal authority for the detention of a per-
son on whose behalf it is asked. The court in which a writ is sought examines on-
ly the power and authority of the court to act, not the correctness of its conclu-
sions, and the petition for a writ may not be used as a substitute for appeal or
writ of error." Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 321, 171 S.E.2d 243, 246 (1969). Be-
cause Petitioner merely attacks the correctness of the Arlington courts' conclu-
sions without specifying how the courts lacked the power and authority to act,
her petition must fail.
17. Petitioner is currently pursuing remedies available to her through the appellate
process. Specifically, this Court's TPR and custody orders from June will soon be
reviewed by the Court of Appeals. As held in the Brooks case, infra, Petitioner
may not use habeas as "a substitute for appeal or writ of error."
18. This Court finds that, even if Petitioner had standing to bring this petition, the
minor child is not actually or "effectively" incarcerated. The child is not serving a
detention sentence, and she is not in the custody of the Department of Juvenile
Justice or a local juvenile detention facility. Petitioner offers no legal authority
for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to address a decision by Arlington DHS
to place the child in a residential setting of its choosing.

Appendix A - 8
Accordingly, it is the judgment of this Court that the petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus be and is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice, and the motion for dis-
covery is DENIED.

Entered this 4
th
day of December 2012 January 2013.










Appendix A - 9
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8.6J9-K 4/C L*M9*-1 0.6 %,-+.N*6;
V I R G I N I A :
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Civil Division
IN RE: [AOB]
V. Case No. 12-2170
Petitioner: Delores O'Brien
ARLINGTON DHS Heffernan
ORDER

UPON REVIEW of Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration filed January 14,
2013 and Letter Requesting Adoption of Alternative Order filed on January 4, 2013,
IT IS HERBY ORDERED BY THE COURT the Motion for Reconsideration
and Letter Requesting Adoption of An Alternative Order are denied.
Entered this 14th day of January 2013.






Signatures of the parties waived pursuant to Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:13

Appendix B - 10
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Appendix C - 12
















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Appendix C - 13

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VIRGINIA:
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held in the City of
Richmond on Wednesday the 18th day of December, 2013.
Delores O’Brien Heffernan, Appellant,
against Record No. 131106
Circuit Court No. CR12-2170
Arlington County Department of Human Services, Appellee.

From the Circuit Court of Arlington County

Upon review of the record in this case and consideration of the argu-
ment submitted in support of and in opposition to the granting of an appeal,
the Court is of the opinion there is no reversible error in the judgment com-
plained of. Accordingly, the Court refuses the petition for appeal.
The said circuit court shall allow the guardian ad litem the fee set forth
below. And it is ordered that the Commonwealth recover of the appellant the
costs in this Court and in the court below.
Costs due the Commonwealth by appellant in Supreme Court of Virginia:
Guardian ad litem fee $500.00 plus costs and expenses.
A Copy,

Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk
Teste:

Deputy Clerk

Appendix D - 14










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Appendix D - 15
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VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held in the City of
Richmond on Wednesday the 7th day of March 2014.

Delores O’Brien Heffernan, Appellant,
against Record No. 131106
Circuit Court No. CR12-2170
Arlington County Department of Human Services, Appellee.


Upon a Petition for Rehearing

On consideration the petition of the appellant to set aside the judgment
rendered herein on the 18th day of December, 2013 and grant a rehearing
thereof, the prayer of the said petition is denied.


A Copy,

Teste: Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk





Dep

Appendix E - 16

















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Appendix E - 17












All constitutional provisions and statutes are set forth at page 2 of the Petition.

Appendix E - 18


















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APPENDIX F- 19

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8BL"P3 1. 12* !67,/D1./ 8,6+9,1 8.961

VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ARLINGTON COUNTY

IN RE: )
)
[AOB], A 13-Year-Old Minor, )
(Incarcerated at Hallmark Youthcare Services) )
Who Petitions By )
Delores O’Brien Heffernan, )
Her Maryland Circuit Court )
Appointed Guardian )
And Grandmother And Next Friend ) Case Nos. CR12-2170
) Judge Daniel S. Fiore, II
vs. )
)
Arlington Department Of Human Services (DHS) )
Suzanne Eisner, Director )
2100 Washington Blvd., Arlington, Virginia 22204 )


EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

COMES NOW Delores O’Brien Heffernan, Maryland Circuit Court Appointed
Guardian and Grandmother for 12 (almost 13) year old [AOB], pursuant to Virginia
Code, including §8.01-654, et. seq. hereby requests a writ of habeas corpus, that
orders Defendant to produce [AOB] before this Court, to release her from effective
incarceration in a psychiatric institution (Hallmark Youthcare Richmond), place
her in proper foster care in Arlington County, allow her to go to her Arlington school,
to allow contact between [AOB] and her family in order to afford her protection from
further abuse and neglect by Arlington DHS, to keep her family informed of her

APPENDIX F- 20
placement and condition. to cease their effective abandonment of her, as well as the
abuse and neglect that she has experienced under the care of Arlington DHS.
[AOB]’s GAL, Karen Grane (who has stated that she is only supposed to represent
the “child’s best interests” (and not the child)) has failed to protect her. Left un-
checked, Arlington DHS, either intentionally or through incompetence, has set
about to destroy [AOB]’s life and place her safety at great risk, denied her access to
her LDS/Mormon religion, and placed her in conditions that are far worse than the
false claims of “unstable housing” they alleged as the sole basis for taking her from
her loving LDS/Mormon family. The Arlington DHS “solution” is far worse than the
falsely alleged original “problem” that led to Ashile’s snatching in Stafford County.
Upon information and belief, [AOB] is incarcerated and drugged at:
Hallmark Youthcare Richmond
2800 West Creek Parkway, Richmond VA 23238
email:info@hallmarksystems.com, (804) 784-2200

Her incarceration was a result of a secret proceeding without legal represen-
tation for [AOB] and without notice to any family member by Judge Varoutsos (who
failed to recuse himself for known conflicts he has previously acknowledged) in the
Arlington Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on June 7, 2012.
In support of this Petition, Petitioner sets forth the following:
1) [AOB] was born on [XXXXXX XX,] 1999 (see attached photos).
2) Delores O’Brien Heffernan, who is 66 years old, was appointed by the Mar-
yland Circuit Court as [AOB]’s permanent Guardian (see attached MD order).
3) [AOB] and her Grandmother are practicing Mormons (LDS).

APPENDIX F- 21
4) In July 2010, [AOB] was abducted by Arlington DHS from her family home
in Stafford County, and placed in Foster care. The Arlington DHS claimed that
[AOB] had “unstable housing.” This began two years of abuse and neglect by the
Arlington DHS of a healthy then 10 year old. Since taking her, the Arlington DHS
has most recently incarcerated her in complete isolation at a psychiatric institution,
Hallmark Youthcare Richmond, without a proper hearing and without legal repre-
sentation.
5) The details of some of the pattern of early abuse and neglect by Arlington
DHS from the time they took her from her family and which the Arlington DHS
sought to cover up by incarcerating [AOB] in the Hallmark Youthcare are detailed
in the Attachment to this Petition, including: 1) being strip searched in a public
restroom with photos being taken by DHS workers, 2) being forced to sleep on the
floor of a cold apartment in Delaware in the middle of winter, 3) forced to sleep in a
dirty attic of an overcrowded noisy daycare home, 4) being treated as a servant
cleaning toilets, 5) being denied food and proper timely medical treatment for seri-
ous injuries (such a concusion and neck injury), 6) being denied reasonable access to
a computer to do homework, 7) denied access to a phone to call the social worker
and/or the GAL, 8) being talked about disparagingly by her foster family in their
public twitter “tweets,” 9) being denied reasonable visitation with her family, 10)
psychologically abused by Arlington DHS, her GAL, and her Foster family by being
told at the outset and many times after that she will not be returning to her family
(even before any decision was made by any court that this would be the case), 11)

APPENDIX F- 22
being forced to watch an older foster child have sex in the same room, 12) being
denied access to her religion, including having a copy of the Book of Mormon, access
to LDS Elders and Missionaries, 13) allowed to be brutally interrogated for hours by
a Maryland Detective without legal representation, while Arlington DHS, her GAL,
and the foster family watched in entertainment, 14) having her housing and school
changed numerous times within two years, and 15) well before any court ruled that
[AOB] was to be adopted, both the Arlington DHS personnel and her GAL Karen
Grane, repeatedly told [AOB] that it was a “done deal” that she was going to be
adopted, severely traumatizing [AOB]. Clearly, Arlington DHS has imposed on
[AOB] worse “neglect” and additional abuse than they allege was the basis for origi-
nally removing her from her loving Mormon/LDS family (i.e., which was only al-
leged “unstable housing” and “tardy” on a few days from school). By no measure,
was this treatment in [AOB]’s “Best Interests” -- and it occured because there is no
oversight on Arlington DHS misbehavior and coverup, that was allowed by the GAL
who knew of the abuse and neglect but took no measures to protect the child.
6) Yet, despite Arlington DHS’s inability to properly care for [AOB] and de-
spite her family having cured the alleged housing problem and completed the other
requirements set forth in the family plan, Arlington DHS formally filed a petition in
June 2011 to terminate the parental rights of [AOB]’s natural parents. They did
this, when, in fact, [AOB] had not been in her natural parent’s custody for years. In
fact, she had been in the custody of [AOB]’s Mormon Grandmother/ Maryland Cir-
cuit Court Appointed Guardian since only being a few days old.

APPENDIX F- 23
7) On December 7, 2011, the Arlington JDR Court held a hearing to termi-
nate [AOB]’s parent’s parental rights. [AOB] was subpoenaed to testify at that De-
cember 7, 2011 hearing. She intended to testify that she did not want to be adopted,
that she had been abused and mistreated, and wished to return to her loving Mor-
mon/LDS family.
8) Eye witnesses, along with court monitor video confirmation, indicate that
during the JDR court hearing recess late on the afternoon of December 7, 2011 at
approximately 5:54 pm in public view, an Arlington Sheriff’s Deputy physically
shoved [AOB] out of the JDR courtroom, slammed her against the glass doors of the
Judge’s chambers so hard that the telephone fell off the wall, and then placed
pinned her with a nightstick. She began to bleed from the nose, was choking on her
own blood, and she was tasered causing her to let out a scream of excruciating pain
heard throughout the floor, and to lose consciousness. All of this violence by the
Arlington County Sheriff’s Deputies was unjustified as [AOB] was compliant and in
no way violent or aggressive. As a result of this incident and the coverup by Arling-
ton DHS, [AOB] suffered a concussion, which went undiagnosed until February
2012 when she was finally allowed to go to INOVA hospital. According to the Ar-
lington EMS runsheet of December, 7, 2011 (where EMS was called because of a
reported assault on [AOB]), the delay in the diagnosis was caused by Arlington DHS
declining to have her transported by EMS from the courthouse to the hospital for
treatment on December 7, 2011 (to this day, CAT scan, etc. have not been done).
She subsequently complained of headaches, blackouts, and dizzyness, none of which

APPENDIX F- 24
was taken seriously by Arlington DHS and, as a result, no appropriate timely medi-
cal examination had occurred and, now, long term damage is evident.
9) The Arlington JDR Court granted the Arlington DHS’s petition on Decem-
ber 7, 2011 to terminate [AOB]’s natural parent’s rights.
10) The Arlington JDR decision was appealed to the Arlington Circuit Court,
and, in orders showing a signature date of June 27, 2012 (which were actually
signed on August 10, 2012), the Arlington JDR decision to terminate [AOB]’s par-
ent’s rights was upheld and an unjustified “no contact” order was entered as advo-
cated by the Arlington DHS -- again, for the sole purpose of attempting to continue
to cover up their abuse and neglect of [AOB]. (Case Nos. CJ11-67, CJ11-68, CJ12-1,
CJ12-3 to 7 and 12-34) [those order have all been appealed to the Virginia Court of
Appeals]. There never was any evidence presented that [AOB] was or would be
harmed by contact with her family, including her older sister, Samantha Mahoney.
The “no contact” order was originally successfully sought by Arlington DHS in Feb-
ruary 2012 as a direct result of [AOB] trying to communicate with others about the
abuse and neglect she was suffering which the Arlington DHS and her GAL were
ignoring.
11) None of the Arlington JDR Court orders or the Arlington Circuit Court or-
ders disturbed Delores O’Brien Heffernan’s Maryland Circuit Court Appointed
Guardianship of [AOB]. Thus, that Guardianship remains in full force and effect
today and, per that order, Delores O’Brien Heffernan remains responsible for [AOB]
and has the right and obligation to bring this Petition.

APPENDIX F- 25
12) As detailed in the Attachment, prior to incarcerating her in Hallmark
Youthcare Richmond psychiatric institution, Arlington DHS allowed her to be
abused and neglected in Foster care, and, ironically, did not provide her anything
that resembled “stable housing.” Instead, Arlington DHS moved [AOB] from foster
home to foster home – a total of three different homes within one year.
13) Before the Arlington Circuit Court even had a chance to rule in June 2012
on the de novo appeal to Circuit Court of the JDR Parental Rights Termination pro-
ceeding, Arlington DHS incarcerated [AOB] in a psychiatric institution, Hallmark
Youthcare Richmond (12800 West Creek Parkway, Richmond VA 2323; CEO J.
Thomas McAfee, III of Macon, Georgia) on June 1, 2012 without a hearing in any
court, without representation by her own attorney, and without any notice to her
family.
14) [AOB] and other children have been placed in a nightmarish dangerous
environment where they are being given high powered psychotropic drugs not ap-
proved for children, and in some cases the dosing has been so high and for such a
period of time as to cause observed permanent damage of Tardive Dyskinesia (in-
voluntary body movements caused by long term use of psychotropic drugs). In ad-
dition, female children at the facility have suffered attacks by other children, lesbi-
an sexual assaults, and been severely confined.
15) The Arlington DHS has all but abandoned [AOB]. The Arlington County
Assistant County Attorney, Jason McCandless, has admitted to [AOB]’s natural
mother, Patricia Tackett, that the Arlington DHS social workers did not approve of

APPENDIX F- 26
[AOB] being incarcerated in Hallmark Youthcare, yet the county has done so any-
way.
16) Again, [AOB] was incarcerated in Hallmark Youthcare on June 1, 2012
without any pre-commitment hearing, legal representation or notice of any hearing
to her family for approving such a placement. [AOB] has requested an attorney,
and a new GAL on multiple occasions, and those requests have not been granted
due to opposition by Arlington DHS and her current GAL, Karen Grane. In fact,
when [AOB] was incarcerated in the Hallmark Youthcare psychiatric facility on
June 1, 2012, it was well before the secret JDR hearing for her placement on June 7,
2012, where [AOB] appeared by video, and, as part of the coverup of her illegal in-
carceration, was denied her request for an attorney, no family notified of the hear-
ing, and Virginia Attorney Elizabeth Tuomey (who represented Petitioner (who re-
mains the Maryland Circuit Court appointed Guardian for [AOB]) was denied ac-
cess to [AOB]’s case file.
17) [AOB] has no criminal history or known psychiatric illnesses that could
justify placement in Hallmark Youthcare Richmond. She has always been de-
scribed as polite and warm with others. In psychological evaluations done by DHS
psychologists, she was found only to be mildly depressed solely because of her erro-
neous placement in foster care and separation from the family she loves. There has
never been an evidence presented in any adversarial proceeding in any court, with
any expert testimony, demonstrating that placing [AOB] in a psychiatric facility
like Hallmark Youthcare Richmond is in her best interests.

APPENDIX F- 27
18) Permanent damage is being done to [AOB] by her placement in this re-
mote psychiatric institution, where [AOB] is forced to mix with and go to Hall-
mark’s school with very psychologically disturbed children, and to be subject to
complete isolation from the outside world, and given administered drugs that are
not approved for children.
19) No case can be made that placement in this facility hundreds of miles
away from Arlington is the best alternative for her. In fact, Valerie Cuffee of Arling-
ton DHS has admitted publicly that sending children outside of Arlington and far
from their families to these out of county institutions is not in the best interests of the
child.
1
Arlington DHS’s behavior is entirely explained by its wish to cover up all of
the neglect and abuse they have caused [AOB] to endure (see Attachment), and to
cover up the physical injury she endured from the brutality she suffered in the pub-
lic hallway of the JDR court on December 7, 2011, where the Arlington DHS failed
to allow EMS to transport her to the hospital to be examined and treated.

1
Arlington Shifts Philosophy For Troubled Children (WAMU.ORG, April 25, 2011):
“"Children were aging out of the foster care system without the necessary supports,"
says Valerie Cuffee, chief of the (Arlington DHS) division. "They didn't have fami-
lies. They didn't have any connections to family or any adults.”

Over the past five years, the county has cut the number of children who are sent
away by half.

"The alternative is for them to stay in the community, stay in their homes and stay
in school," she says.

Aside from having better outcomes, Cuffee says, providing community-based sup-
port creates less of a financial burden on the county.

APPENDIX F- 28
20) No showing has been made why Arlington DHS should not immediately
place [AOB] in a foster home in Arlington, and allowed to attend school like any
other normal child.
21) Furthermore, experience now clearly shows that denying [AOB] contact
with her family is harmful to her both emotionally and physically. By denying
[AOB]’s family knowledge of her condition and contact with her, the “checks and
balances” on Arlington DHS neglect and abuse have been effectively removed. Oth-
er than to avoid the threat of [AOB] reporting Arlington DHS’s abuse and neglect,
there is no rational why contact with [AOB] should be cut off. Contact was never
shown to harm her. In fact, the US Department of Health and Human Services
advocates that, as a matter of policy, natural family contact with older children is
beneficial and should be maintained. The benefits of continuing involvement and
oversight by [AOB]’s family is a well recognized by the experts in the feld. See,
RESURRECTING PARENTS OF LEGAL ORPHANS: UN-TERMINATING PA-
RENTAL RIGHTS, Lashanda Taylor, Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law;
Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law, Winter 2010, 318, 352-353. (“the ab-
sence of a legal parent has negative social, emotional, and financial effects. The loss
of the legal relationship can mean a loss of the physical and emotional relationship
between the parent and child.....some courts have ordered post-termination visita-
tion when in the child's best interests,”)


APPENDIX F- 30
ATTACHMENT
Details of Abuse and Neglect While Under the Supervision of [AOB] from
July 2010 Through June 2012 (when [AOB] was incarcerated in the Psy-
chiatric Institution Hallmark Youthcare Richmond where she continued
to be isolated from her family and subject to abuse and neglect)

Since forcibly taking [AOB] in June 2010,from the custody of her 66 grand-
mother, the Petitioner, Arlington DHS has done little to help her, but instead has
neglected her and allowed her to be abused, including:
a) being strip searched in a public bathroom by Arlington DHS workers who
then took photos of her naked,
b) Arlington DHS almost immediately cut off contact between [AOB] and her
family, limiting her contact to a 10 minute supervised call once per week from Au-
gust 2010 to January 2011 (for five months), then only allowing in January 2011 a
one hour supervised visit once a week with Petitioner, who is her Grandmoth-
er/Maryland Circuit Court Appointed Guardian (where the supervised visits had
[AOB] and Petitioner observed like rats in a cage, by multiple (sometimes unknown)
observers who were hidden behind a one way mirror). All visits were unilaterally
cut off by Arlington DHS in November 2011 when they had discovered that [AOB]
was trying to communicate with her family to tell them about the abuse and neglect
she was suffering in Foster care which the Arlington DHS and her GAL were not
addressing.
c) while in her first foster home (the Burkas in Arlington) she was:
i. treated like a prisoner under house arrest
ii. called names by the siblings,

APPENDIX F- 31
iii. told she would never return to her famly,
iv. even forced to write letters of apology for reporting abuse by the
Foster Burka foster family,
v. she was forced to clean a Jewish temple that the foster father
headed,
vi. she was effectively prohibited from using a computer to do her
homework,
vii. prohibited from using the phone to call for example,
viii. her DHS social worker or her GAL, not allowed to go outside freely
and socialize with other children, not permitted to have a Book
of Mormon or lessons by Elders,
ix. forced to sleep on the floor in the middle of winter in an apartment
in Delaware on Christmas in 2011,
x.forced to clean up after others in the home, treated like a servant,
xi. hit by the older boy in the home, and in one incident pulled down
the steps,
d) While in her second foster home (the Burns in Springfield), [AOB] was:
i. on November 15, 2011, hit by the foster mother, requiring to call
911 and be taken by an ambulance to the hospital,
ii. had to plead for food,
iii. had to play outside alone, where public records show sex offenders
live within one block of the foster home,

APPENDIX F- 32
iv. she was not allowed to have any friends over from school,
v. she couldn’t go over to other friends houses for the simplest things,
such as having ice cream,
vi. she was denied use of the phone,
vii. she was called a thief for having had to sneak food to eat,
viii. she suffered untreated neck pain and headaches,
ix. she was forced to clean up the house and after the animals like a
servant for the family,
x. she was bullied by the biological children, called names (stupid, fat,
dummy, ugly), insulted and lied on.
xi. when she went to school the school staff refused to give any weight
to her attempts to inform them of the abuse, referring to her as
a “foster kid,”
xii. she was repeatedly told that this it was not her home, but she is
never going back to her family,
xiii. forced to go to the Bible Church, and denied visits by LDS Mission-
aries because the foster mother did not want Missionaries in her
home,
xiv. she had no good experiences, or happy times, or the love that a,
then 12 year old, needs and deserves.
e) While in her third foster home (the Campbells in Alexandria), [AOB] was:

APPENDIX F- 33
i. forced to live in the dirty, spider web infested, attic with no real
bed (the Arlington DHS workers failed to visit the room to check
it out)
ii. had no bedroom door allowing for any privacy,
iii. was latently diagnosed with a concussion and neck injuries by
INOVA hospital in February 2012 (which was a result of the at-
tack by Arlington Sheriff’s Deputies on December 7, 2011, but
Arlington DHS refused to allow her to be taken to the hospital
at the time), and then referred to Dr. Jacqueline Hoang, who ra-
ther than order the CAT scan recommended by the INOVA hos-
pital, told her to drink more water, but the Arlington DHS con-
tinued to let this malpractice continue on [AOB] and fraudulent-
ly entered in their records that [AOB] was diagnosed with an
anxiety attack rather than the concussion and neck injury,
iv. the single family home was used as a noisy all day (5 am to 10 pm)
daycare center ( Flo’s Daycare Center, Alexandria Virginia)
http://www.daycarematch.com/provider_profile.asp?lid=20812wi
th many children coming and going, and overpopulated with
many adults throughout the day,
v. she was denied access to her personal property including her
clothes (e.g., had to wear one bra for 30 days because she was
not allowed to wash it),

APPENDIX F- 34
vi. forced to watch her roommate have sex with a boy in her room,
vii. she was forced to watch a child suffer from an overdose of medicine
she was forced to take by her social services agency, causing
[AOB] to be taken to the hospital for an anxiety attack,
viii. forced to take a cab unaccompanied (with only the male driver) for
almost an hour each way from her foster homes to her school --
forcing her to be late many times to school,
ix. forced to eat Jamaican food that she could not tolerage due to its
spiciness,
x. she is never taken to buy clothes (with the money provided DHS),
which the foster mother refused to, and, presumably, the foster
mother kept the money for herself,
xi.she was denied access to her Mormon Church, missionaries, and the
Book of Mormon, and
xii. the abuse and neglect became so bad that [AOB] ran away to
Maryland after seeing her Arlington DHS foster-child roomate
(who shared the attic room) escape and run away just days be-
fore in April 2012 -- only to be returned to Arlington’s DHS’s
custody days later in May 2012 after she was enrolled in Mont-
gomery County Schools as a returning student, without a hear-
ing on the abuse and neglect that she had suffered, and then
placed in incarceration in Northern Virginia Detention Center in

APPENDIX F- 35
Alexandria (with no legal representation, and when the family
tried to get her an attorney, GAL Karen Grane refused that at-
torney access to [AOB] in the Detention Center).


APPENDIX F- 36


APPENDIX F- 37


APPENDIX F- 38


APPENDIX F- 39


APPENDIX F- 40
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.0 "*1,1,./ 0.6 H4I*4- 8.6J9-= U,7*C &/ 8,6+9,1 8.961


VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ARLINGTON COUNTY

IN RE: )
)
[AOB], A 13-Year-Old Minor, )
(Incarcerated at Hallmark Youthcare Services) )
Who Petitions By )
Delores O’Brien Heffernan, )
Her Maryland Circuit Court )
Appointed Guardian )
And Grandmother And Next Friend ) Case No. CL12-2170
) Judge Daniel S. Fiore, II
vs. )
)
Arlington Department Of Human Services (DHS) )
Suzanne Eisner, Director )
2100 Washington Blvd., Arlington, Virginia 22204 )


MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF EMERGENCY TREATMENT,
CORRECTION OF OMISIONS FROM COURT’S SEPTEMBER 14, 2012
LETTER TO ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND
REQUEST HEARING BEFORE JUDGE FIORE, II

COMES NOW Delores O’Brien Heffernan, Maryland Circuit Court Appointed
Guardian and Grandmother for 12 (almost 13) year old [AOB], pursuant to Virginia
Code, including §8.01-654, et. seq. hereby requests:
1) reconsideration of the Court’s September 17, 2012 Order to the extent it
denies relief on an emergency basis for [AOB] from abuse and neglect by Arlington
County Department of Human Services (DHS), and illegally incarcerated in the
Hallmark Youthcare Richmond facility on a fraudulent basis at Medicaid expense;

APPENDIX F- 41
2) correction of the the Court’s September 14, 2012 Letter to the Attorney
General to include all of the relevant orders, namely those used that illegally com-
mitted [AOB] to incarceration without legal representation;
3) a hearing before Judge Fiori, as he has no apparent conflict and was the
judge who requested that a petition be filed explaining [AOB]’s situation and her
need for emergency relief;
Background
Before the Court is an Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed
by the Petitioner, [AOB], A 13-Year-Old Minor (Incarcerated at Hallmark Youth-
care Services) Who Petitioned By Delores O’Brien Heffernan, Her Maryland Circuit
Court Appointed Guardian And Grandmother And Next Friend.
That petition sought:
1) a writ of habeas corpus, that orders Defendant to produce [AOB] before
this Court,
2) to release her from effective incarceration in a psychiatric institution
(Hallmark Youthcare Richmond),
3) to place her in proper foster care in Arlington County,
4) to allow her to go to her Arlington school,
5) to allow contact between [AOB] and her family in order to afford her pro-
tection from further abuse and neglect by Arlington DHS,
6) to keep her family informed of her placement and condition.

APPENDIX F- 42
7) to cease their effective abandonment of her, as well as the abuse and ne-
glect that she has experienced under the care of Arlington DHS.
“The writ [of habeas corpus] is guaranteed by U.S. Constitution Article I Sec-
tion IX and by Virginia Constitution Article I Section 9.” [Circuit Court Clerk Man-
ual Rev. 7/10 at 7-73]
Left unchecked, Arlington DHS, either intentionally or through incompetence,
has set about to destroy [AOB]’s life and place her safety at great risk, denied her
access to her LDS/Mormon religion, and placed her in conditions that are far worse
than the false claims of “unstable housing” they alleged as the sole basis for taking
her from her loving LDS/Mormon family.
[AOB]’s incarceration was a result of a secret proceeding without legal repre-
sentation for [AOB] and without notice to any family member by conflicted Judge
Varoutsos (who failed to recuse himself for known conflicts he has previously
acknowledged (see attachments to Emergency Petition)) in the Arlington Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court on June 7, 2012.
The details of the pattern of early abuse and neglect by Arlington DHS from
the time it took her from her family and the time Arlington DHS sought to cover up
their abuse by incarcerating [AOB] in the Hallmark Youthcare are detailed in the
Emergency Petition.
This is An Emergency
The statutes of the Commonwealth of Virginia require that when, supported
by affidavit, a child is being subject to permanent damage due to abuse and neglect,

APPENDIX F- 43
the child should be immediately removed. That is the case here. The sworn Emer-
gency Petition sets forth extensive detailed facts of the illegal incarceration, isola-
tion, and even drugging of [AOB]. If a parent or other custodian were doing to their
child what the Arlington DHS is doing to [AOB], the child would be immediately
removed. The standard is no different because the party doing the abuse and ne-
glect is a government agency, namely Arlington DHS.
Although the Emergency Petition has been served on Arlington DHS, an ex-
amination of the court file reveals that Arlington County has failed to even file a
response or otherwise rebut the evidence presented in the Emergency Affidavit. If a
parent failed to respond to an affidavit alleging abuse and neglect, the Court would,
without hesitation, remove the child from that parent. The standard is no different
because the party doing the abuse and neglect is a government agency, namely Ar-
lington DHS.
Prior to the abuse and neglect by Arlington DHS, [AOB] was a normal child,
and had no serious psychological problems, certainly none that would warrant her
being fraudulently incarcerated in a psychiatric institution at Medicaid expense.
She earned good grades. Her teachers described her in glowing terms. For example,
Ms. Bryce, her fifth grade teacher, described [AOB] with the following glowing
praise:
“She was a hard worker, very kind and respectful to her teachers. She had dif-
ficulties in math and language arts.”

See, In Re [AOB], Dec. 7, 2011 JDR Transcript at 192

APPENDIX F- 44
Arlington DHS’s actions are particularly devastating and require urgent re-
lief because [AOB] is a victim survivor of an extensively documented serious sexual
attack and molestation many years ago in an LDS Church in Germantown, Mary-
land. That incident involved a relative of well-known Senator. Like some at Penn
State did with Sandusky, some in the LDS Church, including the LDS attorney
Randy Austin, have tried to cover up the attack and protect those involved. Since
then, some have abused their power and influence with government agencies in
Maryland and Virginia to try to remove [AOB] from her family – including having
[AOB]’ Maryland Court appointed Guardian maliciously prosecuted with non-
crimes -- in the false hope that it would prevent [AOB] from speaking out about that
attack and avoid embarrassment to some in the LDS Church and in government.
The isolation and neglect and abuse detailed in the Emergency Petition that [AOB]
has and is now suffering is clearly part of that illegal and corrupt effort. This
Court should have no part of it.
Thus, the Court is respectfully requested to immediately reverse its decision
to deny [AOB] emergency relief and, instead, treat this as the emergency it is. This
Court must protect [AOB]’s rights under the US Constitution, the Virginia Consti-
tution and US and Virginia laws.
The Court Failed to Provide The Attorney General The Judicial Orders
Illegally Committing [AOB]

Based on a review of the letter found in the Court file, the Court’s letter to
the Attorney General, dated September 14, 2012, failed to include the JDR orders
that illegally committed [AOB] Hallmark Youthcare Richmond, including the June

APPENDIX F- 45
7, 2012 JDR order. The letter stated that “a copy of all known order(s) that relate
to the matter” were attached. However, that is obviously not the case. The Attorney
General needs to have those JDR commitment orders for it to properly analyze and
respond to the Emergency Petition.
The Court should resend its September 14, 2012 letter but this time with “a
copy of all known order(s) that relate to the matter” – including the June 7, 2012
commitment order of the JDR court where [AOB] was denied legal counsel, and all
subsequent JDR orders.
The Emergency Petition Should Be Handled by Judge Fiori and Any Hear-
ing Should be Held Before Him

The genesis for the Emergency Petition was a hearing before Judge Fiori on
August 20, 2012. That hearing was for visitation by [AOB]’s sister with [AOB],
which Mr. Jason McCandless, representing the Arlington DHS, personally opposed,
even though the Arlington DHS social workers approved of such contact. Mr.
McCandless had the hearing on that matter without any basis delayed until 2013,
providing further evidence of Arlington County DHS’s intent on isolating [AOB] to
cover the abuse and neglect, even when the JDR approved of her having contact
with her adult sister Samantha.
In that hearing, [AOB]’s abuse and neglect by Arlington DHS was brought to
Judge Fiore’s attention, and he asked for the submission of the documentation in
written form. As a result, the Emergency Petition was prepared and filed. The
veteran judges of the Arlington Circuit Court are conflicted and/or have shown bias
apparently due to external influences, as Judge Kendrick has been caught backdat-

APPENDIX F- 46
ing orders, and in an order dated August 30, 2012, Judge Neuman allowed that
improper backdating without correction in Case Nos. CJ11-67, CJ11-68, CJ12-1,
CJ12-3 to 7 and 12- orders.
To assure continuity, and assure, no apparent conflict, this matter should be
heard by newly appointed Judge Fiori in an expeditiously scheduled hearing within
the next seven days. Also, the Court should avoid engaging in ex parte communica-
tions and limit itself for the record in this proceeding.

Respectfully submitted,

Delores O’Brien Heffernan
Maryland Circuit Court Appointed Guardian and Grandmother of [AOB]
9653 Marston Lane ,Montgomery Village, MD 20886
email: dobrienh@gmail.com, 240-483-6456



APPENDIX F- 47
3*J1*FI*6 >?= @\\\) B6C*6 Y64/1,/D 89-1.C; 1. Y64/CF.12*6= V46;74/C 8,6+9,1 8.961

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
PETITION OF
DELORES O'BRIEN-HEFFERNAN Misc. Petition No.
2448 Lakeside Drive
Frederick, Maryland 21702

ORDER
Upon consideration of the verified Petition for Temporary Custody of Infant,
the facts recited therein, and it appearing to the Court that it would be In the best
Interests of the minor herein, it Is, by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
Maryland this 20
th
day of September, 1999
ORDERED, that the Petitioner, Delores O'Brien-Heffernan be, and she here-
by granted temporary custody of the minor child named [AOB] born [XXXXXX],
1999 at Holy Cross Hospital, the child being Petitioner's granddaughter and the
natural child of Petitioner's daughter, Patricia Padilla; and It is further
ORDERED. that Delores O'Brien-Heffernan be, and she hereby is fully au-
thorized to accept immediate physical custody of the above-named child from Holy
Cross Hospital, Silver Spring, Maryland; and it is further
ORDERED, that this temporary custody Order shall be effective until Fur-
ther Order of the Court ORDERED, that presentation of a copy of thus Order shall
authorize and entitle the Petitioner to obtain on behalf of the minor child any and
all medical treatment and any other benefits of public or private services to minor
children: and it is further

APPENDIX F- 48
ORDERED, that the Clerk of Court shall certify as many copies of this Order
as the Petitioner may request.


William P. Turner, Judge Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, Maryland


APPENDIX F- 49

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8.961
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
Sitting as a Juvenile Court
In the matter of: [AOB] O'BRIEN Petition No. 06-1-04-000101
Respondent Child No. 70003 DOB: XX/XX/1999
ORDER GRANTING GUARDIANSHIP OF A JUVENILE
Upon request of the Montgomery County Department of Health and
Human Services for a Want of primary guardianship, and the parties
having been heard, this Court, pursuant to Maryland Code Annotated,
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Sections 3-819(c)(1)(ii) and 3-
819(d), has determined that it is in the best interest of the Respondent
Child that a guardian be appointed. It is therefore this 20
th
day of Janu-
ary, 2005, by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, sit-
ting as a Juvenile Court,
ORDERED, that DELORES O'BRIEN HEFFERNAN be, and
hereby is, appointed by this Court as the GUARDIAN of the above-
named Respondent Child for the purposes set forth herein and has the
right and obligation to make ALL ORDINARY AND EMERGENCY
CARETAKING DECISIONS, including those concerning the Child's
educational, travel, medical, hospitalization, psychotropic medication,
and mental health treatment needs that are in the best interest of the
Respondent Child; and it is further


APPENDIX F- 50
ORDERED, that a copy of this Order be served upon the above-
named Guardian; the Respondent Child and/or Counsel for the Respond-
ent Child; the Respondent Child's Mother and Father, if known, and their
Counsel, if any; and the Montgomery County Department of Health and
Human Services by Counsel/Maryland Department of Juvenile Services,
Montgomery County State's Attorney's 0ffice in person or by first class
mail at their respective last known address.




MARJELSA A. BERNARD, Judge




APPENDIX F- 51