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MILESTONE FARMS, INC, vs. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, 217SCRA 644
FACTS: Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. was
incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
Commission to engage in the raising of cattle,
pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands by
purchase or lease, which may be needed for
this purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose
of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock and
their produce when advisable and beneficial to
the corporation; to breed, raise, and sell
poultry; to purchase or acquire and sell, or
otherwise dispose of the supplies, stocks,
equipment, accessories, appurtenances,
products, and by-products of said business;
and to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock,
and animal food necessary for the raising of
said cattle, pigs, and other livestock as may be
authorized by law.
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), took effect, which included the raising
of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
LANDS DEVOTED TO LIVESTOCK FARMING ARE
NEVERTHELESS SUBJECT TO DAR'S CONTINUING
RULING: Let it be stressed that when the CA
provided in its first Decision that continuing
review and verification may be conducted by the
DAR pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9, the latter was
not yet declared unconstitutional by this Court.
The first CA Decision was promulgated on April
29, 2005, while this Court struck down as
unconstitutional DAR A.O. No. 9, by way
of Sutton, on October 19, 2005. Likewise, let it be
emphasized that the Espinas group filed the
Supplement and submitted the assailed MARO
reports and certification on June 15, 2005, which
proved to be adverse to petitioner's case. Thus,
it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely
abused its discretion in respecting the mandate
of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting
and in full force and effect.
In all these proceedings, all the parties' rights to
due process were amply protected and
DAVID LU vs PATERNO LU YM, SR.,23 SCRA
FACTS:The three consolidated cases stemmed
from the complaint for “Declaration of Nullity of
Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution” filed
on August 14, 2000 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City by David Lu, et
al. against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. and sons (Lu Ym
father and sons) and LLDC.
By Decision of March 1, 2004, Branch 12 of
the RTC ruled in favor of David et al. by annulling
the issuance of the shares of stock subscribed
and paid by Lu Ym father and sons at less than
par value, and ordering the dissolution and asset
liquidation of LLDC. The appeal of the trial
court’s Decision remains pending with the
In G.R. No. 153690 wherein David, et
al. assailed the appellate court’s resolutions
dismissing their complaint for its incomplete
signatory in the certificate of non-forum
shopping and consequently annulling the placing
of the subject corporation under
receivership pendente lite.
In G.R. No. 157381 wherein Lu Ym father
and sons challenged the appellate court’s
resolution restraining the trial court from
proceeding with their motion to lift the
In G.R. No. 170889 involved the denial
by the appellate court of Lu Ym father and sons’
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether the Courts have acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: As reflected early on, the Court, in a
turnaround, by Resolution of August 4, 2009,
reconsidered its position on the matter of
docket fees. It ruled that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case for David Lu, et
al.’s failure to pay the correct docket fees,
hence, all interlocutory matters and incidents
subject of the present petitions must
consequently be denied.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC)
states that the Court en banc shall act on the
specific matters and cases directed to them.
At least three members of the Court’s
Second Division (to which the present cases
they being assigned to a
Member thereof) found, by Resolution of
October 20, 2010, that the cases were
appropriate for referral-transfer to the Court En
Banc which subsequently accepted
in view of the sufficiently important reason to
resolve all doubts on the validity of the
challenged resolutions as they appear to modify
or reverse doctrines or principles of law.
PAQUITO ANDO, vs ANDRESITO CAMPO, ET
AL., 513 SCRA 642
(Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court)
Petitioner was the president of Premier
Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an
independent labor contractor. In June 1998,
respondents were dismissed from employment.
They filed a case for illegal dismissal and some
money claims with the NLRC which ruled in favor
of the respondent.
Petitioner also raises anew his argument
that he can choose between filing a third-party
claim with the sheriff of the NLRC or filing a
He maintains that this special
civil action is purely civil in nature since it
“involves the manner in which the writ of
execution in a labor case will be implemented
against the property of petitioner which is not a
corporate property of PACSI.” What he is
seeking to be restrained, petitioner maintains, is
not the Decision itself but the manner of its
execution. Further, he claims that the property
levied has been constituted as a family home
within the contemplation of the Family Code.
ISSUE: 1) Whether the regular courts have
jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which
arise from and are incidental to the enforcement
of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in
labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals
of the Department of Labor and Employment.
2) Whether the complaint is a third- party
RULING: 1)The Supreme Court has long
recognized that regular courts have no. To hold
otherwise is to sanction splitting of
jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice.
NLRC Manual on the Execution of
Judgment defines a third-party claim as one
where a person, not a party to the case, asserts
title to or right to the possession of the property
It also sets out the procedure for
the filing of a third-party claim.
2) There is no doubt in our mind that
petitioner’s complaint is a third- party claim
within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner
may indeed be considered a “third party” in
relation to the property subject of the execution
vis-à-vis the Labor Arbiter’s decision. There is no
question that the property belongs to petitioner
and his wife, and not to the corporation.
In sum, while petitioner availed himself of
the wrong remedy to vindicate his rights,
nonetheless, justice demands that this Court
look beyond his procedural missteps and grant
Merceditas Gutierrez vs.House Of
Representatives,198 SCRA 643
On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa
Hontiveros-Baraquel, et.al. (Baraquel group)
filed an impeachment complaint against
petitioner. On August 3, 2010, private
respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group)
filed another impeachment complaint. Both
impeachment complaints were endorsed by
different Party-List Representatives. On August
10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales
II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules,
instructed the Deputy Secretary General for
Operations to include the two complaints in the
Order of Business, which was complied with by
their inclusion in the Order of Business for the
following day. On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m.,
during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both
complaints to public respondent. After hearing,
public respondent, by Resolution of September
1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form,
which complaints it considered to have been
referred to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress
was published on September 2, 2010.
Issue: When is impeachment deemed initiated?
(Does the present impeachment complaint
violate the one-year bar rule under the
Ruling: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section
3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.”
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar
from the filing of the first impeachment
complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four
days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the
15th Congress. She posits that within one year
from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to
The filing of an impeachment complaint is
like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the
matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the
candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or
torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint
to the proper committee ignites the impeachment
proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of
multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted
matchsticks light the candle at the same time.
What is important is that there should only be
ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that
once the candle starts burning, subsequent
matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
ROQUE C. FACURA VS COURT OF APPEALS, 427 SCRA 643
On October 18, 2002, Facura and Tuason filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint
before the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman against De Jesus and Parungao charging them
with: 1) violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; and 2) dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave
misconduct, falsification of official documents, being notoriously undesirable, and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, for the fabrication of fraudulent appointments of nine (9) coterminous
employees of LWUA.
Facura and Tuason alleged that the retroactive appointment papers were fabricated and
fraudulent as they were made to appear to have been signed/approved on the dates stated, and not on
the date of their actual issuance. They further alleged that with malice and bad faith, De Jesus and
Parungao willfully and feloniously conspired not to submit the fraudulent appointment papers to the CSC,
and to submit instead the valid set of appointment papers bearing the December 12, 2001 issuance date.
Whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman’s decision in administrative cases carries
with it the suspension of the imposed penalty;
The issue of whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman decision in an administrative case carries
with it the immediate suspension of the imposed penalty has been laid to rest in the recent resolution of
the case of Ombudsman v. Samaniego,
where this Court held that the decision of the Ombudsman is
immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of
an injunctive writ.
The Court now looks into the issue of whether De Jesus was rightfully dismissed from the
government service, and whether Parungao was righfully exonerated by the CA.
When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully
perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit
of the public.
Simple neglect of duty is classified under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service as a less grave offense punishable by suspension without pay for one month and one day to six
months. Finding no circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty of six months, and
considering her demonstrated good faith, the Court finds the imposition of suspension without pay for
one month and one day as justified.
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