Third World Quarterly, Vol 19, No 3, pp 339±348, 1998

Third World studies, development
studies and post-communist studies:
de®nitions, distance and dynamism
ABSTRACT The collapse of state socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in
the late 1980s and early 1990s has had contrary impacts on Third World studies
and development studies. On the one hand, the disintegration of the former
Soviet bloc has made the spirit of `non-alignment’ of the Third World no longer
relevant. On the other hand, the nature of post-communist transformation has
led many scholars to study transition in terms of development. This article will
examine the recent trend of decline in Third World studies and the penetration
of development studies into post-communist studies. It will argue that the
employment of development perspectives in transitology will widen our ®eld of
vision of post-communist transformation.
The emergence of the concept of the Third World in the 1950s called forth a
generation of political scientists, economists, sociologists, and scholars of
several other disciplines to investigate into the past, present and future of the
`new’ world that was largely unknown to the West before the 15th century. One
of the ®rst paradigms employed in Third World studies was moderni sation
theory, which analyses social changes in terms of unilinear movement from
tradition to moderni ty. Criticised as being Eurocentric, moderni sation theory
gradually gave way to development studies, which in principle dropped the
assumption of single destiny.
Yet, as the idea of development is still a Western
one, the notion of the Third World is preferred by those countries striving for a
non-Western identity. In any case, Third World studies and development studies
share similar basic academic concerns and research targets, and the difference
between the two ®elds is often ideological rather than real.
However, the collapse of state socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in
the late 1980s and early 1990s has had contrary impacts on Third World studies
and development studies. On the one hand, the disintegration of the former
Soviet bloc has made the spirit of `non-alignment’, `independence between
capitalism and socialism’, and the `third way’ of the Third World no longer
relevant. Third World studies, along with the concept of the Third World itself,
are in crisis. On the other hand, the nature of post-communist transformation has
Shu-Yun Ma is Assistant Professor at the Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese
University of Hong Kong, Shatin, NT, Hong Kong.
339 0143-6597/98/030339-20 $7.00 Ó1998 Third World Quarterly
led many to situate transition in development perspectives. While post-commu-
nist studies are still searching for an inheritance from the outdated communist
development studies have the potential of handling at least part of the
vast issues brought up by post-communist changes. In short, the end of socialism
has tended to impoveri sh Third World studies, but enrich development studies.
This article will examine in detail the above trend. After a brief review of our
standard perception of the formation of the Third World, we will show how the
three-world taxonomy is in fact based on a set of inconsistent criteria. We will
then address the issue of whether the former Second World is (re)joining the
Third World or transiting to the less-developed world. This will be followed by
a discussion on the relevance of development studies to post-communist trans-
formation. Our conclusion is that, although the post-communist countries in
Central and Eastern Europe may not welcome a development model based on the
East Asian experience, the employment of development perspectives in transitol-
ogy will widen our ®eld of vision of post-communist transformation.
Making of the Third World
A major mission of the Third World is to achieve an identity that is clearly
differentiable from the type of moderni ty originated in Europe. Ironically,
however, the notion of the Third World is not itself an indigenous Third World
idea, but a European concept. The term `Third World’ originated from the
system of three estates, which is an early form of functional representation
commonly adopted in Europe in the Middle Ages and the early modern period.
In France, there were three estates: lords spiritual, lords temporal and the `third
estate’ comprising the common people.
In 1952 the French demographer Alfred
Sauvy coined the term `Third World’ to refer to the `third estate’ before the
French Revolution. It has economic (`poor ’), political (`powerless’), and social
(`marginalised’) connot ations.
In the 1960s some scholars began to use the term
`Third World’ to describe the conditions of `under developed’ or `developing’
countries. It gained increasing currency in the early 1970s and has gradually
passed from academic circles into popular daily use.
In recent years, however, the notion of the Third World has been challenged.
Doubts have been cast about the current validity of the three-world taxonomy:
the Second World has disappeared following the disintegration of the Soviet
bloc; the newly industrialising countries have left, or are about to leave, the
Third World; the North±South gap has narrowed signi®cantly; the idea of Third
World solidarity has been eroded by persistent nationalism; and the condition of
internal colonialism has blurred the boundary between the First World and the
Third World.
On the other hand, the concept of the Third World has been
defended on the basis that the North±South gap is in fact widening rather than
that the Third World continues to be a powerful international actor
in a number of arenas;
that the term Third World remains `manageable,
functional, and forceful’;
and that the Third World is still a distinct group
clearly identi®able by its `tenuous, impermanent, fragmented’ political culture.
Before presenting our view on this debate, we need brie¯y to review our
standard perception of how the Third World is formed. This is essential to our
later argument about the outdatedness of the idea of the Third World. The
following account on the making of the Third World will be based on L S
Stavraino’s de®nitive work Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age.
Basically this is a dependency interpretation of the history of the Third World.
The central thesis of the dependency school is that the `under development’ of
the Third World is the result of the economic exploitation of the `periphery’ by
the `centre’, rather than of any internal impediments to moderni sation and
According to this perspective, the Third World is seen as a
complex historical±political product of the global expansion of European capital-
ism. The whole process began in the early 15th century with the emergence of
commercial capitalism in Western Europe. This advanced mode of production
established the economic and thus political and military primacy of Western
Europe over other parts of the world. Capitalism emphasised trade; but given the
unequal power structure, much of the trade was conducted on unequal terms.
Stavrianos thus de®ned Third World as `those countries or regions that partici-
pated on unequal terms in what eventually became the global market econ-
The Third World, in the sense de®ned above, was born in Eastern Europe in
the 15th century. Being adjacent to Western Europe, Eastern Europe was the ®rst
to face the challenge of capitalist trade. At the outset, the two parts of the
continent were at similar starting points of development. However, during the
16th and 17th centuries Western Europe grew rapidly into a producer of
manufactured goods, whereas Eastern Europe remained a supplier of raw
materials. Through unequal exchanges Eastern Europe was gradually captured
by Western Europe as an economic appendage. Initially, the capitalist system
was unable to stretch into Russia thanks to the existence of a vast and seemingly
ever expandable eastern territory. Flat terrains, navigable rivers, and the lack of
strong local resistance allowed Russia to extend into Siberia, transforming the
country from an East European nation into a cross-continent, relatively self-
suf®cient empire with regional specialisation and inter-regional trade. A massive
industrialisation drive was launched in the 18th century, under the leadership of
Peter the Great. Nevertheless, these factors did not save Russia from the eventual
fate of membership of the Third World. After its defeat in the Crimean War
(1854±56), Russia was forced to open up the country to Western capitalism. Key
sectors of the national economy fell into foreign hands, and agricultural re-
sources were export ed on unfavourable terms.
Latin America was brought into the Third World by the Spanish and
Portuguese conquest at the end of the 15th century. The long isolation of the
American Indians from other parts of the world made them biologically,
technologically and psychologically too weak to resist European colonisation.
The large, relatively docile Indian labour force was used to mine gold and silver;
they also worked on haciendas to provide the mining communities with wheat,
corn and meat. In the coastal areas where the Indian population was sparse,
African slaves were imported to plant single cash crops such as sugar, tobacco
and cotton, mainly for export to Europe. During the 17th century bullion output
declined, and the importance of haciendas diminished accordingly. Plantations
thus became the mainstay of the Latin American economy. The monocul tural
nature of the plantations prevented the emergence of local horizontal linkages,
making Latin America a dependent economy of Europe. In contrast, the much
poorer natural endowment in Anglo-America forced the British and French
settlers to develop broad-based, well integrated and thus self-generating econom-
ies. As a result, the originally rich Latin America became part of the poor Third
World, whereas the initially poor Anglo-America grew into the leader of the
developed world.
Unlike the American Indians, the African people had a long history of
interaction with the peoples, cultures and technologies of Europe and Asia. This
reduced the vulnerability of the African people to external threat. Moreover the
Europeans were discouraged from entering Africa by the inaccessible geograph-
ical conditions, hot and humid climate, tropical diseases, and the lack of readily
available sources of wealth in the hinterland. Consequently, when North and
South America were opened up and colonised, Africa could still keep the
Europeans out of the continent. However, instead of penetrating the interior for
wealth, the Europeans found it pro®table to capture slaves along the African
coast and sell them to the New World. With the growth of sugar plantations in
Latin America in the 17th century, the trans-Atlantic slave trade prosper ed. A
slave trade existed in Africa long before the arrival of the Europeans but the
internationalisation of this business had the impact of subordi nating domestic
slave trade to the emerging global capitalist economy, thereby obstructing the
emergence of local horizontal economic ties. During the early 19th century, the
slave trade was gradually replaced by export s of West African resources, such
as palm oil, groundnuts, ivory and cotton. Growing con¯ict between European
and local traders, and the balance-of-power among the European powers resulted
in a scramble for African lands. By 1914 the entire continent had been
partitioned (except for Ethiopia and Liberia).
In the Middle East the Ottoman Empire was originally strong and self-
suf®cient. But its proximity to Europe made it the ®rst Asian civilisation to face
a challenge from the West. A decline relative to the West began in the 17th
century, two centuries before similar process occurred in China and Japan.
Internally, the primacy of religious af®liation over national allegiance prevented
the Ottoman Empire from achieving political integration comparable to that of
Western Europe’ s nation-state system. The Empire also lagged behind the West
in terms of science, technology and productivity. Externally, changing the
Asia±Europe trade route from one which went through the Middle East to one
which went round the Cape damaged the economies of the Ottoman Empire.
Trade with Western Europe was dominated by Levantine companies, the large
joint-stock companies organised by the French, English and Dutch to exploit the
resources of the Ottoman Empire. The Levantine companies paid for the
foodst uffs and raw materials they obtained from the Middle East in part with the
bullion that ¯owed into Europe from the New World, a process which transmit-
ted in¯ation from the West to the Middle East. In the 19th century, the Western
powers annexed the Ottoman Empire’s land in North Africa and established
colonies in this area. The remaining territories, which escaped partition only
because of disagreement among the European invaders, became quasi-colonies
economically controlled by Western capital.
Asia was the last entrant to the Third World. When other parts of the globe
were integrated one after another into Western capitalism, Asia remained
external to the system. Trade between Asia and Europe was limited, as the West
produced little of interest to Asians, while Asian goods were too expensive for
European buyers. But Asia’s independence ended with the British colonisation
of India in the 19th century. European consumers who formerly could not afford
Indian goods now exchanged jute, cotton, hides and oilseeds for tea. Millions of
Indian coolies were shipped to work in plantations and mines in Southeast Asia,
Fiji, East Africa and the Caribbean. More importantly, Indian opium was traded
for Chinese tea. When China refused to take in opium, the British resorted to
military force, leading to the defeat of China in the Opium War of 1839±42.
Although subsequent struggles among the European powers saved China from
outright conquest and direct foreign rule, the country was forced to accept a
series of unequal treaties which subjected China to the world capitalist system.
Treaty ports were opened; coolies were exported; spheres of in¯uence were
established; and native industries were ruined. While the European powers
approached Asia from the west, the USA intruded from the east. The Treaty of
Kanagawa (1854) opened up Japan to the Americans and similar pacts were
signed subsequently with other Western powers. However, for a number of
reasonsÐthe preoccupation of the Western powers with the Crimean War and
the Indian Mutiny; a high degree of cultural and racial homogeneity; the
tradition of borrowing from foreign experience; internal social tensions that
produced forces of change; and outstanding leadershipÐJapan became the only
part of the world that was able to maintain political and economic independence
from the West. By the end of the 19th century, instead of becoming a Third
World country, Japan had emerged as an imperialist power.
In brief, from the 15th to the 19th century, the global expansion of capitalism
from Europe created a Third World that included Eastern Europe and Russia,
Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia (except Japan). Decolonisation,
which began in the 19th century in Latin America and after the Second World
War in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, gave rise to a number of new states.
However, political independence was not followed by economic independence,
as indicated by the devastating impact of the Great Depression of the 1930s on
Latin America, the Western control of oil production in the Middle East until the
1970s, the specialisation in export able cash crops at the expense of traditional
food production in Africa, and the strong presence of multinationals in many
Asian countries. On the other hand, the emergence of the socialist bloc and its
separation from the capitalist world economy detached Russia and Eastern
Europe from the Third World. `The Third World’, then, comprises at present the
following portions of the globe: all of Latin America, all of Africa except South
Africa, and all of Asia except Japan and Israel.
Two-dimensionalisation of the concept of the Third World
As mentioned at the beginning of the last section, the concept of the Third World
originated from the term `third estate’. The numeric meaning of the `third estate’
(common people) was that it was next to the `®rst estate’ (lords spiritual) and
`second estate’ (lords temporal). However, when the term `third estate’ was
modi®ed into Third World, the word `third’ became an adjective without
numeric meaning. In other words, the original notion of the Third World is not
based upon the prior existence of the First and Second World. However, as the
word `third’ inevitably leads to numeric association, people encountering the
term are naturally induced to ask what the other two worlds are. It is this
question that the dependency approach fails to answer. As evident in Stavrianos’
work summarised above, in the dependency framework there are only two
worlds, the centre and the periphery. In a strict numeric sense, therefore, there
is no such thing as the Third World in the dependency analysis.
Dependency theory is predominantly a study of economic relations. If econ-
omic relations is substituted for degree of economic development as the criterion
of classi®cation, a greater number of worlds can be identi®ed. But this may lead
to the other extreme of having too many worlds. For example, the World Bank’s
classi®cation of countries into `low-income’, `lower-middle-income’, `upper -
middle-income’ and `high-income’ economies suggests the existence of four
Also working from an economic standard, Newsweek magazine pro-
posed the category of the Fourth World, referring to `the worst economic
hardship cases’; and Time added the Fifth World to designate `the globe’s true
basket cases’.
More recently, it has been suggested that the world be classi®ed
into seven categories based mainly on changes in per capita income.
This kind
of exercise can result in endless and meaningless multiplications of worlds and
in this case, the concept of worlds may better be replaced by a `purely linear list
of countries ranked in order of level of development’.
Yet, among the various taxonomies, the notion of the Third World has been
most popular. This has been the result of the addition of a political dimension
to the economic criterion, thanks to the emergence of communist regimes. The
Russian Revolution in 1917 and the socialist transformation in Eastern Europe
after the Second World War represented efforts to achieve rapid industrialisation
without resort to capitalism. The initial success seemed to suggest the viability
of socialism as an alternative path of development.
This was followed by the
Cold War, characterised by political, military and ideological confrontation
between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp. The clear division between
the two camps gave rise to the notion of the First World, referring to the
advanced capitalist countries led by the USA, in contrast with the Second World
consisting of the Soviet bloc countries.
In such an antagonistic atmosphere,
those countries which wanted to keep a neutral position between the capitalist
camp and the socialist camp were attracted by the notion of the Third World,
which implied the possibility of a third way. In this manner, to the concept of
the Third World was added the meaning of non-al ignment.
The term Third World in its current usage, then, can only be underst ood from
two dimensions: the economic and the political. The economic dimension
divides countries into centre and periphery and the political dimension into the
capitalist camp, the socialist camp and the non-al igned countries. These two
dimensions form the matrix shown in Table 1.
In the economic dimension, we follow Stavrianos’ dependency division of the
world into centre and periphery. However, in addition to the capitalist centre
Economic and political dimensions of the three worlds
Political Economic
Centre Periphery
Capitalist camp 1. North America 4. Southern Europe
Western Europe
Socialist camp 2. Soviet Union 5. Eastern Europe
Non-Aligned countries 3. Nil 6. Asia (except Japan), Latin
America, the Middle East
(except Israel), Africa (except
South Africa)
comprising North America and Western Europe, we add the socialist centre
represented by the Soviet Union and the corresponding periphery consisting of
Eastern Europe. This is to recognise the `socialist dependency’ of Eastern
Europe on the Soviet Union.
In the political dimension, the division of
capitalist camp, socialist camp and non-al igned refers to the presence or absence
of a formal political alliance, but not to the nature of the socio-economic system.
Hence socialist countries like China and Ethiopia are not included in the socialist
camp, but are classi®ed as non-al igned. The term `non-aligned’ came from the
Non-Aligned Movement initiated in the 1960s by a group of countries striving
for political and military neutrality between the capitalist camp and the socialist
camp. Although the Non-Aligned Movement itself might be regarded as a
`non-military, anti-colonial, alliance’, it did not form any formal political
In terms of Table 1, the First World is represented by cells 1 and 4, the
Second World by cells 2 and 5, and the Third World by cell 6. Cell 3 is empty,
as basically no developed country has joined the Non-Aligned Movement.
What Table 1 shows is that the three-world taxonomy is in fact based on a set
of inconsistent, two-dimensional criteria. The difference between the First World
(cells 1 and 4) and the Second World (cells 2 and 5) is political; but the
developed part of the First World (cell 1) and the developed part of the Second
World (cell 2) is lumped together to make an economic contrast with the Third
World (cell 6). Between the political and economic criteria, the former often has
primacy over the latter. Thus Eastern European countries (cell 5) have been
included in the Second World for political reasons, although their economic
dependency on the Soviet Union should classify them as part of the Third World.
Similarly, by the late-15th century Southern European countries (cell 4) had
declined to the status of Third World economies;
yet they are regarded as part
of the First World because of their political alliance with the West. According
to this three-world taxonomy, the First World produced the most output with the
least land and labour, as shown in Table 2.
As mentioned above, according to the dependency school’s interpretation, the
Third World as a historical product was formed between the 15th and 19th
century, before the formation of the First and Second World in the cold war
Relative economic, geographic and demographic size of the three
Share in world gross Share in Share in world
national product (%) world area (%) population (%)
First World 63 23 15
Second World 19 26 33
Third World 18 51 52
Source: Rod Hague, Martin Harrop & Shaun Breslin, Comparative Government and
Politics: An Introduction, London: Macmillan, 1992, pp. 45±46.
Note: According to the source, the First World consists of around 30 economically
advanced liberal democracies; the Second World around 30 industrialized communist party
states and the Third World a large number of less-developed countries. This is thus only
a rough approximation of our three-world taxonomy.
period, implying that the concept of the Third World can exist independently of
the First and Second World. It is only through the two-dimensionalisation of the
concept of the Third World that the First, Second and Third World were given
numeric sense. But this process involves changing and inconsistent criteria.
The Second World: joining the Third World or transiting to the less
developed world?
The domino-type collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe that began in
1989 precipitated the Soviet bloc into a collapse and the dissolution of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization on 1 July 1991 marked the of®cial end of the
Second World.
For Third World countries, this meant the loss of a socialist
alternative in terms of development model, political support and economic
assistance. Moreover, Western interest in them is expected to diminish with the
decline of their strategic importance.
From an academic point of view, perhaps
the most signi®cant impact is an identity crisis for the Third World.
As discussed in the last section, if the term Third World is to make any
numeric sense, it must be based on a two-dimensional taxonomy with the
political criterion given primacy over the economic criterion. Now with the
disintegration of the socialist bloc, it is no longer meaningful to speak of a
capitalist camp and a ªnon-alignedº group. The political dimension of the
concept of the Third World thus collapses and, as mentioned above, the
economic dimension alone is not adequate to give full numeric meaning to
the term Third World. In this sense, the Third World has disappeared. This
reinforces the arguments against the current validity of the notion of the Third
World summarised at the beginning of the ®rst section.
Our view favour s abandoning the notion of the Third World. From the very
beginning, the term has been problematic as it misleads people over questions
such as what the three worlds are. Convent ional dependency analysis can name
only two worlds, whereas economic development approach suggests arbitrary
numbers of worlds. The current conception of the Third World is based on
shifting two-dimensional (economic and political) criteria. The problem of
inconsistency aside, the disappearance of the political dimension in the post-cold
war period makes the Third World no longer identi®able. Although originally the
concept of the Third World does not imply the existence of two other worlds,
the term itself inevitably leads to questions about its numeric meaning.
More importantly, the Third World has disappeared not just as a category of
countries, but also as an idea. Third Worldism, if it is to mean the goal to `chart
a political and economic path between the liberal capitalism of the ªFirst Worldº
and the ªstate socialismº of the ªSecond Worldº;
is no longer relevant in the
post-cold war era. Third Worldism `as a critique of an unequal world, a
programme for economic development and justice, a type of national reformism
dedicated to the creation of new societies and a new world’
is also dead, as
revolutionary romanticism has proved unsustainable.
To abandon the notion of the Third World does not mean that the Third World
conditions of being `poor, powerless and marginalised’ have disappeared from
the globe. Poverty and injustice continue to prevail on our planet. More
importantly, the collapse of state socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe has
drawn the former Second World countries into the Third World arena. This has
led to the argument that `while East Asia may be leaving the ªThird Worldº
much of the former Soviet Bloc can be said to have (re)joined it;
or that `it
might be better to look to third world countries for Russia’s likely destiny’.
However, such a characterisation of the conditions of the former Soviet bloc
countries is wrong if we stick to the political criterion of the Third World, as
none of the former Second World countries have `(re)joined’ the Non-Aligned
Movement of the Third World. To the contrary, many of them have been seeking
political as well as an economic alliance with the First World. The statement that
some members of the former Second World have `(re)joined’ the Third World
makes sense only if it refers to the decline in the level of development of
post-communist countries. But this situation can better be conceptualised in
terms of `de-development’, rather than as (re)joining the Third World.
Table 3 shows changes in the Human Development Index (HDI) of countries
undergoing post-communist transformation. Though not a perfect design, the HDI
constructed by the United Nations Development Programme contains measure-
ments for different aspects of development, including income, health and
education. From 1990±94, the HDI dropped throughout the entire former Second
World (except in Poland and Romania), re¯ecting a general decline in the level
of development in the region. Nine countries (Armenia, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Russian Federation and Ukraine) even
fell from the category of `high human development’ to `medium human
development’. They provide clear cases of `de-development’. In Russia, the
`centre’ of the former Second World, the HDI dropped by 8.1%. A closer look
at the trade, consumption and welfare conditions of the country led Petras &
Vieux to the conclusion that Russia is in `transition to underdevelopment’.
Focusing on the brain drain problem, Kuznetsov found that Russia is on the
verge of `becoming a developing country’.
In short, we ®nd it more appropriate to describe changes in Russia and Eastern
Europe as a transition to the less developed world, rather than as a switch from
Human Development Index
1990 1994 Change (%)
High human development:
Armenia 0.831 Fell to medium human development
Belarus 0.861 0.806 26.4
Bulgaria 0.854 Fell to medium human development
0.892 0.872 22.2
Estonia 0.872 Fell to medium human development
Georgia 0.829 Fell to medium human development
Hungary 0.887 0.857 23.4
Kazakhstan 0.802 Fell to medium human development
Latvia 0.868 Fell to medium human development
Lithuania 0.881 Fell to medium human development
Poland 0.831 0.834 0.4
Russian Federation 0.862 Fell to medium human development
Ukraine 0.844 Fell to medium human development
Medium human development:
Albania 0.699 0.655 26.3
Armenia Fell from high human 0.651 2 21.7
Azerbaijan 0.770 0.636 2 17.4
Bulgaria Fell from high human 0.780 28.7
Estonia Fell from high human 0.776 2 ll.0
Georgia Fell from high human 0.637 2 23.2
Kazakhstan Fell from high human 0.709 2 12.0
Kyrgzstan 0.689 0.635 27.8
Latvia Fell from high human 0.711 2 18.1
Lithuania Fell from high human 0.762 2 13.5
Moldova 0.758 0.612 2 19.3
Romania 0.709 0.748 5.5
Russian Federation Fell from high human 0.792 28.1
Tajikistan 0.657 0.580 2 11.7
Turkmenistan 0.746 0.723 23.1
Ukraine Fell from high human 0.689 2 18.4
Uzbekistan 0.695 0.662 24.7
Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993, 1994, 1997.
The data on Czechoslovakia covered only the period from 1990±92, because by the end of 1992 the country had
broken up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
the Second to the Third World. To be sure, the concept of development is
controversial. It rests on a belief in human progress;
it tends to be Eurocen-
and the term `less developed’ carries negative connot ations.
disagreements over the idea of development could be dealt with by recognising
indigenous development models,
and by adding new content to the meaning of
Comparing the notion of development with that of the Third
World, the former has the advantage that it avoids all the numeric confusions of
the latter. Moreover, we have a variety of quantitative indicatorsÐper capita
gross national product, human development index, physical quality of life index,
index of social progress and socioeconomic development index
Ðto measure
and rank different levels of development, whereas the notion of the Third World
provides only a broad categorisation of countries. Finally, by including depen-
dency as a feature of underdevelopment, the concept of development is able to
incorporate the centre±periphery dimension of the Third World emphasised by
the dependency school.
Relevance of development studies to post-communist studies
Post-communist countries are committed to development, but not to reviving the
ailing Third Worldism. What then is the relationship between development
studies and post-communist studies? What insight do development studies have
for post-communist transformation? Can post-communist studies be incorporated
into development studies? Samuel Huntington identi®ed ®ve major goals of
development: economic growth, equity, democracy, political order and stability,
and national autonomy.
Are these not also the goals of post-communist
transformation? To achieve these goals, former Second World countries has been
engaged in different forms and degrees of liberalisation, stabilisation, privatisa-
tion and democratisation. These are also common themes of reform in the
developing world. Such commonalities have led to a trend of analysing post-
communist issues in the ®eld of development studies. The present author’s
survey of four major journals in development studies (Journal of Developing
Societies, Journal of Development Studies, Third World Quarterly and World
Development) from 1989±96 found at least 21 pieces on post-communist
transformation. Issues discussed range from the Armenian±Azerbaijani con¯ict,
pastoralism in post-socialist Mongoli a, mass privatisation in the Czech and
Slovak Republics, local government reform in Poland, to state±market±civil
institutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics.
Apart from journal
articles, chapters on post-communist transition have appeared in books shelved
under development studies.
The publication of the World Development Report 1966 perhaps marked the
most of®cial attempt to include post-communist transformation into development
studies. This annual text of the World Bank, which `de®ne[s] the conventional
paradigm of development’,
is highly in¯uential in the setting of development
agenda. The 1996 report, entitled From Plan to Market, is devoted `to the
transition of countries with centrally planned economies¼to a market orien-
According to this report
The long-term goal of transition is the same as that of economic reforms elsewhere:
to build a thriving market economy capable of delivering long-term growth in living
standards. What distinguishes transition from reforms in other countries is the
systemic change involved: reform must penetrate to the fundamental rules of the
game, to the institutions that shape behavior and guide organizations. This makes
it a profound social transition as well as an economic one. Similar changes have
been needed in many other countries and the transition experience is therefore of
interest to them as well. But most of their reform programs pale in comparison to
the scale and intensity of the transition from plan to market.
Most of the world’s economies, at one time or another, have lifted price controls,
opened trade, or privatized state enterprisesÐwith varying degrees of success. But
as noted above, transition is different. It is not simply the adoption or modi®cation
of a few policies or programs but a passage from one mode of economic
organization to a thoroughly different one. The underlying habits and rules of an
economic system are often so pervasive and ingrained that they are taken for
In other words, in the World Bank’s view, post-communist transformation is
different from the reforms in the developing world only in the intensity but not
the nature of the change. Post-communist transition is regarded as a highly
complicated development issue. Does this mean that former socialist countries in
general ®nd it more dif®cult than developing countries to achieve development?
Anne Krueger found that, in terms of starting income levels, social indicators,
savings rates and human capital stock, post-communist countries in Eastern
Europe are in a more advantageous position than most middle-income develop-
ing countries.
But, on the other hand, the East European countries lack the
commercial codes, laws of contract, clear proper ty rights arrangements and
entrepreneurial tradition that are essential for development As such, post-
communist countries have to face the unique problem of creating those institu-
tions and incentives.
A World Bank researcher, Mary Shirley, also noted that, unlike Latin
American countries, post-communist economies in Eastern Europe lack a large
private sector and functioning ®nancial systems that are essential for successful
Nevertheless, she found that both Eastern Europe and Latin
America share similar problems such as poorly performing state enterprises,
varied commitment to privatisation, technical dif®culties and adverse macroeco-
nomic conditions. There are therefore, important lessons from Latin America
that are relevant to post-communist transformation.
Focusing on the political dimension, Joan Nelson observed some important
parallels between Eastern Europe and developing countries: commitment to
fundamental changes because of the failure of limited reforms; disagreements
over the design, speed and sequencing of reform; nationalistic sentiment against
economic and political liberalisation; and the existence of organised opposit ion
but absence of organi sed support for reform. However, there are problems that
seems to be more serious in Eastern Europe than in developing countries: the
presence of a larger public sector; a lower degree of tolerance towards inequality
and insecurity; opposit ion from the more organi sed labour; greater reliance on
state agencies and of®cials to reform the state itself (the so-called `orthodox
paradox’ of reform in developing countries); and a lack of the features that
produced strong centralised executive authority in developing countries. Overall,
Nelson concluded that, notwithstanding important contrasts between the settings
of reform in post-communist Eastern Europe and the developing world, there are
`striking parallels’ in the issues confronting the two groups of countries.
Therefore, `[developing] countries]’ experience may enrich underst anding and
thereby contribute to Eastern Europe efforts to design ways to cope with the
inherent tensions of the [economic and political] transition’.
From a different
angle but in a similar tone, Roger Markwick wrote: `many parallels can be
drawn between the political problems facing erstwhile Soviet republ ics and those
in the [developing world] attempting to make the transition from authoritarian
In short, there is a growing trend of incorporating post-communist transform-
ation into development studies. De Kadt et al. have made perhaps the most
explicit statement in this regard. In de®ning the issues for developmentalists in
the 1990s, they noted that:
The boundaries of development studies have become more blurred. Greater atten-
tion is now being paid to the global changes that are affecting the world as a
whole¼If the study of structural adjustment in Africa has taught us certain lessons
about the way state institutions adjust (or do not adjust!) to policy changes in
situations that require a major transformation, then those lessons may well be of
relevance to what is occurring in Eastern Europe today, and vice versa.
In most attempts to link post-communist studies with development studies,
differences between former Second World countries and developing countries
are noted. But suf®cient similarities are found to justify use of development
perspectives to analyse post-communist changes. The next question, then, is
what development model is most relevant to post-communist countries? What is
the central message that development studies has for post-communist leaders?
Conclusion: an Asian model for post-communist transformation?
Notwithstanding the recent Asian ®nancial crisis, among the less developed
countries, it is those in East Asia±Japan, South Korea, TaiwanÐwhich have
achieved the most remarkable development in the postwar period. This has given
rise to the notion of an East Asian model which highlights such features as high
saving and investment rates, attention to education, an emphasis on exports and,
above all, pervasive state intervention.
Ha-Joon Chang examined the appli-
cability of the East Asian development model to post-communist countries and
concluded that, although some institutions in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are
idiosyncratic, this should not lead us to the conclusion that the East Asian
development experience is strictly non-transferable.
Following the notion of an
East Asian developmental state.
Chang argued that the most important lesson
that post-communist countries could draw from East Asia was the important role
played by the state. The real issue is thus not to destroy the central planning
legacy in the former socialist countries, but to modify it to produce effective
state intervention. This is in direct contrast to the Western neoliberal prescrip-
tion, which emphasises the importance of a minimal state and a maximal market.
Within the context of post-communist transformation, there is also an `Asian
approach’ that has been regarded as more successful than the method of changes
adopted in Russia and Eastern Europe. Compared to the `big bang’ reforms
(consisting of rapid liberalisation, stringent stabilisation and wholesale privatisa-
tion) in the former Soviet bloc countries, changes in transitional economies in
Asia (including China, Mongolia, the Lao PDR, Burma and Vietnam) have been
much more gradual and evolutionary. Although there are many important
differences between transitional economies in Asia and Europe in terms of initial
conditions and external circumstances, advocates of the Asian approach hold that
the Asian transition experiences contain valuable lessons for post-communist
transformation worldwide.
However, although the East Asian model has been popular among developing
countries and an Asian approach is emerging in the context of post-communist
transformation, the current mood in Eastern Europe is to `return to Europe’,
rather than to learn from Asia. As Chang observed, `most studies on the reform
in Eastern Europe seem to accept that [Anglo-Saxon capitalism] is the best of all
possible models, and discuss how best to transform the Eastern European
economies into (highly idealised versions of) Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Of those
studies which try to draw lessons from experience of non-Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, only a minority look at the East Asian experience’.
Apart from the
aspiration for a European identity, such an atmosphere also re¯ects a strategic
consideration for East European countries. For them, to `return to Europe’ Ðto
join such important West European organi sations as the European Union the
Council of Europe, NATO and the European Conference on Security and Cooper-
ationÐis a means to guarantee their security.
The situation in Russia is more
complicated. After the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, `the European
or Western orientation of the early days of Russian independence¼has been
replaced by a growing awareness that Russia is not merely the eastern part of
Europe, but also the northern and western part of Asia’.
For national security
and unity reasons, the Russian state needs to maintain a careful balance between
the country’s European and Asian identity. Any development policy that claims
to `return to Europe’ or to learn from Asia may jeopardise this effort.
The Eastern European countries’ resistance to the East Asian development
model and the Asian transition approach is reminiscent of developing countries’
rejection of the Eurocentric development formula. Before long, the West was
accused of imposing its own history and value onto the less developed world;
now East Asia has its own development lessons to offer. Nevertheless, at present
it is still the West that has the upper hand in the export of development
prescription. Through international lending agencies such as the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, the West has been attempting to translate the
neoliberal doctrine into actual policies in both the developing world and
post-communist world, resulting in similar economic liberalisations in the two
worlds. In this sense, `the parallels [between developing countries and post-com-
munist countries] re¯ect shared pressures from the larger international setting’.
In any event, the employment of development perspectives in post-communist
studies widens our ®eld of vision of post-communist transformation. Just as in
its earlier contribution in breaking the belief that tradition would move along a
single path to reach modernity, development studies tells us that post-communist
transformation may take different forms towards different directions. The very
basic idea of development suggests that there is no end of history. It is too early
to say whether development studies and post-communist studies will converge or
not; but it is now time for transitologists to make more reference to development
studies, and for developmentalists to pay greater attention to post-communist
Robert C Bartlett, `On the decline of contemporary political development studies’, Review of Politics, 58,
1996, pp 272±278.
For an effort in this direction, see Frederic J Fleron, Jr & Erik P Hoffmann (eds), Post-Communist Studies
and Political Science: Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sovietology, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
R J W Evans, `Estates’, in Vernon Bogdanor (ed), The Blackwell Encyclopaidia of Political Science, Oxford:
Blackwell, 1991, p 297.
Ted C Lewellen, Dependency and Development: An Introduction to the Third World, Westport, CT: Bergin
& Garvey, 1995, p 3.
Leslie Wolf-Phillips, `Why ªThird Worldº?: origin, de®nition and usage’, Third World Quarterly, 9(4),
1987, pp 1311±1327.
Mark T Berger, `The end of the ªThird Worldº?’, Third World Quarterly, 15(2), 1994, pp 257±275; Nigel
Harris, The End of the Third World: Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an Ideology,
London: Penguin, 1987; and Vicky Randall, `Third World: rejected or rediscovered?’, Third World
Quarterly, 13(4), 1992, pp 727±730.
Robin Broad & Christina Melhorn Landi, `Wither the North±South gap?’, Third World Quarterly, 17(1),
1996, pp 7±17.
Hans-Henrik Holm, `The end of the Third World?’, Journal of Peace Research, 27(1), 1990, pp l±7.
Allen H Merriam, `What does ªThird Worldº mean?’, in Jim Norwine & Alfonso Gonzales (eds), The Third
World: States of Mind and Being, Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1988, pp 15±22.
Mehran Kamrava, `Political culture and a new de®nition of the Third World’, Third World Quarterly, 16(4),
1995, pp 691±701.
L S Stavrianos, Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age, New York: William Morrow, 1981.
There is a vast literature on dependency theory; a recent comprehensive survey can be found in Robert A
Packenham, The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1992.
Stavrianos, Global Rift, pp 31±32.
Ibid, p 34. South Africa and Israel are not included in the Third World as these white-settler economies
enjoy special connections with the `centre’. Ibid, pp 755±790.
Wolf-Philips, `Why ªThird Worldº?’, pp 1313±1314.
Merriam, `What does ªThird Worldº mean?’, pp 17±18.
The seven categories are: the industrialized First World: the newly industrialising Third World countries: the
major surplus oil producers: Third World countries with growing per capita income: Third World countries
with constant per capita income; Third World countries with declining per capita income; and transitional
economies. See Karl P Magyar, `Classifying the international political economy: a Third World proto-the-
ory’, Third World Quarterly, 16(4), 1995, pp 703±716.
Peter Worsley, The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1984, p 321 (emphasis in the original).
It should be noted that according to the world-system theory of the dependency school, there is only a
capitalist world, and the emergence of the socialist system did not change this situation. As the world-system
theorist Wallerstein argued, the socialist countries do not constitute a separable world, and there is still only
a single world-system. The communist state is merely a `collective capitalist ®rm as long as it remains¼a
participant in the market of the capitalist world-economy’. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-
Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp 68±69.
Paul Cammack, David Pool & William Tordoff, Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction,
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1993; Lewellen, Dependency and Development, p 4; Tony Spybey, Social
Change, Development and Dependency: Modernity, Colonialism and the Development of the West,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, pp 143±157 and Worsley, The Three Worlds, p 308.
Cammack et al, pp 5±6; Lewellen, Dependency and Development, p 3; and Stavrianos, p 33.
Worsely, The Three Worlds, pp 310, 312 used similar economic±political matrices to illustrate different
meanings of the Third World. But the factor of non-alignment is absent in his framework.
Cal Clark & Donna Bahry, `Dependent development: a socialist variant’, International Studies Quarterly,
27(3), 1983, pp 271±293. Apart from this external dependency, a kind of socialist internal dependency has
also been found in the relationship between the Asian republics in the Soviet Union and the Soviet centre.
See Gregory Gleason, `The political economy of dependency under socialism: the Asian republics in the
USSR’, Studies in Comparative Communism, 24(4), 1991, pp 335±353.
Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance, London: Frances Pinter,
1978, pp 224±225.
France under de Gaulle may be considered as a marginal case of cell 3 in Table 1 as the French president
attempted to pursue a foreign policy that was independent of the USA. In 1968 de Gaulle was invited to
attend a Non-Aligned Movement meeting. But he did not respond, and later moved his neutral position
towards renewed adhesion to NATO, see Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: the Ruler 1945±1970, New York: WW
Norton, 1992, pp 411±412.
Stavrianos, Global Lift, pp 86±87.
For an overview of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, see Minton F
Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, Armonk, ME: Sharpe, 1997; and for a
brief history of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, see Raymond L Garthoff, `Warsaw Treaty Organization’,
in Joel Krieger, (ed), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp
For the impact of the collapse of socialism on the Third World, see Fred Halliday, `The Third World and
the end of the Cold War’, in Barbara Stallings (ed), Global Change, Regional Response: The New
International Context of Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp 33±66; Franz J
Hinkelammert, `The crisis of socialism and the Third World’, Monthly Review, 45, 1993, pp 105±114; Colin
Legum, `The Post-communist Third World: focus on Africa’, Problems of Communism, 41(1±2), 1992, pp
195±206; Shahid M Shahidullah, `The Third World after the Cold War: global imperatives and local
pecularities’, Journal of Developing Societies, 12, 1996, pp 119±135; Carlos M Vilas, `Is socialism still an
alternative for the Third World?’, Monthly Review, 42, 1990, pp 93±109; Mark Webber, `The Third World
and the dissolution of the USSR’, Third World Quarterly, 13(4), 1993, pp 691±712. See also the special
issue of Third World Quarterly, 13(2), 1992, devoted to `rethinking socialism’.
Berger, `The end of the ªThird Worldº?’, p 259.
Harris, The End of the Third World, p 200.
Berger, `The end of the ªThird Worldº?’, p 257.
Michael Burawoy, `From Sovietology to comparative political economy’, in Daniel Orlovsky (ed), Beyond
Soviet Studies, Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, l995, pp 72±102, see p 90.
James Petras & Steve Vieux, `Russia: the transition to underdevelopment’, Journal of Contemporary Asia,
25(1), 1995, pp 109±118.
Evgenii Kuznetsov, `Is Russia becoming a developing country? Brain drain and allocation of talent in the
post-socialist transition’, Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, 7(4), 1995, pp 485±497.
P W Preston, Theories of Development, London: Routledge, 1982, pp 18±20.
John Brohman, `Universalism, eurocentrism and ideological bias in development studies: from modernis-
ation to neoliberalism’, Third World Quarterly, 16(1), 1995, pp 121±140; and Jan Nederveen Pieterse, `The
development of development theory: towards critical globalism’, Review of International Political Economy,
3(4), 1996, pp 541±564, see pp 543±547.
Merriam, `What does ªThird Worldº mean?’, p 19.
Howard J Wiarda, `Toward a nonethnocentric theory of development: alternative conceptions from the Third
World’, Journal of Developing Areas, 17, 1983, pp 433±452.
Barbara Ingham, `The meaning of development: interactions between `New’ and `Old’ Ideas’, World
Development, 21(11), 1993, pp l803±1821.
David Drakakis-Smith, `Human development indicators’, in Tim Unwin (ed), Atlas of World Development,
New York: John Wiley, 1994, pp 34±38.
Samuel P Huntington, `The goals of development’, in Myron Weiner & Samuel P Huntington (eds),
Understanding Political Development, Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1987, pp 3±31.
The 21 articles found were John B Allcock, `In praise of chauvinism: rhetorics of nationalism in Yugoslav
politics’, Third World Quarterly, 10(4), 1989, pp 208±222; Michael Burawoy, `The state and economic
involution: Russia through a China lens’, World Development, 24(6), 1996, pp 1105±1117; Klaus Deininger,
`Collective agricultural production: a solution for transition economies?’, World Development, 23(8), 1995,
pp 1317±1334; Tamara Dragadze, `The Armenian±Azerbaijani con¯ict: structure and sentiment’, Third
World Quarterly, 11, 1989, pp 55±71; Andre Gunder Frank, `Revolution in Eastern Europe: lessons for
democratic social movements (and socialists?’, Third World Quarterly, 12(2), 1990, pp 36±52; Kiaras
Gharabaghi, `Development strategies for Central Asia in the 1990s: in search of alternatives’, Third World
Quarterly, 15(1), 1994, pp 103±119; James F Hicks & Bartlomiej Kaminski, `Local government reform and
transition from communism: the case of Poland’, Journal of Developing Societies, 11(1), 1995, pp 1±20;
Jude Howell, `Coping with transition: insights from Kyrgyzstan’, Third World Quarterly, 17(1), 1996, pp
53±68; Ross Levine & David Scott, `Old debts and new beginnings: a policy choice in transitional socialist
economies’, World Development, 21(3), 1993, pp 319±330; Nick Manning, `TH Marshall & Jurgen
Habermas, `Citizenship and transition in Eastern Europe’, World Development, 21(8), 1993, pp l313±1328;
Robin Mearns, `Community, collective action and common grazing: the case of post-socialist Mongolia’,
Journal of Development Studies, 32(3), 1996, pp 297±339; Gordon C Rausser & S R Johnson, `State±mar-
ket±civil institutions: the case of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics’, World Development, 21(4),
1993, pp 675±689; Nemat Sha®k, `Making a market: mass privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics’,
World Development, 23(7), 1995, pp 1143±1156; Mary Shirley, `Privatization in Latin America: lessons for
transitional Europe’, World Development, 22(9), 1994, pp l313±1323; Guy Standing, `Employment restruc-
turing in Russian industry’, World Development, 22(2), 1994a, pp 253±260; Guy Standing, `Labour market
implications of ªPrivatizationº in Russian industry in 1992’, World Development, 22(2), 1994, pp 261±270;
Guy Standing, `The changing position of women in Russian industry: prospects of marginalization’, World
Deve1opment, 22(2), 1994, pp 271±283; Andres Solimano, `The post-socialist transitions in comparative
perspective: policy issues and recent experience’, World Development, 21(1), 1993, pp 1823±1835; Valerii
Tishkov, `Glasnost and the nationalities within the Soviet Union’, Third World Quarterly, 11, 1989, pp
191±207; S David Young, `Going to market: economic organization and transformation in a Hungarian
®rm’, World Development, 12(6), 1993, pp 883±899; and Ryszard Zukowski, `Stabilization and recession in
a transitional economy: the case of Poland’, World Development, 21(7), 1993, pp 1163±1178. Articles on
China are not included in this list, because before post-communist transition began in Eastern Europe, China
had already been studied as a developing country.
Examples include RuÈ diger Dornbusch, Stablilization, Debt, and Reform: Policy Analysis for Developing
Countries, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993; Maya Koteva, `Trade policy reform in Central and
Eastern Europe: early experience and lessons’, in Oliver Morrissey & Frances Stewart (eds), Economic and
Political Reform in Developing Countries, London: St Martin’s Press, 1995, pp 39±57; and David Seddon,
`Reform and popular protest in Eastern Europe’, in Oliver Morrissey & Frances Stewart (eds), Economic and
Political Reform in Developing Countries, London: St Martin’s Press, 1995, pp 11±38.
Broad and Landi, `Wither the North±South gap?’, p 8.
World Bank, World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market, Washington DC; Oxford University
Press, 1996, p. iii.
Ibid, p 1.
Ibid, p 3.
Anne Krueger, `Appendix: policy reform in Eastern Europe’, in Krueger, Economic Policy Reform in
Developing Countries, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, pp 162±176.
Shirley, `Privatization in Latin America’.
Joan M Nelson, `The politics of economic transformation: is Third World experience relevant in Eastern
Europe?’, World Politics, 45(3), 1993, pp 433±463, see p. 463,
Roger D Markwick, `A discipline in transition? From Sovietology to ªtransitologyº ’, Journal of Communist
Studies and Transition Politics, 12(3), 1996, pp 255±276, see p 272. In both Nelson’s and Markwick’s
articles, the term `Third World’ was used to refer to Asian, African and Latin American countries. To be
consistent with our line of argument, we have changed it into `developing countries’. This does not
constitute any distortion of Nelson’s and Markwick’s analyses.
Emanuel de Kadt, Zoe Mars & Gordon White, `State and development into the 1990s: the issues for
researchers’, in Claude Auroi (ed), The Role of the State in Development Processes, London: Frank Cass,
1992, pp 185±200, see p 187.
There is a blooming literature on the East Asian development model. It includes Alice Amsden (ed), special
section on `The World Bank’s East Asian miracle: economic growth and public policy’, World Development,
22(4), 1994, pp 615±670; Peter L Berger & Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (eds), In Search of an East Asian
Development Model, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1988; William R Cline, `Can the East Asian model
of development be generalized?’. World Development, 10(2), 1982, pp 81±90; Frederic C Deyo (ed), The
Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987; Paul W
Kuznets, `An East Asian model of economic development: Japan, Taiwan and South Korea’, Economic
Development and Cultural Change, 36, 1988, supplement, pp S11±43; and Gustav Ranis, `Can the East
Asian model of development be generalized?’, World Development, 13(4), 1985, pp 543±545.
Ha-Joon Chang, `Return to Europe? Is there anything for Eastern Europe to learn from East Asia?’, in
Ha-Joon Chang & Peter Nolan (eds), The Transformation of the Communist Economies: Against the
Mainstream, London: St Martin’s Press, 1995, pp 382±399.
For discussion of the developmental state in East Asia, see M Douglass, `The ªdevelopmental stateº and the
newly industrialised economies of Asia’, Environment and Planning A, 26, 1994, pp 543±566; Richard
Grabowski, `The successful developmental state: where does it come from?’, World Development, 22(2),
1994, pp 413±422; Chalmers A Johnson, Japan, Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State, New
Religion State & Society
Dr Philip Walters, Keston Research, Oxford, UK
Religion, State & Society is a unique source of information and analysis for
individuals and institutions involved in a wide variety of ways with communist and
formerly communist countries. It is still the only English-language academic
publication devoted to issues of church, state and society in these countries.
Responding to the new situation in Russia and Eastern Europe, the journal explores
its conviction that the experiences of religious communities in their encounter with
communism will be central to the evolution of the new Europe and of the Western
world in general in the next century. Tackling social, cultural, ethnic, political and
ecclesiological problems is in future going to be a cooperative effort, in a way
hitherto impossible, involving the religious communities of both East and West.
Religious communities in Western Europe, the USA, Australasia and Latin America
will have much to learn from the way in which their counterparts in the East have
tackled such problems in the past, and vice versa
Volume 26, 1998, 4 issues. ISSN 0963-7494.
Carfax Publishing Limited
PO Box 25 · Abingdon · Oxfordshire OX14 3UE · UK
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York: Norton, 1995; Ziya Onis, `The logic of the developmental state’, Comparative Politics, 24, 1991, pp
l09±126; and Ding-Xin Zhao, `State power and patterns of late development: resolving the crisis of the
sociology of development’, Sociology, 28, 1994, pp 211±229.
Pradumna B Rana & Naved Hamid (eds), From Centrally Planned to Market Economies: The Asian
Approach, Vol 1, An Overview; Vol 2, People’s Republic of China and Mongolia and Vol 3, Lao PDR,
Myanmar, and Viet Nam (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995, 1996).
Chang, `Return to Europe?’, p 387.
Robert Weiner, Change in Eastern Europe, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994, pp 153±154.
S Neil MacFarlance, `Russian conceptions of Europe’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 10(3), 1994, pp 234±269, see
p 235.
Nelson, `The politics of economic transformation’, p 447.