1

Copyright 2006, Offshore Technology Conference

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Houston, TX, U.S.A., 14 May 2006.

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Abstract
The offshore industry is presently developing a new
recommended practice (RP) that will focus on the Structural
Integrity Management (SIM) of existing offshore structures.
The proposed API RP 2SIM will be a significant change to
existing practice and provide considerably more in-depth
guidance for maintaining existing platforms than is available
in the present API RP 2A. The key concept of proposed RP
will be the use of Risk-Based inspection strategies, which will
require the engineer to understand the platforms likelihood of
failure and consequence of such a failure. Additionally RP
2SIM will, for the first time, provide the engineer with fitness-
for-purpose acceptance criteria against the platforms ultimate
load capacity, measured as the Reserve Strength Ratio (RSR).
To take full advantage of RP 2SIM provisions, the engineer
will require knowledge of the likelihood of platform failure,
which is best determined through an understanding of the
platforms ultimate strength.
This paper provides an overview of ultimate strength
assessments and their role in understanding the structural
system response to extreme loads for defining appropriate
risk-based inspection strategies and for demonstrating fitness-
for-purpose. The paper also reviews future recommended
practices (RPs) and regulations, and provides several
informative studies to further demonstrate the role of ultimate
strength assessments in the SIM of offshore structures.

Introduction
SIM is an ongoing life-cycle process for ensuring the
continued fitness-for-purpose of offshore structures. The SIM
process has evolved over the last 25 years to provide industry
and regulatory authorities a means to ensure the continued safe
and reliable operation of the aging fleet of offshore platforms
around the world. RP developments, in the form of a proposed
new API RP for the SIM of offshore structures, will allow the
engineer to use ultimate strength assessments to gain an
understanding of the behavior of the structural system. This
valuable information can provide a role for the development of
risk-based strategies, including setting appropriate intervals
between inspections and selecting areas for inspection. The
information can also be used to demonstrate fitness-for-
purpose and assess the need for risk reduction and/or
mitigation.
Offshore structures are traditionally designed on a
component-by-component basis, such that under all
combinations of design loading every component in the
structure has a utilization ratio, derived using the strength
formulations from the API RP 2A, of unity or less. However,
it is recognized that fixed offshore structures are usually
redundant and have a number of different load paths such that
failure of one member is unlikely to lead to catastrophic
structural collapse, provided that adequate redundancy is
available. By utilizing this inherent redundancy found in most
offshore structures the likelihood of failure of a platform in an
extreme event can be determined.
During the life-cycle of an offshore structure the ultimate
capacity is an important attribute that affects the SIM strategy,
and can significantly influence the risk levels and operational
costs. For example, a minimally braced structure may not have
alternative load paths to redistribute forces if a component is
damaged or if applied loads are higher than initially
anticipated. As a consequence, failure of a single component
may be critical to overall integrity relatively intense
inspection activity may be required to monitor the structural
condition of key load paths. Conversely, a robust structure
with alternative load paths through the jacket may be more
tolerant of damage or increased loads, offering greater
operational flexibility and a much-reduced need for inspection
activity to provide the same assurance of fitness-for-purpose.
The key elements of ultimate strength assessments are the
application of first principles, technology awareness and an
understanding of industry experience and lessons from in-
service performance data [Bucknell, et al., 2000], including
platform failures in extreme events such as hurricanes Andrew
[Puskar, et al., 1994], Lili [Puskar, et al., 2004], Ivan [Puskar,
et al., 2005], Katrina and Rita. This awareness is not typical of
traditional design contractors and more specialist input may be
required. Ultimate strength results are sensitive to the
assumptions, and careful evaluation of the results is
recommended.

OTC 18331
The Role of Ultimate Strength Assessments in the Structural Integrity Management
(SIM) of Offshore Structures
H.S. Westlake, MSL; F.J. Puskar, Energo Engineering Inc.; P.E. O'Connor, BP; and J.R. Bucknell, MSL
2 OTC 18331
Platform Ultimate Strength Overview
The ultimate strength of an offshore structure is usually
evaluated using non-linear finite element analysis of a
structural model, often termed pushover or collapse analysis.
Typically the analysis is undertaken by applying the gravity
loading as an initial load step. The concurrent metocean
design load for the chosen direction is then applied to the
model, and the lateral loading is factored incrementally until
the ultimate strength of the structure is reached, typically
characterized by a plateau in the global load-deflection
behavior of the structural model. Alternatively, the wave
height or storm severity is increased rather than factoring the
design load. The latter method is often applied if the air gap of
the structure is small, such that wave-in-deck loading may be
accounted for in the ultimate response of the structure.
The ultimate strength assessment considers load
redistribution and allows members and joints, including piles,
to undergo plastic deformation, carrying loads past yield or
buckling; also loads are redistributed within the system until
the structure collapses. Members and joints may exhibit a
reduced strength in the form of damage caused by overload,
having crossed over buckling or inelastic yielding. In this
context, damage is acceptable to individual or groups of
members as long as the integrity of the structural system
against collapse is not compromised.
An ultimate strength assessment of a platform determines
the actual system capacity of the analyzed structure. A
structure will have a different ultimate strength for each
predominant wave direction; the most important ultimate
strength for a structure is the lowest, which is likely to be
associated with the weakest direction or the most severe
metocean loading.

Reserve Strength Ratio
The ultimate strength of an offshore structure is expressed in
terms of the Reserve Strength Ratio (RSR), which is a
measure of the structures ability to withstand loads in excess
of those determined from the platforms design. The RSR is
quantified as the ratio of the structures ultimate strength to a
reference level load. For structures operating in the Gulf of
Mexico the reference level load is determined by the 100-year
metocean conditions used for the design of new L-1 high
consequence platforms, as defined in API RP 2A.
For each structure there is a separate RSR for each
metocean direction, although it is typical for most structures to
determine the RSR for three principal directions only, the end-
on, broadside and diagonal. It should also be noted that the
metocean condition/direction that results in the highest
component utilizations or highest base shears may not always
produce the lowest platform RSR.

Residual Strength
The ultimate strength of an offshore structure in a damaged
condition is expressed as the structures residual strength and
is highly dependent on the inherent robustness of the structure.
The ISO code of practice defines robustness as the ability of a
structure to find alternative load paths following failure of one
or more key components.
Sources of Reserve Strength and Residual Strength
Several sources contribute to the reserve and residual strength,
which are a result of explicit and implicit conservatisms made
during the design of an offshore structure. These aspects of a
structures design have been published on several occasions
[UK HSE, Research Report 087], [UK HSE, OTO 97 046],
[Lalani, et al., 1993], and are provided here in summary form
as reference.
Explicit Design Safety Factors
The design of offshore structures is based on traditional
engineering practice, which applies a combination of loads to
the structure to determine the internal forces in each brace
member. For each member and joint in the structure an
allowable strength is provided in the design, and the structure
is considered to meet the selected standard if all the individual
components satisfy the requirements. All structural
recommended practice, whether they are based on permissible
stress design (Working Stress Design, WSD) or limit state
design (Load and Resistance Factor Design, LRFD), address
the design of individual members and joints. Within this
design procedure is the premise that failure of one member or
joint to satisfy the requirements, constitutes non-compliance
with the relevant RP. Explicit safety factors are applied to the
strength formulae, which are straightforward to calculate, for
example a compression member designed to the API RP 2A
WSD, has a safety factor of 1.4 (KL/r=80).
I mplicit Design Safety Factors
Implicit sources of reserve strength are a result of strength
conservatisms that are outside the control of the designer.
Members have reserve strength beyond first yield, which
contributes to the global reserve. Assuming that most modern
jacket structures have strong joints and that the system failure
is dominated by member failure, the implicit safety factor will
be dominated by the differences between the effective length
factor (K-factor) used in design and the actual K-factor for
compression members.
Other sources of implicit safety include the differences
between the actual strength of the component and the RP
based analytical strength predictions, i.e. the model bias and
uncertainty. For members under combined compression and
bending the expected value of model uncertainty is close to
one.
Expected Material Strength
The actual material yield strength is typically higher than
the minimum allowed for in the design of the structure. Actual
yield strengths values can be between 5-25% above the
specified minimum [Baker, 1973]. This additional yield
strength provides an increase in structural capacity not
accounted for in the design.
System Redundancy
Each structure has an inherent reserve and/or residual
strength, which is directly related to the ability of the structure
to provide alternate load paths after failure of a member. This
redundancy in the structural system (or robustness) is
primarily associated with the arrangement of the braces within
the system. A reduction of component capacity does not
necessarily imply that the system strength is compromised.
This will depend on whether or not the component is
participating in the failure sequence that produces the system
OTC 18331 3
collapse mechanism, or whether the members integrity is
required to realize that particular mechanism.
Corrosion Allowance
Additional thickness is usually allowed for members in the
splash zone to account for operational corrosion protection
requirements. During the life of the structure these design
allowances may not be consumed uniformly or completely,
leading to additional member strength.
Over-design
During the design, members and joints may be sized by the
requirements for construction, load-out, transportation or
launch loads. These components are often not optimized and
will contribute to the platform reserve strength since they were
not included to provide operational strength. Other steel
introduced at the design stage for boat impact, fatigue and
seismic loads also contributes to the reserve and residual
strength.
Legs are often sized to accommodate piles, which pass
through the inside. Leg member and associated joint strengths
are often under-utilized, especially if minimum wall thickness,
impact resistance and leg grouting requirements are specified.
Modeling Techniques
During the design, analytical techniques may not be
rigorously employed to model the primary bracing and joints.
For example it is not common to take advantage of joint
flexibility or use gap elements; also point-to-point lengths may
have been used, instead of face-to-face lengths when modeling
braces between legs. These design simplifications will provide
additional strength to the structural framing.
Secondary Framing
Platform design usually focuses on the primary structural
framing of the legs, piles, vertical braces and horizontal braces
to resist the design loads. Secondary bracing is used to provide
support for items such as launch framing, launch runners,
conductor guide framing, etc. In reality, these members
provide additional strength to the primary structural framing.

Ultimate Strength Assessments
Ultimate strength assessments within a formal SIM process
can be used to:
1. Optimize the SIM strategy and update future inspection
planning or condition monitoring as appropriate.
2. Determine the continued fitness-for-purpose of the
structure in its present condition.
3. Identify and optimize the extent of any required
strengthening, repair or other mitigation.

Risk-Based Inspection (RBI)
Within the overall SIM process the inspection strategy will
determine the frequency for routine periodic inspections of the
platform, including underwater and above water inspections.
An appropriate interval may be selected using a risk-based
approach, which categorizes each platform within a fleet of
platforms and considers the likelihood of a platforms failure
and the consequences of such a failure. The frequency as well
as the scope of inspection is increased for the high-risk
platforms.
I nspection I nterval
The time interval between platform inspections should be
determined in accordance with the overall SIM philosophy. A
risk-based strategy involves the understanding of the
platforms likelihood of failure and warrants the application of
quantitative methods, such as ultimate strength assessments.
I nspection Area Selection
Of critical importance to the effectiveness of each
inspection is the proper and adequate selection of the areas to
be examined. It is important to select a sufficient number of
inspection areas to provide representative information on the
overall structure. Making this selection requires an
understanding of the platforms structural behavior and
requires an understanding of the platforms susceptibility to
damage and the tolerance of the structure to that damage. This
understanding is gained through the application of ultimate
strength assessments, which will determine which components
are highly loaded and would contribute to the collapse of the
structure in the event of an overload condition. These
members or joints would be prioritized for inspection.

Platform Fitness-for-Purpose
Fitness-for-purpose assessment is a key element of the overall
SIM process. The purpose of assessment is to establish
whether an existing structure remains fit-for-purpose or
whether strengthening and/or repair or other mitigation is
required. A platform may be considered fit-for-purpose when
the risk of failure, considering both likelihood and
consequence, is within acceptable levels. For existing
structures, it is possible that isolated component failure(s), i.e.
loads exceeding the component capacity, will be acceptable,
provided that sufficient reserve against overall system failure
exists.
Assessment analysis provides a best estimate of the
strength of the structure. It seeks to utilize the available
reserve strength and redundancy not accounted for in design.
In particular, initial yield of individual members or joints may
be acceptable provided that sustainable alternative load paths
can be demonstrated. The assessment of an existing platform
is solely intended to demonstrate fitness-for-purpose;
metocean and structural criteria for an existing platform may
be significantly different from a new design.
To demonstrate structural fitness-for-purpose using
ultimate strength methods there are two types of acceptance
criteria available.
Acceptance Metocean Criteria
The first is specific metocean loading criteria such as wave
height, current, etc., that the platform should be shown to
withstand without collapse. Typically the metocean criteria are
referenced to the platforms consequence of failure. If used,
the platform is deemed to be fit-for-purpose if it is able to
sustain metocean loads equal to or greater than the loads
represented by the selected conditions.
Acceptance RSR
Alternatively, a minimum acceptable RSR is specified,
which as previously discussed, is a measure of the platform
loading relative to loads caused by the 100-year metocean
conditions used for new platform design. Similar to
acceptance using specific metocean criteria, a range of
acceptable RSRs based on the platforms consequence of
failure is specified.
4 OTC 18331
Mitigation and/or Risk Reduction
It is important to recognize that not all damage is structurally
significant such as light corrosion or slight bow of a member.
Equally important, a well-designed platform with load
redistribution may be able to function adequately throughout
its remaining life, even if one or more of its members or joints
have significant structural damage. In this context, evaluation
of the ultimate strength of a damaged structure is one step for
optimizing the requirement for mitigation and/or risk
reduction.
The residual strength (or robustness) is a useful measure
for determining damage tolerance for a platform; for a robust
structure, damage may result in little immediate risk to the
platform. For other less robust structures, even a small damage
event may significantly degrade the platforms global
capacity, resulting in a high-risk situation, justifying
immediate response such as platform de-manning, platform
shutdown, or emergency repair.

Recommended Practices and Regulations
Presently there is no explicit RP requirement to encourage the
regular use of ultimate strength methods in the design of fixed
offshore platforms for metocean conditions. RPs and
regulations for the design of offshore platforms are based on
the design of individual members and components and
generally have no formal requirement to structural system
strength beyond the component requirement. API RP 2A is a
component-based RP; therefore the strength of the structure is
defined by the strength of the weakest component. System
strength is not addressed and benefit can not be taken in
design from load redistribution.
Furthermore, traditional RPs allow the setting of
inspection intervals of the underwater components, based
solely on the consequence of platform failure. This approach
ignores the different characteristics of each platform and their
tolerance to damage as determined from their inherent reserve
and residual strength.

API RP 2SIM (Under Development)
The original Section 17 of API RP 2A [Wisch, et al., 2004],
upon which the proposed API RP 2SIM is based, provided
specific metocean criteria for the assessment for Gulf of
Mexico platforms. The proposed new RP [OConnor, et al.,
2005, Puskar, et al., 2006] will provide alternative acceptance
criteria for platform fitness-for-purpose assessments. The
criteria will be in the form of acceptable RSRs and will be
applicable for the assessment of all platforms. To maintain
consistency with the present RP, the acceptance criteria will
be consequence-based and differentiate between older and
newer platforms, such that platforms designed to API RP 2A
20th edition or later will have more stringent RSR criteria.
The present API RP 2A provides a prescriptive approach
for platform inspections. The proposed API RP 2SIM will
provide an alternative for a Risk-Based Inspection, where
inspection intervals and inspection work scope can be based
on the combination of the platforms RSR (likelihood of
failure) and platforms the consequence of failure.
ISO
The ISO Standard (ISO/DIS 19902, Clause 24) for the design
and operation of fixed steel structures has expanded the basis
of API RP 2A Section 14 to allow prudent Owners to set
inspection intervals through the development of an inspection
strategy. ISO stipulates that the development of an inspection
strategy must consider factors such as age, existing condition,
function, consequence, etc., as well as be technically
defensible. Default intervals are provided for Owners that do
not wish to, or do not have the requisite data and experience to
set a defensible strategy.
Adoption of ISO will make possible intervals longer than
API RP 2A for certain platforms, and hence allow
rationalization of inspection resources. Consistent with the
ISO provisions, RBI allows a first level screening of a fleet of
platforms for risk. ISO states that intervals for underwater
inspections may be extended beyond the default requirements,
provided the Owner can show through SIM that a platform or
group of similar platforms are fit-for-purpose during the
interval to the next inspection. ISO suggests that in the
evaluation stage of the SIM process, consideration should be
given to consequence of platform component failure and
perceived likelihood of such failure; however, ISO provides
specific caution against the use of probability-based methods
in the evaluation.
It is presently not clear when the ISO standard will be
adopted in the US. However, at the time of this writing, API is
supporting studies to assess the use of ISO for US fixed
offshore platforms.

Code of Federal Regulations
Recent amendments to 30 CFR Part 250 requires an annual
inspection plan, as specified in paragraph 250.919:
You must develop a comprehensive annual in-service
inspection plan covering all of your platforms. As a minimum,
your plan must address the recommendations of the
appropriate documents listed in 250.901(a). Your plan must
specify the type, extent, and frequency of in-place inspections
which you will conduct for both the above water and the
below water structure of all platforms, and pertinent
components of the mooring systems for floating platforms.
The plan must also address how you are monitoring the
corrosion protection for both the above and below water
structure.
These regulatory changes allow platform Owners to set
inspection intervals based on risk considerations and to focus
their inspection resources on platforms that can benefit the
most from frequent inspections.

Case Studies
To illustrate the role of ultimate strength assessments in the
SIM of offshore structures several informative studies are
included.

Pompano
As part of a series of proposed modifications to the Pompano
platform, a fitness-for-purpose assessment was required to
ensure feasibility. The study included the development of
center of gravity (CoG) contour plots to define the technical
limits for future possible deck additions. An ultimate strength
OTC 18331 5
assessment was also required to evaluate the platforms
robustness as the structures cellar deck was inundated during
the passage of hurricane Ivan.
The Pompano platform is a manned 4-leg drilling fixed
steel jacket platform, operating in 1290 ft of water in the
Viosca Knoll Block 989, Gulf of Mexico. It was installed in
1994 and currently supports 40 conductors and 11 J-tubes. The
platform is anchored to the foundation through 12 skirt piles
(3 skirt piles at each corner leg). The structural assessments
included SACS strength analysis and USFOS ultimate strength
analysis.

SACS Strength Assessment
The initial assessment of the structure was performed
using linear-elastic methods against API RP 2A component
acceptance criteria. The analyses were performed using SACS
software and three different metocean assessment criteria were
employed. An appropriate dynamic amplification factor
(DAF) was used to account for dynamic effects due to the
deep water location. The three sets of criteria allowed
comparison of results of the site-specific, API 19
th
Edition
design and the API 21
st
Section 17 L-1 design level criteria.
The results of the assessment are presented in Table 1, and it
was observed that some jacket members and primary joints
had utilization ratios greater than 1.0.

USFOS Ultimate Strength Assessment
To demonstrate the robustness of the Pompano platform
and illustrate the tolerance of the platform to the metocean
loads imposed by the assessment criteria, a series of
engineering ultimate strength assessments using USFOS
software were conducted. For comparative purposes four
different assessment criteria were used, which included the
API 19
th
design criteria, API 21
st
Section 2 L-1 design criteria,
API 21
st
Section 17 L-1 design criteria and API 21
st
Section 17
L-1 ultimate strength analysis criteria. The ultimate strength
assessments were conducted for the three principal wave
approach directions and two deck loading cases were
considered with a movable rig on Well 1 or Well 13. A DAF
was also used for the ultimate strength assessment
The results of the ultimate strength assessments of the
Pompano platform are summarized in the Table 2 for the three
principal wave approach directions and the two deck-loading
scenarios. The RSR or Load Factor shown is the ratio of the
base shear at platform collapse to that derived from the
assessment criteria. It is observed that the diagonal wave
direction has the lowest RSR or load factor in all cases, and
the ultimate strength assessment using the API 21st Section 17
L-1 ultimate strength criteria gave the lowest load factor of
1.70 in the diagonal wave direction.

Topsides CoG Contour Development
To develop an allowable topsides CoG contour, a series of
additional ultimate strength assessments were performed.
Shifting the topsides CoG away from its original position
developed the topsides CoG contour. The deck loads due to
the topsides CoG shift were distributed to the four corner legs.
The allowable distance of CoG shift was then determined by
running USFOS pushover analyses until the Load Factor
reached an allowable minimum value of 1.60. The topsides
CoG contour development was conducted using the L-1 full
population hurricane ultimate strength criteria. The topsides
CoG contour was developed for deck capacities of 28,000
Kips, 30,000 Kips and 32,000 Kips.

Hurricane I van Assessment
The predicted hurricane Ivan event criteria were used for
an ultimate strength assessment of the Pompano Platform. The
results from the ultimate strength assessment, shown in Figure
1, indicated that the Pompano substructure had reserve
strength above the hurricane Ivan event criteria, which is
consistent with the platform surviving the hurricane event.
Conclusions and Recommendations
It was possible on the basis of the ultimate strength
assessment engineering carried out for the Pompano
substructure and foundations, to conclude the following:
The Pompano platform has sufficient capacity to resist the
loads imposed by the API RP 2A L-1 full population
hurricane ultimate strength criteria in the present as-is
condition.
The Pompano platform has sufficient robustness to
sustain the load imposed by an event similar to hurricane
Ivan in the present as-is condition.
Depending on the nature and extent of future damage, the
damage, as determined from inspection of the jacket, may
not require repair. However, monitoring of damage must
be considered and included as part of the inspection
planning process.
The developed allowable topsides CoG contour provides
a technical limit envelope for possible future deck
additions.
The use of linear-elastic assessment techniques against
component acceptance criteria, i.e., checking on a
member-by-member basis to demonstrate fitness-for-
purpose would have resulted in expensive strengthening
of the topsides to accommodate the additional topside
weights proposed. The ultimate strength assessment
confirmed that this was not necessary.

Cassia A
As part of relatively minor topsides modification project for
the Cassia A platform, an estimate of the remaining fatigue
life of the structure was performed. The analysis indicated
numerous fatigue lives below the 40-year design requirement
with several below 5-years. The project was in the process of
initiating a multi-million dollar underwater inspection
program with a possible outcome of costly strengthening.
Using a combination of technology (non-codified fatigue
curves and joint flexibility) and worldwide and regional
performance data, the project was able to demonstrate that no
fatigue issue existed.
To provide further evidence that the structure had residual
strength (robustness) and is tolerant to damage, a series of
ultimate strength assessments were performed, which
progressively removed critical members until the platform
collapsed. The guiding principle was to select those members
that participate in the system collapse mechanism for the intact
structure, as determined from the results of the intact structure
6 OTC 18331
ultimate strength assessment. Engineering judgment was also
called upon to select members for downgrading, particularly
when alternative collapse mechanisms could be produced that
might lead to lower system strength. As a result the need for a
special inspection was removed. The assessment results,
shown in Figure 2, were also used to optimize the long-term
integrity plan for the facility and to establish a risk-based
periodic inspection interval for the platform.

Virgo
On September 16
th
, 2004 the eye of hurricane Ivan passed
directly over Virgo. The platform, installed in 1999, is a 14-
slot drilling and production jacket and is located in 1139ft
water depth at Viosca Knoll Block 823, Gulf of Mexico. It
was noticeable from the damage that the waves generated by
hurricane Ivan had impacted the cellar deck beams.
Total E&P USA decided to identify areas that might have
been highly stressed to allow a more focused inspection. An
USFOS ultimate strength assessment of Virgo using the
predicted hurricane Ivan metocean criteria was performed.
The results from the ultimate strength assessment indicated
that the Virgo substructure had reserve strength above the
hurricane Ivan event criteria, which is consistent with the
platform surviving the hurricane event.
From the load-displacement plots, shown in Figure 3, it
was possible to determine the members/joints that were highly
loaded during the passage of hurricane Ivan, as shown in
Figure 4. From the results the planned follow-up underwater
inspection could be tailored to include close visual inspection
of the heavily loaded members/joints.
The underwater inspection was performed using a working
class remotely operated vehicle (ROV) operating from DSV
Ocean Intervention II from October 13 to 16, 2004 in
compliance with MMS NTL-2004-G18, API RP 2A-Section
14. The general visual survey did not discover any structural
anomalies. A more extensive and focused close visual
inspection was carried out on 26 structurally significant welds
determined from the USFOS ultimate strength assessment.
The close visual survey did not reveal any structural
anomalies.

Subsiding Platform
During the Level I inspection of a platform located in the Gulf
of Mexico, it was reported that the structure had a measured
subsidence of 12ft. To understand the likelihood of failure of
the platform in an extreme storm it was necessary to perform
an ultimate strength assessment of the platform. The fixed
steel jacket platform is located in greater than 200 ft of water,
installed in 1971 it is presently operating with eighteen
conductors, two risers and three J-tubes.
Although the structure is categorized as an API L-2
consequence of failure, the assessment considered the API L-1
ultimate strength metocean criteria as being more
representative of the extreme storm that the structure might be
subjected to and would provide the Owner with a better
understanding of the platforms likelihood of failure. The
assessment was performed for three principal wave directions
and the results are presented in the Table below. It was
apparent from the results that the structure would not survive
the loads imposed from the API RP 2A Section 17 L-1 full
population hurricane. It was also apparent from the assessment
that the deck legs are the weakest part of the structure due to
the wave-in-deck force associated with the diagonal wave
approach direction.
Direction Deck Inundation Base Shear Load Factor
End On 3.75 ft 4660 kips 1.35
Diagonal 6.0 ft 6480 kips 0.90
Broadside 1.0 ft 4340 kips 1.60
To explore appropriate mitigation and/or risk reduction
options, a number of additional ultimate strength assessments
were performed that considered deck leg strengthening and or
conductor removal.
Since the deck leg failures, shown in Figure 5, are the main
failure mechanism, a total of 8 knee braces were proposed to
reinforce the deck legs. The introduction of the 8 knee brace
members, shown in Figure 6, resulted in a slight (<1%)
increase in the total imposed metocean loads. The introduction
of 8 knee braces resulted in an increase in load factor for the
diagonal wave approach, from 0.90 to 1.00, as shown in the
Table below. The increase in load factor implies that the
proposed strengthening, shown in Figure 7, would provide
sufficient additional strength to the platform to allow it to
survive the imposed loads from the L-1 full population
hurricane ultimate strength assessment criteria.
Direction Deck Inundation Base Shear Load Factor
End On 3.75 ft 4700 kips 1.32
Diagonal 6.0 ft 6520 kips 1.00
Broadside 1.0 ft 4360 kips 1.85

Other Considerations
Although the technologies used to perform ultimate strength
assessments are relatively mature with proven track records,
they are outside of existing guidance and unfamiliar to many
design contractors. The technologies bring with them a level
of additional complexity over and above the complexity
associated with a conventional design approach. To better
understand the complexities involved additional consideration
should be given to the following when performing ultimate
strength assessments.

Residual Strength
To properly assess the platforms residual strength it is
necessary to use scenarios that simulate realistic damage
possibilities. An understanding of the structures susceptibility
to damage is very important; recent work [Bucknell, et al.,
2000] has shown that certain vintages of platforms and certain
types of platforms are more susceptible to vessel impacts,
while certain older platforms with large conductor trays are
more susceptible to fatigue cracking of the first conductor
guide framing below the waterline. This knowledge is
important for selecting appropriate damage scenarios, in terms
of which member (or members) to downgrade during the
residual strength assessment. Thus, damage due to ship impact
can only occur around the free water surface, dropped objects
will normally only affect outboard members, corrosion of the
piles below mudline is unlikely to occur, and so on.
OTC 18331 7
Special Inspection Initiators
The load at which a structure ultimately collapses may be
considerably higher than the load at which first yield or
member buckling occurs. This information is valuable to the
engineer such that triggers for special inspections can be set. If
possible the load at first component failure should be back
calibrated to an associated metocean condition (wave height).
If the metocean condition is exceeded during the operational
life of the structure then a special inspection should be
instigated, which would primarily focus on the component
known from the ultimate strength assessment to be susceptible
to failure.

Load Incrementing
Representation of the wave forces by a single static design
wave force pattern is an engineering model. Better knowledge
of a structures sensitivity to the actual load pattern at collapse
may be gained by scaling the wave height (and thus load
patterns) to better represent the collapse load. Increasing the
wave height can lead to other failure modes than those arising
from incrementing the load with a constant load pattern,
particularly in the case where the wave reaches the cellar deck
or main decks.
The actual metocean conditions which would cause failure
of the structure will usually be higher than those used in the
ultimate strength assessment. The actual conditions may cause
inundation of the lowest major deck and result in an increased
loading not represented in the assessment, which may alter the
failure mechanism, such as causing the deck columns to fail. It
is therefore apparent that a structure with a lower RSR with a
higher deck elevation has a greater survival chance during an
extreme storm than a comparable structure with a higher RSR
and lower deck elevation.

Platform Reliability
The determination of the RSR by factoring the metocean loads
is not a measure of the reliability of the structure; it is simply
the assessment of the reserve strength of a structure subjected
to a specific set of loads. The assessment is crude, as by
factoring the metocean loads the collapse of the structure is
caused by a set of loads, which in reality will never exist. An
RSR in excess of one implies that the structure can withstand
the metocean loads considered without collapse and is not
readily interpretable in terms of the size of a storm that can be
withstood. Design RPs deal with this by stipulating minimum
deck elevations or that an air gap should exist between the
crest of the design wave and the underside of the deck. A
more rational approach is to assess the platform to survive a
definite, but longer return period storm, for example 500 or
1,000 years.
Consequently the comparison of RSR values may be
misleading; one structure may have a lower RSR that another,
however it may have a larger air gap and consequently have an
increased survival probability during a severe storm. The true
reliability of a structure is related the maximum storm wave
that the structure can withstand and this in turn is dictated by
the size of the air gap and the way the increasing wave height
converts to structural load.
Performance-Based Design
Performance-based design, as the title implies, is a
performance driven approach to offshore engineering design.
It is distinct from risk-based or consequence-based design,
introduced in the 21st Edition of API RP2A, in that it does not
try to optimize the likelihood of failure on the basis of an
understanding the consequence of failure. Instead, the
objective of performance-based design is to facilitate the
design of structures that have predictable performance in
compliance with performance goals selected for the intended
life of the platform. Emphasis is provided on the consideration
of entire platform life-cycle; from concept, design, operation,
through to disposal; potentially after one or more change-of-
use or reuse. Performance-based design is commonly used in
the seismic design of onshore buildings [FEMA 356].
Effective performance-based design requires the engineer
to understand the implications of the performance goals on the
design and to allow the risks to be weighed against the
rewards. The implementation of performance-based design
during a project requires the engineer to use enabling
technologies that exist and be flexible enough to think beyond
the confines of conventional design practice. To deliver and
document a performance-based design the engineer will be
required to perform ultimate strength assessments. The
outcome may be improvements in the framing configuration
of the structure, which improves the robustness (tolerance to
damage and to human error). This improvement may be
sufficient to allow a RBI strategy, with possible diverless
underwater inspections on a ten-year interval, supplemented as
required by event driven inspections e.g. following vessel
impact or occurrence of a hurricane. All of this could be
implemented for a minimum increase in the design costs and a
significant reduction in the operational costs.

Qualifications
The key elements of assessment engineering are the
application of first principles, technology awareness and
application and an understanding of industry experience and
lessons from in-service performance data [Bucknell, et al.,
2000], including platform failures in extreme events such as
hurricanes Andrew [Puskar, et al., 1994], Lili [Puskar, et al.,
2004], Ivan [Puskar, et al., 2005], Katrina and Rita. Although
these technologies are relatively mature with proven track
records, they are outside of existing guidance and unfamiliar
to many design engineers. The technologies, therefore, bring
with them a level of additional competency over and above the
competency associated with a conventional design approach.
These competencies are not typical of design engineers
and more specialist input is usually required. Ultimate strength
assessment results are sensitive to the assumptions and careful
evaluation of the results is required. It is important that these
risks are understood to allow Owners to make informed
decisions in the consideration of mitigation and/or risk
reduction alternatives. Experience indicates that an increased
level of competency is usually necessary to manage a risk-
based strategy and assessment engineering technologies and
data.

8 OTC 18331
Conclusions
Offshore steel structures are designed on a component rather
than system basis. Accordingly, offshore installations have
varying ultimate strengths, even if they have been designed to
the same RP. Experience from in-service performance
[Bucknell, et al., 2000] suggests that well-maintained
platforms are more robust and damage tolerant than a
component-based design approach would indicate. As a result
of this inherent design reserve-strength, large numbers of
fixed platforms are seeing safe service well beyond their
intended design lives. It is apparent that engineers should use
ultimate strength assessments as an important decision-making
tool in the design of new structures and, more importantly,
during the life-cycle SIM for existing offshore structures.
Through more realistic simulation and visualization of a
platforms structural behavior, the engineer gets a better
understanding of the structures integrity and susceptibility to
damage. This increased knowledge can be used to determine
the criticality of components within the structural system and
to assess inspection and repair schemes.
The design approach, where the structure is considered as
numerous components and checked for compliance with RP
prescribed allowable stresses, is not always a rational or cost
efficient means of demonstrating the fitness-for-purpose of a
structure. In some cases it may stop a project or suggest very
costly and often hazardous underwater strengthening,
modification or repair that typically has no impact on the
reliability of the structure. An assessment approach, in
contrast, estimates the capacity of the whole structure as a
system. Failure mechanisms and associated safety factors are
determined allowing informed risk adjusted decision-making.
If strengthening is required it can be targeted to maximize
improvement in reliability.

Acknowledgements
The authors wish to gratefully thank bp and Total E&P USA
for giving permission to publish the results of ultimate
strength assessments performed on their platforms and used as
examples in the paper. The authors also thank Tracy King
(MSL) for her critical review and comments.

References
API RP 2A-WSD,

Recommended Practice for Planning, Design and
Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms, 19th Edition, August
1991.
API RP 2A-WSD, Recommended Practice for Planning, Design and
Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms, 20th Edition, August
1993.
API RP 2A-WSD, Recommended Practice for Planning, Design and
Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms, 21st Edition, Errata
and Supplement 2, October 2005.
Baker, M. J., Variability in the strength of structural steel a study
in structural safety. Part 1 material variability, CIRIA
Technical Note 44, September 1973.
Bucknell, J., Lalani M., Gebara J., and Puskar F. J., Rationalization
and Optimization of Underwater Inspection Planning Consistent
with API RP2A Section 14, OMAE00-2073, February 2000.
Code of Federal Regulations., Department of Interior Oil and Gas
and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
Fixed and Floating Platforms and Structures and Documents
Incorporated by Reference, 30 CFR Part 250, Part IV, July 19,
2005.
FEMA 356, Prestandard and Commentary for the Seismic
Rehabilitation of Buildings, November 2000. Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
ISO/DIS 19902, Draft International Standard, Petroleum and Natural
Gas Industries - Fixed Steel Offshore Structures, 2004.
Joint Industry Project, Recommended Practice for Structural
Integrity Management (SIM) of Fixed Offshore Platforms,
MSL Services Corporation, Final Report planned summer 2006.
Lalani M. New Large-scale Frame Data on the Reserve and Residual
Strength of Offshore Structures, ERA Conference, London,
1993.
Notice To Leases (NTL) No. 2004-G18, Damage Caused by
Hurricane Ivan, Effective Date October 4, 2004, United States
Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Gulf
of Mexico OCS Region.
OConnor, P. E., Versowsky, P., Day, M., Westlake, H. S., and
Bucknell, J., Platform Assessment: Recent Section 17 Updates
and Future API/Industry Developments, Proceedings, Offshore
Technology Conference, Paper No. 17699, May 2005.
Puskar, F. J., Aggarwal, R. K., Cornell, C. A., Moses, F., and
Petrauskas, C., A Comparison of Analytically Predicted
Platform Damage to Actual Platform Damage During Hurricane
Andrew, Proceedings 26
th
Offshore Technology Conference,
OTC No. 7473, May 1994.
Puskar, F. J., Ku, A., and Sheppard, R. E., Hurricane Lilis Impact
on Fixed Platforms and Calibration of Platform Performance to
API RP 2A, Proceedings, Offshore Technology Conference,
Paper No. 16802, May 2004.
Puskar, F. J., and Spong, R. E., MMS Study for Hurricane Ivan
Fixed Platform Performance, MMS Roject #549, Final Report,
January 2006.
Puskar, F. J., Westlake, H. S., OConnor, P. E., and Bucknell, J. R.,
The Development of a Recommended Practice for Structural
Integrity Management (SIM) of Fixed Offshore Platforms,
Proceedings, Offshore Technology Conference, Paper No.
18332, May 2006.
UK HSE, Comparison of Reserve Strength Ratios of old and New
Platforms Offshore Technology Report OTO 97 046, June
1997.
UK HSE, System-based calibration of North West European annex
environmental load factors for the ISO fixed steel offshore
structures code 19902, Research Report 087.
Wisch, D. J., Puskar, F. J., Laurendine, T. E., OConnor, P. E.,
Versowsky, P. E., and Bucknell, J., An Update on API RP 2A
Section 17 for the Assessment of Existing Platforms,
Proceedings, Offshore Technology Conference, Paper No.
16820, May 2004.

OTC 18331 9



Number of Utilization Ratios > 1.0
Jacket
Assessment Criteria
Members Joints
Piles
Site-Specific Criteria 20 0 0
API 19
th
Design 16 2 0
API 21
st
Sect 17 L-1 Design 1 0 0

Table 1: Pompano SACS Linear-Elastic Assessment Results



Reserve Strength Ratio/Load Factor
Assessment
Criteria
Rig
End-on Broadside Diagonal
Well 1 2.40 2.25 1.80
API 21
st
Sect 17 L-
1 Ultimate
Well 13 2.00 2.15 1.70
Well 1 2.36 2.08 2.00
API 19
th
Design
Well 13 2.20 2.00 2.00
Well 1 3.50 3.07 2.65
API 21
st
Sect 17 L-
1 Design
Well 13 3.40 2.90 2.70
Well 1 2.45 2.40 1.90
API 21
st
Sect 2 L-1
Design
Well 13 2.40 2.37 1.76


Table 2: Pompano USFO Non-Linear Assessment Results Figure 1: Pompano Maximum Plastic Utilization (Hurricane
Ivan Criteria)

Cassia A End-on Pushover
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
0.0 1.5 3.0 4.5 6.0 7.5 9.0 10.5 12.0
Global Displacement (ft)
G
l
o
b
a
l

L
o
a
d

F
a
c
t
o
rAs-is str ucture
One above tension member removed
One below tension member removed
Multiple member s r emoved
Low f atigue lif e member s r emoved



Virgo Pushover
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
0.0 3.0 6.0 9.0 12.0 15.0
Global Displacement (ft)
G
l
o
b
a
l

L
o
a
d

F
a
c
t
o
r
1
2
3
4

Figure 2: Cassia A - Load-Displacement Curve Figure 3: Virgo Load-Displacement Curve (Hurricane Ivan
Criteria)

10 OTC 18331



Figure 4: Virgo - Joint Failure at Load Increment No. 2 Figure 5: Subsiding Platform - Maximum Plastic Utilization,
Diagonal Direction, 18 wells, L-1 Metocean Criteria


Figure 6: Subsiding Platform - Deck Legs Strengthened by 8 Knee
Brace Members
Figure 7: Subsiding Platform - Knee Brace Installation