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Camid v. Office of the President, et,al.

FACTS:
This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipalityof
Andong in Lanao Del SurThis decision have noted the earlier decision of
Pelaez where theExecutive orders of Former President Macapagal creating
33Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considerd null and void due toundue
delegation of legislative powers.Among the annulled executive orders is
EO107 creating Andong.The petitioner herein represents himself as resident
of Andong (as aprivate citizen and taxpayer)Camid contends/argues the
following:oMunicipality of Andong evolved into a full blown municipality
(sincethere is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential
tasksand sevices, it has ist own high school, Bureau of Post, DECS officeetc.
and 17 baranggays with chairman)oHe noted agencies and private grous
recognizing Andong and alsothe CENRO and DENR Certification of land area
and population of AndongIn the Certification of DILG, there is an
enumeration of existingmunicipalties including 18 0f the 33 Municipalities
invalidated inPelaez Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and
unequaltreatment for Andong.Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of
EO107 arguing that inMunicipality of San Narciso v. Hon.Mendez, the court
affirmed inmaking San Andres a de facto municipal corporation. San Andres
wascreated through an executive order.Thus this petition.
ISSUE:
May the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de factomunicipal
corporation?
RULING:
NO. Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it isshown that
the community has claimed and exercised corporatefunctions, with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature,and without interruption or
objection for period long enough to affordtitle by prescription.-Camid does
not have shown factual demonstration of thecontinuous exercise by the
municipal corporation of its corporation of its corporate powers as well as
acquiescence by the otherinstrumentalities of the state like charters or the
legislatures action.May the any action on the Certification be an appropriate
solution toCamids prayer?-NO. The Certification has no power or it does not
bear any authorityto create or revalidate a municipality.Should the case of
Andong be treated same as the case of SanAndres?-No. for the following
reasons:oThere are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present
inthe case at bar: (1) The Executive Order creating San Andres was
notinvalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) The municipality existed for 30 yearsbefore
it was questioned and (3) The municipality was classified as afifth class
municipality and was included in the legislative district inthe House of
Representatives apportionment.oAndong did not meet the requisites set by
LGC of 1991 Sec.442(d)regarding municipalities created by executive orders.
It says:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of thisCode shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipaldistricts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executiveorders and which have their
respective set of elective municipalofficials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shallhenceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.oThe failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence
of elections in the municipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that theState
does not recognize the existence of the municipality.
oThe Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (whichapportioned seats
for the House of Reps to the different legislativedistricts in the Philippines,
enumerates the various municipalitiesencompassed in the various districts)
did not include Andong.Is there an unequal treatment since 18 of the 33
invalidatedmunicipalities are now considered existing?-No there was none.
The DILG Certification and the Ordinance in the1987 Constitution validates
them. The fact that there existing organicstatutes passed by the legislation
recreating these municipalities isenough to accord a different treatment as
that of the municipality of Andong


SEMA VS COMELECFACTS:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the
province of Maguindanao but itis not part or ARMM because Cotabato City
voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanaohas two
legislative districts. The 1St legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and
8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it
with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays.
Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff
Kabunsuan(Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1
St district of Maguindanaowith the exception of Cotabato City.For the
purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st
district is now only made of CotabatoCity (because of MMA 201). But it later
amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just forthe
purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from
Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S.
Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st
district). Later,Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate
legislative district and that votes therefrom shouldbe excluded in the voting
(probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in
fact hewon). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a
province (S. Kabunsuan), that provinceautomatically gains legislative
representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in
effectCotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.COMELEC
maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created,the legislative district is not affected and so is its
representation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can
create validly LGUs.
HELD:
RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is
governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:Sec. 10.
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundarysubstantially altered except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject toapproval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units
province, city, municipality or barangay must complywith three conditions.
First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in
the LocalGovernment Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, theremust be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of
authority in the Constitution for Congress todelegate to regional or local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However,
under itsplenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create local governmentunits, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. Infact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city
and municipal councils, the power to create barangayswithin their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and theplebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan
province.



Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at
least 250k, and that a province, oncecreated, should have at least one
representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative
district,there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City
did not meet the population requirement so
Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly
create the province of S. Kabunsuan
without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally
possible because the creation of legislativedistricts is vested solely in
Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.

Surigao Electric Company vs Municipal of Surigao 24 SCRA 898
Facts
Congress amended the Public Service Act changing the requirements of a
certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service
Commission for public services owned and controlled by the government but
at the same time affirming its power of regulation. The petitioners Surigao
Electric Co. and Arturo Lumanlan to whom the rights and privileges of the
former including its plants and facilities were transferred challenged the
validity of such order of the Public Service Act holding that it had no
alternative but to approve the tentative schedules of rate submitted by the
Municipality of Surigao. Issue
Whether or not the Municipality of Surigao has the power to directly
maintain and operate an electric plant without obtaining a specific franchise
for the purpose and without obtaining specific franchise from the Public
Service Commission.

Held The court held that a municipality corporation maintains a dual
personality: governmental and corporate. No franchise or right can override
the proper exercise of police power of the government. Municipal
corporations may promote public services without the need of a certificate of
public convenience. The Amendatory Act provided in the Public Service Act
lend encouragement and support for municipality corporaions to undertake
activities and the result of which is competing firms would be adversely
affected.

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. BAZ
Facts
: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino
pursuant toSec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Sinacaban laid claim to
several barrios based on thetechnical description in EO 258. The Municipality
of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on anagreement with Sinacaban which
was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidentalwhich fixed the
common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared
the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlierresolution
approving the agreement between the municipalities was void since the
Board had nopower to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258.
Jimenez argued that the power tocreate municipalities is essentially
legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), thenSinacaban, which was
created thru and EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert
aterritorial claim.
Issue
: Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical personality. YES
Held
: Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized
and its acts areaccorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be
questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid
the factors to consider in validating the creation of amunicipal corporation:1.
The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been
challenged;2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the
validity of the EO creating themunicipality; and3. The fact that the
municipality was later classified as a 5th class municipality, organized aspart
of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the
Constitutionapportioning the seats in the House.In this case, the following
factors are present:1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when
Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet thevalidity of EO 258 creating it had
never been questioned.2. It was only 40 years later that its existence was
questioned.3. Rule 66, Sec. 16 of the Rules of COurt provides that a quo
warranto suit against a corporationfor forfeiture of its charter must be
commenced within 5 years from the time the act complanedof was done or
committed.4. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacabans corporate
existence by entering into anagreement with it regarding the boundary. Ex.:
AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc.5. Sinacaban is constituted
as part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in
the country.Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that municipal
districts organized pursuant topresidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of electiveofficials holding office at the time
of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered asregular
municipalities. Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinanceappended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative
districts throughout the country,which considered Sinacaban as part of the
2nd District of Misamis Occidental.II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status
at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. It is notsubject to the plebiscite
requirement. It applies only to new municipalities created for the firsttime
under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite was originally
contained in Art. XI,Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be
applied to municipal corporations createdbefore, such as Sinacaban.

Vilas v. City of Manila
Facts: Vilas, Trigas, and aguado are creditors of Manila as it existedbefore the
cession of the Philippine Islands (PI) to the US by thetreaty of Paris.
According to them, under its present charter fromthe Government of the PI
is the same juristic person and liableupon the obligations of the old city. PI
SC: different entity.Issue: WON notwithstanding the cession of the PI to the
US followedby a reincorporation of the city, present municipality liable
forobligations of old city. YES
The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of theproperty rights of
the old city and to the right to enforceall its causes of action. There is identity
of purposebetween Sp and Am charters and substantial identity of municipal
powers, area, and inhabitants.
Argument against liability: ayuntamiento of Manila was acorporation entity
created by the Sp government . whenthe sovereignty of Sp ceased,
municipality, ceased aswell.--> analogy to doctrine of principal and agent,
deathof principal=death of agent
Dual Character of Municipal Corporations:1.Governmental: exercises by
delegation a part of thesovereignty of the state2.Private/Business: mere legal
entity or juristic person.Stands for the community in the administration of
local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the publicpurposes for which its
governmental powers areconferred
In view of the dual character of municipal corporations,there is no public
reason for presuming their totaldissolution as a mere consequence of
militaryoccupation or territorial cession.
McKinleys instruction: relinquishment or cessioncannot in any respect
impair the property or rights whichby law belong to the peaceful possession
of property of all kinds
Property rights of municipal corporations and individualswere safeguarded.
The cession did not operate as anextinction or dissolution of corporations.
The legal entitysurvived both military occupation and cession. Thecorporate
identity and liability of the city was notextinguished.
TVA: entitled to proceed to judgment

ORTIGAS VS. FEATI BANK [94 SCRA 533; NO.L-24670; 14 DEC 1979]
Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots
to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On
March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad
Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on
installments over two parcels of land of the Subdivision. On July 19, 1962, the
said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in
favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase
price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of
Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of
sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential purposes, and
she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or
any other lots belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be
constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and
properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected
either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be
at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines.
Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from Chavez
and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with same
restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction is for the beautification of the
subdivision. Defendant claimed of the commercialization of western part of
EDSA. Defendant began constructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff
demand to stop it, which forced him to file a case, which was later dismissed,
upholding police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not non-impairment clause violated.
Held: No. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. EDSA, a main traffic
artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro
Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity,
noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of
the residents in its route. Health, safety, peace, good order and general
welfare of the people in the locality are justifications for this. It should be
stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE VS. VM REALTY CORPORATION [292 SCRA
676; G. R. NO. 127820; 20 JUL 1998]
Facts: Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a
resolution by the municipal council. Petitioner cites a previous case wherein
a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner also relies
on the Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution authorizes a
Local Government Unit to exercise eminent domain.
Issue: Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.
Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it
is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent
domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the
municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only
an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by
Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code,
which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the
Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an
administrative rule which cannot amend the former.

Alfredo Patalinghug vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 104786January 27, 199

Facts:On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 363,otherwise known as the Expanded Zoning
Ordinance of Davao City, Sec.8 of which states: A C-2 District shall be
dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses asprovided
hereunder:xxx3.1. Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street
parking space and provided that they shall be established not less than 50
meters from any residential structures, churches and other institutional
buildings.
Petitioner constructed a funeral parlor in the name and style of
Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at CabaguioAvenue, Agdao, Davao City.Acting on
the complaint of several residents of Brgy. Agdao that the construction of
petitioners funeralparlor violated Ordinance No. 363 since it was allegedly
situated within a 50-meter radius from theIglesia ni Kristo chapel and several
residential structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted
aninvestigation and found that the nearest residential structure, owned by
Wilfred Tepoot, is only 8inches to the south .Notwithstanding the findings of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, petitioner continued with theconstruction of
his funeral parlor until it was finished on November 3, 1987.Issues:Whether
petitioners operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use within a
particular districtor zone in Davao City?Held:Petitioner did not violate Sec.8
of Davao City Ordinance No. 363. The question of whether Mr. Tepoot
sbuilding is residential or not is a factual determination which we should not
disturb. Although thegeneral rule is that findings of the lower courts are
conclusive upon the Supreme Court, this admits of exceptions as when the
findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court
arecontrary to each other. While the trial court ruled that Tepoot
s building was commercial, the AppellateCourt ruled otherwise.Tax
declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning
purposes. A property may wellbe declared by its owner as residential for real
estate taxation purposes but it may well be within acommercial zone. A
discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of property for
realestate taxation purposes vis--vis the determination of a property for
zoning purposes.A tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the
evidentiary value of a tax for assessmentlevels. In fact, a tax declaration does
not bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the RealEstate Tax
Code,appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of
any previous assessment or taxpayer s valuation thereon. A piece of land
declared by a taxpayer as residential maybe assessed by the provincial/city
assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial.Even if Tepoot
s building was declared for taxation purposes as residential,
once a local government hasreclassified an area as commercial, that
determination for zoning purposes must prevail
. While thecommercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared
through ordinance, privaterespondents have failed to present convincing
arguments to substantiate their claim that CabaguioAvenue, where the
funeral parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone. Unquestionably,
theoperation of a funeral parlor constitutes as commercial purposes as
gleaned from Ordinance No. 363.The declaration of said area as a
commercial zone through a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police
power
to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.
Corollary thereto,the State may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations in orderto promote the general
welfare. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints
andburdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this
fundamental aim of thegovernment, the rights of the individual may be
subordinated. The ordinance which regulates thelocation of funeral homes
has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the
orderlydevelopment of the area covered thereunder.

Masikip v. City of Pasig
G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly
provided for by statute
FACTS:
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which
the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the sports
development and recreational activities of the residents of Barangay
Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of
land for the alleged purpose that it was in line with the program of the
Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our community.
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the
rial court on the ground that there was genuine necessity to expropriate the
property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed
petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property

HELD:

Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate
private property to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it,
which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation
therefor. It is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private
property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in
government.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the
power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility
corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no
inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly
authorized by statute.
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws.
Provided:
(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not
accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least 15% fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the
proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property
There is already an established sports development and recreational activity
center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no genuine
necessity to justify the expropriation. The records show that the
Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the
basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation,
indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the
residents of Caniogan

Macasiano v. Diokno
Facts:On 13 June 1990, the Municipality of Paranaque passed Ordinance 86,
s. 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabrielle, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt.
Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro
Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance
was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MCC Ordinance 2, s.
1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal
streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea
market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions. On 20 July
1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance 86, s. 1990 of
the municipal council subject to conditions. On 20 June 1990, the municipal
council issued a resolution authorizing the Paraaque Mayor to enter into
contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation,
maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On 8
August 1990, the municipality and Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered
into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage
the flea market with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the
municipal government of Paraaque. Consequently, market stalls were put
up by Palanyag on the said streets. On 13 September 1990 Brig. Gen.
Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command,
ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J.
Gabrielle St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to Palanyag. On 16
October 1990, Macasiano wrote a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days
to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be
dismantled.
On 23 October 1990, the municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a
joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for
preliminary injunction. On 17 December 1990, the trial court issued an order
upholding the validity of Ordinance 86 s. 1990 of the Municipality of
Paraaque and enjoining Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against
Palanyag. Hence, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed by
Macasiano thru the OSG.

Issue:Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal
council of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or
thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid?

Held:The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into
property for public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to
property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code provides that "property for
public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the
provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces,
cities or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is
patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws." In the present case, thus, J. Gabrielle G.G. Cruz,
Bayanihan, Lt. Gacia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for
public service and are therefore considered public properties of the
municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.
Hence, local government have no authority whatsoever to control or
regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon
them by Congress.

City of Manila vs. Teotico
G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
Concepcion, J.:

Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and
P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for
a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed,
and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin
or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries.
Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the
same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.

Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave
making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.
In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good conditionand
manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers
concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue
was and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established
to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires
is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision"
over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national
highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's
"control or supervision."



Torio v Fontanilla (G.R. No. L-29993, 23 Oct 1978)
On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed
a resolution which created the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee.
This committee handled everything for their annual town fiesta, which would
be held on January 21, 22, and 23 the following year. The Municipal Council
appropriated P100 for the construction of two stages, one to be used
especially for a zarzuela entitled Midas Extravaganza. The
committee, under chairman Jose Macaraeg, supervised the construction of a
stage.
At the night of the first show, even before the zarzuela itself started, many
people were already climbing up the stage to listen or catch a glimpse of the
performers. Midway through the zarzuela, the stage collapsed, and Vicente
Fontanilla, who was at the rear of the stage, was pinned underneath. He was
taken to the hospital and died the following afternoon.
The heirs of Fontanilla then filed a complaint for damages with the Manila
CFI, naming the Municipality of Malasiqui and all the individual members of
the Municipal Council as defendants.
CFI ruled that the Town Fiesta Executive Committee did exercise due
diligence and care of a good father of a family in constructing the stage for
such purpose, and its collapse was due to forces beyond the Committees
control. The heirs of Fontanilla appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed
the ruling, and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Fontanilla.
The issue is whether a town fiesta is an exercise of a municipalitys
governmental/public function (from which it incurs no liability), or is it of a
private/proprietary character (from which it incurs liability).
HELD: A town fiesta is considered a private/proprietary function. But the
Supreme Court concedes that there is no hard and fast rule in determining
the nature of a municipalitys undertaking. Whether it is a
governmental/public or private/proprietary function will depend heavily on
the context. McQuillins rule is: A municipal corporation proper
has...a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in
government, and private (so-called) insofar as it is to promote local
necessities and conveniences for its own community. Thus, a town fiesta
clearly falls under private/proprietary function.
The Municipality of Malasiqui argues that they exercised due diligence in the
construction of the stage. But the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the
collapse was due to great number of onlookers who mounted the stage; this
the municipality could have prevented by asking the people to step away
from the stage, but they did not.
The individual members of the Municipal Council, however, cannot be held
liable under Art. 27 of the Civil Code, because Art. 27 covers cases of
nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer of his or her official
duty, not to cases of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official
duty. The records do not show that the members of the Municipal Council
directly participated in the defective construction of the stage, or that they
personally permitted spectators to go up the platform. The municipal
councilors are absolved from liability, but the Municipality of Malasiqui is still
liable

Mondano v. Silvosa
L-7708, 30 May 1955
FACTS:
The petitioner, Jose Mondano, is the duly elected and qualified Mayor of the
Municipality of Mainit, Surigao. On 27 February 1954, Consolacion Vda. De
Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and
Action Committee accusing him of rape and concubinage which was
subsequently indorsed by the Assistant Executive Secretary to the
respondent, Fernando Silvosa, Governor of Surigao for immediate
investigation, appropriate action and report. On April 10,1954, petitioner
appeared, upon summon, before the respondent with the Provincial Board.
On the same day, the respondent issued Administrative Order No.8
suspending the petitioner from office, and thereafter, the Provincial Board
proceeded to hear the charges against him.
ISSUE:
Whether the indorsement of the complaint, by the Assistant Executive
Secretary, to the respondent is legal.
HELD:
Yes because the heads of various executive departments are agents of the
President who, constitutionally, have general supervision over local
governments, as may be provided by law. Supervision, in administrative law,
means overseeing or the power or authority of an official to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties The respondent Governor, upon
the indorsement of the Assistant Executive Secretary, is only acting as an
agent of the President in investigating the petitioner

Andaya vs RTC, Cebu City, Br. 20 [319 SCRA 296; GR 126661, Dec 3, 1999]
Facts: Petitioner Andaya, Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7,
submitted to the City Mayor of Cebu a list of 5 eligibles for the mayor to
choose one to be appointed as the chief of police of Cebu City. The mayor did
not choose anyone from the list because the name of his protg was not
included therein.
The City of Cebu filed a complaint against the petitioner to require him to
include the mayors protg in the list of 5 eligibles to be recommended by
the Regional Police Director to the mayor.
Petitioner refuses stating that aside from the fact that said protg is not
qualified; the power to designate the chief of police of Cebu City is vested
with the Regional Director. However, the mayor is authorized to choose the c
hief of police from a list of 5 eligibles submitted by the Regional Director.
Under RA 6975, Sec 51, the mayor of Cebu City shall be deputized as
representative of the National Police Commission in his territorial jurisdiction
and as such the mayor shall have authority to choose the chief of police from
a list of 5 eligibles recommended by the Police Regional Director. Then the
Regional Director, RPC No.7, appoints the officer selected by the mayor as
the Chief of Police, Cebu City.
Issue: WON the mayor has the authority to appoint the Chief of Police.
Held: No. As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is very
limited. In reality, he has no power of appointment; he has only the limited
power of selecting one from among the list of 5 eligibles to be named the
chief of police. Actually, the power to appoint the chief of police of Cebu City
is vested in the Regional Director.
Moreover, it is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director to name the 5
eligibles from a pool of eligible officers without interference from local
executives. Hence, the mayor cannot require the petitioner to include the
mayors protg in the list of 5 eligibles to be recommended by the Regional
Police Director to the mayor

Frivaldo vs COMELEC [174 SCRA 245]
Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon
on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988, respondents filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioners election and
proclamation on the ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and
had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on
January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected
governor.
Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his
naturalization as an American citizen was not impressed with
voluntariness. His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should
be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the
1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under
the laws of the US, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an
American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the
Philippines. His election did not cure of this defect because the electorate
could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code and the
Omnibus Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.
Held: No. First, petitioners loss of his naturalized American citizenship did
not and could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Philippine
citizenship.
Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a natural
born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act of repatriation.
Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must
be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged

Coquilla vs COMELEC [385 SCRA 607; GR 151914, September 17, 2002]

Facts: Petitioner Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar,
where he grew up and resided.
In 1965, he joined the US Navy and subsequently naturalized as a US citizen.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a
residence certificate, albeit continued making several trips to the US.
On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines
subsequently after his application for repatriation was approved.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga,
Oras, Eastern Samar.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his COC stating therein that he has been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
On March 5, 2001, respondent incumbent mayor of Oras who was running
for re-election, sought the cancellation of petitioners COC on the ground
that the latter had resided in Oras for only about 6 months since when he
took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On May 14, 2001, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed mayor of Oras.
Issue: WON petitioner satisfied the residency requirement for the position of
mayor.
Held: No. Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160)
provides that an elective official must be a resident therein (barangay,
municipality, city or province) for at least 1 year immediately preceeding the
day of the election
The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal
residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile
of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of a new domicile (domicile of choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a
US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy in 1965. From then on and until
November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, he was an
alien

Marquez vs COMELEC
Posted on October 3, 2012
GR No. 112889
April 18, 1995

FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a
petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution
which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for
being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance
fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the
Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State
of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed,
has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight
from that country.
Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs
May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the
filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against
private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC for cancellation of respondents CoC on account of the candidates
disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May
1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28)
against private respondent before the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign
court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term fugitive
from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore,
disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding
on to, an elective local office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in
criminal cases here and abroad are disqualified from running for any
elective local position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge
of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181).
However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling
law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative
rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain
congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person
who has been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or
not private respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term must
be interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo
warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of
facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a
determination of this unresolved factual matter.

MERCADO VS.MANZANO, digested
307 SCRA 631, May 26, 1999 (Constitutional Law Dual Citizenship, Dual
Allegiance)

FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner was seeking the disqualification of
respondent to hold elective office on the ground that he is a dual citizen,
having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. Pursuant to Local
Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), those with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running any elective local position.
ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.
HELD: No, because dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is
inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

KAISER B. RECABO, JR. vs. COMELEC & FRANCISCO R. REYES, JR.
G.R. No. 134293; 308 SCRA 793
June 21, 1999

FACTS:
On March 27, 1998, Francisco R. Reyes, Jr., filed his certificate of candidacy
for vice-mayor of Mainit, Surigao Del Norte under the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP.
His nomination by said political party is evidence by the certificate of
nomination and acceptance dated March 27, 1998 signed by Fidel V. Ramos
and Jose de Venecia, National Chairman and Secretary General, respectively,
of said political party.
However, on April 2, 1998, Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr., claimed to be the official
candidate of LAKAS as vice-mayor of the same municipality and also filed his
certificate of candidacy. Recabo also submitted to the Commission a copy of
the certificate of his nomination and acceptance signed only by one
representative of LAKAS, Francisco T. Matugas. The space of the other
representative (Robert Z. Barbers) is blank. It was further alleged that
Recabo, Jr., is a SUBSTITUTE candidate of MRS. CANDELARIA B. RECABO who
filed her Certificate of Candidacy for VICE-MAYOR of Mainit, Surigao del
Norte on March 25, 1998.
Reyes submits the theory that since the certificate of nomination and
acceptance in favor of Candelaria B. Recabo is not signed by Robert Barbers,
there is no valid nomination by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP in favor of Candelaria
Recabo. Therefore, Candelaria B. Recabo not having been validly nominated,
should be deemed an independent candidate only. And since Candelaria B.
Recabo is an independent candidate, she cannot be validly substituted
because under Sec. 11 of Comelec Res. No. 2977 promulgated on January 15,
1998, no substitution shall be allowed for an independent candidate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners certificate of nomination by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP
is valid?

HELD:
NO. COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 provides under Section 5 thereof: The
certificate of nomination by registered political parties of their official
candidates shall be filed with the certificates of candidacy not later than the
last day for filing of certificates of candidacy as specified in Section 4 hereof,
duly signed and attested under oath by the party president, chairman,
secretary-general or any other party officer duly authorized in writing to do
so.

Be that as it may, the certificate of nomination of the petitioner as well as his
mother did not comply with the requirements of being official candidates of
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP Party. For the reason, that the certificate of nomination
was invalid because it was signed only by one authorized party officer as
compared to Reyes which was signed by the National Chairman and
Secretary General, respectively, of said political party. Therefore, Candelaria
Recabo is considered an independent candidate
1. Phil. Society v COA, GR 169752
2. Limbona v Mangelin, GR 80391
3. Magtajas v Pryce Corp., 234 SCRA 255
4. Laguna Lake v CA, GR 120865-71
5. Plaza II v Cassion, 435 SCRA 294
6. MMDA v Bel-Air Village Assoc, 328 SCRA 836
7. Basco v Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52
8. Prov. of Batangas v Romulo, 429 SCRA 736
9. Batangas Power v Batangas City, GR 152675
10. Camid v Office of the President, 448 SCRA 711
11. Municipality of Jimenez v Baz, 265 SCRA 182
12. Sema v Comelec, July 16, 2008
13. League of Cities of the Phils. V Comelec, Feb. 15, 2011
14. City of Pasig v Comelec, 314 SCRA 179
15. Mejia v Balolong, 81 Phil 486
16. Surigao Electric Co. v Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898
17. Vilas v City of Manila, 42 Phil 935
18. Ortigas & Co. v Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 533
19. Patalinghug v CA, 229 SCRA 554
20. Municipality of Paraaque v VM Realty Corp, 292 SCRA 676
21. Heirs of the Estate of JBL Reyes v City of Manila, 422 SCRA 550
22. Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip v City of Pasig, 479 SCRA 391
23. Macasiano v Diokno, 211 SCRA 464
24. Bunye v Sandiganbayan, 306 SCRA 663
25. City of Manila v Teotico, 22 SCRA 267
26. Torio v Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599
27. Mondao v Silvosa, 97 Phil 143
28. Radia v Review Committee, 157 SCRA 749
29. Andaya v RTC, 319 SCRA 696
30. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727
31. Coquila vs. COMELEC, July 31, 2002
32. Marquez vs. COMELEC, April 18, 1995
33. Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, 259 SCRA 296
34. Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 680
35. Borja vs. COMELEC, 259 SCRA 152
36. Victoria vs. COMELEC, 229 SCRA 269
37. Recabo vs. COMELEC, 308 SCRA 793
38. Farinas vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396
39. Bunye vs. Escareal, 226 SCRA 392