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Noah Stein January 31, 2006

Games

• Set I of interacting agents (I = {1, 2} throughout) • Set Ci of strategies for each player i ∈ I. • Utility function ui : C1 × C2 → R. – Each player wants as much utility as possible. – Utilities capture all strategic interactions.

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems

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Equilibrium

• A Nash Equilibrium is a choice of strategy for each player, so that if only one player deviates, he cannot expect to improve his utility. • An ǫ-equilibrium is weaker – no player can improve his payoﬀ by more than ǫ.

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems

2

**Rock, Paper, Scissors
**

(u1 , u2 ) Rock Paper Scissors Rock (0, 0) (+1, −1) (−1, +1) Paper (−1, +1) (0, 0) (+1, −1) Scissors (+1, −1) (−1, +1) (0, 0)

• No equilibrium! • Enlarge the set of strategies (not with dynamite). • Allow players to choose a mixed strategy, i.e. a probability distribution over Ci . • Deﬁne utility on these larger strategy spaces as expected utility.

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems 3

**Zero-sum Finite Games
**

• Both C1 and C2 are ﬁnite. • Utilities satisfy u1 = −u2 . • Strictly competitive games (Rock, Paper, Scissors). • Set of mixed strategies for each player is a simplex. • Prove existence of a Nash Equilibrium via LP duality, and compute it eﬃciently with interior point methods (von Neumann 1928).

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems

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**General Finite Games
**

• Both C1 and C2 are ﬁnite. • Utilities are arbitrary. • Allows for both competition and cooperation. • Prove existence of an equilibrium via a non-constructive ﬁxed-point argument (Nash 1951). • Simple algorithms exist, e.g. the Lemke-Howson algorithm (simplex method with a diﬀerent pivoting rule). • PPAD-completeness proven in a Dec. 4, 2005 paper.

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems 5

Continuous Games

• Both C1 and C2 are compact metric spaces. • Utilities are continuous. • An equilibrium always exists (Glicksberg 1952). • But the probability measures involved can be arbitrarily complicated! • No hope of computing equilibria in general.

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems

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**Zero-sum Polynomial Games
**

• C1 = C2 = [−1, 1]. • Utilities satisfy u1 = −u2 = a polynomial. • Space of mixed strategies is inﬁnite-dimensional, but has a ﬁnite-dimensional representation (more on next slide). • Can be cast as an SDP, and computed eﬃciently with interior point methods (Parrilo 200x).

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems

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Separable games

• A continuous game is separable if it has payoﬀs:

r

ui (s1 , s2 ) =

k=1

k k ak f1 (s1 )f2 (s2 ) i

k where ak ∈ R and fj : Cj → R is continuous i (superscripts are not exponents).

• The separable structure allows for a ﬁnite-dimensional representation of the mixed strategy space. • Can assume WLOG that each player randomizes among at most r + 1 strategies.

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems 8

**Computing ǫ-equilibria for two-player separable games
**

• Assume Ci = [−1, 1] and the utilities are Lipschitz. ˜ • Discretize the game: Choose a set Ci of m ∝ 1 ǫ equally spaced pure strategies for each player, and ˜ sample the utilities to get ui : C1 × C2 → R. ˜ ˜ • Compute an equilibrium of this ﬁnite game. • This yields an ǫ-equilibrium of the separable game.

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems

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**Will this work?
**

• In general computing an equilibrium of a ﬁnite game is not easy. • But in this case the ﬁnite game has the same separable structure as the original game:

r

ui (s1 , s2 ) = ˜

k=1

˜k ˜k ak f1 (s1 )f2 (s2 ) i

• In particular the ﬁnite game has an equilibrium in which each player mixes among at most r + 1 strategies, independent of the choice of m ∝ 1 . ǫ

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems 10

**Computing an equilibrium of the ﬁnite game
**

• Given a guess at the support of each player’s mixed strategy (which pure strategies he plays with positive probability) there is a simple LP to ﬁnd equilibria with that support. • # supports = m m m + +. . .+ 1 2 r+1 ≤ m+r 1+r

polynomial in m

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems

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**Complexity of the algorithm
**

• The number of LPs and the time to solve each are both polynomial in 1 . ǫ • Algorithm is polynomial in

1 ǫ

and exponential in r.

• Dependence on r is no worse than for ﬁnite games. • A recently published ǫ-equilibrium algorithm for ﬁnite games is exponential in ǫ1 (LMM 2003). 2

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems

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Conclusion

• Future directions: – Apply SDP-related methods to non-zero-sum polynomial games. – Consider separable games with additional structure, e.g. graphical separable games. – Algorithms for discontinuous games. • Thanks to: – Asuman Ozdaglar – Pablo Parrilo – LIDS Student Conference Committee

MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems 13

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