ou ( - f r o 1 1 g o
Event: Jack Salata, former FAA liaison to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Type of event: Interview
Date: November 3, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: John Raidt
Team Number: 7
Location: K Street
Participants - Non-Commission:—Jack Salata, former FAA liaison to the FBI; Bob
Sinton, FBI counsel's office
Commission Participants—Sam Brinkley, John Raidt
(5KSalata currently works for the FBI as an Intelligence officer. In 1988-1989 he
served as a special agent with the USAF Office of Special Investigations as a special
agent. In 1989 he joined FAA's Intelligence Office, and worked as an intelligence
analyst. In this capacity he served as both a liaison and analyst with the CIA and
Department of State counter-terrorism units. In 1992 he took a job in the FAA's newly
created position of liaison officer to the Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic
Security. He remained in this position until 1998. In May of 1998 he was assigned by the
FAA to serve as its liaison officer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, stationed in the
Strategic Information and Operations Center. In May of 1998 thru October of 1998 he
split time between the FBI and State Department. In October he was assigned to the FBI
full time and was originally assigned to the counter-terrorism assessment and warning
unit. In December of 1998 he was asked to join the team investigating the Africa
bombings in the Usama Bin Laden (UBL) unit, specifically the East African Intelligence
unit. He remained in the Usama Bin Laden unit and the Radical Fundamentalist Unit.
During this time when he wasn't doing FAA work he was conducting threat analysis for
the UBL unit. He was responsible for every significant issue affecting civil aviation.
Work Load
(U) Salata acknowledged that trying to do both FAA liaison work and the other work that
the FBI assigned was "a lot." Salata said that the FBI regarded him as a detailee which
created a "bureaucratic problem" of his roles and mission. He saw the problem as a
cultural issue. The FBI expected him to lend his expertise to them. He was required to
blend the FAA and FBI roles. Salata raised the concern to the FAA and FBI that he was
under a great deal of pressure to comply with FBI requests. Salata said he recognized his
primary role was to the FAA. The FAA saw him as a liaison, the FBI saw him as a
detailee and he tried to do both (i.e. "serve two masters").
(Si) 5 Greg Ahern was the first FAA liaison to the FBI and Salata relieved him. The FBI
asked Jack Salata to move from the terrorist assessment and warning unit to the UBL
unit. Salata cleared it with the FAA authorities and made the move. He saw this move as
helpful to the FAA because he could learn more in an operational unit than he could
assigned to an assessment unit.
(U) Salata said he spent about 60% of his time on FAA liaison and 40% on FBI tasks.
(§ST) Salata said he was connected to the FAA by e-mail and received no less than 10
calls a day from the ACI watch. At the FBI he was a member of a five-man intelligence
team and while he referred to himself as an "Official FBI employee" but he said he didn't
lose sight of his FAA obligations.
(U) Salata was responsible for any threat to civil aviation/airports whether in the context
of criminal investigations or national security intelligence. He was also available to work
with FBI legal attaches on issues affecting civil aviation overseas.
(U) Salata said civil aviation was a high priority for the FBI, citing Beverly Wright who
he said was assigned full-time to civil aviation as the FBI's Civil Aviation Security
Program Manager. She was focused on the Joint Vulnerability Assessment program and
working with the agents conducting that work. Wright retired after 9/11 and was
replaced by Alexis Smolleck.
(U) He lauded the FBI's efforts in regard to civil aviation security, saying that the FBI
appreciated the possibilities of attack after the WTC bombing and the Bojinka plot.
(U) Salata said his section chief Mike Rollince had an open door policy and actively
solicited Salata's advice. He often gave him information he received from foreign
security services telling him to get it to the FAA. Salata lauded all the section chiefs with
whom he worked.
(U) Salata was asked how FAA transmitted its CAS intelligence needs to the FBI. He
said that the tasking on collection for international intelligence was already in place when
he got there.
(U) On the domestic front, he said that Bev Wright's primary contact at FAA was Peter
Falcone who was security operations for airports.
(U) Salata said that his job was very specific to international terrorism analysis, terrorism
analysis, and intelligence analysis. It's what he was trained to do and what he did.
(SSI) Salata said the only way an individual would have been able to access the FBI's
case file information was to access the FBI's automated case system (ACS). While
Salata's predecessor Greg Ahern did not have access, Salata was given limited access by
Mike Rollince. But he also had access through his counter-part FBI officials who would
give him information. Salata was asked if he could word search case files to identify
issues related to civil aviation. Salata reiterated that his access to the automated case
system was limited but stressed that he had a great relationship with Beverly Wright and
that if she came across something he needed to know, she would share it.
FAA-FBI Relations
(U) Salata was told by staff of concerns expressed by FAA ACI (FAA intelligence)
authorities to the commission about the "blind spot" they felt they had with respect to
domestic intelligence. Salata disagreed with the idea that FAA had a blind spot with
respect to domestic threats and said that any deficiency was the result of the need for
operational security and the need to protect information until you could take it to
(U) Salata said that understanding domestic threats was as important to him as
understanding the international threat. Throughout his career at the FAA there was a
"culture of distrust and dislike" for the FBI.
(U) Salata said that the FAA didn't understand the needs of the FBI. Mike Rollince
never denied FAA management to come over to the FAA to talk. He referred to the fact
that the first thing he did when Gen. Mike Canavan became ACS 1 was to have him meet
Dale Watson, Assistant Director for Counter-Terrorism. He said that he was not aware
of whether Irish Flynn ever met with FBI counter-terrorism authorities, but that Flynn did
meet with State Department authorities. He reiterated that FBI never denied FAA the
opportunity to meet on issues of concern.
(U) Salata said the he saw a strong relationship between the FAA's regional aviation
security managers and the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF's) in their community,
particularly in New York and Los Angeles. He recounted that after the millennium plot
the JTTF in Seattle asked for an FAA official to be part of the JTTF but that the FAA
vetoed the idea. Salata said he asked Claudio Manno why they wouldn't want a spot on
the Seattle JTTF but he never got a response.
(U) Salata said that in 80% of the cases he was able to get a full brief on what was going
on and could pass most of it on as long as it didn't interfere with operational security or
the prosecution.
(SSI) While the FBI's UBL unit was focused on Sunni extremism, and the Hezbollah unit
was focused on Shiite extremism, Salata was kept informed about all aspects of the
counter-terrorism unit, primarily because of his personal skills and relationships.
(SSI) Salata said that Bev Wright wouldn't get "everything" that the FBI was working on
in civil aviation because she was in "operations." Salata agreed that the field office
wouldn't necessarily put all the issues they were working on in their Joint Vulnerability
Assessments of local airports.
(U) ACI decided if and when to close a case that they opened, even if the FBI were
performing tasks. Salata said that he remembers several occasions where ACI would
task the FBI to work a civil aviation issue.
(SSI) Salata cited the Newark FBI Field Office walk-in who claimed there was a plot to
hijack planes out of JFK. Salata was not aware of any Hong Kong walk-in who claimed
a hijack plot was in the offing prior to 9-11. He did remember a Singapore issue post 9-
11, and after 9-11 Salata said that he was permitted to review the entire case files and talk
real time with agents to assure himself that the work was done thoroughly and the
conclusions were reasonable. Salata said he couldn't think of an instance where the FBI
didn't do a thorough investigative job.
(SSI) Salata said that criminal matters were a "different kettle of fish" because division
six of the FBI (the Criminal Division) was a separate division but that they would bring
Salata in on key issues. He cited a threat that came out of the Caribbean where the
criminal division contacted him.
(U) Salata was unable to describe standing orders to field offices about how to share civil
aviation issues with either his office or Bev Wright's. It all depended upon the FBI case
file number which determined who got information on the cases, and that case
information would come back to different units at headquarters, and thanks to his
personal relationships he would usually hear about it.
(U) Salata said the he learned about the Phoenix memo after September 11, 2001. He
said he has asked himself many times why he didn't get that memo in the summer when
it was drafted. He indicated that in an ideal world they would have notified him.
(U) Salata did remember getting a call from the Phoenix FBI field office asking if the FBI
or FAA tracked foreign students in U.S. flight schools. Salata said his reaction was that
if the individual was in the U.S. legally, going to school and not committing any crimes,
the FAA would have never been tracking people going to flight school because we had
the best flight training in the world, and people came from across the globe to attend such
(U) Salata was asked why we tasked the intelligence community to track individuals
seeking aviation skills overseas but we would not undertake that task domestically. Salata
replied that on a case-by-case basis if a person was a concern they would look into it, but
there wasn't a "collection" requirement in general about flight schools.
(U) When presented with information from the Joint Inquiry that the FBI had asked 24
field offices in 1998-1999 to monitor flight training schools, Salata said he was not aware
of it, but the information should have passed through him.
(U) Salata agreed that had he been aware of that tasking it would have cast the call from
Phoenix in a different light, and he could have put more focus on the issue. He said that
at the time he was very concerned about getting into the ethnicity of people involved in
aviation, because without a specific beef it would have been inappropriate.
(U) Salata stated that there was no effort to cross-reference airmen certificates with
terrorist watch lists nor was there any discussion of such an effort that he was aware of.
(U) Salata said that pre 9-11 there were very few watch lists. The one primary method by
which the FAA was looking out for individuals was the issuance of Security Directives
which the FAA issued about several conspirators in the WTC and Bojinka plot.
(8SI) Although the FBI and FAA could call air carriers directly to apprise them of threat
information, he's not aware of any efforts outside of security directives to stop an Al
Qaeda member or other terrorist from flying. In the pre 9-11 environment individuals
who were wanted by the FBI were not maintained on any lists. Salata said the
perpetrators of the TWA 847 hijacking were still at large. Their names did not appear on
any "no fly" lists. They could have boarded any flight they wanted.
(U) Salata said that the plot for Libyans to crash a plane into the WTC was dismissed
because the Libyans didn't have large aircraft that could fly to the United States.
(U) If an issue is "specific" "credible" and "counterable" it would be issued in a security
directive. Whoever originated that information would be asked to follow-up and provide
an assessment of whether there was a "threat to aviation." He said that while the FAA
could have made those assessments on their own, "they would never do that." The FAA
preferred that the originator provide the determination, but often the FAA could have
made the call on its own. He said the FAA environment was "very risk averse." Salata
said it was fair to characterize "risk averse," as "we don't want to be responsible" for the
(U) Salata said there were "so many" UBL threats about using aircraft. It had been a
consistent theme over the years, but he doesn't remember a specific threat by UBL to
smash a plane into a U.S. airport.
(U) Salata called the "theme of crashing airplanes into buildings" something that was
inevitable because of the high profile nature of civil aviation. Salata said he didn't want
to criticize Secretary Mineta or Administrator Garvey but that he couldn't believe they
would ever say that "we never conceived of the use of aircraft as weapons." Logic
dictated that such a possibility was a concern. In fact, in the summer of 2001, FAA did a
great presentation for the airline security directors highlighting the potential for suicide
c581) Salata said he certainly was aware of an April 2001 Intelligence Community report
that UBL was interested in using commercial pilots as terrorists. He cited the fact that
one of Ramzi Yousef s confederates was a trained commercial pilot and that part of the
Bojinka plot was to smash a plane into CIA headquarters.
(SSI) Salata stated that it was always in his mind that a civil aviation attack could happen
anywhere including in the United States. Salata said the problem was not that there
weren't "too many dots to connect" but rather too few people to connect them. He said
the UBL unit had about 27 people trying to track a lot of terrorist activity.
(4Si) Salata said that when Abu Zubaida "lit up "J  tin March 2001, he got
"very, very concerned." Everyone was concerned.
(U) Salata said that the FAA liaisons (CIA, FBI, STATE) would talk among themselves
frequently. They talked several times a week.
(U) Salata said he was never briefed on what FAA was ordering the air carriers to do to
provide security, but he was sure that the air carriers were complaining about the cost of
(5-SI) Salata said that both the CIA and State Department were light-years ahead of the
FBI in accessing the information assets available to the counter-terrorism (CT)
community. Salata said he was one of only a few people in the building who knew how to
He pulled one of the 11 computer terminals!  lout
of a closet, dusted it Off-and used it. FBI analysts at that time tended tc; focus on the
computer terminal in front of them. He said that the FBI was and is too,paper intensive.


9/11 Classified Information
(U) Salata did not participate in the formulation of FAA Security Directives (SD's) or
Information Circulars (IC's)
(U) Salata agreed that it was imprudent to stop the physical search of "selectees" and
their carry on in 1998 at a time when the threat was going up.
(U) Salata said he was an advocate for using the Israeli methods of aviation security but
quickly added that it would never work in the United States. He clarified that we could
employ some of the Israeli's approaches.
(See Classified MFR)
(I) In August of 2001 an electronic communication was sent from the Minneapolis
Field Office to the RFU unit (from an analyst named Mike Maltby) describing
Moussaoui's flight training at the Pan Am facility and how an alert citizen had alerted the
FBI field office about Moussaoui. It was a multi-page EC about what Moussaoui had
intended to do, and they asked Salata to read it and evaluate whether there was anything
unusual about it. Salata said it took him only a couple of pages to realize that it was
"highly unusual" and that for someone who had very limited piloting skills to drop so
much cash on a sophisticated pilot simulator training on a 747 was highly unusual. It
very much concerned him. After he finished reading it, he gave the document to Mike
Maltby and Dave Frasca, the unit chief, and "whatever Minneapolis is doing with this,
it's right to run this thing out and run it completely to ground."
(U) According to Salata, "I was on the periphery of all that. I was only aware generically
of the issue of the laptop and the probable cause of accessing it." That was a legal
question not in his jurisdiction.
(SSI) Salata remembers that the original plan was to return Moussaoui to France and
there were discussions with him by FBI authorities about how best to affect Moussaoui's
return to France in a secure manner, such as on a commercial flight with a law
enforcement escort, FAA flight or some other government aircraft.
(SSI) Salata believes that the plan to return Moussaoui to France was in effect until 9-11
happened. He was involved in this discussion only to the extent that the FBI might want
to use air marshals to escort him back to France, or perhaps even use an FAA plane to do
so. He said his dealing with Moussaoui was that on the morning of August 14 th, Mike
Maltby came up to Salata and said he had gotten a draft EC (Moussaoui EC) and before
he give it to Dave Frasca he wanted Salata's take on it. Salata said it was clear this was
unusual and important.
(Si) S When asked whether the part of the cable that stated Moussaoui "along with others"
were plotting a crime alarmed him, particularly the author of the EC's concern that others
may be involved, Salata said that the issue of other people being involved was an
"agent's conclusion." (STAFF NOTE: It seemed like Salata didn't concur.) Salata
indicated that he was focused on the fact that someone with Moussaoui's skill set and
background would plunk down $8,500 and be wanting such training, apart from someone
who was very wealthy. He said that when he saw the route on which Moussaoui was
practicing it gave him a sick feeling. Salata said that he verbally informed FAA that there
was a matter being investigated out of Minneapolis of an individual who had limited pilot
skills trying to get sophisticated simulator training. He said he gave this verbal briefing
to Claude Manno with Pat Durgen standing next to him.
cRSI) Salata stated that as the next couple of weeks played out he was sure there was
some kind of briefing on Moussaoui. About the 18 th or 19th of August was his last day in
the office, before he went on a family vacation during which he was gone on the week of
August 22". He returned to work on the Tuesday after Labor Day. When he got back he
was in discussion with FAA about whether they could provide air marshals for
Moussaoui's return to Europe.
(S1) Salata felt that the September 4 th teletype that went from FBI to FAA about
Moussaoui had sufficient details (which he saw when he got back from vacation). Salata
said he was actually surprised by the level of detail.
158I) Salata was asked about the cable sent from the FBI field office to CIA stations
mentioning the theory that Moussaoui might be part of a larger plot. Salata did not seem
familiar with this cable. He said he was on vacation when that went out, and that in his
absence either Mike Maltby or Rita Flack would have handled the information at FBI
HQ. (STAFF NOTE: Who was expected to get this to the FAA in Salata's absence?).
Salata said there was no one designated to come over to take his place while he was
away. He would leave contact information for points of contact at FAA and if a "barn
burner" came up they would contact either the points-of-contact, or the 24-hour watch.
(SST) Salata said that when he got back from vacation he quickly caught up to speed and
was aware of concerns that Moussaoui might be part of a larger plot. Salata said he never
spoke with the agent who thought Moussaoui might be part of a larger plot to determine
why he believed that to be the case. Salata said his personal assessment was that
Moussaoui was "an individual" operating by himself, based on the facts as he saw them.
He described himself as being an "interested observer" if someone else felt it was a larger
(U) He believes we need greater operational security with our aviation security measures.
(U) He said he was always concerned about cockpit security.
(U) Intelligence sharing needs to be improved, but the FBI did a great job in trying to
improve it. He said that as a "lowly FBI detailee" he was permitted to intellectually
argue issues. This was latitude he was not given at the FAA. He found this atmosphere at
the FBI to be productive and healthy.
(U) Salata said he did the first study on MANPAD attacks against civil aviation. Salata
said we need to improve our physical infrastructure against penetration. Salata thinks it
has been way too easy to penetrate a major airport from access control.
(U) Salata said the dual nature of the FAA to regulate and promote industry was a large
issue. He supports the idea of taking ACS out of FAA and putting it into TSA. He
believes that downsizing government also downsized intelligence which hurt the country
and that we were "outgunned."
(U) Salata said he and four others who lived inside the FBI in the summer of 2001 trying
to connect the dots. He thinks we should increase our intelligence assets. He stressed the
need to better train intelligence novices, and to remember that experience matters.
(U) Salata was asked about the new threat level FAA articulated in the summer 2001
rulemaking including a "domestic Bojinka." He said he was aware of the rulemaking to
increase the baseline, but he believes the articulation of a domestic "Bojinka" was really
just a cost-benefit issue not a realistic scenario.
(U) He feels that in every airport we build from here on out we need to engineer security
into the system. We need to build security from the ground up.
(>81) He said that Al Qaeda is still focused on aviation. He said he believes that they are
focusing on IED's or gun cotton. He said he still doesn't understand why we haven't
experienced the suicide bomber phenomenon the way they have in Israel.
(U) He said that KSM is Ramzi Yousef's uncle and that if Ramzi were interested in
bojinka, KSM might still be.
o c o o t o
Event: Follow-up interview of Jack Salata, former FAA liaison to the FBI
Type: Interview
Date: June 14, 2004
Special Access Issues: SSI
Prepared by: John Raidt
Team: 7
Participants (non-Commission): Jack Salata, FBI; Bob Sinton, FBI General Counsel's
Participants (Commission): John Raidt, Lisa Sullivan, and Bill Johnstone
Location: FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC
See memorandum for the record of first interview of Jack Salata
FBI's Civil Aviation Program
[U] Salata noted that Bev Wright who served as manager of the FBI's Civil Aviation
Program was very conversant with FAA operations. If there were anything alarming
regarding civil aviation security she would share the information with him. He stated that
she had an "open door" policy and was always calling him with information. She had
good relations with the field offices and the agents who served as liaisons with local
airports. He said that he did not recall Ms. Wright expressing any concern that she might
not be receiving information from the field pertinent to civil aviation.
[U] Mr. Salata was told by Mr. Raidt that the FAA regarded the Ahmed Ressam case
(who was seeking to attack Los Angeles Airport) as an example of where the FBI failed
to share with FAA threat information of direct interest to the agency. In previous
interviews, FAA officials told the Commission they learned from news reports, not the
FBI, that Ressam was seeking to attack civil aviation. Salata said he was aware the FAA
thought that the FBI was holding back information but he said the charge was absolutely
untrue. He recalled that FBI did find a map in Ressam's possession that had a circle
around Los Angeles, but there was no way to discern that his target was the airport.
Salata said that Ressam's plan to attack LAX came out during the prosecution and
everyone (including the press, the FBI and the FAA) learned about the plot at the same
Libyan threat to slam a plane into the WTC
[U] Salata said he recalled the Libyan threat to slam a plane into the WTC and that he
officially assessed it as unrealistic. He said the threat information was that the Libyans
were considering flying a Libyan plane into the WTC. There was an embargo on Libya
at the time and the Libyan's were not allowed to fly outside of certain airspace. He didn't
believe that they had the aircraft that had the range to get to the U.S. or the ability to
carry-out the threat since they were restricted to certain airspace. When asked whether at
the time he considered the possibility that the Libyans might hijack an airplane to conduct
the attack, Mr. Salata responded that there was nothing in the intelligence reporting to
suggest that was what they had in mind.
UBL flight training in the U.S.
[U] Mr. Salata said that he started looking at UBL when he was assigned to the State
Department in 1992. He has always been aware that UBL depended on pilots so that he
could engage in extensive private air travel. He was also aware in a general sense that
because the U.S. trained so many of the world's pilots, UBL might have associates
training in U.S. flight schools. He said it was simply a matter of common sense.
However, he was not aware of any particular individual who the FBI knew to be affiliated
with UBL or al Qaeda in flight training, but whom the Bureau let alone because they
were training for transportation purposes rather than terrorist attacks.
Phoenix EC
[U] Mr. Salata said that he remembers receiving a call from a female agent in Phoenix
asking if the FAA had a database of Arab students enrolled in flight training. Salata told
her they did not have such a database, but asked if they were interested in any particular
person or if there was some specific concern. The agent told Salata that their seemed to
be a lot of Arab students in flight training in the Phoenix area. Salata told us that in the
pre 9/11 environment it would not have occurred to anyone to keep track of such things.
He believes doing so would have been a violation of the privacy act. Mr. Salata recalled
that "profiling" was considered a dirty word. This was the reason the name of CAPS
(computer assisted profiling system) was changed to CAPPS (computer assisted
passenger prescreening system) in 1998.
[U] Because he received the call prior to the issuance of the Phoenix EC, he believes it
was a precursor to the memo. He reiterated that he did not see the Phoenix EC until after
9/11. He agreed that it had been received by individuals within the FBI's Radical
Fundamentalist Unit where he worked, and that he should have been given the
information. He's not sure why he didn't.
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
FBI's 1998 tasking of field offices to examine flight schools
[U] Salata stated that he does not remember being informed of the tasking, but that such
a tasking would be the kind of information that either he or Bev Wright should have
received. The interviewers told Mr. Salata that agent'  F7ho worked on the
tasking stated that he had run the information past him. Mr. Salata said it is possible that
he saw it, but he just doesn't recall.
[U] Mr. Salata reiterated what he previously told the commission that he saw a draft and
the distributed copy of the EC from the FBI Minneapolis Field Office regarding the
Moussaoui case. He said that the EC did not include any analysis aboUt the extent of the
terrorist threat that Moussaoui might pose. He said that EC's convey facts not conjecture.
The communication laid out the facts of the case and said nothing about the possibility
that Moussaoui might be working with others in a terrorist plot.

[U] He recalled that he orally briefed Claudio Manno and Pat Durgin of FAA's
intelligence bureau at FAA's office the Thursday or Friday following the 18 th of August.
He told them that Moussaoui was engaged in advanced flight training and had raised
concerns. The subject was in custody on immigration charges. There were no
confederates. And the FBI needed a few days to find out what was going on.
[U] Salata said he did not tell Manno or Durgin about the specifics of why Moussaoui
raised suspicions such as his lack of interest in learning to take-off and land, etc. Salata
stated to the Commission that he was instructed by the FBI (possible Dave Frasca) not to
tell them too much. Mr. Salata the FBI did not want information to get out that might
complicate the investigation. Salata said that if the FAA sent out a warning to airports
about the arrest, it could interfere or damage the investigation. Salata never sent anything
in writing to the FAA about the case. He then went on a family vacation and returned the
Tuesday after Labor Day. He was not aware that a Minneapolis field agent had urged
headquarters to warn the Secret Service because of the threat Moussaoui might pose to
Washington DC, nor was he aware of the "brainstorming" sessions held in Minneapolis
where one of the agents opined that Moussaoui might be training to slam an airplane into
the WTC.
[U] Mr. Salata was asked about the CIA product regarding Moussaoui including the
memo that went to CIA Director Tennant titled "Islamic Extremist Learns How to Fly,"
and the CIA cable to stations overseas calling Moussaoui a possible hijacker who might
be plotting to attack the U.S. Salata did not see this information. However he said that
we need to ask  lwho-was the FAA
liaison tor - the CIA' Whether he saw the" l
information and why he didn't pass it onto FAA Intelligence. Salata said he did learn
about information provided by the French that Moussaoui had terrorist connections, but
only after he got back from vacation on the 4 91 . He added that it would be interesting to

Closed by Statute
9/11 Classified Information
know ii  
1assed along to FAA intelligence this information as well as the
 (CIA about al Hazmi and Mihdar that came in on August 23 rd .
[U] Salata said that in the midst of the Moussaoui issue the FAA/FBI was also dealing
with six Pakistani's in Bolivia who were subjects of great concern to aviation security.
[U] Salata stated that FAA did receive the Sept. 4 th teletype sent out by the FBI to
agencies including the FAA giving details about the Moussaoui arrest. Salata stated that
neither he nor the FBI were tasked by the FAA to provide any additional information or
conduct any particular follow-up.
[U] Mr. Salata said that he was caught between being an FAA liaison and an FBI
detailee. He was trying to serve two masters who had very different expectations of him.
Mr. said that he didn't have written job description but that having one might have helped
clarify his role and expectations for everyone. He stated that he was grossly overworked.
His phone never stopped ringing at home and at work. He said the watch officers at FAA
would send volumes of questions to him because it was easy for them to do. They did
not appreciate the difficulties and constraints of living in the operational world. Part of
the problem is that the Clinton/Gore administration downsized the intelligence
community which put too much stress on the system.
Saudi Flights
[U] Salata said that the Saudi Embassy arranged for charter transport of certain people
from the country in the aftermath of 9/11 because of security concerns for their people.
He remembered that he was working in FBI Headquarter's Operations Center in the
aftermath of 9/11. He received a call from a desk officer at the State Department's
counter-terrorism unit (SCT). They wanted to be sure that the FBI was in the loop
regarding the request from the Saudi Embassy to conduct these flights, and that they took
whatever action was necessary to ensure that people were cleared before they were
allowed to depart. This information was fed up the food chain to Director Mueller. Salata
said that the FBI wanted everyone checked out and to his knowledge this was done. He
stated that the State Department did not press the FBI to take any shortcuts in checking
these people out.
[U] Salata said that the effort to assure that passengers were cleared was well coordinated
among customs/INS/etc. He remembered that he lashed up the FBI with FAA Air traffic
control. He stated that air traffic management would not clear any flights to depart until
the FBI gave the clearance.
'9,711 Closed by Statute


[U] Salata said that the Senior Executive Intelligence Briefs mirrored the President's
Daily Brief and it would be interesting to see what the SEIB's on those days had to say
about the threat and the information about hijacking that the president received.
April 2001 Request for Information from FAA Intelligence Watch
LSSI] Mr. Salata was shown a watch log entry indicating that he/FBI had been asked
some questions regarding al Qaeda's knowledge of technical aviation information,
including piloting skills(stemming from an al Qaeda threat to attack planes'
 According to FAA intelligence officialsthe FBI never
responded to their questions. Mr. Salata said that he didn't remember• e tasking but he
was sure that he would have pasSed it along. He allowed as perhaps'the FBI didn't
answer the questions. He said FAA wrote lots of questions for Rift() answer.
9/11 Classified Information


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