________________________________________________________________________

No. 14-2388
____________________________________________________

In the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________________________________________

PAMELA LEE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
BRIAN ABBOTT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana,

Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-406-RLY-MJD
The Honorable Richard L. Young, Chief Judge
____________________________________________________

Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Motion to Lift Stay
____________________________________________________

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES OFFICER PAMELA LEE, et al.
EMERGENCY MOTION TO LIFT THE COURT'S STAY IN PART
Karen Celestino-Horseman William R. Groth
Of Counsel, Austin & Jones, P.C. Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth &
One N. Pennsylvania St., Ste. 220 & Towe, LLP
Indianapolis, IN 46204 429 E. Vermont St., Ste. 200
Indianapolis, IN 46202

Mark W. Sniderman Kathleen M. Sweeney
Sniderman Nguyen, LLP Sweeney Hayes, LLC
47 S. Meridian St., Ste. 400 141 E. Washington St., Ste. 225
Indianapolis, IN 46204 Indianapolis, IN 46204

Robert A. Katz
Indiana University McKinney School of Law
530 W. New York St., Room 349
Indianapolis, IN 46202
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2
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Officer Pamela Lee, Candace Batten-Lee,
Officer Teresa Welborn, Elizabeth J. Piette, Batallion Chief Ruth
Morrison, Martha Leverett, Sergeant Karen Vaughn-Kajmowicz, Tammy
Vaughn-Kajmowicz and J.S.V., T.S.V. and T.R.V., by their parents and
next Friends, Sergeant Karen Vaughn-Kajmowicz and Tammy Vaughn-
Kajmowicz (collectively, the “Lee Plaintiffs”), respectfully move this Court
to lift the order staying the enforcement of the injunction ordered by the
district court as regards the administration of pension benefits. (See,
(Lee v. Abbott, No. 1:14-cv-406 (S.D. Ind.), D. Ct. Dkt. No. 58, Entry on
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment ("SJ Order"), attached hereto as
Ex. E).
This case, unlike Baskin, only challenges the prohibition of Ind.
Code § 31-11-1-1, which bars the recognition of marriages lawfully
performed outside the State of Indiana. The district court held that
Indiana’s non-recognition ban is unconstitutional and, in the instant
case, specifically ordered the Indiana Public Retirement System ("INPRS")
to recognize marriages performed outside the State of Indiana for
purposes of administering the pension benefits. The case of the Lee
Plaintiffs is very different from the district court’s judgment declaring
that Indiana’s refusal to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples is
unconstitutional and enjoining certain county clerks in the State of
Indiana from denying marriage licenses to same sex couples.
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3
To preserve resources and this Court’s time, this motion
incorporates the applicable arguments set forth in Baskin et al. in
support of Plaintiffs-Appellees Quasney and Sandler’s Emergency Motion
to Lift the Court’s Stay in Part.
I. Statement of Facts Relevant to this Motion
The Lee Plaintiffs are four same-sex couples who were married
outside the State of Indiana and who are asking that their otherwise
lawful marriages be recognized by the by the Indiana Public Retirement
System ("INPRS") which administers the 1977 Police Officers' and
Firefighters' Pension and Disability Fund ("Pension Fund"). The
defendants are the trustees and executive director of INPRS ("Lee
Defendants"). Officer Pamela Lee, Officer Teresa Welborn and Sergeant
Karen Vaughn-Kajmowicz are active-duty police officers while Battalion
Chief Ruth Morrison is a retired firefighter ("Lee First Responders").
This litigation challenges that part of I.C. § 31-11-1-1 which
prohibits the recognition of the marriages of the validly performed out-of-
state marriages of the Lee First Responders and their spouses. The
statute provides as follows:
(a) Only a female may marry a male. Only a male may
marry a female.

(b) A marriage between persons of the same gender is void
in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place
where it is solemnized.

The district court entered a declaratory judgment, finding I.C. § 31-
11-1-1 was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to all the
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4
plaintiffs. (SJ Order at 33). Specifically, the Lee Defendants were enjoined
"to administer the Pension Fund . . . so as to provide the same benefits
for all married couples, regardless of whether the couples are of the
opposite sex or same sex." (SJ Order at 35). The judgment, injunction
and order of the district court should not be stayed with respect to the
first responder members of the Pension Fund or alternatively, should not
be stayed as to only the Lee Plaintiffs because the Defendants did not
carry their burden in seeking the stay. At the very least, the stay should
be lifted so as to enjoin the Lee Defendants from refusing to provide the
same benefits to the Lee Plaintiffs as are provided first responders
married to persons of the opposite sex.
A. The Pension Fund
The Pension Fund is governed by I.C. § 36-8-8 et seq. If an officer
dies in the line of duty, then his/her surviving spouse is entitled to
receive for life a monthly benefit of 100% of the deceased officer's
calculated monthly retirement benefit and a lump sum payment, tax-free
of $150,000.00. See, I.C. § 36-8-8-14.1, I.C. § 36-8-8-20(c) and Ex. G,
Survivor Benefits, p.p. 1-2.
1

If a Pension Fund member dies while on active duty but not in the
line of duty, then the surviving spouse will receive a monthly benefit
equaling 60% of the deceased's calculated monthly benefit. See I.C. § 36-

1
A handbook and other information regarding the Pension Fund can
be found at: http://www.in.gov/inprs/policeandfirefighters.htm (Last
visited June 30, 2014). The Survivor Benefits hand-out is located at
http://www.in.gov/inprs/77fundmbrhandbooksurvivorbenefits.htm.
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8-8-13.8(c); Ex. F, p. 2, 1977 Fund At A Glance (which can be found at
http://www.in.gov/inprs/files/77_fund_glance_membership.pdf). If a
retired firefighter dies while receiving the monthly benefit, the "surviving
spouse is entitled to a monthly benefit." I.C. § 36-8-8-13.8.
While I.C. § 36-8-8, et. seq. references "surviving spouse", the term
"surviving spouse" is not defined within the Indiana Code. INPRS takes
the position that "Eligible survivors for 1977 Fund members are set by
law and are not subject to personal choice." Ex. F, p. 2, 1977 Fund At A
Glance. Instead, INPRS relies upon I.C. § 31-11-1-1 to define who can be
a surviving spouse and takes the position that by law, the lawfully
executed marriages of the Lee First Responders are void and their
spouses do not qualify as "spouses" for the purposes of the Pension
Fund.
B. The Lee First Responders and Their Spouses
Three of the first responders are active-duty police officers who
wear bullet-proof vests on the job due to the daily dangers they confront.
(D. Ct. Dkt. No. 27-1, Aff. of Officer Pamela Lee and Candace Batten-Lee,
p.p. 2-3, attached hereto as Ex. A, and D. Ct. Dkt. No. 27-3, Aff. of
Officer Teresa Welborn and Elizabeth Piette, p. 2, attached hereto as Ex.
B). If the job is undercover where the officer seeks to hide her identity,
she cannot wear a bullet-proof vest because it would give her away due
to its visible bulkiness. (D. Ct. Dkt. No. 27-5, Aff. of Sargent Karen
Vaughn-Kajmowicz and Tammy Vaughn-Kajmowicz p.p. 3-4, attached
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6
hereto as Ex. C). Without the bullet-proof vest while confronting a
dangerous situations, the threat of death resulting from being shot or
injury resulting from attack while on the job is increased. As a retired
firefighter, Chief Morrison was exposed to carcinogenic materials on the
job that have been known to cause cancer. (D. Ct. Dkt. No. 27-9, Aff. of
Battalion Chief Ruth Morrison and Martha Leverett, p.p. 3-4, attached
hereto as Ex. D). All four Lee First Responders are in long-term
committed plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT
II. The Stay Should Be Lifted Because INPRS Failed to Satisfy the
Requirements Necessary to Secure a Stay

A. Legal Standard
Defendants filed their Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(2). (D. # 4) For a
stay to issue, this Court considers the following factors: (1) the showing
of likelihood of success on appeal; (2) the likelihood of irreparable harm
absent the court order; (3) the harm to other parties from a possible
court order; and (4) the public interest. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S.
770, 776 (1987); Glick v. Koenig, 766 F.2d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1985); see
also, Bradford-Scott DataCorp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128
F.3d 504, 505 (7th Cir. 1997).
At root, there is simply no irreparable harm that will be suffered by
the Lee Defendants, INPRS or the State of Indiana should the stay on the
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7
declaratory judgment and injunction be lifted with respect to these
defendants and plaintiffs.
B. The Defendants are unlikely to succeed on the merits.
There have been an avalanche of cases invalidating state statutes
or constitutional amendments barring state recognition of out-of-state
same sex marriages following United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675
(2013).
2

The Defendants here make no effort to engage the merits and
direction of this clear trend. Instead, they proffer only the same
arguments that were before the trial court, and show no substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. Additionally, there has been now

2
See, Wright v. State of Arkansas, No. 60CV-13-2662 (Ark. Cir. Ct. 2nd
Div. May 9, 2014) (unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause); Latta v.
Otter, --F.Supp. 2d.--, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho, May 13, 2014)
(unconstitutional under both Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection
Clause); Bourke v. Beshear, --F.Supp. 2d--, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12,
2014) (unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause); De Boer v. Snyder,
973 F.Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich., 2014) (unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause); Henry v. Himes, 2014 WL 1418395 (S.D. Ohio, Apr. 14
2014) (unconstitutional under both Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection Clause); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F.Supp. 2d 968, 979 (S.D. Ohio
2013); Bishop v. United States of America, ex rel. Eric H. Holder, 962 F.Supp. 2d
1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (unconstitutional under Substantive Due Process and
Equal Protection Clause); Whitewood v. Wolf, 2014 WL 2058105 (M.D. Pa. May
20, 2014) (unconstitutional under both Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection Clause); Tanco v. Haslam, --F.Supp. 2d--, 2014 WL 997525 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) (preliminary junction entered where same-sex couples
seeking marriage recognition likely to prevail on claim that law violates the
Equal Protection Clause); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F.Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex.,
2014) (unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause and Substantive Due
Process); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F.Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013)
(unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause and Substantive Due Process);
Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F.Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014) (unconstitutional under
Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection). Following Windsor, only one
court has upheld a state's refusal to recognize same sex marriage. See Sevcik v.
Sandoval, 911 F.Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012) (law and constitutional
amendment do not violate Equal Protection Clause).
Case: 14-2388 Document: 11-1 Filed: 07/01/2014 Pages: 16 (7 of 72)
8
showing of likelihood of success on the merits nor is a stay supported by
the public interest. On these grounds, the stay should be lifted.
C. Defendants and the INPRS will Suffer No Irreparable Harm
Absent a Stay

A. Defendants' Acknowledge the Injunction Issued
Against Against INPRS Does Not Result in Irreparable
Harm

An injunction issued against INPRS so as to require it to recognize
the marriages of the Lee First Responders for purposes of administering
the Pension Fund. The Attorney General acknowledges that the
injunction requiring INPRS to recognize the marriages of the Lee First
Responders does not result in irreparable harm:
The emergency in the Lee case, on the other hand, has not
so much to do with the specific injunctions applicable to
those Defendants (though such relief should be stayed as
well) as it has to do with the broad declaration of invalidity of
Indiana’s traditional marriage definition. It is with that
emergency in mind, and a desire to maintain consistency
among the three cases concerning the status of Indiana’s
marriage definition, that the
State seeks a broad stay that would apply to the Lee
Defendants, as well.

(Dkt. 4-1, Emergency Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal ("Mot.") at 13,
attached hereto as Ex. E).
The issue raised by this motion to lift the stay is whether INPRS
suffers irreparable harm requiring the injunction issued against it to be
stayed. As the Lee Defendants claim no irreparable harm, the injunction
should be lifted.
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9
In regard to the Lee Plaintiffs, the only argument specifically
addressed to them is an ill-defined concern regarding "consistency" for
the remainder of the state. The Lee Defendants cite no case law for the
proposition that the award of death benefits to the spouse of one of the
Lee First Responders will somehow result in an "inconsistency" that rises
to the level of irreparable harm. There will be no confusion should the
stay be lifted as to the Lee Defendants on behalf of the Lee Plaintiffs. If
the stay is lifted, should any first responder or the Lee First Responders
die during the pendency of the appeal, then the Pension Board will
simply be required to pay the appropriate benefits.
Defendants seek to avoid some “confusion that may arise” from the
mere fact that a stay is issued in one case, but not two others. But this is
exactly what happened in the district court where a preliminary
injunction was entered to less then all of the parties in all of the cases
and there was no "confusion". The district court entered a preliminary
injunction with respect to only two of the plaintiffs - Ms. Quasney and
Ms. Sandler - directing the State of Indiana to recognize their marriage.
The State points to no inconsistency that caused statewide confusion or
irreparable harm from doing so. Indeed, contrary to any panicked claims
of inconsistency, the sky did not fall.
Initially, before the district court, the Lee Defendants did not seek
a stay of this cause in the district court, although they did immediately
in the two related actions, Baskin and Fujii. The Lee Defendants justified
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10
the delay on the grounds they had “hoped to gather evidence
demonstrating the precise amount of exposure to the Indiana Public
Retirement System in the absence of a stay.” (Dist Ct. Dkt. No. 66,
Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal ("DC Mot. for Stay"), p. 1,
attached hereto as Exhibit G). This hope went unfulfilled "as it has
proved infeasible to gather such evidence quickly." Id. What defendants
fail to acknowledge is that a pension fund is premised upon statistics
and probabilities regarding certain outcomes. For example, while the
Pension Fund cannot state with absolute certainty how many first
responders will marry or how many first responders will die in the line of
duty, it does try to make a prediction of sorts so as to know how much
money it will need to maintain the fund so it can make the necessary
pay-outs. Certainly, as regards the four Lee Plaintiffs, the Pension Fund
could have provided a cost should it have to pay out following the death
of those Lee First Responders.
But even if the Defendants could somehow have captured the cost
to the Pension Fund in dollars should it have to pay out if a first
responder should die or one of the Lee First Responders should die, that
is simply a question of money damages. If it is later determined that Ind.
Code § 31-11-1-1 is unconstitutional, the Pension Fund can then seek to
recover money damages from the spouses it paid, if any, while the
litigation was pending. Money damages do not constitute irreparable
harm. See, e.g., Kartman v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 634
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11
F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir. 2011) ("plaintiffs have not suffered irreparable
harm" as [t]heir injury—the underpayment of their insurance claims—is
easily remedied by an award of money damages, a fully adequate
remedy").
Ultimately, the issue raised by this stay is whether INPRS will
suffer irreparable harm if it is enjoined from recognizing the marriages of
all Indiana first responders participating in the Pension Fund or
alternatively, only the Lee First Responders. The short answer is "no."
The most that the INPRS can claim - and which it did not claim - are
money damages and those do not constitute irreparable harm.
III. Unlike INPRS, the Lee Plaintiffs will Suffer Irreparable Harm

A denial of a constitutional right is a sufficient harm that favors
denial of a stay. Hinrichs v Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006) (no stay
of district court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs where “the harm to the
plaintiffs is no less than a denial of religious liberty in the form of a
probable violation of the First Amendment”). In the case of the Lee
Plaintiffs, they are not only suffering a denial of their due process and
equal protection rights but they are also suffering another type of
irreparable harm by which no remedy can make them whole.
By treating lawfully-wedded individuals as legal strangers under its
laws, Indiana denigrates their human dignity and civic equality. By
publicizing and continuing this unequal and unconstitutional treatment,
Indiana stigmatizes Plaintiffs and invites others to view them as second-
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12
class citizens. By denying the existence of the central reality of Plaintiffs’
lives -- their marriages -- Indiana threatens to undermine their identities
for as any married couple can tell you, when handling the day-to-day
decisions of life, the question is not "what do I need" but rather "what do
we need." (See Ex. A-F, Affidavits of Lee Plaintiffs)
“When couples—including same-sex couples—enter into marriage,
it generally involves long-term plans for how they will organize their
finances, property, and family lives.” Obergefell v.Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp.
2d 968, 979 (S.D. Ohio 2013). The district court’s order brought a well-
deserved measure of peace to the Lee Plaintiffs: but the stay creates
uncertainty anew as to the non-participating spouse’s property interest
in the state pension, and hampers the Lee Plaintiffs’ ability to make
provisions for surviving spouses. The Lee First Responders, who daily
enter dangerous situations as part of their promise to serve and protect
the people of Indiana, deserve no less a promise returned to them when
it comes to caring for their families should they die in the line-of-duty or
in retirement.
The knowledge that their families will not be provided these
benefits by the Pension Fund has caused Officers Lee and Welborn and
Sargent Vaughn-Kajmowicz additional emotional distress, concern, worry
and upset about what may happen to their surviving spouses and
children should the Lee First Responders predecease their spouses. (Ex.
A, Aff. of Lee, p. 4) (“Officer Lee says that her stress and worry are
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13
increased because she knows that if anything happens to Officer Lee, the
State of Indiana and will not provide Candace with financial support as it
will the spouses of officers who are married to persons of the opposite-
sex”); Ex. B, Aff. of Wellborn, pp. 4-5] (“Officer Welborn is worried about
whether Elizabeth will have the financial security to continue living in
their home”); Ex. C, Aff. of Vaughn-Kajmowicz, p. 6 (Per Sergeant
Vaughn-Kajmowicz: “If I should die while a police office or in the line of
duty, Tammy will not receive the spousal benefit provided by the Pension
Fund and this worries me because she will be alone and left to take care
of our children without the same financial stability afforded my fellow
officers in the same situation but who are married to persons of the
opposite-sex”); Ex. D, Aff. of Morrison, pp. 4-5 (“Chief Morrison worries
how Martha Leverett will fare financially when Chief Morrison passes”
because Martha will be left without the same resources provided her
colleagues’ spouses in opposite-sex marriages)).
Because the harm imposed upon the Lee Plaintiffs is irreparable
and the harm to the Lee Defendants is not irreparable, the stay should
be lifted.
IV Public Interest Militates in Favor of Vacating the Stay

Lifting that portion of the stay as applied to all first responder
members of the Pension Fund or alternatively, only the Lee Plaintiffs, will
serve the public interest in several ways. First, the Lee Plaintiffs or,
alternatively, their fellow first responders, who protect the public, shall
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14
be able to do so without fear of leaving their spouses unprotected from
financial loss should they die, either in the line of duty or while on active
duty. Second, lifting the stay with respect to the Lee Plaintiffs
alternatively, all first responders, would augment and inform the public
dialogue regarding what it actually means to be married, and the need of
all married first responders to be protected by pension laws, just as
opposite-sex married couples are. This dialogue and explanation of the
scope and depth of marital rights informs the citizenry, while it
encourages and promotes democratic discourse.
Because the public interest militates in favor of vacating the stay
with respect to the Lee Plaintiffs only, the injunction directed to the Lee
Defendants should not be stayed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as the Defendants have failed to carry
their burden and demonstrate they are entitled to a stay, the stay should
be lifted as regards all affected Indiana first responders or alternatively,
only the Lee Plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Karen Celestino-Horseman /s/ William R. Groth
Karen Celestino-Horseman William R. Groth
Of Counsel, Austin & Jones, P.C. Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth &
One N. Pennsylvania St., Ste. 220 & Towe, LLP
Indianapolis, IN 46204 429 E. Vermont St., Ste. 200
Tel: (317) 632-5633 Indianapolis, IN 46202
Fax: (317) 630-1040 Tel: (317) 353-9363
E-mail: Karen@kchorseman.com Fax: (317) 351-7232
E-mail: wgroth@fdgtlaborlaw.com

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15
/s/Mark W. Sniderman /s/Kathleen M. Sweeney
Mark W. Sniderman Kathleen M. Sweeney
Sniderman Nguyen, LLP Sweeney Hayes LLC
47 S. Meridian St., Ste. 400 141 E. Washington St., Ste. 225
Indianapolis, IN 46204 Indianapolis, IN 46204
Tel: (317) 361-4700 Tel: (317) 491-1050
Fax: (317) 464-5111 Fax: (317) 491-1043
E-mail: mark@snlawyers.com E-mail: ksween@gmail.com

/s/Robert A. Katz
Robert A. Katz
Indiana University, McKinney School of Law
530 W. New York St., Room 349
Indianapolis, IN 46202


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 27, 2014, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which
sent notification of such filing to the following:
Thomas M. Fisher
Solicitor General
Office of the ATtorney General
Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov

No. 14-2386
Paul D Castillo
Camilla B. Taylor
Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.
pcastillo@mail.lambdalegal.org
ctaylor@lambdalegal.org

Brent Phillip Ray
Jordan Heinz
Melanie MacKay
Scott Lerner
Dmitriy Tishyevich
Kirkland & Ellis LLP
brent.ray@kirkland.com
jordan.heinz@kirkland.com
melanie.mackay@kirkland.com
scott.lerner@kirkland.com
Case: 14-2388 Document: 11-1 Filed: 07/01/2014 Pages: 16 (15 of 72)
16
dmitriy.tishyevich@kirkland.com

Barbara J. Baird
The Law Office Of Barbara J Baird
bjbaird@bjbairdlaw.com
Robert V. Clutter
Kirtley, Taylor, Sims, Chadd & Minnette, P.C.
bclutter@kirtleytaylorlaw.com

Darren J. Murphy
Assistant Hamilton County Attorney
dmurphy@ori.net

Nancy Moore Tiller
Nancy Moore Tiller & Associates
nmt@tillerlegal.com

John S. Dull
Law Office of John S. Dull, PC
jsdull@yahoo.com

No. 14-2387
Chase Strangio
American Civil Liberties Union
cstrangio@aclu.org

Thomas Alan Hardin
Shine & Hardin LLP
thardin@shineandhardin.com
Kenneth J. Falk
ACLU Of Indiana
kfalk@aclu-in.org

Sean C. Lemieux
Lemieux Law
sean@lemieuxlawoffices.com



/s/ Karen Celestino-Horseman
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

PAMELA LEE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v.
BRIAN ABBOTT, in his official capacity as
member of the Board of Trustees of the
Indiana Public Retirement System, et al.,

Defendants.
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)
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)
)



Case No. 1:14-cv-00406-RLY-MJ D



EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), Defendants Brian Abbott, Chris
Atkins, Ken Cochran, Steve Daniels, J odi Golden, Michael Pinkham, Kyle Rosebrough, Bret
Swanson, and Steve Russo respectfully move this Court to stay the enforcement of its Entry on
Cross-Motions for Summary J udgment [hereinafter “MSJ Entry”], Final J udgment, and all
related injunctions entered on J une 25, 2014, pending appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Defendants-Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal from the
Court’s final judgment as well as their Docketing Statement on J une 25, 2014. That same day,
they filed Notices of Appeal, Docketing Statements, and Emergency Motions for Stay in two
related cases, Baskin v. Bogan, No. 1:14-cv-355-RLY-TAB, and Fujii v. Commissioner, Indiana
State Dep’t of Health, No. 1:14-cv-404-RLY-TAB. Defendants did not seek a stay in this case at
that time because they hoped to gather evidence demonstrating the precise amount of exposure to
the Indiana Public Retirement System in the absence of a stay. As it has proved infeasible to
gather such evidence quickly, Defendants now respectfully move the Court to stay enforcement
of its MSJ Entry and Final J udgment. Defendants are particularly concerned that the granting of
a stay in Baskin and Fujii without a stay in this case—particularly with respect to declaratory
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relief—will cause even more uncertainty and confusion in the administration of Indiana’s
marriage laws.
Until the United States Supreme Court determines that traditional marriage laws such as
Indiana’s are unconstitutional, it is premature to require Indiana to change its definition of
marriage and abide by this Court’s conception of marriage, including with respect to pension
benefit claims, which may include large sums for individuals and potentially vast sums in the
aggregate for the Indiana Public Retirement System. If ultimately any benefits paid pursuant to
the Court’s order are deemed improper because Indiana’s traditional marriage definition is
upheld on appeal, Defendants and Plaintiffs alike will be in the uncertain (and potentially
financially catastrophic) position of having to make the Pension Fund whole. The Court should
avoid that bleak and uncertain scenario by staying its injunction pending appeal.
STANDARD FOR GRANTING A STAY
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) provides that “[w]hile an appeal is pending from an
interlocutory order or final judgment that grants . . . an injunction, the court may suspend [that]
injunction . . . .” The purpose of a stay is to “maintain the status quo pending appeal, thereby
preserving the ability of the reviewing court to offer a remedy and holding at bay the reliance
interests in the judgment that otherwise militate against reversal[.]” In re CGI Indus., Inc., 27
F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1994). If a stay is not granted and action is taken in reliance on the
judgment, “the positions of the interested parties have changed, and even if it may yet be
possible to undo the transaction, the court is faced with the unwelcome prospect of
‘unscrambl[ing] an egg.’” Id. (citation omitted).
In considering whether to issue a stay, the Court must “consider the relative hardships to
the parties of the relief sought, in light of the probable outcome of the appeal,” and “should grant
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the stay” if the party seeking it “both has a good chance of winning the appeal and would be hurt
more by the injunction than the [opposing party] would be hurt by a stay of the injunction
pending appeal.” Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 733 F.2d 484, 486
(7th Cir. 1984).
The nature of the showing required to justify a stay pending appeal varies with the facts
of each case. The “[p]robability of success is inversely proportional to the degree of irreparable
injury evidenced. A stay may be granted with either a high probability of success and some
injury, or vice versa.” Cuomo v. NRC, 772 F.2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also FTC v.
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (granting stay of
injunction against federal do-not-call law and holding that if the moving party can establish “that
the three ‘harm’ factors tip decidedly in its favor, the ‘probability of success’ requirement is
somewhat relaxed”).
With respect to success on the merits, the Supreme Court has held that there must be a
“strong showing” of likely success, not necessarily a definitive “likelihood of success” as in the
preliminary injunction context. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). Indeed, “the
movant need only present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is
involved and show that the balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay.”
Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21, 23 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
ARGUMENT
I. The Injunction Issued by This Court Should, Like All Other Contested Same-Sex
Marriage Injunctions to Date, Be Stayed

To date, in light of Supreme Court guidance on the issue, in no case does a fully
contested final permanent injunctive decree precluding enforcement of traditional marriage
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definitions remain in effect. The thrust of these cases is difficult to miss: The traditional
definition of marriage has been around a long time. Its validity is hotly contested, but the
outcome of these legal disputes is uncertain, such that the status quo should remain until the
Supreme Court squarely addresses the issue.
On J anuary 6, 2014, the Supreme Court stayed a permanent injunction issued by the
United States District Court for the District of Utah in Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181
(D. Utah 2013), pending final disposition of an appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Herbert v. Kitchen,
134 S. Ct. 893 (J an. 6, 2014). In that case, three same-sex couples challenged Utah’s
constitutional amendment and statutes upholding the traditional definition of marriage. Kitchen,
961 F. Supp. 2d at 1187. The district court entered a permanent injunction that required officials
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and to recognize same-sex marriages validly
performed in other States. Id. at 1215. Although the Tenth Circuit upheld the permanent
injunction, it has, “[i]n consideration of the Supreme Court’s decision to stay the district court’s
injunction pending the appeal[,] conclude[d] it is appropriate to STAY our mandate pending the
disposition of any subsequently filed petition for writ of certiorari.” Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-
4178, slip op. at 64-65 (10th Cir. J une 25, 2014).
Federal courts across the country have fallen into line by staying injunctions involving
traditional marriage definitions, both with respect to licensure of same-sex marriages within a
State and recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions. Wolf v. Walker,
No. 14-cv-64-bbc, 2014 WL 2693963, at *6 (W.D. Wis. J une 13, 2014) (“[S]ince [Kitchen],
every statewide order enjoining the enforcement of a ban on same-sex marriage has been stayed,
either by the district court or the court of appeals, at least when the state requested a stay.”); see,
e.g., Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014)
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(licensure); Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13-cv-395, 2014 WL 561978, at *23 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13,
2014) (licensure and recognition); De Leon v. Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982-OLG, 2014 WL
715741, at * 28 (W.D. Texas Feb. 26, 2014) (licensure and recognition); Bourke v. Beshear, No.
3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at * 14 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 19, 2014) (recognition); DeBoer v.
Snyder, No. 14-1341, Doc. 22-1 at 3 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (licensure).
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a stay of its injunction in
Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-cv-01159, 2014 WL 1117069, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014), that
barred defendants from “enforcing” Tennessee’s anti-recognition statute and constitutional
amendment against the six named plaintiffs in that case. Order, Tanco v. Haslam, No. 14-5297,
Docket No. 29, at 2 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2014) (per curiam). The court found persuasive the district
court’s grant of stay of its own injunction in Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL
1512541, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 16, 2014), explaining that “[r]ecognition of same-sex marriages
is a hotly contested issue in the contemporary legal landscape, and, if [the state’s] appeal is
ultimately successful, the absence of a stay as to [the district court’s] ruling of facial
unconstitutionality is likely to lead to confusion, potential inequity, and high costs.” Tanco,
Order at 2. The court ruled that, “[b]ecause the law in this area is so unsettled, in our judgment
the public interest and the interests of the parties would be best served by this Court imposing a
stay on the district court’s order until this case is reviewed on appeal.” Id.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit granted a temporary stay in Latta v. Otter, where the district
court denied an emergency motion for a stay, Order, Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13-cv-00482-CWD,
Docket No. 100, at 3 (D. Idaho May 14, 2014), while it fully considered an emergency motion
for stay. Order, Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35421, Docket No. 109, at 2 (10th Cir. May 15, 2014).
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The Supreme Court “sent a strong message” with its “unusual intervention” in Kitchen v.
Herbert that stayed a final, permanent injunction against enforcement of traditional marriage
definitions. Bourke, 2014 WL 556729, at *14. This Court should heed that message and stay
enforcement of its Final J udgment and all related injunctions pending appeal.
II. The Injury to Defendants, Public Policy, and Balance of Hardships Weigh in Favor
of a Stay

The MSJ Entry permanently enjoins “[t]he Board of Trustees of the Indiana Public
Retirement System and Steve Russo, the Executive Director of the Indiana Public Retirement
System, and their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and all those acting in
concert with them . . . to administer the Pension Fund pursuant to Indiana Code Chapters 5-10.5-
3, 5-10.5-4, and 5-10.5-6, so as to provide the same benefits for all married couples, regardless of
whether the couples are of the opposite sex or the same sex.” MSJ Entry at 35.
A. Absent a stay, Defendants will be required to implement broad changes in the
administration of the Pension Fund, which would later need to be undone if
Defendants prevail on appeal

Given that there is no final resolution of the same-sex marriage issue, the Court’s ruling
creates public uncertainty and a sense of chaos as to what Indiana law is now and what it
portends in the long term. This is true not only with respect to eligibility for marriage licenses
but also eligibility for marriage benefits down the road, including with respect to eligibility for
public retirement benefits. If the Pension Fund must pay death benefits to their members’ same-
sex spouses as a result of this ruling, confusion will ensue if the ruling is ultimately overturned
on appeal. Indeed, if it is later held that Indiana’s traditional marriage definition is constitutional
and, thus, benefit payments were improperly made, it is unclear whether and how the Pension
Fund could recoup these payments. In that event, either the beneficiaries or the Pension Fund
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would stand to suffer unnecessary losses, to the detriment of untold others not party to this
lawsuit.
More generally, the Court’s J une 25 ruling places a burden on Defendants to re-calibrate
their methods for calculating benefits and to implement new agency-wide policies and
procedures. For example, the Pension Fund will have to change its forms and applications to
account for their members’ same-sex spouses. Because these forms—and the Fund’s records
generally—are maintained electronically, the Fund will have to input data manually until it is
able to upgrade its computer software. It is premature to require the Pension Fund to implement
such broad changes in order to comply with a ruling that could be overturned in a matter of
months.
B. The Court’s ruling creates confusion over the meaning of marriage in Indiana
more generally

The Court’s final judgment and injunctions threaten irreparable harm to Defendants
because it proposes to alter the meaning of marriage in Indiana, but potentially only temporarily,
and creates confusion over the meaning of marriage in Indiana. County clerks, even those not
directly subject to this Court’s injunction, have already begun to issue marriage licenses. Marion
County Clerk’s Office, http://www.indy.gov/eGov/County/Clerk/Pages/home.aspx (last visited
J un. 25, 2014) (An alert on the main page reads, “The Marion County Clerk’s Office is issuing
same-sex marriage licenses.”); see also J ill Disis & Cara Anthony, Weddings Begin as Judge
Throws Out Indiana’s Same-Sex Marriage Ban, IndyStar, J une 25, 2014,
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2014/06/25/judge-throws-indiana-ban-sex-
marriage/11354083/.
Other non-defendant clerks have decided not to immediately issue licenses, though these
decisions are fluctuating rapidly. See Same-Sex Marriage in Indiana: Is Your County Allowing
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It?, TheIndyChannel, J une 26, 2014, http://www.theindychannel.com/news/local-news/how-are-
indiana-clerks-handling-same-sex-marriage (Adams, Benton, Clay, Clinton, Daviess, Decatur,
Grant, Lawrence, Newton, Steuben, Switzerland, Union, and Warren Counties not issuing
licenses as of Thursday evening). Numerous other sources report on the confusion from this
Court’s ruling. See, e.g., Federal Judge Rules Indiana’s Ban on Gay Marriage Unconstitutional,
Fox 59 (J un. 25, 2014), http://fox59.com/2014/06/25/federal-judge-rules-indianas-ban-on-gay-
marriage-unconstitutional/#axzz35fsXGU3s.
This type of confusion is not unique to Indiana. Wisconsin experienced similar
uncertainty after J udge Crabb of the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin struck
down Wisconsin’s constitutional provision defining marriage as between one man and one
woman. See Ashley Luthern & Megan Trimble, State Divided on Issuing Licenses: Some County
Clerks Await Word on Legality, Milwaukee J ournal Sentinel, J une 10, 2014,
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/counties-split-on-whether-to-issue-marriage-licenses-
to-gay-couples-b99287392z1-262397131.html; Erik Eckholm, Legal Confusion Follows Federal
Judge’s Ruling on Same-Sex Marriage, New York Times, J une 11, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/us/legal-confusion-follows-federal-judges-ruling-on-same-
sex-marriage-in-wisconsin.html?_r=0. J udge Crabb ultimately stayed her ruling, pending
appeal. Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-CV-64-BBC, 2014 WL 2693963 (W.D. Wis. J une 13, 2014). 
The public interest in the continuity of Indiana’s marriage laws—i.e., the interest in
avoiding the potential for public confusion over a series of judicial injunctions that keep re-
setting a state’s authority to define marriage—favors a stay. Widespread attention to this case
raises the risk exponentially that permanent injunctive relief without full appellate review will
disrupt public understanding of the meaning and purpose of marriage in Indiana, raise
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expectations that any number of Indiana laws pertaining to marriage are suddenly suspended or
modified, and generally create unnecessary confusion among the public. This would be
especially damaging with respect to any public acts that cannot be undone.
Without a stay, in the absence of a final appellate determination of their rights, any
“recognition” of same-sex marriage would come under a cloud of doubt. Plaintiffs have
discussed at length their desire for societal recognition and acceptance. See, e.g., Pls.’ Prelim.
Inj. Mem. at 25 [Doc. 36]; Pls.’ Summ. J . Mem. at 1, 4, 8, 18-19 [Doc. 39]. Yet the final
judgment and related injunctions cannot ensure those aims, and it will unavoidably leave a bitter
taste because it cannot conclusively resolve the legality of same-sex marriages. The best course
of action would be to allow for full and fair appellate review before building up the expectations
of these Plaintiffs or any other same-sex couples interested in recognition of their out-of-state
marriages.
III. Defendants Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 180 (1972), was a ruling on the merits that upheld Minnesota’s
traditional definition of marriage. Baker was not overruled by United States v. Windsor, 133
S.Ct. 2675 (2013), or any other Supreme Court case and therefore precludes these challenges.
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has issued a
decision stating that the constitutional right to marry encompasses forcing States to recognize
out-of-state same-sex marriages. Furthermore, other federal courts that have considered the issue
have concluded that traditional marriage laws limiting marriage to the legal union of a man and
woman do not violate the Constitution. See Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D.
Hawaii 2012); Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012); Citizens for Equal
Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
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The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), did
not undermine the legal underpinnings of these decisions. The Court struck down Section 3 of
DOMA, which had “the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity[,]” as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment principally because it was an “unusual deviation from the tradition of recognizing
and accepting state definitions of marriage . . . .” Id. at 2693, 2696 (emphases added). It was
critical to the Court’s analysis that New York had previously granted marital interests that
federal DOMA then threatened. Id. at 2689.
While the Constitution plainly gives its blessing to New York to recognize out-of-
jurisdiction same-sex marriages, id. at 2692 (explaining that New York’s “actions were without
doubt a proper exercise of its sovereign authority within our federal system, [which] allow[s] the
formation of consensus respecting the way the members of a discrete community treat each other
in their daily contact and constant interaction with each other”), it is a considerable leap from
this to the conclusion that Windsor established a singular vision of a fundamental right to
marriage that must be respected by all States. Traditional state marriage definitions are, as
Windsor amply affirms, the “usual” course of business. Id. at 2691. In no uncertain terms, the
majority forcefully states that “[t]his opinion and its holding are confined to [New York’s] lawful
marriages.” Id. at 2696. It is therefore improper to extrapolate from “this opinion” any rule that
affects any other state’s marriage laws.
Furthermore, there is no constitutional right to have one’s out-of-state same-sex marriage
or civil union recognized in Indiana. See Defs.’ Combined Mem. at 24-32 [Doc. 56]. There is
no federal due process right to have a license issued in one State—whether for professional,
weapons, driving, or marriage purposes—treated as valid by government and courts in another.
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See Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171, 1176 (4th Cir. 1974) (“[L]icenses to practice law granted
by . . . one state, have no extraterritorial effect or value and can vest no right in the holder to
practice law in another state.”). Marriage-recognition principles are rooted in the common law
of comity. The common law choice-of-law starting point is usually the lex loci rule, which says
a marriage valid in the State of licensure is valid in other States as well. But that is not, and
never has been, the end of the matter. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(2)
(1971) states that even if a marriage “satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage
was contracted,” that marriage will not “be recognized as valid” if “it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of the marriage.” This “public policy” exception comports with the
“Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices,” and indeed dates back before the Fourteenth
Amendment. See J oseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws § 113a, at 168 (Little
Brown, & Co. 6th ed. 1865). See Defs.’ Combined Mem. at 27 (listing examples). In the only
Indiana Supreme Court decision that Defendants are aware of that addresses an out-of-
jurisdiction marriage that could not have been entered into in Indiana, the Court refused to
recognize the marriage on public policy grounds. Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 41 N.E.2d 801, 802-
03 (Ind. 1942) (treating as void a marriage between uncle and niece).
Finally, Indiana’s traditional marriage definition does not violate equal protection. The
proper level of scrutiny here is rational basis, see Defs.’ Combined Mem. at 35-48, and to the
extent out-of-state opposite-sex marriages are generally treated as valid under Indiana law but
same-sex marriages are not, that differential treatment is fully justifiable. For Indiana, marriage
is about encouraging responsible procreation so as to ameliorate the consequences of unplanned
pregnancies. See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Defs.’ Combined
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Mem. at 50-55. For States recognizing same-sex marriages, the purpose of marriage is obviously
something else—something that cannot be reconciled with Indiana’s marriage philosophy.
Notably, the same is not true with respect to other variations in state marriage laws, which may
reflect marginal differences about the proper age of majority or the proper distance of
consanguinity, but which do not call into question the fundamental purpose of the entire
enterprise. Indiana has a legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of its fundamental
rationale for civil marriage rather than letting it be redefined by other States.
Fundamentally, the constitutional validity of Indiana’s decision not to recognize out-of-
state same-sex marriages turns on the constitutional validity of its traditional marriage definition.
Because Indiana can constitutionally adhere to that definition and thereby refuse to provide for
same-sex marriages, Defs.’ Combined Mem. at 32-60, it can also refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages from other States.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court stay
enforcement of its Final J udgment and all related injunctions pending disposition of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Attorney General of Indiana
s/ Thomas M. Fisher
Thomas M. Fisher
Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
IGC South, Fifth Floor
302 W. Washington Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Tel: (317) 232-6255
Fax: (317) 232-7979
Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov
Counsel for Defendants
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13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on J une 27, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which sent notification of such filing to the following:
William R. Groth
FILLENWARTH DENNERLINE GROTH &
TOWE, LLP
wgroth@fdgtlaborlaw.com

Mark W. Sniderman
SNIDERMAN NGUYEN, LLP
mark@snlawyers.com


Karen Celestino-Horseman
AUSTIN & J ONES, P.C.
Karen@kchorseman.com

Kathleen M. Sweeney
SWEENEY LAW GROUP, LLC
ksween@gmail.com

s/ Thomas M. Fisher
Thomas M. Fisher
Solicitor General


Office of the Attorney General
Indiana Government Center South 5th Floor
302 W. Washington St.
Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770
Phone: (317) 232-6255
Fax: (317) 232-7979
Email: Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov


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Indiana Public Retirement System
Police and Firefighters Member Handbook:
Survivor Benefits
Lump Sum Death Benefit
Your heirs or estate are entitled to receive a one-time death benefit of
$12,000 upon your death.
Survivors of Active Members (Non-Line of Duty)
If you die as either an active member of the 1977 Fund, or after leaving
employment with at least twenty (20) years of creditable service but are
not yet retired and receiving benefits, the following survivor benefits will
be paid:
Your surviving spouse is entitled to a monthly benefit equal to sixty
percent (60%) of your monthly retirement benefit payable for the
spouse’s lifetime. Your retirement benefit will be calculated as
though you were receiving retirement benefits at age fifty-two (52)
with twenty (20) years of service. If you have more than twenty
(20) years of service, your benefit will be increased by one percent
(1%) for each six months of additional service. Your spouse may
remarry without the risk of losing the benefit.
Each of your surviving children are entitled to a monthly benefit
equal to twenty percent (20%) of your monthly retirement benefit
until the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or until the age of
twenty-three (23) if the child is enrolled in and regularly attending a
secondary school or is a full-time student at an accredited college or
university. Your retirement benefit will be calculated as though you
were receiving retirement benefits at age fifty-two (52) with twenty
(20) years of service. If you have more than twenty (20) years of
service, your benefit will be increased by one percent (1%) for each
six months of additional service.
Benefits are paid to eligible disabled children for the duration of
their physical or mental disability (regardless of age), if the child is
not a ward of the state. An eligible disabled child is entitled to
receive an amount each month that is equal to the greater of thirty
percent (30%) of the monthly pay of a first-class police officer or
first-class firefighter or fifty-five percent (55%) of the monthly
benefit the deceased member was receiving or was entitled to
INPRS: Police and Firefighters Member Handbook: Survivor Benefits http://www.in.gov/inprs/77fundmbrhandbooksurvivorbenefits.htm
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receive on the date of the member's death as long as the mental or
physical incapacity of the child continues.
If you have no surviving eligible child or spouse, upon submission of
satisfactory proof that your parent or parents were wholly
dependent on you, your surviving parent or parents, if qualified, are
entitled jointly to receive fifty percent (50%) of your monthly
benefit during their lifetime. Your retirement benefit will be
calculated as though you were receiving retirement benefits at age
fifty-two (52) with twenty (20) years of service. If you have more
than twenty (20) years of service, your benefit will be increased by
one percent (1%) for each six (6) months of additional service.
If you die other than in the line of duty and you had less than
twenty (20) years of service, your contributions plus interest will be
paid to your designated beneficiary. If you have no designated
beneficiary, your contributions plus interest will be paid to your
estate.
Survivor Benefits Chart

Non-Line of
Duty (Active
Member) or
Vested Inactive
Retiree
Line of Duty as
Determined by the
INPRS Board (Active
Member)
Lump Sum
Death
Benefit
$12,000 to heirs
or estate
$12,000 to
heirs or
estate
$150,000 to surviving
spouse, children, or
dependent parent(s) +
$12,000 to heirs or
estate
Surviving
Spouse
60 percent of
eligible benefit
payable for life
60 percent
of member’s
benefit
payable for
life
100 percent of eligible
benefit payable for life
Each
Surviving
Child*
20 percent of
eligible
benefit,payable to
age 18 or 23 if
full-time student
20 percent
of member’s
benefit
payable to
age 18 or 23
if full-time
student
20 percent of eligible
payable to age 18 or 23
if full-time student
INPRS: Police and Firefighters Member Handbook: Survivor Benefits http://www.in.gov/inprs/77fundmbrhandbooksurvivorbenefits.htm
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Wholly
Dependent
Parent(s) if
no surviving
spouse or
child
50 percent of
eligible benefit
payable for life
50 percent
of member’s
benefit
payable for
life
50 percent of eligible
benefit payable for life.
If both parents are
eligible, they share the
benefit equally.
*Benefits are paid to eligible disabled children for the duration of their
physical or mental disability (regardless of age), if the child is not a ward
of the state. An eligible disabled child is entitled to receive an amount
each month that is equal to the greater of thirty percent (30%) of the
monthly pay of a first-class police officer or first-class firefighter or
fifty-five percent (55%) of the monthly benefit the deceased member
was receiving or was entitled to receive on the date of the member's
death as long as the mental or physical incapacity of the child continues.
Survivors of Retirees
If you die while receiving retirement or disability benefits:
Your surviving spouse is entitled to a monthly benefit equal to sixty
percent (60%) of your monthly retirement or disability benefit
payable for the spouse’s lifetime. Your spouse may remarry without
the risk of losing the benefit, and
Each of your surviving children are entitled to a monthly benefit
equal to twenty percent (20%) of your monthly retirement or
disability benefit until the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or
until the age of twenty-three (23) if the child is enrolled in and
regularly attending a secondary school or is a full-time student at an
accredited college or university.
Benefits are paid to eligible disabled children for the duration of
their physical or mental disability (regardless of age), if the child is
not a ward of the state. An eligible disabled child is entitled to
receive an amount each month that is equal to the greater of thirty
percent (30%) of the monthly pay of a first-class police officer or
first-class firefighter or fifty-five percent (55%) of the monthly
benefit the deceased member was receiving or was entitled to
receive on the date of the member's death as long as the mental or
physical incapacity of the child continues.
If you have no surviving eligible child or spouse, upon submission of
proof that your parent(s) was a dependent on the federal income
tax return filed by you in the year prior to the year of your death,
your surviving parent or parents are entitled jointly to receive fifty
INPRS: Police and Firefighters Member Handbook: Survivor Benefits http://www.in.gov/inprs/77fundmbrhandbooksurvivorbenefits.htm
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percent (50%) of your monthly benefit during their lifetime.
Beneficiaries
You may designate one or more of your beneficiaries to receive, in a
lump sum, your contributions plus interest at a rate determined by
INPRS. If you die:
without receiving a retirement benefit;
without receiving a disability benefit;
without a survivor entitled to receive a benefit; and
without INPRS returning your contributions;
your contributions plus interest at a rate determined by INPRS are
payable to your designated beneficiary. If you do not designate a
beneficiary and you have no survivors entitled to receive a 1977 Fund
benefit, your contributions plus interest at a rate determined by INPRS,
will be paid to your estate.
Line of Duty Benefits
Death Benefit
If you die in the line of duty (as determined by the INPRS board or its
designee), a special one-time death benefit of $150,000 will be paid to
your surviving spouse, or surviving children if there is no spouse. If you
have no surviving spouse or child, the special death benefit is payable to
your parent or parents in equal shares.
Survivors of Members who Die in the Line of Duty
If you die in the line of duty while an active member of the 1977 Fund,
the following survivor monthly benefits will be paid.
Your surviving spouse is entitled to a monthly benefit equal to one
hundred percent (100%) of your monthly retirement benefit
payable for the spouse’s lifetime. Your retirement benefit will be
calculated as though you were receiving retirement benefits at age
fifty-two (52) with twenty (20) years of service. If you have more
than twenty (20) years of service, your benefit will be increased by
one percent (1%) for each six (6) months of additional service. Your
spouse may remarry without the risk of losing the benefit.
Each of your surviving children are entitled to a monthly benefit
INPRS: Police and Firefighters Member Handbook: Survivor Benefits http://www.in.gov/inprs/77fundmbrhandbooksurvivorbenefits.htm
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equal to twenty percent (20%) of your monthly retirement or
disability benefit until the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or
until the age of twenty-three (23) if the child is enrolled in and
regularly attending a secondary school or is a full-time student at an
accredited college or university. Your retirement benefit will be
calculated as though you were receiving retirement benefits at age
fifty-two (52) with twenty (20) years of service. If you have more
than twenty (20) years of service, your benefit will be increased by
one percent (1%) percent for each six (6) months of additional
service.
Benefits are paid to eligible disabled children for the duration of
their physical or mental disability (regardless of age), if the child is
not a ward of the state. An eligible disabled child is entitled to
receive an amount each month that is equal to the greater of thirty
percent (30%) of the monthly pay of a first-class police officer or
first-class firefighter or fifty-five percent (55%) of the monthly
benefit the deceased member was receiving or was entitled to
receive on the date of the member's death as long as the mental or
physical incapacity of the child continues.
If you have no surviving eligible child or spouse, upon submission of
satisfactory proof that your parent or parents were wholly
dependent on you, your surviving parent or parents, if qualified, are
entitled jointly to receive fifty percent (50%) of your monthly
benefit during their lifetime. Your retirement benefit will be
calculated as though you were receiving retirement benefits at age
fifty-two (52) with twenty (20) years of service. If you have more
than twenty (20) years of service, your benefit will be increased by
one percent (1%) for each six (6) months of additional service.
Section Five: Benefit Application Checklist
INPRS: Police and Firefighters Member Handbook: Survivor Benefits http://www.in.gov/inprs/77fundmbrhandbooksurvivorbenefits.htm
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