You are on page 1of 53

1

TREASON
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court,
acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and
based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving
the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there
was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and
temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the
obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and
that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the
qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he
remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in
the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign.
(Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster
Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web.
Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of
a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or
sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty
vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which
governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be
distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be
destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended
because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it
out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-
called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of
the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory
occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the
subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory
occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the
former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one
of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th
Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in
articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of
the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists
during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such
thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of
the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was
suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United
States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our
decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the
question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de
factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied
territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently
in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy
2

territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first
case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the
legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government
thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or
doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become
obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore
it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance,"
repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the
relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may,
at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner
owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in
return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do
away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing
in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a
citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and
convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an
inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may
commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he
adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that
if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is
nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he
receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign
country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship
thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and
commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the
other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to
obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not
receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his
own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the
rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied
by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power
to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague
Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties
and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance
during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to
the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to
the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national
security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence
with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against
public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of
firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to,
and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the
legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as
against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter
(Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against
public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable
as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted
by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter
was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied
territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to
treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still
bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or
continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those
laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of
the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and
may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones
when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is,
when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country
and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations
imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized
nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land
Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant
dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the
territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate
government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though
continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier,
shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said
inhabitants;
3

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation
of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or
sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive
attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid
and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding
consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason,
essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to
their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and
comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by
the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the
inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their
allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an
inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military
occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort,
the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit
thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance
would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states,
and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public
conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the
Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own
government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for
treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military
operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue
and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own
independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of
invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party
in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and
independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty;
in other words, to commit a political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the
Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though
originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized
by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through
their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United
States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines
established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the
sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of
the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof,
which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in
such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign
government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed
in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our
Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or
Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above
quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the
declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the
Executive Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt
in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on
August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as
having now the status as a government of other independent nations in
fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional
Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the
Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case
of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the
question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and
subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
which provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe
allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the
sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these
limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the
same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own
sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the
latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the
Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason
may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the
sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the
4

Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government
from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those
charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth,
because it is an offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The
government established by this constitution shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be
known as the Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended
opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the
reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion,
without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices
Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto
concurs in a separate opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
December 22, 1923
G.R. No. L-21049
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.
Mario Guaria for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa Real for appellee.

Malcolm, J .:

Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a
citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in
the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the
administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a
number of times: The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Woods
head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our
independence. Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation
of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the
Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the
case to this court. The question presented for decision is, What crime, if any, did the
accused commit?

A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It reads in
translation as follows:
That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippine Islands, the said accused, Isaac Perez, while holding a discussion with
several persons on political matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with
knowledge that Honorable Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his functions as such authority, insult by
word, without his presence, said Governor-General, uttering in a loud voice and in
the presence of many persons, and in a public place, the following phrases: Asin an
manga filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an
payo ni Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot con Filipinas, which in
English, is as follows: And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
Woods head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.
Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code.

At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and
three witnesses on behalf of the defense. According to the first witness for the
Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal president of Pilar, what Perez said on the
occasion in question was this:

The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-
General Wood, because he has recommended a bad administration in these Islands
and has not made a good recommendation; on the contrary, he has assassinated the
independence of the Philippines and for this reason, we have not obtained
independence and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off. Higinio J.
Angustia, justice of the peace of Pilar, in a written statement, and Gregorio
Cresencio, another witness for the prosecution, corroborated the testimony of the
first witness. Cresencio understood that Perez invited the Filipinos including himself
to get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and throw it into
the sea.

The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the
morning of April 1, 1922, in which the accused participated. But they endeavored to
explain that the discussion was between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter
maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued that
the Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified that the discussion was
held in a peaceful manner, and that what he wished to say was that the Governor-
General should be removed and substituted by another. On the witness stand, he
5

stated that his words were the following: We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party
which is in power but do not take into account that above the representatives there is
Governor-General Wood who controls everything, and I told him that the day on
which the Democrats may kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos will
install the government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay
taxes.

The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the language stated
in the beginning of this decision and set out in the information. The question of fact
thus settled, the question of law recurs as to the crime of which the accused should
be convicted.

It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256 of the Penal
Code as having been infringed and the trial judge so found in his decision. The first
error assigned by counsel for the appellant is addressed to this conclusion of the
lower court and is to the effect that article 256 of the Penal Code is no longer in
force.

In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 1), the accused was
charged with having uttered the following language: To hell with the President of
the United States and his proclamation! Mr. Helbig was prosecuted under article
256, and though the case was eventually sent back to the court of origin for a new
trial, the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of law that article 256 is
still in force.

In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was charged
with having published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members
in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. In this court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted
by unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding that article 256 was
abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the
Philippines, and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of
repealing so much of article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult,
and that under the information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the libel Law. In the course of the
main opinion in the Perfecto case, is found this significant sentence: Act No. 292 of
the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected
article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain a
contrary opinion must bow with as good grace as we can muster, that until otherwise
decided by higher authority, so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as does not
relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under the Libel Law, exist and
must be enforced. To which proposition, can properly be appended a corollary,
namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels, constitute a violation of Act No. 292,
the Treason and Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Penal Code and the Libel
Law are modified.

Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article 256
of the Penal Code, it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instance is not this
article but rather a portion of the Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as will
later appear, we think that the words of the accused did not so much tend to defame,
abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise a disturbance in the
community.

In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily
against individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the
Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created and defined in Act
No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising
of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority.
Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least
such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and
open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouviers
Law Dictionary, 974; U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; People vs. Cabrera [1922],
43 Phil., 64.)

It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be
interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism,
no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within
the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when
the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of
freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of
the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (III Whartons Criminal
Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto,
supra.)

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine
Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high
offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, of affording immunity from
promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance,
6

the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily
produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.

The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the
United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States,
and holds in his office at the pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests
supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be exercised in accordance
with law. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in
the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-
General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American
sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2
Phil., 332.)

Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No.
1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a
situation. This section reads as follows:

Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish
or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against
the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or
make any statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any
lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to
instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or
incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or
order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from
the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both,
in the discretion of the court.

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement
and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and
incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which
tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement
and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or
order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the
action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as
amended.
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act
No. 292 as amended, is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the offense with
which the defendant is charged. The designation of the crime by the fiscal is not
conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands charged is that described by the
facts stated in the information. In accordance with our settled rule, an accused may
be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that designated in the
information, if such graver offense is included or described in the body of the
information, and is afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial.
(Guevarras Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joyas Code of Criminal
Procedure, p. 9.)

The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the
Treason and Sedition Law, and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.
That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be possible. Our
course is justified when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief Justice Taft of the
United States Supreme Court, in speaking of an outrageous libel on the Governor of
the Porto Rico, observed: A reading of the two articles removes the slightest doubt
that they go far beyond the exuberant expressions of meridional speech, to use the
expression of this court in a similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U.S. , 452,
456). Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous in their character that they suggest
the query whether their superlative vilification has not overleapt itself and become
unconsciously humorous. (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], 258 U.S., 298.) While our
own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain the conviction
that the courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection. The
fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt
with firmly before it endangers the general public peace.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to
convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the
modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being understood that, in
accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the defendant and appellant shall
suffer 2 months and 1 days imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered.

7

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (aliasEDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C.
Borromeo for appellee.
TUASON, J .:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After
pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained
the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence
only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have
sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as
well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of
P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any
single detail. Juanito Albano, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the
accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American
aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a
carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner
if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai
headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier. Valentin
Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused
following an American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness stated
that the American was walking as well as his captors. And there was no sled, he said,
nor did he see Juanito Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a drink of
tuba together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to
corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it.
(People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating
circumstances mentioned above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders
and physical injuries charged in the information, not only as crimes distinct from
treason but also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the
decision except as to technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense
committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a member of the Japanese Military
Police and acting as undercover man for the Japanese forces with the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead,
guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers
to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and
locating their hideouts; that said accused and his companions did
apprehended Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind him and give him fist
blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the accused and his
Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely tortured
by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and from there he
was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for
7 days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the
Japanese Military Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the, and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a group of Filipino
undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla
suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did in fact apprehend
Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce from their house; that said accused
8

and his companions did tie the hands of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario
Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the face and in other
parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai
Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following day while
his brother was detained and thereafter nothing more was heard of him nor
his whereabouts known;
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with
the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said
accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol
of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality
of Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla
suspects, and said patrol did in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian
Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and
detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago
Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home and the accused did
bayonet them to death;
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the
enemy and other Filipinos undercovers, said accused did cause the torture
of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the
infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under
the Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution defining treason,
after which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy
and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by
some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity
may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes
identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment,
or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium
in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of
coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of
opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so
may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction
with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient
of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude the punishment of murder or
physical injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the culprit
specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them as an element of treason. it is
where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can
not be regarded separately under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out
may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other
atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less painful method of execution
will be taken into account to increase the penalty under the provision of article 14,
paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case, augmented the
sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal
objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of
plea of guilty. it is true that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but
count 4 has not be substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.
In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of
the trial court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite
of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial)
that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons."
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality
and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that
the accused was not denied the right to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.)
It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is
made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact
that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense
expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel
assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to
overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below did no
necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the
accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said
Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do
not discern in the record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct the
defense to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of
9

the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not cut
any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as
charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance, the penalty
to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be
modified in this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be
affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2189 November 3, 1906
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Aguedo Velarde and Pineda and Escueta, for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

CARSON, J .:
The appellants in this case was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of
the crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the
Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the Government of the
Philippine Islands, as defined and penalized in section 4 of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission.
The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, with
hard labor, and $3,000 fine, and Aniceto de Guzman and Tomas Puzon, and each of
them, to three years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and a fine of $2,000, and all and
each of the said appellants to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the trial
and to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay
their respective fines.
The evidence of record conclusively establishes that during the latter part of the year
1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos,
resident in the city of Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of
the United States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and establishing in its
stead a government to be known as the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina;
that one Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy and one
Artemio Ricarte as chief of the military forces to the organized in the Philippines in
the furtherance of the plans of the conspirators; that toward the end of December,
1903 the said Ricarte came to Manila from Hongkong in hidding on board the
steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival in the Philippines he held a number of
meetings in the city of Manila and the adjoining provinces whereat was perfected the
above-mentioned conspiracy hatched in Hongkong that at these meetings new
members were taken into the conspiracy and plans made for the enlistment of an
army of revolution and the raising of money by national and private loans to carry on
the campaign; that to this end bonds were issued and commissions as officers in the
revolutionary army were granted to a number of conspirators, empowering the
officers thus appointed to raise troops and take command thereof; and that the
conspirators did in fact take the field and offered armed resistance to the constituted
authorities in the Philippines, only failing in their design of overthrowing the
Government because of their failure to combat successfully with the officers of the
law who were sent against them and of the failure of the people to rise en masse in
response to their propaganda.
It further appears from the evidence that the appellant Francisco Bautista, a resident
of the city of Manila, was an intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote
and notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that, to aid him in his journey,
Bautista forwarded to him secretly 200 pesos; that after the arrival of Ricarte,
Bautista was present, taking part in several of the above-mentioned meetings whereat
the plans of the conspirators were discussed and perfected, and that at one of these
meetings Bautista, in answer to a question of Ricarte, assured him that the necessary
preparations had been made and that he "held the people in readiness."
It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon, united with the conspirators
through the agency of one Jose R. Muoz, who was proven to have been a prime
leader of the movement, in the intimate confidence of Ricarte, and by him authorized
to distribute bonds and nominate and appoint certain officials, including a brigadier-
general of the signal corps of the proposed revolutionary forces; that at the time
10

when the conspiracy was being brought to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held
several conferences with the said Muoz whereat plans were made for the coming
insurrection; that at one of these conferences Muoz offered Puzon a commission as
brigadier-general of the signal corps and undertook to do his part in organizing the
troops; and that at a later conference he assured the said Muoz that he had things in
readiness, meaning thereby that he had duly organized in accordance with the terms
of his commission.
Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united himself with the conspirators;
that he had accepted the appointment as brigadier-general of the signal corps of the
revolutionary forces with no intention of ever taking any further action in the matter,
and merely because he did not wish to vex his friend Muoz by refusing to do so,
and that when Muoz offered him the appointment as brigadier-general he did so in
"a joking tone," and that he, Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in Manila
organizing the conspiracy at that time.
These statements, however (except in so far as they corroborate the testimony of
Muoz as to the fact that he had several interviews with Puzon at which plans were
entered into for the advancement of the cause of the conspirators), can not be
accepted as true in the light of a written statement signed by Puzon himself at the
time when he was first arrested, part of which is as follows:
Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence, and occupation?
A. My name is Tomas Puzon; born in Binondo in the Province of Manila;
37 years of age; married; by profession a teacher of primary and secondary
schools, and residing in Calle Concepcion, No. 195, district of Quiapo.
Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? A. Personally I do not know him, but
by name, yes.1wphil.net
Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in these Islands and with
what object he came here? And if you know it to be true, through whom did
you get such information? A. In the first place I had notice of his coming
to the Islands as well as his object by reading the newspapers of Manila, and
secondly because J. R. Muoz told me the same on one occasion when I
was in his house to visit him.
Q. Did you acquire this information through any other person? A. No,
sir; I have no more information than that which I have mentioned.
Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by Ricarte? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. What is the employment (empleo) which you have in this organization,
and who is it who invited you to join it? A. J. R. Muoz, who is general
of division of this new organization, spoke to me with much instance,
asking me to accept employment as brigadier-general, chief of signal corps,
to which I, on account of his request and in view of the fact that the said
Muoz is a friend of mine from my youth, acceded; nevertheless I have
organized absolutely nothing in respect to this matter.
Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give you any commission
for it? A. Yes, sir; I accepted said employment and although they gave
me an order to organize in my brigade I did not do it, because I had neither
the confidence nor the will.
Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor the will to carry out
what was intrusted to you, why did you accept employment as general of
the brigade? A. I accepted it on account of friendship and not to vex a
friend, but I never have the intention of fulfilling the obligations.
Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not deny that he made this
statement, but he attempted to explain it away by saying that when he made it he was
so exited that he did not know just what he was saying. He does not allege that
improper means were taken to procure the confession, and it was proven at the trial
that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation,
threat, menace, or promise of reward or leniency. The accused appears to be an
intelligent man and was for eighteen years a school-teacher and later a telegraph
operator under the Spanish Government, and during the insurrection he held a
commission as an officer in the signal corps of the revolutionary army. His
confession is clear and intelligible and in no way supports his pretense that he was so
excited as not to know what he was saying when he made it, and its truth and
accuracy in so far it inculpates him is sustained by other evidence of record in this
case.
It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an officer of
the military forces of the conspiracy should not be considered as evidence against
him in the light of the decisions of this court in the cases of the United
States vs. Antonio de los Reyes
1
(2 Off. Gaz., 364), United States vs. Silverio Nuez
et al.
2
(3 Off. Gaz., 408), the United States vs. Eusebio de la Serna et al.
3
(3 Off.
11

Gaz., 528), and United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al.
4
(4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the
case at bar is to be distinguished from these and like cases by the fact that the record
clearly disclose that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the apppointment
in question and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance,
and that the charge in this case is that of conspiracy, and the fact that the accused
accepted the appointment is taken into consideration merely as evidence of his
criminal relations with the conspirators. In the first of these cases the United
States vs. De los Reyes the accused was charged with treason, and the court found
that the mere acceptance of a commission by the defendant, nothing else being done
either by himself or by his companions, was not an "overt act" of treason within the
meaning of the law, but the court further expressly held that
That state of affairs disclosed body of evidence, . . . the playing of the game
of government like children, the secretaries, colonels, and captains, the
pictures of flags and seals and commission, all on proper, for the purpose of
duping and misleading the ignorant and the visionary . . . should not be
dignified by the name of treason.
In the second case the United States vs. Nuez et al. -- wherein the accused were
charged with brigandage, the court held that, aside from the possession of
commissions in an insurgent band, there was no evidence to show that it they had
committed the crime and, "moreover, that it appeared that they had never united with
any party of brigands and never had been in any way connected with such parties
unless the physical possession of these appointments proved such relation," and that
it appeared that each one of the defendants "were separately approached at different
times by armed men while working in the field and were virtually compelled to
accept the commissions."
In the case of the United States vs. de la Serna et al. it was contended that de la Serna
had confessed that "he was one of the members of the pulajanes, with a commission
as colonel," but the court was of opinion that the evidence did not sustain a finding
that such confession had in fact been made, hence the doctrine laid down in that
decision, "that the mere possession of such an appointment, when it is not shown that
the possessor executed some external act by the virtue of the same, does not
constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of the defendant," applies only the case of
Enrique Camonas, against whom the only evidence of record was "the fact that a so-
called appointment of sergeant was found at his house."
In the case of the United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. there was testimony that
four appointments of officials in a revolutionary army were found in a trunk in the
house of one Valentin Colorado, and the court in said case reaffirmed the doctrine
that "the mere possession of the documents of this kind is not sufficient to convict,"
and held, furthermore, that there was "evidence in the case that at the time these
papers were received by the appellant, Valentin Colorado, he went to one of the
assistant councilmen of the barrio in which lived, a witness for the Government,
showed him the envelope, and stated to him he had received these papers; that he
didn't know what they were and requested this councilman to open them. The
coucilman did not wish to do that but took the envelope and sent it to the councilman
Jose Millora. We are satisfied that this envelope contained the appointments in
question and that the appellant did not act under the appointment but immediately
reported the receipt of them to the authorities."
It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might appoint a person in no wise
connected with them to some high office in the conspiracy, in the hope that such
person would afterwards accept the commission and thus unite himself with them,
and it is even possible that such an appointment might be forwarded in the mail or
otherwise, and thus come into the possession of the person thus nominated, and that
such appointment might be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding all this, the
person in whose possession the appointment was found might be entirely innocent of
all intention to join the conspiracy, never having authorized the conspirators to use
his name in this manner nor to send such a commission to him. Indeed, cases are not
unknown in the annals of criminal prosecutions wherein it has been proven that such
appointments have been concealed in the baggage or among the papers of the
accused persons, so that when later discovered by the officers of the law they might
be used as evidence against the accused. But where a genuine conspiracy is shown to
have existed as in this case, and it is proven that the accused voluntarily accepted an
appointment as an officer in that conspiracy, we think that this fact may properly be
taken into consideration as evidence of his relations with the conspirators.
Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision requiring the
testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court,
to support a conviction for the crime of treason should be applied in this case, but
this court has always held, in conformance with the decisions of the Federal courts of
the United States, that the crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate and
distinct offense from the crime of treason, and that this constitutional provision is not
applicable in such cases. (In re Bollman, 4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs. Mitchell, 2 Dall.,
348.)
The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of Aniceto de Guzman. The
finding of his guilt rest substantially upon his acceptance of a number of bonds from
12

one of the conspirators, such bonds having been prepared by the conspirators for the
purpose of raising funds for carrying out the plans of the conspiracy, but it does not
affirmatively appear that he knew anything of the existence of the conspiracy or that,
when he received the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the contents of the
bundle was, nor that ever, on any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to
these bonds. He, himself, states that when he opened the bundle and discovered the
nature of the contents he destroyed them with fire, and that he never had any
dealings with the conspirators in relation to the conspiracy or the object for which it
was organized.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and sentence before us, in so far as it
affects the said Aniceto de Guzman, should be reversed, with his proportionate share
of the costs of both instances de oficio, and that the said Anecito de Guzman should
be acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and set a liberty forthwith, and
that the judgment and sentence of the trial court, in so far as it applies to Francisco
Bautista and Tomas Puzon, should be, and is hereby, affirmed, except so far as it
imposes subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay their
respective fines, and, there being no authority in law of such provision, so much of
the sentence as undertakes to impose subsidiary imprisonment is hereby reversed.
After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, when the record will
be returned to the trial court for execution. So ordered.

13

ESPIONAGE
[ Commonwealth Act No. 616, June 04, 1941 ]

AN ACT TO PUNISH ESPIONAGE AND OTHER OFFENSES AGAINST
THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION 1. Unlawfully obtaining or permitting to be obtained information
affecting national defense. (a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information
respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information
to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the Philippines or of the United States, or
to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise
obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard,
naval station, submarine base, coaling station, fort, battery, torpedo, station,
dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone,
wireless, or signal station, building, office, or other place connected with the national
defense, owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the Philippines or
by the United States or under the control of the Philippines or of the United States, or
any of its officers or agents, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippines or
of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or
other materials or instruments for the use in time of war are being made, prepared,
repaired, or stored, under any contract or agreement with the Philippines or the
United States, or with any person on behalf of the Philippines or the United States, or
any prohibited place within the meaning of section six hereof; or

(b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe,
copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts, or induces or aids another to copy, take,
make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan,
map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected
with the national defense; or

(c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts or
induces or aids another to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source
what ever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph,
photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note
of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to
believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts or induces or aids
another to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made, or
disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this Act; or

(d) Whoever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or
being intrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch,
photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, instrument,
appliance, or note relating to the national defense, willfully communicates or
transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit the same to any person not entitled
to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the
officer or employee of the Philippines or of the United States entitled to receive it; or

(e) Whoever, being intrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any
document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, blue print, plan, map. model, note or information, relating to the national
defense, through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper
place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of this trust or to be lost, stolen,
abstracted, or destroyed, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten
years and may, in addition thereto, be fined not more than ten thousand pesos.

SEC. 2. Unlawful disclosing information affecting national defense. (a) Whoever,
with the intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the Philippines
or of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates,
delivers, or transmits, or attempts to, or aids or induces another to, communicate,
deliver, or transmit to any foreign government, or any faction or party or military or
naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the
Philippines or by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent,
employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document,
writing code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue
print, plan, map, model, instrument', appliance, or information relating to the national
defense, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years, if the
offense is committed in time of peace, or by death or imprisonment for not more than
thirty years, if it is in time of war.

(b) Whoever, in time of war with intent that the same shall be communicated to the
enemy, shall collect, record, publish, or communicate, or attempt to elicit any
information with respect to the movement, number, description, condition, or
disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the
Philippines or of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or
supposed plans or conduct of any military, naval, or air operations, or with respect to
14

any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the
fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public
defense which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by
imprisonment for not more than thirty years.

SEC. 3. Disloyal acts or works in time of peace. It shall be unlawful for any
person, with intent to interfere with, impair, or influence the loyalty, morale, or
discipline of the military, naval, or air forces of the Philippines or of the United
States: (a) to advise, counsel, urge, or in any manner cause insubordination,
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military, naval, or air
forces of the Philippines or of the United States; or (b) to distribute any written or
printed matter which advises, counsels, or urges insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny,
or refusal of duty by any member of the military, naval, or air forces of the
Philippines or of the United States. The violation of this section shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or by fine not more than ten thousand
pesos, or both.

SEC. 4. Disloyal acts or words in time of war. Whoever, when the Philippines or
the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false
statements with the intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military,
naval, or air forces of the Philippines or of the United States or to promote the
success of its enemies shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination,
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military, naval, or air forces of the
Philippines or the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or
enlistment service of the Philippines or of the United States, to the injury of the
service of the Philippines or of the United States, shall be punished by imprisonment
for not more than twenty years, or by a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos,
or both.

SEC. 5. Conspiracy to violate preceding sections. If two or more persons conspire
to violate the provisions of sections one, two, three, or four of this Act, and one or
more of such persons does not act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the
parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as in said sections provided in the case
of the doing of the act the accomplishment of which is the object of such conspiracy.

SEC. 6. Harboring or concealing violators of the law. Whoever harbors or
conceals any person who he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect,
has committed, or is about to commit, an offense under this Act, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not more than ten years and may, in addition thereto, be fined not
more than ten thousand pesos.

SEC. 7. Designation of prohibited places by proclamation. The President of the
Philippines in time of war or in case of national emergency may by proclamation
designate any place other than those set forth in subsection (a) of section one hereof
in which anything for the use of the army, navy, or air forces are being prepared or
constructed or stored as a prohibited place for the purpose of this Act: Provided, That
he shall determine that information with respect thereto would be prejudicial to the
national defense.

SEC. 8. Photographing, etc., defensive installations regulated; penalties.
Whenever, in the interests of national defense, the President of the Philippines shall
define certain vital military, naval, or air installations or equipment as requiring
protection against the general dissemination of information relative thereto, it shall
be unlawful to make any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical
representation of such vital military, naval, and air installations or equipment without
first obtaining permission of the commanding officer of the military, naval, or air
post, camp, or station concerned, or higher authority and promptly submitting the
product obtained to such commanding officer or higher authority for censorship or
such other action as he may deem necessary. Any person found guilty of a violation
of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a
fine of not more than two thousand pesos, or both.

SEC. 9. Photographing, etc., from aircraft. Any person who uses or permits or
procures the use of an aircraft for the purpose of making a photograph, sketch,
picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation of vital military naval or air
installations or equipment, in violation of section eight of this Act, shall be liable to
the penalty therein provided.

SEC. 10. Reproducing, publishing, selling, etc., un-censored copies. After the
President of the Philippines shall have defined any vital military, naval, or air
installation or equipment as being within the category contemplated under section
eight of this Act, it shall bs unlawful for any person to reproduce, publish, sell, or
give away any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map or graphical representation
of the vital military, naval, or air installations or equipment so defined, without first
obtaining permission of the commanding officer of the military, naval, or air post,
camp, or station concerned, or higher authority, unless such photograph, sketch,
picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation has clearly indicated thereon that
it has been censored by the proper military, naval, or air authority. Any person found
15

guilty of a violation of this section shall be punished as provided in section eight of
this Act.

SEC. 11. Destroying or injuring or attempting to injure or destroy war material in
time of war. When the Philippines or the United States is at war, whoever, with
intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the Philippines or the United States or any
associate nation in preparing for or carrying on the war, or whoever, with reason to
believe that his act may injure, interfere with, or obstruct the Philippines or the
United States or any associate nation in preparing for or carrying on the war, shall
willfully injure or destroy, or shall attempt to so injure or destroy, any war material,
war premises, or war utilities, as herein defined, shall be imprisoned not more than
thirty years or be fined not more than thirty thousand pesos, or both.

SEC. 12. Making or causing war material to be made in defective manner. When
the Philippines or the United States is at war, whoever, with intent to injure, interfere
with, or obstruct the Philippines or the United States or any associate nation in
preparing for or carrying on the war, or whoever, with reason to believe that his act
may injure, interfere with, or obstruct the Philippines or the United States or any
associate nation in preparing for or carrying on the war, shall willfully make or cause
to be made in a defective manner,, or attempt to make or cause to be made in a
defective manner, any war material, as herein defined, or any tool, implement,
machine, utensil, or receptacle used or employed in making, producing,
manufacturing or repairing any such war material as herein defined, shall be
imprisoned not more than thirty years or be fined not more than thirty thousand
pesos, or both.

SEC. 13. Injuring or destroying national defense material, premises, or utilities.
Whoever, with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of the
Philippines or the United States shall willfully injure or destroy, or shall attempt to
so injure or destroy, any national defense material, national defense premises, or
national defense utilities, as herein provided, shall be imprisoned not more than ten
years or be fined not more than ten thousand pesos, or both.

SEC. 14. Making or causing to be made in a defective manner, or attempting to
make or cause to be made in a defective manner, national defense material.
Whoever, with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of the
Philippines or of the United States, shall willfully make or cause to be made in a
defective manner, or attempt to make or cause to be made in a defective manner, any
national defense material, as herein defined, or any tool, implement, machine,
utensil, or receptable used or employed in making, producing, manufacturing, or
repairing any such national defense material, as herein defined, shall be imprisoned
not more than ten years, or fined not more than ten thousand pesos, or both.

SEC. 15. Definition of terms. The term "aircraft" as used in this Act means any
contrivance known or hereafter invented, used, or designed for navigation or flight in
the air. The expression "post, camp, or station" as used in this Act shall be
interpreted to include naval vessels, military and naval aircraft, and any separate
military, naval or air command.

The words "war or national defense material" as used herein shall include arms,
armament, ammunition, livestock, stores of clothing, food, foodstuffs, or fuel; and
shall also include supplies, munitions, and all other articles of whatever description,
and any part or ingredient thereof intended for, adapted to, or suitable for the use of
the Philippines or the United States, or any associate nation, in connection with the
conduct of war or national defense.

The words "war or national defense premises," as used herein, shall include all
buildings, grounds, mines, or other places wherein such war or national defense
material is being produced, manufactured, repaired, stored, mined, extracted,
distributed, loaded, unloaded, or transported, together with all machinery and
appliances therein contained; and all ports, arsenals, navy yards, prisons, camps, or
other military, naval, or air stations of the Philippines or the United States or any
associate nation.

The words "war or national defense utilities," as used herein, shall include all
railroads, railways, electric lines, roads of whatever description, railroad or railway
fixture, canal, lock, dam, wharf, pier, dock, bridge, building, structure, engine,
machine, mechanical contrivance, car, vehicle, boat, or aircraft, or any other means
of transportation whatsoever, whereon or whereby such war or national defense
material or any troops of the Philippines or of the United States, or of any associate
nation, are being or may be transported either within the limits of the Philippines or
the United States or upon the high seas; and all dams, reservoirs, aqueducts, water
and gas mains, oil or gasoline stations, pipes, structures, and buildings, whereby or in
connection with which water, or gas, or oil, or gasoline, or other fluid is being-
furnished, or may be furnished, to any war or national defense premises or to the
military, naval, or air forces of the Philippines or the United States, or any associate
nation, and all electric light and power, steam or pneumatic power, telephone, and
telegraph plants, poles, wires, and fixtures and wireless stations, and the buildings
16

connected with the maintenance and operation thereof used to supply water, light,
heat, gas, oil, gasoline, fluid, power, or facilities of communication to any war or
national defense premises or to the military, naval, or air forces of the Philippines or
of the United States, or any associate nation.

The words "associate nation," as used in this chapter, shall be deemed to mean any
nation at war with any nation with which the Philippines or the United States is at
war.

The words "foreign government," as used in this Act, shall be deemed to include any
government, faction, or body of insurgents within a country with which the
Philippines or United States is at peace, which government, faction, or body of
insurgents may or may not have been recognized by the Philippines or the United
States as a government.

SEC. 16. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, June 4, 1941.

17

PIRACY
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J .:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain
Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when
grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history
and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century
piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as
to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta,
another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject,
and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland.
After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second
boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There
the boat was surrounded by sixvintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The
Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods
too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception
of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea
that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days
of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped
one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu,
Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de
officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force
in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial
was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and
sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together
with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties,
the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the
amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de
officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly
disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are
present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as
is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of
the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal
of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is
against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits,
though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat.,
184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for
the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the
crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as
follows:
18

ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects
of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty
ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation
at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph
of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or
death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph
of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing
upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by
any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and
fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and
two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against
chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without
means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of
this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any
part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every
person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status
of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating
to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-
known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The
municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the
United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in
force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer,
designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a
municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are
altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114
U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines
by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley
Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines,
when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the
municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of
person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the
new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the
occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are
allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened practice
is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official
Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with
piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in
relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make
the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as
piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of
the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the
concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal
Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power
to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses
19

against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in
putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that
whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of
nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev.
Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were
content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of
nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines
relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in
the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A
logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the
crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be
substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned,
the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and
citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the
case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority"
as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend
all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government
of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as
follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and
citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at
war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from
cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation
at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of
presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably
articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation
to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last
cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was
accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons
without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us
to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be
imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal
Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage
was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in
fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the
sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the
crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the
imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused
who raped on of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr.
Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of
Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the
defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor
to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first
instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and
severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-
half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.


20

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO
and RICO LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y ELAUSA, accused-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, Rico
Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa and Peter Ponce y
Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were charged of the crime of piracy in an information
filed before the then Court of First Instance of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the
vicinity of Muligin Island and within the territorial waters of the
Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi,
and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-
named accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias Jaime Rodriguez
(Jimmy) Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez y Fernandez
and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power being crew
members of the M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of Philippine
registry, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another and armed with bladed weapons and high
caliber firearms, to wit: three (3) daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1)
garand and one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, with intent of gain
and by means of violence and intimidation upon persons, did then
and there willfully and unlawfuflly, and feloniously take, steal and
carry away against the consent of the owners thereof, the
equipments and other persona) properties belonging to the crew
members and passengers of the said M/V Noria 767, consisting of
cash money amounting to Three Million Five Hundred Seventeen
Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P3,517,300.00), personal
belongings of passengers and crew amounting to One Hundred
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P130,000.00), the vessel's compass,
navigational charts and instruments amounting to Forty Thousand
Pesos (P40,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned owners in the total amount of THREE MILLION
SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00) Philippine Currency; that by
reason of and on the occasion of the said piracy and for the
purpose of enabling the abovenamed accused to take, steal and
carry away the properties abovementioned, the herein accused in
pursuance to their conspiracy, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, treacherously attack, assault, stab, shot and, taking
advantage of superior strength, use personal violence upon the
persons of Abdusador Sumihag, Vicente America, Perhan Tan,
Marcos Que, Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk
Rasdi Alfad, Kasmir Tan, Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael
Ombra, Sabturani Ulag, Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam,
Quillermo Wee, Reuben Segovia Ho, Michael Lao, Yusop
Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad Quezon, Rebuan Majid
Edgar Tan, Abdurasul Alialam Federico Canizares, Omar Tahil
Gilbert Que, Arajul Salialam, Masihul Bandahala, Asola
Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani Bassal, Ibrahim Jamil,
Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan, thereby inflicting upon them
multiple gunshot wounds which caused their instantaneous death
and likewise causing physical injuries upon the persons of Inggal
21

Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H. Alfad and Hadji
Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution which could
have produced the death of said persons, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason or cause independent of the will of said
accused, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered
to said victims which prevented death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, night time and the use of superior
strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo of L-61069)
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez, assisted
by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge, were convicted on March 5, 1982 and
sentenced each "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not guilty. However,
he withdrew his plea and substituted it with that of guilty. On March 10, 1982 he was
convicted of the crime charged and sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of
death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty
of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of the four
defendants because "there was a separate civil action for breach of contract and
damages filed with the same trial court in Civil Case No. N-85 against the several
defendants, including the four accused aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069)
The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on automatic review.
Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the evening, the vessel
M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the name of Hadji Noria Indasan left Jolo
wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. It arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the
following day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in the afternoon. In the evening of
the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On board the vessel were several traders
and crew members. Two or three hours after its departure, while sailing about 25
miles from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the
vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after awhile, he heard
shots being fired. He rushed to the motor launch to hide and on his way through the
engine room, he saw appellant Peter Ponce. Then appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario
Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles, started firing towards Que's companions
after which they brought Que to the pilot's house to handle the steering wheel. He
was substituted by Usman, another passenger, while Que and the other crew
members were ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of
Peter Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente America. At the time, appellant
Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from the motor launch,
followed by gunfire. He hid by laying down among the sacks of copra. He saw
appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece coming down
the stairs as they were firing shots until Fred Canizares and Guilbert Que were hit,
their bodies falling upon him. When he tried to move, he realized that he was also hit
on the right side of his stomach. Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till daytime.
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion from one of the
cabins. He ordered his men to open the door but it could not be opened. After awhile,
the door opened and he saw a gun pointed at them. Whereupon, he hid behind the
bags of copra until appellant Jaime Rodriguez came and fired at him. Luckily, he
was not hit. He and some of his men crawled and they took cover in the bodega of
copra. While in hiding there were gunfires coming from Dario Dece and Peter Ponce.
About four (4) hours later, his Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to come out
otherwise something worse would happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who ordered
him to direct his men to throw the copras as well as the dead bodies overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel reached an island where
the four appellants were able to secure pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered to load in
one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache cases which were full of money. Rico Lopez
and Jaime Rodriguez boarded one pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and Dario Dece
boarded another, bringing with them: dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of
ammunitions, gallons of water and some meat, as well as rifles.
22

Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V Noria when it
arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at the wharf ten
dead bodies, all victims of the sea-jacking, namely: Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul Naran
Salialam, Mallang Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico Canizares, Masihul Bandahala,
Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani Tahir and Abdurasul Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece claim that the
trial court erred (1) in imposing the death penalty to the accused-appellants Jaime
Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara, Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias
Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa despite their plea of guilty; (2) in giving weight to
the alleged sworn statements of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay, Identified as Exhibits "C"
to "C-10" and Exhibits "I to I-5", as evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay; (3)
in holding that accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of
piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay was merely a
denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00
which was his personal money to Atty. Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of
Investigation.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants, namely: Jaime
Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100, and Dario Dece in G.R. No. L-
60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974, provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.Any person who commits piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by
competent court be punished by:
a) Piracy.The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or
no homocide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy,
or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of
saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing
upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of piracy
where rape, murder or homicide is committed is mandatory death penalty. Thus, the
lower court committed no error in not considering the plea of the three (3)
defendants as a mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states
that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.In
all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it
shag be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the deed.
With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be devoid of merit.
Appellants Peter Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian
authorities and another statement (Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National Bureau
of Investigation of Manila. When said statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was
offered in evidence by the prosecution, the same was not objected to by the defense,
aside from the fact that Peter Ponce, on cross examination, admitted the truthfulness
of said declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing
is that correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police
authority of Kudat and Kota Kinabalo, is that
right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at
Kudat, you have signed that statement, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the
authority in Kudat?
23

A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069), which We
likewise declare to be without merit, evidence shows that his participation in the
commission of the offense was positively testified to by the master of the vessel,
Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a passenger, Hadji Mahalail Alfad. Another witness,
passenger Clyde Que also pointed to have seen him (Peter Ponce) armed with an M-
14 rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr. who actually saw
appellant Peter Ponce firing his weapon indiscriminately at the passengers and crew
members in wanton disregard of human lives and the fact that after the looting and
killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat, there
can be no question that he was in conspiracy with the three other defendants. After
his arrest, Ponce gave a statement to the authorities stating therein his participation
as well as those of his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the Malaysian authorities. On
January 8, 1982, the National Bureau of Investigation authorities fetched and brought
them to Manila where they executed their respective statements after Rico Lopez and
Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI, P3,700.00 and P1,700.00, respectively, aside from
the P527,595.00 and one Rolex watch which the Malaysian authorities also turned
over to the Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo.
The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and answers pertinent
to Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are
informing you that you are under investigation
here in connection with the robbery committed
on the M/V Noria last August 31, 1981, where
you are an Assistant Engineer. You have a right
to remain silent and to refuse to answer any of
our questions here. You have the right to be
represented by counsel of your choice in this
investigation. Should you decide to be
represented by a lawyer but cannot afford one we
will provide a lawyer for you free. Should you
decide to give a sworn statement, the same shall
be voluntary and free from force or intimidation
or promise of reward or leniency and anything
that you saw here maybe used for or against you
in any court in the Philippines. Now do you
understand an these rights of yours?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?
A: No, sir.
3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature
hereinbelow to signify that you so understand all
your rights as above stated and that you do not
need the services of a lawyer?
A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)
Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his constitutional right to
remain silent and his right to counsel.
Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits "E", "F", "G", "H",
"J" and "K"), interlocking as they are with each other as each admits his participation
and those of the other co-accused, there is no room for doubt that conspiracy existed
among them. The conduct of appellant
Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a circumstance
showing the presence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime. As a
consequence, every one is responsible for the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

24

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and
ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J .:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH,
OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were
accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder said to have
been committed according to the information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is.,
Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the
above named accused, being strangers and without lawful
authority, armed with firearms and taking advantage of their
superior strength, conspiring and confederating together, aiding
and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain and by the use
of violence or intimidation against persons and force upon things,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their
guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de
Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de
Guzman were riding, traveling at that time from the island of
Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and take,
steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo
sets, merchandise and other personal belongings amounting to the
total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said
accused, on the occasion of the crime herein above-described,
taking advantage that the said victims were at their mercy, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill,
ordered them to jump into the water, whereupon, the said accused,
fired their guns at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de
Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one
Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed all the acts
of execution which would have produced the crime of Qualified
Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reasons of causes in dependent of their will, that is,
said Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid
himself, and due to the timely medical assistance rendered to said
victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his death.
(Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and
Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this
Court finds the accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy
with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined and
penalized under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and
hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH. However, considering the provision of Section 106 of the
Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme
poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities,
under a regime of so called compassionate society, a commutation
to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM
AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
25

The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at
the Larmitan Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3,
tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman,
Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman
received goods from his store consisting of mosquito nets,
blankets, wrist watch sets and stereophono with total value of
P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were received under
an agreement that they would be sold by the above-named persons
and thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea and
keep part of the profits for themselves. However these people
neither paid the value of the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods
to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by
Antonio de Guzman that his group was held up near Baluk- Baluk
Island and that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16,
1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and
Anastacio de Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to
Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman
survived the incident that caused the death of his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with
his friends who were also travelling merchants like him, were on
their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the goods
they received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they brought with
them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for
Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They
took their dinner and slept that night in the house of Omar-kayam
Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together
with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They
were able to sell goods worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the
group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went to sell their
goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P
12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However
that night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon inquiry the
following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram told the
former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went
to Baluk-Baluk, a place suggested by Kiram. They were able to
sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas
Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-
Baluk accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They
used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time
armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and
Siyoh going ahead of the group went to a house about 15 meters
away from the place where the group was selling its goods (pp. 50-
53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking with two
persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize (pp.
53-54, tsn). After selling their goods, the members of the group,
together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island.
They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the
front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island,
Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green
about 200 meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly
after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter
two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards
them (pp. 57-58, tsn). There were two persons on the other
pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized
them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a
house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to them,
Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de
Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja
Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of
their money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter
Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to
undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram
put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to
kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen
while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman
jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from the
pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his
back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a mangrove where
he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead
bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de
Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the
26

Philippine Army station at Maluso where he received first aid
treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial
Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his
companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He
pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they
could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took
from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the
Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano
Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and findings showed:
'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C,
prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial
Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de
Castro and Danilo Hiolen and issued the corresponding death
certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp. 137-138; 140-141,
tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of
witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone
prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that
they were also the victims of the crime? The trial court which had the opportunity of
observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified assigned credibility
to the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked or the significance of
which was misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's
determination. Additionally, the following claims of the appellants are not
convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the
Kiram house or on any of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice
it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family
immediately suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods
would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while at sea and after
they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not
support this assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is of important consequence
to mention that the witness presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and
friends of the accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving team for the dead
bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this fact. The defense may
counter why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily Event
book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or
Police but to an army detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so
why take the pain in locating the army soldiers with whom the report was made?
(Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this observation: "..., this Court is
puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true, why the lone survivor
Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused testified against
them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from the
evidence of the defense so far presented showing reason why the lone survivor
should pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified
piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder? The point which makes us doubt
the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to whom the report was
allegedly made by the accused immediately after the commission of the offense.
Instead of helping the accused, the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps
not crediting the report of the accused or believing in the version of the report made
by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the latter's report
and placed the accused under detention for investigation." (Expediente,pp. 127-128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de
Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that
Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands
were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the appellants'
claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not
the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the
accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is
sufficiently proved in this case. In fact the following facts appear
to have been established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On July
14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused
were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk
Island; B) When the pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the
survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized their captors to be
the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two accused talked
in Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two
accused, without order from the two armed strangers transferred
the unsold goods to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman
27

and companion peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash
and undressed while the two accused remained unharmed or not
molested. These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy
and make them equally liable for the same crime (People vs.
Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The
convergence of the will of the conspirators in the scheming and
execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all of them
the act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp.
128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo
de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no
reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner
different from his companions. The incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when
the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still
missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material.
P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed
as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by
death regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by
the victims; were they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated
for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds,
possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with the
testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the appellants
were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts
and the law, it is affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary
votes the penalty imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants
shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the amount of
P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

28

HIJACKING
REPUBLIC ACT No. 6235
AN ACT PROHIBITING CERTAIN ACTS INIMICAL TO CIVIL
AVIATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to compel a change in the course or
destination of an aircraft of Philippine registry, or to seize or usurp the control
thereof, while it is in flight. An aircraft is in flight from the moment all its external
doors are closed following embarkation until any of such doors is opened for
disembarkation.
It shall likewise be unlawful for any person to compel an aircraft of foreign registry
to land in Philippine territory or to seize or usurp the control thereof while it is
within the said territory.
Section 2. Any person violating any provision of the foregoing section shall be
punished by an imprisonment of not less than twelve years but not more than twenty
years, or by a fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos but not more than forty
thousand pesos.
The penalty of imprisonment of fifteen years to death, or a fine of not less than
twenty-five thousand pesos but not more than fifty thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon any person committing such violation under any of the following
circumstances:
1. Whenever he has fired upon the pilot, member of the crew or passenger
of the aircraft;
2. Whenever he has exploded or attempted to explode any bomb or
explosive to destroy the aircraft; or
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, serious
physical injuries or rape.
Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to ship, load or
carry in any passenger aircraft operating as a public utility within the Philippines,
and explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substance or material.
Section 4. The shipping, loading or carrying of any substance or material mentioned
in the preceding section in any cargo aircraft operating as a public utility within the
Philippines shall be in accordance with regulations issued by the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
Section 5. As used in this Act
(1) "Explosive" shall mean any substance, either solid or liquid, mixture or
single compound, which by chemical reaction liberates heat and gas at high
speed and causes tremendous pressure resulting in explosion. The term shall
include but not limited to dynamites, firecrackers, blasting caps, black
powders, bursters, percussions, cartridges and other explosive materials,
except bullets for firearm.
(2) "Flammable" is any substance or material that is highly combustible and
self-igniting by chemical reaction and shall include but not limited to
acrolein, allene, aluminum dyethyl monochloride, and other aluminum
compounds, ammonium chlorate and other ammonium mixtures and other
similar substances or materials.
(3) "Corrosive" is any substance or material, either liquid, solid or gaseous,
which through chemical reaction wears away, impairs or consumes any
object. It shall include but not limited to alkaline battery fluid packed with
empty storage battery, allyl chloroformate, allytrichlorosilane, ammonium
dinitro-orthocresolate and other similar materials and substances.
(4) "Poisonous" is any substance or materials, except medicinal drug, either
liquid, solid or gaseous, which through chemical reactions kills, injuries or
impairs a living organism or person, and shall include but not limited to
allyl isothiocyanate, ammunition (chemical, non-explosive but containing
Class A, B or poison), aniline oil, arsine, bromobenzyle cyanide,
bromoacetone and other similar substances or materials.
Section 6. Any violation of Section three hereof shall be punishable by an
imprisonment of at least five years but not more than ten years or by a fine of not
less than ten thousand pesos but not more than twenty thousand pesos: Provided,
That if the violation is committed by a juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed
upon the manager, representative, director, agent or employee who violated, or
caused, directed, cooperated or participated in the violation
thereof: Provided, further, That in case the violation is committed in the interest of a
29

foreign corporation legally doing business in the Philippines, the penalty shall be
imposed upon its resident agent, manager, representative or director responsible for
such violation and in addition thereto, the license of said corporation to do business
in the Philippines shall be revoked.
Any violation of Section four hereof shall be an offense punishable with the
minimum of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.
Section 7. For any death or injury to persons or damage to property resulting from a
violation of Sections three and four hereof, the person responsible therefor may be
held liable in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 8. Aircraft companies which operate as public utilities or operators of
aircraft which are for hire are authorized to open and investigate suspicious packages
and cargoes in the presence of the owner or shipper, or his authorized representatives
if present; in order to help the authorities in the enforcement of the provisions of this
Act: Provided, That if the owner, shipper or his representative refuses to have the
same opened and inspected, the airline or air carrier is authorized to refuse the
loading thereof.
Section 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned
shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof
and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited
materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board
the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and
the air carrier.
Section 10. The Civil Aeronautics Administration is hereby directed to promulgate
within one month after the approval of this Act such regulations as are provided in
Section four hereof and cause the publication of such rules and regulations in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week
for three consecutive weeks. Such regulations shall take effect fifteen days after
publication in the Official Gazette.
Section 11. This Act shall take effect after the publication mentioned in the
preceding section.
Approved: June 19, 1971

30

TERRORISM
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Thirteenth Congress
Third Regular Session


Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the nineteenth day of February, two
thousand seven.
Republic Act No. 9372 March 6, 2007
AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM
TERRORISM
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall henceforth be known as the "Human
Security Act of 2007."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is declared a policy of the State to protect life,
liberty, and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and
dangerous to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people,
and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and
against the law of nations.
In the implementation of the policy stated above, the State shall uphold the basic
rights and fundamental liberties of the people as enshrined in the Constitution.
The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive
approach, comprising political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means duly
taking into account the root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as
justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such measures shall include
conflict management and post-conflict peace-building, addressing the roots of
conflict by building state capacity and promoting equitable economic development.
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of
constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government. It is
to be understood, however that the exercise of the constitutionally recognized powers
of the executive department of the government shall not prejudice respect for human
rights which shall be absolute and protected at all times.
SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the
following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the
Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and
Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and
Liability Act of 1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974); and,
31

6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying
the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture,
Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions
or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty
of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for
under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended.
SEC. 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. - Persons who conspire to commit the
crime of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of the crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to
commit the same.
SEC. 5. Accomplice. - Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the
Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the
execution of either the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by
previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of from seventeen (17) years,
four months one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 6. Accessory. - Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having
participated therein, either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of the
Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following
manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of
the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects, or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for accessories shall
not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling
within the provisions of subparagraph (a).
SEC. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and I nterception and Recording of
Communications. -The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping
Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and the
members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to,
intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or
other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of
any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message,
conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words between members of a
judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism.
Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between
lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and
confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.
SEC. 8. Formal Application for J udicial Authorization. - The written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept,
and record communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be granted by the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application of a police or of a law
enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce to establish: (a) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be
committed; (b) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential to the conviction of any
charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such crimes,
will be obtained; and, (c) that there is no other effective means readily available for
acquiring such evidence.
SEC. 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. - The written order
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if
any, to extend or renew the same, the original application of the applicant, including
his application to extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the Anti-
Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified
information: Provided, That the person being surveilled or whose communications,
32

letters, papers, messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or written words and
effects have been monitored, listened to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement
authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement
authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality
of the interference before the Court of Appeals which issued the written order. The
written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the
following: (a) the identity, such as name and address, if known, of the charged or
suspected person whose communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and
recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or
otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be
tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if
the person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is
not fully known, such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided
there is a reasonable ground to do so; (b) the identity (name, address, and the police
or law enforcement organization) of the police or of the law enforcement official,
including the individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law
enforcement organization) of the members of his team, judicially authorized to track
down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words; (c) the offense or offenses
committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and, (d) the length of
time within which the authorization shall be used or carried out.
SEC. 10. Effective Period of J udicial Authorization. - Any authorization granted by
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(d) of this Act,
shall only be effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official.
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said
authorization for another non-extendible period, which shall not exceed thirty (30)
days from the expiration of the original period: Provided, That the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the
public interest: and Provided, further, That the ex parte application for extension or
renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in
writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council.
In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file
the application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant
among the members of the team named in the original written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the application for extension or
renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or law
enforcement personnel under Section 20 hereof, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period
granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in the preceding paragraphs within
which to file the appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any
violation of this Act.
If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance,
interception and recording of the termination of the said surveillance, interception
and recording. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement official
who fails to notify the person subject of the surveillance, monitoring, interception
and recording as specified above.
SEC. 11. Custody of I ntercepted and Recorded Communications. - All tapes, discs,
and recordings made pursuant to the authorization of the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals, including all excerpts and summaries thereof as well as all written
notes or memoranda made in connection therewith, shall, within forty-eight (48)
hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration
of any extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing Division of the Court of Appeals in a
sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by
a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the members
of his team.
In case of death of the applicant or in case he is physically disabled to execute the
required affidavit, the one next in rank to the applicant among the members of the
team named in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
shall execute with the members of the team that required affidavit.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the tapes, discs
and recording, and their excerpts and summaries, written notes or memoranda to
copy in whatever form, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in
33

any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext
whatsoever.
Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the
items enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day
to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 12. Contents of J oint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit of the police or of the law
enforcement official and the individual members of his team shall state: (a) the
number of tapes, discs, and recordings that have been made, as well as the number of
excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda, if
any, made in connection therewith; (b) the dates and times covered by each of such
tapes, discs, and recordings; (c) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well as
the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and
memoranda made in connection therewith that have been included in the deposit; and
(d) the date of the original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism
Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the tracking down,
tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as the date of any extension or renewal
of the original written authority granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the
whole or any part of any of such tapes, discs, and recordings, and that no duplicates
or copies of the whole or any part of any of such excerpts, summaries, written notes,
and memoranda, have been made, or, if made, that all such duplicates and copies are
included in the sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, deposited
with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police or law enforcement official to omit or
exclude from the joint affidavit any item or portion thereof mentioned in this
Section.
Any person, police or law enforcement officer who violates any of the acts
prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of not less than ten
(10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 13. Disposition of Deposited Material. -The sealed envelope or sealed package
and the contents thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals, shall be deemed and are hereby declared classified information,
and the sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents
(including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the excerpts and summaries thereof
and the notes and memoranda made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged,
revealed, read, replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted
only upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed before the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the
Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council to file the application with proper written notice the person whose
conversation, communication, message discussion or spoken or written words have
been the subject of surveillance, monitoring, recording and interception to open,
reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as
evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to
notify in writing the persons subject of the surveillance as defined above shall suffer
the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 14. Application to Open Deposited Sealed Envelope or Sealed Package. - The
written application with notice to the party concerned to open the deposited sealed
envelope or sealed package shall clearly state the purpose or reason: (a) for opening
the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b) for revealing or disclosing its classified
contents; (c) for replaying, divulging, and or reading any of the listened to,
intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and
any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); [ and, (d) for using
any of said listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts
and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection
therewith) as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to
notify as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight
years of imprisonment.
SEC. 15. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. - Any listened to, intercepted,
and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words, or any part or parts thereof, or any information or fact contained
therein, including their existence, content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning,
which have been secured in violation of the pertinent provisions of this Act, shall
absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial,
34

quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or
hearing.
SEC. 16. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious I nterceptions and/or
Recordings. - Any police or law enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to
do so by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens
to, intercepts, and records in whatever manner or form any communication, message,
conversation, discussion, or spoken or written word of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism
shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day
to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other
offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment and the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from
public office shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who
maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to track down, tap,
listen to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or form any communication,
message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism:
Provided, That notwithstanding Section 13 of this Act, the party aggrieved by such
authorization shall be allowed access to the sealed envelope or sealed package and
the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution of any police or law enforcement
personnel who maliciously procured said authorization.
SEC. 17. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or Group of
Persons. - Any organization, association, or group of persons organized for the
purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although not organized for that purpose,
actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon
application of the Department of Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court,
with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or
group of persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed organization,
association, or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court.
SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without J udicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police
or law enforcement personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the
Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without
incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the
proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper
judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the said
charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken
into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the
arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits
under Section 27 of this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the
person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the
latter's residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of
the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the
identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they
have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why
they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation
whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or
psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report
of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper
court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. The judge shall
forthwith submit his/her report within three calendar days from the time the suspect
was brought to his/her residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement
personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of
apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where the arrest is made during Saturdays,
Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the
residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall
be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and
judge as Provided in the preceding paragraph.
SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or I mminent Terrorist
Attack. - In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be
detained for more than three days without the written approval of a municipal, city,
provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the
municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of
35

Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays,
Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement
personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials
mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The
approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law
enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date of the detention of
the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three days after the detention
the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established,
shall be released immediately.
SEC. 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper J udicial Authority
within Three Days. - The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years
of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel
who has apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of a person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and
fails to deliver such charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority
within the period of three days.
SEC. 21. Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. - The moment a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be
informed, by the arresting police or law enforcement officers or by the police or law
enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her
right: (a) to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law
enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free legal assistance
unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO). It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO
thus contacted to immediately visit the person(s) detained and provide him or her
with legal assistance. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of the counsel of choice; (b) informed of the cause or causes of his
detention in the presence of his legal counsel; (c) allowed to communicate freely
with his legal counsel and to confer with them at any time without restriction; (d)
allowed to communicate freely and privately without restrictions with the members
of his family or with his nearest relatives and to be visited by them; and, (e) allowed
freely to avail of the service of a physician or physicians of choice.
SEC. 22. Penalty for Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. - Any police or law
enforcement personnel, or any personnel of the police or other law enforcement
custodial unit that violates any of the aforesaid rights of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism
shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day
to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a detainee
or detainees as stated above is duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on
the police officer or hear or leader of the law enforcement unit having custody of the
detainee at the time the violation was done.
SEC. 23. Requirement for an Official Custodial Logbook and its Contents. - The
police or other law enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism has been placed under custodial arrest and detention shall keep a
securely and orderly maintained official logbook, which is hereby declared as a
public document and opened to and made available for .the inspection and scrutiny
of the lawyer or lawyers of the person under custody or any member of his or her
family or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree or his or
her physician at any time of the day or night without any form of restriction. The
logbook shall contain a clear and concise record of: (a) the name, description, and
address of the detained person; (b) the date and exact time of his initial admission for
custodial arrest and detention; (c) the name and address of the physician or
physicians who examined him physically and medically; (d) the state of his health
and physical condition at the time of his initial admission for custodial detention; (e)
the date and time of each removal of the detained person from his cell for
interrogation or for any purpose; (f) the date and time of his return to his cell; (g) the
name and address of the physician or physicians who physically and medically
examined him after each interrogation; (h) a summary of the physical and medical
findings on the detained person after each of such interrogation; (i) the names and
addresses of his family members and nearest relatives, if any and if available; (j) the
names and addresses of persons, who visit the detained person; (k) the date and time
of each of such visits; (1) the date and time of each request of the detained person to
communicate and confer with his legal counsel or counsels; (m) the date and time of
each visit, and date and time of each departure of his legal counsel or counsels; and,
(n) all other important events bearing on and all relevant details regarding the
treatment of the detained person while under custodial arrest and detention.
The said police or law enforcement custodial unit shall upon demand of the
aforementioned lawyer or lawyers or members of the family or relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the person under custody or his or
36

her physician issue a certified true copy of the entries of the logbook relative to the
concerned detained person without delay or restriction or requiring any fees
whatsoever including documentary stamp tax, notarial fees, and the like. This
certified true copy may be attested by the person who has custody of the logbook or
who allowed the party concerned to scrutinize it at the time the demand for the
certified true copy is made.
The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with the
preceding paragraph to keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty of ten (10)
years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 24. No Torture or Coercion in I nvestigation and I nterrogation. - No threat,
intimidation, or coercion, and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or
torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, on the detained person, which
shall vitiate his freewill, shall be employed in his investigation and interrogation for
the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; otherwise, the
evidence obtained from said detained person resulting from such threat, intimidation,
or coercion, or from such inflicted physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or
psychological pressure, shall be, in its entirety, absolutely not admissible and usable
as evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation,
inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SEC. 25. Penalty for Threat, I ntimidation, Coercion, or Torture in the
I nvestigation and I nterrogation of a Detained Person. - Any person or persons who
use threat, intimidation, or coercion, or who inflict physical pain or torment, or
mental, moral, or psychological pressure, which shall vitiate the free-will of a
charged or suspected person under investigation and interrogation for the crime of
terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense
and shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of
imprisonment.
When death or serious permanent disability of said detained person occurs as a
consequence of the use of such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or as a consequence
of the infliction on him of such physical pain or torment, or as a consequence of the
infliction on him of such mental, moral, or psychological pressure, the penalty shall
be twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and
the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is
entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor,
shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where
he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public
safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of
said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a
violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as
provided under the Rules of Court.
He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual
place of residence.
While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails,
computers, the internet or other means of communications with people outside the
residence until otherwise ordered by the court.
The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the
accused or of the dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion
of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of the accused.
SEC. 27. J udicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts,
and Records. - The provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary
notwithstanding, the justices of the Court of Appeals designated as a special court to
handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable
cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: (1) a person charged with or suspected
of the crime of terrorism or, conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and
(3) of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association,
or group of persons, may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer
and the members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism
council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b) gather or cause
the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial institution. The bank or
financial institution concerned, shall not refuse to allow such examination or to
provide the desired information, when so, ordered by and served with the written
order of the Court of Appeals.
SEC. 28. Application to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The
written order of the Court of Appeals authorizing the examination of bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records: (1) of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of any
37

judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons, or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of persons
in a bank or financial institution, and the gathering of any relevant information about
the same from said bank or financial institution, shall only be granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte application to that
effect of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in
writing to file such ex parte application by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in
Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under
oath or affirmation of the applicant and, the witnesses he may produce to establish
the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records: (1) of the person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of
a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association or group of
persons; or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of persons.
SEC. 29. Classification and Contents of the Court Order Authorizing the
Examination of Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written order granted
by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to
extend or renew the same, the original ex parte application of the applicant, including
his ex parte application to extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of
the Anti-Terrorism Council, shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified
information: Provided, That the person whose bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records have been examined, frozen, sequestered and seized by
law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law
enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so,
the legality of the interference. The written order of the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals designated to handle cases involving terrorism shall specify: (a) the
identify of the said: (1) person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) member of such judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, as the case
may be. whose deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are to be
examined or the information to be gathered; (b) the identity of the bank or financial
Institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are
held and maintained; (c) the identity of the persons who will conduct the said
examination and the gathering of the desired information; and, (d) the length of time
the authorization shall be carried out.
SEC. 30. Effective Period of Court Authorization to Examine and Obtain
I nformation on Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The authorization issued
or granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to examine or cause
the examination of and to freeze bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records, or to gather information about the same, shall be effective for the length
of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt
of the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the
applicant police or law enforcement official.
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said
authorization for another period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days renewable to
another thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period: Provided, That the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or
renewal is in the public interest: and, Provided, further, That the application for
extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly
authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council.
In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file
the application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant
among the members of the ream named in the original written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the application for extension or
renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or law
enforcement personnel under Section 19 hereof, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period
granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in the preceding paragraphs within
which to file the appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any
violation of this Act.
If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall immediately notify in writing the person subject of the
bank examination and freezing of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets
and records. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement official
who fails to notify in writing the person subject of the bank examination and freezing
of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to
notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to
eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 31. Custody of Bank Data and I nformation Obtained after Examination of
Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - All information, data,
38

excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and other
documents obtained from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared
and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a
member of any such organization, association, or group of persons shall, within
forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after
the expiration of the extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
in a sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied
by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the
persons who actually conducted the examination of said bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records.
SEC. 32. Contents of J oint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit shall state: (a) the
identifying marks, numbers, or symbols of the deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets, and records examined; (b) the identity and address of the bank or financial
institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are
held and maintained; (c) the number of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets, and records discovered, examined, and frozen; (d) the outstanding balances of
each of such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets; (e) all information, data,
excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, documents, records
examined and placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited with the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; (f) the date of the original written
authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex
parte Application to conduct the examination of the said bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of
the original written authorization granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals; and (g) that the items Enumerated were all that were found in the bank or
financial institution examined at the time of the completion of the examination.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the
information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports,
and documents acquired from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records have been made, or, if made, that all such duplicates and
copies are placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited with the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the bank data and
information obtained after examination of deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets
and records to copy, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any
manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext
whatsoever,
Any person who copies, removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys
the items enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one
day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 33. Disposition of Bank Materials. - The sealed envelope or sealed package
and the contents thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals, shall be deemed and are hereby declared classified information
and the sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents shall
not be divulged, revealed, read, or used as evidence unless authorized in a written
order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall
be granted only upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed before
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the
Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council to file the application, with notice in writing to the party concerned not later
than three days before the scheduled opening, to open, reveal, divulge, and use the
contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to
notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to
eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 34. Application to Open Deposited Bank Materials. - The written application,
with notice in writing to the party concerned not later than three days of the
scheduled opening, to open the sealed envelope or sealed package shall clearly state
the purpose and reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b)
for revealing and disclosing its classified contents; and, (c) for using the classified
information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports,
and documents as evidence.
SEC. 35. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Bank Materials. - Any information, data,
excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, work sheets, reports, or documents acquired
from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records of: (1) a person charged or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime
of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
39

organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such organization,
association, or group of persons, which have been secured in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence
against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative
investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SEC. 36. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Examination of a Bank or a
Financial I nstitution. - Any person, police or law enforcement personnel who
examines the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or
financial institution of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared
and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a
member of such organization, association, or group of persons, without being
authorized to do so by the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an offense and shall
suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other
offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel, who
maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to examine the deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution of: (1)
a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association,
or group of persons; or (3) a member of such organization, association, or group of
persons: Provided, That notwithstanding Section 33 of this Act, the party aggrieved
by such authorization shall upon motion duly filed be allowed access to the sealed
envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution
of any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said
authorization.
SEC. 37. Penalty of Bank Officials and Employees Defying a Court
Authorization. - An employee, official, or a member of the board of directors of a
bank or financial institution, who refuses to allow the examination of the deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records of: (1) a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism;
(2) a judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons;
or (3) a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association,
or group of persons in said bank or financial institution, when duly served with the
written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an
offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years
of imprisonment.
SEC. 38. Penalty for False or Untruthful Statement or Misrepresentation of
Material Fact in J oint Affidavits.- Any false or untruthful statement or
misrepresentation of material fact in the joint affidavits required respectively in
Section 12 and Section 32 of this Act shall constitute a criminal offense and the
affiants shall suffer individually the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve
(12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 39. Seizure and Sequestration. - The deposits and their outstanding balances,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution,
moneys, businesses, transportation and communication equipment, supplies and
other implements, and property of whatever kind and nature belonging: (1) to any
person suspected of or charged before a competent Regional Trial Court for the
crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) to a judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) to a
member of such organization, association, or group of persons shall be seized,
sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer, or conveyance for
purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to the
interest of the State.
The accused or a person suspected of may withdraw such sums as may be reasonably
needed by the monthly needs of his family including the services of his or her
counsel and his or her family's medical needs upon approval of the court. He or she
may also use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen
because of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any
legitimate reason.
Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division of the
Court of Appeals to allow the person accused of the crime of terrorism or of the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism to withdraw such sums from sequestered or
frozen deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records as may be necessary
for the regular sustenance of his/her family or to use any of his/her property that has
been seized, sequestered or frozen for legitimate purposes while his/her case is
pending shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
SEC. 40. Nature of Seized. Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements,
Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - The seized, sequestered and frozen bank
40

deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records belonging to a person
suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism shall be deemed as property held in trust by the bank or financial institution
for such person and the government during the pendency of the investigation of the
person suspected of or during the pendency of the trial of the person charged with
any of the said crimes, as the case may be and their use or disposition while the case
is pending shall be subject to the approval of the court before which the case or cases
are pending.
SEC. 41. Disposition of the Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits,
Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Record. - If the person suspected of or
charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is found, after
his investigation, to be innocent by the investigating body, or is acquitted, after his
arraignment or his case is dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court, the
seizure, sequestration and freezing of his bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records shall forthwith be deemed lifted by the investigating body or by
the competent court, as the case may be, and his bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records shall be deemed released from such seizure,
sequestration and freezing, and shall be restored to him without any delay by the
bank or financial institution concerned without any further action on his part. The
filing of any appeal on motion for reconsideration shall not state the release of said
funds from seizure, sequestration and freezing.
If the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
is convicted by a final judgment of a competent trial court, his seized, sequestered
and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall be
automatically forfeited in favor of the government.
Upon his or her acquittal or the dismissal of the charges against him or her, the
amount of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500.000.00) a day for the period in which
his properties, assets or funds were seized shall be paid to him on the concept of
liquidated damages. The amount shall be taken from the appropriations of the police
or law enforcement agency that caused the filing of the enumerated charges against
him/her.
SEC. 42. Penalty for Unjustified Refusal to Restore or Delay in Restoring Seized,
Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and
Records. - Any person who unjustifiably refuses to restore or delays the restoration
of seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets
and records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism after such suspected person has been found innocent
by the investigating body or after the case against such charged person has been
dismissed or after he is acquitted by a competent court shall suffer the penalty of ten
(10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 43. Penalty for the Loss, Misuse, Diversion or Dissipation of Seized,
Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and
Records. - Any person who is responsible for the loss, misuse, diversion, or
dissipation of the whole or any part of the seized, sequestered and frozen bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or
charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall suffer
the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 44. I nfidelity in the Custody of Detained Persons. - Any public officer who
has direct custody of a detained person or under the provisions of this Act and who
by his deliberate act, misconduct, or inexcusable negligence causes or allows the
escape of such detained person shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the
penalty of: (a) twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment,
if the detained person has already been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment
of a competent court; and (b) six years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment, if the detained person has not been convicted and sentenced in a final
judgment of a competent court.
SEC. 45. I mmunity and Protection of Government Witnesses. - The provisions of
Republic Act No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act) to the
contrary notwithstanding, the immunity of government witnesses testifying under
this Act shall be governed by Sections 17 and 18 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court:
Provided, however, That said witnesses shall be entitled to benefits granted to
witnesses under said Republic Act No.6981.
SEC. 46. Penalty for Unauthorized Revelation of Classified Materials. - The
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be
imposed upon any person, police or law enforcement agent, judicial officer or civil
servant who, not being authorized by the Court of Appeals to do so, reveals in any
manner or form any classified information under this Act.
SEC. 47. Penalty for Furnishing False Evidence, Forged Document, or Spurious
Evidence. - The penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly furnishes false
41

testimony, forged document or spurious evidence in any investigation or hearing
under this Act.
SEC. 48. Continuous Trial. - In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism, the judge shall set the continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to
Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial.
SEC. 49. Prosecution Under This Act Shall be a Bar to Another Prosecution
under the Revised Penal Code or any Special Penal Laws. - When a person has
been prosecuted under a provision of this Act, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense or felony
which is necessarily included in the offense charged under this Act.
SEC. 50. Damages for Unproven Charge of Terrorism. - Upon acquittal, any
person who is accused of terrorism shall be entitled to the payment of damages in the
amount of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) for every day that he or she
has been detained or deprived of liberty or arrested without a warrant as a result of
such an accusation. The amount of damages shall be automatically charged against
the appropriations of the police agency or the Anti-Terrorism Council that brought or
sanctioned the filing of the charges against the accused. It shall also be released
within fifteen (15) days from the date of the acquittal of the accused. The award of
damages mentioned above shall be without prejudice to the right of the acquitted
accused to file criminal or administrative charges against those responsible for
charging him with the case of terrorism.
Any officer, employee, personnel, or person who delays the release or refuses to
release the amounts awarded to the individual acquitted of the crime of terrorism as
directed in the paragraph immediately preceding shall suffer the penalty of six
months of imprisonment.
If the deductions are less than the amounts due to the detained persons, the amount
needed to complete the compensation shall be taken from the current appropriations
for intelligence, emergency, social or other funds of the Office of the President.
In the event that the amount cannot be covered by the current budget of the police or
law enforcement agency concerned, the amount shall be automatically included in
the appropriations of the said agency for the coming year.
SEC. 51. Duty to Record and Report the Name and Address of the I nformant. -
The police or law enforcement officers to whom the name or a suspect in the crime
of terrorism was first revealed shall record the real name and the specific address of
the informant.
The police or law enforcement officials concerned shall report the informant's name
and address to their superior officer who shall transmit the information to the
Congressional Oversight Committee or to the proper court within five days after the
suspect was placed under arrest or his properties were sequestered, seized or frozen.
The name and address of the informant shall be considered confidential and shall not
be unnecessarily revealed until after the proceedings against the suspect shall have
been terminated.
SEC. 52. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of Book I of the
Revised Penal Code shall be applicable to this Act.
SEC. 53. Anti-Terrorism Council. - An Anti-Terrorism Council, hereinafter referred
to, for brevity, as the "Council," is hereby created. The members of the Council are:
(1) the Executive Secretary, who shall be its Chairperson; (2) the Secretary of
Justice, who shall be its Vice Chairperson; and (3) the Secretary of Foreign Affairs;
(4) the Secretary of National Defense; (5) the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government; (6) the Secretary of Finance; and (7) the National Security Advisor, as
its other members.
The Council shall implement this Act and assume the responsibility for the proper
and effective implementation of the anti-terrorism policy of the country. The Council
shall keep records of its proceedings and decisions. All records of the Council shall
be subject to such security classifications as the Council may, in its judgment and
discretion, decide to adopt to safeguard the safety of the people, the security of the
Republic, and the welfare of the nation.
The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency shall be the Secretariat of the
Council. The Council shall define the powers, duties, and functions of the National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency as Secretariat of the Council. The National Bureau
of Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration, the Office of Civil Defense, the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Anti-Money
Laundering Council, the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the
Philippine National Police intelligence and investigative elements shall serve as
support agencies for the Council.
42

The Council shall formulate and adopt comprehensive, adequate, efficient, and
effective anti-terrorism plans, programs, and counter-measures to suppress and
eradicate terrorism in the country and to protect the people from acts of terrorism.
Nothing herein shall be interpreted to empower the Anti-Terrorism Council to
exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial power or authority.
SEC. 54. Functions of the Council. - In pursuit of its mandate in the previous
Section, the Council shall have the following functions with due regard for the rights
of the people as mandated by the Constitution and pertinent laws:
1. Formulate and adopt plans, programs and counter-measures against
terrorists and acts of terrorism in the country;
2. Coordinate all national efforts to suppress and eradicate acts of terrorism
in the country and mobilize the entire nation against terrorism prescribed in
this Act;
3. Direct the speedy investigation and prosecution of all persons accused or
detained for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and
other offenses punishable under this Act, and monitor the progress of their
cases;
4. Establish and maintain comprehensive data-base information system on
terrorism, terrorist activities, and counter-terrorism operations;
5. Freeze the funds property, bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 9160, otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of
2001, as amended;
6. Grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers who give vital
information leading to the apprehension, arrest, detention, prosecution, and
conviction of person or persons who are liable for the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism;
7. Establish and maintain coordination with and the cooperation and
assistance of other nations in the struggle against international terrorism;
and
8. Request the Supreme Court to designate specific divisions of the Court of
Appeals and Regional Trial Courts in Manila, Cebu City and Cagayan de
Oro City, as the case may be, to handle all cases involving the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and all matters incident to said
crimes. The Secretary of Justice shall assign a team of prosecutors from: (a)
Luzon to handle terrorism cases filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila;
(b) from the Visayas to handle cases filed in Cebu City; and (c) from
Mindanao to handle cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City.
SEC. 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. - The Commission on Human
Rights shall give the highest priority to the investigation and prosecution of
violations of civil and political rights of persons in relation to the implementation of
this Act; and for this purpose, the Commission shall have the concurrent jurisdiction
to prosecute public officials, law enforcers, and other persons who may have violated
the civil and political rights of persons suspected of, or detained for the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.
SEC. 56. Creation of a Grievance Committee. - There is hereby created a Grievance
Committee composed of the Ombudsman, as chair, and the Solicitor General, and an
undersecretary from the Department of Justice (DOJ), as members, to receive and
evaluate complaints against the actuations of the police and law enforcement
officials in the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall hold office in
Manila. The Committee shall have three subcommittees that will be respectively
headed by the Deputy Ombudsmen in Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao. The
subcommittees shall respectively hold office at the Offices of Deputy Ombudsman.
Three Assistant Solicitors General designated by the Solicitor General, and the
regional prosecutors of the DOJ assigned to the regions where the Deputy
Ombudsmen hold office shall be members thereof. The three subcommittees shall
assist the Grievance Committee in receiving, investigating and evaluating complaints
against the police and other law enforcement officers in the implementation of this
Act. If the evidence warrants it, they may file the appropriate cases against the erring
police and law enforcement officers. Unless seasonably disowned or denounced by
the complainants, decisions or judgments in the said cases shall preclude the filing of
other cases based on the same cause or causes of action as those that were filed with
the Grievance Committee or its branches.
SEC. 57. Ban on Extraordinary Rendition. - No person suspected or convicted of
the crime of terrorism shall be subjected to extraordinary rendition to any country
unless his or her testimony is needed for terrorist related police investigations or
judicial trials in the said country and unless his or her human rights, including the
43

right against torture, and right to counsel, are officially assured by the requesting
country and transmitted accordingly and approved by the Department of Justice.
SEC. 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. - Subject to the provision of an
existing treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision
of any law of preferential application, the provisions of this Act shall apply: (1) to
individual persons who commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act
within the terrestrial domain, interior waters, maritime zone, and airspace of the
Philippines; (2) to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial
limits of the Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to commit any of the crimes
defined and punished in this Act inside the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3) to
individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship or Philippine
airship; (4) to individual persons who commit any of said crimes within any
embassy, consulate, or diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the
Philippine government in an official capacity; (5) to individual persons who,
although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said
crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of Philippines descent, where their
citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the commission of the crime; and (6) to
individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit said crimes directly against the Philippine government.
SEC. 59. J oint Oversight Committee. - There is hereby created a Joint Oversight
Committee to oversee the implementation of this Act. The Oversight Committee
shall be composed of five members each from the Senate and the House in addition
to the Chairs of the Committees of Public Order of both Houses who shall also Chair
the Oversight Committee in the order specified herein. The membership of the
Committee for every House shall at least have two opposition or minority members.
The Joint Oversight Committee shall have its own independent counsel. The Chair of
the Committee shall rotate every six months with the Senate chairing it for the first
six months and the House for the next six months. In every case, the ranking
opposition or minority member of the Committee shall be the Vice Chair. Upon the
expiration of one year after this Act is approved by the President, the Committee
shall review the Act particularly the provision that authorize the surveillance of
suspects of or persons charged with the crime of terrorism. To that end, the
Committee shall summon the police and law enforcement officers and the members
of the Anti-Terrorism Council and require them to answer questions from the
members of Congress and to submit a written report of the acts they have done in the
implementation of the law including the manner in which the persons suspected of or
charged with the crime of terrorism have been dealt with in their custody and from
the date when the movements of the latter were subjected to surveillance and his or
her correspondences, messages, conversations and the like were listened to or
subjected to monitoring, recording and tapping. Without prejudice to its submitting
other reports, the Committee shall render a semiannual report to both Houses of
Congress. The report may include where necessary a recommendation to reassess the
effects of globalization on terrorist activities on the people, provide a sunset clause to
or amend any portion of the Act or to repeal the Act in its entirety. The courts
dealing with anti-terrorism cases shall submit to Congress and the President a report
every six months of the status of anti-terrorism cases that have been filed with them
starting from the date this Act is implemented.
SEC. 60. Separability Clause. - If for any reason any part or provision of this Act is
declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other parts or provisions hereof which are
not affected thereby shall remain and continue to be in full force and effect.
SEC. 61. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or
regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
SEC. 62. Special Effectivity Clause. - After the bill shall have been signed into law
by the President, the Act shall be published in three newspapers of national
circulation; three newspapers of local circulation, one each in llocos Norte, Baguio
City and Pampanga; three newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cebu, lloilo
and Tacloban; and three newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cagayan de
Oro, Davao and General Santos city.
The title of the Act and its provisions defining the acts of terrorism that are punished
shall be aired everyday at primetime for seven days, morning, noon and night over
three national television and radio networks; three radio and television networks, one
each in Cebu, Tacloban and lloilo; and in five radio and television networks, one
each in Lanao del Sur, Cagayan de Oro, Davao City, Cotabato City and Zamboanga
City. The publication in the newspapers of local circulation and the announcements
over local radio and television networks shall be done in the dominant language of
the community. After the publication required above shall have been done, the Act
shall take effect two months after the elections are held in May 2007. Thereafter, the
provisions of this Act shall be automatically suspended one month before and two
months as after the holding of any election.

44

GENOCIDE
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two
thousand nine.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9851
AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING CRIMES AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE AND OTHER
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, ORGANIZING JURISDICTION,
DESIGNATING SPECIAL COURTS, AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Philippine Act on Crimes
Against I nternational Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity".
Section 2. Declaration of Principles and State Policies. -
(a) The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to a policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations.
(b) The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights, including the rights of indigenous cultural
communities and other vulnerable groups, such as women and children;
(c) It shall be the responsibility of the State and all other sectors concerned
to resolved armed conflict in order to promote the goal of "Children as
Zones of Peace";
(d) The state adopts the generally accepted principles of international law,
including the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions on the
protection of victims of war and international humanitarian law, as part of
the law our nation;
(e) The most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole must not go unpunished and their effective prosecution must be
ensured by taking measures at the national level, in order to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to the
prevention of such crimes, it being the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes;
(f) The State shall guarantee persons suspected or accused of having
committed grave crimes under international law all rights necessary to
ensure that their trial will be fair and prompt in strict accordance with
national and international law and standards for fair trial, It shall also
protect victims, witnesses and their families, and provide appropriate
redress to victims and their families, It shall ensure that the legal systems in
place provide accessible and gender-sensitive avenues of redress for victims
of armed conflict, and
(g)The State recognizes that the application of the provisions of this Act
shall not affect the legal status of the parties to a conflict, nor give an
implied recognition of the status of belligerency
CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 3. For purposes of this Act, the term:
(a) "Apartheid' means inhumane acts committed in the context of an
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one
racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that
regime
(b) "Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced
displacement of the persons concerned by expultion by expulsion or other
coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without
grounds permitted under domestic or international law.
45

(c) "Armed conflict" means any use of force or armed violence between
States or a protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within that State: Provided,
That such force or armed violence gives rise, or may give rise, to a situation
to which the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, including their
common Article 3, apply. Armed conflict may be international, that is,
between two (2) or more States, including belligerent occupation; or non-
international, that is, between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a state. It does not cover
internal disturbances or tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence or other acts of a similar nature.
(d) "Armed forces" means all organized armed forces, groups and units that
belong to a party to an armed conflict which are under a command
responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates. Such armed
forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which enforces
compliance with International Humanitarian Law
(e) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in Section 6
of this Act against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy to commit such attack.
(f) "Effective command and control" or " effective authority and control"
means having the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of
offenses by subordinates.
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest,
detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate
or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time
(h) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching
to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such
power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and
children.
(i) "Extermination" means the international infliction of conditions of
life, inter alia, the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to
bring about the destruction of a part of a population.
(j) " Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a women to be
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition
of any population carrying out other grave violations of international law.
(k) "Hors de Combat" means a person who:
(1) is in the power of an adverse party;
(2) has clearly expressed an intention to surrender; or
(3) has been rendered unconscious or otherwise incapacitated by
wounds or sickness and therefore is incapable of defending
himself: Provided, that in any of these cases, the person form any
hostile act and does not attempt to escape.
(l) "Military necessity" means the necessity of employing measures which
are indispensable to achieve a legitimate aim of the conflict and are not
otherwise prohibited by International Humanitarian Law
(m) "Non-defended locality" means a locality that fulfills the following
conditions:
(1) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military
equipment, must have been evacuated;
(2) no hostile use of fixed military installations or establishments
must have been made;
(3) no acts of hostility must have been committed by the
authorities or by the population; and
(4) no activities in support of military operations, must have been
undertaken.
46

(n) "No quarter will be given' means refusing to spare the life of anybody,
even of persons manifestly unable to defend themselves or who clearly
express their intention to surrender.
(o) "Perfidy" means acts which invite the confidence of an adversary to lead
him/her to believe he/she is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection
under the rules of International Humanitarian Law, with the intent to betray
that confidence, including but not limited to:
(1) feigning an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce;
(2) feigning surrender;
(3) feigning incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
(4) feigning civilian or noncombatant status; and
(5) feigning protective status by use of signs, emblems or uniforms
of the United Nations or of a neutral or other State not party to the
conflict.
(p) "Persecution" means the international and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of identity of the
group or collectivity.
(q) "Protect person" in an armed conflict means:
(1) a person wounded, sick or shipwrecked, whether civilian or
military;
(2) a prisoner of war or any person deprived of liberty for reasons
related to an armed conflict;
(3) a civilian or any person not taking a direct part or having
ceased to take part in the hostilities in the power of the adverse
party;
(4) a person who, before the beginning of hostilities, was
considered a stateless person or refugee under the relevant
international instruments accepted by the parties to the conflict
concerned or under the national legislation of the state of refuge or
state of residence;
(5) a member of the medical personnel assigned exclusively to
medical purposes or to the administration of medical units or to the
operation of or administration of medical transports; or
(6) a member of the religious personnel who is exclusively
engaged in the work of their ministry and attached to the armed
forces of a party to the conflict, its medical units or medical
transports, or non-denominational, noncombatant military
personnel carrying out functions similar to religious personnel.
(r) " Superior" means:
(1) a military commander or a person effectively acting as a
military commander; or
(2) any other superior, in as much as the crimes arose from
activities within the effective authority and control of that superior.
(s) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical, mental, or psychological, upon a person in the custody or
under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.
(t) "Works and installations containing dangerous forces" means works and
installations the attack of which may cause the release of dangerous forces
and consequent severe losses among the civilian population, namely: dams,
dikes, and nuclear, electrical generation stations.

47

CHAPTER III
CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Section 4. War Crimes. - For the purpose of this Act, "war crimes" or "crimes
against Interntional Human Humanitarian Law" means:
(a) In case of an international armed conflict , grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against
persons or property protected under provisions of the relevant Geneva
Convention:
(1) Willful killing;
(2) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments;
(3) Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
health;
(4) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly;
(5) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person
of the rights of fair and regular trial;
(6) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population or
unlawful confinement;
(7) Taking of hostages;
(8) Compelling a prisoner a prisoner of war or other protected
person to serve in the forces of a hostile power; and
(9) Unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or
other protected persons.
(b) In case of a non-international armed conflict, serious violations of
common Article 3 to the four (4) Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely , any of the following acts committed against persons taking no
active part in the hostilities, including member of the armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention or any other cause;
(1) Violence to life and person, in particular, willful killings,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(2) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(3) Taking of hostages; and
(4) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally
recognized as indispensable.
(c) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely:
(1) Internationally directing attacks against the civilian population
as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities;
(2) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is,
object which are not military objectives;
(3) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material,
medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol III in
conformity with intentional law;
(4) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations,
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, as ling as they are entitled to the protection given to
48

civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed
conflict;
(5) Launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(6) Launching an attack against works or installations containing
dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects, and causing death or serious injury to body or health .
(7) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages,
dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not
military objectives, or making non-defended localities or
demilitarized zones the object of attack;
(8) Killing or wounding a person in the knowledge that he/she
is hors de combat, including a combatant who, having laid down
his/her arms or no longer having means of defense, has
surrendered at discretion;
(9) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or the
military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United
Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions or other protective signs under International
Humanitarian Law, resulting in death, serious personal injury or
capture;
(10) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not military objectives. In case of
doubt whether such building or place has been used to make an
effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to
be so used;
(11) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party
to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of
any kind, or to removal of tissue or organs for transplantation,
which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his/her
interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health
of such person or persons;
(12) Killing, wounding or capturing an adversary by resort to
perfidy;
(13) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(14) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such
destruction or seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities
of war;
(15) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(16) Ordering the displacements of the civilian population for
reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians
involved or imperative military reasons so demand;
(17) Transferring, directly or indirectly, by the occupying power of
parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or
the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the
occupied territory within or outside this territory;
(18) Commiting outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatments;
(19) Commiting rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions or a serious violation of common Article 3 to the
Geneva Convensions;
49

(20) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person
to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from
military operations;
(21) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare by depriving them of objects indespensable to their
survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided
for under the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols;
(22) In an international armed conflict, compelling the nationals of
the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed
against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's
service before the commencement of the war;
(23) In an international armed conflict, declaring abolished,
suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions
of the nationals of the hostile party;
(24) Commiting any of the following acts:
(i) Conscripting, enlisting or recruiting children under the
age of fifteen (15) years into the national armed forces;
(ii) Conscripting, enlisting or recruiting children under the
age of eighteen (18) years into an armed force or group
other than the national armed forces; and
(iii) Using children under the age of eighteen (18) years to
participate actively in hostilities; and
(25) Employing means of warfare which are prohibited under
international law, such as:
(i) Poison or poisoned weapons;
(ii) Asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or devices;
(iii) Bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human
body, such as bullets with hard envelopes which do not
entirely cover the core or are pierced with incisions; and
(iv) Weapons, projectiles and material and methods of
warfare which are of the nature to cause superfluous
injury or unecessary suffering or which are inherently
indiscriminate in violation of the international law of
armed conflict.
Any person found guilty of commiting any of the acts specified herein shall
suffer the penalty provided under Section 7 of this Act.
Section 5. Genocide - (a) For the purpose of this Act, "genocide" means any of the
following acts with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial,
religious, social or any other similar stable and permanent group as such:
(1) Killing members of the group;
(2) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(3) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(4) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
and
(5) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to directly and publicly incite others
to commit genocide.
Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts specified in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section shall suffer the penalty provided under Section 7 of this Act.
Section 6. Other Crimes Against Humanity. - For the purpose of this act, "other
crimes against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part of
50

a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack:
(a) Willful killing;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation
of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, sexual orientation or
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or
any crime defined in this Act;
(i) Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons;
(j) Apartheid; and
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts specified herein shall suffer
the penalty provided under Section 7 of this Act.

CHAPTER IV
PENAL PROVISIONS
Section 7. Penalties. - Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts
provided under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium to maximum period and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (Php 100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (Php 500,000.00).
When justified by the extreme gravity of the crime, especially where the commision
of any of the crimes specified herein results in death or serious physical injury, or
constitutes rape, and considering the individual circumstances of the accused, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php 500,000.00) to One million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00) shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of inciting others to commit genocide referred to in Section
5(b) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a
fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (Php 10,000.00) to Twenty thousand pesos
(Php 20,000.00).
In addition, the court shall order the forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets
derived, directly or indirectly, from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of
bona fide third (3rd) parties. The court shall also impose the corresponding accessory
penalties under the Revised Penal Code, especially where the offender is a public
officer.
CHAPTER V
SOME PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Section 8. Individual Criminal Responsibilities. - (a) In addition to existing
provisions in Philippine law on principles of criminal responsibility, a person shall
be criminally liable as principal for a crime defined and penalized in this Act if
he/she:
(1) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other
person is criminally responsible;
(2) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime
which in fact occurs or is attempted;
51

(3) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted
commission of such a crime by a group of person acting with a
common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall
either:
(i) be made with the aim of furthering the criminal
activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such
activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime
defined in this Act; or
(ii) be made in the knowledge of the intention of the
group to commit the crime.
(b) A person shall be criminally liable as accomplice for facilitating the
commission of a crime defined and penalized in this Act if he/she aids,
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or attempted commission,
including providing the means for its commission.
(c) A person shall be criminally liable for a crime defined and penalized in
this Act if he/she attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that
commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does
not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's intention.
However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for
punishment under this Act for the attempt to commit the same if he/she
completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
Section 9. Irrelevance of Official Capacity. - This Act shall apply equally to all
persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official
capacity as a head of state or government, a member of a government or parliament,
an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person
from criminal responsibility under this Act, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a
ground for reduction of sentence. However:
(a) Immunities or special procedural rules that may be attached to the
official capacity of a person under Philippine law other than the established
constitutional immunity from suit of the Philippine President during his/her
tenure, shall not bar the court from exercising jurisdiction over such a
person; and
(b) Immunities that may be attached to the official capacity of a person
under international law may limit the application of this Act, nut only
within the bounds established under international law.
Section 10. Responsibility of Superiors. - In addition to other grounds of criminal
responsibility for crimes defined and penalized under this Act, a superior shall be
criminally responsible as a principal for such crimes committed by subordinates
under his/her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as
the case may be, as a result of his/her failure to properly exercise control over such
subordinates, where:
(a) That superior either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time,
should have known that the subordinates were committing or about to
commit such crimes;
(b) That superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures
within his/her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
Section 11. Non-prescription. - The crimes defined and penalized under this Act,
their prosecution, and the execution of sentences imposed on their account, shall not
be subject to any prescription.
Section 12. Orders from a Superior. - The fact that a crime defined and penalized
under this Act has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a government
or a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal
responsibility unless all of the following elements occur:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the
government or the superior in question;
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
For the purposes of this section, orders to commit genocide or other crimes against
humanity are manifestly unlawful.
52

CHAPTER VI
Protection of Victims and Witnesses
Section 13. Protection of Victims and Witnesses. - In addition to existing provisions
in Philippine law for the protection of victims and witnesses, the following measures
shall be undertaken:
(a) The Philippine court shall take appropriate measures to protect the
safety, physical and physiological well-being, dignity and privacy of
victims and witnesses. In so doing, the court shall have regard of all
relevant factors, including age, gender and health, and the nature of the
crime, in particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or
gender violence or violence against children. The prosecutor shall take such
measures particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such
crimes. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the
rights of the accused and to a fair and impartial trial;
(b) As an exception to the general principle of public hearings, the court
may, to protect the victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of
the proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence by
electronic or other special means. In particular, such measures shall be
implemented in the case of the victim of sexual violence or a child who is a
victim or is a witness, unless otherwise ordered by the court, having regard
to all the circumstances, particularly the views of the victim or witness;
(c) Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the court shall
permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of
the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the court in manner which
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair
and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal
representatives of the victims where the court considers it appropriate in
accordance with the established rules of procedure and evidence; and
(d) Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Act
may lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a witness for his/her
family, the prosecution may, for the purposes of any proceedings conducted
prior to the commencement of the trial, withhold such evidence or
information and instead submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be
exercised in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the
rights of the accused and to a fair and impartial trial.
Section 14. Reparations to Victims. - In addition to existing provisions in Philippine
law and procedural rules for reparations to victims, the following measures shall be
undertaken:
(a) The court shall follow the principles relating to the reparations to, or in
respect of, victims,including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.
On this basis, in its decision, the court may, wither upon request or on its
own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of
any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and state the
principles on which it is acting;1avvphi1
(b) The court may make an order directly against a convicted person
specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation; and
(c) Before making an order under this section, the court may invite and shall
take account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted person,
victims or other interested persons.
Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under
national or international law.
CHAPTER VII
Applicability of International Law and Other Laws
Section 15. Applicability of International Law.- In the application and interpretation
of this Act, Philippine courts shall be guided by the following sources:
(a) The 1948 Genocide Convention;
(b) The 1949 Genava Conventions I-IV, their 1977 Additional Protocols I
and II and their 2005 Additional Protocol III;
(c) The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, its First Protocol and its 1999 Second
Protocol;
(d) The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 2000 Optional
Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict;
53

(e) The rules and principles of customary international law;
(f) The judicial decisions of international courts and tribunals;
(g) Relevant and applicable international human rights instruments;
(h) Other relevant international treaties and conventions ratified or acceded
to by the Republic of the Philippines; and
(i) Teachings of the most highly qualified publicists and authoritative
commentaries on the foregoing sources as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of international law.
Section 16. Suppletory Application of the Revised Penal Code and Other General or
Special Laws. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other general or
special laws shall have a suppletory application to the provisions of this Act.
CHAPTER VII
JURISDICTION
Section 17. Jurisdiction.- The State shall exercise jurisdiction over persons, whether
military or civilian, suspected or accused of a crime defined and penalized in this
Act, regardless of where the crime is committed, provided, any one of the following
conditions is met:
(a) The accused is a Filipino citizen;
(b) The accused, regardless of citizenship or residence, is present in the
Philippines; or
(c) The accused has committed the said crime against a Filipino citizen.
In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the
investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if another court or
international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the
prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities may surrender or extradite
suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court,
if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.
No criminal proceedings shall be initiated against foreign nationals suspected or
accused of having committed the crimes defined and penalized in this Act if they
have been tried by a competent court outside the Philippines in respect of the same
offense and acquitted, or having been convicted, already served their sentence.
Section 18. Philippine Court, Prosecutors and Investigators. - The Regional Trial
Court of the Philippines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes
punishable under this Act. Their judgments may be appealed or elevated to the Court
of Appeals and to the Supreme Court as provided by law.
The Supreme Court shall designate special courts to try cases involving crimes
punishable under this Act. For these cases, the Commission on Human Rights, the
Department of Justice, the Philippine National Police or other concerned law
enforcement agencies shall designate prosecutors or investigators as the case may be.
The State shall ensure that judges, prosecutors and investigators, especially those
designated for purposes of this Act, receive effective training in human rights,
International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law.
CHAPTER IX
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 19. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason or reasons, any part or provision
of this Statute shall be held to be unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions
hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 20. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees and issuances,
executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Statute are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 21. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers general circulation.
Approved,