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BPI vs. Casa Internatopnal.

G.R. No. 149507
May 28, 2004
430 SCRA 261

On November 8, 1982, plaintiff CASA Montessori International opened Current Account No.
0291-0081-01 with defendant BPI with CASA’s President Ms. Ma. Carina C. Lebron as one of
its authorized signatories.
"In 1991, after conducting an investigation, plaintiff discovered that nine of its checks had been
encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos since 1990 in the total amount of P782,000.00, who
eventually was known to be a fictitious name used by the external auditor of CASA.
The external auditor admitted forging the signature of CASA’s president to be able to
encash the checks. "It turned out that ‘Sonny D. Santos’ with account at BPI’s Greenbelt
Branch was a fictitious name used by third party defendant Leonardo T. Yabut who worked as
external auditor of CASA. Third party defendant voluntarily admitted that he forged the
signature of Ms. Lebron and encashed the checks. "The PNP Crime Laboratory conducted an
examination of the nine checks and concluded that the handwritings thereon compared to the
standard signature of Ms. Lebron were not written by the latter. The trial court held the bank
liable but this was modified. The modified decision apportioned the loss between BPI and

1. Whether the voluntary admission of Yabut is violative of constitutional rights.
2. Whether there is forgery claim by the petitioner

A forged signature is a real and absolute defense, and a person whose signature appears
on a negotiable instrument is forged is deemed to never have become a party thereto and to
have never consented to the contract that allegedly gave rise to it.

The counterfeiting of any writing, consisting in the signing of another’s name with intent
to defraud, is forgery. First, there was really a finding of forgery. The forger admitted even in
his affidavit of his forgery. Second, there was a finding by the police laboratory that
indeed the signatures were forged.

Furthermore, the negligence is attributable to BPI alone. Its negligence consisted in the
omission of the degree of diligence required of a bank.
The voluntary admission of Yabut did not violate his constitutional rights (1) on custodial
investigation, and (2) against self-incrimination. In the first place, he was not under custodial

His Affidavit was executed in private and before private individuals. The mantle
of protection under Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution

covers only the period
"from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in
the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of
a crime although not yet in custody."

Therefore, to fall within the ambit of Section 12, quoted above, there must be an arrest or a
deprivation of freedom, with "questions propounded on him by the police authorities for the
purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information." The said constitutional
provision does "not apply to spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner"

whereby an
individual orally admits to authorship of a crime. "What the Constitution proscribes is the
compulsory or coercive disclosure of incriminating facts."

Moreover, the right against self-incrimination under Section 17 of Article III of the
Constitution, which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to all other
government proceedings -- including civil actions, legislative investigations, and
administrative proceedings that possess a criminal or penal aspect but not to private
investigations done by private individuals. Even in such government proceedings, this right
may be waived, provided the waiver is certain; unequivocal; and intelligently, understandingly
and willingly made.

Under these two constitutional provisions, "[t]he Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State."

Moreover, the Bill of Rights "is a charter of liberties for
the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state."

These rights are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest coercion by the State that may lead the accused "to admit something
false, not prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

BPI is held liable for P547,115, the total value of the forged checks less the amount already
recovered by CASA from Leonardo T. Yabut, plus interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum -- compounded annually, from the filing of the complaint until paid in full;
and attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) thereof, subject to reimbursement from Respondent
Yabut for the entire amount, excepting attorney’s fees.

Secretary of National defense vs. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906
October 7, 2008

On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo were forcibly taken
from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan by unidentified
armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared by military men belonging to the Citizen
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and
supporters of the New People’s Army(NPA). Both of them suffered torture and violence. After
eighteen months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on the evening of 13August 2007.

On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction,and
Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24
August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense
and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents,
representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined them from causing the
arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to
Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim
and Final Amparo Reliefs. While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a
manifestationand omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition. Petitioners
dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the
October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting
the abduction but denying any involvement therein

On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a
petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and
remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the
petition. On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the
writ of amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of
Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation
reports as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official
assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of
Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense filed
an appeal with the Supreme Court

Issue: Whether or not actual deprivation of life and liberty was violated?

The petition of Secretary of National defense is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and
liberty, and a violation of their right to security under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge...

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the
security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to
give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. The right to privacy is an essential
condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether
it be of home or of persons and correspondence.

Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without
a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical
injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security
of a person.

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to
vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating
information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of
the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution more specifically

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although
not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to
security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed.

G.R. No. 182161
December 3, 2009

Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007.
In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty others, were brought to
Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz
and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was
probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting
to Rebellion.
RTC dismissed the charge filed against the petitioner for lack of probable cause. However,
despite the dismissal of the rebellion case HDO still exists thus petitioner was not able to take
his flight schedule to Hongkong and that every time petitioner would leave and return to the
country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes
because of the existing HDO.
1. Whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on
charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
2. whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his
right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal
recourse or remedy.
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his
right to travel because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The
restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case
filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel
was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right
to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
The writ of Amparo is for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his
or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in
order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its
precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
The court see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the
absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personal
concern that the writ is intended to protect is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. There is no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance
of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by
analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that
the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely
speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through
a petition for a writ of amparo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated February 4,
2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.