November 28, 2009 Saturday Mr. William C. Haman & Mr.

Kevin Donnelly Chief Division Counsel Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation 2500 T.C. Jester Blvd. Houston, Texas 77008 Re: Sanctions et al. Subject: Carol Ann Davis v. City of Jersey Village et al 4:03CV-02395 Mr. Haman & Mr. Kevin Donnelly: Plaintiff Davis has no objection if you want to produce the ‘duty agent’ i.e. Special Agent Rick Veterinarian (fact witness) to disclose information relating to the disjointed and delusional information relayed to him about (retired)Special Agent Ron Stern in connection with USC SDTX 4:03-CV-Ho-02395 regarding complaint number 0-62, and 282-H-Ho-59712, under a Rule 60 (b) (6) when Agent Rick Veterinarian was trying to cover up for Special Agent Al Tribble not requesting the “booking documents”, not to mention YOU COVERING IT UP TOO. The statutory requirements have been clearly satisfied as it relates to the agreement to present special agent Ron Stern and plaintiff limited inquiry. [See usca 5 pages 3759 filed 10-30-08] to ensure you have a valid reason for not granting my request, and “playing games” presently by copy of this letter to Judge

Werlein Jr. that Plaintiff Davis is requesting sanctions i.e. Rule 11 motions and a hearing. Plaintiff Davis is requesting the court to impose sanctions against you at least in the amount for the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred to date including the loss of life, and your participation in re- directing the DOJ investigation that was also involves former United States attorney Laurence Finder., Judge Werlein Jr. is going to want to hear from the duty agent Rick who practices veterinary medicine and law enforcement, and Plaintiff is seeking unspecified damages from YOU and John M. O’Quinn is that delusional and disjointed enough for you sir. This will include Special Agent Rick Veterinarians medical diagnosis of Plaintiff Davis; his basis in medicine, fact and law about disjointed and delusional information where Plaintiff is correcting by “connecting the dots” to YOU, and Special Agent Al Tribble and appends the information to Part I ( correction Number One) of the motion to vacate filed at 274 and 275 pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (6) filed in “Federal Court” and in Harris County Probate Court No. 2 Judge Mike Woods presiding, armed with a verified request for Declaratory Relief in a Section 1983, where the United States Department of Justice, Albert N. Moskowitz on July 19, 2002 authorized a Section 1983 civil lawsuit, 2002 documented in their letter to Plaintiff Davis that she file a civil rights lawsuit against the City of Jersey Village et al for constitional deprivations,

and YOU continue to punish Plaintiff Davis due to Judge Sim Lake “FILE A COMPLAINT ON THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY” knowing full well Plaintiff Davis was not as sophisticated in government operations and the complaint was misdirected and should have been aimed at YOU. Plaintiff Davis was unaware it was you did not agree with Albert M. Moskowitz, Chief of the Criminal Section of the United States Department of Justice and know if Plaintiff Davis discovers “Federal Court” reporter Cher Barron removed that letter from the “Federal Court” file there is not going to be enough ‘medicine’ to fix the delusion I have planned for YOU and her in a Federal Court to disjoint both of your freedom and profits from illegal activity. Special Agent Rick Veterinarian ‘handing’ Ron Sterns federal information source clearly not proper and ‘advising’ Plaintiff “Go to the doctor, “for

medication” presumably to medicate her for delusions about O’Quinn and the FAKE client documented in the “CAPIAS” that it is NOT an illegal dissemination and an offer of proof of tampering with government data bases not pursuant to the Texas Government Code , Subchapter F has not been presented, and to seek ‘medicine’ it is detected as a part of YOUR GAME. The medicine is the TML policy limits and Declaratory Relief granted, and gets you FIRED, sir. The ‘duty agent i.e. Rick Veterinarian has OBJECTED November 23, 2009 absent a medical or a law license to Judge Werlein’s continued “Federal Court” jurisdiction,

claiming Plaintiff Davis is delusional ‘fanciful’, and “out of an abundance of caution” the “Federal Court” is requested to set a hearing, and immediately hear the EMERGENCY, OF THE DUTY AGENT and the PERIL of Plaintiff Davis request for ‘medicine’ i.e. sanctions against you, Mr. William C. Haman to explore your professional violations detected even if you occupy Plaintiff is needing ‘medicine’ and not her legal right to payment for damages. Plaintiff Davis made claims against the United States, through the Order of Judge Sim Lake for the actions of the FBI, and other agents, connected to the sentencing of Texas DPS Trooper Defendant Richard Rodriguez, for tampering with governmental data base computers but, Plaintiff Davis still not understanding the O’Quinn Law Firm ‘s role in ‘representing’ a FAKE client under the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”) for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, concealing the physical assaults of February 18, 2001, and Special Agent Al Tribble not requesting the “booking documents”, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and invasion of privacy is DETECTED as a part of the cover up. The ‘duty agent’ so much as said, Plaintiff Davis filed a “Bivens” 1 claims against FBI agents for due process and Fifth Amendment violations for alleged violations of the federal Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18

U.S.C. § 1961-1968, by The O’Quinn Law Firm, and various employees of these government operations i.e. State of Texas et al, court reporters, videographers and interference with economic advantage and benefit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud and deceit claims against all defendants connected to the Department of Justice Special Agent Ron Stern contract that bears Plaintiff Davis name to collect criminal evidence armed with the July 19, 2002 . While at the time, Plaintiff was unaware that Judge Sim Lake was talking about you, Mr. William C. Haman. The FTCA applies state law to determine the government’s liability for torts within the FTCA waiver of immunity. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674. Under Texas law, there are seven [7] elements for a malicious prosecution claim: (1) commencement of a criminal prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) causation (initiation or procurement) of the action by the defendant; (3) termination of the prosecution in the plaintiff’s favor; (4) the plaintiff’s innocence; (5) the absence of probable cause for the proceedings; (6) malice in filing the charge; and (7) damage to the plaintiff. See Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1997). Special Agent Al Tribble did not ask for the “booking documents “as part of the setup to protect his friend former head of the Houston FBI Office Don Clark (emphasis added). Attorney John M. O’Quinn hired Don Clark to protect John O’Quinn and his empire built on corrupt activities with public officials;

racketeering the purpose of Ron Stern’s probe and the contract with Plaintiff Davis . Your argument; Plaintiff Davis cannot meet the fifth criterion, absence of probable cause, and blame Plaintiff for the absence of indictments related to the targets for bribing a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A)& (C), which provides: (b) Whoever (1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives . . . anything of value to any public official . . . with intent (A) to influence any official act; or (B) to induce such public official . . . to commit or aid in committing, or collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; shall be [subject to criminal liability] is not going to be received very well by Judge Werlein. You are aware Judge Werlein is a stickler about the law; he expects to see a commitment to public service. Protecting John M. O’Quinn and the FAKE client is not the commitment that is authorized by the “Federal Court” where YOU joined in the “game”; “Everyone agrees to lie” to the “Federal Court “and plaintiff Davis. Probable cause is defined as “the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor [complainant], that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.” Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517 (citation omitted) (editing original). If the facts necessary to instigate a criminal prosecution are in dispute, the issue of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact to be

resolved by Judge Werlein Jr. Where the facts underlying the decision to prosecute are not disputed, however, then the question of probable cause is a question of law decided by the court. See Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 518. It is undisputed that Al Tribble did not collect the “booking documents” and has continued to PROFIT as a Special Agent for the FBI, and Al Tribble has defended the employment of Don Clark when Clark was hired by John M. O’Quinn during a federal investigation about public corruption i.e. Texas Attorney General Dan Morales remember him? FBI Agent Robert Hightower remember him? The only dispute concerns Tribble’s s mens rea – what Al Tribble knew or intended. “[T]he complainant’s failure to make a further investigation into the suspect’s state of mind does not constitute lack of probable cause if all objective elements of a crime reasonably appear to have been completed, and the ‘duty agent’ wants Plaintiff Davis medicated for delusion and disjointed thoughts. Even though the Plaintiff Davis evidence might have been weak (delusional and or disjointed) and the prospects of obtaining a conviction may not have been good, before receiving the medical diagnosis of the Special Agent Veterinarian as a matter of law, the Davis Plaintiff “ federal information source “ under Special Agent Ron Stern has proffered proof of probable cause; and thus Plaintiff Davis has not failed to state a claim for the denial of protection of her civil rights, when Al Tribble did not collect the “booking documents” from Sgt. Robert “Body Armor” LaRouax

connected to investigation 282-A-HO-59712 where Plaintiff hand wrote about John M. O’Quinn and his vast government conspiracy on February 18, 2001 and when Al Tribble ‘investigates’ Don Clark gets a new job , and Plaintiff says come on back Don it’s over because YOU know everything of John M. O’Quinn ‘s is mine because if you do not Plaintiff Davis is going to prosecute you too Mr. Don Clark; and by copy Don Clark is advised. (See Houston Chronicle Archive and the United States Attorney Ronald G. Woods, and his professional opinion that Clark working for O’Quinn was “problematic” and for $ 150.00., Plaintiff Davis can turn “hearsay” in to testimony evidence against the O’Quinn, his billion dollar empire where Plaintiff Davis says its mine (and the Harris County Rico Victims) – Judge Werlein Jr. rules, while you too act “impervious to the truth”. 2. Abuse of Process Under Texas law, there are three elements for an abuse of process claim: “(1) that Al Tribble made an illegal, improper or perverted use of the process, a use neither warranted nor authorized by the process; (2) that the Al Tribble et al had an ulterior motive or purpose in exercising such illegal, perverted or improper use of the process; and (3) that damage resulted to the plaintiff Davis as a result of such illegal act.” Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 577 (5th Cir. 1996). The ‘duty agent ‘allegations are fatally defective because they fail to allege use of the process other than the mere institution of the veterinarian, insult to injury, “playing games” i.e. obstruction of justice ,

trivializing Plaintiff Davis peril which was not improper. See In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 739 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, as a matter of law, Plaintiff Davis has not failed to state a claim for abuse of process upon which relief can be granted. C. RICO Plaintiff claims and argues that Judge Werlein is going to err in dismissing you from the prosecution of Plaintiff Davis RICO claims against the government agents i.e. Al Tribble and private defendants on the basis of qualified immunity, when it was Al Tribble deliberate act that gives Plaintiff Davis FIRST CHAIR, based on the letter written by the Department of Justice, and YOU have NOT earned the right to be a GOVERNMENT LAWYER and YOU have ABUSED YOUR OFFICE . Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established’ statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) but Tribble knew NOT to ask for the “booking documents” How ? Plaintiff Davis advises him in a delusional and disjointed manner, and this is your chance to sell it to the Judge – that you are innocent too. Plaintiff has been talking to this Judge since 2003 sometimes represented by counsel most of the time not. This Judge has permitted his Plaintiff to file 27 post trial motions after a four day trial. This Judge has commitment to public service and he is going to look at you and your commitment to public service and this judge is going to make an inquiry in the

public interest due to his commitment to serve the United States of America and its citizens a job that you are supposed to be interested in but you want to “play games”. It is standard operating procedure to request the “booking documents”. The district court will determine that Al Tribble is not entitled to qualified immunity from the RICO claim because the Plaintiffs can show a violation of statutory rights secured by RICO. Specifically, the district court WILL reasoned that “[t]he FBI agent IS liable for RICO violations in the performance of their duties BUT there can be no RICO claim against federal officials on account of their alleged official misconduct,” citing McNeily v. United States , 6 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1993). The holding in McNeily , which held that the FDIC cannot be sued under the RICO statute because the FDIC, as a federal agency, is not chargeable, indictable or punishable for violations of state and federal criminal provisions. See id., relying on Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991). Had the Plaintiffs named the FBI as a defendant to this suit, the district court would have been on firm ground in dismissing RICO claims against that federal agency based on McNeily. However, McNeily does not support the grant of qualified immunity to the FBI agents or to the private individuals who acted at the direction of John M. O’Quinn just like those ‘attorneys’ at the Texas Attorney General Law Enforcement Division , David Talbot, Karen Matlock et al who accepted the setup letter of attorneys Larry Mayo and Leona Filis working
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together to achieve one single purpose ; protect O’Quinn and his billion dollar empire. However, if the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on some alternative ground, the district court’s may affirm a dismissal however doubtful See Gulf Island IV, 940 F.2d at 952. In assessing a claim of qualified

immunity, Judge Werlein Jr. must determine whether: (1) the plaintiff Davis has asserted a constitutional or statutory violation; (2) the law regarding the alleged violation was clearly established at the time of the operative events; and (3) the record shows that the violation occurred, or at least gives rise to “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Al Tribble actually engaged in conduct that violated the clearly- established law, by not requesting the “booking documents.” Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1999). If Judge Werlein Jr. determines that Al Tribble official’s conduct violated clearly established law, we address whether that conduct was objectively reasonable. See Wren v. Towe, 130 F.3d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1997). The Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act RICO imposes criminal and civil liability upon those who engage in “a pattern of racketeering activity” defined as “any act or threat involving” specified state-law crimes, acts indictable under various specified federal statutes, and other federal offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Section 1964(c) allows a private party who has been sustained damages from a RICO violation, to recover those damages. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). And, you are aware even if you think it is delusional and
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disjointed Plaintiff Davis herein alleges that the Government and private defendants’ racketeering activities included mail and wire fraud, which are included among the enumerated predicate acts or a RICO claim. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). . In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the mail fraud statute did not prohibit schemes that defrauded people of their intangible rights to an honest and impartial government. Following McNally , Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346, 2 which, in one sentence, provided that “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” In 1997, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that, by enacting § 1346, Congress intended to protect the intangible right of honest services from wire fraud schemes by state actors. See United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1997) (“fraud statutes cover the deprivation of intangible rights.”). However, prior to the en banc resolution of Brumley, such rights were clearly established by the enactment of § 1346. See id. At 736 (dissent) (“It is therefore incomprehensible to us that the majority can conclude . . . that [§ 1346] reflects a clear statement of a Congressional intention to protect the citizenry of a state from corrupt state officials.”). Because the rights asserted by Plaintiff Davis are clearly established at the time of defendants’ alleged acts, Judge Werlein Jr., will conclude and not err in not dismissing Plaintiff Davis RICO claims. D. Supremacy Clause and State
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Law Claims Plaintiff Davis has yet to bring state law claims for civil conspiracy, invasion of privacy, interference with economic advantage and benefit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 3 and fraud and deceit. Plaintiff Davis contends she is not on the ground that she is barred by the federal supremacy clause, even when you argue Plaintiff Davis is delusional and makes disjointed comments, you make consider that Judge Werlein understand the illusion of good government, the RICO of John M. O’Quinn, and shares an understanding of his Plaintiff ‘disjointed ‘ from Agent Ron Stern is YOUR FAULT, and know Plaintiff Davis is going to advise his wife, United States Attorney Julia Stern, by facsimile, and she will have it by the time you read this line. 4 1. Government Agents The individual agents’ immunity from suit under Texas law is the issue. The Attorney General has not certified under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) that the agents acted within the scope of their employment at the time of the events at issue, thereby substituting the United States as defendant on those claims, see Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno , 515 U.S. 417, 420 (1995). This procedure is not challenged but no doubt in “the game” the government is still working for O’Quinn and you will and you have because you did not seek a
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decision knowing the whole time Al Tribble did not request the “booking documents” on purpose and you want to “play games” with a former Special Agent in this case Ron Stern’s Federal Information Source, where YOU waived YOUR rights to prosecute your friends softly for public corruption crime and YOU know Plaintiff Davis is requesting Judge Werlein to take it all, exclude you and – it is justified 2. Private Defendants The district court will not dismiss Plaintiff Davis state law claims against the private defendants under the federal supremacy clause. While this Court has not addressed the issue of whether the supremacy clause preempts state law tort claims against private defendants acting at the direction of the federal government, there is some precedent to guide us and it is NOT disjointed. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the supremacy clause preempted state law liability of independent contractors performing work for the federal government. Under Boyle, state law may be preempted where: (1) there is a uniquely federal interest and (2) there is a significant
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conflict between federal policy and the operation of state law. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504-05, 507. The liability of private defendants for actions taken at the direction of agents acting within their authority is a unique federal interest. Private businesses and individuals provide invaluable assistance as informants who provide evidence against law violators or, as in this instance, lend credibility to FBI undercover operations. If private businesses were not eligible for immunity from state law claims arising from assisting undercover federal operations, this would provide a major disincentive to assisting law enforcement and would undermine the needs and interests of the federal government. At issue then, is whether the federal policy conflicts with the operation of state law. If the private defendants committed what would have been illegal acts under state law at the direction and control of agents acting within their authority, the operation of state law would conflict with federal policy. In Hunter v. Wood, 209 U.S. 205 (1908), where state law conflicted with a federal court order, the Court will not preclude a state law prosecution of a railroaded federal information source who worked with another federal information source both who worked with federal agents i.e. Ron Stern in this
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case, and has made an offer of proof in the FAKE client documented in the “CAPIAS” is not public corruption when the same ‘client’ was used to high jack legal processes , government operations, waste, fraud and abuse now under investigation at Texas State Auditor John Keel’s Office pursuant to and in that order. Similarly, this Court has suggested that federal immunity privilege should be extended to preclude an action against a telephone company who assisted federal law enforcement agents with wiretapping. See Fowler v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 343 F.2d 150, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1965). See also Connecticut v. Marra, 528 F. Supp. 381 (D. Conn. 1981) (holding that defendant working at direction of FBI was entitled to federal immunity from state law prosecution). State law cannot operate to impede individuals who have government authority and act as is necessary and proper within that authority. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890). If the private defendants acted in good faith by reasonably relying upon the authority of government agents, their actions are shielded from state law action. In this case, the private defendants, in good faith, did not support the FBI’s undercover operation with credibility and legitimacy attached to Special Agent Ron Stern (a turf war). There is
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ample evidence that the private defendants acted maliciously or attempted to derive personal gain from not assisting in the operation. Moreover, the private defendants’ actions, consistent with the apparent authority granted by the government agents, were objectively not reasonable. Under the veil of apparent authority, the private defendants had ample reason to believe that their actions were illegal or would cause injury to Plaintiff Davis and her witnesses. Thus, Plaintiff Davis state law claims against the private defendants are not barred by the supremacy clause. E. FTCA and Bivens Claims: Statute of Limitations You are not authorized to argue that the district court erred in finding that Plaintiff Davis FTCA causes of action and Bivens claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. The district court will not err in holding that Plaintiff Davis Bivens claims are not time barred, and you nevertheless affirm the those claims on the basis of qualified immunity when you “play games.”

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1. FTCA Claims The FTCA applies a two-year statute of limitations from the accrual date of the cause of action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). A cause of action accrues, under federal law, “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff's knowledge of the injury depends on two elements: (1) the existence of the injury; and (2) the connection between the injury and the defendant's actions. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995). After carefully reviewing the veterinarian comments Plaintiff Davis would ask Judge Werlein Jr. to permit a PLAINTIF FIFTH Amended Complaint, concluding Lindy filed the first one, Jerry S. Payne filed the second one, Plaintiff Davis sued O’Quinn and that is the Forth one, Beverly Thompson and Plaintiff have sought Declaratory Relief and that is the fifth one , and this is the Sixth one, and that Plaintiff Davis et al claims for assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy are NOT barred by the statute of limitations. They rest on allegations of events that occurred in with Special Agent Ron Stern and Plaintiff Davis, and have been presented more than two18 | P a g e

years after the events giving rise to the ongoing and continued complaint, and Judge Werlein is correct in NOT dismissing them, and Judge Hitter is not correct for trying to dismiss Plaintiff Davis claims.

2. Bivens Claims Judge Werlein Jr., is holding that Plaintiff Davis et al and (the class action claims) i.e. Bivens claims for due process and Fifth

Amendment violations are not barred by the statute of limitations. Under Bivens, a person may sue a federal agent for money damages when the federal agent has allegedly violated that person's constitutional rights, not asking for the “booking document” when advised to do so by Plaintiff Davis, and not following procedure in seeking to “booking documents”. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). A Bivens action is controlled by the applicable state statute of limitations. See Alford v. United States, 693 F.2d 498, 499 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). This Court, applying Texas law, has held that the statute of limitations period on a Bivens claim is two years. See Pena v. United
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States, 157 F.3d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff Davis became

aware that he had been injured by the Defendants’ alleged violation of his constitutional rights on 12:26 PM November 23, 2009 when the FBI agents revealed to her that she needed to see a doctor had been expending her time and energy in furthering the deceptions of FBI Agent Ron Stern, rather than the government’s business interests. Likewise, the pleadings herein allege that the FBI revealed the undercover scheme to Plaintiff Davis on November 28, 2009 when Ramon Viada sent a police officer to kick in Plaintiff Davis front door at 25311 Sugar Valley Lane, Spring, Texas 77373. However, Judge Werlein Jr., will find nothing in the record that establishes when Plaintiff Davis was made privy to this information she did not act in the government’s best interest because she always tells Judge Werlein Jr. EVERYTHING! Judge Werlein will affirm and hold that

Plaintiff Davis et al Bivens claims are not barred by Texas’ two-year statute of limitations, but will find that you unable to argue the district court not dismissing Al Tribble and Don Clark from Plaintiff Davis Bivens claims on statute of limitations grounds other than the usual lying, and misrepresentations in litigation, and considering Judge Werlein knows about Judge Sim Lake YELLING AT YOU, “as a
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precautionary matter and out of an abundance of caution” you best dial up your ‘friends’ attorney Lori Gillespie and Ken Wall and process Plaintiff Davis a check for policy limits, have the check for damages ready to present to Judge Werlein Jr. and quit “playing games” in a “Federal Court” case where you have no place on the “game” board or in the “playpen”. 3. Qualified immunity Although neither the pleadings, herein are coherent to YOU the Judge Werlein will order the briefs develop the analysis, it is obvious that Al Tribble et al defendants do not have a qualified immunity defense to the Bivens claims. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy, Judge Werlein Jr., will not dismiss Plaintiff Davis Bivens claims on that alternative ground. See Gulf Island, IV, 940 F.2d at 952. “Governmental officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct [does] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 166 (1992). Plaintiff Davis Bivens claims are not bottomed on defendant Al Tribble et al violations of Plaintiff Davis
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constitutional due process rights.


Judge Werlein court has not

addressed the particular issue presented by this case: the specific limits on federal agents’ authority in undercover operations and their continued turf war i.e. Ron Stern (Justin Fox) commitment to prosecute public corruption versus Al Tribble Don Clark et al to be paid ( public money) to cover up public corruption. The district court will find no limits on the power of federal agents operating under cover, reasoning that if Plaintiff Davis is allowed to pursue state law causes of action it would “effectively stop” unauthorized federal undercover operations because, “by their very nature [ they] seek to invade the privacy of those who violate the law.” The district court will say use legal authority, that “[t]he constitutional structure of our federal system does permit private litigants to police federal law enforcement activities by asserting state law claims against federal law enforcement agencies or their agents who play games with other agents “federal information source.” The district court will not err in this regard and you asked the wrong question and reached the wrong conclusion. The Judge will ask whether it was constitutionally permissible for federal agents to inflict damages on innocent nontargets

during an undercover operation and refuse them
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compensation or assistance. Because the Fifth Amendment due process guarantee against conscience-shocking injury imposes clear limits on law enforcement conduct, Judge Werlein will conclude that it was neither necessary nor proper for the Al Tribble on November 23, 2009 at 12:23 PM in this case to destroy the lives and businesses of innocent non-targets in the name of law enforcement, nor is the dispatching a one man mission to arrest Plaintiff Davis on November 24, 2009. Pretend you do not know “The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) it is your job on the line because you want to “play games” with Plaintiff Davis. The Due Process Clause was intended to prevent government officials from “playing games” abusing their power or employing it as an instrument of oppression. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992). The cognizable level of executive abuse of power is “playing games” and then it is “total police power” that which “shocks the conscience,” violates the “decencies of civilized conduct” or interferes with rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 209-210 (1952). Obviously, this guarantee of due process protects citizens against deliberate harm
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from government officials See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) is a delusion and or a disjointed conversation. Allegations of lesser culpability have been held adequate to state a claim in some circumstances. For example, deliberate indifference suffices to impose due process liability when government actors fail to provide adequate care for pretrial detainees with serious medical needs. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) and you said Plaintiff Davis needed a ‘doctor ‘and ‘medicine” when YOU know Plaintiff Davis testified the best medicine for Section 1983 and other constitional deprivations was an attorney like Jerry S. Payne (unless Cher Barron deleted that testimony on her wave digital recorder) However, harm inflicted due to government actors’ simple negligence is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328. The Supreme Court recently provided a road map for navigating mid-level-culpability due process claims. In County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833 (1998), parents of a motorcycle passenger killed in a high-speed police chase brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the officer and governmental agencies involved, alleging deprivation of their decedent’s substantive due process right to life. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1712. The Supreme Court
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rejected the plaintiff’s contention that proof of deliberate indifference by the officer would be sufficient to establish a due process violation. Id. at 1711. “A police officer deciding whether to give chase must balance on one hand the need to stop a suspect and show that flight from the law is no way to freedom, and, on the other, the high-speed threat to everyone within stopping range, be they suspects, their passengers, other drivers or bystanders .” Id. at 1720. Analogizing the circumstances of a police chase to the situation of officers called on to quell a prison riot, the Supreme Court held that “‘[a] deliberate indifference standard does not adequately capture the importance of such competing obligations, or convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance.’” Id. at 1720, quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). The court went on to distinguish situations where mid-level fault was sufficient to impose liability. For example, liability for deliberate indifference to inmate welfare rests upon the luxury enjoyed by prison officials of having time to make unhurried judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1720. “When such
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extended opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking. But when unforeseen circumstances demand an officer’s instant judgment, even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the shock that implicates ‘the large concerns of the governors and the governed’” Id., quoting Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. at 332 when you and your agents behave in a delusional fashion a remedy is requested that Judge Werlein Jr., get you some medicine too located at the infirmary at the “Federal Court” detention center and that you do not pass “Go” i.e. the Exit sign at the Federal Court House but go straight to jail. Applying the Lewis analysis to the FBI’s alleged

activity in this case, Judge Werlein will conclude that the FBI made decisions which harmed the Plaintiffs after ample opportunity for cool reflection. In fact, they invested almost years and thousands of man hours in developing the sting operation attached to the name of DEPARTMNET OF JUSTICE FEDEAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATON SPECIAL AGENT RON STERN ET AL. Thus, the due process clause protects the Plaintiff Davis from any harm that arose from the officers and Agent Al Tribble et al including you and your deliberate indifference. The facts, as pleaded, establish at least
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that level of federal agent culpability as Special Agent Ron Stern Operation on Public Corruption – 062 where he armed Plaintiff Davis with a government tape recorder evolved into a disaster at your office but a windfall for the “probe’ attached to Special Agent Ron Stern where Stern and Judge Werlein snag a bounty for the RICO Victims and Texas; as it should be. Therefore Judge Werlein Jr., will hold that Plaintiff Davis allegations that federal agents inflicted damages on him, an innocent non-target, during this particular undercover operation and refused her assistance and compensation states a claim under Bivens . However, because Judge Werlein will address today for the first time the parameters of due process protections afforded innocent third parties injured by law enforcement sting operations run amok, ( the Estate of Melinda Honerkamp , the estate of Marvin Leo West, the estate of Susan Carol Sherman, Al Johnson, Beverly Thompson, Joe Olson and the other RICO victims, now including adult children ) and because the Supreme Court’s language that drives our analysis appeared in a case decided in 1998, Plaintiff Davis can say that the due process rights claimed by Plaintiff Davis ( and Melinda Honerkamp when she sued Judge William M. “Bill “ Elliot) were clearly established during 1992-94. See Lewis, 523 U.S. 833.
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Judge Werlein will therefore affirm Plaintiff Davis Bivens claims on the alternative basis of qualified immunity. Based on the foregoing, get me my check for policy limits today and allow me to speak to Agent Ron Stern because Judge Werlein when I request it , will affirm Plaintiff Davis and not dismiss her Section 1983 law suit. The Duty Agent i.e. Randy i.e. veterinarian suggesting medication, hospitalization if proper for YOU to have conveyed to Plaintiff Davis, YOU should have filed a proper motion in court to “handle “ the federal information source instead of “playing games” to protect attorney Ramon Viada from lying and withholding in a ‘federal investigation’ or trying to

intimidate the “federal information source”. Judge Sim Lake told “the federal information source” (and Beverly Thompson) to file a complaint on the United States Attorney, we did not know it was you. With the threats made on my life and false arrest of Arvin Leo West, the ‘authorized’ activities of your ATF division, i.e. Ronnie Holley (and Cheryl Yates Webb) when the “federal information source” was making her first attempt to vacate the corrupted verdict obtained by lawyer misconduct i.e. Racketeering, your “contract’ and your silly
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little “game” detected with Mary Docherty et al and the undercover private investigator. Your ‘Duty Agent’, Rick

( the ‘Veterinarian’) clearly has ‘credible’ information but not related to the 878 pages of documents Andrew Duffin downloaded to the State of Texas Computer for attorney Warren Tom Harrison, that was discovered in the Brazos

County case that “Lindy” filed against Sandstone Center and ‘Dr.’ John Vernon Kin Ross Wright that “connects the dots” to attorneys Barbara W. Palmer, Richard Sewell along with

O’Quinn and attorney Charles Soechting to this “vast government conspiracy” where you occupy a fanciful notion and play games in your busy practice that a DOJ “federal information source” under Special Agent Ron tern is going to let you PROFIT from the murder of another “federal and any further concealment of the

information source” HUB, John M. O’Quinn.

Judge Werlein Jr., suggested settlement but the ‘government lawyers’ want to measure the damage to a “federal information source” by the Texas Double Standard. US Julia Stern says “I do not want anything to happen to you”; expert
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Charles Dean Huckabee “lawyers lie” is it you are her we will see in “Federal Court” because this motion is live under a Rule 60 (b) (6) and armed with Declaratory Relief request and you want to play games . This motion i.e. ticket to the game is not be a waiver of any privilege or statutory protection applicable to the material and or information Plaintiff Davis has requested and previously requested. Finally this Motion for Sanctions and a request (to amend Plaintiff Davis original complaint) is in compliance with rule 5 and 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been satisfied. Should you have any

questions in this regard, call me otherwise; I will see you at the “Federal Court”; your office cannot be trusted with matters of truth and justice explaining why Judge Sim Lake in court told Plaintiff Davis and Beverly Thompson to file a complaint on the United States Attorney Office. Please extend the complaint process to former United State Attorney Lawrence D. Finder as I have clearly stated in my disclosures and other supporting sworn motions connected to the case before Judge David Hittner, did not have jurisdiction. Your Department authorized this Section 1983 court case a long time ago based on the false
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police reports of officer Defendant Robert LaRouax, and the withholding of attorney Ramon Viada i.e. the “booking documents”, and again requested is your SWORN response why THE HOUSTON FBI OFFICE – AGENT AL TRIBBLE, did nothing to save Lindy’s life, but will spend millions of public money to protect the RICO of John M. O’Quinn. Be

prepared for voir dire and an inquiry why the ‘O’Quinn” Law Firm was excused from this particular exercise the “Touhy letter” and the other exercise you have decided in violation of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct, when attorney Lin Wood subpoenaed Mr. Don Clark and all those favors Mr. John M. O’Quinn talks about under oath he does for the FBI, be sure you bring that “Touhy letter” agreement to court when Don Clark testified in the Anna Nicole case; Judge Werlein is going to ask you for it and requested is to give Judge Werlein Jr., total control when Judge Dagget took the Corvette, in violation of the Judicial and Professional Rules of conduct just Judge Squiers and Bill Elliot. Plaintiff Davis must be stupid not to have looked at you and how you and the ‘duty agent’ play games in a “Federal Court” case and its “Due Course”
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where what Plaintiff Davis says it is YOU which is disjointed, delusional and requiring medication adjustment, in the Federal Detention Center and where you and the “federal information source” diverge based on Albert M. Robert Moskowitz, Chief Criminal Section of the United States Department of Justice letter for PLAINTIFF DAVIS to prosecute this Section 1983 case, and the next thing I am going to ask you is how do you know ‘agent’ Batista, and to promptly respond to requests, concentrate on identifying main files in the Central Records System at FBI Headquarters( emphasis added). In the end Plaintiff Davis decided to follow the Department of Justice letter about filing a civil suit on the chance that she could be restored for something like frivolous charges attached to the illegal disseminations of government data bases as documented in the “CAPIAS” and connected to the O’Quinn Law Firm et al and his “vast government conspiracy” and you are aware Plaintiff Davis is directed to follow protocol and speak with the Department of Justice veterinarian i.e. duty agent and following the instruction directed to Plaintiff Davis that, theoretically, could prevent me from bringing future suit against the agency, and discover finally if agent Ron Stern, his wife, Julia Stern for playing a game with Plaintiff Davis. Basically, when submitting to a federal judge a motion to file a
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civil suit against any federal agency, that judge first, before any discovery processes or otherwise occurs, must deem whether the civil suit is worth pursuing; if the judge finds the request frivolous, he or she can apply a variety of punishments to the plaintiff, known as sanctions. Sanctions can be monetary fines and can also contain other specific directives solely at the discretion of the judge such as banning the plaintiff from ever filing future suit against the agency in question, but in this case the Department of Justice directed me to protect my legal right and now you want to “play games”. Requested sanctions, and a disclosure of your investigation connected to Plaintiff Davis where I have requested the former FBI Agent Ron Stern to come to court in a Section 1983 civil lawsuit. Where, when, what, why, and what role has supposed mental illness played, especially as a tool employed by the investigation itself in its goal of discrediting Plaintiff Davis attempts to gain information regarding the investigation and be paid damages. You ignore the evidence of retired FBI Agent Justin Fox’s named in a reckless manner and requested is you explain that too when you tender the TML policy limits and do not come to court without my check to be paid for damages in your silly little game to protect John M. O’Quinn and his FAKE client to exact harm i.e. RETALIATE on Ron Sterns criminal investigation.

Respectfully submitted,

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Carol Ann Davis 25311 Sugar Valley Spring, Texas 77373 281-350-2943

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Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Added by Pub.L. 100-690, Title VII, § 7603(a),
3 Davis

Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4508.

is bringing

separate claims for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claims brought pursuant to Texas state law are addressed here. The causes of action seeking relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act are discussed above the game is over.

It is not clear from the record before Plaintiff Davis and the question need not be reached whether Plaintiff Davis state law claims are governed by the Texas two year statute of limitations, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 or the four year statute of limitations, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.004. See Williams v. Khalaf, 802 S.W.2d 651, 658 (Tex. 1990).

Plaintiff Davis and Thompson et al are bringing

additional Bivens claims based on violations of their rights and the other RICO victims and seek to consult with an attorney during their encounters with agents. Thompson et al has made a clear allegation that she suffered similar violations by her signature below and;

Davis & Thompson emphasize at the outset that the legitimacy of the

operation vis-a-vis those who violate the law, i.e. the targets of Ron Stern’s PUBLIC CORRUPTION PROBE is a BIG issue in this law suit and the request for Declaratory Relief and for Judge Werlein to “catch all “ of the MONEY. Because it is a legitimate windfall for the Ron Stern probe- and

that IS HOW YOU ARE INTENDED TO PLAY THE GAME – SO THE United States wins and the State of Texas wins – Davis and Thompson about your ‘friends’ – Game over and Lindy told you repeatedly “Paybacks are hell” and now that Al Johnson lived to tell Judge Werlein Jr. about the “game” when Cheryl Yates Webb became a ‘private investigator’ undercover due to the delivery of criminal evidence connected to Carla Roberson Cummings the poster child of lying and the dots are connected to the Right Hand Man ex-Texas DPS trooper attorney Charles Soechting Mr. O’Quinn’s “stalwart partner” who is now screaming, and reported by Carolyn Logan is Soechting is going to shut Plaintiff Davis down , the question is where because he does not have a chance in “Federal Court” and its “Due Course” is set on him and Professor Treece the ‘applicant’ when they “play games” with Judge Werlein Jr. knowing full well Judge Werlein Jr. rules Judge Mike Wood of Probate No. 2 and that Judge Wood as a precautionary measure vacate his Order where he granted Gerald T. Treece application to act as EXECTOR where a “Federal Court” in “Due course” is going to absolve the same because of the reasons stated by Maria Yolanda Lopez , assistant Harris County Probate No. 2 “ We do not listen to the federal court , we do things our own way here” is simply not in compliance with the law; well settled law and the game of John M. O’Quinn is finally over, AND DO NOT EVER INSULT MY JUDGE

AGAIN is the message to ALL OF THE LAWYERS ! (Excluding attorney Jerry S. Payne who knows better). Mr. Haman you and me – we are done , GOOGLE “RAMON VIADA” & visit the website dedicated to the Texas Double Standard that you have worked so hard to protect , and then you are well advised to seek the counsel of attorney Alla Petard

www.greatlawyer@ this demand is what Alla says you are looking for

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