You are on page 1of 62

LONDON REGIONAL RESILIENCE FORUM

LOOKING BACK, MOVING FORWARD

London Resilience Team


Government Office for London
Riverwalk House
157-161 Millbank
London SW1P 4RR
The Multi–Agency Debrief
www.londonprepared.gov.uk
enquiries-lrt@gol.gsi.gov.uk
Lessons identified and progress since the
terrorist events of 7 July 2005
© Crown copyright 2006

Produced by Government Office for London


Printed on paper comprising 80% post consumer waste and 20% ECF pulp

September 2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE NUMBER

FOREWORD ............................................................................................................... i
SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1
SECTION 2 – OVERVIEW.......................................................................................... 3
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS ................................................................................... 5
SUSTAINABILITY ................................................................................................... 5
STRATEGIC CO-ORDINATION CENTRE .............................................................. 5
TELECOMMUNICATIONS .................................................................................... 6
WARNING AND INFORMING THE PUBLIC........................................................... 8
COMMUNICATION TO BUSINESS COMMUNITY ................................................. 9
COMMON INFORMATION PICTURE................................................................... 10
CORDONS............................................................................................................ 10
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL OR RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) CONTAMINATION ........ 11
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT................................................................................... 12
FAMILY ASSISTANCE CENTRE .......................................................................... 13
RESILIENCE MORTUARY ................................................................................... 14
VOLUNTARY SECTOR ........................................................................................ 15
DISASTER FUND ................................................................................................. 16
ARRANGEMENTS FOR FUTURE EVENT DEBRIEFS ........................................ 16
SECTION 4 – LONDON ASSEMBLY 7 JULY REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT .... 17
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………...… 23

ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005 ....................................................... 25


Introduction………………………………………………………………………….........25
Sustainability……………………………………………………………………………...25
Strategic Co-ordination Centre/Command & Control………………………………...25
Telecommunications……………………………………………………………………. 26
Underground Telecommunications…………………………………………………… 27
London Am bulance Service…………………………………………………………… 27
Warning & Informing the Public……………………………………………………….. 28
Common Information Picture………………………………………………………….. 30
Chemical, Biological and Radiological………………………………………………... 30
Access Through Cordons……………………………………………………………….31

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Mass Fatality Planning…………………………………………………………..…...... 31


Humanitarian Assistance Centre Planning…………………………………….......... 31
Survivor Arrangements.......................................................................................... 32
Casualty Bureau.................................................................................................... 32
Recovery Management……………………………………………………………...… 32
Voluntary Sector……………………………………………………………..…………. 32
British Transport Police…………………………………………………..………….… 33
Security Briefings………………………………………………………………………. 33
Transport………………………………………………………………………………... 33
Transport for London....………………………………………………………………... 33
National Health Service………………………………………………………………... 34
Health Protection Agency……………………………………………………………… 35
Environment Agency…………………………………………………………………… 35
ANNEX B – TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUES .....................................................37
What happened to the Networks............................................................................37
Key Problems/Issues .............................................................................................38
Recommendations.................................................................................................39
Conclusions ...........................................................................................................39
ANNEX C – FAMILY ASSISTANCE CENTRE ........................................................41
Background............................................................................................................41
7 July Bombings ....................................................................................................41
Debrief ...................................................................................................................42
Progress and Current Position...............................................................................43
ANNEX D – RESILIENCE MORTUARY ...................................................................45
Background............................................................................................................45
7 July 2005 ............................................................................................................45
Construction of the Mortuary..................................................................................45
Mortuary Operations ..............................................................................................46
Debriefs .................................................................................................................47
Progress Report.....................................................................................................48
ANNEX E – GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................50
Terms used in the report…………………………………….………………………….51
Organisations.........................................................................................................55

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


FOREWORD

FOREWORD

The events of 7 July were unprecedented in London, as was the challenge they
presented. On that morning London's emergency services and transport workers
mounted their biggest ever response to a terrorist attack. It was a response
characterised by partnership and professionalism, and reflected the contingency
plans that had been honed and tested over four years.
There were some incredible acts of bravery and everybody on duty from the
emergency services, transport staff, health, local authorities, voluntary agency staff
and Londoners stepped up and delivered their best on what was for all a day of
unspeakable tragedy. There can be no doubt that lives were saved thanks to the
efforts of everyone involved in the response.
Our policy on civil contingency planning is to continually seek out and act on any
lessons we can learn from. The London Regional Resilience Forum plans are
constantly being updated and improved. This approach means that criticisms are not
just welcomed but invited. The downside of this policy is that the humbling bravery
and professionalism of our people can sometimes be hidden. Also, the impression
can be given that planning is not as huge and comprehensive as, in reality, it is.
All events are different. However, as far as we know, not one person lost their life
because of a failure of the response. Many lived because of it. That is the true
tribute.
Following the bombings, the London Regional Resilience Forum began a
comprehensive multi-agency debrief process to ensure that essential lessons were
captured and in October 2005 it started a programme of work to address the lessons
identified. This report summarises the main findings and lessons. It focuses on the
frontline response by London’s emergency services and the other key agencies
involved. A separate Government report looks at the response from the national and
central government perspective.

Phil Woolas Ken Livingstone


Minister for Local Government & Community Cohesion Mayor of London
Chair Deputy Chair

London Regional Resilience Forum

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


i
This page is intentionally left blank

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


ii
SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION

1.1 The London Resilience partnership was set up immediately after the attacks
on the United States on 11 September 2001 to assess London’s capacity to
respond to a similar incident, and to drive London’s preparation for
emergencies. The aim of the partnership has been to ensure that the Capital
is as well prepared against emergencies as possible. London Resilience
consists of Government, the Mayor, the Greater London Authority and all
London’s key responding agencies – police, fire, ambulance, health service,
local authorities, the transport operators, the Port of London Authority, the
utilities, voluntary agencies, plus the military, the London business community
and representatives of London’s main faiths. It is led by the London Regional
Resilience Forum which is chaired by the Minister for Local Government and
Community Cohesion, Phil Woolas, with the Mayor of London, Ken
Livingstone, as Deputy Chair. Since May 2002 the Forum has overseen the
development of numerous multi-agency pan-London emergency plans and an
exercise programme to test and practise these plans.
1.2 On the morning of 7 July 2005, four separate but connected explosions
occurred in central London when terrorists detonated bombs on the public
transport system. Three explosions occurred on the Underground system and
one on a bus. While each of these events was a serious incident in its own
right, their unprecedented cumulative effect was to spread public confusion
and speculation, particularly about whether further attacks were imminent.
London’s responders and emergency plans were tested in extremely difficult
circumstances and were shown to be effective.
1.3 On 14 July 2005 the London Regional Resilience Forum (LRRF) met to
consider the immediate lessons from the emergency response, how the
consequences of the bombings would be managed and what action was
necessary. At this meeting a number of key lessons were identified, mostly
concerning problems with telecommunications on the day. The Forum
commissioned a review by the London Resilience Team (LRT) with support
from the Cabinet Office’s Central Sponsor for Information Assurance on how
telecommunications had performed on 7 July. Other issues raised included
the fitness for purpose of the Strategic Co-ordination Centre, media handling
difficulties, and issues around briefing the business community.
1.4 Individual agencies have each carried out their own debrief processes which
has been complemented by a comprehensive debriefing exercise
commissioned by the Forum. Multi-agency debriefings were held for the
Gold/Strategic Co-ordination Group, the Resilience Mortuary, the Family
Assistance Centre, and Media/Public Information arrangements. The main
conclusions from these debriefs were examined on 30 September in a multi-
agency workshop facilitated by the Emergency Planning College.
1.5 The Forum considered the results and recommendations at its meeting on 12
October 2005 where a work programme was agreed. Progress against this
programme has been reviewed at subsequent meetings.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 1
SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

1.6 The Forum has also considered the findings and recommendations of the
London Assembly’s 7 July Review Committee’s Report (which is covered in
Section 4).

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 2
SECTION 2 - Overview

SECTION 2 – OVERVIEW

2.1 The Forum noted that while the response had by no means been perfect, the
overall multi-agency emergency response to the 7 July bombings had been
very successful. By quick, professional and effective action at the scene of
each of the bombs, the situation had been contained and the potential
additional loss of life and suffering considerably reduced.
2.2 Four years of planning and exercises had clearly paid great dividends. Co-
operation and co-ordination between responders had been effective and there
was a willingness to work through issues jointly to achieve a successful
response. The events of 7 July did not exceed the capacity of the responding
agencies to contain and deal with the situation. The response did, however,
provide an opportunity to identify areas that required further work to increase
London’s ability to successfully deal with future emergencies on a similar, or
greater scale.
2.3 The Forum particularly noted success in the following areas:
a) Familiarity with roles and partners was evident. This was greatly helped by
a long series of exercises and most recently Exercise Atlantic Blue in April
2005 (which included multiple attacks on the Underground).
b) The initial response by London Underground staff was exemplary - the
result both of solid training and individual dedication and courage.
c) London Buses reacted quickly and effectively, by initially withdrawing
services from central London and then maintaining staff morale in order to
reinstate the network, other than in the incident areas, in time for the
evening peak.
d) The emergency services’ response was rapid and effective.
e) London emergency plans were successfully deployed including the London
Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Plan, Operation
Benbow (joint operation by London’s police forces), and the London
Command and Control Protocol, Local Authority Gold Protocol, First Alert
Protocol, Public Information Plan, Mass Fatality Plan and Disaster Fund
Plan.
f) Hospitals were rapidly made ready and reserve capacity identified. 1200
hospital beds were made ready in three hours.
g) Mutual aid arrangements worked well. London Fire Brigade and London
Ambulance Service’s mutual aid arrangements were successfully triggered.
London Ambulance Service was also well supported by voluntary sector
ambulances.
h) London Underground’s evacuation procedures worked well. This was only
the second evacuation of the entire network in living memory (the previous
was 23 December 1991 when a number of incendiary devices had been
hidden under train seats both on mainline and Tube trains).

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 3
SECTION 2 - OVERALL

i) The media cell (a group of press officers from across the London
Resilience Partnership) was quickly convened, actions and roles agreed, a
media centre established and the media briefed.
j) A Gold Co-ordinating Group followed by a Strategic Co-ordination Centre
were rapidly established with Gold level representation from all key
partners.
k) The ‘Local Authority Gold’ Protocol (under which one chief executive
represents all 33 London local authorities at the Gold Co-ordinating Group)
was successfully triggered and worked well. ‘LA Gold’ had an important role
in co-ordinating the pan-London local authority response including
providing advice to schools on 7 July, mobilising construction and staffing
of the temporary mortuary, construction and staffing of the Family
Assistance Centre, and co-ordination of flowers, tributes and books of
condolence. Subsequently, ‘LA Gold’ ensured there were arrangements in
place to manage the recovery period after the attacks. Fourteen chief
executives took on the role over four weeks.
l) The London Mass Fatality Plan worked well. The coroners, police, local
authorities, pathologists and the London Resilience Team worked in close
partnership to deliver a ‘Resilience Mortuary’ which was ready to receive
deceased victims in 24 hours and fully functioning in 72 hours.
m) Although no pre-prepared plan existed, a number of agencies came
together (police, local authorities, voluntary sector, London Resilience
Team, NHS and TfL) to rapidly put in place a Family Assistance Centre.
n) Police and local authority arrangements for communication with minority
communities worked well and community cohesion was maintained.
o) Once the police had managed the initial incident, responsibility transferred
to the local authorities to co-ordinate recovery arrangements, as outlined in
contingency plans.
p) The Disaster Fund Plan was implemented as per the London Resilience
plan and worked very efficiently. The London Bombings Relief Charitable
Fund raised £11.5 m in all, made its first payments within two weeks of the
bombings, and had paid out £10.5m by 6 July 2006. The Fund won an
award for effectiveness and was also recognised for the excellent work it
had done in making payments speedily to the victims of 7 July.
2.4 The debrief was extensive and, whilst confirming the successful activation of
contingency pans, it also revealed a number of areas where further work and
improvement were required. The Forum particularly noted the exhaustion of
staff in the days following the bombings and agencies’ concern about
responding to a sustained bombing campaign. Individual agencies were
already acting on the lessons identified in their own debriefs. The Forum
commissioned a work programme based on the key multi-agency lessons.
2.5 Under each of the following headings, the findings and actions are set out.
Annex A sets out progress and changes achieved so far.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 4
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

SUSTAINABILITY

3.1 While the exercise programme that had been run over the preceding years
had proved invaluable to responders, many partners were concerned about
whether they had sufficient staff trained at a senior level (particularly at the
strategic ‘Gold’ level) to sustain a prolonged response and recovery period.

Lessons
• Renewed training efforts to ensure each agency has a sufficient
number of senior staff able to give strategic direction over a long
period of time.
• The exercise programme should capture additional personnel within
responding organisations who could provide relief to staff, thereby
sustaining the tempo of operations over prolonged periods of activity.
The exercise programme should also confirm the adequacy of
training/refresher regimes.
• Mutual aid arrangements should also be revisited to review the scope
for additional assistance in a sustained response.

STRATEGIC CO-ORDINATION CENTRE

3.2 The early decision to establish the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) was
assessed by practitioners to have been sound. The rationale was the
significant nature and unknown potential for other incidents in London, or
elsewhere. It soon became clear that there was a need to co-ordinate at a
strategic level. Clearly the SCC would have assumed an even bigger role if
there had been further attacks. Once the full extent of the challenges had
been made clear and the emergency response was in place the Chair and
other members of the SCC agreed to revert to more conventional Gold level
meetings.
3.3 However, the level of representation at the SCC did not always meet the
requirement to have senior representatives present, who were empowered
and able to make decisions.
3.4 While accessible on the day, the location at Hendon was not easily reached by
some responding agencies (although all succeeded) and also felt by some to
be too distant from their own command & control facilities in central London.
3.5 Although a major effort had been made in recent years to pre-prepare the site
for rapid conversion to use as an SCC, the facilities overall were assessed as
insufficient to support the many users. The SCC site remained improvised,
requiring conversion from day-to-day use. The Forum concluded that London
needed an SCC that was immediately fit for purpose and ‘ready to go’.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 5
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

3.6 The Forum debrief also noted that there were inevitably occasions when there
were uncertainties over the respective roles and responsibilities of Gold and
COBR and that these would benefit from greater clarification.

Lessons
• The SCC role is crucial for the effective management of a multi-
agency response to an emergency on a scale similar to 7 July. In
view of the speed of response required to assert early control over
an emergency situation, it is vital to have: the best possible site for
the SCC facility (together with an alternative for resilience
purposes; a fully-fitted facility with core staff permanently in
residence to maintain and test the facility.
• Further common training in the Gold role for all agencies was
identified as a requirement and would be beneficial.
• The respective responsibilities of Gold and COBR would benefit
from greater clarity and wider dissemination.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

3.7 This was the greatest single area of concern. However, while the
telecommunications challenges presented difficulties, they did not significantly
affect the emergency services’ ability to respond effectively.
3.8 The Forum considered the review in late July (summarised at Annex B). It was
originally prepared by the London Resilience Team in consultation with the
Cabinet Office, and fed into the national-level work on telecoms resilience
subsequently led by the Cabinet Office.
3.9 Overdependence on mobile phones: On 7 July the mobile telephone
networks did not crash but were heavily congested and users had extreme
difficulty making calls. (If the operators had not managed the situation the
effects would have been far worse). This made it impossible to establish
reliable communications between mobile telephone users which had
ramifications throughout the whole of the multi-agency response, and hindered
strategic consultation between key London players.
3.10 Responders’ overdependence on mobile phones raised major concerns. While
this related mainly to managers (most front-line operatives of responding
agencies used radios), there was nevertheless some reliance on mobile
phones by frontline staff.
3.11 Access Overload Control (ACCOLC): The ACCOLC system was invoked for
a short time in a one kilometre radius of Aldgate. It subsequently became
evident that the ACCOLC system was not currently accessible by all Cat 1 and
2 responders that may have a critical need for it. In any event, the use of
ACCOLC procedures could themselves be counterproductive because the
public relies heavily on mobile telephones as their primary means of

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 6
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

communication and would want to use them in a crisis to reassure family and
friends.
3.12 Public Education: The Forum concluded that the mobile network was vital for
public reassurance, but there was a need to educate the public to be
disciplined in using their phones in a crisis (for example, use text messages to
be brief, only use mobile phones for essential purposes, only make short calls
to establish people’s safety, then stay off the network).
3.13 Communication below ground: This was a difficulty but did not significantly
hinder the response. The London Underground radio communications system
held up well for both London Underground and British Transport Police.
Adequate interim arrangements exist but there will be significant improvement
once a TETRA-based ‘Connect’ system on the underground is installed. This
will link to emergency service Airwave radio systems.
Annex B outlines Telecommunications issues in more detail.

Lessons
• Responders must not rely on mobile phones for critical functions
in a crisis. Emergency responders need to have dedicated
communications that will work in an emergency.
• Mobile Phones: diversify sources of supply. Do not rely on one
single mobile phone provider.
• Fixed Phones: review requirements for incoming and outgoing
lines in crisis, and compare with current capacity provided.
• ACCOLC: review the criteria and protocol for invoking ACCOLC.
Train police Silver and Gold commanders in the criteria and
procedures for requesting ACCOLC.
• Pagers: so long as they are sufficiently independent of other
networks, consider using pagers for alerting and mobilisation,
including pre-set pager groups, where this function is critical.
• Radio: action must be taken to make responders’ primary means
of communications (usually radio) fully capable of meeting their
communications needs in a crisis. The possibility of wider use of
TETRA based systems such as the Airwave Service for Category 1
and 2 responders (including individual strategic-level ‘Gold’
executives) should be investigated.
• General Public: educate public on need for phone discipline in a
crisis, for example, only use mobile phones for essential
purposes, make short calls to establish people’s safety (to land
lines where possible), then stay off the network.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 7
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

WARNING AND INFORMING THE PUBLIC

3.14 The Forum concluded that the London Resilience Media/Public Information
Plan and First Alert Protocol had worked well on 7 July. The London Press
Officers’ First Alert Protocol had been triggered at 09.07 with all partners being
alerted. Two telephone conferences had followed shortly afterwards (09.25
and 10.15) chaired by the Metropolitan Police (MPS) and involving all the key
London partners and Government Departments (led by the Cabinet Office).
Action had been agreed, a media cell convened and by late morning a media
centre had been established, linked to the Gold Co-ordinating Group, at the
Queen Elizabeth II Centre (with the help of the then Office of the Deputy Prime
Minister) from which co-ordinated briefing was successfully delivered. The
central government News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) was also activated,
though the debrief concluded that this should have been done earlier.
3.15 Media coverage during the morning of 7 July was synchronized by the Media
Cell with the key messages that were being given. The initial messages,
including the key message to avoid travelling if possible, were successfully
relayed to the public by the media. However, despite a steady flow of press
conferences and briefings at the QEII Centre, subsequent information was not
always used as effectively. In the afternoon some confusion arose over
messages about the status of the transport system. In particular, it became
evident that the media were continuing to use out of date information as if it
were live, which created a misleading impression. As a result the message
that the public should begin their journeys home was only conveyed in a very
patchy manner. The Forum agreed that media monitoring was required to
ensure that unhelpful messages were removed from the news media. It also
agreed that the involvement of the media in future exercises could be useful in
ensuring that they give accurate and timely information in the event of a future
incident.
3.16 Press officer support had been provided to the Incident Coroner and briefing
had been provided on the complexity of the victim identification process but
only in response to media concern. The debrief identified these as areas for
future pre-planning. Similarly, significant problems had occurred with the
international media at some hospitals and action (including, if possible
protocols) was required to encourage foreign media to use the media centre in
future, and not gather at hospitals.
3.17 There was also a need to set up clearer agreements for the media’s use of
CCTV cameras and footage. This had been used extensively on 7 July due to
the limited number of film crews in London, the majority being in Scotland for
the G8 Conference.
3.18 Finally, although the media cell had succeeded in delivering a broad range of
messages to the media and public, the debrief identified the need to pre-plan
cascade routes, so that in future specific information can be targeted at
different sections of the public (for example to local residents, commuters,
minority communities, employers, schools, and off duty responders such as
transport and emergency service staff).

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 8
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

Lessons
• Interviews and briefings need to be visibly “time stamped”.
• More thorough media monitoring is required to pick up incorrect
reporting.
• The media should be invited to participate in some future
exercises.
• Support for the Incident Coroner and briefing on the victim
identification process to be pre-planned.
• Work with the international media to ensure more appropriate
behaviour at hospitals.
• Agreements to be set up for the media’s use of CCTV cameras and
footage.
• Strong need to pre-identify key audiences and pre-tailor messages
and communication channels.

COMMUNICATION TO BUSINESS COMMUNITY

3.19 The business community has specific and significant information needs in an
emergency. To enable them to make effective and wise decisions they need
access to certain information quickly, ideally at the same speed or faster than
news broadcasts.
3.20 The financial community, which is particularly vulnerable to events, is already
well linked to the London command and control arrangements and
representatives of the Treasury, Bank of England and Financial Services
Authority attended the strategic co-ordination centre as observers attached to
the Government Liaison Team. This arrangement from the Gold Co-ordinating
Group to the financial community worked well.
3.21 The Forum concluded that more work should be undertaken with the London
business community to ascertain the specific information that it (and its major
components), requires in an emergency and the responsibilities and channels
for ensuring this is delivered as rapidly as possible. One possibility already
being pursued is to find a way of representing business on the Gold Media
Cell.

Lessons
• Business information requirements need to be understood and
fulfilled to enable the business community to take informed
decisions.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 9
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

• Once this is defined there is also a need for agreed arrangements


to deliver rapid, authoritative messages to the wider London
business community.

COMMON INFORMATION PICTURE

3.22 An important objective in the command and control of any emergency


response is to maintain a Commonly Recognised Information Picture (CRIP)
to feed all information needs. Communication at the Gold Co-ordinating Group
(GCG) and between Golds before the GCG met was effective. However, there
was a lack of accurate, collated information to pass on to all of the responding
agencies in the initial stages of the response.
3.23 The debrief recommended three linked actions to address this capability gap.
The first was to review the flow of information during an emergency at the
national level. The second was to address the London requirements, where
the Forum had commissioned the London Resilience Team to produce the
specification and protocols necessary for a secure London extranet for the
London Resilience partnership. This is now well advanced and could provide
the required facility for rapid dissemination and updating of a common
situation report in an emergency. The third called for the Metropolitan Police to
develop a joint multi-agency cell to collate and manage the flow of verified
factual information to service the needs of the partners. This could be
disseminated by the extranet.

Lessons
• There is a need for an improved ability to develop a coherent view
and share it among agencies in a timely manner and a need for an
information management system to support this. A centralised
joint multi-agency cell could provide this view.
• The London Resilience extranet could provide the secure vehicle
for rapid dissemination of this information to partners and rapid
multilateral communication between partners.

CORDONS

3.24 The cordons at the four scenes worked well (as per the LESLP Major Incident
Manual). However, staff that were not from police, fire or ambulance services
did report difficulties in gaining access through the cordons for specific
inspections (such as investigating and making safe fractured gas pipes
underground, or carrying out structural surveys of bomb damaged tunnels),
despite this having been pre-agreed at the Gold Co-ordinating Group.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 10
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

3.25 There was also some anecdotal evidence from other agencies indicating a
lack of appreciation and awareness of the roles and responsibilities of the
multi-agency partners who had critical functions to perform during the
immediate response phase.
3.26 It was particularly evident that police officers on cordon duties at some of the
bomb sites were working to very precise rules that initially prevented other
responders from gaining access to undertake crucial work, despite pre-
agreement at Gold level.

Lessons
• More work is required to ensure decisions agreed at the Gold Co-
ordinating Group are communicated to frontline cordons.
• All responders should have an awareness of each others’
functions, building on the success of Exercise Atlantic Blue in
April 2005.
• The content of LESLP standardised procedures needs to be
reinforced with all potential responders.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL OR RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) CONTAMINATION

3.27 Contamination Control Arrangements: while not detected on this occasion,


there was uncertainty among some responding agencies about arrangements
for determining the presence or otherwise of CBR agents at the scene of an
unexplained explosion.
3.28 Smoke and other pollution from the explosions in the tube tunnels made it
difficult for detection and identification equipment to determine effectively
whether there was contamination
3.29 While standard operating procedures were invoked by incident commanders
on scene and worked well, unfortunately this was not communicated to those
not on the front line. One hospital conducted chemical and radiological
monitoring of all casualties before allowing them into its Accident and
Emergency department. As patients arrived at hospitals, they underwent a
medical consultation to assess whether any toxic substance was present from
any unexpected chemical exposure.
3.30 This activity also revealed the need for a co-ordinated approach to
environmental monitoring data. A cell was set up to advise Gold.
3.31 The Forum also agreed that in future there is a need to record the details of
those present in the immediate vicinity of an incident, so that any risk of
exposure to harmful substances can be registered. This will help to assess
any possible future health implications. At the direct request of the Chief
Medical Officer, such a Register was set up by the Health Protection Agency.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 11
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

Lessons
• It was agreed that arrangements for determining the presence or
otherwise of CBR or other toxic material at the scene of an
unexplained explosion, or other traumatic event, needed to be
clearly promulgated to all responding agencies to ensure
conformity of approach.
• The London emergency services are addressing the issue of early
detection of CBR contaminants and have agreed to draw up a joint
memorandum of understanding that will cover the range of
detection and identification equipment carried by each service and
its deployment at an incident.
• Hospitals need faster advice on whether contamination is present.
• ‘At risk’ register: It was also agreed that there should be a
requirement to record details of those in close proximity to the
scene of an incident (an exposure Register) for subsequent
monitoring.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

3.32 There was concern expressed by frontline services that responders dealing
with the emergency (such as hospitals) had received large numbers of
requests for information from government departments.
3.33 There was also felt to be a need for better understanding by central
government of the role of the Gold Co-ordinating Group and the division of
responsibilities between operators/responders and COBR (central
government) over issues such as closure and re-opening of the transport
system. Equally, responders understood the need for a full appreciation of the
political and parliamentary responsibilities of COBR.
3.34 On funding, the local authorities were grateful to the Deputy Prime Minister for
his early decision (on 8 July) that Government would meet their reasonable
costs in responding to the emergency. They nevertheless remained
concerned that clearer mechanisms and faster decision making was required
for responses to applications for emergency funding.
Lessons
• Government requests for information should be channelled to
responders’ Gold level representatives at the Strategic Co-
ordination Centre through the Government Liaison Team.
• Clear pre-agreement was required on procedures for the closing
and re-opening of the transport networks and the respective roles
of operators and Government.
• Government should review the procedures and protocols for
decisions on funding local authorities in an emergency.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 12
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

FAMILY ASSISTANCE CENTRE

3.35 Emergency Planning protocols dictate that, where practicable, uninjured


survivors should be looked after at a Survivor Reception Centre. They also
state that a Friends and Family Reception Centre should be created to provide
a location where those seeking news of their loved ones may receive
information. The need to set up a Family Assistance Centre was identified on
8 July, although there had been no pre-planning for this facility because the
Guidance Document, which was in development, was still a draft document
and not yet in the public domain, nor had it been seen by responders.
3.36 At the request of the Gold Co-ordinating Group on the evening of 8 July, the
London Resilience Team convened a meeting of relevant partners. This was
chaired by the Chief Executive of Westminster Council and included
Westminster emergency staff, the Metropolitan Police (mostly present by
phone), the British Red Cross, the London Resilience Team (including the
Salvation Army secondee to LRT), and a liaison officer from the Civil
Contingencies Secretariat of the Cabinet Office. The meeting designed the
facility, and selected and inspected an initial venue (the Queen Mother
Centre).
3.37 The Metropolitan Police and Westminster City Council then led the
construction of the centre and it was opened by the Culture Secretary 14
hours later. This was the first time a Family Assistance Centre had been
established in the UK. The centre was significantly improved and relocated to
better premises (the Royal Horticultural Hall) on 12 July where it remained
until 19 August when it moved to a smaller facility, in line with reduced
demand for its services. The partners were grateful to O2 and Ikea for rapidly
providing the centre with, respectively, mobile phones and furniture.
3.38 The purpose of the centre was to provide a ‘one stop shop’ to enable those
affected to gain information about family members or friends, offer a range of
facilities to enable families or survivors to make informed choices, ensure a
seamless multi-agency approach to providing support, and help responders
ensure that bereaved families, survivors and communities received co-
ordinated, clear, compassionate and professional advice and assistance.
3.39 Annex C outlines Family Assistance Centre issues in more detail.

Lessons
• The multi-agency debrief found that the word ‘family’ had been
unhelpful and misleading, deterring some individuals from
attending.
• It identified the need for formal guidance, a detailed London plan,
and identification of suitable sites for Assistance Centres across
the Capital.
• A whole range of other improvements were identified, including
information gathering, arrangements for running the centre, the
range of assistance to be offered and expertise required, the roles

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 13
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

of supporting agencies and the welfare of staff working at the


centre, both during and in the weeks after the period of the
operation.
• A media and marketing strategy needs to be prepared with a pre-
agreed budget to ensure that the existence of the centre is made
as widely known as possible.

RESILIENCE MORTUARY

3.40 The London Mass Fatality Plan had been prepared over a number of years
under the aegis of a multi-agency planning group which included
representatives of all the key relevant agencies. It was approved by the Forum
in March 2005 and formally circulated to all stakeholders at the end of June,
just days before the bombings.
3.41 After initial preparatory work by the London Resilience Team (LRT), the Plan
was triggered by the coroners at noon on 7 July and the decision was taken to
set up a ‘Resilience Mortuary’ (a demountable structure). A Mass Fatality Co-
ordination Team was set up as required by the Plan, consisting of the three
coroners involved, the Metropolitan Police Senior Investigating Officer and
Senior Identification Manager, Westminster City Council (as lead council), the
military, the Anti-Terrorist Branch, LRT, the Home Office and the contractors
De Boers who were formally requested to construct the mortuary.
3.42 The Plan worked well. The coroners, police, local authorities, pathologists,
LRT, Home Office, NHS, and others worked in close partnership to deliver a
‘Resilience Mortuary’ which was ready to receive deceased victims in 24
hours and fully functioning in 72 hours. An existing stockpile of £130,000 of
mortuary equipment (purchased and stored by LRT and jointly funded by the
Home Office and the British Airports Authority) proved invaluable in the rapid
deployment of the mortuary. The mortuary included facilities for bereaved
families to view their loved ones. The Salvation Army provided many valuable
services at this facility.
3.43 Annex D outlines Resilience Mortuary issues in more detail.

Lessons
• The London Mass Fatality Plan had only just been circulated when
the bombings took place and many at the Gold Co-ordinating
Group and among local responders were unaware of the Plan.
There is a strong need for wider dissemination of the Plan and for
middle management in key organisations such as the police and
local authorities to be aware of it.
• The three coroners involved worked very closely and successfully
together, despite the fact that there was no protocol to establish a
lead coroner in a multi-site incident, or for coroners to work

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 14
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

together, or for agreement on the location of a mortuary. Such


procedures would be helpful and could avoid confusion in a future
multi-sited emergency.
• A need was identified for training and exercising of the Plan,
particularly for the three police forces involved, Disaster Victim
Identication and the local authorities.
• Radiological equipment had to be borrowed for the mortuary by
the Association of Forensic Radiographers. There was a need for
pre-allocation of radiological equipment.
• The Plan relied on military sites for a (demountable) ‘Resilience
Mortuary’. There was a need to broaden the range of pre-identified
and surveyed sites to include civilian sites such as Royal Parks
and local authority sites.

VOLUNTARY SECTOR

3.44 The voluntary agencies played a significant role. They responded to the
incident sites, assisted at the temporary mortuary, set up and provided staff
for the Support Helpline, set up First Aid Posts at main line stations, and
provided personnel at the Casualty Bureau.
3.45 They also played an important role in establishing and providing ongoing
support to the Family Assistance Centre (and subsequent 7 July Assistance
Centre), working with Westminster City Council and the Metropolitan Police
Service. The agencies provided invaluable expertise and assistance. Key
players included the British Red Cross, the Salvation Army, St. John
Ambulance, Disaster Action, Cruse Bereavement Care and Victim Support.
However, it became clear that the various agencies had different funding
expectations with some expecting (and needing) immediate reimbursement
and others being opposed to funding as a point of principle.

Lessons
• The debrief agreed that London Regional Resilience Forum
Voluntary Sector Sub-committee (which consists of the voluntary
agencies involved in emergency response in London) should draw
up a protocol to set out their potential roles in an emergency and
their position on funding. The protocol was drawn up, approved by
the Forum on 10 May and formally signed in the presence of the
Minister for Local Government and Community Cohesion on 16th
June 2006.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 15
SECTION 3 – KEY LESSONS

DISASTER FUND

3.46 Preparation of a London Disaster Fund Plan was commissioned by the Forum
and developed by the Greater London Authority as part of the suite of plans
prepared under the aegis of the London Resilience banner. It is the only
Fund endorsed and supported by the Forum. The intention was to cover any
emergency occurring in the London area and to avoid a situation of several
competing funds being established. Legal arrangements for the Fund were
developed by the GLA and arrangements for its practical administration were
developed for the GLA by the British Red Cross. The original version of the
Plan was agreed in September 2003 and it was updated in early 2005.
Fortuitously a workshop was held two weeks before the London bombings
where, with the participation of a wide range of partners, the arrangements
were rehearsed and remaining issues and roles resolved.
3.47 The Forum’s 7 July debrief found that the London Bombings Relief Charitable
Fund had worked very efficiently and effectively, raising £11.5 million in all
and making its first payments within two weeks of the bombings, and paying
out £10.5 million by 6 July 2006.

Lessons
• The Fund has been very successful in meeting its goals and
should be considered as a model for other cities, counties and
regions.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR FUTURE EVENT DEBRIEFS

3.48 The debrief arrangement set in place by the Forum was felt to have worked
well. It was nevertheless agreed that to aid the process of identifying cross
boundary lessons it would be helpful in future to have an agreed national
procedure and facility for conducting multi-agency debriefs while the
information is still fresh. This would need to be broadbrush to allow the
flexibility required by widely-different incidents, but it would allow lessons to be
addressed in a common way.

Lessons
• Response plans should include arrangements for conducting
immediate individual and multi-agency debriefs. This should be
carried out as a matter of routine, so that lessons can be captured,
and meaningful feedback can be given to all responders even
while the recovery activity is ongoing.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 16
SECTION 4 – LONDON ASSEMBLY REPORT

SECTION 4 – LONDON ASSEMBLY 7 JULY REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT

Purpose of Report
4.1 The Review Committee describes the purpose of the report as being to
identify lessons learnt from the events and aftermath of 7 July attacks, identify
successes and failings and improvements, and ensure systems and
communications are put in place to facilitate the best response to the needs of
those caught up in an incident.

Terms of Reference
4.2 To review lessons to be learned from the 7 July bomb attacks on London, in
particular looking at:
a) how information, advice and support was communicated to Londoners;
b) how business continuity arrangements worked in practice;
c) the role of Broadcasting Services in communication; and
d) the use of Information and Communication Technology to aid the response
process.

Approach
4.3 The Committee’s approach is to consider the 7 July response from the
perspective of a member of the public caught up in the attacks and response
rather than that of the emergency planners and responders themselves. The
Forum values this perspective and is concerned to take on board any areas of
weakness not previously identified in earlier reviews.

Assembly Report Summary


4.4 The report concludes that “Undoubtedly the emergency plans and
exercises that had been put in place during the preceding months and
years contributed to what was, in many respects, an outstanding
response.” It acknowledges that those responsible for co-ordinating the
response on 7 July were faced with “a situation of extraordinary pressure,
uncertainty and complexity” and the dangers of “twenty-twenty
hindsight”.
4.5 The report’s main criticism of the 7 July response is a ‘lack of consideration
of individuals caught up in major or catastrophic incidents’, the focus
being on incidents rather than individuals, process rather than people. It
suggests that plans should be recast from the perspective of the people
involved rather than the emergency services.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 17
SECTION 4 – LONDON ASSEMBLY REPORT

Balance
4.6 Acknowledging the approach referred to in paragraph 4.3, it is nevertheless
disappointing that the tone of the report is largely negative. There is, for
example, little acknowledgement of the openness of responding agencies
about the lessons learnt. Also, despite references to the unprecedented scale
of the attacks and difficulties to be overcome, and occasional praise for the
overall response, the report gives little weight to the effectiveness of the main
elements of that response – evacuation of scenes, treatment and rescue of
casualties, provision of 1000 hospital beds, evacuation of the entire tube
network, mainline stations and the central London bus service, rapid triggering
of media briefing arrangements and a media centre, rapid restoration of the
transport system, setting up of the temporary mortuary and Family Assistance
Centre, rapid but sensitive victim identification by the Coroners service, and
the successful setting up and operation of the Mayor’s Disaster Fund.

Misunderstandings
4.7 The report was not shown to responders in advance of publication (despite an
earlier undertaking to allow the London Resilience Team to check it for
accuracy), and the Committee does not seem to have the benefit of informed
‘technical’ advisers. As a result there are a number of misunderstandings and
inaccuracies that could have been eliminated, reducing responders’ concerns.
For example, the report confuses the Press Officers’ First Alert mechanism
with the initial consultation between responders’ Gold commanders. It also
suggests that the timetable for installation of ‘Connect’ on the Underground
will be a further 20 years whereas it is in fact a 20 year programme to install a
new radio and communication system and then to maintain it. The new system
is being installed currently and will be brought into operational service on a
line by line basis and will be completed in 2007. (These issues are being dealt
with in individual agencies’ responses to the report).

Assembly Concerns
4.8 The main areas of concern highlighted by the report are as follows:
a) the telecoms difficulties experienced by some responders;
b) serious London Ambulance Service difficulties with telecoms and supply
of medical and other equipment;
c) a need for non emergency hospitals near an incident to be briefed;
d) improvements in communication to the media, public, business and
schools;
e) improvements to the Family Assistance Centre arrangements; and
f) failure to look after uninjured survivors and collect their details.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 18
SECTION 4 – LONDON ASSEMBLY REPORT

4.9 All except (c) and (f) were identified in the Forum’s debrief and are covered in
its work programme. Point (c) was reviewed by the London NHS earlier this
year. Point (f) has been accepted by the Metropolitan Police as valid
feedback and will shortly be covered by detailed guidance to all police forces
and local authorities which will be issued by the Department of Culture Media
and Sport, and the Association of Chief Police Officers.

Telecommunications Difficulties
4.10 Telecoms between emergency services: The same difficulties were
identified by the Forum on 14 July 2005 and subsequently reviewed in detail
(see Section 3, paras 3.7 – 3.13). The situation was reviewed and addressed
in London in the following months. In addition Cabinet Office has issued
advice to responders and is also carrying out a national review of responders’
telecoms resilience. A specific review of ACCOLC (ACCess OverLoad Class)
led by the Cabinet Office) was also set in train following the 7 July debriefs.
Rollout of new digital based systems has already started to the Police, and will
continue to the other emergency services with final completion expected by
mid 2009. Once digital systems are in place it will be unnecessary for
emergency services to use mobiles.
4.11 Underground telecoms: The Assembly report criticises the continued inability
of police (except British Transport Police) to communicate between above and
below ground on London Underground, and the “failure” to implement the
Fennell Inquiry’s recommendations following the King’s Cross underground
fire in 1988 (that London Fire Brigade and British Transport Police should
have compatible radios).
4.12 In fact, overall communications between the surface and below ground worked
well on 7 July. Radio communication on the Underground is never ideal but
difficulties did not significantly hinder the response. Both British Transport
Police (BTP) and London Fire Brigade (LFB) were able to maintain effective
communication between the surface and below ground. In addition:
a) All police and LFB radios worked reasonably at the shallow tunnels (at
Edgware Road and Aldgate).
b) At present, only BTP and LFB radios work on deeper Underground
platforms (but not far into deep tunnels) and BTP can facilitate
communications for the other emergency services. BTP radios worked well
at King’s Cross and Russell Square, and LFB radios at King’s Cross mostly
worked well (with some interference from a defective handset). BTP
conveyed messages for London Ambulance Service at King’s Cross. LFB
carry ‘leaky feeders’ and UHF repeaters which they could have deployed in
the tunnels had they regarded this as necessary.
c) The new digital radio system (Connect) is already being installed as quickly
as possible and is being brought into operation on a line by line basis. It will
be fully in place across the Underground by August 2007. The Police
Airwave system will follow on shortly after and by Spring 2008 it should be
fully complete. It will be possible for the police to communicate by Airwave

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 19
SECTION 4 – LONDON ASSEMBLY REPORT

digital radio between the surface and the deep tube tunnels. The other
emergency services will follow. This will be much more resilient and it is
expected that in a similar incident, communications underground would not
be disrupted – but there can be no guarantees against the effects of an
explosion.
d) The Fennell Inquiry’s recommendation for compatible BTP and LFB radios
were carefully considered but not implemented because existing systems
at local commander level are already compatible, and it was felt that front
line police and fire officers communicate with each other verbally as a
result of the close proximity of their work. Use of runners and radio
communication between BTP and LFB worked successfully on 7 July.

Passenger Driver Communications


4.13 “Passengers on the three bombed trains were unable to communicate
with drivers to alert them to the explosion” and “a large proportion of
underground trains don’t have any means for passengers to contact the
driver.” Responders do not believe this caused significant problems on 7
July. Nevertheless as new trains are introduced this will be dealt with: all new
tube trains will have passenger to driver communications systems (Northern,
Jubilee, Piccadilly & Central already have it and all others except the Bakerloo
Line are planned to have it by 2014.) But there can be no guarantee or
expectation that any communication system will continue to operate after an
explosion.

Serious London Ambulance Service difficulties with telecoms and supply


4.14 Telecommunications: Identified in the Forum debrief. Since 7 July, London
Ambulance Service (LAS) has actively improved its response systems. It has
issued pagers to all managers, put in place a major incident response that
sends twenty ambulances and six managers immediately to a scene,
reconfigured incident rooms and accelerated national roll-out of a digital radio
system for ambulances.
4.15 Medical Supplies: Identified in the Forum debrief. LAS did have problems
getting back up medical equipment to scenes because of the unprecedented
nature of the incident. All London Underground stations have medical supplies
and supplies in major transport hubs are being further built up. There are now
fully-stocked equipment support vehicles located permanently in central
London, and additional supplies are also now being carried in twenty-five
training officer vehicles across the capital.

A need for non-emergency hospitals near an incident to be briefed


4.16 Not an issue identified in the Forum debrief. On the morning of 7 July NHS
Gold issued a statement via the five Strategic Health Authorities informing all
NHS organisations of the major incidents, placing them on a preparatory
footing.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 20
SECTION 4 – LONDON ASSEMBLY REPORT

4.17 On the whole communications were effective between London Ambulance


Service, NHS London, receiving hospitals and the Department of Health.
Hospitals received many requests for information from a variety of sources. It
was agreed following 7 July that the flow of information needed to be
streamlined and this is in hand (see Annex A).
4.18 ‘Uneven’ distribution of casualties: The “uneven” distribution of casualties
is a regular feature of any major incident. As the Assembly report notes, this
had a minimal impact on the care of patients. The NHS across London had
1200 beds available within three hours and was prepared to receive many
more casualties, including those requiring specialist care, such as people with
burns injuries.
4.19 Role of Great Ormond Street as a triage centre: Great Ormond Street
Hospital (GOS) made a valuable and significant contribution to the response
on 7 July. GOS does not have an accident and emergency department but,
as the Assembly report states, it is understandable for clinical staff to
contribute to the immediate response. The London NHS is working with
specialist hospitals in London to ensure there is an appropriate flow of
information and to agree how they can support the acute hospitals during an
emergency.

Improvements in communication to the media, public, business and schools


4.20 Similar issues were identified by the Forum debrief though there are some
misunderstandings. Action on the issues identified has been taken forward by
the London Resilience Communications and Business Community Sub-
committees which include representation from all the key agencies involved.

Improvements to Assistance Centre arrangements


4.21 This was an issue identified by the Forum debrief (see Annex C). National
guidance was issued by ACPO and the Cabinet Office on 28 September 2005,
London guidance was issued by the London Resilience Team in February
2006, a London Assistance Centre Plan has been prepared by the London
Family Assistance Centre Working Group (a multi-agency group) and potential
sites have been identified across London by London’s six Local Resilience
Forums.
4.22 Updated national guidance on Assistance Centres is to be issued by DCMS
and ACPO to emergency planners and London’s FAC Plans will reflect this.
4.23 Casualty Bureau: The Assembly report finds that the MPS bureau was set
up too slowly because of an avoidable error, that the volume of calls could
never have been coped with, that new technology now being put in place will
enable calls to be redirected to bureaux outside London (NB this was already
the case), and that more could have been done by explaining the purpose of
the bureau through the media to limit the volume of calls.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 21
SECTION 4 – LONDON ASSEMBLY REPORT

Failure to look after uninjured survivors and collect their details


4.24 This was not an area specifically identified in the Forum’s debrief beyond the
need to widen and improve the facilities and information provided by the
Assistance Centre. The Assembly report points to a lack of planning for those
survivors who were traumatised but uninjured.
4.25 Existing police practice is, wherever practicable, for uninjured survivors to be
looked after at Survivor Reception Centres and for their details to be logged.
Local authorities’ role is to support the police by providing suitable premises
near to the incident. Unfortunately on 7 July the pressure of events was such
that this could not be done and priority was given to the rescue of the injured
and (given the danger of further bombs) to evacuation of the sites.
4.26 The Family Assistance Centre which was set up on 9 July provided a great
deal of assistance for both survivors and bereaved, but this was too late to
provide the initial support and data gathering that would ideally have been
provided.
4.27 London’s police and other emergency services have, since 7 July, urgently
reviewed existing protocols and practice. They have taken on board feedback
from voluntary organisations such as Disaster Action, who have been in close
contact with the survivors. They have also taken comments from their own
Family Liaison Officers.
4.28 In addition, survivors and the bereaved have been invited to meetings with
Ministers at the Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) and the
Home Office. They have been consulted on their experience of 7 July and the
support they received in the months that followed and their views have been
fed into detailed planning.
4.29 The importance of, where possible, establishing immediate reception centres,
the need to streamline the collection and sharing of survivors’ personal data,
and the value of getting basic information out to those affected quickly at the
scene will be stressed in the guidance to be issued by DCMS and ACPO.
However, responders’ ability to provide this number of facilities and level of
support must be subject to the circumstances of the emergency and response.
The first priority must always be saving life, the rescue and treatment of the
seriously injured, and protection from further danger.
4.30 The Assembly report also recommends that at least two potential survivor
reception centres should be identified close to Tube stations, overground rail
stations and major bus stations in central London. This would amount to at
least sixty centres being identified, which is impractical. On 7 July, both
Westminster City Council and the London Borough of Camden were able to
rapidly provide suitable sites near to the bomb scenes. The fact that these
were not used is down to pressure of events and concerns over further attacks
rather than any difficulty in quickly mobilising suitable premises.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 22
CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

4.31 Since its inception in the dark days after the attacks on the United States in
September 2001, the London Resilience partnership has striven to ensure that
London is as well prepared for emergencies as possible. Key to this is
learning lessons and acting to ensure that gaps are filled, and the ability to
respond continually improves. The partnership has been determined to learn
lessons from the tragic experiences of other countries (for example 9/11, Bali,
Madrid and Moscow), no less than from our own.
4.32 The lessons from the response to the London bombings were quickly
identified and, as Annex A to this report makes clear, they are being doggedly
pursued. There is absolutely no room for complacency. We must continue to
redouble our efforts to identify areas for improvement and to test and practice
London’s response.
4.33 The London Regional Resilience Forum will continue to monitor the threat to
the Capital and to drive London’s emergency response preparations as
vigorously as possible. And, it will continue to do so as a solid partnership,
reflecting the wider bonds of community and partnership that characterise the
Capital city.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 23
This page is intentionally left blank

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 24
ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

A1. Introduction
All areas were comprehensively debriefed in August and September and a
programme of action was agreed at the London Regional Resilience Forum on
12 October 2005. Lessons from the 7 July debrief are being incorporated into
the London Resilience Exercises programme. Progress against the main
areas identified by the Forum follows.

A2. Sustainability
a) Work on the recommendations agreed by the Forum is in hand, and all
partner agencies are addressing this in their planning.
b) The Forum has reviewed Gold training and the London exercise
programme is being revamped (following an understandable lull after July
2005) to reflect the need for more senior staff at Gold level, particularly
among the agencies outside of the emergency services.

A3. Strategic Co-ordination Centre/Command & Control


a) Work is proceeding on developing detailed proposals for purpose built
SCC for the Capital, together with a fallback.
b) Command & Control: The London Command & Control Protocol has
been revised to take on board lessons of 7 July. A revised protocol was
approved by the Forum on 10 May and is now in place.
c) In November 2005 the Cabinet Office published advice on the
management of emergencies and relationship between responders at
different levels in its central guidance “Emergency Response and
Recovery” underpinning the operation of the Civil Contingencies Act. It
has also set out responders’ roles in “Central Government
Arrangements for Responding to Emergencies – Concept of
Operations”.
d) Emergency Closure and Reopening of Transport Networks: The
Department for Transport is discussing with partners how the roles,
procedures and lines of communication for managing the closure and
reopening of transport networks can be pre-planned, while ensuring
operators and emergency services can still act quickly as and when they
need.
e) Gold Training: Multi-agency Gold training continues to be built into the
London Resilience exercise programme. In particular, the Forum is looking
at enhancing existing arrangements through linking into new exercising
facilities being developed by the Cabinet Office’s Emergency Planning
College.
f) Exercise Programme: Arrangements have been put in place to
strengthen the exercising capability. The Exercise Working Group has

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 25
ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

reviewed its Terms of Reference and Membership and is addressing the


exercising of risks identified at national, regional and local level. As part of
this work, a database, complementing the national one developed by
Cabinet Office, has been put in place to capture information on exercises
taking place in London which impact on the wider Partnership so that
maximum benefit can be gained from these.

A4. Telecommunications
a) Alternative and fall-back radio-based communication systems have been
progressed by response agencies following 7 July.
b) A review of London Resilience partners’ telecommunications resilience on
7 July was carried out by the London Resilience Team with the assistance
of the Cabinet Office in August and September 2005 and endorsed by the
Forum on 12 October 2005. The lessons identified are being acted upon.
c) The Cabinet Office has issued advice to all emergency responders asking
them to review their telecommunications provision against a range of
vulnerabilities to ensure diverse, flexible and resilient arrangements.
d) At the same time, the Cabinet Office is working through the regional
resilience teams (in London the London Resilience Team) to review the
resilience of multi-agency communications at a regional and local level.
e) The Cabinet Office is also reviewing the operation of the ACCOLC
(Access Overload Class) network management arrangement.
f) The rollout of the new digitally based Airwave mobile radio systems has
already started in London. Once emergency services have Airwave
communications it will be much less necessary for them to rely on mobiles
for operational command and control purposes.
g) The British Transport Police already had Airwave when the bombings took
place as did some units of the City and Metropolitan Police.
h) The City of London Police completed migration to Airwave on 6 June
2006. Eight of the 32 Metropolitan Police Borough commands had
migrated to Airwave by May 2006 and all will have done so by October
2007.
i) Arrangements have been made for the London Ambulance Service to go
live with Airwave in May 2007 and complete the change by early 2008.
j) The London Fire Brigade will receive an early issue of Firelink Airwave
terminals for strategic officers this year. The full programme will
commence in May 2007 with the process complete by the 3rd quarter of
2009 according to current plans.
k) Satellite mobile phones have been deployed to key London responders as
a fallback network.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 26
ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

l) The London Resilience Communications sub-committee has developed a


catchphrase which advises the public on the use of mobile phones in an
emergency.

A5. Underground Telecommunications


a) Transport for London has been working as quickly as possible to improve
radio communication on the Underground. Work on installing the state of
the art ‘Connect’ digital radio system across the Tube is well advanced.
Connect will link control centres, trains, stations, and depots. It is already
installed on the East London Line, will be on three more lines by
November 2006 and should cover the entire Underground network by
August 2007. Much of the equipment has already been installed and staff
are being trained.
b) The Connect system will also improve communications between drivers on
trains and rescuers.
c) As part of the project there will be interoperability with the Police service’s
‘Airwave’ digital radio system by Spring 2008. The Airwave radio system
will then be able operate above and below ground and will enable the
Police to communicate on their own encrypted channels between the
surface and deep tunnels.
d) The ‘Connect’ system will also be able to deliver incident radio
communications along the tunnels for London Fire Brigade.
e) But although the new system will be much more effective and resilient to
damage than the current Underground radio system, no system can be
guaranteed against the effects of an explosion.
f) PITO (the Police Information Technology Organisation) has contracted
with O2 Airwave to provide an Interim London Underground solution. This
has been available since March 2006 and consists of 3 emergency
response vehicles that respond to major incidents on the Underground.
These vehicles carry equipment that can link with the nearest surface
base station and extend Airwave coverage underground via ‘leaky feeder’
cables (carried on trailers). This capability will be maintained once the
‘fixed’ Airwave solution is in place to provide fallback resilience.

A6. London Ambulance Service (LAS)


a) London Ambulance Service has installed a new ‘Gold’ control suite
designed to allow the service to deal with multiple, simultaneous attacks.
b) LAS managers have all been given radio pagers which are resilient in a
major incident.
c) On 7 July, although technically LAS radios worked, the volume of traffic
on their radio system made it difficult for managers to get through and
speak to the control room. LAS has made changes to their internal
procedures to address these problems,

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 27
ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

d) The new Airwave national digital radio system has been accelerated and
will be introduced in summer 2007 and fully operational by early 2008. In
the meantime, from July 2006, operational managers are being given
digital radio handsets.
e) LAS has now agreed with London Underground that they will provide two
of their radios at each station for LAS staff to use when called to the
station. This will allow them to communicate from ground level to the
tunnel level.
f) The amount of equipment carried on emergency support vehicles has
also been reviewed and more supplies are being carried on 25 training
officer vehicles.
g) Since 7 July, LAS has put in place a new automatic major incident
response that sends twenty ambulances and six managers immediately
to a scene.
h) Medical supplies: Network Rail, London Underground, London
Ambulance Service and the Department of Health are working together
on the storage of forward medical supplies at key London rail locations
for use in emergency situations across the London transport network.
These supplies will be in addition to the stations’ standard first aid
provision (deleted words) and will principally be used by ambulance and
other health or advanced first aid staff responding to an incident. This
was first suggested following 7 July when a number of people (off duty
doctors, nurses, etc.) came forward to assist victims before the
emergency services arrived.

A7. Warning & Informing the Public


a) Public Information Planning: The London Resilience Public Information
Plan is being updated in light of 7 July lessons and will be brought to the
Forum for approval on 19 October 2006.
b) Targeting Information to Business: A piece of work is underway, led by
London First, to look at how the communications network across
business should function in the time of an emergency. The aim is to
agree how to inform the business community of relevant Gold command
information during a major incident and also how to feed issues and
concerns back. This has been well received by business, in particular, in
providing an authoritative source of information alongside the media.
c) Targeting Information to Other Audiences: The information cascade to
businesses will shortly be tested. If successful, this will be used as a
model for other key audiences. Press officers across the London
Resilience Partnership have filled in ‘desktop instructions’ identifying their
own role in an emergency and highlighting the sectors and umbrella
groups they each have contact with. Once the business cascade has
been implemented, further cascades will be developed and tested that

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 28
ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

include the health and voluntary sectors, commuters, schools, minority


groups and others.
d) Schools: As part of the work on targeting specific audience, the
Association of London Government will prepare plans to ensure that
when an incident occurs that causes a combination of parental anxiety
and widespread disruption of the transport network, local authorities
across London provide schools with rapid and consistent advice.
e) Foreign Media: The Metropolitan Police and the Cabinet Office are
working with the Foreign Press Association to ensure that its members
have a greater understanding of emergency response and the
arrangements made for media during a major incident. This should make
for a more orderly response from the Foreign Press in a future incident.
f) Timing of Information: The Cabinet Office and Metropolitan Police are
working through the National Media Emergency Forum to ensure that
messages released to the public are current and accurate, and where
interviews are repeated at a later time in the day, the media make it clear
that they are broadcasting an earlier recording.
g) Media Monitoring: The police and Cabinet Office have also set up
improved arrangements for monitoring broadcasts to identify incorrect
and unhelpful information, and speedily correct this through the media.
h) Support to the Coroner: Protocols are being created for press officer
assistance to coroners and mortuaries in an incident and pre-preparation
of explanatory material to allow for early media briefing on issues such as
victim identification and other forensic work.
i) Support to Assistance Centre: DCMS press office assisted in handling
the centre's media calls over the 7 July anniversary period and
proactively managed a publicity campaign to publicise the centre's
helpline and website. Communications and marketing need to be an
integral part of the future Assistance Centre Plan, and DCMS and
Westminster are due to discuss the future arrangements for the centre's
communications, with a view to preparing a communications strategy.
j) Guidelines for Use of Traffic Cameras by Media: Well established
protocols exist between Transport for London (TfL), the Metropolitan
Police (MPS) and two media organisations regarding the use of images
from traffic cameras. The existing CCTV feed is provided on condition
that it is only used and broadcast for traffic information purposes. This
protocol was breached by some media agencies on 7 July and TfL wrote
to all relevant media agencies last year to reiterate the terms of the
protocol. This states that no general news transmission or recording may
be made from traffic camera feeds without express prior permission of
TfL.
k) Media Involvement in Exercises: LFEPA and LRT are currently
planning an exercise, ‘Safer City’, to test local authority command and
control arrangements. It is hoped the media will be involved as players in
the exercise, and a bid has been made to members of the LMEF. This

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 29
ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

will also be an opportunity to test the revised arrangements for providing


information to schools in an emergency.
l) Mayor’s Role: A considerable amount of work has gone into preparing a
Mayor’s Media Protocol, defining the Mayor’s role during an incident.
This has been agreed at a senior level and by the Mayor’s Office, and will
be formally endorsed by Government in the next few months, with a view
to signing it off at the October meeting of the LRRF.
m) Internet: The London Prepared website (www.londonprepared.gov.uk)
has been redesigned to provide more up to date information on the work
of the London Resilience partnership, public advice about emergencies
aimed at residents, commuters and visitors to London, and business
continuity advice for businesses. It will be re-launched in Autumn 2006.
n) Evacuation: A communications strategy for evacuation plans has been
prepared by the London Resilience Team (LRT) and agreed by the
evacuation working group. This is ready to be implemented as soon as
central government has released its national guidance.
o) Training on Civil Contingencies Act for Local Authority Press
Officers: LRT and the Association of London Authorities (ALG), are
organising a series of workshops to be held in the autumn of 2006 for
local authority emergency planning officers and their press officers, to
inform and practise their roles and responsibilities under the Civil
Contingencies Act for warning and informing the public. Additional
workshops will be held for other responding organisations.

A8. Common Information Picture


a) The London Regional Resilience Forum meeting on 18 January 2006
agreed that an extranet should be implemented in London. This will be a
useful tool for communicating across the partnership both in slow and
fast time.
b) Protocols have been developed by the London responders for the use of
the extranet in an emergency to give all partners a rapidly available
common information picture.
c) The Cabinet Office has agreed, in principle, subject to contract
negotiations, to fund linked extranets for each of the nine English regions.
d) The London extranet specification has been agreed with the other
English regions and will now be procured by the Department for
Communities and Local Government on behalf of the Cabinet Office.

A9. Chemical, Biological and Radiological


a) Detailed planning and exercising continues.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 30
ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

A10. Access Through Cordons


a) The difficulties which arose on 7 July have been reviewed by a multi-
agency group led by the police and as a result minor changes are being
made to the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel’s Major Incident
Procedure Manual.

A11. Mass Fatality Planning


a) The London Mass Fatality Working Group has been extended to ensure
that a wider range of organisations are aware of The London Resilience
Mass Fatality Plan.
b) The Plan has been revised to take on board lessons from 7 July. The
revised version will be put to the next meeting of the London Regional
Resilience Forum in October 2006 for formal endorsement by the
partnership.
c) A significant number of new temporary mortuary sites have been
identified and are currently being surveyed.
d) Following the dismantling of the temporary mortuary used for the
bombings, the London Resilience mortuary equipment stockpile has
been completely replenished and, through the efforts of the Home
Office, Westminster City Council, and MITIE, significantly improved.
e) Three additional stockpiles of mortuary equipment have now been
established and being held in other parts of the UK.
f) The Home Office has entered into a call-off contract for the use of
demountable temporary mortuaries in an emergency.
g) A dedicated national Disaster Victim Identification Team has been
established.

A12. Humanitarian Assistance Centre Planning


a) DCMS has interviewed many survivors and this information has been
fed into London’s detailed planning for London Humanitarian Assistance
Centres.
b) The London Resilience Family Assistance Centre Working Group has
completed a detailed London Assistance Centre Provisional Guidance
Document which could be used in an emergency now. The Forum put a
draft plan out to final consultation on 13 July and will formally approve it
on 19 October 2006. Potential sites have been identified by all six of
London’s Local Resilience Forums.
c) Draft national guidance was issued by the Association of Chief
Constables (ACPO) and Cabinet Office in September 2005. Further
guidance will be issued by ACPO and the Department of Culture Media
and Sport shortly which will dovetail with a training programme to be run

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 31
ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

by the Government’s Emergency Planning College for local emergency


responders who would set up and staff Assistance Centres.
d) Specific services, such as the 7 July Assistance Centre were set up after
18 August 2005 and the London trauma screening programme will be
evaluated in the coming months to see whether such a model will work
in the future.

A13. Survivor Arrangements


a) Following 7 July, police and emergency services have urgently reviewed
existing protocols and practices. They have taken on board feedback
from voluntary organisations such as Disaster Action who have been in
close contact with the survivors as well as from their own Family Liaison
Officers. In Government, DCMS has taken the major role in reviewing
arrangements for survivors.
b) Survivor Reception Centres and Family & Friends Reception
Centres: Further guidance will be issued by ACPO and DCMS shortly
to all police forces and local authorities and will recommend that people
are provided with information on where to go for support in the first
crucial hours after an incident, either at the scene or by other means
such as TV and radio announcements. It will also provide a template
for a basic information leaflet to meet this need.

A14. Casualty Bureau


a) Following the 7 July attacks the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has
increased its capability to efficiently collate casualty information from
receiving hospitals and from those persons affected who present
themselves at designated survivor reception points. This has been done
by securing portable systems for remote data collection, linked directly
to CasWeb and then a secure connection to the MPS HOLMES2
Casualty Bureau. The MPS is now examining options as to how this
capability can be further increased within London.

A15. Recovery Management


a) A London Resilience Recovery Management Protocol was approved by
the Forum on 10 May 2006 and is now in place.

A16. Voluntary Sector


a) A London Resilience Voluntary Sector Protocol, drafted by the voluntary
agencies, is now in place. It was approved by the Forum on 10 May
2006 and formally signed in the presence of the Minister for Local
Government and Community Cohesion.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 32
ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

A17. British Transport Police


a) One of the range of options being used by the BTP is an increased use
of Section 44 TACT searches in conjunction with security measures
being implemented by the rail industry and Transec.
b) BTP has expanded its proactive counter terrorism capability and has
done a lot of work in regard to hostile surveillance. It has developed a
behaviour assessment screening training package which is being rolled
out to officers.
c) BTP has enhanced its guidance to its Special Response Units with
regard to CBR surveying at reported incidents.
d) BTP has expanded its Special Branch capability, forging close links with
the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist branch. BTP officers attend daily
intelligence meetings and contribute to the weekly Security Review
Committees.
e) BTP, as part of its debrief process, has reviewed and developed its
Gold Support function.

A18. Security Briefings


a) There is a continuing programme of ongoing stakeholder briefings on
security and the threat level, between (London) police agencies and
partners, notably the business and transport sectors.

A19. Transport
a) The Department for Transport (DfT) has undertaken a trial of more
thorough security check processes and equipment (including body
scanners) on London Underground, Heathrow Express and National
Rail.

A20. Transport for London (TfL)


a) TfL has invested in more British Transport Police officers over the past
two years – now funding 670 (an increase of 200). The annual TfL
policing budget has increased by 10% since 7 July.
b) TfL has now installed 6,000 CCTV cameras on the Underground
network and will double that figure by 2010.
c) London Underground has also increased staff visibility on stations
capitalising on greater 'Oyster' take-up and the reduced need for ticket
office staff at certain locations.
d) The vigilance campaigns are regularly refreshed for transport staff and
passengers, utilising spoken word announcements and poster
campaigns.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 33
ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

e) TfL has been working closely with Government and emergency


services on transport security issues.
f) Over the next five years every station on the London Underground
network will be refurbished or updated with over 30 (more than 10%)
having been modernised during the last year. This includes security
improvements (including digital CCTV), help points and improved
lighting.
g) On London Underground, links have been installed to enable the
NOC/MICC to remotely monitor activity at 80 stations using the existing
CCTV equipment. On buses, options for remote monitoring of vehicle
interiors using CCTV are being evaluated. Remote monitoring of key
bus interchanges via CentreComm, the bus control centre, is also
possible.
h) An emergency equipment review has been undertaken – larger first
aid kits will be supplied to stations following consultation with the NHS
as well as other emergency equipment such as “hands free” torches,
paper overalls and masks to prevent dust inhalation.
i) The challenge is achieving the right balance between running a mass
public transit system that keeps London moving whilst introducing
proportionate security measures that deter and prevent terrorist
attacks.

A21. National Health Service


a) Since 7 July, the London NHS Emergency Planning Team has held a
major exercise testing its response, once again, in the event of several
big attacks on London.
b) A template has been developed for situation reports, which would
enable hospitals to report information on a regular basis to the NHS
strategic co-ordination centre.
c) A notification cascade protocol has now been put in place to ensure
that all NHS organisations are informed in the event of a major
emergency in London. An exercise took place on 26 April 2006 to test
the protocol and communications response from all London NHS
organisations. With the advent of the new Strategic Health Authority
for London, this protocol is being reviewed.
d) On telecoms, the NHS is currently engaging in both internal and
external reviews to develop more resilient ways of communicating.
e) The National Institute for Clinical Excellence has produced guidance
for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (www.nice.org), which recognises
that overall people are resilient and will recover from an event such as
7/7 without long-term problems. However, for those who symptoms do
not subside over time, e.g. 2 months, they may require professional
support. NHS London established NHS Trauma Response Project to

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 34
ANNEX A – PROGRESS SINCE 7 JULY 2005

co-ordinate the establishment of a screening and treatment programme


drawing on resources from most of London's mental health trauma
services. This work continues.

A.22 Health Protection Agency


a) Long term health follow-up: Following the bombings, the Health
Protection Agency (HPA) agreed with the Department of Health (DH)
that a long-term health follow-up be established for those individuals
at potential risk of delayed effects on their health. No prior protocol
existed for such a follow-up in the UK so this process represents a
pioneering activity. A protocol is being developed, and those who
were involved in the attacks are being informed of its existence and
encouraged to take part. In the longer term, the findings of this follow-
up will inform a national protocol for the public health response to
major incidents in the future.

A.23 Environment Agency


a) Since the London Bombings the Environment Agency has stepped up
its engagement with Civil Contingency Act category 1 responders and
professional partners, and has increased staff training in incident
management. The agency is also increasing the number of staff with
security clearances to increase the level of integration in multi agency
planning.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 35
This page is intentionally left blank

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 36
ANNEX B – TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUES

ANNEX B – TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUES

B1. What Happened to the Networks?


a) Mobile Phones: GSM networks experienced very high levels of
traffic over a wide area. Demand was managed by network
providers. Networks did not “collapse”, nor were they “turned off”.
Callers either could not get through, or they could only get through
after multiple attempts.
b) Fixed Phones: High traffic levels were managed by network
providers.
c) 999 Calls: Demand did not affect 999 calls, but callers who were
denied access because of congestion, could not make 999 calls.
d) Consultation: From 1200 hours, CSIA, OFCOM, DTI, and
telecomms companies conferred to exchange information and
discuss mutual support. London utility companies conferred from
approx 1130 hours.
e) SMS Text via Mobile: Text messages pass information more
efficiently than voice, but the (fixed) allocation of channels for text is
less than for voice. On 7 July, congestion seriously delayed delivery
of text messages. Encouraging people to send more text messages
instead of making voice calls in such circumstances would cause
longer delays in text delivery.
f) Mobile data: GPRS (GSM Packet Radio System), uses separate
channels on the same radio networks as voice and text. Some
systems were affected by congestion on 7 July, but others operated
well.
g) ACCOLC: (ACCess OverLoad Control) bars the public from the
networks except for 999 calls. It was applied at the request of the
City Police in a 1km radius of Aldgate on the O2 network from 1210
hours to 1646 hours. An earlier request to apply ACCOLC on the
Vodafone network was refused.
h) 3G: “3G” is the new mobile phone technology being rolled out,
starting in London, which will eventually replace GSM. Although
there were some reports of congestion on 3G networks, it caused no
particular difficulties.
i) Satellite Phones: Cabinet Office satellite phones (satphones) were
issued to LRT on 7 July, 14 July, and 21 July. None were deployed
on 7 July but some have since been deployed to key London
organisations.
j) Pagers: Designed to alert and inform, most pagers provide one-way
communications only, with no confirmation of receipt. They can
enable messages to get through when mobile phone networks are
congested. LFB uses an LFB-owned system and a public service.
Both worked normally on 7 July. COLP successfully used its pager

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 37
ANNEX B – TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUES

alert scheme on 7 July to provide key business personnel with


incident progress information.
k) Radio: British Transport Police (BTP) officers, some Metropolitan
Police Service (MPS) officers, and some City of London Police
(COLP) officers used Airwave. MPS and COLP also used their older
radio systems. Mutual aid specialist officers from other forces used
Airwave. MPS and COLP radio worked, but LAS and LFB radio nets
were extremely busy. The London Buses radio system, fitted to all
buses in London, worked well. Airwave performed well, deployed
underground solutions to Russell Square and Kings Cross, and
loaned handsets to LU to assist with recovery underground.

B2. Key Problems/Issues

Category 1 and 2 Responders


a) Mobile phones: Responders must not rely on mobile phones for
critical functions. LAS officers were out of contact at critical periods.
LFB had difficulty contacting key staff. London Buses at times had
difficulties in contacting some field staff.
b) Fixed phones: Some fixed phone lines in the Health sector were
reported to be so congested as to be unusable.
c) 999: No difficulties were reported on 7 July.
d) Text Via Mobile: LAS unable to alert officers by text.
e) GPRS Mobile Data: National Grid Transco (NGT) gas engineers
mobile data system alarmed at 0930. NGT reverted to manual tasking
for emergency calls until 1600, and ceased non-emergency work in
London. LAS ambulance mobile data terminals worked satisfactorily.
f) ACCOLC: Perception that the wrong people have ACCOLC SIM
cards. One view: all police officers should be issued with these cards
as any officer could be at the scene of an incident. Opposite view:
mobile phone systems must be fully available for public use.
g) 3G: Currently under-used 3G capacity may present a temporary
opportunity during the roll-out of 3G networks.
h) Satellite phones: Issues: handset size, usability in cities, unknown
capacity constraints, status of overseas gateways.
i) Pagers: Very soon after 7 July, LAS purchased pagers to alert and
inform key roles without relying on mobile phones.
j) Radio: LFB radio network was busy, but procedures were in place to
enable priority radio traffic to take precedence. LAS radio networks
were very busy. Recognising some of the communication difficulties
experienced on 7/7, Bus Inspectors (road staff) vehicles have been
equipped with radio and Airwave handsets will be issued to road staff
in the near future

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 38
ANNEX B – TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUES

B3. General Public and Business.


a) Unable/difficult to get through to loved ones on 7 July morning.
b) Importance of mobile networks for public reassurance.
c) Possibility of using mobile network for mass public messages in 7
July congestion situations, perhaps by utilising “cell broadcast”
facility.

B4. Recommendations

• Mobile Phones: Diversify sources of supply.


• Fixed Phones: Review requirements for incoming and outgoing lines in a
crisis, and compare with current capacity provided.
• ACCOLC: Review the criteria for invoking ACCOLC, the decision-making
protocol, and training for police silver and gold commanders.
• 3G: Buy 3G phones to bypass GSM congestion in the short term, if the
benefit outweighs the cost.
• Satphones: Acquire them where advantages outweigh disadvantages.
• Pagers: So long as they are sufficiently independent of other networks,
consider using pagers for alerting and mobilisation.
• Radio: Action must be taken to make responders’ primary means of
communications (usually radio) fully adequate to meet their
communications needs in a crisis. Make wider use of TETRA based
systems such as Airwave for partners, including senior staff working at the
strategic level.
• General Public: Educate public on need for phone discipline in a crisis,
e.g: only essential purposes, make short calls only to establish people’s
safety, then stay off the network. Consider use of “cell broadcast”.

B5. Conclusions

a) No networks collapsed, thanks to providers taking timely and


coordinated action, but services were unreliable.
b) Key features of the impact were that management tiers were more
affected than operational tiers, and that communication between
agencies was inadequate, especially outside the emergency
services and among senior colleagues at a strategic level.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 39
This page is intentionally left blank

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 40
ANNEX C – FAMILY ASSISTANCE CENTRE (FAC)

ANNEX C – FAMILY ASSISTANCE CENTRE (FAC)

C1. Background

1.1 At the time of the London bombings on 7 July, there was no Family Assistance
Centre Plan in existence. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) led
on the Humanitarian Assistance Guidance Document which was still in draft
form and not yet in the public domain.
1.2 The requirement to establish a Family Assistance Centre was identified on 8
July. There had been no pre-planning for this facility because the guidance
document was in development and had not been seen by responders.
1.3 The purpose of a Family Assistance Centre is to:
a) enable those affected to gain as much information as is currently available
about missing family members and friends;
b) offer access to a range of facilities that will allow families and survivors to
make informed choices according to their needs;
c) ensure a seamless multi-agency approach to provide support without
duplication; and
d) help local responders to ensure that bereaved families, survivors and
communities receive professional advice and assistance that is co-
ordinated, consistent and clear, that meets individuals’ needs and is offered
in a sensitive and compassionate manner.

C.2 7 July Bombings

2.1 At the request of the Gold Coordinating Group, the London Resilience Team
convened a meeting of relevant partners on the evening of Friday 8 July. This
was chaired by the Chief Executive of Westminster Council and included
Westminster Emergency Planning Staff, the Metropolitan Police (some
contributing to the meeting by telephone), the British Red Cross, the London
Resilience Team (including The Salvation Army secondee to LRT) and a
liaison officer from the Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the Cabinet Office.
2.2 The group identified and inspected the initial venue (the Queen Mother Sports
Centre). The Metropolitan Police Service and Westminster City Council then
led the construction of the facility which was opened by the Culture Secretary
at 2pm on Saturday 9 July, just fourteen hours after the initial planning
meeting.
2.3 The FAC was subsequently relocated to more suitable premises at Lindley
Hall (Royal Horticultural Hall & Centre) in Vincent Square, Westminster,
London SW1, which opened at 2pm on Tuesday 12 July. This became known
as the ‘7 July Assistance Centre’ after considerable negative reaction in
respect of the name ‘Family Assistance Centre’.
2.4 The centre was set-up for all those affected by the events of 7 July – in
particular to relatives and friends of those who died, and survivors, whether or
not physically injured. It aimed to provide an integrated multi-agency

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 41
ANNEX C – FAMILY ASSISTANCE CENTRE (FAC)

response, in the form of a secure and private focal point for assistance from a
range of professional and voluntary services. This was in addition to existing
local support arrangements.
2.5 During the time the FAC was open, support was provided to over 600 visitors.
In the initial period the FAC was fully staffed for 24 hours per day but this was
reduced to 8am to 10pm, seven days a week. A small team of Police Family
Liaison Officers and Local Authority Social Services Staff were present at all
times the facility was open.
2.6 The FAC was complemented by a 7 July Family Assistance Helpline which
aimed to assess callers’ needs, offer on-the-spot emotional support and listen
to concerns and offer advice and practical support by signposting callers to
other organisations that could provide more in-depth assistance.
2.7 Westminster City Council led on the creation of an Assistance Website which
went live on 5 August and launched on the 7 August to coincide with the one
month anniversary of the incidents. The website is intended as an accessible,
one stop source of information on support services available from all agencies.
2.8 The 7 July Assistance Centre closed on the 19 August and moved to a smaller
facility in the Westminster area in line with reduced demand for its services.

C3. Debrief

3.1 Following the FAC debrief it was identified that a process of pre-planning
should be instigated with a view to the publication of a London Family
Assistance Plan.
3.2 The multi-agency debrief found that the word ‘Family’ had been unhelpful and
misleading, putting some individuals off from attending.
3.3 It identified the need for formal guidance, a detailed London plan, and
identification of suitable sites for Assistance Centres across the Capital.
3.4 A whole range of other improvements were identified including initial ‘triage’ on
entry, information gathering, arrangements for running the centre, the range of
assistance to be offered and expertise required, the roles of supporting
agencies and the welfare of staff working at the centre, both during and in the
weeks after the period of the operation.
3.5 To ensure that the existence of the centre is made as widely known as
possible, a marketing strategy needs to be prepared with a pre-agreed budget.
3.6 The debrief agreed that London Regional Resilience Forum Voluntary Sector
Sub-committee (which consists of the voluntary agencies involved in
emergency response in London) should draw up a protocol to set out their
potential roles in an emergency and their position on funding. This protocol
was drawn up, approved by the Forum on 10 May and formally signed in the
presence of the Minister for Local Government & Community Cohesion on 16
June 2006.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 42
ANNEX C – FAMILY ASSISTANCE CENTRE (FAC)

C4. Progress and Current Position

4.1 National Guidance: Since 7 July, National Guidance for the establishment of
Family Assistance Centres has been made available (28 September 2005).
Due regard and consideration of this guidance will be taken into account in the
development of a London Assistance Centre Plan.
4.2 An Interim Guidance Document was prepared by LRT and issued in
February 2006.
4.3 A multi-agency London Assistance Centre Working Group has been formed to
work with LRT in the development of a London Assistance Centre (LAC) Plan.
Each of London’s six Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) is represented by an
Emergency Planning Officer.
4.4 On 15 May 2006, the London Resilience Team (LRT) hosted an FAC
Workshop designed again to debrief the events of the 7 July 2005 in relation
to the implementation of the Family Assistance Centre. It was designed to
identify aspects of good practice and opportunities for professional learning.
The workshop was successful and acted as the catalyst for the inclusion of a
number of elements in the developing LAC Plan.
4.5 A ‘working draft’ plan was presented to the London Regional Resilience Forum
(LRRF) on 13 July 2006. As part of the consultation process, the working draft
of the LAC Plan is now with stakeholders.
4.6 In addition, LRT has co-ordinated the identification of suitable venues for any
future London Assistance Centre. These venues have been identified by the
EPO representative from each LRF. Members of the working group are
currently visiting these elected sites in order to confirm their suitability as FAC
venues.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 43
This page is intentionally left blank

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 44
ANNEX D - RESILIENCE MORTUARY

ANNEX D – RESILIENCE MORTUARY

D1. Background

1.1 The London Mass Fatality Plan was approved by the London Regional
Resilience Forum of March 2005. It was printed and published at the end of
June 2005 and circulated to all key stakeholders including the emergency
planning officers for each London Borough, the London Coroners and
emergency services. The events of 7 July therefore occurred only a few days
after the plan had been distributed.

D2. 7 July 2005

2.1 On the morning of 7 July 2005, after the scale of the events was recognised,
the London Resilience Team (LRT) Mass Fatality Team contacted key
representatives of partner agencies to prepare for activation of the London
Mass Fatality Plan. The representatives included the central London
Designated Mortuary Managers (at St Pancras and Westminster) and the
three relevant Coroners (Dr Knapman - Westminster, Dr Reid – Camden and
Mr. Matthews – City of London.)
2.2 At 12 noon Dr. Knapman hosted a teleconference of the relevant Coroners
and they decided that a ‘Resilience Mortuary’ would have to be established as
it was likely that the capacity of existing mortuaries would be exceeded.
2.3 The London Mass Fatality Plan calls for a ’Mass Fatality Co-ordination Team’
to meet. The first meeting was held at 14.00 hosted by the LRT at the
Government Office for London and chaired by Dr. Knapman. A second Mass
Fatality Co-ordination Team meeting was held at 16.00, again hosted by the
LRT and chaired by Dr. Knapman. This meeting was attended by all three
London Coroners, the police Senior Investigating Officer, the police Senior
Identification Manager and representatives from the Home Office, Westminster
City Council, the military, the police Anti-Terrorist Branch, LRT and DeBoers
(the provider of the Resilience Mortuary). It was at this meeting that a formal
request was made to DeBoer to construct the Resilience Mortuary.
2.4 A number of sites listed in the London Mass Fatality Plan were considered for
the location of the mortuary and, following advice from London District
(military), the Honourable Artillery Company (HAC) in City Road, EC1 was
selected. As per the plan, a ‘Mortuary Management Team’ was formed to
discuss the tactical decisions around the establishment of the facility. This
team included the police Mortuary Operations Manager and the Local
Authority Mortuary Facilities Manager.

D3. Construction of the Mortuary

3.1 The focus for the LRT Mass Fatality Team then fell to the HAC where the
Resilience Mortuary was erected overnight. The plan required the facility to be
ready to receive and store victims within 24 hours of a request being made
and this deadline was met. The first deceased victims arrived on the evening
of 8 July and the first identification examinations were made the next morning.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 45
ANNEX D - RESILIENCE MORTUARY

3.2 Within a few hours one of the largest mortuaries in the world was constructed
with approximately 250 staff being on site at any one time. Facilities included:
a) A covered area where victims could be removed from vehicles
transferring them from all four scenes
b) Four reception areas for the deceased1
c) Four refrigerated victim storage areas1
d) Four refrigerated examination areas for police forensic teams1
e) A large autopsy suite with six fully equipped workstations, a
large working area for fluoroscopy and radiography, and work
areas for the odontologist, police photographers, Scenes Of
Crime Officers (SOCOs) and Coroners Officers.
f) Staff changing, shower and toilet facilities
g) An exhibit handling and storage area
h) A multi-agency Site Co-ordination Centre
i) A 24-hour canteen
j) A Family Viewing Area to accommodate families who wished to
view their loved ones.
k) Meeting rooms and offices for key staff.
l) All areas were air conditioned and well lit to provide good
facilities.
3.3 Over the next few days, the LRT Mass Fatality Team worked closely with all
agencies but, in particular, the Metropolitan Police Service and Westminster
City Council to ensure that the site was constructed effectively and in
accordance with the agreed plan.

D4. Mortuary Operations

4.1 In the initial development of the plan and associated equipment stockpiles,
LRT had assisted in procuring equipment for the initial running of the
mortuary. The stockpiling of equipment was jointly funded by the Home Office
and British Airports Authority. This equipment was fully used and was found to
be essential for the set up of the facility which, in turn, enabled a speedy
identification of the deceased. Mortuary teams from the Metropolitan Police
Service, British Transport Police and City of London Police worked long hours
to ensure this was done accurately, effectively and with respect and dignity.
Radiographers released from the NHS also assisted with this process.
Mortuary examinations ran from 8am to 8pm but with meetings, site
maintenance and security there was activity at the site 24 hours a day.

1
Four areas required due to four different scenes of crime. This ensured that there was not cross-
contamination of evidence.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 46
ANNEX D - RESILIENCE MORTUARY

4.2 Despite the site being overlooked by offices and residential accommodation,
disruption to local people was kept to a minimum due to an effective
communication strategy by Westminster City Council.
4.3 The facilities provided for families visiting the mortuary to view their loved ones
were highly praised by expert visitors and faith leaders, but most importantly
by the families themselves. This important aspect of the plan benefited
significantly from the services of The Salvation Army, whose dedication and
hard work were important to the success of the Family Viewing Area in its role
as the mortuary’s principal public interface.
4.4 The LRT provided an on-site contact point during the whole period of the
mortuary operation and on many occasions were called on to broker meetings.
They attended every Mass Fatality Co-ordination Team meeting and every
Mortuary Management Meeting. Partnership working by all the organisations
involved was essential to the successful delivery of the facility.

D5. Debriefs

5.1 It is important that, in such ongoing operations, the lessons learned are quickly
disseminated (in this instance further terrorist attacks could not be ruled out)
and, therefore, a number of individuals and agencies were conducted around
the mortuary when operations were completed as part of a rapidly designed
and implemented Resilience Mortuary Awareness Programme. Amongst the
visitors were members of the Royal Family, Government Ministers, Faith
Leaders, senior officers and planners from the emergency services and many
additional Category 1 & 2 agencies under the Civil Contingencies Act. The
Lord Chancellor who attended described the facilities as setting a “gold
standard” in the care of victims and the pursuit of forensic evidence. The
programme was mainly targeted at practitioners from across the country and
consisted of three one-day seminars with speakers drawn from subject-matter
experts who had actually worked at the site. Over 600 people attended these
events.
5.2 A mortuary debrief for those who had been involved was later held by
Westminster City Council and Chaired by the Head of Emergency Planning of
London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA). The London Mass
Fatality Plan was particularly praised by all parties including HM Coroners with
some small concerns being offered in respect of the plan not being fully
disseminated prior to the incident.
5.3 Concern was also raised that the Honourable Artillery Company site was
actually owned by a Private Charitable Trust and not by a public body. This
meant that an agreement had to be brokered between the HAC, Westminster
City Council and the (then) Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) to
ensure that the site owners would be fully reimbursed for the use of the site for
the three months it was in use as a mortuary. All parties have now been fully
compensated. In addition the London Mass Fatality Plan has now been
amended so as not to rely on military premises as venues for the Resilience
Mortuary. Many more sites have now been identified across London including
locations at Royal Parks and Local Authority open-spaces.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 47
ANNEX D - RESILIENCE MORTUARY

5.4 A further general multi-agency debrief was held on 30 September 2005 - again
chaired by LFEPA. The London Mass Fatality Plan and mortuary facilities
were roundly praised with relatively minor areas for improvement being
identified.

D6. Progress Report

6.1 The London Resilience Team and many of the personnel who worked at the
Resilience Mortuary have worked closely with the National Mass Fatality
Working Group of the Home Office and other organisations across the UK. As
a result a number of new developments have been put in place. These include
arrangements for the provision of an ‘Emergency Mortuary’ (a facility of a very
similar nature to the aforementioned ‘Resilience Mortuary’), a dedicated
national Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) Team and three further stockpiles
of mortuary equipment held across the UK.
6.2 The London Mass Fatality Working Group has met on several occasions and
has now been extended to ensure that a wider range of organisations are
sighted on the mass fatality plan for London. At their next meeting in
September 2006, they will review Version 2 of the London Mass Fatality Plan
with a view to presenting a draft version to the next meeting of the London
Regional Resilience Forum in October 2006.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 48
This page is intentionally left blank

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 49
ANNEX E - GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

E1. Terms used in the report

Access Overload Control (ACCOLC) – the ACCOLC system is a government-


authorised scheme whereby the major mobile telephone companies can reserve
exclusive use of available channels for the emergency services and local authorities
at the scene of a major incident. It allows for calls to be made without being
interrupted by overloaded radiotelephone networks.

Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) - is a UK Government coordination facility


which is activated in cases of national or regional emergency or crisis, or during
events abroad with major implications for the UK.

Casualty Bureau – the Metropolitan Police Service Central Casualty Bureau


provides a central contact point for all records and data relating to people who have
or are believe to have been involved in an incident.

Category 1 and 2 responders –


a) Category 1 responders are the main organisations involved in most
emergencies - the emergency services, Local authorities, health bodies
(Primary Care Trusts, Acute Trusts, Foundation Trusts, Health Protection
Agency) and Government agencies (Environment Agency).
b) Category 2 responders are also likely to be heavily involved in some
emergencies - utilities and transport companies, health bodies (Strategic
Health Authorities) and Government agencies (Health and Safety
Executive).

CBR - Chemical, Biological and Radiological.

Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004 - the Government Act which delivers a single
framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom.

Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) – CCS sits within the Cabinet Office. It
works in partnership with government departments, the devolved administrations and
key stakeholders to enhance the UK's ability to prepare for, respond to and recover
from emergencies.

Connect – a state of the art radio system which will be installed on a line by line
basis by the end of 2007 connecting all London underground staff on a single radio
system. It will also be used by the British Transport Police.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 50
ANNEX E - GLOSSARY

Crip – Commonly Recognised Information Picture - a method by which partners can


access information, e.g. an extranet.

Emergency Planning College – Based in the Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the


Cabinet Office, this is the Government's centre for running short seminars,
workshops and courses basis in the field of crisis management and emergency
planning.

Emergency Planning Officer (EPO) – an officer in a Local Authority responsible for


dealing with emergencies.

Emergency Response and Recovery – this document describes the multi-agency


framework for responding to and recovering from civil emergencies in the United
Kingdom under the Civil Contingencies Act.

Exercise Atlantic Blue – exercise that took place in April 2005 between UK and
USA to test resilience in an emergency.

Exercise Working Group – a Group which reports to the London Regional


Resilience Forum. Its objective is to exercise risks at national, regional and local
level.

Family Assistance Centre (FAC) – A one-stop shop for survivors, families and
those affected by disasters, through which they can access support, care and advice.
(subsequently renamed as Humanitarian Assistance Centre).

Family Liaison Officer (FLO) –police officers who are specifically trained in Family
Liaison who are investigators and who will be an integral part of the police
investigation.

Fennell Inquiry – The inquiry into the 1987 King’s Cross fire.

First Alert Protocol – a system by which press officers are “tipped off” when an
incident occurs. This alert is followed by a teleconference to ensure that
communications are co-ordinated during an emergency.

Forum – meaning “London Regional Resilience Forum” (see below).

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 51
ANNEX E - GLOSSARY

Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM) – the most popular standard
for mobile phones in the world.

Gold – Gold is the commander in overall charge of each organisation, responsible for
formulating strategy for an incident.

Gold Co-ordination Group (GCG) – the GCG is responsible for determining the
strategic aims, objectives and priorities of a Major incident. It is made up of Gold level
representatives (see Gold above) from appropriate agencies and is chaired by a
Senior Police Officer.

Gold Media Cell – this is part of the arrangements to support the Gold Co-ordination
Group. Usually provided by the Metropolitan Police Service, it is responsible for
media group representation and co-ordination.

Government Liaison Team (GLT) – the role of the GLT is to provide the link
between the Gold Co-ordinating Group and the Central Government overview and
response provided at COBR.

GPRS (GSM Packet Radio System) - GPRS is defined by 3GPP (Third Generation
Partnership Project) and is employed to connect mobile phone users to PDN (Public
Data Network).

GSM (The Global System for Mobile communications) - A second generation


cellular telecommunication system which was first planned in the early 1980s. Unlike
first generation systems operating at the time, GSM was digital and thus introduced
greater enhancements such as security, capacity, quality and the ability to support
integrated services.

Leaky feeder – A special type of coaxial cable which can be used to provide radio
coverage inside buildings and tunnels.

Local Authority Gold Protocol – an agreement which exists between the thirty
three London boroughs which allows the Chief Executive on duty to represent the
other boroughs in the event of an emergency.

Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) – the principle mechanism for ensuring multi-
agency co-operation at local level. In London there are six Local Resilience Forums.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 52
ANNEX E - GLOSSARY

London Bombings Relief Charitable Fund – fund set up to give help and support
to the victims of 7/7.

London Command & Control Protocol – protocol setting out command and control
arrangements in London.

London Emergency Services Panel (LESLP) – LESLP was formed in 1973 and
consists of representatives from the Metropolitan Police Service, City of London
Police, British Transport Police, the London Fire Brigade, the London Ambulance
Service and local authorities.

London Mass Fatality Plan – the plan provides the basis for an integrated
emergency response to an incident in London involving large numbers of human
fatalities. It may also be used to cater for the response to an incident overseas which
calls for the identification and repatriation of large numbers of UK nationals.

London Media Emergency Forum (LMEF) – The regional branch of the National
Media Emergency Forum (see NMEF).

London Prepared – London Resilience website providing public advice about how to
prepare for emergencies. www.londonprepared.gov.uk

London Regional Resilience Forum (LRRF) – a partnership of all London’s key


responders (emergency services, local authorities, transport agencies, health
service, utilities, voluntary services, military and the business community) and the key
Government Departments. It is chaired by the Minister for Local Government with the
Mayor as deputy Chair.

London Resilience Team (LRT) – multi-agency team made up of civil servants and
secondees based in the Government Office for London. In an emergency, LRT acts
as the Government’s principal channel on consequence and recovery issues.

Mayor’s Disaster Fund – the Fund is a registered charity - Registered Charity No.
1110400. Its purpose is to provide support and help for victims of the London
bombings of 7 July 2005. Otherwise known as London Bombings Relief Charitable
Fund.

Mayor’s Media Protocol – a document providing an overview of the communications


role of the Mayor of London in the event of a serious incident or emergency.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 53
ANNEX E - GLOSSARY

Media cell – The group of press officers from across the London Resilience
Partnership who ensure that during a major incident there is a coordinated strategy
for handling the media and communicating with the public.

MITIE - One of the UK’s leading support services companies. It services, maintains,
manages and improves buildings and infrastructure for a wide range of private and
public sector customers.

National Media Emergency Forum (NMEF) – An ad hoc group of senior media


editors, government representatives, local authority emergency planners, emergency
services and private industry. The aim of the Forum is to strengthen the resilience of
mass media communications and to improve the shared government/media
responsibility for keeping the public informed in an emergency.

News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) – Co-ordinates the information activities of the


various government departments and agencies involved in an incident, by pulling
together briefing from the different expert bodies for ministers and ensuring that
interview bids for ministers are handled appropriately.

O2 Airwave – a secure digital radio network dedicated for the exclusive use of the
UK’s emergency and public safety services.

Operation Benbow – a joint operation carried out by London’s police forces.

PITO (Police Information Technology Organisation) - A non-departmental public


body (NDPB) that manages a large ICT (Information and Communication
Technology) portfolio, helping to solve crimes and save time, money and even lives
across all areas of policing, including major civil emergencies such as terror attacks,
train crashes or floods.

Public Information Plan – a plan to deal with communicating with the public in an
emergency.

Safer City – an exercise being held on 18th October designed to test the activation
of Local Authority Gold structure organised by LFEPA.

Scene of Crime Officers (SOCOs) - civilian personnel employed by Police


Authorities to investigate crime scenes in order to recover evidence by use of
fingerprints, photographic and forensic techniques.

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 54
ANNEX E - GLOSSARY

Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) – the SCC is designed to provide the


enhanced facilities and additional accommodation for the Gold Co-ordinating Group
to operate.

Section 44 Tact - Section 44 of Terrorism Act 2000.

Step 123 – this is a process used when emergency service personnel encounter
people collapsed or unconscious with no obvious physical reason for their injury. Its
purpose is to ensure that emergency responders recognise early indicators of
possible chemical attack.

Survivor Reception Centre – secure area to which uninjured survivors can be taken
for shelter, first aid, interview and documentation.

TETRA – Terrestrial Trunked Radio is a digital trunked mobile radio standard


developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).

Transec – Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate, within the Department


for Transport.

E2. Organisations

ALG – Association of London Government


ACPO - Association of Chief Police Officers
BAA – British Airports Authority
BTP – British Transport Police
CasWeb - Community Advice Service
CISA – Certified Information Systems Auditor
COLP – City of London Police
DEFRA – Department for the Environment, Foods and Rural Affairs
DCLG – Department for Communities and Local Government (previously
ODPM)
DCMS - Department for Culture, Media and Sport
DfT – Department for Transport
DoH – Department of Health
DTI – Department for Trade and Industry
GLA – Greater London Authority

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 55
ANNEX E - GLOSSARY

GOL – Government Office for London


GOS – Great Ormond Street Hospital
HPA – Health Protection Agency
HO – Home Office
LAS – London Ambulance Service
LFB – London Fire Brigade
LFEPA - London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority
LRRF – London Regional Resilience Forum
LRT – London Resilience Team
LU – London Underground
MITIE – Management Incentive Through Investment Equity
MPS – Metropolitan Police Service
NHS – National Health Service
ODPM - Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (now DCLG)
OFCOM – Office of Communications
PITO - Police Information Technology Organisation
TfL – Transport for London
SHA – Strategic Health Authority (now NHS London)

London Regional Resilience Report on events of 7 July 2005


Page 56
LONDON REGIONAL RESILIENCE FORUM

LOOKING BACK, MOVING FORWARD

London Resilience Team


Government Office for London
Riverwalk House
157-161 Millbank
London SW1P 4RR
The Multi–Agency Debrief
www.londonprepared.gov.uk
enquiries-lrt@gol.gsi.gov.uk
Lessons identified and progress since the
terrorist events of 7 July 2005
© Crown copyright 2006

Produced by Government Office for London


Printed on paper comprising 80% post consumer waste and 20% ECF pulp

September 2006