You are on page 1of 10



Inside this issue:

Corporate Flight Attendant News E-Letter is a bi-monthly newsletter. Our mission is to
Time Game 10
inform our loyal readers on today’s issues that shape the corporate flight attendant. Cus-
tomer satisfaction is our focus in our ongoing quest to exceed the goals for market, profes- NTSB Synopsis 4
sional and personal growth. Each electronic publication is free to corporate flight atten- February 2, 2005
dants and aviation personnel throughout the world. Please direct all editorial comments
and membership requests to FAA Advisory on 3
Computer Batteries

Sheng Tan Kuai Lo! The Case for A 2

Flight Attendant
Buon Natal!
Geseënde Kersfees en 'n voorspoedige Nuwe Jaar! Holiday Greetings 1
Pozdrevlyayu s prazdnikom Rozhdestva i s Novim Godo!
& Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!
As you can see by the opening words these are greetings from around the world for the holidays. Wondering what countries are
sending holiday greetings here let me tell you, Chinese, Italy, South Africa – Afrikaans, Russian, and finely the United States, so
good-bye 2006 and greetings to 2007!

Within this newsletter, will be one of the most important readings you will have to help begin with a fresh outlook for 2007. I have
selected two articles that will help remind us of what we are truly here for, “SAFETY!”

Mr. John Sheehan writes our feature article entitled “The Case for a Flight Attendant -- Ensuring cabin safety is just one benefit of
flying with a three-person crew.” Mr. Sheehan is president of Professional Aviation Inc., which assist companies with air transpor-
tation analyses and flight departments with safety, management, and training issues.

His article appears in the NBAA Safety magazine for October 2006 makes a strong case for the flight attendant community. His
article gives insight to any owner or manager trying to make the decision of having a QUALIFIED Safety Professional (AKA Flight
Attendant) on board a business jet these days.

The second article featured, is an synopsis from the NTSB of the February 2, 2005, Challenger accident
at TEB Airport. Even though many of the findings in this synopsis proteins to the operator and pilots fly-
ing the plane, there is a section on the “Cabin Hostess” you will find to be very interesting. Please enjoy
this wonderful holiday!

Daniel C. Slapo

Dates to think about! Things to know!

Aviation history began, December 17, 1903 at 10:35 A.M.
18th Annual International Women in Aviation Conference
February 15-17, 2007
Disney's Coronado Springs Resort, Lake Buena Vista, FL Things to Ask!
For more info go to
Who was the first woman to fly solo from Hawaii to
NBAA 12th Annual Flight Attendants Conference California on January 11-12 1935?
June 29-30, 2007,
Sheraton San Diego Hotel and Marina, San Diego, CA Who set the trans continental speed record from Burbank,
NBAA Flight Attendant Scholarship Program March 2007 CA to Newark, NJ on January 19, 1937?
For more info go to Answers 1) Amelia Earhart 2) Howard Hughes

1 Corporate Flight Attendant News E-Letter Volume 1 Issue 3

The Case for a Flight Attendant
Ensuring cabin safety is just one benefit of flying with a three-person crew.
By John J. Sheehan
Professional flight crews are highly trained to handle normal and abnormal situations involving operation of the aircraft, but they
are not in a good position to attend to passengers in the event of a problem in the cabin. That’s the all-important role of a trained
flight attendant.

Corporate aviation is a very safe way to travel, especially if it is done in a turbojet. In fact, safety is a very strong selling
point when making the case for corporate aviation. But there are those rare times when the system fails, when all the links
in the error chain are forged and connected and an incident or accident results. Such occasions prompt us to be introspec-
tive, to ask ourselves if the way we manage our flight operations does indeed provide our passengers with the highest level
of safety and care.

Most of us would say yes, flight crew qualifications and training, equipment, and operating procedures and limitations pro-
tect both the passengers and crew from unsafe events. Corporate aviation's exemplary safety record backs that up, too.
But what about those isolated occurrences that potentially could lead to an incident or, at the very least, raise passengers'
anxiety level to the point that the reputation of the flight department suffers? The answer is that we should not be experi-
encing any isolated occurrences. Blemish-free safety is the only standard to pursue because the trust and confidence of
your passengers is the capital that keeps the flight department in business; lose it and the company will explore transporta-
tion alternatives.


Most flight departments pride themselves on their treatment of passengers-maintaining passenger preference files, greeting
and escorting passengers to and from the aircraft, providing a welcome briefing, and conducting satisfaction surveys. But,
once the passengers are seated and the pilots retire to the cockpit to produce the magic of flight, the folks in back are pretty
much on their own. From the time of the safety briefing to the door opening at the destination, the passengers enjoy regal
isolation; in other words, they are left to fend for themselves. The Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) require pilots to
remain in their seats in the cockpit for the duration of the flight with the exception of "[performing] duties in connection
with the operation of the aircraft or in connection with physiological needs."

What happens if a passenger becomes ill or incapacitated? Who knows what's going on in back in the first place? In
'small-cabin aircraft an occasional look back into the cabin will satisfy this requirement, but in large-cabin aircraft it is of-
ten difficult to see all seats, especially if the cabin divider is closed. This is particularly hazardous on long flights when
passengers are likely to get some sleep or become absorbed in their work.

Perhaps more common is the case of overly curious, untrained, or inept passengers finding a means of injuring themselves
on cabin equipment items, especially hazards lurking in the galley. Burns, bumps, and pinches are common consequences.
Most serious is passengers' ability to create hazards that threaten the entire aircraft. Less serious, but still costly, is the pos-
sibility of passenger-related damage to cabin furnishings and equipment.


Flight attendants have been employed in corporate aviation since the days of Ford Trimotors;
however, the rationale for their use often ignores what should be the focus-the safety of the pas-
sengers. High-quality service for passengers typically is the motivating factor for using flight
attendants; it conveys an image of privilege and status. Fortunately, through the efforts of
NBAA and other service providers, the value of a flight attendant now focuses more on the safety
and welfare of the passenger rather than their service function.
While statistics are not available, informal surveys of operators of large-cabin corporate aircraft
indicate that approximately half use flight attendants on at least some flights. Larger companies,
especially pharmaceutical and oil companies, appear to use them more than do other communi-
ties; family concerns or closely held corporate operations use them less.
Ms. Debra Finke FA Not all flight attendants are traditional crewmembers who limit their duties to the cabin and pas-
sengers; a number of companies use flight technicians who provide flight attendant functions in addition to assisting the
cockpit crew with certain flight duties and providing after-trip maintenance and handling matters.
(Continued on page 5 — Flight Attendant)

2 Corporate Flight Attendant News E-Letter Volume 1 Issue 3

Safety Alert for Operators

U.S. Department SAFO 05008

of Transportation DATE: 12/30/05

Federal Aviation Flight Standards Service

Administration Washington, DC

A SAFO contains important safety information and may include recommended action. SAFO content should be especially valuable to
air carriers in meeting their statutory duty to provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest.

Subject: Potential for in-flight fires resulting from laptop battery failures.

Background: This office was alerted of certain batteries contained within particular make and models of portable laptop computers
that could possibly electrically short, overheat, and cause possible smoke and flames. While, according to the identified manufac-
turer, there is a remote possibility that the affected batteries could result in smoke and flames, the manufacturer is taking extensive
action to recall and replace the affected batteries. Users of the subject laptop computers have been advised by the laptop manufac-
turer not to use their computers on battery power.

Discussion: On January 8, 2004, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 120-80, In-Flight Fires, which discusses the dangers of in-
flight fires, with particular emphasis on hidden fires that may not be visible or easily accessed by the crew. The AC provides guid-
ance on how to deal with in-flight fires, emphasizing the importance of crewmembers taking immediate and aggressive action in
response to signs of an in-flight fire while stressing the effectiveness of Halon extinguishing agents. In addition, the AC discusses the
importance of appropriate crewmember training in dealing with hidden fires.

Crewmembers, in particular, should be aware that the potential for smoke emission and fire propagation from high-energy batteries,
of any kind, could result from internal short-circuit failures. If detected, arresting or suppression techniques should be followed, as
prescribed in the AC.

Recommended Action: Directors of safety, directors of operations, chief pilots, training managers, and crewmembers of passenger-
carrying airplanes under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 91, 121; 125, 129, and 135 should be aware of
the potential hazard described in this SAFO and should apply the practices of AC 120-80. Operators are reminded to follow their
established procedures in contacting their local FAA Flight Standards District Office or their Certificate Management Office to re-
port any incidents of in-flight fires occurring during its operations. Title 14 CFR part 121, section 121.703(a)(2), and part 135, sec-
tion 135.415(a)(2), as applicable, address reporting requirements for fires [occurring] during flight not protected by related fire-
warning system.

AC 120-80, In-Flight Fires, may be found at:


When dining with someone important

and your cell phone rings, you
Mini Maryland Crab Cake
w/ Fresh Lemon Wedge and Cocktail Sauce
a) Answer it within two rings and keep the call brief.
Chicken Piccata b) Ignore it and pretend someone else’s phone is ringing.
w/Fresh Lemon and Copped Parsley Butter Sauce c) Apologize and turn the phone on silent mode. The person
you’re with takes priority.
Rosemary Roasted Potatoes d) d) Apologize, step away from the table, and take the call in
the restroom.
Warm Bread Pudding w/Raisins,
Pecans, & Bourbon Vanilla-sauce
Answer C

3 Corporate Flight Attendant News E-Letter Volume 1 Issue 3


Public meeting of October 31, 2006

(Information subject to editing)

Report of Aviation Accident

Runway Overrun and Collision, Platinum Jet Management, LLC,

Bombardier Challenger CL-600-1A11, N370V

Teterboro, New Jersey, February 2, 2005


This is a synopsis from the Safety Board’s report and does not include the Board’s rationale for the conclusions, probable cause, and
safety recommendations. Safety Board staff is currently making final revisions to the report from which the attached conclusions and
safety recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety recommendation letters will be distributed to rec-
ommendation recipients as soon as possible. The attached information is subject to further review and editing.


On February 2, 2005, about 0718 eastern standard time, a Bombardier Challenger CL-600-1A11, N370V, ran off the departure end
of runway 6 at Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey, at a ground speed of about 110 knots; through an airport perimeter
fence; across a six-lane highway (where it struck a vehicle); and into a parking lot before impacting a building. The two pilots were
seriously injured, as were two occupants in the vehicle. The cabin aide, eight passengers, and one person in the building received
minor injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post impact fire. The accident flight was an on-demand passenger
charter flight from TEB to Chicago Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois. The flight was subject to the provisions of 14 Code of Fed-
eral Regulations (CFR) Part 135 and operated by Platinum Jet Management, LLC (PJM), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, under the aus-
pices of a charter management agreement with Darby Aviation (Darby), Muscle Shoals, Alabama. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The National Transportation Safety Board deter-
mines that the probable cause of the accident was the flight crew’s attempt to take off with the center of gravity well forward of the
forward takeoff limit, which prevented the airplane from rotating at the intended rotation speed.

Contributing to the accident were: 1) PJM’s conduct of charter flights (using PJM pilots and airplanes) without proper Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) certification and its failure to ensure that all for-hire flights were conducted in accordance with 14 CFR
Part 135 requirements; 2) Darby Aviation’s failure to maintain operational control over 14 CFR Part 135 flights being conducted
under its certificate by PJM, which resulted in an environment conducive to the development of systemic patterns of flight crew per-
formance deficiencies like those observed in this accident; 3) the failure of the Birmingham, Alabama, FAA Flight Standards Dis-
trict Office to provide adequate surveillance and oversight of operations conducted under Darby’s Part 135 certificate; and 4) the
FAA’s tacit approval of arrangements such as that between Darby and PJM.

The safety issues addressed in this report include weight and balance procedures; flight crew actions, training, and procedures; com-
pany oversight and operational control; FAA responsibility and oversight; cabin aide actions, training, and procedures; and runway
safety areas.


1. The captain held the certificates required to act as pilot-in-command of CL-600 flights under 14 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) Part 91, but he had not yet received the training needed to operate 14 CFR Part 135 flights for Darby Aviation.
2. Information obtained from previous employers and post accident interviews and the National Transportation Safety Board’s
review of FAA records, the captain’s resumes, and other documentation called into question the validity of the captain’s re-
ported experience (his flight times and previous training) as a pilot.
3. The first officer had received only 22 of the 31 hours of ground training required by Darby’s operations specifications to per-
form second-in-command duties on a CL-600 being operated under Part 135. Additionally, his FAA medical certificate had
expired for the purposes of commercial operations. Therefore, he was not properly trained or certificated for the accident flight.
4. There was no evidence that fatigue affected the pilots’ performance on the morning of the accident.
(Continued on page 8— NTSB)

4 Corporate Flight Attendant News E-Letter Volume 1 Issue 3

(Flight Attendant — Continued from page 2)

While some companies use only contract flight attendants, an increasing number are employing at least one full-time at-
tendant. The trend for flight attendant usage appears to be increasing among large-cabin aircraft users.


The FARs state that for non-commercial (Part 91) operations, a flight attendant is required when at least 19 passengers
are on board; additional numbers are required as the number of passengers increase. The person fulfilling the role of
flight attendant is required by regulation "[to have] demonstrated to the pilot-in-command familiarity with the necessary
functions to be performed in an emergency or a situation requiring emergency evacuation and is capable of using the
emergency equipment installed on that airplane." Since very few corporate aircraft have the capability or occasion to
carry at least 19 passengers, most corporate flight attendants are employed as a matter of company policy rather than

Corporate policies regarding flight attendant usage range from having at least one on every passenger-carrying flight, to
never using one at all. Interspersed in this continuum are requirements stemming from one or more of the following:

• At the discretion of the aviation manager/chief pilot

• When at least X number of passengers are carried (typically 3 - 6)
• When customers are on board
• On international flights
• On flights longer then X hours (typically 3)
• When a hot meal is served
• For special circumstances (usually undefined)


The principal reason for the use of flight attendants is safety; secondary reasons have to do with customer service issues. But if cor-
porate aircraft accidents requiring an emergency evacuation are extremely rare, why bother? Further, the cockpit crew is often
trained to direct and assist with emergency evacuations, right? Not necessarily, for two reasons. First you may not be considering
all types of emergencies and second, don’t be so sure that most cockpit crews have received recent evacuation training.

Most passenger emergencies do not involve an emergency evacuation. Emergencies requiring a trained and qualified cabin safety
attendant fall into three main categories: passenger illness, self-inflicted injuries, and cabin equipment safety.

Passenger illnesses come in many varieties: heart attack, chocking, breathing difficulty, intestinal distress, anaphylactic shock,
stroke, seizures, drug overdose, fainting, and diabetic shock. All of these events have occurred in corporate aircraft to vary-
ing degrees of severity and consequence. In a number of cases flight attendants were able to assist the passengers through
first-aid and telephonic consultations with doctors. Significantly, in a number of these instances suitable divert fields were
unavailable due to distance/time considerations, placing responsibility for primary care on the flight attendant.

Flight attendants all have a variety of humorous and not-so-humorous anecdotes regarding the ingenious ways passengers
have of inflicting injuries on themselves. Bums in the galley, mashed and broken fingers, trip-and-fall in the cabin and on
the airstair, bumped heads, and injuries due to turbulence. The latter can be deadly, and sometimes the only way to prevent
it is an assertive flight attendant who insists that the passenger remain seated.

Cabin equipment safety refers to a potential hazard to the aircraft due to an improper passenger action. Most of these in-
volve such mishaps as spilling liquid into entertainment consoles resulting in overheated, smoking wiring; galley misadven-
tures including fires, overflowing sinks, and overloaded circuitry; and lavatory fires caused by clandestine smoking.
How would passengers cope with these "little" emergencies? Are they capable of saving a life or preventing damage to the
aircraft? Would the cockpit crew be able to cope with these events and still safely fly the airplane? The answer to all of
these is a qualified "possibly."

And how about "the big one," evacuation of the cabin after a takeoff or landing accident or other ground emergency? Simu-
lated and real evacuations reveal that:

• Getting passengers organized in the first few moments after the event is essential.
(Continued on page 6 — Flight Attendant)

5 Corporate Flight Attendant News E-Letter Volume 1 Issue 3

(Flight Attendant — Continued from page 5)

• Passengers are often confused and undirected immediately following an accident.

• Passengers are hesitant to act in the face of an emergency.
• Unfamiliarity with escape routes causes significant delays.
• Failure to see alternative escape exits wastes valuable time.
• Assertive and organized cabin crew members facilitate exit success.

So, despite repeated passenger safety briefings and the availability of passenger safety briefing cards, passengers may not
prove to be effective during self evacuations. Moreover, frequent flyers may not have paid attention to the briefing in
some time, especially given the permissiveness of the regulation requiring safety briefings for frequent flyers.
While the cockpit crew may be able to help with some of these issues, their duties following an event may keep them from
assisting the passengers in the first critical moments. And, one or more of the cockpit crew may be rendered ineffective
due to shock, injury, and incapacitation. The flight attendant, on the other hand, has been specifically trained for this mo-


Perhaps the best feature of having a flight attendant aboard is the training. Professional flight attendants have received
training in first-aid, automatic external defibrillator use, flight physiology, hazardous materials, crew resource manage-
ment, survival and aircraft critical surface contamination, fire fighting, security, and emergency evacuation. Often, this
training will include hands-on scenarios involving fire-extinguisher use, CPR in the cabin, altitude chambers, hypoxia
simulators, night/reduced visibility evacuations, life-raft deployment, and water survival techniques practiced "in the wet."

The real value of this training is ensuring that the flight attendant is both physically and mentally prepared to handle actual
emergencies. They have thought their way through the events and have gone through the motions. In effect, they have
experienced emergency and survival simulations equivalent to those practiced by the cockpit crew. That means the front
and back ends of the aircraft are ready for the real deal.

Moreover, full-time flight attendants have become very familiar with most aspects of the aircraft, its configuration, and
operations aft of the flight deck. This familiarity will enable them to react positively in case of an abnormal or emergency
situation. Their assessment of abnormal situations in the cabin will provide the cockpit crew with valuable information
and assistance when things go wrong in the cabin.

This training, knowledge, and experience make the flight attendant a full-fledged member of the flight crew, an extension
of professionalism and care throughout the aircraft. Working as an enhanced team, the crew is better able to provide high-
quality service and a safe operating environment to the passengers.


While most companies are reluctant to mention it, the flight attendant makes the passengers' journey more comfortable and
productive. Whether it's just a short flight or 14 hours to Tokyo, the flight attendant brings a sense of order and discipline
to the cabin-coats are hung, briefcases stowed, newspapers distributed, and confirmation provided that seatbelts are fas-
tened and seats positioned for takeoff. These are all confidence-builders for the passengers, but are simply not possible
with only a cockpit crew on board.

Many talented flight attendants make each flight a memorable experience by adding touches of class and care. One of
their trademarks is the innovative catering they devise, often saving thousands of dollars each flight over conventional ca-
tering fare.

Directors of maintenance will attest to the value of the flight attendant regarding the condition of the cabin and its accesso-
ries. Without the guidance, oversight, and assistance of the flight attendant tables get broken, galley drawers are sprung,
drains plugged, seats abused, lavatory fixtures broken, and mysterious faults found in entertainment systems. While some
of these problems may seem minor in the big picture, a $5,000 table repair or $15,000 headliner replacement can be atten-
tion getting.

More serious events occur in the cabin, too. Non-passenger-induced discrepancies occur in the cabin that requires the im-
mediate attention of a trained crewmember. Smoking Airshow monitors, burning odors coming from the baggage com-
partment, and strange noises may not be immediately fixable by the flight attendant, but he or she serves as an early warn-
(Continued on page 7 — Flight Attendant)

6 Corporate Flight Attendant News E-Letter Volume 1 Issue 3

(Flight Attendant — Continued from page 6)

ing system and first responder to events that may rapidly become serious threats.


There are many excuses for not carrying a flight attendant on large-cabin corporate aircraft:
• We don't need the service.
• I want my privacy.
• It's only a short flight.
• All of our passengers are experienced flyers.
• It's an added expense.
• We've never had an accident.

I hope you will agree that, given the variety of tasks accomplished by the flight attendant, these excuses pale in compari-
son to the value received from their services. The third crewmember is an affirmation that the company really cares about
providing the best quality of safety and service to its passengers.

Most flight attendants prove their worth on every flight. Yet, it only takes one minor medical emergency or smoke-in-the-
cabin event for the flight attendant to cement his or her value to the operation. Companies employ safety professionals in
the front end of the airplane; why not the back end, too?

John Sheehan is president of Professional Aviation Inc., which assists companies with air transportation analyses and flight depart-
ments with safety, management, and training issues. His book, Business and Corporate Aviation Management (McGraw-Hill,
New York), contains the basis for many ideas in this article. He holds an ATP certificate and an MBA degree. Contact him at

(Editor’s Note: While Mr. Sheehan makes reference to the requirement for a “Flight Attendant” in accordance with FAR Part 91, I
must state this regulation does not differ from commercial or non-commercial flying. See the following:

§ 91.533 Flight attendant requirements.

(a) No person may operate an airplane unless at least the following number of flight attendants are on board the airplane:

1. For airplanes having more than 19 but less than 51 passengers on board, one flight attendant.

2. For airplanes having more than 50 but less than 101 passengers on board, two flight attendants.

3. For airplanes having more than 100 passengers on board, two flight attendants plus one additional flight attendant
for each unit (or part of a unit) of 50 passengers above 100.

(b) No person may serve as a flight attendant on an airplane when required by paragraph (a) of this section unless that person
has demonstrated to the pilot in command familiarity with the necessary functions to be performed in an emergency or a situa-
tion requiring emergency evacuation and is capable of using the emergency equipment installed on that airplane.

7 Corporate Flight Attendant News E-Letter Volume 1 Issue 3

(NTSB — Continued from page 4)

5. The accident airplane was properly certificated and was maintained in accordance with industry practices. There was no evi-
dence of any preexisting power plant, system (including brakes, ground spoilers, and engine thrust reversers) or structural fail-
6. Weather was not a factor in the accident. The aircraft rescue and firefighting response from Teterboro Airport, Teterboro, New
Jersey, and surrounding communities was prompt, and exterior post accident fires were extinguished efficiently. The air traffic
controllers’ prompt and efficient reaction to this accident was exemplary and facilitated the prompt ARFF response.
7. Doorframe and/or fuselage distortion caused by impact with the building accounted for the passengers’ difficulty opening the
main cabin door.
8. PJM pilots routinely improperly modified the airplane’s weight and balance forms, using a variety of invalid airplane empty
weights to ensure that the form indicated that the airplane was operating within its limitations.
9. The airplane, as loaded for the accident flight, had a forward center of gravity that was significantly forward of the airplane’s
forward limit, which severely degraded the airplane’s ability to rotate.
10. Neither pilot used the available weight and balance information appropriately to determine the airplane’s weight and balance
characteristics for the accident flight and the pitch trim setting selected by the pilots is further evidence that they did not con-
sider the airplane’s center of gravity during preflight preparations.
11. The captain’s decision to initiate the rejected takeoff (RTO) was reasonable, even though the airplane had already reached a
higher-than-normal RTO speed.
12. Considering the advantages the simulator pilots had and their lack of success during the simulator runs, most line pilots attempt-
ing to abort a takeoff 5 seconds after and at a speed well above the expected rotation speed, like the accident captain, would not
have been able to stop the accident airplane in time to avoid departing the end of the runway.
13. The pilots’ failure to ensure that the airplane’s weight and center of gravity were within approved takeoff limits was sympto-
matic of poor airmanship and a broader pattern of deficiencies in their crew resource management skills (specifically in the ar-
eas of leadership, workload management, communications/briefings, and crew coordination) that were exhibited on the day of
the accident.
14. Darby Aviation failed to maintain operational control over on-demand charter flights conducted by PJM under Darby’s 14 CFR
Part 135 certificate, as required by Federal regulations.
15. Because neither Darby nor PJM was rigorous about enforcing the Federal requirement for operational control, PJM pilots oper-
ated in an environment in which pilot errors and/or omissions during preflight preparation were less likely to be detected before
16. The FAA’s inadequate oversight of the 14 CFR Part 135 charter management agreement between PJM and Darby permitted
management failures and a lack of operational control to exist. In effect, this allowed PJM to operate virtually independently as
an on-demand air carrier while maintaining little of the structure of a certificated carrier and without demonstrating fitness to
conduct such operations.
17. Darby Aviation’s Birmingham, Alabama, Flight Standards District Office (FSDO)-based principal inspectors should have re-
quested assistance from a FSDO more conveniently located to PJM’s Fort Lauderdale-based operations to ensure proper over-
sight of the operations conducted by PJM under the auspices of Darby’s certificate.
18. The FAA failed to perform adequate charter operator surveillance and therefore did not recognize that PJM operated as a de
facto 14 CFR Part 135 carrier, despite the lack of necessary personnel; policies; procedures; and FAA approvals, certification,
and oversight that would normally be associated with such operations.
19. Without clear and specific guidance on agreements between certificate holders and other entities that provide airplanes and/or
flight crews for charter flights, unauthorized entities could still be performing most, if not all, of the functions of an on-demand
charter operator without the controls, oversight, and demonstration of fitness
imposed by a 14 CFR Part 135 certificate.
20. The cabin aide did not perform a seatbelt compliance check before the accident
flight, which resulted in two passengers being unrestrained during the accident
21. The intentional positioning of the seatbelts out of the passengers’ sight made
them difficult to locate and use and resulted in reduced compliance with passen-
ger seatbelt usage requirements.
22. The cabin aide’s training did not adequately prepare her to perform the duties
with which she was tasked, including opening the main cabin door during emer-

(Continued on page 9 — NTSB)

8 Corporate Flight Attendant News E-Letter Volume 1 Issue 3

(NTSB — Continued from page 8)

23. The installation of an engineered materials arresting system (EMAS) at the departure end of runway 6 at Teterboro Airport (and
other similarly affected runways) would provide an additional safety margin; however, although an EMAS would have reduced
the energy of the accident airplane as it departed the runway, it would not have prevented the accident because the circum-
stances of the runway departure exceeded the design capabilities of the EMAS.


The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the flight crew’s failure to ensure
the airplane was loaded within weight and balance limits and their attempt to take off with the center of gravity well forward of the
forward takeoff limit, which prevented the airplane from rotating at the intended rotation speed.


As a result of the investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations.

To the Federal Aviation Administration:

1. Disseminate to all principal inspectors of 14 CFR Part 135 certifi-

cate holders and to all Part 135 certificate holders guidance that includes
specific procedures, such as those contained in the draft revisions to
Operations Specifications A-008, that detail appropriate methods by
which a certificate holder can demonstrate to the FAA that it is main-
taining adequate operational control over all on-demand charter flights
conducted under the authority of its certificate. This guidance should
address operations based at locations geographically distant from the
certificate holder’s base, should be included in all Part 135 certificate
holders’ operations specifications, and should be required as periodic
inspection items for principal inspectors.

2. Review all charter management, lease, and other agreements be-

tween 14 CFR Part 135 certificate holders and other entities to identify
those agreements that permit and/or enable a loss of operational control
by the certificate holder and require revisions of any such arrangements.

3. Require all 14 CFR Part 135 certificate holders to ensure that seat-
belts at all seat positions are visible and accessible to passengers before
each flight.

4. Require that any cabin personnel on board 14 CFR Part 135 flights
who could be perceived by passengers as equivalent to a qualified flight
attendant receive basic FAA-approved safety training in at least the fol-
lowing areas: preflight briefing and safety checks; emergency exit op-
eration; and emergency equipment usage. This training should be docu-
mented and recorded by the Part 135 certificate holder.

Today’s Health

Do you have your vaccinations up to date?

Do you know what you need for where you are going?

To find out more information go to the CDC website


9 Corporate Flight Attendant News E-Letter Volume 1 Issue 3

If it is 0900L in New York City,
what time would it be in the following locations?

A B C Answer
Country Time Zone GMT +/-

1 Korean KST +9

2 Mexico MEX -6

3 Guam GST +10

4 Eastern Brazil EST -3

5 Eastern Norfolk NFT +1130

6 Australian South SAST +930

7 Columbia COT -5

8 Maldives MVT +5

9 Tonga TOT +13

10 United Kingdom GMT +0

11 Siberian USZ5 +5

Answer in February issue

Here are 4 questions for future articles. Answer and please fax to 845-434-1260

Dating a crew members you work During a trip, what is your worst On “AVERAGE”, your catering In your work environment,
with is? nightmare? arrives correct to your airplane? your job is for?

Good Practice Trip Change None of the time Safety

Questionable Pax Load Change Most of the time Comfort
Run Away Crew Disagreements Some of the time

Here is your chance to comment about this newsletter.

Is it meeting your expectation, has it been informative, is it easy to read?

10 Corporate Flight Attendant News E-Letter Volume 1 Issue 3