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Price, R.J. (2007) Russian nationalism: creating a civic identity.

Groundings 1.

http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/3726/

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Russian Nationalism: Creating a Civic Identity
Rhiannon J. Price

A shared sense of identity within a state is a stabilising structure


allowing a focus for citizens to rally around. As a multi-ethnic state
Russia has always been faced with the problem of how to imbue its
citizens with a sense of identity that strengthens the state without
causing dissent among the majority ethnic Russians or the many
different minorities encapsulated wit hin its territory. The choice
between a civic based identity and an ethnically based national identity
has faced the ruling apparatus for hundreds of years, and still poses a
problem for both the people and the government of today’s Russia.

National identity is a key component in building strong states. People are more
invested in and more committed to the government and institutions of a state
when they are able to identify with it on a political or ethnic basis.

In conditions of weak statehood tradition, nationalizing states are


required to invest a great deal of institutional capacity in the
construction of a new national identity. 1

National identity and nationalist rhetoric have been used by many states to
build a powerful symbol or idea of the nation that people can directly relate to
ethnically. An exclusive state makes people feel more patriotic and more
willing to work to make the state the best it can be, at least for those ethnically
defined to be included by it. In contrast, a civic identity takes a multi-ethnic

RHIANNON J. PRICE graduated with a first class honours degree in Philosophy and
Central & Eastern European Studies in June 2007, winning the Macfie Bequest Class
Prize. She is greatly interested in post-communist nation-building having written her
dissertation on national identity in Belarus. Next year she will be doing a Catholic
Internship in the European Parliament in Brussels.

1James Hughes, “Managing Secession Potential in the Russian Federation”, Regional and
Federal Studies 11 (Autumn 2001): 36-68.

1
approach and asks people to identify with the state structures to define
themselves. Instead of binding people together along blood lines it claims that
living under one government in one territory should be the defining feature of
the country. Theoretically, race does not play a part, people will invest
themselves economically and politically into bettering the state for everyone.

National identity is, in some ways, easier to build on an ethnic basis than on a
civic one. This is particularly true in Russia as states throughout Russian history
have based their unifying role on concepts of ‘Great Russian-ness’ and the ‘sviaz
vremen’ (‘tie of ages’); whereas the civic concept of the Russian Federation has
only existed for fifteen years.2 The key to identity of any kind for a state would
seem to be ideology. In this sense I refer loosely to a base set of principles
which provide the foundations of the state. Nationalism is a strong ideology
that can very quickly bind a state together; Socialism and Marxist-Leninism
were portrayed in a similar light and fostered by the Soviet Union as the key to
its identity. However, the Russian Federation can not employ either of these
identities to define all of its citizens. Since 1991 different people have made
attempts at creating a new concept of identity for the Russian Federation, at
different times attempting to incorporate different ideologies, but the
pendulous nature of policies has had divisive as well as amalgamating effects.

The Soviet Union, from its very beginning, acknowledged the difficulties posed
by the existence of the many different nationalities within it; however this was
treated as a positive rather than a negative feature. Initially, people were
encouraged to foster a dual identity of sorts, as a Soviet citizen as well as a
person from a certain nation. In the long run the individual nationalities were
expected to ‘whither away’ and the identity remaining would lose all ethnic
basis and become the political and class identity of the Soviet citizen.

2Stephen D. Shenfield, “Post-Soviet Russia in Search of Identity” in Russia’s Future:


Consolidation or Disintegration?, Douglas Blum, ed., (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1994), 6.

2
Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known as Lenin, created a federal system for
managing the different regions within the vast expanse that was the Soviet
Union. Nations were differentiated and given a measure of national self-
determination within the confines of the Soviet state. This did not only extend
to the national republics such as Latvia and Uzbekistan but smaller territories
within the republics were also given ethnic designations even when the titular
nation was not a majority in the region. These designations were hierarchical in
nature and given less political autonomy down the scale. The official unifying
ideology for the Soviet Union was Socialism but in the early days of the Civil
War Lenin realised that nationalism could be used as a strong motivating factor
for people and as a useful tool for strengthening the state. A lesson was learnt
from experiences of the Tsarist Empire; nationalism could be a strong
destabilising force that added weight to revolutionary movements. By
institutionalising ethnic identity Lenin aimed to bring its power under the
states control.

The vast numbers of these nationalities deprived of rights, and the


sharpness of their deprivations, gave to the national problem in Tsarist
Russia a gigantic explosive force.3

Lenin was not going to make the same mistake and so founded his federal
structure in such a way that allowed for national expression; to some extent, his
nationalities policy even encouraged it. The Korenizatsiia (Indigenisation)
policy meant that native cultures that previously had no written language could
be formalised and allowed greater expression. Each of the national republics
was allowed to use their own languages and have institutes of science and
culture. During this period the people of the newly formed Soviet Union
experienced more freedom than they ever had before. Nations were granted the
right to secede from the Union if they chose to do so. Naturally this was more
in theory than in practice. Lenin himself said:

3Leon Trotsky, “The History of the Russian Revolution”; available at http://


easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~socappeal/russia/part8.html; internet; accessed 30 May 2007.

3
To accuse those who support freedom of self-determination, i.e.,
freedom to secede, of encouraging separation, is as foolish and
hypocritical as accusing those who advocate freedom of divorce of
encouraging the destruction of family ties. 4

The final aspect of Lenin’s policy towards nationalism involved the eradication
of Great Russian Chauvinism. Russia had always held a privileged role in the
Tsarist Empire which was the cause of much resentment by the other nations.
Lenin undertook to overcome this resentment in many ways, to the point of
excluding any references to ‘Russia’ in official documents after the revolution
simply referring to ‘the Workers’ State’5.
All Lenin’s nationalising policies were meant to bring the different nations
together in a voluntary union, not just one enforced from the centre. The
identification of different nations was supposed to be transitional, gradually the
nations were meant to come together (sblizhenie) and eventually merge
(sliyanie), the only identity would be that of a Soviet citizen, nationalism would
simply whither away.

Following Lenin’s death, arguably, Stalin selected the most negative aspects of
Lenin’s nationalities policy and ignored those most positive, then proceeded to
consolidate the Soviet state under these principles. This is particularly ironic
considering his Georgian background. He clearly reinstated Great Russian
Chauvinism drawing on Russia’s heroes of old to encourage national spirit
during ‘the Great Patriotic War’. Stalin reintroduced old Tsarist policies of
Russification and forced the predominance of the Russian language and culture
on the rest of the Union. Lenin believed that the Soviet Union needed one
common language for communication but not to the exclusion of all others,
which is what Stalin attempted to implement. The concept of Russia as the
leader of all the Soviet peoples was officially reintroduced in 1955 in the
‘Kratkii filosofskii slovar’:

4Rob Sewell, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination”; available at


http://www.marxist.com/lenin-national-question160604.htm; 30 May 2007.
5 Trotsky, History, internet.

4
All peoples and nations of the USSR see in the great Russian people
their best friend and guide, their elder brother, who played a decisive
role in the struggle for the victory of the proletarian revolution and
triumph of socialism.6

This concept was espoused by all of the subsequent leaders of the party after
Stalin and was still mentioned in official propaganda on the eve of the collapse
of the Soviet Union.

The idea of an over-arching civic identity as a Soviet citizen was most


enthusiastically carried out in the Russian republic. This was the only republic
not given institutions for upholding its culture and language, instead the
Russians were encouraged to identify with the entire Soviet Union as their
rodina (homeland), hence the high degree of out-migration to the other
republics.

As the Soviet Union began to unravel and the outlying Socialist republics began
their ‘National Awakenings’ to reassert their independence, the Russian
republic was in the unique position of having based its national identity on its
civic identity as the leader of all of the other nations. The Estonians had been
Estonian before Soviet citizens and so reclaiming independence meant
throwing off their Soviet identity and creating new state structures within
Estonian national identity. The loss of Russia’s leadership role and the end of
Soviet socialist ideology left Russian identity in a state of limbo.

The loss of their ‘big homeland’ has consequently had a deeply


disturbing impact on many Russian psyches.7

6
Meredith Roman, “Making Caucasians Black: Moscow since the Fall of Communism
and the Radicalization of Non-Russians” in The Journal of Communist Studies and
Transition Politics Vol. 18, No. 2 (June 2002), 1-27.
7 Blum, Russia’s Future, 7.

5
Ethnic Russians became an easy target for Yeltsin’s appeal to Russian
nationalism in his bid to out do Gorbachev.

By 1989 Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost, Perestroika and Democratisation


within the Communist Soviet framework had run their course. It no longer
seemed possible to reform the system from within. Nationalities had been given
a chance to assert themselves and now they intended to take it to its logical
conclusion of independence. The March 1989 elections to the new Congress of
People’s Deputies returned nationalistically minded people from the republics
who intended to ally themselves with liberal Russian reformers; Boris Yeltsin
being the leading figure. It became clear that Yeltsin’s best chance at asserting
his influence over Russia was nationalism; getting people to associate
themselves primarily with the Russian Republic as opposed to the entire Soviet
Union and therefore with his authority as the leader of it instead of
Gorbachev’s as President of the whole of the USSR.

Yeltsin’s resolution of the coal mining strikes in the Kubass and Donbass
regions of Russia played a large part in creating and maintaining his image as
protector of Russians and had the added effect of making Gorbachev appear
superfluous. In 1990 as the Parade of Sovereignties swept the USSR, Yeltsin was
elected Chair of the Russian Supreme Soviet and declared its sovereignty as
well. After Yeltsin saved Gorbachev in the attempted 1991 coup by the
hardliners of the party it became clear that even a new Union treaty would not
save Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. Yeltsin had successfully mobilised
Russian nationalist sentiment to create the First Russian Republic.
During the Parade of Sovereignties, while the Russian state was at it weakest,
Yeltsin encouraged the republics to ‘take as much sovereignty as they could
swallow’. The status of several ethnic autonomous formations was even
increased: the Adygei, Altai and Khakassia autonomous oblasts were constituted
as separate republics. 8

8See Anders Aslund and Martha Brill Olcott, ed., Russia after Communism
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

6
This idea continued to be upheld as bi-lateral treaties were made with the
separate regions giving them huge amounts of autonomy. This period of
asymmetric federalism has been characterised as both positive and negative in
terms of the creation of post-Soviet identity in the Russian Federation.

Asymmetric federalism has acted as an institutional counterweight to


centuries of ethnic Russian hegemonic control and the policies of
Russification, coercion and centralization that accompanied it. 9

This sentiment mirrored Lenin’s in his creation of the federal structure of the
Soviet Union and attempt to eradicate Great Russian Chauvinism. The
difference however, is that in the USSR Russians made up just over 50% of the
population, whereas the Russian Federation had a population of more than 80%
ethnic Russians.

For this reason asymmetric Federalism was heavily resented by ethnic Russian
nationalists and in part contributed to their radicalisation. It was characterised
as multi-ethnic bargaining and seen as a betrayal of the Russian nation. 10

Scholars associate asymmetric federalism with a dangerous


‘ethnification’ of Russian politics that was seen as an obstacle to the
building of a harmonizing ‘civic’ national identity.11

An emphasis was placed on the autonomy of the regions. Many introduced


nationalist policies on religion or language that were in direct conflict with the
federal constitution.

Nationalizing policies in Tatarstan have a strong cultural dimension


(mosque building, rewriting of textbooks and Latinization of the Tatar
alphabet). 12

9 Hughes, Managing Secession, 39.


10 Ibid., 46.
11 Ibid., 38.

7
Although many of the regions talked about sovereignty and autonomy, a lot of
their demands were more to do with economic grievances than the need to
define themselves ethnically. Donor regions to the federal centre did much
better out of the bi-lateral treaties than recipient regions; those of greater
economic importance to the centre had something to bargain with.

During the early period of his presidency, up until 1992, Yeltsin made a
concerted effort to foster a civic identity among Russians being careful always
to refer to the people of Russia (Rossiyani) and not to the ethnic Russians
(Russkie). However, the main focus of this period was establishing the
mechanisms of the state and attempting to start economic transition processes.
Yeltsin needed to get popular support for these policies and so when it seemed
people were no longer responding to the idea of the Russian civic identity he
changed his position. He instead focussed on a highly exclusive definition of
Russians, emphasising their imperial past, defined by a common language. This
promoted the intervention of Russia into the ‘near abroad’: the embracing of
the Russian diaspora living in the newly independent states surrounding her.

This clearly appealed to the old idea of Russia having dominion over these
areas; Russia was seen again as the protector of all Russian peoples. Naturally,
this approach was not welcomed by the newly independent states and none of
them agreed to the joint citizenship proposal Yeltsin put forward: not wanting
Russia to have a stake in their affairs. Due to this reaction, Yeltsin took a step
back and instead promoted the idea of a universal Commonwealth of
Independent States citizenship policy.

This was further championed by Yeltsin during the Russian presidential


elections in 1996. By then the consequences of privatisation had hit and his
popularity was waning. Yeltsin appealed to Russian nationalism in the form of a
common Slavic identity and used the potential Union with Belarus as a major
nationalist issue to trumpet his cause.

12 Ibid., 43.

8
After he had won the presidency, Yeltsin’s nationalist rhetoric died down again.
He introduced several new policies that were clearly aimed at taking away
power from the ethno-territorial basis of the Federation and moving to a more
civic identity. The National Cultural Autonomy Act was passed, aimed at
fulfilling the promise of the Russian Constitution to confer extra-territorial
rights on all ethnic groups regardless of place of residence. NCAs were set up
throughout the country to address national and cultural rights of citizens; by
1999 227 NCAs had been formed, mainly by diaspora groups outside any
national territory.

In 1997, in a clear move towards a civic identity for Russia, the ‘fifth point’ was
removed from Russian passports. People were no longer required to define their
nationality or ethnicity as they had been throughout the entire Soviet period.
However, the passports were only produced in the Russian language and the
Tsarist double headed eagle was put on the cover. This produced anger on both
sides of the spectrum. Nationalist Russians were angry that their ethnic identity
was being erased. Minorities were angry that their languages were being
ignored and feared the threat of further Russian assimilation.

Yeltsin’s presidency faced a problem. It was the regional centres of the Russian
Federation which supported him in the final days of the Soviet Union and in his
1996 presidential campaign. Yeltsin now required, however, popular support
and legitimacy on a national level. An appeal to nationalism would galvanise
internal support but risk damaging relations with the regional centres.

In 1999 Vladimir Putin did not owe his position to help from the regions and in
fact gained support from the populace on the basis of recentralising the state to
make it strong again. Putin closely followed the suggestions of Valerii Tishkov 13
on how to create a civic identity in Russia. Tishkov claimed that the
‘dissemination of common civic values and symbols among citizens of the
Russian Federation is crucial.’ Putin brought back the music from the Soviet

13Vera Tolz, Inventing the Nation – Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001),
249.

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national anthem that everyone knew and had the same composer write new
words to the same tune. The Red Soviet flag became the flag of the armed forces
to appease Russian nationalists, while the tri-colour flag was accepted as the
national flag and the double-headed eagle became the new national emblem.
While these symbols were still very ‘Russian’ there was an attempt to move
away from the symbols Yeltsin had resurrected such as the music from Mikhail
Glinka’s first Russian National opera; ‘A life for the Tsar’14. Putin also took a
step back from the idea of a common Eastern Slavic identity and changed the
citizenship law to only recognise those living in the Russian Federation as
citizens instead of all of the ethnic Russians living in the near abroad.

Tishkov’s second principle was to reorganise the federal nature of the Russian
Federation in such a way that it was no longer based on ethno-territories. He
claimed this would avoid ‘dangerous terminological confusion, which could
trigger the disintegration of the Federation.’15 Hence Putin introduced seven
super-regions which correspond to no ethnic boundaries. Although these are
run by his direct appointees they are a step towards a more civic type of
federalism if not democratic federalism.

The last of Tishkov’s principles has only been implemented in part. He believes
that individual rights should take precedence over collective rights, parties
based on ethnic principles should be banned yet the representation of ethnic
minorities in government should be safeguarded by law. Putin’s recent draft
law, which comes into effect in time for the 2007 parliamentary elections, will
prevent political parties from standing only in specific regions, They will have
to have national standing, meaning that, in effect, no minority nationalist
parties can form as no diaspora is spread out enough to gain support in enough
regions to adhere to the law. This does not affect the Russian nationalists; they
still can and do have political parties with support around Russia such as

14
Vera Tolz, “A Future Russia: A Nation-state or a Multi-national Federation” in The
Legacy of the Soviet Union, Wendy Slater and Andrew Wilson, ed., (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 27.
15 Tolz, Inventing the Nation, 250.

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Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). While
Putin seems to be consolidating a more civic identity for the Russian Federation
he still emphasises Russian nationalism, drawing on it as his support base as
much as any other.

Russian Nationalism has been growing since as early as 1987 when Pamyat’, a
Russian Nationalist organisation was formed; its ideals were to the three
traditional Russian values of: ‘Orthodoxy, national character and spirituality’.

Pamyat’ was formed on the rallying cry of Russia’s return to its Slavic
roots and a call for the eradication of unhealthy foreign influences
from its culture and territory. 16
Even before that, in the early 1980s, a high up Komsomol official circulated a
manifesto demanding the sterilisation of all Russian women who ‘give
themselves to foreigners’ 17.

Support for Russian nationalism can be seen in new found popularity of the
Orthodox Church; in the 1970s 6-10% of the population counted itself as
Orthodox, in 1996 it had risen to over 50%: Putin himself converted in the
early 1990s after a life-threatening fire in his dacha.18 This has brought
complaints from the Muslim dominated republics concerning the
‘Pravoslavizatsiia’ or ‘Orthodoxisation’ of Russia at a federal level.19

Further evidence for the rise of nationalist sentiment in Russia is the


appearance of neo-Nazi groups such as the Russian National Unity movement.
Forty-four people were killed by neo-Nazis in Russia in 2004, as one member
said “We must fight ethnic groups that threaten our state and destroy the

16
Fran Markowitz, “‘Not Nationalists, Russian Teenagers’ Soulful A-politics” in Europe-
Asia Studies Vol. 51 No. 7 (1999): 1183.
17
Hayda, Lubomyr and Mark Beissinger, The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and
Society (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), 289.
18 Tolz, Inventing the Nation, 263.

19 Tolz, A Future Russia , 26.

11
Russian national culture”. 20 It is unclear how a nine year old Tajik girl, who was
stabbed eleven times in front of her father by ten neo-Nazis in St Petersburg,
threatened the Russian national culture.

Luckily it does not seem that the majority of young people feel this way, many
have embraced a new concept of civic identity within the Russian Federation.
For them the most important aspects of citizenship emphasised ‘soul’ or ‘dusha’
over ‘blood’. Being born and/or living in Russia was important but much more
so, was speaking some level of Russian and cherishing Russia as a homeland. 21
Upholding Russian values is more important than being ethnically Russian. The
very idea of only defining Russians by blood seemed absurd to young people
interviewed in 1999.

Lena R.: My own background is like this: one of my great-


grandmothers is Turkmeni, or Tajik. My grandfather, my father’s
father, is Ukrainian. Many of us are mixed in this way. Russia is a
mixture. That’s what makes Russia today, and it is hard to pull this
mixture apart. And it shouldn’t be. To those who say Russia must be
absolutely Slavic, I absolutely disagree.22

However, the same young people who proclaimed these inclusive statements
also spoke of ‘the problem of ‘lits kavkazskikh natsional’nostei’ referring to the
bad attitude of new comers who disregarded what they considered to be the
norms of Russian hospitality.23

Veronika: No I am not completely against the slogan ‘Russia for the


Russians’ because here in Russia there are refugees who, especially

20
These statistics from Amnesty International are quoted by Anna Badkhen, “A
Gathering Storm of Russian Thugs”, San Francisco Chronicle, 14 August 2005; Ibid.
21 Markowitz, Not Nationalists, 1187.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 1190.

12
from Georgia, are bringing in guns and drugs and lots of crime. I think,
close the border and the crime will go away.24

There has also been a new defining of racial stereotypes since the Soviet period.
It used to be “Azeris as artists, Armenians as poets, Georgians as musicians and
Uzbeks as dancers” now it has become “Azeris as drug-traffickers, Armenians as
book keepers, Georgians as car thieves and Uzbeks as weapons dealers”. 25

Institutionalised racism has emerged in such a way that was always abhorred
during the Soviet period, when the Soviet Union believed it had ‘discovered the
cure for racism’.26 The use of the official registration system for all visitors to
Russia has been used as an excuse to crack down on ethnic minorities,
particularly in Moscow. Naturally the Chechen war and the apartment
bombings have added to the racism towards anyone who looks even slightly
Caucasian.

Moscow has been officially re-imagined as white and Slavic27

The police services are often heavy-handed in their dealings with ethnic
minorities in the capital.

Harassment can be so severe that for the person of colour it means


being stopped as many as ten times a day for document checks, being
fined five times a day, being detained at the police station once a day
and being subjected to physical abuse three times a day.28

Naturally all of this harassment is seen by the white, Slavic people of the city
but this simply adds to the criminal stereotype, as people from ethnic minorities

24
Ibid., 1192.
25
Roman, Making Caucasians Black, 6.
26 Ibid., 1.

27 Ibid., 3.

28 Ibid., 14.

13
are seen being arrested all the time it is assumed that many of them must be
guilty.

The transition from Soviet citizen to citizen of the Russian Federation has been
difficult for both the government and the people. For 80 years Russians saw
themselves as the leader of a multinational super power nation and previously
as the Tsarist Empire they were recognised as one of the Great Powers. Now,
their territory has been much reduced, their economic capacity has been
destroyed and, for a time, they have been largely ignored on the world stage.
Within their own country they have seen minority nationalities gain
preferential rights and status than them and in some cases been strongly
discriminated against in recompense for their previous Soviet, privileged status.
The turn towards Russian nationalism in this context can be understood.

However, Putin has made considerable moves to creating a viable civic identity
for the people of the Russian Federation in his steps to create a strong state. A
civic identity needs to be based on a sense of common purpose and
identification with the institutions of the state. The people of the Russian
Federation seem to be showing by voting for Putin, that a strong state matters
more to them than democratic ideals. It is a strong state that they can identify
with and want to build their own identity upon.

Putin appeals to other facets of the population in other ways, appealing to


nationalism in his support of the church: fiscally, politically and spiritually. He
risks, however, alienating the Muslim population of Russia through his vocal
support for the ‘war on terror’ as well as the continued military action in
Chechnya. Yet intermittently portraying Russia as a close ally of the US does
give it a higher ranking on the world stage and therefore more international
status; something important to all of the citizens of the Russian Federation.

While it is clear that Russian Nationalism is still a force to be reckoned with


within the Russian Federation, it seems that Putin is making steps to embed a
civic identity among Russians. Hopefully, as the Chechen situation is resolved
he will make a more decisive move to get rid of the significant Caucasian racism

14
which is linked to expressions of Russian nationalism. The Russian young
people of today, who barely experienced the institutionalised ethnicity of the
Soviet Union are comfortable with a civic identity within the Russian
Federation. This identification, if encouraged by the government, may
hopefully lead to a civic identity which rejects racism and arbitrary ethnic
division.

15
REFERENCES

Aslund, Anders and Martha Brill Olcott, editors. Russia after Communism .
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999

Badkhen, Anna. “A Gathering Storm of Russian Thugs.” San Francisco


Chronicle. 14 August 2005.

Hayda, Lubomyr and Mark Beissinger. The Nationalities Factor in Soviet


Politics and Society. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990.

Hughes, James. “Managing Secession Potential in the Russian Federation.”


Regional and Federal Studies, Volume 11 (Autumn 2001): 36-68.

Markowitz, Fran. ‘Not Nationalists, Russian Teenagers’ Soulful A-politics’


Europe-Asia Studies 51, 7 (1999): 1183-1198.

Roman, Meredith. “Making Caucasians Black: Moscow since the Fall of


Communism and the Radicalization of Non-Russians.” The Journal of
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Volume 18, Number 2
(2002): 1-27.

Sewell, Rob. “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination.” Available at


http://www.marxist.com/lenin-national-question160604.htm. Internet;
accessed 30 May 2007.

Shenfield, Stephen D. “Post-Soviet Russia in Search of Identity.” In Russia’s


Future: Consolidation or Disintegration? Edited by Douglas Blum, 5-
17. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994.

Tolz, Vera. Inventing the Nation — Russia. New York: Oxford University Press,
2001.

________. “A Future Russia: A Nation-state or a Multi-national Federation.” In

16
The Legacy of the Soviet Union. Edited by Wendy Slater and Andrew
Wilson, 17-39. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Trotsky, Leon. “The History of the Russian Revolution.” Available at


http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~socappeal/russia/part8.html. Internet;
accessed 30 May 2007.

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