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Plan: The United States federal government should exempt Cuba from section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section
620A of the Foreign Assistance Act by removing Cuba from the United States State
Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.
1) No plans to take Cuba off the state sponsors of terrorism list
Haven 5/2
Paul Haven, Associated Press,
A State Department spokesman said Wednesday that Washington has no plans to remove Cuba from a
list of state sponsors of terrorism that also includes Iran, Syria and Sudan. That is sure to ruffle feathers
in Havana, which vehemently denies any links to terrorism. Cuba's government contends its inclusion
on the list is a political vendetta by a U.S. government that has kept an economic embargo on the
Communist-run island for 55 years. State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said Washington "has
no current plans to remove Cuba" from the list, which is included in the department's annual report on

2) Cuba is not a state sponsor of terrorism
Williams 13
(Carol J., Los Angeles Times international affairs writer, May 3
rd 2013
, LA Times, “Political calculus keeps
Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors”,
terror-list-20130502,0,2494970.story, 6/24/13) chip
Cuba’s communist leadership was quick to send condolences to the victims of the Boston Marathon
bombings and to reiterate to Washington that it “rejects and condemns unequivocally all acts of
terrorism.” Once a key supplier of arms and training to leftist rebels in Latin America, the Castro regime long ago disentangled itself from
the Cold War-era confrontations. Havana now hosts peace talks between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia that it once supported and the U.S.-allied government the insurgents battled for years. Havana
still gives refuge to a few fugitive radicals from the Black Panthers and Basque insurgents, and two years ago a Cuban court convicted 64-year-
old development specialist Alan Gross on spying charges for attempting to install satellite equipment without government permission. But
nothing that Cuba has done suggests its government is plotting harm against Americans, national
security experts say. And they criticize as counterproductive the State Department’s decision, disclosed
this week, to keep Cuba on its list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” “We ought to reserve that term for
nations that actually use the apparatus of statehood to support the targeting of U.S. interests and
civilians,” said Juliette Kayyem, a former assistant secretary for intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security and now
writing and lecturing on national security in the Boston area. “Yes, Cuba does a lot of bad things that we don’t like, but it
doesn’t rise to anything on the level of a terrorist threat.” On Wednesday, State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell
said the administration “has no current plans to remove Cuba” from the list to be released later this month. The island nation that has been
under a U.S. trade and travel embargo since shortly after revolutionary leader Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 is in the company of only
Iran, Syria and Sudan in being branded with the “state sponsor” label. ¶ they include countries on the list that aren’t even close” to threatening
Americans, Aramesh said.
State Terrorism
3) The designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism reveals the list to be a
politically motivated designation that enables a political discourse of unlimited
violence while obscuring the U.S.’s complicity with state terrorism.
Jackson 06
[Richard Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, December 18-
20, in Michael Innes, (ed) Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens (Praeger Security
International), “The State and Terrorist Sanctuaries: A Critical Analysis”,
Final.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/25/13, VJ]

Political Bias A related problem for the “terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse is that it has always been plagued
by a certain political bias and selectivity. For example, an analysis of the mainstream terrorism literature during
the cold war demonstrates that terrorism experts regularly identified Iran, Libya, Cuba, the Soviet Union and
many other mainly communist countries as “state sponsors‟ of “international terrorism‟, but failed to
include countries like Israel or South Africa – despite the fact that South Africa, for example, not only
engaged in numerous acts of terrorism against dissidents in neighbouring states but also sponsored
movements like Unita and Renamo who engaged in extensive terrorism. Similarly, Israeli support for
various Christian militants in Lebanon is rarely discussed as state sponsorship of terrorism, despite the
widely accepted evidence of Israeli involvement in the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, for example. The
“terrorist sanctuaries‟ literature from this period also focused heavily on the assistance provided by states like Libya and Syria to
groups like the PLO, but failed to discuss U.S. support for groups like Unita, the Afghan mujahaddin, anti-
Castro groups and the Contras, despite the fact these groups engaged in numerous acts of terrorism,
including planting car-bombs in markets, kidnappings, civilian massacres and blowing up civilian
airliners.66 Many would argue that from this perspective, the “terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse has
functioned ideologically to distract from and deny the long history of the West’s direct involvement
in state terrorism and its support and sanctuary for a number of mainly anti-communist terrorist
groups. Western involvement in terrorism has a long but generally ignored history, which includes: the
extensive use of official terror by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the U.S. and other colonial powers in numerous countries throughout the
colonial period;67 U.S. support and sanctuary for a range of right-wing insurgent groups like the Contras
and the Mujahideen during the cold war, many of whom regularly committed terrorist acts;68 U.S.
tolerance of Irish Republican terrorist activity in the U.S.;69 U.S. support for systematic state terror by
numerous right-wing regimes across the world, perhaps most notoriously El Salvador, Chile,
Guatemala, Indonesia and Iran;70 British support for Loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland71 and various other „Islamist‟ groups in
Libya and Bosnia, among others;72 Spanish state terror during the „dirty war‟ against ETA;73 French support for terror in Algeria and against
Greenpeace in the Rainbow Warrior bombing; Italian sponsorship of right-wing terrorists; and Western support for accommodation with
terrorists following the end of several high profile wars74 – among many other examples. In short, there is no denying that the
discourse has often been used in a highly selective and hypocritical manner to highlight some acts of
terror whilst selectively ignoring others. Arguably, this political bias continues today: the Taliban forces in
Afghanistan are more often described as terrorists than insurgents, while various warlords, including General
Rashid Dostum, are rarely called terrorists, despite overwhelming evidence of the use of terror and
intimidation against civilians by many Afghan warlords.75 This situation is mirrored in Somalia, where the Islamist Al
Itihad Al Islamiya group is typically described as a terrorist organisation with links to al Qaeda, while U.S.-supported Somali warlords
who also use violence against civilians are exempted from the terrorist label.76 Similarly, Cuba remains
on the State Department‟s list of “state sponsors of terrorism‟ largely because it hosts a few former
ETA members, but continued U.S. sanctuary and support of anti-Castro terrorists,77 former Latin
American state terrorists78 and other assorted Asian anticommunist groups79 is completely ignored.
And Iran and Syria‟s sponsorship of Palestinian terrorist groups is the subject of substantial academic analysis, while Pakistan‟s support for
Kashmiri militants rarely featured in the first few years of the „war on terror‟ – although it is now an increasingly prominent point of
contention.80 Most glaringly, and as already mentioned, the state terror of countries like Uzbekistan, Colombia and
Indonesia – and continued tolerance and support for it from the U.S.81 – is simply never discussed in
the mainstream “terrorist sanctuaries‟ literature. The result of these omissions is a discourse that for
whatever reasons appears to many outside observers as biased towards official U.S. views. From a
discourse analytic perspective, it can be argued that the “terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse is always in danger of
promoting a narrow set of partisan interests and discrete political projects. For example, the discourse
describes an almost infinite number of potential “terrorist sanctuaries‟ or “havens‟, each of which
then logically becomes a legitimate target for various kinds of counter-terrorism measures. As noted
above, the literature identifies a large list of potential „terrorist havens‟, including: all failed, weak or poor states; the widely accepted list of
state sponsors of terrorism; a much longer list of passive state sponsors of terrorism; states with significant Muslim populations; Islamic
charities and NGOs; informal, unregulated banking and economic systems; the media; the internet; diasporas in western countries; groups and
regions characterised by poverty and unemployment; the criminal world; radical Islamist organisations; mosques and Islamic schools; insurgent
and revolutionary movements; and „extremist‟ ideologies – among others. The identification of these groups and domains
as “terrorist sanctuaries‟ or “havens‟ consequently functions to permit a range of restrictive and
coercive actions against them – all in the name of counter-terrorism. That is, the discourse can be
deployed politically in a variety of ways: domestically for example, it can be used to discipline society,
demonise dissent, control the media, enhance the powers of the security services, centralise
executive power, create a surveillance society and expand state regulation of social life. In addition to this
broad legitimating function, the “terrorist sanctuaries‟ discourse can also support a range of discrete political
projects and partisan interests, including: re-targeting the focus of military force from dissident
groups and individuals (which privileges law enforcement) to states (which privileges the powerful
military-industrial complex); legitimating broader counter-insurgency programmes where the real
aims lie in the maintenance of a particular political-economic order;82 de-legitimising all forms of
counter-hegemonic or revolutionary struggle, thereby functioning as a means of maintaining the
liberal international order; and selectively justifying projects of regime change,83 economic sanctions,
military base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the
isolation of disapproved political movements. In the end, the discourse functions – in its present form – to permit the
extension of state hegemony both internationally and domestically. Far from being an objective
academic analysis therefore, it may serve a number of distinctly ideological purposes.

4) This creates an extremely poor form of knowledge production that produces
serial policy failure and enables state violence.
Jackson, 7
[Richard Jackson, Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Radicalization and
Contemporary Political Violence, March 3, 2007, International Studies Association, “Terrorism
Studies and the Politics of State Power,”
Jackson2.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 6/28/13]
Both past and more recent review exercises of the terrorism studies field have revealed an ¶
embarrassing list of methodological and analytical problems, including: its poor research ¶ methods and
procedures, particularly its over-reliance on secondary information and ¶ general failure to undertake primary
research;4¶ its failure to develop an accepted ¶ definition of terrorism and subsequent failure to develop
rigorous theories and concepts;5¶ the descriptive, narrative and condemnatory character of much of its output; its ¶
dominance by orthodox international relations approaches and general lack of interdisciplinarity; its
ahistoricity and tendency to treat contemporary terrorism as a „new‟ ¶ phenomenon that started on
September 11, 2001;6¶ its restricted research focus on a few ¶ topical subjects and its subsequent failure to fully engage with a range of
other important ¶ topics,¶ 7¶ not least the issue of state terrorism;8¶ and its strong prescriptive focus9¶ – among ¶ Others However, a much
more serious problem for the field is that it has, for the most ¶ part, adopted state-centric priorities and
perspectives on terrorism. Within the literature, ¶ terrorism is seen as an illegitimate form of political violence practiced mainly by
nonstate actors; moreover, it is viewed as a kind of asymmetric warfare waged against ¶ (mainly democratic) states
and societies. It is also viewed as posing a serious, even ¶ existential threat to the survival of liberal
democratic states, and thus, extraordinary state ¶ counter-terrorism efforts are considered to be de facto necessary and legitimate. ¶
Importantly, it is assumed that one of the key purposes of terrorism studies is to provide ¶ policy-relevant
research to aid the authorities in their counter-terrorism campaign.¶ Partly as a consequence of its
inherent state-centricity, there is a tendency by ¶ many terrorism scholars to uncritically reproduce a
number of accepted assumptions, ¶ narratives and discursive formations, thereby constructing and
maintaining a particular ¶ kind of terrorism “knowledge‟. A series of studies on the academic and political ¶ discourses of
terrorism11 reveals that the field as a whole tends to continuously reproduce a series of core assumptions, narratives and discursive formations
about terrorism which ¶ have subsequently been accepted as „knowledge‟. For example, a great deal of past and ¶ recently
published terrorism research unreflectively takes as its starting point the ¶ assumption that terrorism
can be understood and studied objectively and scientifically ¶ without political bias. As mentioned, terrorism
studies also tends to treat terrorism as ¶ primarily a form of illegitimate non-state political violence; when state terrorism is ¶
discussed, it is usually limited to descriptions of “state-sponsored terrorism” by so-called ¶ “rogue
states‟. The deafening silence on the direct use of terrorism by states within the ¶ literature is
underpinned by a strong belief that liberal democratic states in particular ¶ never engage in terrorism
as a matter of policy, only in error or misjudgement.

5) The core terrorism narrative creates an insatiable war machine which
continually demands new blood- new wars must be constantly found and
Debrix Professor of International Relations at Florida International University 7
(François Debrix is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University in
Miami, “Tabloid Terror”, Page #117-118, NC)

In his essay produced a few days after the 9/11 attacks, Baudrillard writes: “*N+obody seems to have
understood that Good and Evil climb to power at the same time and in the same move.” Baudrillard
goes on: “The triumph of the one does not imply the vanquishing of the other . . . At the bottom, Good
could only defeat Evil by renouncing its claim to be Good.”112 Turning to final/fatal truths (defeating
“evil,” protecting the “good,” revealing the ultimate “what is,” absolutely triumphing over despair) and
making use of total heroic warfare as a preferred technique to reach such truths is a self-defeating
project, Baudrillard intimates. Only by becoming what one never wants to be and what one allegedly
abjects can such a prophecy become realized. “Good” can triumph over “evil” only by renouncing its
claim to be good, as Baudrillard suggests, and the American state/nation can only defeat terror and
terrorism by turning into a terrifying and terrorizing war machine. But, in order to avoid the frightful
revelation that, eventually, if “we” do take this path, “we” may be no different from “them” (and that in
fact “we” are abject and crave abjection) and, moreover, “our” ideologies and moralities may be just as
disruptive and even destructive as “theirs” are said to be,113 “we” must try to postpone this ultimate
realization. In the meantime, to lend credence to the moral superiority (the “good”) of our ideologies
and policies (and to convince “ourselves” that “we” are different, that “we” are not “evil”), “we” seek to
mark the distinction between “us” and “them” through the use of the war machine, through countless
instances of agonal violence. Yet, as was the case with abjection, this sovereign agonal violence brings
“us” ever closer to being undistinguishable from “them.” In these instances of agony that endlessly
seek to postpone the fateful realization that “our” so-called better and superior values may themselves,
sometimes, be “evil” (at least, to some “others”), the aesthetics of combat and destruction are prized
for what they show, that is to say, for the heroism of the deed that they appear to reveal, and nothing
else. Foolishly, “we” believe (often because “we” are told that this is so, that it is what “we” need to
escape loss and despair) that only in those moments can the claim that “we” are “good” and that “they”
are “evil” be demonstrated. This modality of action that advocates sovereignty, victory, and salvation
from “evil” through the glory of war’s theatrical brutality is the most insecure and unsafe strategy that
could ever be selected. Far from (re)securing the state, the nation, or those who believe or have been
told they are “good,” it puts us all on a path toward annihilation. The war machine demands ever
more blood, ever more battles, and ever more deaths. Since the fateful end can never be accepted or
reached (for then, as Baudrillard claims, “we” would have to see that the “good” is indeed not “good” as
such, and perhaps not so distinguishable from “evil”), new wars have to be found and must be justified.
This is exactly the message that American tabloid imperialistic proponents of agonal violence (and not
just statecraft anymore) like Kaplan and Kristol and Ledeen, among others, leave us with. The wars that
have been started by the American war machine after 9/11 and championed by these tabloid
intellectuals of terror and absolute warfare are just the beginning of things to come. They are part and
parcel of an approach to security and sovereignty ad absurdum, one that secretly (or unconsciously
perhaps) recognizes that the “evil” it fights will never be caught, or else the moment of confrontation
between “our good” and “their evil” would take place and reveal not a final triumph of the “good,”
but rather its possible indistinction from “evil.” (Could we perhaps not use this critical insight to make
sense of the decision by the United States’ war makers in the summer to fall of 2002, when it appeared
that they had cornered Bin Laden in some caves in the mountains separating Afghanistan from Pakistan,
around an area called Tora Bora, to turn around and start up a plan to invade Iraq instead?).
6) State terrorism outweighs violence by non-state actors.
Mickler 10 (David, teaches in Security, Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies at Murdoch University,
Western Australia, “Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice”, ed. Jackson, Murphy, and
Poynting, p. 28 DAG)
The Darfur case demonstrates vividly that regimes of terror are not only phenomena of history. In
their daily lives, millions of ordinary people across the globe continue to experience politically
motivated repression, violence and terrorism. Such instances are particularly concerning when it is in
fact the institutions of the state which are the source of acute - and indeed intentional - human
suffering. In addition to the basic immorality of such violence, this is a matter of fundamental social,
political, and intellectual importance because of the powerfully destructive capabilities of modern
states, the violation of the posited social contract between citizens and their governments, and also
because of an emerging international consensus that states which abuse the fundamental human rights
or security of their populations should incur a suspension of their assumed sovereign legitimacy and
immunity (ICISS 2001). Using Darfur as a case study, this chapter argues that in addition to more
commonly used legal designations such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, we can
characterize certain forms of state violence as 'terrorism' if those acts conform to the following
constitutive criteria: they are politically motivated, intentional and pre-determined, and they intend
to cause fear and intimidate a wider audience than just the immediate targets, which are primarily
(but not only) civilians (Jackson 2008: 29-30).
In a context in which 'no word in the contemporary American and international political lexicon is more
frequently invoked or more emotionally charged than "terrorist" ' (Selden and So 2004: 3), however,
critics highlight the intellectual anomaly of how - historically and at present - such 'state terrorism' has
been collectively responsible for a vast number of civilian deaths per annum but is generally de-
emphasized, ignored, or even justified in much of the burgeoning contemporary discourse and
analysis of terrorism (Blakeley 2007; Booth 2008). Indeed, one observation is that 'mainstream social
scientists have failed to recognise the possibility that states ... can and do carry out acts of terrorism'
(Selden and So 2004: 4). Yet, as Sluka has argued convincingly: If we allow the definition [of terrorism]
to include violence by states and agents of states, then we find that the major form of terrorism in the
world today is that practiced by states and their agents and allies, and that, quantitatively, antistate
terrorism pales into relative insignificance compared to it. (Sluka 2000: 1)

7) This western obsession with non-state terror paints a one sided portrait of
terrorism and functions as an arm of state security, reaffirming state power and
supremacy in force relations with its subjects. The real horror of the 20
is unending state violence which the narrative structure of the War on Terror
works diligently to conceal and legitimize. This creates the conditions for state
terror and western exceptionalism, enabling ceaseless global violence.
Jackson, 09
[Richard Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, March 18
Critical Studies on Terrorism, Volume 1 Issue 3, “The ghosts of state terror: knowledge, politics and
terrorism studies”, p 385-356, accessed 6/27/13, VJ]
In contrast to first-order critique, second-order critique involves the adoption of a critical standpoint
outside of the discourse. In this case, based on an understanding of discourse as socially productive or constitutive, and fully cognisant of the
knowledge–power nexus, a second-order critique attempts to expose the political functions and ideological
consequences of the particular forms of representation enunciated by the discourse. In this case, we want
to try and understand what some of the political effects and consequences of the silences of state
terrorism are. A number of such effects can be identified. First, the discourse naturalises a particular
understanding of what terrorism is, namely, a form of illegitimate non-state violence. Such an
understanding of terrorism functions to restrict the scholarly viewpoint to one set of actors and to particular kinds
of actions, and functions to distract and obscure other actors and actions which should be named and
studied as ‘terrorism’. It also narrows the possibilities for understanding terrorism within alternative paradigms, such as from the
perspective of gender terrorism (Sharlach 2008). In other words, it has a restrictive and distorting effect within the field
of knowledge which gives the impression that terrorism studies is more of a narrow extension of
counter-insurgency or national security studies than an open and inclusive domain of research into all forms and aspects of
terrorism. Consequently, Silke (2001) concludes that terrorism studies ‘is largely driven by policy concerns’ and ‘largely limited to government
agendas’ (p. 2). In addition, the broader academic, social, and cultural influence of terrorism studies (through the authority and legitimacy
provided by ‘terrorism experts’ to the media and as policy advisers, for example), means that this restrictive viewpoint is diffused to the
broader society, which in turn generates its own ideological effects. Specifically, the distorted focus on non-state terrorism
functions to reify state perspectives and priorities, and reinforce a state-centric, problem-solving
paradigm of politics in which ‘terrorism’ is viewed as an identifiable social or individual problem in
need of solving by the state, and not as a practice of state power, for example. From this perspective, it
functions to maintain the legitimacy of state uses of violence and delegitimise all forms of non-state
violence (which has its own ideological effects and is problematic in a number of obvious ways). This
fundamental belief in the instrumental rationality of political violence as an effective and legitimate tool of the state is open to a great many
criticisms, not least that it provides the normative basis from which non-state terrorist groups frequently
justify their own (often well-intentioned) violence (Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005, Burke 2008). There is from this
viewpoint an ethical imperative to try and undermine the widespread acceptance that political
violence is a mostly legitimate and effective option in resolving conflict – for either state or non-state actors.
Political violence is in fact, a moral and physical disaster in the vast majority of cases. From an ethical-normative perspective, such a
restricted understanding of terrorism also functions to obscure and silence the voices and
perspectives of those who live in conditions of daily terror from the random and arbitrary violence of
their own governments, some of whom are supported by Western states. At the present juncture, it also
functions to silence the voices of those who experience Western policies – directly, as in those
tortured in the war on terror, and indirectly, as in those suffering under Western-supported regimes –
as a form of terrorism. That is, it deflects and diverts attention from the much greater state terrorism
which blights the lives of tens of millions of people around the world today. Related to these broader normative
and ideological effects, the treatment of state terrorism within the discourse – the silences on it and the narrow construction of ‘state-
sponsored terrorism’ – also functions to position state terrorism (should it even exist within the dominant framework) as seemingly less
important than non-state terrorism, and as confined to the actions that states take in support of non-state terrorism. This also distorts the field
of knowledge and political practice by suggesting that the sponsorship of Palestinian groups by Iran for example, is an infinitely more serious
and dangerous problem than the fact that millions of Colombians, Uzbeks, Zimbabweans, and so on, are daily terrorised by death squads, state
torture, and serious human rights abuses. Within this discursive terrain, it can also function to provide legitimacy to Western policies such as
sanctions, coercive diplomacy, and pre-emptive war against politically determined ‘state-sponsors of terrorism’ which may be terroristic
themselves, and which ignore the involvement in state-sponsorship by Western states. From a political-normative viewpoint, the silence
on state terrorism, and in particular the argument of many terrorism scholars that state actions can never be defined as ‘terrorism’,
actually functions to furnish states with a rhetorical justification for using what may actually be
terroristic forms of violence against their opponents and citizens without fear of condemnation. In
effect, it provides them with greater leeway for applying terror-based forms of violence against
civilians, a leeway exploited by many states such as Israel, Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe, and others who try to intimidate groups
with the application of massive and disproportionate state violence. From this perspective, a discourse which occludes and
obscures the very possibility of state terrorism can be considered part of the conditions that actually
makes state terrorism possible. In addition, the silence on state terrorism within the field also functions to undermine the political
struggle of human rights activists against the use of terror by states by disallowing the delegitimising power and resources that come from
describing state actions as ‘terrorism’. It is pertinent to note in this context that the world’s leading states have continually rejected any and all
attempts to legally define and proscribe a category of actions which would be called ‘state terrorism’, arguing instead that such actions are
already covered by other laws such as the laws of war (Becker 2006). The silence on state terrorism has another political
effect, namely, the way in which it has functioned, and continues to function, to distract from and
deny the long history of Western involvement in terrorism, thereby constructing Western foreign
policy as essentially benign – rather than aimed at reifying existing structures of power and
domination in the international system, for example. That is, by preventing the effective criticism of
particular Western policies it works to maintain the dangerous myth of Western exceptionalism. This
sense of exceptionalism and the supportive discourse of terrorism studies permits Western states and
their allies to pursue a range of discrete political projects and partisan interests aimed at maintaining
international dominance. For example, by reinforcing the notion that non-state terrorism is a much greater
threat and problem than state terrorism and by obscuring the ways in which counterterrorism can
morph into state terrorism, the discourse functions to legitimise the current war on terror and its
associated policies of military intervention, extraordinary rendition, reinforcement of the national
security state, and the like. More specifically, the discourse can provide legitimacy to broader counter-
insurgency or counterterrorism programmes where the actual aims lie in the maintenance of a
particular political–economic order such as is occurring in Colombia at present (Stokes 2006). Importantly, the silence on
state terrorism also functions to de-legitimise all forms of violent counter-hegemonic or revolutionary
struggle (by maintaining the notion that state violence is automatically legitimate and all non-state
violence is inherently illegitimate), thereby maintaining the liberal international order and many
oppressive international power structures (also Duffield 2001). Lastly, the discourse can be used to selectively
justify particular projects of regime change,13 economic sanctions, military base expansion, military
occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the isolation of disapproved political
movements such as Hamas or Hezbollah. In the end, the discourse functions to permit the reification and
extension of state hegemony both internationally and domestically, and perhaps more importantly, the belief in the
instrumental rationality of violence as an effective tool of politics. Despite the intentions of terrorism scholars therefore, who may feel that
they engage in objective academic analysis of a clearly defined phenomenon, the discourse actually serves a number of distinctly political
purposes and has several important ideological consequences for society.

8) Our 1AC is a critique of conventional terror studies and comes at an opportune
juncture; the failure of the war on terrorism provides a unique window of
vulnerability for the dominant discourse.
Jackson, Deputy Director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 09
[Richard, March 18
, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Volume 1 Issue 3, “The ghosts of state terror:
knowledge, politics and terrorism studies”, p 385-356, accessed 6/27/13, VJ]
In the end, however, the puzzle of why state terrorism has been so neglected in the field is less
important than recognising that there are important reasons for ‘bringing the state back into
terrorism studies’ (Blakeley 2007). First, there are obvious analytical reasons for taking state terrorism
seriously, including the imbalances and distortions which a narrow focus on non-state terrorism
introduces. Second, there are normative reasons for studying state terrorism in a rigorous and
systematic manner, notably that such knowledge furnishes a powerful means of holding states to
account for their actions and reinforcing norms of behaviour that exclude the use of violence to
intimidate and terrorise civilians. By any measure, states have been responsible for infinitely more
human suffering and terror than any other actor; the promotion of human security therefore depends
on protecting citizens from the abuses and predations of states. In conclusion, exposing the ideological
effects and political technologies of the discourse has the potential to open up critical space for the
articulation of alternative and potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice. The good
news is that discourses are never completely hegemonic; there is always room for counter-hegemonic
struggle and subversive forms of knowledge. In this case, not only is the discourse inherently unstable
and vulnerable to different forms of critique, but the continual setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan,
ongoing revelations of state torture and rendition by Western forces, and increasing resistance to
government attempts to restrict civil liberties suggest that the present juncture provides an
opportune moment to engage in deliberate and sustained critique of a dominant discourse which
focuses on non-state actors and obscures the much greater te rrorism of state actors

STUMP AND DIXIT 11 (Jacob, Shepard U, and Priya, Virginia Tech U., International Relations
vol. 26 No. 2 pp. 203)

In terms of dualism, Jonathan Joseph has recently called for CTS to adopt an explicitly
„philosophical realist‟ ontological stance in regards to terrorism. On this view, the
emphasis would be on „ontology over epistemology and [he] takes this ontology to be
objective rather than intersubjective‟.26 By objective he means that „social relations [can
be seen] as real things “out there” that are open to investigation through the right kind
of social scientific practice‟.27 In assessing CTS, Joseph supports a „critique of the
extra-discursive realm‟ that „intersects with [the terrorism discourse]‟. His goal is to get
at „the real structure of power and oppression that have an objective basis and that give
meaning to the discourse just as the discourse might give meaning to them‟.28 In making
the strong case for an ontology composed of both discursive and material elements and
an epistemology seeking to bridge this gap by explaining what terrorism really is,
Joseph offers an exemplary illustration of a dualist ontological presupposition at work.


JARVIS 09 (Lee, Dept. of Politics and IR, Swansea U, Security Dialog vol. 40 no. 5, pp. 20-21)

Although less immediately obvious than in the first face above, this second critical approach also
mobilizes a far more engaged normative project than the mainstream debates. By highlighting
the contingent structuration, exclusionary construction and politico-strategic functions of
narratives, images and discourses of terror, this face opens considerable space for a
„countermemorializing‟ (Ashley & Walker, 1990: 385) alternative to the militaristic
framings that continue to dominate discussions of terrorism. In so doing, this work holds
significant opportunity for an active and critical scholarship seeking to contest, destabilize and
intervene in the politics of terror. This commitment to otherness – other readings of terror, other
responses to terror and, ultimately, other ways of life – I argue, offers the scholar of terrorism a
genuine alternative to the ameliorative, problem-solving role characterizing the mainstream and
first-face discussions alike (see, for example, Campbell, 1998: 4–5; Roffe, 2004: 44).
Accordingly, if the critical terrorism studies enterprise is to succeed in radically reframing
discussions of political violence, it is likely do so, ultimately, from further attention to this
interpretivist sensibility.

11) Governmental action is key
Raco, PhD, 3 (Mike, Ph.D Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, Reader in Human Geography, Lecturer in Urban Economic Development in the
Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, Lecturer in Economic Geography, Department of Geography, University of Reading, “Governmentality, Subject-Building, and the
Discourses and Practices of Devolution in the UK, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers Vol. 28 No. 1 (March 2003), Blackwell Publishing, The Royal Geographical Society with
Institute of British Geographers, p.77)
This is not to say that Foucauldian, governmental-ist approaches have been without their critics and can and should be adopted
by geographers without careful reflection. One recurring criticism of govern-mentalist approaches is that in adopting, often
explicit, anti-foundationalist positions, its potential to establish alternative, critical political agendas is
highly circumscribed. Frankel (1997), for example, argues that the plethora of discourse analyses and textual
studies that characterize much of the work of governmental writers do not get to grips with the social,
political and economic structures in and through which policy debates and practices are implemented.
Moreover, despite its anti-totalitarian and anti-Marxist rhetoric, governmental writers are often 'close to
appearing as new structural func-tionalists in their preoccupation with order and regulation... leaving
little room for emphasising alternative political processes' (Frankel 1997, 85). Others, such as Harvey (1996 2000)
express similar concerns, arguing that the inherent pessimism of anti-universalist approaches has helped to
create a political vacuum in which those who are punitively disciplined by existing capitalist systems are
left without the hope that their circumstances can be improved. Even proponents of governmentality
accept that 'despite the clear potential for linking the governmentality approach to a critical politics, by and large it has not
been realised' (O'Malley et al. 1997, 503). What is required is for a change in meth-odological focus towards
the empirical practices of government and government programmes and less concern with abstract


GUNNING 07 (Jeroen, Reader in Middle East Politics, and Conflict Studies in the School of
Government and International Affairs, Durham U.,Government and Opposition, vol. 42 no. 3, p.

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a
„critical‟ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means combining
„critical‟ and „problem-solving‟ approaches, it does not fulfil its „emancipatory‟ potential.94 One
of the temptations of „critical‟ approaches is to remain mired in critique and deconstruction
without moving beyond this to reconstruction and policy relevance.95 Vital as such critiques
are,the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and
„terrorists‟ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a
transformation, however modestly, of political structures. That, after all, is the original meaning
of the notion of „immanent critique‟ that has historically underpinned the „critical‟ project and
which, in Booth‟s words, involves „the discovery of the latent potential situations on which to
build political and social progress‟, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not
realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes,„this means building with one‟s feet firmly on the
ground, not constructing castles in the air‟ and asking „what it means for real people in real