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Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization is a recognized labor union in Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police (didnt say what it was about the police). PBMEO thru
Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has
nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The
Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is
an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure
is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite
the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration
from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed
the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No
Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held: Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is
not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take
up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police.

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were
fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss
or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon,
is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark
reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the

As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig,
was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss
can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and
brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human
rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property
rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a
cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well
as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by
that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the
more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members
will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet
continued alleged police persecution.


A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City
Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North
EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three
(3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.

Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo
that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".

On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang
Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of
the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA.

The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July
1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at
North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR. In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in
contempt for carrying
out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a
fine of P500.00 on each of them.

Issue: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were
demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners
for contempt;

a) No. Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent
that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more
severe cases of human rights violations.

Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political
detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases
of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious."
While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just
expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set.

In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive
delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve,
instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within
the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." In the particular case at
hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to
be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City
which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life
and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed
to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that
as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-avis the circumstances obtaining in this
instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines
and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to
cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for
contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational
guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the
power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said
body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in
pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in
the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative
power that it does not possess.

PADILLA, J., dissenting

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as
well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights
violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition
of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to
investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street
corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when
the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the
start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide
latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights

Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760. Petitioners filed a
complaint citing the following provisions and questioned them for violation of due process:

1.) refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in
the lobby in open view;
2.) prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
3.) usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
4.) making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5.) cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held: Yes. The Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a
police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body.
Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.


President Noynoy Aquino issued executive order no. 1 which involves the investigation of reported
cases of graft and corruption of the previous administration. By Virtue of this order, the truth commission was
created as an ad hoc body tasked to investigate such cases.

The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official,
transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies

Petitioners asked the court to declare such order unconstitutional as the truth commission usurps unto the
powers and the duties of the supreme court. It thus violates the separation of powers since the it is also
legislative in nature as it creates a new office and allocates funds for it.
Respondent answers that the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.
They further argue that E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is
no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
a.) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
b.) Is E.O. 1 constitutional?

Yes. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and
present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the
Court. egislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action
which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

Yes. It is violative of the equal protection clause. The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that
is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. The failure of the executive order to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past
administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the
previous administration only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be
taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished
by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo
administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended
investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include other past
administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its
effectiveness. The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective
of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it breeds.

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance no. 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short
time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be
nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It
ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The
City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is
empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City,

Whether or not Ordinance 7774 is valid.

The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash
up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to
freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a
limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.


Facts: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the
basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom
she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union
office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida
narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.

Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant,
men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio
thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his
companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay, a union officer, who even asked them if
they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.

As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an
investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscals Office of
Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court
Petitioners argue that the search of the union office was reasonable under the circumstances, given that the
hotel owns the room where the union holds office; the search was not without probable cause as it was
conducted precisely due to reports received by petitioners that the union office was being used as a venue for
illegal activities, particularly the sale and/or use of prohibited drugs, and the search was conducted with the
consent and in the presence of union officer Babay.

Petitioners contend that the court of appeals erred in granting respondent union officers damages.

Issue: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.

Ruling: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x

In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities
and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions
barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners violation of individual
respondents constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the
right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure

Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages
under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who
orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to
herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in
relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6)
Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

Petition was Denied.



Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of
Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation at
Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped.

Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under
certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. They have considerable
Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are peaceful, timid, primitive,
seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000 . The manguianes have shown no desire for
community life, thry have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under
any for of municipal government. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board,
extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300
Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand
by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation.

An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging
that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been
illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading:
"With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board, was challenged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is constitutional.

HELD: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term "non-Christian" should not be given a literal
meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization.

The term "non-Christian" it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more
directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the
provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the
Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public
interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power,
And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an
advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in
particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the
development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends
are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor
class legislation, and stated among other things: ". . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class."

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That fact is not denied. I cannot give
my consent to any act which deprives the humblest citizen of his just liberty without a hearing, whether he be a
Christian or non-Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are entitled to a hearing, at least, before they
are deprived of their liberty.

MOIRE, J. dissenting

The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It does

The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is similar to that accorded the
Indians in the United States, and reference is made all through the court's decision to the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court with reference to the Indians. It is not considered necessary to go into these cases
for the simple reason that all the Indians nations in the United States were considered as separate nations and
all acts taken in regard to them were the result of separate treaties made by the United States Government with
the Indian nations, and, incompliance with these treaties, reservations were set apart for them on which they
lived and were protected form intrusion and molestation by white men. Some these reservations were larger
than the Islands of Luzon, and they were not measured in hectares but in thousands of square miles.

In fact, citing the case of U.S. vs crook, which involved the detention by the U.S. of Indians for a similar reason as
the law at issue in the case at bar, the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the
United States and in violation of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and ordered their
release from custody.

Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and was a former member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 elections.

He was charged in conspiring to other members to prevent and exclude Docena (Respondent), a qualified
replacement of a deceased member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body.
In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a resolution suspending their respective public position and office for
ninety (90) days.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if executed shall
affront the petitioner s right for due process; [2] the suspension would assault his covenant to the people of
Samar as their vice-governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension no longer exist.

Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent
Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar.


Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the SANDIGANBAYAN is valid?

Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged
might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged. The suspension
order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public office is "a
public agency or trust,"and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provisionwhich petitioner

Hence, SC dismissed the petition. SANDIGANBAYAN decision is affirmed


Facts: Pura Kalaw Ledesma owned a parcel of land adjacent to those owned by Herminigilda located in
Tandang sora Quezon city/ Hermingilda sold her 2 parcels of land to Mariano Lising who then registered both
lots in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots.1wphi1.nt

Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners, spouses Victor
and Honorata Orquiola.

Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching
upon her land. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw
Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial
continued for thirty years.

The trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching on
plaintiffs land. By virtue of which, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners, through an alias writ
of execution, to remove the house they constructed on the land they were occupying.

A writ of demolition was issued subsequently.

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with TRO. Petitioners alleged that they
bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value; hence, they were parties in interest. Since they
were not impleaded in the civil case, the writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced
against them because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the case, Hence, this petition.

a) whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners; and
b) whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith

a.) No. Petitioners argue that the court erred when it relied heavily on the courts ruling in Vda. de Medina
vs. Cruz in holding that petitioners are successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as such, they can be
reached by the order of execution in Civil Case even though they were not impleaded as parties thereto.
It is submitred that Medina is not applicable in this case because the circumstances therein are different
from the circumstances in the present case.
In this case petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case. The right over the land of
the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized Torrens title. Petitioners in
this case acquired the registered title in their own names. This differs from the medina case where the
ownership is not by virtue of torrens title but rather as issued by the Spanish government.

where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens system, the
applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered property need not go beyond the certificate of
title; he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are
annotated on the title. It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are
fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system.

b.) Yes. This is the first time that petitioners have raised this issue. As a general rule, this could not be done.
Nevertheless, the court deem it proper that this issue be resolved in this case, to avoid circuitous
litigation and further delay in the disposition of this case.

Petitioners are indeed builders in good faith.

Petitioner spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano
Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff
of Quezon City tried to execute the that they had notice of private respondents adverse claim. The
institution of Civil Case cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since they were not
impleaded therein as parties.

As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the subject
property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case thereon.

Consequently, private
respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be
reached by the decision in said case.

Petition is granted


Facts: Deloso was the elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in 1971. Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the
Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law in relation to the award of
licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976 to 1978
and the issuance of five (5) tractors of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement
as to the payment of rentals.

The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. While the other case
involving the tractors were included in 5 informations for violation of Anti-Graft Law with the sandiganbayan.

Petitioner was suspended pendent elite from his position as governor in 1989 (he was elected governor 1988)

Hence he filed this instant petition.

Whether or not the suspension was proper.

No, regular term of a governor is only 3 years. He was, however, ordered suspended from performing his duties
as governor by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of the criminal charges filed against him. The order of suspension
does not have a definite period so that the petitioner may be suspended for the rest of his term of office unless
his case is terminated sooner. An extended suspension is a distinct possibility.

Under these circumstances the preventive suspension which initially may be justified becomes unreasonable
thus raising a due process question. With this being so, there is injustice inflicted on the people of Zambales.
They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as governor. The protracted
continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A
denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of
suspension should be lifted.

We previously ruled on the issue as to whether the preventive suspension beyond the maximum period of 60
days, provided in Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act 2260) is illegal and void. The
preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, In the
guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed
without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the constitution.

The order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period can not be sanctioned.
We rule that henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act
3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil
Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The suspension was lifted.


Facts: Javier (petitioner) and Pacificador (respondendt), a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be
members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. On the eve of the elections, several followers of the petitioner
were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the Pacificadors men. Seven suspects, including respondent
Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Despite this event, respondent won the elections.

The petitioner filed a case arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by
the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his
proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

While the case was pending, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation,
already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted
by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they
were above the law.

Batasang Pambansa was subsequently abolished after the revolution and the case was dismissed due to the
disappearance of the division in issue.

Issue: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

Held: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor.
ArticleXII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution expressly provides that:
The COMELEC may sit en banc or in three divisions.All election cases maybe heard and decided by divisions
except contests involving members of theBatasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.. the
decision of the second division alone regarding the protest was invalid.

The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are
violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go
to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls
the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only
to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions
and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of
the established facts and the pertinent law.

Wherfore, the court held that, were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and
academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23,
1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution. (the supreme court decided on the case despite the fact that the
constitutional body in issue no longer existed.)

Aug. 21, 1983 Ninoy Aquino was assassinated while inside the premises of the Mla Intl Airport. 3 hours after
the incident, the military investigators reported that the man who shot Aquino was a communist-hired gunman.
the latter was gunned down in turn by the military (a few days later, said gunman would be identified as
Rolando Galman)

Marcos established a Fact Finding Board (the Agrava Board) to investigate the case

After 125 days of hearing the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in transcript, the Agrava Board came up
with a minority and majority report, both contending that the killing was not a communist plot but a military

Minority report 6 persons who were at the service stairs as plotters, and Gen. Luther Custodio was
essential to the implementation of the plan

Majority report 26 persons headed by gen Fabian Ver, all acting in conspiracy with one another in the
premeditated killing of Ninoy

Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman together with 29 other petitioners, charged the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan of serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in the miscarriage of justice for want
of due process of law; the argued that there was failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to
present vital documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan
and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

They prayed for a TRO, a nullification of the proceedings and a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an
unbiased prosecutor

A 9-to-2 vote of the SB granted the TRO while later on the same 9-to-2 ratio dismissed the petition and lifted
the TRO

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration based on the lack of legal ground for the dismissal

All of the accused were acquitted while even though Galman was not on trial, he was, in effect, convicted as the
assassin of Ninoy

The Mla Times published an article entitled Aquino Trial A Sham, which had for its context the revelations of
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera that the graft court were convinced by Marcos to whitewash the criminal

SC appointed a 3-member commission (Vasquez Commission) to hear and receive evidence of the charges of
collusion and pressure

The Vasquez Commission submitted its report with an affirmation of the secret meeting held in Malacaang,
wherein Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran to handle the case (without raffling the case first) and for the entire
tribunal to have all of the accused acquitted

a.) Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.

b.)Whether or not a call for a re-trial of the case would be tantamount to double jeopardy.

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since
legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused. The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as
it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the first
jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and trial before the
lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy.

The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President ordered
the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due
pressure to the judiciary. The courts decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in
observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy
cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion
between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered the
decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.

PP vs. Castillo

FACTS: Castillo stabbed Velasco with a fan knife on his left chest which led to the latters death. A criminal case
for murder was filed against Castillo in the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC, appreciating the direct testimonies of
the witnesses of the prosecution positively identifying the accused as against the latters alibi, convicted Castillo
for the crime of murder.
Castillo appealed in the SC declaring that the trial judge was biased against him. He averred that the trial judge
propounded questions to the witnesses which were within the prerogative of the prosecution to ask. Castillo
alleged that the trial judge took over from the prosecution and asked questions in a leading manner. The trial
judge was alleged also to have interrupted the cross-examination to help the witness give answers favourable
to the prosecution and asked questions which pertained to matters of opinion and allusions of bad moral
character. All of which could not have been objected by the defense since the same have been ventilated by the
trial judge.
ISSUE: Was the Judge impartial?
No. It is the judges prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to eek out the truth. After careful
examination of the records, it appears that the assailed questions by the judge were merely clarificatory in
Allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with caution, especially when the
queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judges queries is determined not by their
quantity but by their quality and in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such
questioning. Upon evaluation, even if all questions and answers propounded by the judge were eliminated, the
appellant would still be convicted.
The Sol-Gen was correct when he said that there was no showing that the judge had an interest,
personal or otherwise in the prosecution of the case at bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted regularly
and in the manner that preserves that idea of cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

Tejano vs. Ombudsman
The Facts
The instant petition stemmed from the report of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Resident Auditor
Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October 1992, on his investigation regarding an alleged unfunded withdrawal in the
amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes Subdivision (V&G) under Savings Account No. 365-5355-6-4.
The report implicated Vice President Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive Officer Emilio
Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela
Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G, as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB
In a resolution dated 29 March 1993, Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing
of the proper information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, against petitioner
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G. The resolution was approved by Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
The resolution was thereafter referred for review to Special Prosecutor III Orlando I. Ines of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor.
In a Memorand
dated 25 October 1994, Ines affirmed the resolution of Graft Investigation Officer
Edgardo G. Canton.
On 28 October 1994, Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De G. Ferrer recommended the approval of the
memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer Ines.
On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred in the approval of
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez concurred thereto on 11 November 1994.
Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as
amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 21654.
On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminary
investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the
marginal note assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal Case No. 21654.

ISSUE: Was Due process observed?

This Court has been consistent in holding that it will not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his
constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers, and respect the initiative and independence
inherent in the Ombudsman who beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of
the integrity of public service. Such discretionary power of the Ombudsman is beyond the domain of this Court
to review, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction of the latter.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public
officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.

Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner attributes partiality on
the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the
fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was a Special
Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan.
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having recommended
the filing of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating
in the review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies.

Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel
of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep.
Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep"
in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad
had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the
1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formalcomplaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan
acted on thecomplaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was
accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for
investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending
the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By
October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the
Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approvedby the Tanodbayan. Five
criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
(1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-
law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of
Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager
of AmityTrading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for
printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on
three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets andLiabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976
and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due
process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

HELD: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly,
the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation,
which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and
their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case
under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that
this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: On January 5, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make or draw and issue to Chu Yang T. Atienza to apply on account or for value PCI Bank,
Commonwealth Ave. Branch Check No. 017744 dated March 18, 1992 payable to the order of CASH in the
amount of P14,125.00 Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment which
check when presented for payment was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Chu Yang T. Atienza the amount of
said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving
said notice.
When arraigned on August 16, 1993, accused Caras pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial proceeded.
The evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on or about February 18, 1992, up to May 31, 1992 at
Quezon City, accused Jane Caras obtained from complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza on installment various gift
checks and purchase orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment thereof, the accused issued to the complainant
the following checks drawn against Philippine Commercial Bank.
When the checks were presented for deposit or encashment, they were all dishonored for the reason Account
Closed. Despite repeated verbal and written demands made on her to replace the dishonored checks with
cash, she failed and refused to do so.
Attienza then filed a ccriminal case for violation of BP 22. The Lower court found Caras guilty of 15 counts of BP
Caras now appeals averring that she was not afforded due process because there was no notice of dishonour
which could have precluded a criminal prosecution.
ISSUE: Was there a violation of the right of the accused to be informed?
HELD: Yes. There is no mention of when the demand to pay was made, whether before or after the checks were
dishonoured so that within 5 banking days from receipt of such notice she could pay the check fully or make
arrangements for such payment.
The testimony of Panuelos, the branch manager of PCI Bank where petitioner maintained her checking account
indicates that the bank also failed to send notice to the petitioner for her to pay the value of the checks or make
arrangements for their payment within 5 days from the dishonour of the said checks. The absence of notice of
dishonour necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminat prosecution. Accordingly,
procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonour ne actually served on the petitioner.
The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonour is a clear
ground for her acquittal.
Mariveles Shipyard vs. CA


FACTS: Sometime on October 1993, Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the services of Longest Force
Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to render security services at its premises. Pursuant to their agreement,
Longest Force deployed its security guards, the private respondents herein, at the petitioners shipyard in
Mariveles, Bataan.

According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract with Longest Force,
promptly paying its bills and the contract rates of the latter. However, it found the services being rendered by
the assigned guards unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to terminate its contract with Longest Force on
April 1995. Longest Force, in turn, terminated the employment of the security guards it had deployed at
petitioners shipyard.
On September 1996, private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages pursuant to
the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and attorneys fees, against both Longest Force and petitioner, before the
Labor Arbiter. The case sought the guards reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority
Longest Force admitted that it employed private respondents and assigned them as security guards at the
premises of petitioner rendering a 12 hours duty per shift for the said period. It likewise admitted its liability as
to the non-payment of the alleged wage differential in the total amount of P2,618,025 but passed on the liability
to petitioner
The petitioner denied any liability on account of the alleged illegal dismissal, stressing that no employer-
employee relationship existed between it and the security guards. It further pointed out that it would be the
height of injustice to make it liable again for monetary claims which it had already paid. Anent the cross-claim
filed by Longest Force against it, petitioner prayed that it be dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner averred that
Longest Force had benefited from the contract; it was now estopped from questioning said agreement on the
ground that it had made a bad deal.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment that Longest Force and Mariveles Shipping be jointly and severally liable
to pay the money claims of the complainants. Petitioner appealed the foregoing to the NLRC. The labor tribunal,
affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the

The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the NLRC judgment for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied due course to
the petition and dismissed it outright.

ISSUE: Was the petitioner denied Due Process?

HELD: No the petitioner was not denied due process.. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard. In administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Not all cases require a trial-type hearing.
Due process with the Labor Arbiters is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit their
position papers to which they are supposed to attach all the supporting documents or documentary evidence
that would prove their claim, in the event that LA determines that no formal hearing would be conducted or
that such hearing was not necessary.
The petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side in several hearings conducted before the LA and
in the position papers and other supporting documents that it had submitted. Due process was observed.

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from investigating
graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, respondents powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the Office of the
Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation
and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include:
(a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on
Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating
the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that
in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court
and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying
that the SCs order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially
because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free was
publicized in leading newspapers.

Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for
contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get
some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and
prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the
Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has
become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court
and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of
speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather
than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.

Held: There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it
was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of
contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice."

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the
statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such
circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the
Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and
fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial
system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the
bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society.

Roque vs. Ombudsman

FACTS: Roque and Mabanglo were Schools Division Supernitedent of DECS. Roque was assigned in Koronadal,
South Cotabato while Mabanglo was assigned in Tagum, Davao Province until their compulsory retirement.
The Commission on Audit conducted an audit on the P9.36 million allotment released by the DECCS Regional
Office No. XI to its division offices. In the course of the audit, the COA, through Soriano and Enriquez found
some major deficiencies and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Violations of COA Circular
No. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 Section 88 of PD 1445.
Complaint affidavits were filed before the Ombudsman in Mindanao against Mabanglo on May 7, 1991 and
Roque on May 16, 1991.
On June 11, 1991 the Ombudsman ordered a preliminary investigation.
On March 18, 1997 (6 years later), the complaint against Mabanglo was resolved by the Ombudsman
recommending that respondents were probably guilty of the offenses charged. The same was approved by
Ombusman Desierto on September 19, 1997.
On April 30, 1997(6 years later), the Ombudsman in Mindanao recommended the filing of cases against ROque
for the offenses abovementioned. The same was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on August 22, 1997.

ISSUE: Was there undue and unjustifiable delay?
HELD: Yes. The delay of 6 years was unjustified. RA 6770 mandates that the Ombudsman must act promptly on
complaints before him. Moreover, it violated the constitutional provision on the speedy disposition of cases.
Although the respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the
recommentdation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost six years for
the latter to resolve the Complaints.
Angchangco vs. Ombudsman: The inordinate delay of more than 6 years by the OPmbudsman in resolving the
criminal complaints against the petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process and a speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that
the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner
with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National
Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro,
which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court,
but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes
arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can injusticiable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render itsdecision in such manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected
by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such
evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.


FACTS: Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been
receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local
elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of
Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was
joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and
Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of
the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not
run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged.
Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the
requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise
of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide
the case. In this case, only the 3
requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons
charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are
based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from
younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger
ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more
than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to
promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials.
For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one,
aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired,
as provided for in the challenged provision.
G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., was an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning
agencies, which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-
principals. POEA issued GOVERNING RESOLUTION NO. 01 SERIES OF 1994, which povides in part, that in case
of death of the seaman during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine
Currency equivalent to the amount of US$50,000 and an additional amount of US$7,000 to each child under the
age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of
payment In case of death of the seaman during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries
the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of US$50,000 and an additional amount of US$7,000 to each
child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children at the exchange rate prevailing during
the time of payment. POEA Administrator Felicisimo Joson informed all Filipino seafarers, manning agencies,
ship-owners, managers and principals hiring Filipino seafarers, that Governing Board Resolution No. 01
adjusted the rates of compensation and other benefits. For this reason, Conference Maritime et al. filed a
petitition to annul Resolution No. 01 on the grounds that: (1) The POEA does not have the power and authority
to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-
going vessels; (2) that POEA violated the standards for the exercise of the power to fix rates; (3) resolution was
unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts. POEA
contended that the petition was without merit because the issuance of the resolution was a valid exercise of the
POEA's rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation.
Whether or not POEA had valid rule-making power.
Yes. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.
797, stating that the governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA). Similar
authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a
standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA

Whether or not there has been valid delegation of legislative power.
Yes. The principle, of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government. In the case of legislative power, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not
necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. These solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and
more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is
effected by their promulgation of supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
The power of the POEA, in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard
guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order
itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights
of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices. While the making of laws is a non-
delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for
the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met
in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law.

This is the principle of subordinate legislation. The challenged resolution strictly
conformed to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O.
No. 797.

Whether or not there was violation of equal protection clause.
None. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. And for the classification to be reasonable,
it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas
workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and
accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.

Whether or not obligations to a contract may be impaired.
Yes. Social justice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state and requires the
extensive use of such power.
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be
read with literal exactness . It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value and
which confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public
subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and
public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its
police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or
general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be
placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them. The freedom to contract is not
absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations
which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to
time, as the general, well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as
experience may demonstrate the necessity.

And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to
the police power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are impresses with public interest.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797,
which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they
violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to
subordinate the police power to the contract clause.
The petition was DISMISSED.

G.R. Nos. 132875-76
February 3, 2000
Romeo F. Jaloslos was a member of Congress who was confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts, which was pending appeal.
Jalosjos filed a Motion to Be Allowed to Discharge Mandate as Member of House of Representatives. He argued
that his re-election being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority
to any right or interest not even the police power of the State. He claimed also that to deprive the electorate
of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation. In addition, Jalosjos also mentioned
that to bar him from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed
mandates entrusted to him by the people and the electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants
their voice to be heard. Jalosjos prayed that a co-equal branch of government to respect the mandate of
Congress. Finally, Jalosjos reasoned that temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-
appellant to discharge his mandate and he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed
to leave jail. Jalosjos prayed that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense. Jalosjos claimed that he should be exempted from statutes and rules, which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general.
Whether or not Jalosjos should be released from jail.
No. All top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law.
There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government
office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law,
not inferred from the duties of a position. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of
the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows
that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. The present Constitution adheres to
the same restrictive rule.
Jalosjos argued that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. However, Jalosjos had not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law; it
has constitutional foundations. Reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos will not extricate him from his
predicament. In the above-quoted ruling, the case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for
acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of
criminal law. Moreover, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled
by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-
defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. A person charged with
crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. It is the injury to the public which
State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the
Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be
supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform
congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement. It will be recalled that when a warrant for
accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the
House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. This
can not be countenanced because, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it
would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system. Jalosjos argued that on several occasions the RTC
Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail for official or medical
reasons. He was also allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises. But there is no showing that the above
privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. What the
accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free man with all
the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such a situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of
a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Jalosjos also claimed that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to
discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to
leave jail. But he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Jalosjos had been discharging his
mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently
under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts. When the voters of his district elected Jalosjos to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

Whether or not there was equal protection.
Yes. The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be denied the equal protection of laws.

simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed.

The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison. Jalosjos claimed that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise. Never has the call of a particular
duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. The
election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane
to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Imprisonment is the restraint of a
man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of
locomotion. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.It can be seen from
the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in society.

Prison officials have the
job of preserving the security as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-
entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of
certain rights.
The motion was DENIED.
Separate Opinion
GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring opinion;
I concur in holding that the motion is bereft of any legal merit.
The Bill of Rights provides that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong , shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. This constitutional
provision denying the right to bail for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is
strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court found accused-appellant
guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua . The trial court's judgment of
conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued
incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to
provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.
Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest to legislators provide legal
justification for accused-appellant's motion. To allow accused-appellant to attend legislative sessions would
constitute an unjustified broadening of the privilege from the arrest bestowed by the Constitution upon
members of Congress. Under the 1987 Constitution, the privilege includes arrests for crimes punishable by
imprisonment of six years or less. Despite the expansion of the privilege, the rationale for granting members of
Congress immunity from arrest remained the same to ensure that they are not prevented from performing
their legislative duties. It was never the intention to shield a member of Congress from the consequences of his
wrongdoing. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrest for relatively minor offenses,
punishable at most by correctional penalties. Jalosjos, having been convicted of statutory rape which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua , an afflictive penalty, was obviously not entitled to the privilege of
parliamentary immunity.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-
appellant is already moot and academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the criminal
process at which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused by means of his arrest.
Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely being arrested. As a matter of fact, he has already been
arrested, tried and convicted by the trial court.
Accused-appellant's contention that his re-election constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such
an expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by even the police power of the State is hollow.
The doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-elected official may have
committed during his previous term.

The administrative liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from
his penal liability. Since the Constitution itself provides for the immunities from the general application of our
criminal laws which a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may enjoy, it follows that any
expansion of such immunities must similarly be based upon an express constitutional grant.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
Upon application of the officers of the government, several judges issued, on different dates a total of 42
search warrants against Stonehill and/or the corporations of which they were officers to search the persons
named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of
the following personal property to wit: books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing
all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins, thee subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense, which was described in the applications in
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.
Stonehill alleged that the search warrants were null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
Court because (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2)
cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures
were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to
the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Stonehill filed with the Supreme
Court this action for certiorari , prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the Prosecutors, their
agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their
agents or representatives to return the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under
the search warrants in question. The prosecutors alleged

that the contested search warrants are valid and that
the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent.
Whether or not Stonehill in his personal capacity had standing to question the validity of the search
warrants issued against the corporation.
As regards the items seized from the corporation, Stonehill had no cause of action for the simple reason
that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
Stonehill. It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,

and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties.

Consequently, Stonehill may not validly object to the use in evidence against them
of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. The Government's action in gaining possession of papers
belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If the constitutional
rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants . Such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property
had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed.
Whether or not the search warrants were valid.
No. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. No specific offense had
been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. It
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. To
uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted. SC deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court

by providing in that "a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. The grave violation of the Constitution made
in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the
effects to be searched for and seized. Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal
or illegal .
The position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. To be sure, if the applicant for a search
warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party
against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the
warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of
the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish
a probable cause.
The warrants for the search of three (3) residences of Stonehill were null and void and that the searches
and seizures therein made were illegal.

Separate Opinion:
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants
and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution.
All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were
consequently illegal.
The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People was declared abandoned
The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners arweree expressly declared null
and void the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal.
I do not share the reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search
warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures
conducted under the authority thereof. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly
general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the
Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. Whether or not the petitioners
possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal
and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the
lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a
search or seizure.
Stonehill had the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents,
papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences. Excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually
made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners. Ownership
of matters seized gives " standing. " Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a
motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure.
Control of premises searched gives "standing." Independent of ownership or other personal interest in
the records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue
of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. It has never been held that a person
with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a
motion to return and suppress.
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily directed against said person gives "
standing. "
Stonehill et al. had full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these
were directed against residences, as long as the documents were personal papers of Stonehill and were held by
them in a personal capacity or under their personal control. Stonehill likewise hadave clear legal standing to
move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the
corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

A.M. No. RTJ-95-1293 May 9, 1995
Gil Manlavi was a senior police officer. Manlavi arrested without a warrant the accused who was caught
with illegally caught assorted fish with the use of explosives, weighing more or less 8,000 Thousand Kilos. The
accused moved to quash Criminal Case on the ground that the evidence of the prosecution was the product of a
warrantless and illegal search and seizure. Manlavi contended that the confiscation of the fish in the absence of
a search warrant was allowed under Circular No. 130 (s. 1967) of the Office of the President. Judge Gacott
granted the motion on the ground that the search and seizure was not covered by a search warrant, and that
the search warrant presented in court was issued after the fact. The accused moved also to quash the other
Criminal Case on the ground that the information failed to charge the offense of illegal possession of fish caught
by explosives for its failure to allege the element "for profit." The City Prosecutor admitted the omission in the
information of the phrase "for profit" but he claimed that said omission was a mere technicality. Judge Gacott
granted the Motion on the ground that the information area fatally defective, because it failed to allege two
essential elements: (1) that the accused had knowledge that the fish were illegally caught with the use of
explosives; and (2) that they intended to dispose of or sell the fish for profit. The prosecution moved for the
reconsideration of the order but it was denied. For this reason, Manlavi filed this administrative charge against
judge Cagott with partiality, miscarriage of justice and knowingly rendering an unjust decision in connection
with the dismissal of the above-mentioned Criminal Cases. Judge Gacott denied the charges against him and
asserted that his orders were supported by law and evidence. He moved for the dismissal of the instant
Whether or not the judge should be held administratively liable for the dismissal of the cases.

No. The arresting officers failed to show compliance with the procedure prescribed by the very circular
they invoke. The information suffered from infirmity for failure to allege the element "for profit." It is true that
the provision prohibits the separate acts of possessing, dealing in, selling or disposing of illegally caught fish
and aquatic products, but said acts must not only be done "knowingly" but also "for profit," an essential
element of the offense. The accused moved for the quashal of the criminal cases after their arraignment. As a
rule, an accused can move for the quashal of the information on any ground before arraignment. However, the
rule admits of some exceptions such as where there is no offense charged, for what controls is not the
designation of the offense charged in the information but the allegations of the constitutive elements of the
offense. Any ambiguity in the information shall be resolved in favor of the accused.
Well-settled is the rule that the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary power, unless when they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.
The complaint was DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-6980
October 8, 1985
Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz
Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City, determined to be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the
clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has
been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The
Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Search
Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion. Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus were examined under
oath by Judge Pao. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be
searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including
support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion. The searching party seized 428
documents and written materials,

and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431
items in all. According to the Return, the search was made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of
the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the
Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang. AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and
TOLENTINO, were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (upon complaint filed by the CSG against
petitioners for Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion. The CITY FISCAL
filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents)
against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos. The CSG filed an MR with the CITY FISCAL, praying
that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied. CSG submitted an
Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431
documents and articles. Nolasco raised the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to
the Search Warrant but Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents shall be
subject to disposition of the tribunal. Nolasco filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS
CASE, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them on the ground that the
proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. The motion was denied on the ground that the validity
of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and mandamus.
Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
No. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
It is evident that the Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described
and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding
what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus
in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description
of the things to be seized. Search warrants of general description are considered null and void for being too
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant
for Search Warrant. The questions propounded by the Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant
thereof. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said
witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon
which a warrant may issue.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles
seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar
to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has
been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been
served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and
that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her
respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible
effective results in the interest of public order
The Search Warrant No. 80-84 by Judge Pao was annulled and set aside and the CSG was enjoined
from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a general
warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated.
All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against
any of the three petitioners. The Court has held that "in issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly comply
with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given
in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured
by the Constitution. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer
undertakes to justify it.
The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to Mila Aguilar- Roque's arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-B
Mayon Street, Quezon City could have been searched, even without a warrant, for evidence of rebellion is
patently against the constitutional proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Suffice it to add and stress
that the arresting CSG Group themselves knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void
warrant in question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search of a person who is
lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search
obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this case, Aguilar-Roque was arrested on
board a public vehicle on the. To hold that her dwelling could "later on the same day" be searched without
warrant is to sanction an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant. In addition I wish to state the judge
either did not fully know the legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant or he
allowed himself to be used by the military.
I do not agree with the ponencia that personalities seized may be retained by the CSG for possible introduction
as evidence in Criminal Case before Special Military Commission No. 1 for the reasons that their retention
cannot be justified by the provisions of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
But I cannot agree with the statement that not all the things seized can be ordered returned to their owners. He
refers to "the subversive materials seized by the government agents." Who will make the determination?
Certainly not the military for it is not competent to do so aside from the fact that it has its own peculiar views
on the matter. I say return everything to the petitioners.
CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting
I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search warrant No. 80-84 as it does not
specify with requisite particularity the things, objects or properties that may be seized hereunder.
I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on the basis of Sec. 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court. The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search
under the aforequoted provision the same must be limited to and circumscribed by, the subject , time , and place
of said arrest. As to subject , the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect,
and things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense." With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by
law, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have
been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the
suspect was arrested. The search must be incident to the arrest. The search must be made at the place of the
arrest, otherwise, it is not incident to the arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to
make an arrest , but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future arrest, then search is not incidental to
arrest. It is undisputed is that the search was made in a place other than the place of arrest and, not on the
occasion of nor immediately after the arrest . It cannot be said, therefore, that such a search was incidental to the
arrest of the petitioners. Not being an incident of a lawful arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St.,
Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the
respondent. The things and properties seized on the occasion of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE
in evidence under the exclusionary rule.

G.R. No. 107383
February 20, 1996
Cecilia Zulueta was the wife of Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her
husband. Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the RTC Manila, which, after trial, rendered judgment for Dr. Alfredo
Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties and ordered Zulueta to immediately
return the properties to Dr. Martin. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Hence this petition.
Whether or not the items seized by Zulueta may be used aginst Dr.Martin.
No. There is no question that the documents and papers belonged to Dr. Martin, and that they were
taken by his wife without his knowledge and consent. Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable"

is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is
if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies
between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and
in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available
to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share
what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
The petition for review was DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 143384
February 4, 2005
Dr. Maquiling was an employee of Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTS). Dr. Maquiling received a memo
from the PTS OIC-Executive Director Soriano directing him to submit within five (5) days from notice a written
explanation on the delay GSIS remittances; the reported deficit of P7.3 million appearing in our financial
statement for 1990; the expenses he approved and incurred in connection with the Dale Carnegie and Silva
Mind Control Seminar; the P3.7 million miscellaneous expenses appearing in our financial statement; and his
reasons for renewing service contract with Ultra.

Dr. Maquiling, was dismissed from service as Deputy Executive Director after serving PTS for twenty-three (23)
years. Dr. Maquiling filed a complaint against PTS for reinstatement or, in the alternative, for payment of full
backwages and separation pay in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code. After PTS failed to appear
despite having requested for several postponements, Dr. Maquiling was allowed to present his evidence ex
parte consisting of his testimony on direct examination and documentary proofDr. Maquiling moved for
submission of the case for resolution, which motion was granted. Dr. Maquiling submitted his explanatory
letter. Dr. Maquiling had a thirty (30) minute conversation with Soriano. No further related proceedings were
undertaken before Dr. Maquiling received a letter-notice informing him that the PTS Executive Committee
approved Sorianos findings and recommendations calling for his dismissal effective immediately, without any
retirement benefits. The termination of Dr. Maquilings employment was allegedly due to loss of trust and
confidence. It was alleged that PTS terminated his services without any retirement benefit for gross
mismanagement, for acts inimical to the interest of PTS, and also for reason that PTS has lost its trust and
confidence in him. Despite Sorianos instruction for him not to report for work, Dr. Maquiling manifested,
through a letter to the OIC-Executive Director, his intention to continue performing his duties as Deputy
Executive Director. Dr. Maquiling continued to report for work at the PTS daily. In the meantime, he elevated
his case to the PTS Board of Directors through a memorandum, which sought to point out the illegality of his
dismissal from office and prayed for a resolution upholding his position. Dr. Maquiling, protesting non-payment
of his salary, wrote the OIC Finance Department and formally demanded the release of his earned wages. PTS
reacted through Soriano by informing Dr. Maquiling that there are no wages forthcoming inasmuch as the
latters service had been terminated for cause. In an effort to exhaust the remedies within PTS, Dr. Maquiling
wrote the President of PTS a letter that if the Board does not act on the Memorandum within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the letter, such omission will mean confirmation of Sorianos notice of his alleged termination
from the service a Dr. Maquiling stopped reporting for work at the PTS in the. Then Dr. Maquiling filed his
complaint with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering PTS to immediately reinstate
Dr. Maquiling to the position of Deputy Executive Director or its equivalent in rank and pay, without loss of
seniority rights inclusive of all benefits attached to said position at the time of his dismissal, and to pay Dr.
Maquiling backwages computed from the time of his dismissal until his actual reinstatement but not to exceed
three (3) years at the rate of thirteen thousand nine hundred pesos (P13,900.00) per month or three hundred
seventy-eight thousand seven hundred seventy-five pesos (P378,775.00). the Labor Arbiter likewise ordered
PTS to pay Dr. Maquiling moral damages, exemplary damages and to pay attorneys fees. Upon appeal by PTS to
the NLRC, the Commission upheld the decision of the labor arbiter and dismissed the appeal. PTS appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decisions of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter by declaring that
the dismissal from employment as legal and valid. It, however, ordered PTS to pay Dr. Maquiling damages or
indemnity for violation of his right to procedural due process and separation pay in the interest of social justice.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Whether or not PTS validly dismissed Maquiling.
No. With respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal
requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question and that mere uncorroborated assertions and
accusations by the employer will not suffice. But as regards a managerial employee, mere existence of a basis
for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal.

SC held that Dr. Maquiling was indeed validly dismissed for just cause. However, PTS was remiss in its
duty to observe procedural due process in effecting the dismissal of Dr. Maquiling. Under this second
requirement, two notices must be sent to the employee who is the subject of an investigation for acts, which
may warrant his eventual dismissal from employment.

The notices required before an employee may be validly dismissed are:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the grounds for termination and giving the
employee reasonable opportunity to explain his/her side;
(b) a hearing or conference wherein the employee, with the assistance of counsel if so desired, is given
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut evidence presented against
him/her; and
(c) written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all
the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify termination.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute elements of due process in cases of employees
dismissal. The requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employers intent to
dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal. Upon the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the
employee an opportunity to answer his employers charges against him and accordingly to defend himself
therefrom before dismissal is effected.
Clearly, the first notice must inform outright the employee that an investigation will be conducted on
the charges particularized therein, which, if proven, will result to his dismissal. Such notice must not only
contain a plain statement of the charges of malfeasance or misfeasance but must categorically state the effect
on his employment if the charges are proven to be true. This notice will afford the employee an opportunity to
avail all defenses and exhaust all remedies to refute the allegations hurled against him for what is at stake is his
very life and limb his employment. Otherwise, the employee may just disregard the notice as a warning
without any disastrous consequence to be anticipated. Absent such statement, the first notice falls short of the
requirement of due process. It is worthy to note that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals all
agree in concluding that procedural due process in the instant case was not observed. It must be noted that the
first notice was a mere instruction to explain the matters enumerated therein. It did not apprise Dr. Maquiling
of any investigation to be conducted or being conducted that will warrant his dismissal from service if found
guilty of charges specified therein. Thus, such notice fell short of the requirement of law that an employee must
be afforded the benefit of the two-notice rule in dismissal cases that will allow the employee to substantiate the
charges specified in the notice with full knowledge at the outset that the investigation to be conducted may
result in his dismissal or suspension from employment.
The Serrano ruling awarded full backwages and separation pay to the employee who was dismissed for
just cause but without the observance of the procedural due process requirement. However, in Agabon v. NLRC,
SC modified the Serrano ruling and awarded nominal damages, service incentive leave and thirteenth month
pay to the petitioners in the said case. This case clarified the criticisms and answered the questions created by
the Serrano ruling. The Agabon doctrine enunciates the rule that if the dismissal is for just cause but statutory
due process was not observed, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured,
it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and
should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process
violation of the employer. The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private
respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.

Dr. Maquiling argued that PTS should have considered his twenty-three (23) years of service in the
institution before he was dismissed from service. Such ratiocination is not quite convincing. Although length of
service may be considered in reaching a decision in employment termination cases, the same alone is not
controlling for other considerations must be taken into account such as the nature of the position he was
holding, performance of an employee, quality of work, character and work attitude. Worth stressing is the fact
that Dr. Maquiling is holding a managerial position being a Deputy Executive Director. Hence, trust and
confidence is an essential factor in determining his eligibility to continue holding his position. The crucial
nature of his position in PTS is exacting as to such qualification which cannot be outweighed by any length of
service he earned.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals was MODIFIED pursuant to the Agabon ruling as the latest
jurisprudential rule on the matter. SC ordered PTS to pay Dr. Maquiling nominal damages.

G.R. No. 107566
November 25, 2004
Oseo C. Hamada was the president and general manager of the Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc.,
which publishes the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper published and circulated in Baguio City and
other provinces within the Cordillera region. He was also the business manager of said newsweekly. Cecille
Afable was Baguio Midland Couriers editor-in-chief and one of its columnists who ran the column In and Out
of Baguio. Ramon L. Labo, Jr., was among the mayoralty candidates in Baguio City. Prior to this, in 1984, Labo
had already embarked on a political career by running for a seat in the former Batasang Pambansa. As part of
the campaign propaganda for Labo in the 1984 local elections, political ads appeared in the various issues of
Baguio Midland Courier and campaign paraphernalia were printed by Baguio Printing and Publishing Co. Afable
wrote in her column a series of articles dealing with the candidates for the various elective positions in Baguio
City. In said articles, she mentioned that Labo wanted to put an advertisement in the Midland Courier but was
refused because he has not yet paid his account of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. She also used
Dumpty in the egg to refer to a candidate and that Labo should settle his small debts like the insignificant
amount of P27,000. Labo claimed that Afables column were tainted with malice. So Labo filed separate
criminal and civil actions for libel against Baguio Midland et al. The DOJ dismissed the criminal case due to
insufficiency of evidence and the civil suit was raffled to RTC Baguio City. In the civil case, Labo alleged that in
her columns, Afable made it appear that Labo could not comply with his financial obligations. Labo also claimed
that the articles were written solely for the purpose of destroying his reputation, integrity, and personality and
that said articles were false, untrue, libelous, and published with evil intent. Baguio Midland and Afable filed
separate motions to dismiss upon the ground that there was failure to comply with the requirement of referral
of certain disputes to the barangay conciliation process before they are filed in court. The RTC denied the
motions to dismiss on the ground that the requiremnt was not applicable it pertained only to actions involving
natural persons. During the trial, Baguio Midland denied that Afables articles were libelous. They also claimed
that Labo still owed them a sum of money for the political ads and campaign. Baguio Midland asserted that
Afables write-ups were fair comments on facts and reports that were of public interest as private respondent
was a mayoralty candidate at that time. Afable denied that the statements were libelous. She contended that the
contents of her column were protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press
and that the same were privileged as they dealt with a public figure. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit as the article in question was privileged and constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as
it dealt with the integrity, reputation, and honesty of private respondent who was a candidate for local elective
office at that time. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC on the ground that the Labo was, at the time
the article in question was published, not a public official but a private citizen seeking an elective office and
Afables article was intended to impeach his honesty, virtue or reputation and to make him appear in the eyes
of the public as unfit for public office. CA also declared that the malicious nature of the article may be deduced
from the fact that it was published a few days before the scheduled local elections and from the style and tone
of writing employed by Afable. Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration but these were
denied. Hence, this petititon.
Whether or not the article was defamatory.
No. Concededly, private respondent was not yet a public official at the time the 10 January 1988 article
was published. Nevertheless, this fact does not remove said article from the mantle of protection guaranteed
by the freedom of expression provision of the Constitution. This Court had recognized the publics right to be
informed on the mental, moral, and physical fitness of candidates for public office. It is of the utmost
consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their
suffrages. The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast and the advantages derived
are so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be
involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at
times such injury may be great. In such a case, the occasion gives rise to a privilege, qualified to this extent: any
one claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual malice or go remediless. The privilege
extends to a great variety of subjects including matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.
The rule, however, only applies to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being that
which is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon reasonable degree of care
and on reasonable grounds. The principle does not grant an absolute license to authors or writers to destroy
the persons of candidates for public office by exposing the latter to public contempt or ridicule by providing the
general public with publications tainted with express or actual malice. In the latter case, the remedy of the
person allegedly libeled is to show proof that an article was written with the authors knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. While the law itself creates the presumption that
every defamatory imputation is malicious, nevertheless, the privileged character of a communication destroys
said presumption. The burden of proving actual malice shall then rest on Labo. Labo was unable to prove that
Afables column was tainted with actual malice. The records are replete with evidence that Labo incurred an
obligation which had remained unpaid until the time the questioned article was published. The minuscule
difference in the amount fails to establish reckless disregard for truth on the part of petitioners. Mere error,
inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any
scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should
not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of
language. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as
critical agencies in our democracy.
Afables article constitutes a fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with the character of
Labo who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City. Considering that Labo assured his would-be
constituents that he would be donating millions of his own money, Afables column with respect to private
respondents indebtedness provided the public with information as regards his financial status which was still
unbeknownst to them at that time. Indeed, the information might have dissuaded some members of the
electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but such is the inevitable result of the application of the
law. The effect would have been adverse to the private respondent but public interest in this case far
outweighs the interest of private respondent.
The petition is GRANTED and the Decision CA was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and RTCs Decision was

G.R. No. L-12592
March 8, 1018
In the 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a
petition to the Executive Secretary, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol,
Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Thirty-four citizens signed the petition. One of
the petitioner, Polintan, visited the justice of the peace who told her that he would draw up complaint for P5
and afterwards take P3 which she paid and also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took from
her two chickens. In addition, Sunga claimed he went to see the justice of the peace to ascertain the result of the
trial, and the justice of the peace told him that if he wished to win he must give him P50. For failure to give said
amount, he lost the case. the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50. Quiambao, for his part,
claimed that on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house, where the justice secretly gave him
P30 and the complaint was shelved. The petition was referred to the judge of first instance for investigation,
proper action, and report. The justice of the peace Punsalan denied the charges. The investigating judge
recommended to the Governor-General to remove the justice of peace from his position. The justice of the
peace filed a motion for a new trial claiming that the charges were filed for personal reasons. The judge of first
instance reversed its previous recommendation and ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan. For
this reason, justice off peace Punsalan filed a criminal action against Polintan et al. He alleged that they wrote,
signed, and published a writing, which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the
justice of the peace with deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and reputation of the justice of the
peace and thus exposing him to public hatred contempt, and ridicule. The trial court found Polintan et al. guilty.
Polintal et al. filed a motion for a new trial but it was denied. Hence, this appeal.
Whether or not the allegations against the judge were libelous.
No. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs. Completely liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. Men
in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.
Only thus can the intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. The guaranties of a free speech and a
free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. The sword
of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his
prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one
owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all
who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate to bring the facts to the notice of those whose
duty it is to inquire into and punish them. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon
public policy, though, as an incidental result, it may afford immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified
privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. A
communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or
in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. The
duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good
faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by
the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege
concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such
unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that presumption.
The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount
to proof of malice. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.
In this case, the particular words set out in the information might well be considered libelous per se.
Generally, words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or
misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution.
Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true
by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed was apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal
from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. There was no abuse the privilege. No undue
publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was
SC found Polintan entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of
constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing them for an honest endeavor to improve the
public service, SC commended them for their good citizenship.
SC acquitted Bustos et al.

Separate Opinion
CARSON, J., concurring:
The Attorney-General was entirely correct when he said that this case is substantially identical with
United States vs. Bustos. But the doctrine of the prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case hag long since
been abandoned by SC; and it would make for the more efficient administration of the Libel Law in these

G.R. No. 190259
June 7, 2011
On November 23, 2009, 57 men and women were killed on their way to file certificates of candidacy in
Maguindanao, including some news reporters. For this reason, then President Arroyo issued Proclamation
1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency. She directed the AFP and PNP to undertake such measures to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence. Later, Arroyo issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the
President to DILG. Then the President issued Administrative AO 273-A amending the former, by delegating
instead of "transferring" supervision of the ARMM to the DILG. Hence, Ampatuan filed this petition for
prohibition under Rule 65 claiming that the issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy. He alleged that
the proclamation empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional
governments powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy under RA 9054 and the Constitution.
Ampatuan also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in
the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constituted an invalid exercise of the Presidents
emergency powers. Ampatuan asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared
unconstitutional and that respondents DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing
them. The OSG, on the other hand, insisted that the President issued Proclamation 1946 not to deprive the
ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places pursuant to her "calling out" power as
Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power rested solely on her based on
intelligence reports and such best information as are available to her to suppress and prevent lawless violence
wherever and whenever these reared their ugly heads. OSG also claimed that the President merely delegated
her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary without authorizing a take over of the ARMM.
The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.
Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy the
Constitution and the Expanded ARMM Organic Act.

No. the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement
agents took Ampatuan into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-
Governor assumed the vacated pursuant to the rule on succession found in RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor
Adiong named the Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly as Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG
Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
The deployment of the AFP and PNP is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers. The President did
not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. The calling out of
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly
vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. The Presidents call on
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution.
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above
power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. It is clearly to the President that the
Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress
lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the
Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. If Ampatuan fails, by way of proof, to support the
assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. In many instances, the evidence
upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not
constituting technical proof. The President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to
avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to
prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
Ampatuan failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual
basis. The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too
grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.
Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and
armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the
President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose
firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected
places. The presence of troops in those places is still necessary to ease fear and tension among the citizenry and
prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite the passage of more than a year from the time of
the Maguindanao massacre.
The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.

A.M. No. 1120-MJ
May 5, 1976
The employees of the Municipal Mayor wanted to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal
Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of Taal,
Batangas. Judge Dimaano allowed the employees to open and view the docket books of the judge under certain
conditions and under his control and supervision. The employees were aware of the rules and conditions
imposed by the judge when they went to his office to view his docket books for the purpose mentioned in their
communication. They agreed that they were amenable to such rules and conditions, which the judge may
impose. The judge justified the regulation that although court records are among public documents open to
inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may
be inspected. He also asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or
inspection of its records. And the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is
not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify
private spite or to promote public scandal. The judge claimed that to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited
exercise of the right to free access, might do more harm than good to the citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos
might result defeating the very essence of their request. For this reason, the Municipal Secretary of Taal filed a
verified letter-complaint charging Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano of the same municipality with abuse of
authority. The case was referred to Judge Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing,
Taal Mayor Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperation among officers
in the municipality. The Investigating Judge denied the motion. After formal investigation, he recommended the
exoneration of Judge Dimaano on the ground that there was no showing of abuse of authority on the part of the
Whether or not there was abuse of authority on the part of judge Dimaano.
None. The Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters
of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts,
or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law.

The incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy.
Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. Maintaining
the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.

The access to public records predicated on the right of the
people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a
legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. However, restrictions on access to certain
records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been
permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control
inadequate to maintain order.
After a careful evaluation of the recommendation, SC found that the respondent did not act arbitrarily in
the premises. As found by the Investigating Judge, the judge allowed the complainant to open and view the
docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown
that the rules and conditions imposed by the judge were unreasonable. Citing the case of Sabido v. Ozaeta,

stated that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to
inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their rights, such power does not carry with it
authority to prohibit.
The case against Judge Dimaano was dismissed.

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

SSS filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances
to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the
SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners
herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
WHY THE STRIKE? SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
1. implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues;
2. payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;
3. conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service
into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances
and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and
4. payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain
amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and
unfair labor practices
RTC issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting
of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal. Subsequent MR was also denied. Hence this petition.
1. Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike? YES.
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize,
the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may
be enacted by Congress."
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for
the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law.
If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the
Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he
terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof and government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
The instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 78508 March 21, 1994
Private respondent obtained from petitioner a P65,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage. Respondent
defaulted; hence petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage, and it acquired the encumbered
assets for the sum of P87,082.00. The sheriff's sale was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Isabela only on 11 October 1972.
Petitioner bank invited private respondent to repurchase the foreclosed property for P87,082.00 plus interest
and other charges. Before that, one day after the foreclosure sale, private respondent already had paid an initial
P10,000.00 to redeem the property. On 21 October 1972, P.D. No. 27 was enacted into law that mandated an
agrarian reform. Pursuant thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer Program" was launched; among the areas it
covered were the parcels of land in dispute.
Private respondent offered to buy the foreclosed property for P284,000.00 and a Deed of Promise to Sell was
executed between petitioner bank and private respondent. Private respondent, through counsel, inquired why
he was still being made to buy the property for P284,000.00 when, in truth, he had already paid P40,000.00 of
the P87,082.00 previously offered by petitioner for the redemption of the property. There was no reply or
response from petitioner.
Private respondent, instituted an action for "Annulment of Foreclosure Deed, Breach of Contract, Sum of Money
and Damages" at the CFI, Echague, Isabela, against petitioner bank and its Branch Manager Leuterio Genato.
While the case was pending, petitioner bank additionally received from the Land Bank of the Philippines
P26,348.12 in cash and P160,000.00 worth of Land Bank Bonds in payment of the foreclosed property.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of petitioner bank. Private respondent went to the Court
of Appeals, which reversed the trial court ordering to set aside the decision and a new one entered declaring
the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties to be without force and effect; ordering the defendant bank to
release the properties and the plaintiff to transfer the rights to the tenants-beneficiaries in favor of the Land
Bank of the Philippines; declaring the deed of promise to sell executed by the plaintiff and the defendant bank
rescinded; ordering the defendant bank and the Land Bank of the Philippines to recalculate the amounts of
payments due for the transfer of the subject properties in accordance with this Decision subject to the
provisions of P.D. No. 27 and in accordance with the mechanics of the Operation Land Transfer; and annulling
the order of the lower court for the plaintiff to pay the defendant the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON P.D. 27 violated the non-impairment clause of the constitution?
We are aware that a ruling that lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the object of the foreclosure
proceedings after the promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972, would concede that P.D. No. 27 had the
effect of impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands. There is no
question, however, that the land reform program of the government as accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and
mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of the police power of the
state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court that the Constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the state (citations
omitted). One limitation on the contract clause arises from the police power, the reason being that public
welfare is superior to private rights (citation omitted). The situation here, is like that in eminent domain
proceedings, where the state expropriates private property for public use, and the only condition to be
complied with is the payment of just compensation. Technically, the condemnation proceedings do not impair
the contract to destroy its obligations, but merely appropriate or take for public use (citation omitted). As the
Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured by the mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without any
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in irregularities in
the sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which
Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The
findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating
that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two
months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the
prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the
confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit
those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A
motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari under Rule
ISSUE: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and
statement of accused? NO.
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses
other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in
any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry."
the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a
witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.
The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial investigation when his
statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The
right to self incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is subjected to
custodial inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is taken in
custody or deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the purview of
custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted in court.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
1. he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2. nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him.
3. any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been
given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,
resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."