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24.

Philcomdat vs Alcuaz
Facts: By virtue of RA 5514, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation was granted a franchise to
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select,
station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications.
Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system
and ground terminal or terminals. Under Sec 5 of the same law, PhilComSat was exempt from the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National
Telecommunications Commission. However, EO 196 was later proclaimed and the same has placed
PhilComSat under the jurisdiction of NTC. Consequently, PhilComSat has to acquire permit to operate
from NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it
however directed PhilComSat to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on
EO 546. PhilComSat assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of respondent
NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications does not provide the necessary
standards constitutionally required hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly
the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PhilComSat asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing
for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing petitioner
under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any
standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PhilComSat subsequently clarified its
said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not
of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an
express conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation
has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative
agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must
have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in
the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In the case
at bar, the fixed rate is found to be of merit and reasonable.
25. Chiongbian vs Orbos
This suit challenges the validity of:-Sec. 13, Art. 29 of RA No. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in MuslimMindanao)-Executive Order No. 429 (Providing for the Reorganization of
Administrative Regions inMindanao
Facts: Pursuant to Sec. 18, Art X of the Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6734
RA No. 6734 called for a plebiscite to be held in the following provinces: Basilan,Cotabato, Davao del
Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, SouthCotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-
Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga delSur; and the following cities: Cotabato, Dapitan,
Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan,Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Prinsesa, and Zamboanga3.Four provinces
voted in favor of creating an autonomous region: Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-tawi4.The
cities and provinces not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region were under ArtXIX, Sec. 13 of the RA
6734:
That only provinces and cities voting favorably in plebiscites shall be included in the ARMM. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region
shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided,however, that the President may,
by administrative determination, merge the existing regions
With this provision, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 429, Providing fortheReorganization
of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.
Petitioners, members of the Congress, wrote to Corazon Aquino, contending that theres:
-No law authorizing the President to pick certain provinces and cities to be restructured to new
administrative regions
-Some of the provinces and cities in the regions did not even take part in the plebiscite
-The transfer of provinces is an alteration of existing governmental units or reorganization. The
authority to merge doesnt include the authority toreorganize.7.The inauguration of the New
Administrative Region IX went ahead.8.Congress brought the suit for prohibition and certiorari;
petitioner Jaldon brough a suitas resident of Zamboanga City, taxpayer and citizen of the
Republic.
Petitioners:
1.Section 29 of RA 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power to the
President by authorizing him to merge existing region and provides no standard for the exercise of the
power delegated; and,2.The power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
Respondent Solicitor General:
1. The exercise of power is traditionally lodged in the President (Abbas v Comelec) and as amere
incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive
departments, bureaus, and offices (Art X, Sec. 16 and Art VII, Sec. 17 of Constitution)
2.There is no undue delegation of power but only a grant of power to fill up or provide thedetails of the
legislation, bec Congress did not have the facility to provide for them.
3. The grant to the President to merge existing regions is fairly embraced in the title of theRA No. 6734,
because it is germane to it. Power extends to all regions in Mindanao asnecessitated by the
establishment of the autonomous region.4.PD 1416, as amended by PD 1772, provides that the
President shall have the continuingauthority to reorganize the National Government, guided by the
framework of moreeffective planning implementation, greater decentralization, etc. The President may
create abolish, consolidate units of the National Government.
Issues:
1.WON the power to merge administrative regions is legislative or executive in character(and whether
Sec. 23 of Art. 29 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide thePresidents discretion)
2.WON the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute
3.WON the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions and provincesthat did not take
part in the plebiscite
4.WON the power granted includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region XIfrom
Zamboanga to Pagadian
Held:
1.Nature of administrative regions and the purpose of their creations:
O RA 5435 authorizing the President, with the help of a Commission onReorganization to reorganize
the different executive departments, bureaus, etc.
O Reorganization Commission submitted an Integrated Reorganization Plan whichdivided the country
into 11 regions (1969)
O PD No. 1 the Reorganization Plan was approved and made part of the law of theland (1972)
O PD No. 773 divided Region IX into two grpups
O PD No. 1555 transfer of regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga
The Creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President
pursuant to the authority granted to him b the law. The choice of President is logical because the
division intended to facilitate the administration of executive departments and local governments. It has
been traditionally lodged in the President.
By conferring the President the power to merge existing regions, Congress merely followed a pattern
set in previous legislation. There is no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the
President the power to merge administrative regions.
Sufficient standard by which President is to be guided in the exercise of power
O Standard can be gathered or implied
O Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant of power to thePresident in RA No. 5435 of
the power to reorganize the Executive Department:to promote simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the
government to enable it topursue its programs consisted with the national goals for accelerated social
andeconomic development.
2. The constitutional requirement that every bill shall be passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof has always been given a practical rather than a
technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is sufficient if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to the subject, such as the
reorganization of the remaining administrative regions.
3. There is a qualification in Sec 13, Art XIX, which states that the President may by administrative
determination merge the existing regions. While non-assenting provinces are to remain in their regions,
they may nevertheless be regrouped into contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of
the administration may require. The regrouping is done only on paper and is no more than a redefinition
or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the
administrative supervision of LGUs and insuring efficient delivery of services. There isno transfer of local
governments. It is not even analogous to redistricting or to thedivision or merger of local governments.
4.The reorganization of administrative regions is based on relevant criteria (EO 429):
O Contiguity of graphical features
O Transportation and communication facilities
O Cultural and language groupings
O Land area and population
O Existing regional centers
O Socio-economic development programs
O Number of provinces and citiesThe change of regional center from Pampanga to Pagadian is based on
the power of thePresident (by virtue of the Executive Order) . The transfer is addressed to the
wisdom,not the legality of the President. The Court cannot interfere.
26. Santiago vs Commission on Election
Facts: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to
Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set
the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of
the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a
special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional
provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three
systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two
latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions
were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of
peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by former
Senator Arturo Tolentino.
Petitioner Santiago argued that:
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
Private respondents on the other hand contended that: EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE
BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO PROMULGATE
SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT.
Issue: w/n the private respondents are correct
Held: No.
Principle of non-delegation of power
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim:
potestas delegata non delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
-Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Sec. 28(2), Art. VI;
-Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Sec. 23(2), Art. VI;
-Delegation to the people at large;
-Delegation to local governments; and
-Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate
rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in
every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, RA 6735 miserably failed
to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is
then invalid.
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.