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U .S.

Brig Gen John J. Tolson, III
Maj Gen Clifton F. von Kann
Col Robert F. Cass dy
Capt Richard C Angl n
Fred M. Montgomery
Richard K. Tierney
William H. Smith
Diana G Williams
H. G. Linn'
H. A. Pickel
D. L. Crowley
J. Johrson
Pierce L Wiggin
William E Carter
Ted Kontos
Charles Mabius
Sl DDE. ItY I "AS AFRAID. Capl (arl V (a'-In
TIIROl'GH THE PACES, \fark. I amhert
  OR SECO DS. MaJ Robert R. 1 \ ncr.
Pl Tn, G THE SQl EEZE William H . ' .'
OLD \\ I 'I ER, Donald Buck
I·ROST FLIGHT, Richard K. Ticlnq
Wallace \V. Prophet and RlI.,<,el F ... . .... .. . .
IHE RIGHT \\A\ . .
L:\IERGE (\' SIll A'I 10 S, (,erard M. Bruggink
\ Ot.;R \\ E \ TIIFR SERVICE, I I Col ( \1 1 ern
The mission of the U S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST 15 to provIde Information of an
operational or functional nature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention, training,
maintenance, operatIOns, rl's arch and development aviation medicine, and other r lat d data.
The DIGEST is an offiCial Dl'partment of the Army periodical publlshld monthly under
the supervision of the Commandant, U. S. Army AviatIon School. Views expre !led herein
are not n(cfssarily those of Department of the Army or the U. S. Army Aviation School.
Photo, are U. S Army unles!l other",1 e specified. Material may be reprInted giving credit
to the DIGEST and to the author, unit' otherwl e Indicated.
ArtIcles, photos, and It ms of interest on Army Aviation are Invited. DIrect commun
tlon IS authOrized to' Edltor-m-Chlef. U. S. Army AVlatll}ll DIgest, Fort Rucker. A/abar
U e of funds for prInting of this publication hn b en approved by Hea
Departm nt of the Army. 27 November 1961.
To be dl trlbuted In accordance with requirements stat d In DA Form 12.
The challenge issued . . . to disprove
that the Fort Bragg aircraft mainte-
nance crew's "Big Sister Act" was the
first of its sort, evacuating an UH-1B
with another helicopter, was met by a
"Big Mother Act" during Howze Board
activities. On 26 Jul 62 in a demonstra-
tion for the Secretary of Defense during
a two rifle company combined artillery
and Army air supported attack of a for-
tified position, an UH-1B lost its tail
rotor in the center of the demonstration
impact area while flaring prior to land-
·ng in a dense smoke cloud. In order to
ontinue this demonstration as planned,
the bird had to be moved. To do this a
CH-37 with a prepared maintenance
crew flew immediately to the injured
bird. This maintenance team accom-
plished their task so coolly in just five
minutes that the spectators thought
the recovery of the downed aircraft ,
rotor and all, was part of the show.
1 st Airborne Battle Group
Fort Bragg, N. C.
Thanks, but we were seeking other
examples of a "big sister act," one heli-
copter lifting another of its own kind.
In the July, 1963, issue of the pub-
lication "U. S. Army Aviation Digest,"
pages 16-18, appears an article ....
This article refers to Nickel-Cad-
mium storage batteries manufactured
by Sonotone Corporation and used in
Army aircraft. Accordingly, the words
"nickel-cadmium" have been reduced in
a seemingly purposeful manner to the
generic term "nicad."
You are hereby advised that the
word "NICAD" is a registered trade-
mark for storage batteries and electric
lamps powered by storage batteries and
is owned by Gould-National Batteries,
Inc. , the forerunner in U. S. produc-
tion of all types of nickel-cadmium
storage batteries.
* * *
The public has come to know our
nickel-cadmium batteries as "NICAD"
and use by anyone in reference to any
nickel-cadmium batteries from any
source other than Gould-National Bat-
teries, Inc., is misleading and confusing
to the public and constitutes infringe-
ment of our trademark rights. . . .
St. Paul , 1, Minn.
I thought that you may be interested
in knowing that your articles regard-
ing the wearing of protective clothing
while flying are wasted effort and
should be discontinued. Being denied
the opportunity to wear the flight suit,
I am not at all interested in how safe
I COULD have been. Rather, I would
suggest that you devote the otherwise
wasted effort determining the feasibility
of the APH-5, as surely that's next to
Just how can anyone authorize this
indifference to what should be respected
Army opinion? After all, hasn't it been
proven that the flight suit, as well as
the APH-5, is designed to lessen the
possibilities of serious injuries (i.e.
burns) in the event of the unexpected?
Hasn't it been established beyond doubt
that you're less likely to suffer these
severe burns if you're wearing a flight
suit than if you weren' t? How much
money and time have we spent coming
to these conclusions just to have some-
one publish a directive prohibiting the
wearing of the flight suit EVEN
WHILE FLYING! Incredible as that
may sound, it's happened. And what
is worse is that it's happened here in
Vietnam! Not in the States where for
reasons of their own some local com-
manders choose to discriminate against
aviators, but here in Vietnam where
getting shot at is routine and forced
landings are as common as rainshowers.
Where is the logic?
One wonders at the reasoning be-
hind such an unthinkable injustice.
Could it be that all-too-familiar line:
" .. . for the sake of uniformity"? Or
perhaps we're here to impress someone
with our appearance. Not that the
flight suit looks all that bad but
starched fatigues and spitshined boots
do look sharp . . . at a Saturday morn-
ing inspection. However, the fact re-
mains that this is not a Saturday morn-
ing inspection; it is instead a war, "a
dirty little war." Already subject to
being injured or killed, there are those
who have compounded this vulnerabili-
ty by abolishing the flight suit ... why?
Sir :
APO 96, U. S. Forces
As one of the "non-rated command-
ers" Captain Dennison was referring
to in his November article "Proficiency
Loss," I would like to carry his argu-
ments to their clear, cold, conclusion,
most especially because it was made
a monthly winner of your Annual
Continued on page 13
T ALL BEGAN on a brisk
January morning as we tax-
ied our DC-3 "Gooney Bird" out
for takeoff at Muscle Shoals. So
far it had been a routine flight
between Augusta and Memphis.
We left Augusta earlier that
morning in clear weather with
the temperature in the thirties.
Clouds had begun forming as we
neared Huntsville and it wasn't
long before we were on instru-
ments. Memphis center changed
us over to Huntsville approach
control and we were cleared on
in. Upon reaching minimum alti-
tude we were VFR and a con-
tact approach was all that was
While we were at Huntsville
an overcast had moved in, but as
maintain 4,000 feet; center
advises unable to approve
The pilot and I looked at each
other. "4,000!", he exclaimed,
"that will put us right in the
We both knew that we would
be going through a front and
there was a chance of light ic-
ing. No one had reported any ice,
so we agreed to go ahead and try
The takeoff and climbout were
normal. After intercepting V-54,
the old Gooney Bird was leveled
off at 4,000 feet. The hostess
came up with the always wel-
come cup of coffee and smile.
She reported that her 18 passen-
gers were doing fine, and one
Mushing along at 90 knots with METO power,
airspeed falling off rapidly and . . .
Suddenly J
we continued our flight to Mus-
cle Shoals we were able to stay
low and remain VFR. Now, we
sat at the edge of the active at
Muscle Shoals waiting for our
clearflnce and anticipating no
Finally Muscle Shoals radio
came on the air and I began
copying the clearance as the pi-
lot completed the engine runup:
You are cleared to the Ross-
ville intersection via V-54 to
A former airline pilot, Capt
Carter is assigned to the Dept
of Maintenance, USAAVNS, Ft
Rucker, Ala. , as an OFW AC
gentleman wanted to know what
the weather was in Memphis and
if we expected to get in on time.
With all the confidence in the
world I replied, "We're always
on time. I'll check on the weath-
er and let you know."
Between sips of coffee and ad-
justments on the carburetor heat
to keep it in the green, I called
Muscle Shoals radio for the lat-
est Memphis weather, which had
not come off the teletype before
takeoff. The weather in Memphis
was 800 overcast and 6 miles vis-
ibility, temperature 32° F, with
very light rain. On the other ra-
dio a DC-7 reported light icing
during climbout from Memphis.
One thing was certain: the
outside air temperature was just
below freezing. We would pick
up some ice. I noticed a very nar-
row strip of what looked like
frost forming on the leading edge
of the wing. However, we felt
there was nothing to worry
about because a DC-3 behind us
was reporting in the clear at
By this time we had completed
about one-third of this leg of the
flight. The pilot asked me to
check the remaining fuel and the
weather at our alternate. As was
necessary many times because of
loads, we had left Muscle Shoals
wi th the minimum amount of
fuel to reach our alternate, J ack-
son, Tenn., and still have the re-
quired reserve.
The pilot called Memphis cen-
ter and asked for a higher alti-
tude. We were advised to stand
by. As we waited, ice began ac-
cumulating on the windshield.
Each propeller was getting alco-
hol now at the rate of 3 quarts
per hour . We could hear the ice
hitting the side of the fuselage
when the rpm was moved back
and forth from 2050 to 2350.
Memphis was still 30 minutes
away. We were just about half-
way when Memphis center in-
formed-us that we could expect a
higher altitude in 10 minutes.
The pilot reported that we were
in moderate icing and needed a
higher altitude as soon as possi-
We had been cruising at 130
knots. Now the airspeed was reg-
istering 115 knots. The attitude
indicator was showing a slight
nose-high attitude, which we
needed to maintain 4,000 feet.
The deicer boots were put into
operation and some of the ice
was falling off the wings-but
not as well as I had expected.
Now my side window was begin-
ning to freeze over. I tried the
windshield wipers, and found
they were stuck in the down po-
sition. I applied more alcohol to
the windshield, but this did not
free them. I knew that I could
reach the wiper on my side from
the side window, but it would
not slide to the rear. We had just
lost our windshield wipers.
Both of us had flown in ice
many times before, and knew
Captain Carl V. Carter
that we could probably climb
and get into warmer air. Mem-
phis center finally cleared us to
5,000. We applied METO power
and proceeded to climb, but no-
ticed that our airspeed quickly
dropped to about 80 knots and
that we were climbing very
slowly. We finally nursed the old
bird to 5,000 feet. We reduced
power to 35 inches and 2350 rpm,
but could hold only 90 knots. We
both were working full time now
to keep the Gooney Bird flying.
I had taken charge of the flight
controls, and the pilot was exer-
cising the engine controls. Each
time the rpm was increased ice
would break loose. It sounded as
if it would tear holes in the side
of the aircraft. I found out later
that the stewardess had noticed
the windows in the rear freezing
up and started to the cockpit to
find out what was happening.
She got as far as the cockpit door
when she heard the ice hitting
and realized that we didn't have
time to talk to her. She returned
to her seat and sat down. Later,
after talking to her I learned that
she had said a little prayer. I
realized that I probably would
have too if I had had time.
The pilot asked me to take a
look at my wing. I tried but I
couldn't even see the engine na-
celle. He tried his, and I don't
think he saw very much either.
We knew now that we were ic-
ing up at a steady rate, and our
deicing boots would not keep the
wings clear. Climbing to another
altitude to get into clear or
warmer air was no longer possi-
ble. Holding 5,000 feet was all we
could do. The ceiling was too
low to break out at a safe alti-
tude if we descended.
Memphis center came on the
air, "You are now cleared to
The pilot answered, "Unable
to climb; airspeed now 85 knots
with METO power."
Memphis replied, "Roger,
maintain 5,000 and contact Mem-
phis approach control."
Approach control responded
Depart Rossville heading
for radar vector to back
course ILS approach course,
landing straight in runway
27; ceiling 600 feet, visibil-
ity 5 miles, light rain; de-
scend at pilot's discretion.
I breathed a sigh of relief. Al-
most straight into runway 27
would be a lot of help. We were
already too slow for comfort. An
engine failure now would mean
certain trouble. We would have
to descend and flight would be
impossible on one engine.
Our fuel consumption had al-
most doubled due to the power
necessary to maintain altitude.
We would not run out of fuel,
bu t if the FAA inspectors were
waiting in Memphis with t.
dipstick, our day would ha
been spoiled.
The omni needle was
ning to show Rossville. As we
approached 4,000, the vertical
speed indicator showed 500 fpm
descent and 90 knots airspeed.
We would be able to make it, I
told myself. I called for an imme-
diate approach clearance over
Rossville intersection. Our alti-
tude now was 3,500 feet and we
were still descending with climb
We were lucky because we
knew the approach from mem-
ory. Had we been at a strange
airport, I doubt that we could
have taken time to look at an
approach chart.
Then a horrible thought hit
me. How would we be able to
see the runway after breaking
out of the overcast? The win-
dows were completely frozen
over and we couldn't see a thing.
We put all the alcohol we could
on the windshield. Then I
thought of a trick I learned from
~ o t h   r pilot. I picked up the
~ t lamp we had aboard and
held it against the windshield.
My feet were freezing and my
forehead was wet with perspira-
tion as I watched anxiously for
the ice to break off the wind-
shield. Suddenly I was afraid.
We were on the approach
course now. Oakville intersec-
tion would be the next check-
point and the final station in-
bound. I thought I noticed the
ice loosening on the windshield
next to the spot lamp. If the
windshield cleared and both en-
gines continued to run, we could
make the field. Other than vibra-
tions caused by ice on the pro-
pellers, the Pratt & Whitneys
seemed to be enjoying the flight
much more than we.
We approached Oakville in-
tersection, unable to maintain al-
titude. We were down to 1,300

et on the altimeter and needed
hold this altitude until reach-
ing Oakville. Ninety knots was
the airspeed we could possi-
get and this was with METO
power. At 1,000 feet we started
to break out, and a feeling of
gratification surged through me
as ice began tearing loose from
the front windshield. The omni
showed Oakville. Straight ahead
we could see the runway.
Wi th our engines at METO
power and 90 knots airspeed we
continued toward runway 27. I
could have sworn someone was
throwing bricks at us as ice came
off the propellers and hit the
My side window was frozen
solid so I did not know how much
ice was on the wings. I could
only see straight ahead. Our stall
speed had to be greatly increased
with the load of the ice on the
wings. We had to keep all of our
power on and airspeed up. We
succeeded, and until this day I
don't understand how we could
fly at 90 knots without stalling
out. We touched down with
power on and came to a stop
about 4,000 feet down the run-
way. I was happy to be on the
After pulling up to the ramp
and parking, I helped open the
door to get out. I had to kick
rather hard to break the ice. The
first place I went to was the
wing of the aircraft. I was glad
that my side window had been
frozen over. If someone had
asked me whether an airplane
would fly with as much ice as we
had, I would have laughed at
When I think back over the
flight I realize that it all could
have been avoided. We were fly-
ing in unsafe conditions and we
were in these conditions because
of our foolishness.
To begin with we knew there
was a chance of some icing en
route. The first mistake we made
was filing into weather without a
good briefing from a weather
forecaster. The only weather we
had seen was on teletype se-
quence reports. We had asked
for an altitude that would have
put us on top of the overcast. We
should never have taken the low-
er altitude because we knew we
could expect ice.
Once we started picking up
ice we were content to let our
airspeed drop off without ever
adding power. This meant we
had to fly the aircraft at an in-
creased angle of attack. As a re-
sult we exposed more of the sur-
face of the wing to the relative
wind and picked up more ice.
Once we started losing airspeed
we should have come in with
more power to maintain as high
an airspeed as possible. When we
made the slow climb to 5,000 feet
from 4,000 feet, we lost fuel and
time because the angle of attack
was further increased and air-
speed lost.
If you should find yourself in
ice, the time to get out is then,
not later. Do not wait around
and get heavy with ice and ex-
pect to climb out of it. If you
have equipment such as wind-
shield wipers, keep it working .
Keep your airspeed up and re-
member that an increase in pow-
er calls for an increase in fuel
Probably the greatest lesson to
be learned from an experience
such as this is that an ounce
of prevention is worth many
pounds of ice.
Choctaws cross paths over Vaiont dam area. Landslide occurred
in area to extreme right.
Early on a Thursday morning in mid-October) SET AF responded
to a request for aid from Italian officials in the Belluno area. There
a tidal wave) caused by the side of a mountain falling into the lake
behind the towering Vaiont dam) had flooded the village of Longa-
rone and was sweeping south) creating havoc in its wake. Reports
indicated that Longarone) with a population of 4)500) was almost
completely under water. The Vaiont dam) tallest in the world) was
damaged at the top. SET AF helicopters with medical equipment
were rushed to the scene.
HE ROLE OF the U. S.
Army's Southern European
Task Force (SETAF) 110th Avi-
ation Company during the re-
cent disaster in Belluno province
of northern I taly has been ac-
knowledged by the U. S. Con-
gress and made a part of the
Congressional Record of Octo-
ber 28, 1963.
The Honorable Silvio O.
Conte, congressman from Massa-
chusetts, took note of SETAF's
participation in the rescue opera-
tions in the Longarone area. In
part, Mr. Conte said: "Mr.
Speaker, judging from the press
~ o v e r   g e of the recent tragedy in
the Belluno area of Italy, I won-
der if most Americans as well
as my colleagues are aware of
the outstanding work done by
SETAF's 110th Aviation Com-
"Having been fortunate to read
recent Italian press coverage of
this most terrible occurrence, I
was amazed at the extent of
their involvement. Their use of
the 6-ton CH-34 Sikorsky trucks
of the sky in Longarone was es-
sential, and, all told, they trans-
ported 180 tons of cargo, laid
communications wire by air, car-
ried out more than 300 differ-
ent missions, carried 4,351 pas-
sengers, and flew a total of
142 hours, or 11,360 nautical
miles .... "
A cafe owner in the village
north of the disaster said: "It
ras a terrible thing to awake in
the morning and see the effects
of this great disaster. After the
shock had worn off so that we
could start to think, we attempt-
ed to probe through the wreck-
age, looking for anyone we could
find alive.
"Suddenly we all looked to the
sky and we could see four flying
birds approaching. From that dis-
tance it looked as if the mythical
'Four Horsemen of the Apoca-
lypse' were descending.
"Gradually these four birds
descended, and then we realized
that they were helicopters of
the U. S. Army, actually 'Four
Horsemen of Mercy.'"
Dubbed "The Four Horsemen"
by the townspeople in the disas-
ter area, these Southern Euro-
pean Task Force (SETAF) heli-
copters from the 110th Aviation
Company in Verona assisted in
locating the dead and injured at
the disaster area in Longarone
and nearby towns.
Initially the SETAF helicop-
ters evacuated about 20 persons
from the disaster area behind
the dam. During the entire res-
cue mission the helicopters re-
located more than 1,000 persons,
mainly evacuees from isolated
hilltop and river villages.
One entire village was evacu-
ated by the helicopters. The
mountainside village of Casso
was in danger of disappearing
into the valley below. It was a
common sight to see the aircraft
picking townspeople from one
side of the mountain and then
shuttling to the other side where
many more were waiting.
One woman almost gave birth
to her baby in a SETAF helicop-
ter. When the pilot landed the
craft, she was turned over to
Italian medical authorities. Her
baby was born a short time later.
An average of five CH-34
Choctaw helicopters were used
daily in support of operation.
With only 37 men on hand the
helicopter crews and mainte-
nance personnel faced a gigantic
task. Sixteen pilots, twelve crew-
chiefs, and nine ground person-
nel performed an unbelievable
work schedule.
In many cases the main te-
nance men worked around the
clock to keep the helicopters in
peak condition. Ground person-
nel consisted of one equipment
specialist, two petroleum-oil and
lubricants personnel, three main-
tenance men, and one main te-
nance noncommissioned officer.
Taking victims from the disaster site
at Longarone
An injured woman is lifted from a CH-34 after
evacuation from the disaster area
Performance figures and flight
techniques in this article are not
intended to supercede those
found in TM 55-1510-204-10.
This article has been adapted
from FLIGHT International
magazine, London, England.
AEROPLANES are definitely
.fl.. becoming more interesting
' ---......
! .
' /
@ \
Through th
to fly, especially when they pack
the powerful punch of light-
weight turboprops. The Grum-
man Mohawk (OV-l) is prob-
ably the most unusual of these
intriguing aircraft. It surpasses
in performance anything the
U. S. Army has in the front line.
During a demonstration of the
Mohawk by Ralph Donnell (sen-
ior Mohawk test pilot), I saw
him rolling into a feathered pro-
peller at low level, cruising past
Mr. Lambert is on the editorial
staff of FLIGHT, specializing in
evaluation flying of all types of
aircraft. He has flown approxi-
mately 140 types of aircraft. ...
· .--.#
at about 60 knots looking down
at the spectators 30 feet below
and topping some long zoom
climbs with vertical rolls which
clearly showed complete confi-
dence in low-speed handling.
In some pretty impressive ma-
neuvers, I learned just how con-
fidence-inspiring the Mohawk
really is. I flew with Ralph when
the Mohawk had full internal
fuel and weighed about 12,500 lb
with all its 1AF -type equipment.
Ralph taxied out using nose-
wheel steering and turned about
one wingtip. He then switched
the steering off and turned about
one wheel with brakes alone.
The steering is limited (rela-
tively) to avoid screwing a
wheel into soft ground by pivot-
ing on it.
Simple cockpit checks includ-
ed 50 right aileron trim to coun-
teract torque. In the controls
I found the typical clunking,
springy feel of spring-tab ailer-
ons and a distinct centering feel
on the elevators, which also
seemed to have some inertia.
With clearance from the tower,
Ralph lined up and handed
straight over to me. I opened the
throttle progressively and we be-
gan to tear off down the runway.
Briefly I noticed that the nose-
wheel steering was extremely
pleasant before we reached 60
knots and I began to feel for sol-
id air on the controls. I inched
the stick back until we rotated
into the air at 80 knots without
any real feel and settled, as in-
structed, to climb at 100 knots.
When Ralph moved the levers,
the gear came in with a hefty
thumping and the flaps retracted,
bu t only slight trim changes re-
Reduced to military power we
rocketed upwards at 2,000 ftl
min, with lots of runway still
somewhere under our backs. I
noted the rate of climb and
Ralph applied full power to send
us uphill at least half as fast
The Stuttgart runway was still
beneath us at 2,000 feet. To
prove his first point, Ralph said
it would be dangerous, wouldn't
it, to pull the stick hard back in
this steep climb-and then he did
so, vigorously. The Mohawk just
sat right up and begged-and
shuddered, but did not give.
There was plenty of vibration,
bu t no real stall developed and
we kept going uphill. Normal
takeoff technique is in fact to
hold the stick hard back all the
time. When the wheels clear the
ground, the tail holds up for a
while until it leaves ground ef-
fect and the nose comes right up.
Pressure is released only at that
We leveled off at about 5,000
feet and 120 knots and I found
control forces fairly heavy, but
response very good. Ralph now
had something to show me. We
normally consider an airplane
first as a glider, don't we? Al-
righty. He armed autofeather,
reduced power to less than 10
lb/sq inch torque and slammed
the throttles into full power and
back, one after the other. Imme-
diately both propellers feathered,
but the gas producers continued
to idle. So we glided down at 120
knots and 1,100 ft/min.
We could have pressed the un-
feather buttons and been under
power in seconds but Ralph said,
"We now want to apply more
drag, don't we?" The speed-
brakes were opened with small
drag at this speed and a little vi-
bration. Rate of descent in-
creased. Next drag stage was to
unfeather the propellers and put
them in to fine pitch for discing
drag: rate of descent 3,000 ft/
min. Gear and then full flap were
extended and we then stood on
the rudder pedals as we plunged
earthwards at almost 5,000 ft/
min, still at 120 knots.
The remarkable thing is that
no one had touched the stick
since we first feathered the pro-
pellers. The elevator trim was at
noseheavy. Then, from ground
idle, the throttles were slammed
open to full power, and in what
seemed like less than 12 seconds
we had full power and the nose
reared up into the climb atti-
tude. Still no one touched stick
or trim-wheel and the speed re-
mained at 120 knots!
I next cleaned the Mohawk up
and cruised at moderate power,
making 120 knots. I could turn
with either aileron or rudder
alone and the controls were ex-
tremely good, if one makes al-
lowance for the distinctive elas-
tic feel of spring-tab ailerons. I
noticed that elevator response
was slow, so that I could rock
the stick and produce a soft
rhythmic bouncing up and down,
without significant pitch-attitude
change. For a while the slow
pitch response gave the impres-
sion of instability, but stick rate
was positive and pitch response
was progressive. The delay was
really encouraging slight over-
control. This all somehow rang a
bell in my memory and I later
realized that the Mohawk is re-
markably like a Meteor to han-
dle, although it has a much bet-
ter rate of roll.
At 120 knots, which is well be-
low the normal operational speed
of 180 to 200 knots, a stall buffet
appeared at 1.5 g in a turn. In
level flight I reduced speed pro-
gressively and strong buffeting
set in until we lost lift with the
nose well up and stick hard back
at 80 knots. There was a little
aileron in hand and plenty of
rudder. Neither wing nor nose
dropped-a completely innocu-
ous stall with an unusually
strong and early warning. Try as
I might, I could not get the Mo-
hawk to stall more firmly.
Speeding up to 190 knots, I
found powerful control and ex-
cellent, fighter-like maneuver-
ability. It was most noticeable
that speed had a considerable ef-
fect on directional trim, and rud-
der correction was required very
much in the same way as in a
Spitfire. Ralph dived to 250 knots
and extended the airbrakes.
They pulled us back hard and
caused a slight nose-up trim
Diving speed is 390 knots and
minimum speed, clean, 80 knots.
This is already a respectable
speed range, but extension of
flap brings an astonishing change
in the Mohawk. Maximum flap
speed is 153 knots and applica-
tion of 15
brings the slats ou-
and cuts in the fully powered in
board ailerons, which droop at
with the stick central. Their
main purpose is to assist single-
engined control by reducing the
lift of the wing being blown by
the "good" engine, but they also
provide remarkable rolling pow-
er. Trim changes with flap are
small and easily cancelled out
with the large trim-wheel.
At 80 knots, when I had previ-
ously stalled and had very little
aileron left, the Mohawk now
exhibited fighter-like lateral ma-
neuverability and no sign of a
stall. At the best turning speed
of 85 knots the radius of turn is a
mere 355 feet. The aircraft can
be thrown around or, for op-
erational purposes, threaded
through narrow gaps in 0 bstruct-
ed approaches. I pulled back un-
til liberal shudder on wing and
rudders announced the stall at 64
knots. But the nose would no
drop and I had powerful ailero:
and rudder control. Full back
stick just would not produce a
proper break into the stall, even
if I released pressure momentar-
ily and rocked the Mohawk back
onto its tail. With full flap the
behavior was just the same, but
the minimum speed with power
was back to 60 knots. Stall warn-
ing was very powerful, but be-
havior could not have been more
innocuous. The elevators still re-
sponded slowly and were in fact
the weakest control at speeds
just above the stall.
Finally we tried single-engine
control. Ralph feathered one en-
gine with the Mohawk flying
clean at 120 knots. I could not
tell for some seconds which one
had stopped. Trim changes were
mostly lateral and a specially big
aileron trim-wheel was fitted be-
cause of this. Vmc with flap is 72
knots, and without, 88 knots.
Best rate of climb speed with
flaps is 80-85 knots, and without,
135 knots. Best angle of climb
speed with flaps is 75-80 knots. I
accordingly set up a full-power
climb with 15°flap and gear up at
75 knots and 6,000 fpm, quite
high for single-engined perform-
ance. Ralph reduced power on
one engine and then feathered it.
A big heave of rudder and ailer-
on held me straight and I put
the nose slightly down to gain 80
knots. The Mohawk began to
shudder and lose height and I
applied full aileron and rudder
trim with about half travel ap-
plied on both surfaces. The shud-
der smoothed out and we began
to climb healthily, but I com-
plained to Ralph that the rudder
load was too high.
"Alrighty, apply full rudder,"
he said. When I did this I noticed
that pedal load decreased almost
to zero, the antibalance tab hav-
ing fined off to neutral. Then he
suggested that I try climbing
with my feet off the rudder. So I
let go, and found that I could
climb straight with almost full
aileron and no rudder. In fact
the Mohawk climbed better with
the rudder free and full power on
one engine. That is why Grum-
man was not greatly worried
about the high rudder load at
the halfway point! I could hold
the necessary aileron with one
fingertip. This is really an ex-
traordinary airplane. Note that
we were then climbing on one
engine at about the clean stalling
speed, but 15 ° flap and slats gave
full flying capability.
By now we were some way
east of Stuttgart and Ralph cou-
pled the autopilot to the appro-
priate VOR radial. The Mohawk
then took itself home with height
lock applied, while we rested, ad-
justed ventilators and fiddled
with the height adjustment of
the ejection seats. I found that
the cockpit was extremely com-
fortable and visibility excellent.
There were two rear-view mir-
rors for each occupant and sun-
blinds overhead to keep off the
blazing sun.
Finally we neared Stuttgart
and Ralph told me that I would
learn more about landing the
Mohawk by watching him than
by doing it myself. With gear and
flap down and zero torque we de-
scended at 3,000 ft/ min towards
a rough grass area near the U. S.
Army dispersal. Final approach
was made at 80 knots with
torques varying between 12 and
20 lb/ sq in and an average rate
of descent of 500 ft/ min. At a
theoretical 50-foot barrier, Ralph
jabbed the stick forward and the
Mohawk slowly nosed-over to-
wards the ground. Then Ralph
pulled the stick all the way back
and it seemed that we would hit
the ground really hard. Just
when I was waiting for the heav-
iest of all landings, the main-
wheels touched the ground and
the oleos just mopped up the im-
pact without the slightest jerk.
Instantly we were in full reverse
thrust and pressed hard towards
the windscreen as the 12,000-lb
aircraft pulled up in under 100
It was a staggering perform-
ance and the German controller
in the tower immediately called
and said, "You must have a very
good undercarriage, Mohawk."
Ralph replied that it was a good
thing to have, wasn't it. Person-
ally I think the Mohawk is a
good thing to have.
The final demonstration, while
I was still sweating from the
landing, was to back into our
parking slot and then, having ap-
plied the brakes, to rock the air-
craft gently back onto its tail
bumper with reverse thrust.
Reason? To test full reverse
thrust or change a nosewheel
without jacks.
Oh well, it sits up and begs and
is as docile as an old four-legged
friend. You cannot get on the
wrong side of the Mohawk's
aerodynamics; but watch out for
that reconnaissance capability!
UH-1 hot starts were ex-
perienced by the training fleet at
Fort Rucker. A T53 engine costs
more than $40,000; it takes a
maximum of 40 seconds to start
one correctly! Repair of a dam-
aged T53 also is a costly opera-
What is the hot start record in
your unit?
UH -1 starting proced ures in
the -lOs are accurate and should
be followed. Other factors, how-
ever, affect a start and should be
remembered by the aviator. Con-
sideration of these factors is now
emphasized at USAA VNS.
Before making a start, stop a
moment to think. What gauges
are you going to watch, in what
$40,000 or
40 Seconds
order? and what are you going
to do if the EGT (Exhaust Gas
Temperature) goes above 600
C? What if the emergency gov-
ernor manipulation does no
good? A few seconds thought
may save some last minute fum-
bling-and an engine. It is espe-
cially important that IPs drill
and redrill students on this.
Before pulling the starter trig-
ger make one more mental
check. Have you really got the
throttle in the starting detent
and have you beeped the gover-
nor to full low?
Do not try to make a start with
a 15-knot (or higher) wind
blowing up the tail pipe, and
don't forget that another helicop-
ter running up or hovering be-
Major Robert R. Tyner
hind you can cause such winds.
A battery with less than 24
volts indicated with only the bat-
tery switch in the ON position is
not likely to give you a start and
most likely will result in high
EGT and abort. Some batteries
showing 25 volts or more still
will not give you a start. Sick
battery condition can be discov-
ered by watching the voltmeter
when the start trigger is pulled.
Ordinarily, voltage will drop to
about 5 volts immediately, then
move back up to about 13-15
volts in 5 seconds or less. If it
Maj Tyner is Chief, Standard-
ization Division, Dept of Rotary
Wing Training, USAAVNS, Ft
Rucker, Ala.
does not, shut off the throttle,
pull the ignition circuit breaker,
and continue to motor the en-
gine until you are sure there is
no fire in the burner.
When a battery start must be
made, leave your inverters OFF
until you have a fire going and
all indicators show no trouble.
Then switch inverters ON and
check engine and transmission
oil pressure. These oil systems
are not likely to fail in the first
place but if they do, you still can
shut down before causing dam-
age. Not using the inverters dur-
ing starting can save you consid-
erable amperage.
If you have a doubtful battery
and no heavy duty APU, you
Continued from page 1
Award contest. Presumably this means
his thoughts echo the feelings of rated
First let me restate his case in un-
equivocal language:
Loss of flying proficiency causes ac-
idents, reduced flying motivation, and
reduced ability in short field work and
in higher performance aircraft.
Ground duty is demanding and pre-
vents pilots from maintaining pro-
Rated supervisors cannot demand
more proficiency flying because they
are trapped by an administrative work-
load which their pilot subordinates
must help shoulder.
Eliminate extended ground duty
Force ground commanders into let-
ting pilots maintain proficiency during
duty hours.
Force ground commanders into re-
leasing their pilots for one week's avia-
tion duty every six months.
Force aviation commanders into
making instrument equipment available
to all pilots.
Put flying experience as a high pri-
ority for assignment of Cat II pilots.
Substitute flying for physical train-
Captain Dennison's argument springs
from an unspoken but loudly implied
premise which must be recognized
without fuzziness or sugar-coating: fly-
ing is a demanding full-time job, and
the better the pilot and his usefulness
to Army Aviation the more he must
e permitted to work at it. Now I want
should not try a start under ordi-
nary circumstances. If special
circumstances exist and you
must go, at least two aids can in-
crease starting amperage:
1. Parallel wire other batter-
ies of any voltage up to 28 volts
and plug this assembly into the
external power receptacle, then
try your start with battery
switch ON.
2. Plug any lightweight low
amperage APU into the external
power receptacle and turn the
battery switch ON. Every 5 min-
utes disconnect the APU and
check battery voltage rise. When
and if voltage comes up to 24
volts or more, go ahead with
your start. Leave the APU dis-
to state its corollary: ground duty,
especially for the young rated officer
in a combat unit, is also a full-time job,
in which his contribution, and his gain-
ing proficiency, are directly proportion-
al to how hard and long he works at
it, and how much his heart is in it.
Therein lies the dilemma Army Avia-
tors had better recognize and think
hard about, for both the demands of
the ground and the demands of the air
are getting greater. I resist the imputa-
tion that the solution lies with ignoring
the demands of the ground while solv-
ing the problem of the air, for that
leads to just one end: pilots who are
"not proficient" in increasingly respon-
sible ground assignments. The price of
poor flying proficiency is often dramatic
-a crash. But the price of poor desk
jockeying can be just as serious, espe-
cially when that desk man is a staff of-
ficer making policy when he never quite
mastered the professional jobs of the
subordinate officers or units he is direct-
I do not want to degrade the prob-
lem Captain Dennison addresses. It is
a frustrating, career-long problem and
causes many a good officer-pilot to
think deeply about his own abilities and
future, both in the air and out. But I
must point out that the Captain's solu-
tions are merely lopsided subversions
of present policies which were original-
ly intended to maintain good pilots
while making good ground officers. J n
short, the article you commend only at-
tacks half the problem because it does
not admit the other half is of equal
concern to the Army.
connected, because you may
damage it as a result of overload.
Ordinarily enough APU s are
at an airfield to prevent serious
loss of time waiting for one for
the first start of the day (which
generally is the most critical
one). Unless unusual circum-
stances exist or large loss of
time is expected, prudence
would indicate use of an APU.
Whenever feasible, cross-
country stops should be planned
only for places where APUs are
available. Generally APUs can
be found at any military installa-
tion. Airfields with commercial
airline personnel will usually
lend you their APU and an op-
erator at no charge. ~
The heart of the matter is the validity
of the basic Army premise: that an
average rated officer can be both a
good pilot and good ground officer
throughout a career. Having served
with a variety of Army Aviators who
ran the gamut from topnotch pilots who
begrudged their every ground duty, to
first rate officers who tried desperately
to remain both good pilots and become
effective unit officers, I feel that the
premise may no longer be supportable.
Army Aviation is still in a crisis of
I want first class Army Aviation, the
best in the world; but having com-
manded in combat, I also demand that
officers who wear branch insignia be
able to carry their load, and not have
to excuse their failings by looking
above their breast pockets. I have rea-
son to doubt we can straddle the fence
much longer. When good men cannot
develop the abilities demanded of them,
it is time to examine the svstem. More
flying at the expense of g ~ o u n   train-
ing is a half-baked answer. Captain
Dennison is an officer trying to do a
job, caught in a dilemma not of his
own making. So am I.
What is your answer, Army Avia-
2730 Bradley Circle
Annandale, Va.
Thank you. We would welcome addi-
tional comments from the field on this
subject. ED
Seeding the cloud above a whiteout may lower its relative humidity,
clear the area, and make for safer landings.
Putting the Squeeze On
"l"I THITEOUTS cause one of
V V the most difficult opera-
tional problems the Army has in
the arctic. When this atmos-
pheric/ surface condition occurs,
everything looks white. No ob-
ject casts a shadow, the horizon
becomes indiscernible, and only
very dark objects can be seen.
Whiteouts usually happen
when snow cover is complete and
the clouds are so thick and uni-
form that light reflected by the
snow is the same intensity as the
light of the sun after it passes
through the clouds.
The problem is critical over
flat terrain where only a few
shadows exist to assist the avia-
tor. Such an area can be found in
the Greenland icecap. There,
whiteouts in the inland area
are associated with supercooled
clouds while those along the
coastline occur with warmer
than freezing clouds.
The U. S. Army Cold Re-
gions Research and Engineering
Laboratory has found that white-
outs can be modified by seeding
the supercooled clouds with dry
ice and "warm clouds" with hy-
groscopic salts (readily taking
up and retaining moisture) and/
or carbon black.
When dry ice is dropped into
relatively thin, stable layers of
supercooled clouds, it induces
Willi am H. Smith
snowfall and subsequent clearing
in the seeded area. Hygroscopic
salts when dropped serve as a
sink for water vapor; and carbon
black absorbs radiation and acts
as a heat source. Each of these
processes, therefore, lowers the
relative humidity in the clouds.
With the drying of the air, the
cloud particles dissipate and
clearing results.
As an experiment, the labora-
tory used an Otter to dispense
dry ice. Five pounds of dry ice
were crushed to chunks less than
1 inch in diameter and released
while the aircraft flew from 50 to
100 feet above the clouds. Of
eight tests, six were successful,
with considerable visibility im-
provements and cloud dissipa-
tion. Several times the aircraft
descended through the hole and
landed without hazard.
The progression of events after
the seeding was dramatic. With-
in 5 or 10 minutes the seeded
area was darker and ice crystals
appeared. Snow began to reach
the ground in 15 to 20 minutes,
and clearing began in 25 to 30
minutes. With 15 to 20 pounds of
crushed dry ice, cleared areas of
10 square miles were produced.
The Russians use a different
method to clear whiteouts. A
cage with dry ice in it is placed
on the side of the aircraft and is
flown through the cloud, thus
producing crystals. The draw-
back with this method is that the
airplane must be flown through
the cloud. Using pellets, the air-
craft is able to fly over the cloud.
Another technique employed
by the Cold Regions Research
and Engineering Laboratory is to
use a tethered blimp to distrib-
ute the dry ice. For this purpose,
plastic mesh (berry) basket
containing the crushed ice are
attached to the tethering line at
25-foot intervals.
On two occasions, with stratus
ceiling of 700 and 1,200 feet and
winds of 1 to 3 knots, ten baskets
of dry ice were raised into the
overcast. As the cloud moved
through the baskets, ice crystals
could be seen 100 yards down-
wind. After 30 minutes snow
began to fall some 1 to 2 miles
downwind, and there was a
clearing a half mile wide in some
places. The process continued for
an hour and the resulting break
in the clouds lasted for 2 hours.
Modification of clouds by drop-
ping hygroscopic salts and car-
bon black has been tried in many
parts of the world where warm
clouds prevail. In some cases
salts have been shot into the air
by rockets. Results have been on
par with dry ice seeding.
In areas where airports and
landing fields must be kept open
through whiteouts, cloud seeding
- with dry ice, salt, or carbon black
ieems to be the answer. Aircraft
can be used when blimps are not
available or practical. Blimps
employed on a large scale are
ideal at permanent fields. They
can be mounted on sleds and
moved upwind to be ready to
perform. The width of the
cleared area can be controlled by
Old Man
Adapted from a safety lecture
by Donald S. Buck, Director of
Safety, Headquarters, U. S. Con-
tinental Army Command.
ACK FROST plays hob with
safety if we aren't ready for
him. During his season he in-
~ e   s e s the hours of darkness. He
c:.lazes runways with sleet, snow,
or ice.
Brakes can be slightly weak
and pass unnoticed during warm
weather. But when the tempera-
ture drops and rain freezes on
runways, those weak brakes can
make life miserable for you. Jack
Frost demands the best from pi-
lots because he offers the worst.
A high degree of pessimism is
needed for winter flying. One
has to resolve to expect the
worst and be ready for it. Con-
sider how the first snow or the
first spell of ice gets so many in to
trouble. Later in the season we
seem to accept the fact that it is
winter and operate accordingly.
It's true, perhaps, that anyone
can taxi safely on ice. Trouble is,
they can't stop safely. It's not the
taxiing that hurts; it's that sud-
den stop when we slam into
something solid. Remember,
skids are easier to prevent than
o overcome!
the number of blimps used.
The seeding of clouds over
whiteouts may not always solve
the problem, but there is a good
chance that it will. For that rea-
son, units operating in white out
areas should be prepared to
squeeze the water out of those
clouds if it should become neces-
Skids result from changing di-
rection or speed on slippery sur-
faces. The more violent the
change, the more certain the
skid. And the higher the speed,
the harder it is to slow down or
turn on slippery surfaces.
Our first rule for winter taxi-
ing is to slow down. To safeguard
against skids, keep speeds down
to where you'll not have to ask
for the impossible from your
Second rule is to change speed
or direction gradually. A lot of
pilots get into serious trouble be-
cause they forget this rule. Make
no sudden changes in speed or
direction. Stretch out the slow
down and turn into a careful,
gradual operation.
The third rule is to take it easy
on the brakes. At best, braking
is pretty tricky on ice or snow.
Hard or long braking can cause a
skid. The expert uses the gentle
touch. He applies the brakes eas-
ily in a fairly rapid sequence.
The intermittent application per-
mits steering, thus helping to re-
tain control. Of course you'll
need a greater distance to stop
"Cloud Physics and Cloud Seeding"
by Louis J. Battan, Anchor Books.
Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden
City, N. Y.
"Seeding Whiteouts in Greenland"
by James E. Juisto and Roddy R.
Rogers, Research Trends, Vol. IX, No.
1, Spring 1961, Cornell Aeronautical
Laboratory, Inc., of Cornell Univer-
sity, Buffalo 21, N. Y. ~
this way, but you'll be more like-
ly to stop where you intended to.
We need to feel like a kid rid-
ing his bicycle on a frozen pond
after his first tumble. He'll turn
very slowly and widely. He
keeps his feet off those brakes,
and he doesn't apply the power
with a hang!
Sometimes despite your best
efforts you'll find yourself in a
skid. Curiously, your instincts
are of no help in a skid. You'll
feel as though you want to jam
on the brakes, but that just keeps
the skid alive.
To get out of a skid:
• Leave that brake alone.
• Turn into the skid. Note
that we didn't say "cut sharply."
Turn gradually and carefully.
• Easy on the power.
It boils down to easy on every-
thing, and do little else but steer,
if you need to get out of a skid.
Winter flying isn't so tough,
provided you remain alert to the
hazards. It comes down to slow,
gradual, and easy. Otherwise,
Old Man Winter is the winner.
wo U-6 BEAVERS were
well out over the Polar ice-
cap when visibility began to de-
teriorate. The pilots, neither in-
strument qualified, were forced
to descend to about 200 feet in an
attempt to maintain visual con-
tact with the tractor trail they
were following across the ice.
About one mile farther, visi-
bility began falling off rapidly
and the pilots had to abort the
mission and return to their home
base, 165 miles away.
Aboard the lead Beaver the
passengers were notified of the
decision. The pilot started a slow
turn and almost immediately en-
Richard K. Tierney
countered a whiteout condition
(see "Putting the Squeeze On,"
page 14). With all visual refer-
ence lost, his only choice was to
go on instruments.
After completing about 90 de-
grees of his 180
turn, the pilot
leveled off and tried to gain alti-
tude. He was experiencing great
difficulty in climbing when sud-
denly he felt the aircraft hit the
icecap. He quickly pulled back
on the controls and the U-6
bounced into a slow climb. Due
to the high altitude of the icecap
the pilot again experienced diffi-
culty climbing, but eventually
broke out above the whiteout
condition. He circled several
minutes, vainly trying to reestab-
lish radio or visual contact with
the other Beaver before return-
ing to base.
As the pilots started to abort
the mission the pilot of the sec-
ond Beaver began to follow the
lead aircraft into the turn. Upon
entering the turn he encountered
the white out condition, and the
lead aircraft (about 700 feet
ahead) disappeared from view.
While continuing the turn the
second aircraft began losing alti-
tude. The pilot was unsuccessful
in his attempt to correct this and
the U-6 "pancaked" into the ice
cap. Fortunately, no fatalities re-

ulted, and rescue helicopters ar-
ived at the crashsite within a
few hours.
Whiteout is only one of many
environmental factors that af-
fects Army Aviation's capability
to provide support to all ele-
ments of the Army. Many others
must be controlled if Army Avi-
ation is to be truly combat effec-
tive. Recognizing this need, the
U. S. Army Combat Develop-
ments Command Aviation
Agency (USACDCA VNA) has
recently completed a study to
determine the capability of Army
air vehicles to support operations
in the following areas:
• Deserts
• Jungles
• Mountains
• Arid semi-mountains
• Snow and extreme cold
• Woods, swamps, and lakes
The study explores hazardous
weather and terrain conditions
encountered in these areas and
offers recommendations to help
control them. Recommendations
are usually contained in one of
the following:
Small Development Require-
ment (SDR) -covering projects
which industry can develop or
manufacture with little or no re-
Qualitative Materiel Require-
ment (QMR) -covering projects
which can be developed with
limited research.
Qualitative Materiel Develop-
mental Objective (QMDO)-
covering proj ects not beyond
present technological capabili-
ties and requiring extensive re-
This article deals only with
USACDCA VNA's study of the
effects of snow and extremely
cold conditions on flight char-
acteristics and logistics. (Other
areas will be covered in fu-
ture issues of the DIGEST.)
Constructive criticism is wel-
come and can be sent to USA-
CDCAVNA or the DIGEST (see
"You-The Idea Factory," DI-
GEST, Oct 63).
Restricted visibility is one of
the chief obstacles Army Avia-
tion faces while operating in
snow and extremely cold envi-
ronments. During whiteout con-
ditions visual operations are im-
possible. Most missions can be
accomplished using standard in-
struments. However, due to the
complete lack of visual refer-
ence points during whiteout
conditions, even instrument ap-
proaches become extremely dan-
gerous with current systems.
Grayout is a condition in
which visibility is not lost com-
pletely. Visual operations are
possible but difficult to accom-
plish. Cross-reference must be
made continually to the attitude
instruments. Flight in a grayout
may be compared to instrument
flight between cloud layers.
The combination of grayout
and fog creates a unique hazard
to aviators. When viewed from
above, patches of fog are indis-
tinguishable from snow. Un-
knowingly a pilot may fly over
surface fog for some time and
then find himself in trouble
when he begins letting down for
a landing.
USACDCA VNA is recom-
mending a remote area approach
system which will improve flight
operations under conditions of
reduced visibility. Currently, air-
craft cannot make low visibil-
ity approaches without ground-
based equipment.
Pending development of
equipment to meet require-
ments, current airborne FM
homing equipment has been im-
proved and allows aircraft to
receive a visual readout from
signals generated by the FM tac-
tical communications radio used
by troop units. It provides track
information, station passage, and
an indication when the aircraft
is approximately one mile from
the station. (Requirements call
for extending this range.)
While providing an acceptable
instrument approach capability,
the improved FM homing sys-
tem does not require additional
or special training of aircrews or
radio operators.
Visual navigation in snow and
extreme cold weather environ-
ments is generally quite difficult.
Along coasts, flat shorelines are
indistinguishable from sea ice-
making it necessary to fly inland
in search of identifiable ground
The unreliability of the com-
pass (due to attractions of min-
eral deposits and/ or proximity to
a magnetic pole), plus the ab-
sence of highways, railroads,
towns, and other prominent
landmarks, often makes naviga-
tion by electronic aids essential.
However, in polar latitudes elec-
tronic aids can be quite unreli-
able due to frequent and unpre-
dictable interference with signal
At night over the snow and ice
it is necessary to rely almost
completely on instruments and
navigational aids. Total darkness
occurs only in wide areas of open
sea. In summer daylight or twi-
light is almost continual; in win-
ter direct or indirect light is ab-
sent, but the snow reflects any
light that reaches it. Usually
enough light is reflected to make
an object the size of a man vis-
bile at 100 yards. Moonlight is
quite bright and provides enough
light to accomplish safe takeoffs
and landings.
A need exists for a reliable
navigation system for position-
ing aerial and ground elements
with respect to an established
electronic grid system not ham-
pered by line-of-sight require-
ments. Both PFNS (see DI-
GEST, Feb 62) and Doppler
self-contained systems are un-
dergoing development and test-
Other proposed aids to naviga-
tion include a lightweight single
sideband (SSB) aircraft radio,
an obstacle terrain avoidance
system, and a light intensifica-
tion system.
A materiel requirement has
stated the need for a SSB radio
set to maintain continuous non-
line-of-sight tactical communica-
tions with compatible radio sets
in ground units up to 150 miles
away. This set must be opera-
tionally compatible with the 100-
mile, 50-mile, and 25-mile range
SSB radio sets, as well as with
high frequency equipment used
by other services.
An interim SSB set has been
procured on a limited basis, but
it is considered too heavy. Head-
quarters, U. S. Army Combat
Developments Command is staff-
ing a revised materiel require-
ment incorporating more desir-
able features.
A stated requirement exists
for terrain/ obstacle sensing
equipment to provide selected
Army aircraft with a low-level,
low-visibility flight capability
during tactical penetrations. This
equipment must provide more
than just terrain avoidance; it
must, to be acceptable as a tacti-
cal aid, enable slow, low flying
rotary wing aircraft to detect and
avoid obstacles such as trees,
poles, and wires.
Ground avoidance equipment
(AN/ DPW-19) is being installed
in a U -9 and is programed. for
the OV-l Mohawk. However,
this system is only capable of
detecting large obstacles such as
hills and buildings. Light intensi-
fication systems discussed below
may help fill the low, slow flying
obstacle detection requirement.
A materiel requirement ha
been completed calling for
system to intensify the ambient
light from the stars, moon, and
reflected sources on the ground.
It will be used by aircraft to de-
tect and identify objects. It also
has applications for navigation,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and
target acquisition during periods
of nearly complete darkness.
Two types are under considera-
• The direct sighting type,
which represents technical im-
provements of the sniperscope.
• The indirect type, or elec-
tronic presentation of a picture
reproduced on a scope such as a
television screen.
Maintenance of aircraft and
ground support equipment is ex-
tremely difficult and time con-
suming in snow and extremely
cold environments. Working
with bulky gloves, heavy cloth-
ing, stiff lubricating oils, and
brittle materials boosts mainte-
lance time requirements four
:imes over that required in a
temperate zone.
Maintenance shelters are an
absolute necessity if efficiency is
to be improved in extremely
cold areas. USACDCA VNA has
completed a materiel require-
ment calling for a family of light-
weight vans or pods capable of
being air-transported. They
would be designed to fulfill vari-
ous shelter requirements-such
as maintenance shops, aid sta-
tions, command posts, etc. To
supplement this general require-
ment USACDC Transportation
Agency is preparing a materiel
requirement specifically calling
for a new, compact, lightweight,
air-transportable main tenance
shop system to support units in
areas inaccessible to ground ve-
hicles. The system should include
specially designed tool cabinets
which can be used within the
ihop or externally as a work-
Also needed is an adequate
shelter or family of shelters to
provide workspace for the main-
tenance of Army aircraft. The
USACDC Quartermaster Agen-
cy recently prepared a series of
materiel requirements calling for
three standard-size, expandable,
multipurpose shelters to replace
a variety of tents now in service.
Logistical support is gen.erally
accomplished with aircraft in
desolate areas of extreme cold.
USACDCA VNA is proposing
that the Army obtain numerous
items of equipment to facilitate
operations in these and (when
appropriate) other environ-
High on the priority list is the
need for refined refueling sys-
tems and equipment which
would provide the following ca-
• To allow single point pres-
sure refueling/ defueling in addi-
tion to the conventional over-
the-wing system.
• To transport fuel in bulk
containers in utility and cargo
aircraft operating in the combat
• To dispense fuel from bulk
containers with a minimum of
pumping and decontamination
• To refuel helicopters with
engines running and without
contamination from surrounding
air, precipitation or blowing de-
• To use selected cargo air-
craft as refueling stations.
• To store fuel at fixed or
semifixed airfields or secure ca-
che points in extremely light-
weight, expendable, collapsible,
ible bulk fuel containers are now
available. Concurrently with the
development of other containers,
filters, and pumping equipment,
USACDCAVNA is preparing a
staff paper to more clearly iden-
tify and state desired require-
Another logistical requirement
exists for simple equipment to
permit quick, accurate determi-
nation of load-carrying capabili-
ties and center of gravity charac-
teristics of given aircraft with
various loads in varying condi-
tions of density altitude and
Also desired are a simple de-
vice that would give the pilot a
continuous inflight reading of
the density altitude and a com-
pact kit or device which would
provide wind direction, velocity,
and inputs necessary to compute
density altitude (the latter
would be used at airfields, land-
ing sites, and by pathfinder
units) .
Small development require-
ments (SDR) have been pro-
posed for aircraft load and per-
formance computers and an
aerology kit. The hardware de-
velopment should be short range,
since prototypes of the equip-
ment have been built. An SDR
also has been prepared for an
instrument which would provide
direct readout of density alti-
Other items recommended to
facilitate logistical support opera-
tions include skis for helicopters
and a hoist for UH-I aircraft.
Skis are required in areas
where extremely deep snow pre-
vents helicopters from landing.
The Arctic Test Board is con-
ducting tests of UH-Is using skis
and other ground stabilization
devices. Similar tests also will be
conducted with the CH-47 Chi-
nook, and results will provide a
basis for determining application
to other helicopters.
A hoist and compatible litter
device is needed to enable cas-
ualties and other personnel to
be lifted aboard a hovering UH-
1. An SDR has been proposed to
acquire a hoist (equipment is
available off-the-shelf from com-
mercial sources). The USACDC
Medical Service Agency is study-
ing requirements for a compat-
ible litter.
Traditionally, combat opera-
tions have been hampered by
adverse weather and terrain
conditions. Today Army Aviation
has a golden opportunity: it can
turn such conditions into assets.
While weather and terrain offer
excellent cover and concealment,
they also stymie ground vehicles.
On the other hand, Army air-
craft can be flown in the nap
of the earth and in marginal
weather. By further developing
these capabilities with improved
equipment and tactical proce-
dures, Army Aviation will be-
come the supporting element the
ground commander depends on.
HE CV-2 DRONED monot-
onously through the cold
winter twilight. Below, the snow-
covered landscape stretched
forth in a seemingly end-
less mass of whiteness. Occa-
sional snowflakes from the over-
cast flicked against the wind-
shield. All in all, it appeared to
be a pretty routine flight. In-
side the cockpit, the pilot and
copilot went about their duties
in a reasonably comfortable en-
vironment. However, each was
beginning to show signs of
strain from the long flight.
The copilot, a young lieuten-
ant getting his first real taste of
cold weather operations, was
speaking, "Jack, I can't raise
anyone at the field. I figure
we're still about 30 minutes out.
make a bump like that."
Seconds later the copilot ex
claimed, "There it is again; wha _
is it?"
The pilot, now also showing
signs of nervousness, responded,
"I don't know; it could be an
engine starting to run a little
rough, but the tach looks all
right and all of the other instru-
ments seem to be in order."
Famous last words!
As the spray of snow settles,
the badly battered CV -2 is re-
vealed, resting at an awkward
angle in the snow. What hap-
pened? These pilots had had
their first experience with two
phenomena characteristic of the
Arctic: grayout and a gross al-
Human Factors I
Wallace W. Prophet, Ph.D.
Do you think we can stay VFR
or will we have to pull up into
this stuff?"
The pilot, a captain who had
made this same flight twice be-
fore, replied, "No sweat. That
ceiling is still about 1,000 feet
and I can make out most of the
features on the ground. I don't
think we have anything to wor-
ry about. The map shows this
area doesn't have any significant
hills or mountains. We're in
good shape. Besides, as you said,
we should be there pretty soon."
A moment later the copilot
asked nervously, "What was
that? Did you feel a bump,
Jack? Could we be picking up
some ice?"
The pilot replied somewhat
uncertainly, "Yeah, I felt it, but
ice slinging off the props doesn't
timeter error. Because of these
phenomena, they unwittingly
flew their aircraft into the snow-
covered ground.
While the preceding anecdote
is fiction, the phenomena are
brutally real and have resulted
in crashes like the one described.
How do such happenings come
about? Part of the difficulty re-
sults from failure to recognize
some of the human factors prob-
lems inherent in cold weather
Dr. Prophet is Director of Re-
search, U. S. Army Aviation
Human Research Unit, Fort
Rucker, Ala.
Mr. Schulz is Research Asso-
ciate with the U. S. Army
Aviation Human Research Unit,
Fort Rucker, Ala.
operations. However, all areas
lave their particular human fac-
ors problems.
When cold weather operations
are mentioned, the pilot usually
thinks of cold weather effects on
aircraft. These frequently re-
quire special techniques of air-
craft operation by the pilot.
However, cold weather also has
pronounced effects on the pilot's
perceptual discriminations and
ability to perform in the air-
craft. We refer to these effects
on the pilot and crew members
as human factors considerations
in cold weather operations.
Grayout and whiteout are two
conditions associated with Arc-
dangerous situation than
out, because a pilot may not
even recognize that he is flying
in a grayout condition.
In the anecdote, the pilots
were flying in a grayout condi-
tion. They perceived their
height above the ground as be-
ing several hundred feet, but
the noise and vibration they
heard and felt were actually the
propellers of the aircraft hitting
snowdrifts. Eventually, they
flew into the ground and crashed.
Their altimeter indicated an
altitude of over 700 feet. The
pilots, however, didn't realize
their altimeter was in error, on
the dangerous side, by over 700
caused by cyclonic activity and
below-standard temperatures,
are common in the Arctic. More
importantly, from the human
factors point of view, they did
not realize that their senses
might deceive them when they
tried to crosscheck their alti-
tude by VFR reference.
All aviators must recognize
that their sensory and
tual mechanisms operate in  
cord with certain physiological
and psychological laws and that
our senses can play tricks on us,
especially under unusual envi-
ronmental conditions. Our best
defence under such circum-
stances is to know when to ex-
old Weather Operation
tic operation which have dis-
ruptive effects on the pilot's
visual perception. Each of these
conditions can lead to the avi-
ator's complete inability to per-
ceive accurately on the basis of
contact visual cues. Whiteout
and grayout result from a com-
bination of lighting and atmos-
pheric conditions that reduce
the pilot's visual field to an in-
distinct or easily misinterpreted
set of cues.
The grayout phenomenon oc-
curs during periods of long twi-
light, particularly when the sky
is overcast. Grayout does not  
fect perception of the horizon,
as does whiteout, but rather the
perception of near objects, the
ground beneath the aircraft, and
estimation of height above the
ground. It is probably a more
Russel E. Schulz
feet. They didn't know that
large errors in pressure altitude,
pect these limi ta tions and take
appropriate action.
Cold weather operations bring
about a number of other human
factors problems, mainly those
concerned with operations in-
side the cockpit .. For example,
more and more reliance is being
placed on warning lights for air-
craft system malfunctions. Oc-
casionally cold weather can
cause the warning light system
to malfunction so that we re-
ceive insufficient or incorrect in-
formation. Therefore, it is a
good idea for the cold weather
pilot to crosscheck the engine
instruments more frequently
and carefully and to integrate
and use all of the available in-
formation concerning the con-
dition of the aircraft.
Many of the precise manipu-
lative skills of the aviator, such
as the positioning of switches,
fuel selectors, and other con-
trols, may depend very heavily
upon tactual feedback for their
correct performance. The wear-
ing of heavy gloves or mittens
may grossly reduce the feedback
that normally occurs through
the sense of touch. Bulky gloves
and mittens may also result in
inadvertent activation of switch-
es and controls. Therefore, the
cold weather pilot again is cau-
tioned to crosscheck very care-
fully all of his actions when he
is wearing such clothing.
A number of psychological
and human factors problems are
associated with cold weather op-
eration that are not related di-
rectly to equipment operation.
Obviously, cold weather can be
extremely uncomfortable and
can produce significant decre-
ments in man's ability to func-
tion. Many people have the mis-
taken concept that the weather
necessitates an immobile, indoor
existence. As a consequence,
such assignments often have a
number of psychological effects
on an individual's performance
as a soldier. The individual must
be taught that he can operate
effectively in a cold weather en-
Several years ago, the Hu-
man Resources Research Office
(HumRRO) undertook a study
entitled COLDSPOT. One of
the principal goals was to de-
termine the problems faced by
the men on military operations
in the Far North and to identify
those problems for which hu-
man factors research might be
of some help. Over 500 officers
and men located at various
Army outposts in the Far North
were interviewed. Several of the
conclusions from these inter-
views are pertinent to aviation.
The effectiveness of any mili-
tary unit is determined in large
part by the motivation of the
individual soldiers and the mo-
rale of the group as a whole.
Even with the best of training,
the unit will not function effec-
tively if motivation and morale
are low.
In Task COLDSPOT, com-
parisons in motivation and mo-
rale were made between officers
and enlisted men of two differ-
ent types of units assigned to
Greenland. The groups differed
in housing, food, entertainment,
and working conditions. One
group lived in barracks-type
buildings; the other lived in
canvas jamesway huts. Frozen
and fresh foods were provided
for one group versus frequent
C-rations for the other. One
group had entertainment facili-
ties; and the other had none.
One group worked normal duty
hours in heated buildings; the
other had long duty hours out-
Contrary to common expec-
tations, the group with good
housing, food, entertainment fa-
cilities, and normal duty hours
indicated a significantly lower
level of individual motivatiol
and group morale than the
group operating under the more
difficult conditions! Obviously,
exposure to cold weather per se
did not have a deleterious effect
on motivation and morale. Ad-
ditionally, comfortable facilities
and normal working hours, in
themselves, did not produce
~ i   h motivation and morale.
What, then, produced the low
morale in the one group? It
appears that the major contrib-
uting factor was plain boredom,
lack of change in the day-to-day
activities. This group was as-
signed to Greenland for the sole
purpose of defending the Thule
area. They performed the same
duties day after day, and fre-
quently they were confined to
their unit areas for relatively
long periods. On the other hand,
the high morale group was as-
signed as a support unit to var-
ious scientific research studies
being conducted on or near the
Greenland ice cap. Their day-
to-day activities changed fre-
quently, both in the nature and
location of their work. This di-
versity of duties appears to have
been important in producing
high morale.
What should the COLDSPOT
lndings mean to aviators and
commanders of aviation field
units? Aviation support units
frequently are pretty well isolat-
ed with regard to their day-to-
day maneuverability and rou-
tine, especially in cold weather
areas. They may have very lit-
tle opportunity for change in
their operation. On the other
hand, aviators have greater mo-
bility and a wider range of
change in routine due to the
frequent changes in flying con-
ditions associated with cold
weather environments. There-
fore, if cold weather restrictions
are severe enough that the sup-
port personnel must stay in
camp day after day, then moti-
vation and morale problems
may crop up in aviation units.
It is important that the com-
mander of such a unit realize
that a lowering of motivation
and morale can easily occur as
a function of the relatively iso-
lated conditions under which
the support personnel must
work. It might be wise to sys-
tematically attempt to give
breaks in the routine for each
individual concerned. Leader-
ship is extremely important in
such a situation.
In some instances it is not pos-
si ble to provide breaks in the
routine. Selection and training
may help minimize some of the
difficulties. Unfortunately, little
information exists concerning
the extent to which interper-
sonal conflicts and irritations
are related to basic personality
traits of the individuals involved
and the extent to which they are
common to all individuals. It is
not known whether individual<::;
can be selected who will tolerate
this sort of environment more
readily than others or whether
individuals can be trained so
their attitudes do not bring them
into major conflict with their
Another point noted in
COLDSPOTwas that many non-
aviator commanders did not re-
alize the capabilities of aviation
in general and the limitations
that might be placed on these
capabilities during cold weather
operation. Therefore, the Army
Aviator has an educational func-
tion to perform, especially with
respect to cold weather oper-
ation. For example, unit com-
manders must realize that cold
weather necessitates certain
procedures, such as preheating
aircraft engines, that may sig-
nificantly alter the response
time of aviation units.
At the present time, we know
a great deal more about the pro-
cedures of operating aircraft in
cold weather than we do about
the human factors involved. Hu-
man factors research by organi-
zations similar to HumRRO, as
well as research by operational
field units, is of prime impor-
tance in the effective operation
of aircraft and aviation units in
cold weather environments.
Cairns AAF is the Army's most completely
instrumented airfield
WACs now assist in the operation of flight
dispatch desks and towers
New aprons give Hanchey AAF, world's
largest heliport, 450,000 sq. yds. of pavement
The $260,000 NCO club under construction
will be one of the Army's finest
ORT RUCKER, Ala., is one of the Army's
criterion. Since the master building plan was first c
type construction at the U. S. Army Aviation Center. A
building program is complete.
Of the $51 million already spent, $25 million was 1
the post 1,528 permanent quarters. The other $26 milli
and roads.
The FY 1963 building program included two batta
complex area; two academic classroom buildings tai
with cafeteria, gymnasium, ·and auditorium; twv .J-m
of Fort Rucker; and additional aprons at Hanchey - ::E
Approved for FY 1964 are two hangars with sh a
repacking building on the main post, three
AAF. Also planned is a 75-bed hospital whi
Medical Division. The new hospital will ;
Planned for FY 1965 are eight more a
pacity flight instructor building, a new po
for the temporary structure housing the co:
Two golf courses afford recreation and provide
emergency landing areas
lllustrating the expansion of Army Aviation
are these Caribou lined up at Cairns AAF
at Rucker
installations, if construction can be used as a
::eived in 1956, $51 million has been spent for permanent
her $50 million will be spent for construction before the
Capehart officer and EM family type housing. This gave
was spent for permanent buildings, hangars, airfields,
1. headquarters and classroom buildings in the barracks
19   each; an elementary school complete
BL • .:>; a large stage field located about 15 miles south
b .ng rooms to be built at Hanchey AAF, a parachute
·man BOQs, and a trainer building at Shell
will include all the clinics and the Aviation
located just east of the present facility.
femic classroom buildings, a 314-man ca-
headquarters building, and a replacement
Shell AAF tower is Fort Rucker's busiest,
handling 390,858 takeoffs and landings in FY 63
Modern academic buildings furnish functional,
up-to-date classrooms for instruction
New headquarters and classroom buildings
have been added to the barracks complex area
Shell AAF near Enterprise, Ala., is the home
of primary fixed wing training
UH-ls continue to arrive to support the
increased pilot training program
Beautiful Lake .Lodge is a branch of the Fort
Rucker Officers' Open Mess
Light Aircraft
CE IS FINE for skaters, but it
can be hard on airplanes and
even harder on the pilots.
Both external icing and in-
ternal carburetor system icing
can seriously affect aircraft per-
formance. Failure to detect and
combat these conditions results
in many accidents and critical
incidents every winter.
Ice accumulation can be slow
or dangerously rapid, depending
upon the moisture content and
temperature of the air. External
icing is most probable when fly-
ing in air with visible moisture
(clouds, drizzle, rain or wet
snow) and at temperatures from
32 to 20 degrees Fahrenheit.
However, it also can occur in
temperatures as low as minus 30
Ice is particularly hazardous
when permitted to accumulate
on or in the wing and tail sur-
faces, propeller, pitot or static air
pressure sources, and carburetor.
The first sign of wing ice is a
thin ribbon along the leading
edge which gradually builds for-
ward into the airstream and
vertically toward the top and
bottom surfaces of the wing.
Since the wing is carefully de-
signed to permit a smooth flow
of air over its surfaces, any
change in the leading edge dis-
rupts the airflow and reduces the
Reprinted from Flight Safety
Foundation, Inc. , Pilots Safety
Exchange Bulletin 63-108/ 109,
September-October 1963.
available lift while increasing the
drag force acting upon the wing.
It is not the weight of the ice,
however, but the shape that pre-
sents the hazard. The blunter the
ice formation, the more the air-
flow is disrupted. The resulting
decrease in lift and increase in
drag can force an airplane to
make an emergency landing.
Pilots also should bear in mind
that even a small amount of wing
ice will increase the stall speed
of light airplanes. This is par-
ticularly critical in approach and
landing situations.
Ice on the tail assembly dis-
rupts the airflow, just as it does
on the wings. An early indica-
tion of ice on these surfaces may
be a tendency of the tail to
swing, or possibly a vibration
that on some aircraft can be-
come heavy enough to cause
structural failure. Ice formation
also can jam flight control sur-
faces on both the wings and tail.
An accumulation of ice on
propeller surfaces changes the
shape of the blades and sharply
reduces propeller efficiency. As
ice forms on the propeller, more
power goes into overcoming the
increased drag of the blades and
less into the thrust necessary to
maintain flying speed. If this
condition is permitted to go un-
checked, the results can be dis-
Freezing of the outside pitot
and static air pressure sources
will change the pressure trans-
mitted to the airspeed, altitude,
and rate-of-climb instruments
and cause incorrect readings.
Outside venturi units, which are
not located within the engine's
exhaust gases, also are very sus-
ceptible to icing and can result
in erroneous altitude and direc-
tion indications. Either condition
can seriously imperil aircraft
Carburetor icing is an ex-
tremely serious problem because
it can result in a critical power
loss. It has the same effect as
slowly closing the throttle-it
cuts down the amount of fuel
mixture reaching the cylinders.
Unlike external icing, carbu-
retor icing does not depend on
visible moisture in the atmos-
phere or on freezing tempera-
tures. It is most probable at
temperatures between 40 and 60
degrees but can occur at temper-
atures as high as 90 degrees. The
temperature range and the de-
gree to which a carburetor is
subject to icing depends on its
particular design and installa-
tion. Pilots should refer to the
airplane manufacturer's manual
on the operation of the engine
for detailed information on cop-
ing with carburetor icing.
Proper de-icing equipment and
procedures will help pilots to
combat icing in critical areas.
Temporary protection of exter-
nal surfaces also may be obtained
by application of a commercial
Continued on page 29
D ECENTLY WE questioned
1. \.. Maj James E. Hertzog,
Chief of Aeromedical Education
and Training, U. S. Army Hos-
pital, Fort Rucker, Ala., on the
subject of cold weather injuries.
It went like this:
Doctor, I'd like to talk about
cold weather injuries and the
things that happen to men
caught out in the cold wastelands
of the Far North.
Why go way up there to find
cold weather injuries? Let's stay
close to Fort Rucker and talk
about the injuries we have down
here in the Third Army area.
You mean we have cold inju-
ries down here in the Sunny
We sure do. As a matter of
fact, it is possible to have cold
injuries in all Army areas of the
United States. Here in the Third
Army area we had 75 men
hospitalized or confined to quar-
ters last year because of cold in-
juries. Last year cold injuries
in this Army area alone cost the
· ·
11, lone
Army some $178,777.
What are the different kinds of
cold injuries?
The three most common are
hypothermia, frostbite, and
trench (immersion) foot. When
the en tire body is exposed to
cold to the point that vital func-
tions cease, it is called hypother-
mia. Frostbite is local tissue
death from exposure to cold be-
low freezing. Trench (or im-
mersion) foot is local tissue
death from exposure to cold
above the freezing temperature.
What type is experienced most
often by aviation personnel?
Minor frostbite. Like sunburn,
frostbite can be prevented and is
usually the result of negligence.
In most cases it is considered a
non-line-of-duty injury. So the
usual result is that personnel do
not report minor frostbite injury.
A re some people more suscep-
tible to cold injury than others?
No. However, a man who has
never experienced extreme cold
is not as aware of the danger as
is someone who has lived with
it. He is more likely to be care-
less and get bit. Each person has
a cold tolerance upon which his
ability to withstand cold de-
Part of this tolerance is due to
the fat that lies just below the
skin. The greater the thickness
of this fat, the greater the insula-
tion against heat loss. This is one
of the few advantages a fat man
has over a thin one.
The most serious cold injury
we had in the Third Army last
year was a case of frostbite re-
ceived by an officer from Fort
Benning on a tactical problem in
the foothills of the Alleghenies
in North Georgia. When his unit
arrived, the temperature was
over 40°. A cold front moved in
unexpectedly and in 24 hours the
temperature dropped to 6° be-
The lieutenant had a history
of cold injury and was admitted
to the hospital with frostbite of
the nose, left ear, and both hands
and feet (see photos).
In iuries
DECENTLY WE questioned
.1 \.. Maj James E. Hertzog,
Chief of Aeromedical Education
and Training, U. S. Army Hos-
pital, Fort Rucker, Ala., on the
subject of cold weather injuries.
It went like this:
Doctor, I'd like to talk about
cold weather injuries and the
things that happen to men
caught out in the cold wastelands
of the Far North.
Why go way up there to find
cold weather injuries? Let's stay
close to Fort Rucker and talk
about the injuries we have down
here in the Third Army area.
You mean we have cold inju-
ries down here in the Sunny
We sure do. As a matter of
fact, it is possible to have cold
injuries in all Army areas of the
United States. Here in the Third
Army area we had 75 men
hospitalized or confined to quar-
ters last year because of cold in-
juries. Last year cold injuries
in this Army area alone cost the
Army some $178,777.
What are the different kinds of
cold injuries?
The three most common are
hypothermia, frostbite, and
trench (immersion) foot . When
the entire body is exposed to
cold to the point that vital func-
tions cease, it is called hypother-
mia. Frostbite is local tissue
death from exposure to cold be-
low freezing. Trench (or im-
mersion) foot is local tissue
death from exposure to cold
above the freezing temperature.
What type is expe7'ienced most
often by aviation personnel?
Minor frostbite. Like sunburn,
frostbite can be prevented and is
usually the result of negligence.
In most cases it is considered a
non-line-of-duty injury. So the
usual result is that personnel do
not report minor frostbite injury.
Are some people more suscep-
tible to cold injury than others?
No. However, a man who has
never experienced extreme cold
is not as aware of the danger as

is someone who has lived with
it. He is more likely to be care-
less and get bit. Each person has
a cold tolerance upon which his
ability to withstand cold de-
Part of this tolerance is due to
the fat that lies just below the
skin. The greater the thickness
of this fat, the greater the insula-
tion against heat loss. This is one
of the few advantages a fat man
has over a thin one.
The most serious cold injury
we had in the Third Army last
year was a case of frostbite re-
ceived by an officer from Fort
Benning on a tactical problem in
the foothills of the Alleghenies
in North Georgia. When his unit
arrived, the temperature was
over 40 °. A cold front moved in
unexpectedly and in 24 hours the
temperature dropped to 6° be-
The lieutenant had a history
of cold injury and was admitted
to the hospital with frostbite of
the nose, left ear, and both hands
and feet (see photos) .
Is there such a thing as im-
munity to frostbite?
No. In fact, once you have
suffered frostbite you become
less tolerant to the cold. Your
susceptibility to cold injury fol-
lowing extreme exposure is
greatly increased.
And where you live has no
effect upon your cold tolerance?
That's right. However, you do
become acclimatized after two
or three weeks in any particular
Ever notice how the first cold
snap of the year worries people?
After months of hot weather
they are not acclimatized to cold.
The first 40
day of fall feels
much colder than the last 40°
day in spring.
Doctor, suppose you are
caught out in the cold, what can
you do to prevent cold injury?
Well, you can't do much if you
are not prepared. A pretty girl in
a bathing suit can't keep warm
in a snowstorm no matter how
hard she tries.
It's pretty hard for an aviator
in an area of relatively mild win-
ter weather to envision what he
should wear in 4-foot snowdrifts
and a-20° temperature. Yet,
that is exactly what must be
In some parts of the Southwest
you can be in a desert area with
90° heat and in 10 minutes be in
an area of extreme cold. All who
board a military aircraft should
take along a minimum of per-
sonal gear to assure survival un-
der the most severe conditions
that could be encountered en
Now if I were out in the cold
and unprepared for it, I think
the first thing I would do is to
get out of the wind. The chill
factor, at any temperature, is in
proportion to the wind. A rule
of thumb is a 30-second exposure
in - 30
temperature will cause
frostbite in 30 seconds. So shel-
ter from the wind is very impor-
Then 1'd try building a fire to
warm by. Warm the extremities
of your body but, of course, don't
overdo it. Even the smallest fire
will help. I know of one soldier
who put a candle in a tin can
and warmed his hands and feet
enough to prevent cold injury.
And above all stay dry. Don't
even work up a sweat. If you do
get wet or your clothes become
damp, the first order of the day
is to get dry.
If you feel you are suffering
any of the three cold injuries
you mentioned, what should you
do until you get to a doctor?
Someone suffering from hypo-
thermia should be rewarmed im-
mediately if he is to survive. He
should be exposed to tempera-
tures of about 120
F. This may
be accomplished by using
warmed water (feels warm to
the skin on forearm) or a
warmed room. In the case of
hypothermia, the patient is usu-
ally not able to care for himself
and must be assisted.
But in the case of frostbite the
patient can help himself. As
quickly as possible he should re-
warm the affected part to about
90°-104°. This can be done in
front of a fire or by placing the
injured extremity against or be-
tween other parts of the body.
In the case of trench foot, re-
warm the injured part to 70°-
80°. Water may be used here,
and it should feel slightly cool to
the forearm. After warming,
protect the injured part with dry
dressing and treat the patient as
a litter case.
I noticed that you said to re-
warm a frostbitten part as
quickly as possible. I have al-
ways been told to gradually thaw
the frostbitten part with snow or
cold water.
That old theory is obsolete and
is more injurious than helpful.
Up to now we've talked about
Continued from page 26
anti-ice preparation prior to
The best guarantee of safe
winter flying, however, is for
pilots to avoid conditions con-
ducive to icing whenever possi-
ble. The U. S. Weather Bureau's
forecasts and reports of icing
conditions are invaluable aids
here. These conditions are de-
fined by the Weather Bureau as
.. Light icing-An accumulation
r JANUARY 1964
the extreme cases of cold injury.
What is the effect upon an avia-
tor if he fails to dress properly
while flying?
of ice which can be disposed of
by operating de-icing equipment
and which presents no serious
Moderate icing-De-icing pro-
cedures provide marginal protec-
tion. The ice continues to ac-
cumulate but not at a rate fast
enough to affect the safety of
flight unless it continues over an
extended period of time.
Heavy icing-Ice continues to
form despite de-icing procedures.
It is sufficiently serious to cause
The loss of heat by radiation
can have a dangerous effect upon
the body, especially to the avia-
tor. Humans seem to lose their
skill in direct proportion to the
coldness of their body. A cold
aviator takes longer to react to
external stimuli.
Also, you must remember that
aviators depend to great extent
upon their sense of touch in the
adjustment of instruments and
maneuvering the aircraft. When
his hands are cold, the aviator
loses a great deal of this sense of
touch and therefore becomes less
My advice is to dress for the
temperature expected inside the
cockpit and to carry along
enough clothes to take care of
an emergency en route. ......
marked alteration in speed and
altitude and would seriously af-
fect the safety of flight.
Pilots should steer clear of
heavy and moderate icing condi-
tions and proceed with caution
into areas where light to mod-
erate icing is forecast. If heavy
icing is encountered unexpect-
edly or unavoidably, prompt ac-
tion should be taken to get into
more favorable flying weather.
To delay such evasive action is
to court disaster. ...,.
The captain flying the CH-21
over the Vietnamese jungle had
given the I-minute warning. He
didn't hear the jumpmaster's
"Go" 60 seconds later; but as the
Shawnee passed over the drop
zone he was certain it had been
given. He was conscious of every
vibration and movement of his
aircraft and knew instan tly
when the troops began moving
through the forward door.
While holding the aircraft
steady at 40 knots, he glanced
back over his right shoulder and
caught a glimpse of the last
parachutist leaving the ,aircraft.
Below the flight of helicopters,
scores of Vietnamese troops
drifted down toward a fortified
village which a company of Viet
Cong troops was attacking.
Army escort helicopters re-
turned fire on the enemy in
conjunction with local security
forces from the village to protect
the descending parachutists. Be-
fore the flight of helicopters was
out of the area the parachutists
had joined the fight and the Viet
Cong was withdrawing in defeat.
This type of operation is only
one of many ways in which
Army Aviation supports the
ground commander. But it is
also one of the most effective,
Jump from to
Army Aircraft
In the August 1963 DIGEST, the article ((Jumping from Army
Aircraft" and accompanying photographs contained jump techniques
not in accordance with TM 57-220. To rectify any impression of
sanctioning unauthorized procedures, we publish the following
article which is in accordance with TM 57-220.
especially when parachutists
must be hurriedly deployed
within the combat zone. The
ground commander can depend
on immediate responsiveness
from Army Aviators and aircraft
under his eommand.
If Army to con-
tinue to be depended on, it must
continue to offer effective and
efficient support. Understanding
the techniques of jumping from
Army aircraft will help achieve
this goal.
The Army Aviator and the
jumpmaster must work together
as a team. Before the flight the
jumpmaster and aviator discuss
the drop zone location and the
type of approach pattern; ex-
change information concerning
altitudes, speeds, winds; and
determine the air release point.
The pilot preflights his air-
craft, and with the jumpmaster,
makes sure the aircraft is prop-
erly prepared for jumping. The
jumpmaster inspects the para-
chutists and their equipment and
holds a final briefing before giv-
ing the command to board the
During the flight the jump-
master is in constant commu-
nication with the pilot or crew-
chief on the progress of the
flight. He is also responsible for
the conduct and safety of his
troops during the flight.
The pilot gives the jumpmaster
20-minute, 4-minute (6-minute
in CH-34 and CH-37) and 1-
minute warnings of the approach
to the drop zone and informs him
when the aircraft is at jump
speed and altitude. The jump-
master organizes the parachut-
ists for the jump and when over
the release point gives the
command to "go." In tactical
units the jumpmaster usually
jumps with the troops. During
parachute qualification training
he normally does not.
Figure 1
Army aircraft used in jump-
ing troops include the U -6A,
U-IA, CV-2B, UH-19, CH-21,
UH-l, CH-34, CH-37 and CH-
47 A. Before discussing jump
procedures from these aircraft,
it should be pointed out that per-
sonnel cannot safely parachute
from hovering helicopters be-
cause of the downwash which
interferes with the canopy and/
or static line. To accomplish
jumps, forward speed must be
maintained; however, if the
speed is. excessive the para-
chutist may be thrown into aft
sections of the helicopter. There-
fore, minimum and maximum
helicopter jump speeds are
stated in TM 57-220. According
to para. 98, if not otherwise spec-
ified, helicopters should slow to
50-70 knots.
V-6A Beaver: This aircraft
carries up to four parachutists.
The rear seats. are removed and
the troops sit on the floor facing .
each other. At the I-minute
warning the first man swings his
legs out the port door and rests
his feet on the step. Ten seconds
from drop time he leans   o r ~
ward, assuming the position
shown in figure 1. (All figures
illustrate door positions only.
Figure 2
The aircraft have not been taped
or padded for jumping.) Upon
jumping he pushes straight out.
The other jumpers do not use
the step; they sit in the door
with their hands grasping the
edge of the floor (figure 2). To
exit, they push off with their
hands. (The first jumper may
also use this procedure if
desired.) when the jumpers have
exited the copilot or safety NCO
recovers the static lines. Only
the port door is used for jump-
ing, and because of cramped
space only experienced para-
chutists jump from the U-6A.
U-1A Otter: Up to five para-
chutists may be jumped from
the U-IA. They sit in the
standard seats-two on the port
side and the rest starboard. U p-
on command, the parachutists
secure their seats in the "up"
position, hook up and sit on the
floor facing the port side. One
minute out, the first jumper sits
in the door with his feet outside
and his hands. grasping the door
sill (figure 3). Upon leaving he
pushes up and out. The others
exit in the same manner. Only
the port door is used for jump-
CV-2B Caribou: The CV-2B
has now received final jump
Figure 3
clearance. It will accommodate
24 parachutists who may exit
from either of the side doors or
off the back ramp (figure 4).
Simultaneous exits are not
made while jumping from the
side doors. Parachutist No. 1
jumps from the starboard door;
then No. 2 leaves through the
port door. The rest of the jump-
ers alternate exits at I-second
When exiting off the aft ramp,
the odd-numbered men hook up
and stand one behind the other
on the starboard side. Even num-
bers are to the port side, slightly
to the rear of the odd numbered
jumpers. No.1 exits first, taking
3 steps down the ramp, which
has been inclined 15 degrees
below the horizontal. No. 2 goes
next the same way and the re-
mainder follow (alternating).
UH-19 Chickasaw: Up to five
parachutists are carried in this
aircraft. The jumper sits in cargo
door (figure 5), similar to the
position used in the Otter. He
exits straight outward by push-
ing down and outward with his
hands, thus clearing the right
rear wheel by about 4 feet.
CH-21 Shawnee: Ten para-
chutists are the maximum to be
jumped in one stick from the
Figure 4
Figure 5
CH-21. If allowable cargo load
permits, 12 parachutists may be
jumped in two or more smaller
sticks in multiple passes over the
drop zone. Troops are seated on
both sides of the helicopter and
upon command secure their seats
in the "up" position. Troops exit
out of the small forward door.
The jumper must keep the upper
part of his body straight, but
still crouch enough to allow at
least a 2-inch clearance between
his helmet and the top of
the door (figure 6). He jumps
Figure 6
straight out and then assumes a
normal body position. Troops
exit only from the right front
CH-34 Choctaw: The CH-34
carries up to 10 parachutists. The
jumper sits in the door with his
feet outside and his hands grasp
the door sill (figure 7). He exits
upward and outward. All para-
chutists exit in a similar manner.
CH-37 Mojave: Twenty-three
parachutists are the maximum
that can jump in one group.
Even-numbered jumpers sit on
the port side; they stand up and
hook up prior to the odd-num-
bered jumpers on the starboard
side. While preparing to exit the
jumper stands in a normal posi-
tion in the door. Upon command
he makes a normal exit.
CH-47A Chinook: Procedures
for jumping from the Chinook
will be included in the next
revision of TM 57-220.
UH-1A/ B Iroquois: Up to five
can jump from the A or B model
Iroquois. Parachutists sit on the
floor until the aircraft is 30 sec-
onds from the drop zone. Then,
the No. 1 jumper centers himself
in the right cargo door with both
feet placed firmly on the landing
skid and both hands (palms
down) on the floor alongside his
Figure 7
thighs (see figure 8). He turns
his head to his left, toward the
jumpmaster. When jumping he
pushes up and out with both
hands. The others follow in
similar fashion. Jump proce-
dures for the UH-1D also have
been approved and will be
published in the next revision of
TM 57-220.
To achieve the highest degree
of safety in jumping from Army
aircraft, it is mandatory to es-
tablish and abide by standard
procedures that have been thor-
oughly evaluated. When an
individual feels he has an im-
proved jump procedure, he
should forward his recommenda-
tions to the U. S. Army Infantry
School, Fort Benning, Ga. Such
recommendations are welcomed,
and will be thoroughly evaluated
and if appropriate adopted as
standard techniques. TM 57-220
is now under revision. One of the
changes anticipated is standard-
ization of the 6-minute warning
for all aircraft.
The Army Aviator plays a key
role in the successful employ-
ment of parachutists. Together,
the Army Aviator and the para-
chutist provide the Army with a
powerful "one-two" punch.
Figure 8
Gerard M. Bruggink
HE MONOTONY of your flight is shattered
by an explosion and a glaring red light on the
panel. What 'are you going to do, besides making
the obvious conclusion that your hearing and eye-
sight, and the bulb in the warning light are in fine
working order?
The system that produced you expects you to
deal with this and any other emergency as fol-
1. Assess the nature and seriousness of the
emergency. (Time available may vary from a split
second to a few hours.)
2. Decide on the best course of action, based on
your total knowledge of the aircraft and your
evaluation of the circumstances. (Choices may
vary between immediate ejection, bailout, or
crash landing, and continuation of the mission
rith certain precautions.)
3. Concentrate on the execution of your plan
with due regard for the safety of the airplane and
its occupants. (Your expert knowledge is con-
sidered a warranty against confusion, panic, and
petrified crew members.)
Sounds like too big an order? If you were not
judged capable of dealing with every possible con-
tingency, somebody else would occupy your seat.
Don't underestimate your own ability and respon-
sibility in an emergency situation. You may fall
in the hands of an investigation board that needs
as many days as you had seconds to analyze your
predicament. From behind a barricade of cigar
smoke and technical manuals, these gentlemen
will question your actions to the point that you
Mr. Bruggink is an air safety   with
the Investigation Division of USABAAR.
feel like screaming: "I'm not the d-- aircraft
designer. Ask the people who sold us that bill of
Let's savor this unpopular situation for a mo-
ment: a pilot just back from the twilight zone,
being grilled by a board that works on the flatter-
ing assumption that the pilot is an expert who can
rationalize his actions without any need for em-
barrassment. The pilot is concerned about his
reputation, while the board members 'are trying
to determine if the pilot's experience forms a
basis for improvements in training, procedures,
or design. Unfortunately, many pilots go on the
defensive when confronted-in their own analy-
sis of the events-with gaps in their knowledge
and try to justify their actions in the light of
what they did know, rather than what they
should have known at the time.
Although a board inquisition will convince any
pilot, for life, of the need to prepare himself for
emergencies while there is time, it is a question-
able privilege, especially when you may not be
around to play the main role. The following dis-
cussion is intended to stimulate the proper atti-
tude towards emergencies the painless way, by
provoking you to be your own inquisitor while
everything's still in the green.
Our interest in emergencies is, or rather should
be, based on their accident potential. When the
accident potential of an unusual situation is as
clear as daylight, there is seldom a delay in crew
response. In too many cases, however, pilots do
not recognize an emergency situation or its seri-
ousness until they are faced with the inevitable;
they lose initiative while underestimating or
ignoring the symptoms of trouble. We may have
to do here with an "it can't-happen-to-me" atti-
tude which is a reflection of modern society's
tendency to ignore and avoid the unpleasant. A
level-headed pilot is not an escapist; he considers
as an emergency ANY UNPLANNED COMBI-
There is a popular belief that any accident pre-
ceded by an emergency situation automatically
relieves the pilot from all responsibility. If this
were true, we would be wasting our time trying
to prepare pilots for emergencies. Actually, the
relationship between emergencies and accidents
is similar to that between love and offspring; you
can have one without the other, depending on the
attitude and the skill of the personnel involved.
The role played by the pilot in the emergency /
accident relationship can best be explained by a
typical example: engine failure on takeoff.
A U-1A took off from a 5,000-foot runway into
a 15-25 mph wind. After becoming airborne, the
engine began to malfunction. The pilot started a
left-hand, downwind turn with partial power
when about 200 feet above the terrain. During
the turn the engine stopped completely. The air-
craft settled to the ground at a flight path and
impact angle of about 30°. Upon first impact the
landing gear collapsed and the aircraft burst into
flames. The six occupants survived.
According to the ,aocident report the main ac-
cident cause factors were engine failure and un-
evenness of the terrain. Some relevant statements
from the crew members, as reported by the first
witnesses to arrive at the scene, give a different
impression: "I tried to pull it up to get more alti-
tude but it just wouldn't climb" (pilot); "We
should have kept it into the wind" (copilot).
Depending on the situation and the pilot's re-
action, this type of an emergency can result in:
1. A forced landing without damage (not an
accident) .
2. A forced landing with damage due solely to
the unsuitability of the available terrain (an ac-
cident -attributed to engine failure only).
3. An un-controlled crash due to poor pilot
technique (an accident attributed to engine fail-
ure as well as pilot technique).
The classification of this takeoff accident is left
to the reader's judgment. The thing to remember
is that an emergency does not become an accident
until the aircraft sustains damage. The pilot's
aotions under these circumstances must be judged
from the standpoint: What could he reasonably
be expected to know and to do?
Theoretically, a pilot has to be prepared for at
least as many types of emergencies as there are
components in an aircraft. In practice, this pre-
sents a highly optimistic point of view; if our
emergencies were caused by hardware malfunc-
tions only, we could stop worrying about the in-
ventiveness of pilots in creating emergencies. To
stay within the scope and purpose of this discus-
sion, emergencies will be broken down into three
:ategories: standard, nonstandard, and self-im-
Acknowledging the existence of standard emer-
gencies is not a sick joke; it is a reference to the
"standardized" emergency instructions in our op-
erator manuals. There are pilots who judge the
reliability of an airplane by the number of these
red pages, on the ,assumption tha't they reflect the
manufacturer's lack of confidence in his product.
A more prudent attitude would be to assume that
these "canned" emergency procedures reflect the
manufacturer's pessimism concerning the pilot's
knowledge of his aircraft.
It is not sufficient to pass a multiple-choice
exam on the handbook, including emergencies,
and to proceed from there on with the smugness
and self-assurance of a hood who just discovered
the Fifth Amendment. Emergencies do not occur
in a classroom atmosphere. Many of them are up-
setting, and unless the pilot has conditioned him-
self through knowledge and mental discipline to
eact properly under stress, he may not regain
is composure in time.
How well do we prepare our pilots for stand-
ard emergencies? As long as they are in training
status, we do a conscientious job; we keep them
on the ball by cutting the power 011 them with
merciless irregularity 'and by demanding a knowl-
edge of the aircraft that approaches that of the
designer. But what happens after they get their
wings and enjoy a degree of independence not
shared by their colleagues in the other services?
We allow them to develop the attitude that the
end of their formal training is the end of the
learning process, as evidenced by the following
Shortly after a normal takeoff, a U -8 pilot ex-
perienced difficulties as the result of a mechanical
failure in the gear retraction and extension sys-
tem. This was a "standard" emergency, provided
for in the handbook with a simple, well illus-
trated, 4-step procedure to extend and lock the
gear. For about 1 hour and 40 minutes the crew
tried to get three in the green, assisted by the
combined knowledge of two U-8 instructors in
the tower. Finally the aircraft was landed on a
foamed runway with unsafe gear indications; the
ose gear promptly collapsed.
Standard emergency, engine failure
The cause of this embarrassing mishap? Every-
body assumed that the pilot had properly ex-
ecuted the emergency gear extension procedures.
As it turned out, he had failed to take two of the
four required steps (pulling a circuit breaker and
disengaging a clutch).
There is no need to expose other red faces in
our ranks. Let it suffice to say that it's not always
the inexperienced pilot who allows emergencies
to turn into accidents for such poor reasons as
failure to maintain airspeed, to drop heavy exter-
nal stores, or to select the fullest fuel tank after
an engine quits. It appears that one of the great-
est hazards for the younger pilot is not the equip-
ment he is flying; it may be the arrogant attitude
of those senior colleagues who build an image of
operational prowess on disregard for established
procedures, school methods, and self-discipline.
What can you do about emergencies that are
not covered in the book? This question in itself
is part of the proper response to nonstandard
emergencies in that it implies acceptance of the
fact that not every form of airborne crisis can be
pre-solved. Without this acceptance the pilot
would not be mentally prepared to face the chal-
lenge of nonstandard trouble.
A Mohawk pilot on a night photographic mis-
sion experienced complete loss of control re-
sponse, subsequent to a violent explosion some-
where behind him. His immediate reaction was
to instruct the copilot to eject, followed by his
own ejection. He landed a few seconds after the
aircraft exploded on the ground, with the copilot
still in it.
In analyzing this accident, the following factors
must be considered:
1. The pilot had no way of knowing that the
explosion of a flare pod had severed the empen-
nage from the fuselage.
2. The urgency of the situation and the noise
level made it impossible for the pilot to realize
that the intercom system, and all other electrical
systems, had been disabled by the explosion.
The pilot's instinctive and proper reaction to
abandon the aircraft was based on two clues: the
explosion and loss of elevator control. The emer-
gency in this case was part of the accident, since
there was no transition period between the two
and no alternative but ejection. The copilot's fail-
ure to save himself can be attributed only to his
non-awareness of the pilot's order to eject and
the pilot's ejection.
This accident, and another similar to it, led to
definite improvements in the reliability of flare
operations and the realization of the need for a
foolproof ejection signal between crew members.
In the meantime, the best preparation for emer-
gencies of this type is familiarity with the experi-
ences of somebody who lived through one.
Much of our most valuable experience is not
shared, and therefore wasted, because we under-
estimate the teaching potential of unusual emer-
gencies that leave crew and aircraft unscratched.
A fine exception is the following incident that
was reported in detail by a crew that understood
its responsibilities toward fellow pilots.
A Mohawk cruising at 1,350 feet above the ter-
rain at an lAS of 185 knots suddenly pitched up
to about a 45° nose-high attitude. The pilot re-
duced power, rolled in full forward trim, and re-
gained control of the aircraft with the assistance
of the copilot. After an uneventful landing, it was
discovered that the absence of one half-inch
cotter pin in the left elevator trim tab push rod
had resulted in loss of a bolt and disconnection of
the left trim tab. With half of the effective nose-
down trim suddenly gone, a violent pitchup was
unavoidable. It was the crew members' opinion
that, if one of them had not had his hand on the
stick when the emergency occurred, ejection
might have been unavoidable. Their instinctive
realization that the circumstances warranted a
delay of the push-button exit probably saved the
Under the heading of nonstandard emergencies,
we must also mention so-called false emergencies.
Profitable efforts to assist the pilot in timely rec-
ognition of an emergency situation have resulted
in the development of warning systems that,
sometimes, cause more panic than confidence. We
could probably equip another Air Assault Divi-
sion with the cost of the aircraft lost by other
services as a result of false fire warning lights.
With the introduction of similar systems in ou
aircraft, it behooves us to understand their opera-
The pilot of a UH-ID, cruising at 1,700 feet
above the terrain, did not waste any time going
into autorotation when the low rpm warning sys-
tem suddenly began to function (a red light on
the panel and an urgent beep in the ear phones).
When he noticed that engine rpm (N-2) had
dropped to zero, he assumed engine failure and
made preparations for a forced landing. Attempts
to restart the engine appeared to be unsuccessful,
judging by the lack of reaction of the N-2 needle.
The forced landing resulted in substantial damage
to the aircraft, but none of the six occupants were
What happened in this case was that the engine
(N-2) tach generator failed. This generator con-
trols the indications of the N-2 needle and the
triggering of the low rpm warning system. Fail-
ure of this lowly component has to result in a
rapid drop to zero of the N-2 indication and acti-
vation of the warning system. It is disappointing,
to say the least, that the other engine instruments
(N-l, torque, EGT, etc.) went unnoticed by the
crew. During the 50 seconds available betwee
first warning and touchdown their attention wa
focused exclusively on the N-2 needle. Although
the pilot's initial reaction was in accordance with
the purpose of the warning system, it is interest-
ing to speculate on what might have happened
had he been familiar with its principle of oper-
ation. In all fairness we must add, however, that
the pilot's handbook does not give this informa-
tion. (Note: The UH-ID handbook is not the
only derelict in this respect. One of our helicopter
manuals states cheerfully that tail rotor failure is
the most critical inflight emergency, followed by
the revelation that "the first and most important
step is to regain directionaI' control." No hint as
to how this can be accomplished except a non-
committal: "The pilot will determine the type of
descent and landing.") Although a pilot lives "by
the gauges" he should be enough of a skeptic to
cross-reference any erratic instrument indication
against corroborating evidence, if there is time.
He should realize, for instance, that the engine
rpm needle cannot wildly fluctuate or suddenly
drop to zero without clear-cut side effects, unless
the instrument is defective. The same applies to
manifold pressure, torque meter, gas producer,
and main rotor rpm.
Temperature instruments are no problem, be-
cause a pilot knows instinctively that workin
temperatures don't fluctuate rapidly or drop to
ero. Due to the simplicity of their design, their
clilure rate is low and failure will seldom be to-
wards the "high" side. Probably more important
than the actual reading of a temperature instru-
ment is its trend, under otherwise normal con-
ditions. An alert pilot, for instance, knows that he
should expect a drop in cylinder head and oil
temperature after levelling off from a climb. After
the temperatures have stabilized, and ·after he has
adjusted the mixture, he'll closely monitor the
same instruments for any trend indicating too
lean a mixture.
Although most engine failures have an unmis-
takable way of announcing themselves, one type
may take the sightseeing pilot by surprise: engine
failure resulting from lack of lubrication. Oil pres-
sure and, in most cases, oil and cylinder head
temperature readings will give ample warning to
anybody who pays attention to them. The proper
reaction to a true indication of impending engine
trouble (this includes the chip detector warning
light) is to get the aircraft on the ground, with-
out undue haste, while power is still available.
So far, we have been discussing what may be
llled legitimate emergencies. The pilot plays no
role in their origination and his main concern
"hould be preparedness to tackle them. A third
:ype of emergency forms a class all by itself. To
avoid misunderstanding and to evoke the proper
connotation, we will call this the self-imposed,
rather than the illegitimate emergency. As the
name implies, this type is brought about by the
operator himself. No amount of emphasis on the
pilot's gallant behavior after the self-inflicted
emergency can camouflage this fact. Our files flow
over with examples.
An aviator, advanced in age and rank, but rela-
tively inexperienced, took off in an 0-1 with an
unsecured oil filler cap. After about one ,and one-
half hours, he noticed that the throttle had to be
advanced to maintain airspeed. Even when he had
to firewall the throttle he was not aware of any
unusual engine instrument indieations. Finally,
when his feet started getting hot he suspected
trouble, but by that time the glowing engine re-
sembled a nose cone upon re-entry and quit. The
pilot was commended for the execution of a
forced landing without damage. The engine was
A sarcastic reviewer of this mishap might sug-
gest that our pilots fly barefooted to make them
m.ore sensitive to laboring engines. The truth of
the matter is that this aviator did not realize that
engine instrument awareness is a basic means to
forestall serious emergencies. And he is not the
only one who got in tr.ouble because he did not
see the handwriting on the panel. Finesse in en-
gine handling has become a neglected part of our
training and is one of the reasons for the increas-
ing number of premature engine overhauls. En-
gine abuse is often an accumulative process, and
the man who finally ends up with the emergency
may be one of the few who are never guilty of
malpractices such as: tardiness in reducing take-
off power, especially rpm; overrevving; crude
mixture leaning methods; and imprudent use of
carburetor heat.
A favorite way to blunder into an emergency
Self-imposed emergency, cracked crankcase
is poor fuel management and cruise control. What
foll.oWS is one of the many variations on this
A U-9, on a pre-Christmas administrative flight,
ran out of fuel on a night IFR flight and was
force-landed at a cost of $158,000. Nobody was
hurt. The local investigation board attributed the
accident to iced-over fuel vent lines, resulting in
collapse of the fuel cells and siphoning of fuel past
the filler caps.
Review .of the pilot's statement showed that the
power settings he reported would have resulted
in an endurance of about 3 hours and 45 minutes.
Actually, the aircraft ran out of fuel after 3 hours
and 32 minutes.
Belatedly it was discovered that this aircraft
did have electrically heated vent lines and that
the fuel cells did not collapse. It was also dis-
covered that this crew, and many others, did not
realize that the fuel consumption in this aircraft
will vary between ,about 24 and 96 gallons per
hour, depending on power settings, altitude, tem-
perature, etc.
Some of our deadliest self-imposed emergencies
are the end result of years of substandard behav-
ior and slipshod methods. We have lost scores
of airplanes and colleagues in weather ,accidents
for the unforgiveable reason that they failed to
develop or maintain instrument flying skill.
Others, guided by a cocky "no sweat" motive,
invite emergencies by concessions regarding the
mechanical condition of the aircr·aft and failure
to recognize their own and the aircraft's limita-
In addition to the self-imposed emergency,
there is a built-in type. We are referring here to
design idiosyncrasies in the cockpit that induce
trouble. Examples: fuel selector valves that have
to be turned to the left to get the right tank and
vice versa (who said these stupidities ended with
WW II?); a stick grip trigger that controls the
transmitter in one aircraft and the guns in
another; a cargo sling release master switch, iden-
tical in appearence and located as close as possible
to the emergency fuel shut-off switch; nonstand-
ardization in the layout sequence of throttle, pro-
peller and mixture levers; and so on. Althougl
human engineering considerations, reportedly,
play a role in the design of our cockpits, there is
no guarantee against the presence of traps.
Awareness of these not-so-tender traps should be
part of the pilot's routine aircraft knowledge.
Finally, we have to consider the fall ability of
our best friend: the maintenance man. Although
we think we flatter him when we take the quality
of his work for granted, we may be doing him a
disservice. A thorough preflight by the pilot
shows the mechanic that he has to do with a
knowledgeable man whose "Ship's in fine shape"
is based on appreciation of good workmanship.
Crawling into the cockpit after a well-aimed kick
in the tires is an insult to responsible maintenance
personnel and deprives them of two important
morale factors: pride and motivation. In addition,
we may invite trouble.
The OH-23C has two positions for the hori-
zontal stabilizer. The drawings show the stabi-
lizer at its negative angle of incidence to offset
the nose-down tendency when litters are in-
stalled. An unnecessary accident occurred when
the aircraft was flown after the litters had
been removed, but without changing the stabi
lizer position: the pilot ran out of forward cycli
A typical example of a self-imposed emergency,
involving the pilot as well as maintenance per
so nne l.
A recent case of a U -6 that became unglued
during takeoff because the ailerons were rigged
in reverse needs no comment. It should be
obvious by now that the best way to handle self-
imposed emergencies is to avoid them.
The purpose of this morbid discussion, speckled
with the sad experiences of some of our col-
leagues, was to encourage the individual pilot to
take a close look at his own preparedness for
emergencies. Assuming that this has been ac-
complished, we can afford to clos.e with an opti-
mistic thought.
There is no need to spoil the enjoyment of
flying by constantly worrying about what may
happen and what to do when it happens. The
right-minded pilot knows the answers before he
ever leaves the ground; he keeps this knowledge
up-to-date and in dry storage, ready to be used
when the need arises, without making an obses-
sion of it. As it was said long ago, the best form
of optimism is to hope for the best but prepare
for the worst.  
free insurance
Your Weather Service
round-robin flight. Every-
thing had gone according
to schedule. Turbulence had
bounced the old bird around
considerably during the landing
at a remote strip. But supplies
were off-loaded so it would be
lighter for the takeoff, and the
Beaver was operating perfectly.
The engine checked out OK
during the runup and the take-
off seemed normal enough-un-
til the wheels left the ground.
Lieutenant Colonel C. M. Terry
Then it was apparent that some-
thing was wrong. It wasn't gain-
ing altitude, even with full
power, and it was rapidly ap-
proaching a hill dead ahead. As
a last resort, the pilot attempted
a low-level turn to avoid the
hill. But the low wing hit a tree
and the aircraft crashed.
This accident happened last
summer and the investigation
board concluded that the prob-
able cause was severe turbulence
and a strong downdraft. Since
a weather factor was involved,
a thorough investigation was
made to determine just what
weather information the crew
received before and during the
flight. This investigation proved
very revealing. First, it was dis-
covered that no request was
ever made for a weather forecast
for the strip area. In fact, the
DD Form 175 did not even indi-
cate the strip as a point of in-
tended landing.
Second, the 175 was not
Col Terry is Staff Weather
Officer, U. S. Army Aviation
signed by a forecaster and no
record could be found to indicate
the pilot ever received a weather
briefing, either in person or by
telephone. Unfortunately, we'll
never know why this pilot
didn't get a weather briefing. He
was also careless about wearing
shoulder harness. As a result, he
was thrown from the aircraft
during the cr"ash and killed.
Air Weather Service, com-
menting on this accident, said:
"We recognize that even if fore-
cast service had been requested,
it would not have guaranteed
that severe turbulence or down-
drafts would have been forecast.
Even if they were, the flight
might have been conducted in
the same manner. Weare con-
cerned in that weather service
was available and not used."
Though proper use of weather
service might not have pre-
vented this -accident, failure to
make full use of available
weather services can be a very
serious matter. Consider the
case of a CH-21 that crashed a
couple of years ago. It, too, was
on a routine flight,assisting in
a search for a missing civilian
The flight departed at 1245
EDT and made a passenger-re-
fueling stop at another airfield
75 miles away to pick up two
Civil Air Patrol members, who
were to act as scanners during
the search. After participating
in the search for 3 hours, the
pilot landed, off-loaded the CAP
members, refueled, and took off
for home. The aircraft crashed
at 1825 EDT in weather de-
scribed by the copilot as, ". . .
almost zero-zero, in fog and
drizzle." The pilot was killed
and the copilot and crewchief
sustained minor injuries.
Investigation revealed that
poor use was made of available
weather facilities and services.
The 6-hour flight was filed VFR
on a DD Form 1080, Local Flight
Clearance. Since forecast service
was not available at the depar-
ture airfield, the pilot accom-
plished a self-briefing by check-
ing the data from the FAA
teletype circuit. He made no at-
tempt to get a weather briefing
from a qualified forecaster by
telephone, and he made no in-
quiries about weather for the
remainder of the flight, except
to listen to a couple of weather
broadcasts on the VOR.
Several actions on the part of
the pilot might have prevented
this accident:
1. A collect call to the nearest
Air Weather Service Briefing
Advisory and Warning Service
station (in this case, located in
the same state) would have
alerted him to expect below
VFR conditions by the end of
the 6-hour flight. Some nearby
mountain stations were report-
ing IFR weather well before he
took off, and deteriorating
weather was forecast.
2. A check of en route and
destination weather during the
last passenger and refueling stop
would have informed him that
the reporting station nearest his
destination was already IFR,
with an indefinite ceiling of 200
feet and visibility 1/4 mile in
fog. And a lowering trend was
3. Observations and forecasts
available through inflight facili-
ties could have warned him of
the dangerous weather condi-
tions. It almost appears that this
pilot avoided finding out about
the weather for fear it would
prove to be IFR!
4. A quick 180 when he en-
countered IFR conditions would
have made it possible for him to
reach an alternate airfield, since
sever·al in the vicinity were still
reporting VFR at that time.
It's clearly evident that the
lack of proper respect for ad-
verse weather, and failure to
make use of available weather
services cost this aviator his life.
Before you ra tionalize this
problem away by thinking, "Iso-
lated case-doesn't mean any-
thing," or, "That couldn't hap-
pen to me," etc., you should
think about a recent study con-
ducted by USABAAR. They
found that 38 accidents, and
33 fatalities happened in IFR
weather during a 4-year period.
It is a significant fact that 37 of
those 38 accidents involved

flights with VFR flight plans. If
they don't accomplish anything
else, these statistics should
prove that it is unwise to at-
tempt VFR flights in marginal
weather conditions. And it
should be evident that careless-
ness, overconfidence, and poor
weather are a lethal combina-
A weather briefing on exist-
ing and forecast weather is an
essential part of any properly
planned flight. It's true that a
pilot can learn a great deal about
a flight by looking at
teletype data and forecasts. This
practice is recommended as an
excellent way to prepare to re-
ceive a briefing. But it should
never take the place of a brief-
There are several good reasons
why the weather briefing is es-
sential. First, AR 95-1 states
that all pilots, prior to takeoff
on any flight, will obtain the
most recent weather informa-
tion available and that a fore-
caster, if available, will be the
• ,#
source of this information.
When you sign a local flight
clearance, you certify that the
weather is forecast to remain
VFR for the   of your
flight. Can you be sure of this
without consulting a forecaster?
If you check the weather
yourself, there's a chance you
may overlook something impor-
tant, regardless of how thorough
a job you think you've done. The
worst weather conditions rarely
occur over reporting stations
and sequence reading does not
always provide a representative
picture. The forecaster is trained
to assimilate and interpret the
vast amount of available infor-
mation in such a way that he
can give you a weather picture
that is as accurate and complete
as possible.
Another thing to consider is
that changes in existing and
forecast weather can occur rap-
idly on occasion. If the fore-
caster has briefed you and
knows your flight is in progress,
he may be able to issue a "met"
watch advisory which would
alert you about a potentially
dangerous situation.
To ensure that briefing serv-
ice is readily available at all
locations in the United States,
Air Weather Service recently
increased the number of
Weather Briefing Advisory and
Warning Service (WBA WS)
stations from 7 to 26. The loca-
tions and telephone numbers for
these WBA WS are shown in
Jeppesen manuals and Flight In-
formation Publications (FLIP).
A collect call to the nearest
WBA WS will make it possible
for you to get a detailed weather
briefing. The service is free. All
it costs is a few minutes of your
The weather briefing, essen-
tial though it is, should not be
considered the final word.
Changes can and do occur. Oc-
casional forecast "busts" are
inevitable. The pilot who recog-
nizes that there are limitations
keeps himself abreast of changes
through the use of excellent in-
flight facilities provided for this
purpose. Among these services
are Flight Following Service,
continuous weather broadcasts,
Pilot to Forecaster (or Weather
Briefer) Service, storm d e t e   ~
tion radar information, and
flight advisories regarding haz-
ardous weather conditions. Prop-
er use of these services can
ensure the safest possible flight.
Our government spends mil-
lions of dollars each year to pro-
vide weather services so that
aircraft operations may be con-
ducted with maximum safety.
Many weather factor acciden
could be prevented if these serv
ices were used properly. You
can do your part by:
1. Becoming thoroughly famil-
iar with available facilities and
2. Learning to use these serv-
ices to maximum advantage.
Habits formed by practice dur-
ing good weather will ensure
that you get weather information
when you really need it.
3. Taking it upon yourself to
keep informed of the latest
weather throughout each flight.
4. Supplementing and improv-
ing weather services by provid-
ing timely and accurate inflight
and/ or postflight reports of
unusual or unexpected weather
that you encounter.
5. Flying the weather as it
really is-not as you hope it will
be. If it's IFR, file IFR. If you
can't file IFR, don't go.
6. Recognizing your limit
tions and the limitations of your
aircraft with regard to weather.
Bell Weapons Support Helicopter Demonstrated
of a new armed helicopter,
the Sioux Scout, was shown re-
cently at the U. S. Army Artil-
lery and Missile Center, Fort
Sill, Okla.
The Sioux Scout was de-
scribed by Bell Helicopter Com-
pany officials as a flying mockup
of an escort helicopter. The
Scout, derived from the OH-13
series, was developed for re-
fining ideas on what the Army
needs in a weapons support
The two-place Scout features
tandem seating, with the gunner
in front of the pilot. This ar-
rangement gives the gunner
maximum VISIOn, enabling him
to exploit the flexibility and ac-
curacy of two M-60 machineguns
mounted beneath the nose of the
chopper. The guns, capable of
delivering almost 1,000 rounds of
fire per minute, are electroni-
cally synchronized with the
pilot's visual sights.
Short wings behind the pilot
contain the fuel tanks. A turbo-
supercharged powerplant gives
the Scout more lift, more speed
(up to 91 knots), a better climb
rate, and more maneuverability
than earlier models.-N ews Re-
Near Accident
Flight Hazard
T AUNCHED 10 June 1963, the Share It Army
L Near-Accident and Flight Hazard Reporting
System is designed to gather and exchange infor-
mation about aviation hazards. The respons.e has
been both encouraging and informative.
Accident prevention information based on ac-
cidents of the type usually described in CRASH
SENSE is both after-the-fact and expensive. Pre-
vention information based on Share It accounts
has a triple advantage: it is before-the-fact, it is
dirt cheap, and it often gives us the positive ac-
tion that was used to prevent a near accident or
flight hazard having to be reported by crash facts
message or accident report. For these reasons,
we're happy to present extracts from the first
batch of Share It forms received by USABAAR.
., JANUARY 1964 43
l __
"As I started to turn off the active at a naval
air station after completing a GCA, I heard the
roar of a PV-2 naval reconnaissance plane pass
overhead at a very low altitude. The PV-2 was
attempting a go-around, but it was mushing in.
The gear was down and power applied, but a
combination of low airspeed and high density
altitude were working against it. The gear came
up, but the mush continued. Then the gear came
back down and it looked like it wasn't going to
fly. Just before touching down, the pilot got it
flying again ,and made his go-around.
"Later I talked to the PV-2 pilot and found that
he had also been on a GCA and hadn't seen my
U-6 on the active. Nor had he been informed by
the controller until he was committed to the land-
ing. He said that if it had not been for the fluores-
cent paint, he would not have seen me until too
late. We learned through operations that the con-
troller said there were four ' miles between air-
craft when the PV -2 turned on final.
"The lesson to be learned here is to be sure,
when going into Navy or Air Force bases used by
high performance aircraft, that GCA controllers
are aware of low approach speeds."
"A signal repairman neglected to replace the
cover on the circuit breaker box behind the
c.opilot's seat. We didn't notice it during preflight,
since it was hidden from view behind the seat,
which had a chest type parachute harness in it.
"During takeoff, metal snaps on the strap of
the chest type harness, which were hanging over
the rear .of the seat, came into contact with elec-
trical circuits in the open circuit breaker box.
Violent flashes of fire and smoke shot from behind
the copilot's seat. The copilot took control ,and I
tried to remove the snap links, getting several
more electric flashes before I pulled them loose.
Much confusion!"
"My passenger climbed in and placed his atta-
che case to the rear of the cyclic stick. I failed to
check for free control movement, and as I brought
the helic.opter to a hover, I found that I had no
rearward play in the cyclic and could only fly
forward. There were obstructions straight ahead
so I couldn't take off. Somehow, I managed to
land without incident."
"I discharged my VIP passenger at an airstrip
and he left [me] with instructions to pick him up
in an hour. I hitched the seat belt across the
empty chute in the copilot's seat and left for a
nearby airbase for service and fuel. As I dumped
landing flaps on final, the angle change toppled
the chute over the belt. I pulled it back into posi-
tion so it wouldn't hamper the yoke during the
landing. I goosed the throttle for reassurance and
found it dead. Fortunately, I had enough altitude
to make a dead stick landing on the runway.
"Apparently, when the chute toppled, the
shoulder strap hooked into the emergency fuel
shut off and when I pulled it back into position,
the engine developed a bad case of fuel starva-
"Shortly after breaking ground on runway 28,
I had a near miss with a large radio controlled
model airplane which appeared to be controlled
by some people about 500-1,000 feet west of the
runway. I had to quickly alter my flight path to
avoid collision.
"I do not consider the end of an active runway
to be suitable for flying radio controlled model
airplanes. "
"We were on a training flight and had been
working at a stagefield near the main airfield. We
, had just broken traffic with a westerly heading
and I busied myself inside the cockpit, helping
the crewchief record instrument readings.
"This was my student pilot's first flight in the
Chinook. He had spotted a U -6 to our right front
which was also heading west. He then focused
his attention inside the cockpit to adjust his
compass heading indicator.
"When I looked up, we were on a head-on
collision course with this same U-6, which had
just completed a 180
turn to the left. I grabbed
the cyclic and made an immediate right turn. We
passed within 300 feet of the other aircraft. The
U -6 showed no indication of its pilot having seen
us. I feel weather was a contributing factor. Sur-
face visibility was 5 miles in haze and the sun was
still low on the horizon."
"I called for landing instructions and was
cleared to enter right downwind, runway 25. As
I came in on my entry leg, I saw a small civil air-
craft making slow turns about 500 feet above my
altitude, directly over the center of the airfield.
  JANUARY 1964
"After I rolled out on downwind, I glanced off
to my right. At this time, the tower called me and
told me to break left at once. At the same time I
noticed the small aircraft had started slow de-
scending turns and was now at my level. He was
coming directly toward me on a collision course.
We missed by about 25 yards, I think."
"I took off from runway 28 and had to bank
hard right to avoid collision with a model 1airplane
that was being flown at an altitude of approxi-
mately 200 feet and about 1,000 feet off the end
of the runway."
"We were making a landing in a considerable
crosswind and were alert to the possible need for
brakes to assist directional control in the landing
"During the landing roll, brakes were applied
and the brakes locked, causing the plane to skid
to an uncontrolled stop on the runway. My first
thought was that the pilot had become apprehen-
sive of the crosswind problem and had misused
the brakes, but he immediately called my atten-
tion to the parking brake handle which was in
the 'out' position. It is not known how or when
the handle was pulled out; however, in review-
ing our knowledge of the brake system, the fol-
lowing was noted:
"Page 1-18 of TM lL-20A-l, dated 5 Jan 60,
states in part that 'momentarily depressing the
toe pedals releases the parking brake to the OFF
"This fact, while true on older U -6As, does not
apply after compliance with TM lL 20A-511 and,
further, TM -511 makes no mention of the change
in operating characteristics.
"Also, the parking brake handle design is such
that it may catch on clothing. If pulled out, it will
not spring back to the OFF position as it did be-
fore modification.
"The pilot graduated from Aviation School in
April 1961, qualified in U -6A and is a TC school
qualified maintenance officer. Both he and I had
never encountered this difficulty before and both
had the feeling that if the parking brake handle
were inadvertently pulled out prior to brake ap-
plication, it would not lock but would spring back
to the OFF position and that the only way to set
the parking brakes is as stated in the TM, to pull
out the brake handle while the toe brakes are
"The two U -6As assigned were checked and it
was found that the parking brake handle can h
pulled even while taxiing, and the next tim,
brakes are applied will remain on and can only
be released by pushing in on the handle."
"The main rotor struck a kite string and pulled
the kite through the main rotor blades. Luckily,
the kite was made of crepe paper and caused no
"I filed IFR and entered the clouds at ap-
proximately 1,000 feet. I remained in the clouds
to 11,000 feet. Suddenly the left engine failed. I
was on autopilot and the aircraft started a roll to
the left.
"I immediately disengaged the autopilot and
leveled the aircraft. I then went through the nor-
mal single engine procedures and manually
feathered the No.1 propeller. At the same time,
called the controller, told him I had lost an
ngine, and wanted to declare an emergency. I
then turned the IFF to the emergency position and
the controller told me that reception was good.
"I told the controller I wanted a vector to
another airfield because I knew it was the best
in the area. I tuned the VOR and ADF to the
navaids at that airfield.
"My airspeed dropped from 160 knots to 110
knots, and I lost approximately 100 feet. I re-
quested an immediate descent to try and break
out of the clouds. I was cleared for the descent
and told to report when VFR.
"I finally broke out of the clouds approximately
1,500 feet above the ground. During the descent,
I maintained 150 knots lAS. When I broke out
of the clouds I was about five miles from the air-
field. I maintained 110 knots on final and com-
pleted my landing without further incident."
"We approached our destination on an IFR
ght and were handed over from the en route
controller to approach control. The weather was
lear with 10-15 miles visibility.
"Approach control put us on a modified entry
to the GCA traffic pattern within 10 miles of the
field. At this time, approach control notified us
we had a target at 12 o'clock, one mile away. The
target actually approached us from the left rear,
and when we finally saw him-late because of his
direction of approach-we recognized a large
B-57 making a violent evasive maneuver at or
near our altitude. This B-57 was also being worked
by the same RAPCON. At the time our controller
called to tell us it was at 12 o'clock and a mile
away, the B-57 was actually maneuvering to
avoid us. Apparently the approach controllers
were not on speaking terms! "
"A number of our CH-34s have soft nylon
safety belts installed. This belt slips loose in five
minutes, or less, and has to be continually re-
tightened. This could result in serious injury in
the event of an accident, and it could be respon-
sible for loss of control in turbulence. The safety
belt number is lap-type MD-2, P I N 54H19651.
"I recommend these belts be eliminated and
replaced by stiffer nylon and/ or cotton belts."
And Here Are Some Flight Hazards That
Ended In A Major Accident",
On an approximate heading of 340°, the UH-IA
raised to a hover from a taxiway. The pilot hov-
ered sideways to the left on the same heading.
When he reached the sod area between the main
, JANUARY 1964
runway and the taxiway, he turned to an ap-
proximate heading of 70°, then discovered he
could not stop his forward movement.
He attempted to set the helicopter down on a
slight upward incline ahead of him. The aircraft
rocked back and he corrected rapidly, trying to
hover to the level taxiway. It continued to move
forward in a nose-low attitude, while rotating
clockwise. The pilot looked ahead and realized
he had to get it on the ground to keep from run-
ning into some parked helicopters and fuel drums.
He attempted to autorotate and inadvertently
reduced his collective pitch. The helioopter
struck the taxiway hard in a nose-low attitude,
shattering the chin bubbles, breaking the left
skid, and bending the right skid into the fuselage.
As it slid around on the taxiway and came to rest,
one main rotor blade, the tail boom, ,and the tail
rotor blades struck the ground. Fortunately, there
were no injuries. But major damage to the fuse-
lage, tail boom, tail rotor blades, elevator, engine
mounts, and fuel cells totaled more than $36,000.
A check of flight controls and links showed all
systems intact and working. The tail rotor drive
shaft was twisted off 4 inches forward of the aft
end of No. 1 shafit. The spline coupling in the No.
1 hangar was torn loose. The 'engine was running
normally at impact.
Internal cargo consisted of six empty auxiliary
fuel containers, several duffel bags, metal parts
for the auxiliary fuel containers, assorted field
gear, and two empty wooden ammunition boxes.
Total weight in the cargo compartment was ap-
proximately 1,790 pounds. The pilot and crew-
chief were aboard and the aircraft was filled with
fuel prior to takeoff to a full weight of approxi-
mately 1,007 pounds.
Total weight for the aircraft was computed at
approximately 7,258 pounds, making it approxi-
mately 58 pounds overgross at takeoff. The center
of gravity was found to be at station 12
five inches forward of the permissible limit f
the gross weight. This was caused by the six
auxiliary fuel containers being placed in a posi
tion that put their center of gravity at station 94.
At the time of the accident, the pilot had ac-
cumulated a total of 35.5 hours UH-1 time, and
he had not completed transition training, or
ground school requirements for a 3-hour block of
instruction concerning UH-1 weight and balance.
1. Inspection - The aircraft was hurriedly
loaded so it could take off in time to join for-
mation. No inspection was made to determine if
gross weight or center of gravity limits had been
2. Operation - The pilot failed to recognize the
out of balance condition, although nearly full aft
cyclic was required to keep the aircraft level at a
hover after liftoff.
3. Training - The pilot had not received unit
ground school training for computing center of
gravity in utility helicopters. Only limited train-
ing had been given him for internal loads con-
sisting of personnel.
4. Supervision - The pilot was assigned to a
cargo mission requiring a knowledge of loading
techniques which he had not been taught.  
O YOU DON' T like the
Army Aviation training lit-
erature publications, or you
think the ones we have should
be organized in some other way?
Well, say so.
You can, you know.
The U. S. Army Aviation
School will evaluate your per-
sonal suggestions. If you think
we need a new field manual, a
new technical manual, or any
other of the several types of DA
publications, you can write the
School instead of just complain-
ing to anyone who happens to be
Recognize, however, that sug-
gestions concerning publications
gain in validity if they have been
previously staffed in your own
unit or at least among several
people who are vitally concerned
in the area involved.
A Chance To Get
In The Act
( ~
s ~ ~
( ~ XI
In January of each year the
U. S. Army A viation School
formalizes the Army Aviation
Training Literature Program for
the next two years. Proposals,
whether changes or completely
new manuals, are submitted to
USCONARC for initial approval
and then by that headquarters
to the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Force Development, DA.
While awaiting formal approval,
the School begins research and
development of the proposed
changes, revisions, or new pub-
One thing to remember before
submitting your suggestions is
that the Army Aviation School
is not responsible for all publi-
cations dealing with Army Avia-
tion. For example, TMs on spe-
cific items of equipment, such as
aircraft operators' manuals, are
not prepared by the School. Rec-
ommendations concerning these
should be submitted to the orig-
inating agency shown in the first
chapter of the publications.
With these cautions in mind,
go ahead. Address your sug-
gestions to the Commandant,
U. S. Army Aviation School,
ATTN: AASPI, Fort Rucker,
Ala. , 36362.
P.S. For more information on
the types of Army publications
and how they are prepared, see
AR 310-1 and 310-3.
Annual Index Available
is available by request.
Address: Editor, U. S. ARMY
u. S. Army Aviation
Fort Rucker, Ala.
AA Training
Establishe at Olathe NAS
I\... completed for the joint
Army-Navy u e of Olathe Naval
Air Station, Olathe, Kans., as an
additional Army Aviation train-
ing facility, the Department of
Defense recently announced.
The additional facility is nec-
essary to accommodate increased
Army requirements for aviation.
The use of a portion of the air
station facilities wiII make it
possible for the Army to meet
these requirements without op-
ening a new installation.
The Army plans to conduct
fixed wing primary and instru-
ment flight training at Olathe.
Flight instruction will be con-
ducted in Army aircraft main-
tained by a contractor.
Current plans call for this ad-
ditional flight training school to
be operational in time to accept
the first class of students by mid-
1964. Subsequent classes will be
phased in on a periodic basis, un-
til peak officer and enlisted stu-
dent loads are reached.
Fort Rucker, Alabama, which
will continue to operate at fuII
capacity, will be used primarily
for advanced training.