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REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

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1. ACTUAL CASE/RIPENESS FOR ADJUDICATION
 PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
o FACTS:
 Act No. 2706 provided that inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges
are obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction.
 Before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from
the Secretary of Education
o HELD:
No justiciable controversy presented/no actual case or controversy.
 Department of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated all private
schools in this country apparently without audible protest.
 Petitioners suffered no wrong—nor allege any—from the enforcement of the criticized
statute.
 All of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their
permits.
o LAW PROVIDES:
 Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who
fails to show that he is injured by its operation. (Ripeness for adjudication)
 The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of
litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. (Actual Case or Controversy)
 The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such
cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed
as contrary to the Constitution are raised. (Actual Case or Controversy)
 TAN VS. MACAPAGAL
o FACTS:
 While 1971 Constitutional Convention was in the midst of its deliberations, petitioners
sought to have the SC declare that the Constitutional Convention was "without power,
under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider,
discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the
adoption of a form of government other than the form now outlined in the present
Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to
the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein.
o HELD:
 "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."
 At the time of the suit, the Convention had not yet finalized any resolution that would
radically alter the 1935 Constitution. (NOT Ripe for Adjudication)
 It is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture. (Separation of Powers)
 As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the
interposition of judicial oversight.


 DUMLAO VS. COMELEC
o FACTS:
 This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated,
seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing
certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
 Section 4 of BP Blg. 52.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired
 Petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr questions the accreditation of some political parties by COMELEC as
contrary to the constitution that provides that a bona fide candidate shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination.
 Section 4 of BP Blg. 51.
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be
qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in
any partisan political activity therein:
 provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned
crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and
 the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil
court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima
facie evidence of such fact.
o HELD:
 Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition
seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC.
 There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being
asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical
issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered
without the benefit of a detailed factual record.

 LACSON VS. PEREZ
o FACTS:
 President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an “angry and violent mob armed with explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons” assaulting and attempting to
break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 dated May 1, 2001 declaring that there was a
state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1
directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.
 All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no
basis both in fact an in law.
 Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration
of a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila.
It is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities to
obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and
until May 1, 2001 which means that preliminary investigations will henceforth be
conducted.
o HELD:
 Petitioners’ apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.
 The instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic due to the lifting of the declaration
of a state of rebellion.

 OPLE VS. TORRES
o FACTS:
 President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O) 308 on December 12, 1996
entitled “Adoption of National Computerized Identification Reference System” or
commonly known as “National ID System.”
 A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22,
1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner Blas Ople filed the instant
petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of
the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.
 Petitioner Blas Ople assailed the constitutionality of A.O. 308 on the following grounds:
 The admin order is deemed to be a law and not merely an admin order thus it is
a usurpation of legislative power of the Congress to make laws
 It intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right to privacy.
 On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
o HELD
 The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails
A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for
the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
 Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No.
308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social
Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of
the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly
announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the
guidelines for the national identification system.
 All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308
and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters’ insistence that we tighten the rule on
standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important
constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
2. LEGAL STANDING (LOCUS STANDI)
 DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, supra
o HELD:
 Igot (taxpayer, qualified voter & member of the Bar) & Salapatan Jr. (taxpayer, qualified
voter & resident of San Miguel, Iloilo) have not been adversely affected by the operation
of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional. What they have is only
generated grievance as contrasted to a direct injury creating a substantial interest in the
case.


 DE GUIA VS COMELEC
o FACTS
 Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in the January 1988 local
elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the position of respondent insofar
as it affects the municipality of Parañaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro
Manila Area. He claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which
requires the apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when
the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would
consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately succeeds par. (c), to support
his view that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should
continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.
o HELD:
 Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that petitioner does
not allege that he is running for reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the
election, by district, in Parañaque. As such, he does not appear to have a locus standi, a
standing in law, personal or substantial interest.
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He does not also allege any legal right
that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to
have any cause of action.
 OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
o FACTS:
 An action was filed by minors bringing in the name “their generation as well as those
generations yet unborn” against the DENR to cancel existing timber license agreements
(TLAs) and to stop issuance of ones. The children invoked their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. DENR’s
refusal to cancel the TRAs was violative of plaintiffs’ right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
o HELD:
 The SC ruled that the children had the legal standing based on the concept of
“intergenerational responsibility”. Their right to a healthy environment carried with in
an obligation to preserve the environment for the succeeding generations.
 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes,
at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.