## Are you sure?

This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?

11, NOVEMBER 2008

5257

^ Continuing this recursion, we can express Xi+k as a function of i01

Xi+k = i+k01

**Communication Through Jamming Over a Slotted ALOHA Channel
**

Sandeep Bhadra, Student Member, IEEE, Shreeshankar Bodas, Sanjay Shakkottai, Member, IEEE, and Sriram Vishwanath, Member, IEEE

2

where

2

1

k

(

1 ^ ^ 0 01) + (1 0 2 ) (X + 01)

i i i k

(34)

^ (Xii+k01 ) =

i

+k01

j

=i

2

1

i

+k010j

(

^ 0 X ):

j

(35)

Thus Xi+k becomes the sum of two independent zero mean terms, ^ since Xj ; 8j i is independent of the noise realizations up to time i 0 1, see (5). We know that

^ Xi =
i01 ( 0 i01 ):

(36)

From (35) and (36)

**E [Xi Xi+k ] =
2 2i+k02 1k E [( 0 i01 )2 ] 2 i+k01 i+k010j 1 1 i01 10 2 +
2 j =i
**

^ ^ 2 E [( 0 01 )( 0 X )]:

i j

Abstract—This correspondence derives bounds on the jamming capacity of a slotted ALOHA system. A system with n legitimate users, each with a Bernoulli arrival process is considered. Packets are temporarily stored at the corresponding user queues, and a slotted ALOHA strategy is used for packet transmissions over the shared channel. The scenario considered is that of a pair of illegitimate users that jam legitimate transmissions in order to communicate over the slotted ALOHA channel. Jamming leads to binary signaling between the illegitimate users, with packet collisions due to legitimate users treated as (multiplicative) noise in this channel. Further, the queueing dynamics at the legitimate users stochastically couples the jamming strategy used by the illegitimate users and the channel evolution. By considering various independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) jamming strategies, achievable jamming rates over the slotted ALOHA channel are derived. Further, an upper bound on the jamming capacity over the class of all ergodic jamming policies is derived. These bounds are shown to be tight in the limit where the offered system load approaches unity. Index Terms—ALOHA, covert channel, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) coding strategies.

(37)

Since the second term on RHS is zero

2 E [Xi Xi+k ] = k :

(38)

I. INTRODUCTION A typical slotted ALOHA system comprises of a collection of legitimate users following a prearranged strategy to gain access to resources and communicate with each other. Our correspondence focuses on using jamming as an unconventional communication mechanism to achieve a nonzero throughput in a slotted ALOHA system. In this mechanism, an illegitimate jamming transmitter that has gained entry into a slotted ALOHA system jams legitimate transmissions, and the resulting “collisions” in the system are then detected by an illegitimate jamming receiver. We employ an information theoretic approach to determine upper and lower bounds on the capacity of this jamming-based communication system, under the constraint that jamming does not result in instability of the legitimate user queues. It is intuitively clear that the with such a constraint, the capacity of the jamming channel will converge to zero as the offered load (due to legitimate users) approaches unity. Our bounds verify this intuition, and we show that both the upper and lower bounds converge to zero as the offered load approaches unity.

Manuscript received June 13, 2007; revised February 7, 2008. Current version published October 22, 2008. This work was supported by the NSF by Grants ACI-0305644, CNS-0325788, CCF-0448181, and CNS-0347400. The material in this correspondence was presented in part at The Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, September 2004. S. Bhadra is with DSPS Research and Development, Texas Instuments, Dallas, TX 75243 USA (e-mail: s-bhadra@ti.com). S. Bodas, S. Shakkottai, and S. Vishwanath are with the Wireless Networking and Communications Group, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712 USA (e-mail: bodas@ece.utexas.edu; shakkott@ece.utexas.edu; sriram@ece.utexas.edu). Communicated by E. Modiano, Associate Editor for Communication Network. Color version of Figure 4 in this correspondence is available online at http:// ieeexplore.ieee.org. Digital Object Identiﬁer 10.1109/TIT.2008.929965

Note that (38) represents the covariance matrix of a wide sense stationary process. However, we are considering the truncated input sequence, i.e., for all channel uses i 2, to obtain this Toeplitz structure. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The contents and presentation of this paper beneﬁted signiﬁcantly from numerous discussions with Prof E. Telatar. Many helpful comments from the reviewers are also acknowledged.

REFERENCES

[1] J. Pieter and M. Schalkwijk, “A coding scheme for additive noise channels with feedback. II. Band-limited signals,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-12, pp. 183–189, 1966. [2] N. Merhav and T. Weissman, “Coding for the feedback gel’fand pinsker channel and feedforward wyner-ziv source,” in Proc. Int. Symp. Inf. Theory, Adelaide, Australia, Sep. 2005, pp. 1506–1510. [3] H. Max and M. Costa, “Writing on dirty paper,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-29, pp. 439–441, 1983. [4] M. C. Thomas and A. T. Joy, Elements of Information Theory, second ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Interscience, 2006. [5] L. H. Ozarow and S. K. Leung-Yan-Cheong, “An achievable region and outer bound for the Gaussian broadcast channel with feedback,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-30, pp. 667–671, 1984. [6] A. El Gamal, “The feedback capacity of degraded broadcast channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-24, pp. 379–381, 1978. [7] G. Kramer, “Feedback strategies for white Gaussian interference networks,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 48, pp. 1423–1438, 2002. [8] A. E. Gamal, “The capacity of the physically degraded Gaussian broadcast channel with feedback,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-27, pp. 508–511, 1981. [9] F. Bert and G. Lawrence, A Modern Approach to Probability Theory. Probability and its Applications. Boston, MA: Birkhäuser , 1997. [10] M. G. Robert, Toeplitz And Circulant Matrices: A Review (Foundations and Trends(R) in Communications and Information Theory). New York: Now, 2006.

0018-9448/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE

Authorized licensed use limited to: INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY MADRAS. Downloaded on May 28, 2009 at 21:21 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

5258

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 54, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2008

Fig. 1. System model.

A vast body of literature exists that studies the effect of illegitimate (covert) communication strategies that exploit inherent weaknesses in conventional systems [1], [2], and in the context of ALOHA [3] (we refer to [4], for additional references). Formally, in a top-level characterization of covert channels, Kemmerer [5] states that necessary conditions for the existence of a covert channel are: the presence of a global resource to which both the sender and the receiver have access, a means of modifying that resource, and a method of synchronization between the receiver and the sender. In this correspondence, our focus is on the fundamental capacity limits of the covert ALOHA channel over the class of all ergodic jamming strategies. We study the information-theoretic capacity of the illegitimate system where two legitimate users communicate over a slotted ALOHA channel, and for any ﬁxed offered load 2 (0; 1), subject to a stability constraint on the legitimate user queues. We ﬁrst derive achievable jamming rates over the slotted ALOHA channel by considering various independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) jamming strategies, and where the illegitimate user has varying degrees of side-information on the channel state. The generalization to any n>2 is presented, along with more details and proofs for the n = 2 case, in [4]. We then derive an upper bound on the jamming capacity of this channel over the class of all ergodic undetectable (to be deﬁned) strategies, subject to stability constraint on the legitimate user queues. The dynamics of this system are complex because the jamming strategy of the illegitimate user inﬂuences the queueing dynamics of all the legitimate users, thus coupling the source (illegitimate user) and the channel state (the queue lengths of all the users). We also show that this upper bound is tight as the offered load approaches unity. II. SYSTEM MODEL In this correspondence, we mainly consider a scenario where two legitimate users and two illegitimate users (Alice and Bob) share the common medium using slotted ALOHA. Alice wishes to transmit to Bob without being detected by the system. Each legitimate user in this slotted ALOHA system is associated with a queue, with i.i.d. Bernoulli packet arrivals to each queue at rate . A slotted ALOHA system with two legitimate users Q1 and Q2 is shown in Fig. 1. We will use Qi , i = 1; 2 to denote both the users and the corresponding length of their queues. When the queue Qi is nonempty, user Qi attempts to transmit in a time-slot with probability p. A time-slot j is said to be active if at least one of the users transmits a packet on the channel. Collisions naturally occur in this system when both users Q1 and Q2 attempt transmission. In a regular slotted ALOHA system, such a collision is detected, and the colliding packet is then retransmitted. We assume that the legitimate users do not care for the packet collisions so long as their buffers do not overﬂow (i.e., as long as their

queues do not become unstable). The legitimate users do not know how many legitimate users use the system, therefore as long as their buffers do not overﬂow, they consider the collisions natural. Alice exploits this aspect of the system to communicate while remaining undetected, choosing signals from a binary alphabet f“0”; “1”g. For every “1” that Alice wishes to transmit, she causes a collision by jamming a transmission in the corresponding time-slot. The illegitimate receiver (Bob) interprets each unsuccessful packet transmission as a “1” transmitted by Alice, and each successful transmission by the legitimate users in the system as a “0”. In order for the illegitimate users to remain undetected, Alice should be able to (causally) detect the presence of a legitimate packet on the channel. This can be achieved by carrier sensing or power-level detection. In practice, there exist protocols, e.g., carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA-CA) that require the transmitter to sense the carrier signal from other transmitter(s) before starting their own transmission. Further, Alice’s jamming strategy must not make the overall system unstable[6]. Alice’s jamming policy is illustrated in Fig. 2. The shaded time-slots in Fig. 2 correspond to idle states when there is no activity by the legitimate users of the channel, while the solid black time-slots represent collisions in the system. Let

Mi = I f channel is active in time-slot ig

(1)

where I is the indicator function. Thus, Mi = 1 if at least one of Q1 or Q2 transmits a packet over the common channel, and Mi = 0 otherwise. For each T 2 + , we deﬁne the active set

AT (!) = fi : 1 i T; Mi = 1g

(2)

to be the random set of active time-slots; the ! in the deﬁnition indicates that this is a random set that depends upon the queue states and the attempt probabilities at each of the legitimate user queues. For ease of notation, we shall drop the ! in subsequent references to this random set. The active time-slots are indexed by the function t(i) = inf fk 1 : jAk j = ig which denotes the time-slot when the channel is active for the i-th time. The illegitimate channel is deﬁned as the jamming channel between Alice and Bob. Note however, that the codewords used by Alice over this jamming channel are only transmitted (and received by Bob) over consecutive t(i)’s. For the purpose of rigor, assume that whenever the channel is idle, Alice transmits a . Thus, Alice’s codewords are strings from the alphabet f0; 1; g. Deﬁne S as the set of codeword strings of inﬁnite length that Alice can use to jam over the illegitimate channel so that

1

Authorized licensed use limited to: INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY MADRAS. Downloaded on May 28, 2009 at 21:21 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 54, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2008

5259

Fig. 2. The Illegitimate Channel.

the queues Q1 , Q2 are stable and ergodic. Formally, x 2 S that for each (k; l) 2 2 , and each sample path ! , the limit T

T !1

lim

1

1 is such

(3)

T

1

i=1

I f(Q1 (i); Q2 (i)) = (k; l)g(!)

converges to a well-deﬁned probability measure over 2 , where Q1 (i), Q2 (i) denote the queue-lengths at time i. Deﬁne the projection (truncation) operator m operating over all strings xn of length n m such that m (xn ) is a string of length m satisfying

(x )i

Fig. 3. The Traditional Z-Channel.

m

( m (x ))i ;

n

81 i m:

where (a)i is deﬁned as the ith element in vector a. Formally, let ST be a set of T length strings derived from S1 under the projection operator T so that for all xT 2 ST , 9x1 2 S1 , such that xT = T (x1 ). Deﬁne the (ergodic) information-theoretic hidden capacity over the active time-slots as follows:

C (S ) = lim inf T !1

We assume that the illegitimate users know the offered load = ^ p, and the Z-channel crossover probability pc pp , where p = 1 ^ because, if the illegitimate users do not know the offered load and start jamming with probability >0, then there is the possibility that the system becomes unstable and the illegitimate users are exposed. When only one of the two legitimate users has packets, there are no collisions in the legitimate channel, and the illegitimate channel reduces to an ideal error-free channel. When none of the legitimate users have packets, no transmission is possible.

0

x

sup

2S T

1

I (x T ; y T )

(4) III. ACHIEVABLE RATES FOR THE HIDDEN CHANNEL: THE TWO-USER CASE A. Capacity The hidden channel is source dependent because the jamming strategy modiﬁes the queues Qi , i = 1; 2. It also has memory, and is constrained to ensure that the legitimate system remains stable. Conventional single letter characterizations for capacity (used for discrete memoryless channels) cannot be used in this context and hence a closed form expression in terms of channel parameters is difﬁcult to obtain. The next sections investigate achievable rates for this channel under i.i.d. jamming strategies, and an upper bound is then used to motivate this i.i.d. jamming strategy. B. I.I.D. Jamming Strategies We deﬁne the following sets S ; = f(Q = 0; Q = 0)g, S ; = f(Q ; Q ) : Q = 0 ; Q > 0g [ f (Q ; Q ) : Q > 0; Q = 0 g and S ; = f(Q ; Q ) : Q > 0; Q > 0g. In other words when

0 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2

= (x1 ; x2 ; . . . ; xT ), each where the codeword vector xT xi 0; 1; transmitted by Alice is received by Bob across the hidden channel as yT . Recall that we considered the alphabet to denote that Alice does not transmit anything over the timeslot corresponding to since the channel is idle at those timeslots. Bob realizes that the channel is idle and does not expect transmission by Alice. Hence the capacity in (4) is

2 f

g

C (S ) = lim inf T !1

x

sup

where xjA j = (xt(1) ; xt(2) ; . . . ; xt(jA j) ) xt(i) 2 f0; 1g is the effective codeword vector transmitted by Alice and received by Bob as yjA j . We use this deﬁnition of capacity in the rest of this correspondence. This capacity is less than one bit per transmission because the channel between Alice and Bob is not ideal. Conditioned on the event that multiple users have packets to transmit and that there is activity in the channel, the hidden channel between Alice and Bob behaves as a Z-channel [7] (see Fig. 3).

2S T

1

I (xjA j ; yjA

j)

(5)

of the two queues are backlogged, the process (Q1 Q2 ) is said to be in state Sk;20k . When the queue length process (Q1 ; Q2 ) 2 S2;0

k

2 0

1

2

1

2

Authorized licensed use limited to: INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY MADRAS. Downloaded on May 28, 2009 at 21:21 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

5260

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 54, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2008

and the channel is active, the illegitimate channel reduces to an equivalent Z-channel (see Fig. 3), while for states (Q1 ; Q2 ) 2 S1;1 when the channel is active, the illegitimate channel reduces to a zero-error channel. Let us denote the channel state in a time-slot t by S t . We consider coding/jamming policies described by a map : C 7! [0; 1] where C is the set of channel states. Alice then jams (i.e., transmits a “1”) a transmission in an active time-slot t(k) when the channel is in state S t(k) 2 C with probability (S t(k) ) independent of all other events. In other words, given the channel state, Alice uses a codebook that has been generated in an i.i.d. manner. Consequently, the expression for capacity achievable over such i.i.d. strategies follows from (5) as

Deﬁne the channel-state dependent active time-slots Mk := I (at least one of the users transmits in time-slot kjS k = Si;20i ). Anal(i;20i) (i;20i) ogously, deﬁne AT := fk : Mk = 1g to be the active time-slots when the channel is in state Si;20i . Let Ci;20i denote the i.i.d. coding capacity of the channel ﬁxed at state Si;20i . It can be proved [4] that C1;1 = p and ^ C2;0 = Cz (; pc )(1 0 p2 ), where

(i;2

0i)

Cz (; pc ) = H (
pc ) 0
H (pc ) ^ ^

with
= (umax ; ), and

(8)

C (S ) = lim inf T !1

x

sup

2S T

1

jA j

k=1

I (x

t(k)

;y

t(k)

):

(6)

umax =

pp =p^ : c ^ p =p 1 + pc pc ^

The queue length process (Q1 ; Q2 ) is a Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC). Consequently, the hidden channel can be deﬁned as a time varying channel where the channel states fSi;20i g, i 2 f0; 1; 2g follow a hidden Markov process. The complete transition matrix of this DTMC can be derived to show that the DTMC is aperiodic and ^ positive recurrent for < pp. Mutual information rates of ﬁnite state Markov channels have been studied in [8] for the i.i.d. coding case. A formula for mutual information for any regenerative stochastic process (including, in particular, for hidden Markov inputs over a countable-state space Markov channel) is provided in [9]. However, the formula in [9] can only be numerically computed. In the following subsections, we derive closed-form expressions for each of the cases discussed above. Coding Strategy 1: The illegitimate users know that the hidden channel is an arbitrarily varying time-varying channel which is composed of a Z-channel (with known crossover probability pc ) and an error-free channel. Also, note that to retain the stability of the legitimate user queues and hence remain undetected, Alice has to ensure that no more than a certain fraction of the packet transmissions are jammed. Alice uses a state-independent i.i.d. jamming policy with jamming probability q . Since the queue length process (Q1 ; Q2 ) is a Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC), we can solve the global balance equations and sum over the probabilities of the relevant states to arrive at the following steady state invariant probabilities for the illegitimate channel:

^ ppq 0 ^^ P (S0;2 ) = 0;2 = pq 0 pq ^ ppq 0 + p ^^ ^ p ^ P (S1;1 ) = 1;1 = 2 1 0 ppq ppq 0 + p ^^ ^^ ^ P (S2;0 ) = 2;0 = 1 0 0;2 0 1;1

Theorem 1: The hidden-channel capacity is lower-bounded as

C Cz (; pc )((1 0 p2 )2;0 + 1;1 p): ^

Proof: See [4].

(9)

Coding Strategy 2: The illegitimate users know that the offered load ^ is = pp , where p = 1 0 p, and the Z-channel crossover probability ^ is pc . Since the Z-channel crossover probability is given by

pc =

1

0p ^

p2

2

=

2

0p

p

(10)

the illegitimate users can compute

p=

1 + pc

2p c

:

(11)

Also, since = p(1 0 p), the illegitimate users can compute , the arrival rate for the user queues Qi . Theorem 2: The hidden capacity C can be lower bounded by,

C 0max Rz (q; 2;0 pc )(1 0 p2 ) ^ q

where Rz (a; b) := H (a^) 0 aH (^) b b Proof: See [4].

(12)

(7)

^ where q = 1 0 q: Further, with this i.i.d. jamming strategy, the stability constraint leads to the inequality q . We can now calculate from ^ the global balance equations in terms of the offered load = =pp of the queues, and have

Remark: Coding strategy 2 is better than coding strategy 1. Achievable Rate in Presence of Side Information: Consider a coding scheme where Alice uses separate codebooks for each channel state. Let the probability of Alice transmitting a “1” in state S2;0 be q as before, while the probability of Alice transmitting a “1” in state S1;1 be w . Finally, Alice does not transmit in the inactive queue state of S0;2 . That is, for each active time-slot t(k),

(S t(k) ) = q; w;

if S t(k) = S2;0 if S t(k) = S1;1

:

(13)

= 1 0 :

to ensure that the 0 < i;20i < 1 for i 2 0; 1; 2 in (7). Hence the state-independent i.i.d. coding strategy for Case 1 is to ﬁnd the optimal value of q . To obtain an expression for the capacity of this arbitrarily varying channel, we ﬁrst decompose the channel into two states S1;1 and S2;0 and calculate the channel capacities for a channel ﬁxed at each of these states. Note that we exclude the state S0;2 since there are no active time-slots in when the channel is in this state.

Using the same arguments as in Section III, steady-state probabilities of the queues (0;2 ; 1;1 ; 2;0 ) can be calculated (see [4]). Then the hidden rate can be simply seen to be the sum of the rates of the Z-channel and the zero-error channel weighted by the probabilities that the illegitimate channel is in these states. The rate can then be maximized over possible values of q and w so as to retain the stability of the steady-state queue lengths at the legitimate users as follows. Theorem 3: The achievable rate of the illegitimate channel as described in Section II, over all i.i.d. jamming policies over a legitimate channel with attempt probability p and offered load , with complete

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 54, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2008

5261

channel state (Si;20i ) information at the sender and receiver is given by

C2 (p; )

**^2 max 2;0 (1 0 p )Rz (q; pc ) q10 0w 10+p +1;1 pH (w)g :
**

0

(14)

n ^ Consider a (2nR ; n) code Xn = fxi (w)g1 over the ternary alphabet f0; 1; g transmitted over this channel with source alphabet W n corresponding to a state sequence (trajectory) Sn = fS i g1 , S i 2 n ^ n = fyi (w)g1 . fSk;20k ; k 2 f0; 1; 2gg and received sequence Y Then following [10], we can deﬁne Cc to be the capacity of the Cindy3 Doug channel and Ci;20i (i;20i ) to be the of the Cindy-Doug channel 3 ﬁxed at a state Si;20i under codeword constraint i;20i as

Proof: See [4]. IV. UPPER BOUND ON HIDDEN CAPACITY: THE TWO USER CASE We derive an outer bound on the hidden capacity of this system over the set of all ergodic jamming policies that Alice may employ. To obtain an upper bound, we ﬁrst decouple the state of the illegitimate channel from the coding strategy by considering a virtual parallel channel. We then prove that the capacity of this virtual illegitimate channel is always greater than that of the true illegitimate channel and then bound it as a weighted sum of the capacities of a Z-channel and a rate 1, error free channel. Theorem 4: The hidden capacity C 3 for a slotted ALOHA system described in Section II achievable using ergodic jamming can be upper bounded as

**Cc = lim inf n!1
**

and

sup 1 I (W ; Yn ; Sn ) X 2S n

m(X

(16)

3 Ci;20i (i;20i ) = lim inf n!1

X

:

sup

)

n

2; where

(17)

1 jA 2 := n

j

k=1

I (xt(k) ; yt(k) jS t(k) = Si;20i ):

respectively. Using standard information theoretic arguments, this can be simpliﬁed to (see [4]):

Cc

i;20i

3 3 Ci;20i (i;20i )i;20i :

(18)

C 3 Cz ( )(1 0 p2 ) + p ^

1 0 p (1 0 ) 0 1 0 p

2

(15)

where Cz ( ) is the capacity of the Z-channel with crossover proba^ bility pc = p2 =(10 p2 ) using codewords constrained to have no more than fraction of 1’s, with =10+ 1 0 p (1 0 p) (1 0 p) 0 1 0 p :

2 2

Next, we desire to upper bound each of the quantities in (18). Recall (2;0) (2;0) that for each T , AT (! ) = i : 1 i T; Mi = 1 . From the strong law of large numbers, we have that

j lim jATT T !1

(2 0)

(2 0)

;

=10p : ^

2

3 3 Proof: Consider a virtual channel (Q1 ; Q2 ) between Cindy and 3 3 Doug, deﬁned as a stationary and ergodic process, so that (Q1 ; Q2 ) = (Q1 ; Q2 ). In other words, for every legitimate packet transmitted over the true channel, there is a virtual packet transmitted over the virtual channel. However, Cindy’s transmit policy (jamming/not jamming any active time-slot) does not affect the dynamics of the queues.

Note that as all of Alice’s strategies are valid jamming strategies for Cindy, the capacity of the Cindy-Doug channel is at least that of the Alice-Bob channel. Note that, although the set of codewords Alice could use might span across different states in general, the ergodicity constraint on the optimal policy implies that the fraction of time-slots jammed by Alice in 3 each state Si;20i converges to a constant i;20i deﬁned as

Now, for any j 2 AT , observe that the illegitimate channel (between Cindy and Doug) is a Z-channel with crossover probability pc , (2;0) p (and where pc = 10p . Thus by concatenating the time-slots in AT ^ (2;0) ignoring f1 j T gnAT ) and employing a Z-channel coding (2;0) strategy over AT , it follows that for any > 0, 9T large enough such that

;

3 C2;0 2;0

Cz ( 3; ) 0

2 0

A(2;0) T T

^ ! Cz 3; 1 0 p

2 0

2

3 where Cz (2;0 ) is the channel capacity of a Z-channel with weight 3;0 . This yields an upper bound on capacity as constraint 2

C3

1 0 p Cz 3; 3; + p3; : ^

2 2 0 2 0 1 1

(19)

**3 k i;20i := nlim 1 !1 n k=1 I fS = Si;20i gI f Alice transmits a “1”g I f channel is active at time-slot kg)
**

where I fg is the indicator function and as before, S t denotes the channel state at time-slot t. Consequently, we will apply the same 3 codeword weight constraint i;20i to the state-dependent code that Cindy uses as well to communicate over the virtual channel at each state Si;20i . Further, note that given queue state information, the Cindy-Doug illegitimate channel is a discrete memoryless time-varying channel with state side information at transmitter and receiver.

n

Using the stability of the system as well as further upper bounds on the parameters of the system, the expression in (19) can be shown to simplify and to be less than or equal to that in (15). A more detailed version of this proof can be found in [4]. We present numerical results for the achievable bound and compare it against the upper bound in Fig. 4. The upper bound is loose everywhere except at values of very close to 1. Observe that the bound is asymptotically tight in the sense that as the offered load ! 1, both the upper bound and the achievable rate tend to 0. The more general n > 2 case is left out of this correspondence and can be found in [4]. V. CONCLUSION The setting studied in this correspondence is of two illegitimate users—a transmitter and a receiver, communicating with each other by

5262

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 54, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2008

Fig. 4. Upper bound and achievable rate p = 0:4 .

exploiting the resources of a slotted ALOHA system. The illegitimate pair communicate by jamming legitimate transmissions while striving to remain undetected by the legitimate slotted ALOHA system. In this correspondence, we ﬁnd lower and upper bounds on capacity. We employ i.i.d. coding strategies under varying side-information assumptions to determine lower bounds. We employ constrained decoupling arguments to determine upper bounds, and ﬁnally, we compare the upper and lower bounds. We ﬁnd that, in the limit when the offered load tends to unity (and the capacity to zero), our upper and lower bounds coincide.

REFERENCES

[1] I. S. Moskowitz and M. H. Kang, “Covert channels—here to stay,” in Proc. COMPASS ’94. New York: IEEE , 1994, pp. 235–243. [2] J. Giles and B. Hajek, An Inf.-Theoretic and Game-Theoretic Study of Timing Channels, vol. 48, no. 9, pp. 2455–2477, Sep. 2002.

[3] T. Dogu and A. Ephremides, “Covert information transmission through the use of standard collision resolution algorithms,” in Proc. Third Int. Workshop on Inf. Hiding, 1999, pp. 419–433. [4] S. Bhadra, S. Bodas, S. Shakkottai, and S. Vishwanath, Communication Through Jamming Over a Slotted ALOHA Channel. Aug. 5, 2008, arXiv:0808.0558v1[cs.IT]. [5] R. A. Kemmerrer, “Shared resource matrix methodology: An approach to identifying storage and timing channels,” ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 256–277, 1983. [6] V. Anantharam and S. Verdú, “Bits through queues,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 42, pp. 4–18, Jan. 1996. [7] S. W. Golomb, “The limiting behavior of the Z-channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, pp. 372–372, May 1980. [8] M. Mushkin and I. Bar-David, “Capacity and coding for the GilbertElliot channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 35, pp. 1277–1290, Nov. 1989. [9] V. Sharma and S. K. Singh, “Entropy and mutual information in the regenerative setup with applications to Markov channel,” in Proc. Int. Symp. Inf. Theory, Washington, DC, 2001. [10] S. Verdú and T. S. Han, “A general formula for channel capacity,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 40, 1994.

- Hmm Tutorial 1
- Ergodic Capacity of Nr x Nt fading MIMO Channel with.docx
- tmp4533.tmp
- Markov Chain
- An Introduction to Markovchain Package
- Foss Lecture4
- The Page ranking Method for hidden web Data
- E_bdpros
- Reverse Acting Grate Com Orientações 2
- Spring 2006 Final
- MIMO_SDR_NK
- Lossless Deterministic Channel
- Sms Spam
- 1507.03804.pdf
- Index.pdf
- ECE Sample Course Material
- R&D - Lateral Spillways - Euroestudios
- Control Lect9
- IAP-Chapter7-2011
- Exploit PDF 2833
- Con Volver
- DSP LAB
- Float
- System Modeling and Simulation
- IDB-WP-540 The Role of Renewable Energy Laws in Expanding Energy from Non-traditional Renewables.pdf
- Indexing, Cointegration and Equity Market Regimes
- 2852 spring 2010
- Reliability and Importance Discounting of Neutrosophic Masses
- Ch9MDP
- nagarro4

- combining replication and evasion for mitigating base-station jamming in sensor networks
- Mobile Jamming Attack and its Countermeasure in Wireless Sensor Networks
- Performance of multi tone code division multiple access (MT-CDMA) in AWGN channel and in presence of narrowband jamming
- Study on the jamming to synthetic aperture radar
- Performance improvement of IEEE 802.16 based system in in jamming environment and improvement with link adaption
- Primary exploration on ISAR image deception jamming
- Optimal Jamming Attacks and Network Defense Policies in Wireless Sensor Networks
- Performance of error-erasure-correction decoding of Reed-Solomon codes for frequency-hop communications in multitone interference
- Security considerations in frequency hopping radio systems
- Performance of IEEE 802.16 based system in in jamming environment and improvement with link adaption
- Performance of DSSS against Repeater Jamming
- A study on active jamming to synthetic aperture radar
- Optimization of a hybrid SFHDS MFSK link in the presence of worst case multitone jamming
- OFDM Channel Estimation With Jammed Pilot Detector Under Narrow-Band Jamming
- Performance of Multi tone Code Division Multiple Access (MT-CDMA) in an AWGN Channel and in Presence of Narrowband Jamming
- Bit Error Rate Analysis of jamming for OFDM systems
- Evaluation of Security for DSSS Under Repeater Jamming
- A study on active jamming to synthetic aperture radar
- Jamming Vulnerabilities of IEEE 802.11e
- DEEJAM Defeating Energy-Efficient Jamming in IEEE 802.15.4-based Wireless Networks
- Effect of Noise FM Jamming against ISAR Imaging
- Impact of multipath fading and partial-band interference on the performance of a COFDMCDMA modulation scheme for robust wireless communications
- Combined tone and noise jamming against coded FHMFSK ECCM radios
- Jamming canceler using interpolated FFT
- A new method of camouflage jamming against ISAR based on compensating modulation
- On the Performance of IEEE 802.11 under Jamming
- Feasibility Assessment of Repeater Jamming Technique for DSSS
- A Novel Method to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Communications Jamming
- Keyless Jam Resistance

Sign up to vote on this title

UsefulNot usefulClose Dialog## Are you sure?

This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?

Loading