The Moral Fabric: Criticisms on Mackies

Bridge between Metaethical and Normative

Considerations
Antonio S. Pagsibigan Jr.
ID Number: 10901779
Introduction
When we talk about good or bad, we normally talk about it in relation to the uestion, !"s
this #articular $orm o$ action good or bad%& "n this sense, the uestion is that o$ a normative
nature and by this, we mean that the uestion concerns itsel$ with ways as to how one !ought& to
act' This #articular to#ic is the $ocus o$ ethics' "$ one does act in a way that one ought to then the
action is considered to be right and i$ the #erson $ails to act as so, then the action is wrong'
(owever, even i$ this is a to#ic which has concerned many #eo#le, there has been many diverse
answers as to which action is right or which action is wrong' "t is right to tell the truth' "t is
wrong to kill or steal' "t is right to #rotect ones li$e' (owever, let us concern ourselves with the
uestion beyond !what is right or wrong&' "t is metaethics that concerns itsel$ with the uestion
which is rarely asked when talking about morality, namely, !why is this action right or wrong in
the $irst #lace%&
When we do ask this uestion, we inuire as to the nature o$ moral #ro#erties and i$ such
#ro#erties do e)ist' There has been an on*going metaethical debate regarding this uestion' +ne
side o$ the debate claims that moral #ro#erties do e)ist and this side is called moral realism'
,nother side o$ the debate claims that they dont e)ist and this is called moral anti*realism'
(owever, there is another #osition o$ the debate which takes a slightly di$$erent stand $rom anti*
realism, namely, the error theory' What would make this error theory di$$erent $rom the moral
anti*realist% The di$$erence is that although the error theorist does acknowledge the same claim
that moral #ro#erties do not e)ist, they also claim that this does not sto# us $rom making moral
-udgments or claims albeit $alse ones' We are, there$ore, in .error every time we make such
claims'
The ma-or #ro#onent o$ the error theory is /'0' Mackie who made use o$ this theory in his
book "nventing 1ight and Wrong to argue that there are no such moral #ro#erties in the world but
we can still make moral -udgments or claims regardless o$ the absence o$ moral #ro#erties as we
commonly see them' By this, Mackie would mean then that moral claims and ethical -udgments
do not lose their claim to be taken seriously and in e$$ect, moral #hiloso#hy still has a role to
#lay' (ere lies, the sub-ect o$ my #a#er, namely, the bridging between the metaethical
consideration o$ the a##arent non*e)istence o$ moral #ro#erties and the normative considerations
o$ ethics' Mackie uses this bridging to show the role o$ moral #hiloso#hy in the absence o$ moral
#ro#erties' The uestion then would be how does he do it% From a metaethical stand#oint, how
would Mackie -um# to the normative area o$ ethics i$ moral #ro#erties do not e)ist%
The Moral Fabric: Criticisms on Mackies Bridge between
Metaethical and Normative Considerations Pagsibigan, Page 1
2enior 1esearch 3a#er
Final 4ra$t
Term 5, ,6 7897*7895
"n answer to this uestion, " would attem#t to illustrate the arguments which Mackie uses
in order to do this' ,$ter illustrating his arguments, " would then show how these arguments $it
together and through an evaluation o$ a key #remise within the structure, " would show that
Mackies arguments $or bridging the metaethical and normative considerations is weak and how
the whole argument $ails without this key #remise'
Metaethical Considerations and Normative Considerations
Be$ore illustrating the arguments $or bridging the metaethical and the normative, let me
$irst clari$y Mackies metaethical claim and the normative considerations which he wishes to
address' By metaethical, we mean that which concerns the nature o$ moral claims and by
normative, we mean that which concerns how one ought to act' 2ome would ask why assume
that Mackie is correct at all by claiming that moral #ro#erties do not e)ist% To answer this, we
must $irst understand the nature o$ moral #ro#erties and how he challenges this'
Moral objectivity and the Error Theory
,s said be$ore, moral realists claim that moral #ro#erties e)ist but to be e)#licit, they
believe that moral ob-ective #rescri#tive #ro#erties e)ist' Mackie in turn believes that this is the
common way how #eo#le understand moral #ro#erties, that basically our moral conce#tion is
that o$ an ob-ectively #rescri#tive one' To clari$y what this means, let me e)#lain how Mackie
illustrates what ob-ectively #rescri#tive means' When we say ob-ectively #rescri#tive, the best
illustration o$ it would be 3latos Form o$ the :ood such that -ust knowing the good or !seeing it
will not merely tell men what to do but will ensure that they do it, overruling any contrary
inclinations or desires, much like how we #erceive moral #ro#erties' ;Mackie, 9<<8, 75=' Not
only are we #rescribed what action to take, we are also given motive to do so when we !see&
moral #ro#erties regardless o$ our interests or desires to #ursue the #rescribed action' (owever,
this conce#tion o$ moral #ro#erties seems to be very #roblematic' For some reason inde#endent
$rom our own, by mere acuaintance o$ moral #ro#erties, we acuire reason to #ursue them' This
is #roblematic sim#ly .cause i$ we are se#arated $rom these moral #ro#erties then we would have
no reason to do what they say' Mackie would make this #oint clearer in one o$ his arguments' (e
makes use o$ two arguments in his error theory to show that moral ob-ective #rescri#tive
#ro#erties do not e)ist, namely, the argument $rom relativity and the argument $rom ueerness'
Argument rom !elativity
The argument $rom relativity rises $rom the various di$$erences in belie$ o$ moral
#ro#erties>$acts' These di$$erences are not merely disagreements in understanding but authentic
di$$erences' (owever, this is not the main $orce o$ the argument' "t may indirectly su##ort
sub-ectivism since di$$erences between moral -udgements make it di$$icult to treat those
-udgments as a##rehensions o$ ob-ective truths ;9<<8, 5?=' "ts $orce is in the belie$ that these
di$$erences occur because our moral -udgments seem to be based on li$e style rather than some
moral #ro#erty' Mackie states that !in short, the argument $rom relativity has some $orce sim#ly
.cause the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily e)#lained by the hy#othesis that
they re$lect ways o$ li$e than by the hy#othesis that they e)#ress #erce#tions, most o$ them
seriously inadeuate and badly distorted, o$ ob-ective values'& ;9<<8, 5@= This argument is the
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lesser o$ two since it does not attack the conce#t o$ moral #ro#erties directly but sim#ly #ut, a
#erson would claim that monogamy is good not because o$ his belie$ o$ moral #ro#erty that
makes it good but rather believes it be so because he #artici#ates in monogamy'
Argument rom "ueerne##
The ne)t argument which he uses to establish that there are no moral #ro#erties is the
argument $rom ueerness wherein the argument is com#rised o$ two challenges, meta#hysical
and e#istemological' Mackie #uts it uite a#tly that !"$ there were ob-ective values, then they
would be entities or ualities or relations o$ a very strange sort, utterly di$$erent $rom anything
else in the universe' Corres#ondingly, i$ we were aware o$ them, it would have to be by some
s#ecial $aculty o$ moral #erce#tion or intuition, utterly di$$erent $rom our ordinary ways o$
knowing everything else'&
9
;9<<8, 5A=' 2im#ly #ut, i$ our conce#tion o$ moral #ro#erties is like
that o$ 3latos $orm o$ the good then these moral #ro#erties would be inde#endent o$ human
agents and thus have no connection to us but it would seem, at least in our conce#tion o$ them,
that they do' Furthermore because they are inde#endent o$ us then we would need some sort o$
s#ecial $aculty to know them in the $irst #lace' "t would seem that because o$ the argument $rom
ueerness and its two challenges, it is highly doubt$ul that there e)ist some ob-ectively
#rescri#tive moral #ro#erties' For instance, i$ there is a moral ob-ective #rescri#tive #ro#erty that
makes stealing bad then " ought not to steal' " am both action guided and motivated not to steal
by this moral #ro#erty' But as was stated, ob-ectivity entails an inde#endence $rom the moral
agent, namely, me because it is not contingent o$ any desire " may have' "$ that is so, then it is
estranged $rom me and thus " not only have no motivation to $ollow its #rescri#tion but " also
have no way o$ coming to know this moral #ro#erty' Thus, Mackie makes clear that there are no
moral #ro#erties in the $irst #lace'
0et us assume that Mackie is correct and that there are no moral #ro#erties at least such
that are ob-ective' , ma-or concern then would be the role o$ moral #hiloso#hy since some would
believe moral -udgments to lose their claim to be taken seriously' (owever, Mackies does not
sto# with his negative thesis o$ #roving that moral #ro#erties dont e)ist' (e also #uts $orward
his #ositive thesis that moral #hiloso#hy and conseuently, ethics does not lose its im#ortance'
Mackie claims that we still have use o$ morality, namely, to invent it' (is normative concern then
would be to show what $orm o$ morality would be acce#table' (owever, let us not concern
ourselves with this normative consideration
7
' Now that we have cleared u# how Mackie
illustrates the metaethical considerations, let us $ocus on how he #lans to make the bridge to the
normative or sim#ly #ut, how he argues $or the need $or morality'
Bridging the Metaethical and the Normative
,s was discussed in the #revious section, a conseuence o$ the error theory is that o$ the
lost o$ moral ob-ective #ro#erties and by relation, the lost o$ moral ob-ective claims' The concern
o$ moral #hiloso#hers is that when we lose this ob-ectivity o$ claims then we lose their claim to
1
There are two ways to respond to the argument from queerness: Naturalism and Non-
naturalism. While Non-naturalism suers the same dilemmas as ob!e"ti#e #alues, Naturalism
does away with $b!e"ti#ity in order to preser#e moral realism.
2
%a"&ie's answer towards the normati#e "onsideration is that of a form of utilitarianism
whi"h fo"uses on utility and gi#es up any notion of moral ob!e"ti#e good.
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be taken seriously ;4enise et al' 788A, 55A=' "$ so, what then is the #oint o$ moral #hiloso#hy%
Mackie states that we still have use $or moral #hiloso#hy and that the $unction o$ moral
#hiloso#hy now is not to be discovered but rather it should be made' By answering as to why one
should make morality, Mackie builds the bridge $rom his metaethical to his normative
considerations and so the argument starts here' Morality was based on the conce#tion o$ moral
ob-ective #rescri#tive #ro#erties e)isting and i$ it were #roven that no such things e)ist then
morality can hardly be taken seriously' (owever, there seems to be a reason why morality should
e)ist and continue to $unction and i$ so there is such a reason, then the -ob o$ moral #hiloso#hy
will be to invent morality' Mackie having stated such an argument #resents his $irst #remise $or
needing morality'
Mackie states that the human #redicament has #ersistent $eatures o$ things being liable to
go very badly and this is because o$ the various limitation that man has to endure such as limited
resources, limited rationality and above all limited sym#athies ;Mackie, 9<<8, 98@*98A=' By
sym#athies, we sim#ly mean the concern $or others such that there is limited sym#athy $rom all
human beings $or his $ellow man' (owever, why is such a limitation inherent in human
#redicament% The answer is sim#ly because, as Mackie argues, it is in human nature to be sel$ish
or egoistic' Mackie argues that man is concerned with the satis$action o$ his own ends than that
o$ hel#ing one another' "n such a case, morality then $unctions to counteract this limitation o$
mens sym#athies ;9<<8, 98A=' By virtue o$ this argument, the need $or morality is then to
counteract mans egoistic tendencies to ensure that he may live a decent li$e and by decent
Mackie means that which would bring him better grati$ications'
Mackie strengthens this #oint by re$erring to $our #hiloso#hers that would illustrate the
bene$its o$ morality, namely, 3rotagoras, Warnock, (obbes and (ume' We have seen that i$
human nature is that o$ a sel$ish one, it would seem that morality is needed to counteract this
nature but how would it do so% The $our #hiloso#hers mentioned are all at least broadly in
agreement that morality is needed to solve limited resources and limited sym#athies since these
generate com#etition which leads to con$lict and an absence o$ mutually bene$icial coo#eration
;9<<8, 999=' These #hiloso#hers may di$$er in the $orm o$ the solution but they would all agree
that morality is the solution' For instance, knowledge and acknowledgement o$ human nature to
be egoistic would lead to distrust among #eo#le and by doing so make li$e harder at the very
least and make it unbearable due to com#etition or $ear o$ death at the most' There needs to be a
moral system which would enable coo#eration and trust to develo# $or the bene$it o$ those within
the system wherein those who abide by the rules o$ the system will be rewarded and those who
dont will be #unished' This $orm o$ morality does not a##eal to ob-ectivity but rather a##eals to
the egoistic nature o$ man since it works $or the bene$it o$ him and thus, he has #ro#er
motivation to $ollow it'
3erha#s a more concrete illustration o$ the argument $or the need o$ morality is in the
variation o$ the 3risoners 4ilemma which Mackie uses' The dilemma goes as $ollows: Two
soldiers, Tom and 4an, are manning two nearby strong*#osts in an attem#t to hold u# an enemy
advance'
"$ both remain at their #osts, they have a $airly good chance o$ holding o$$ the
enemy until relie$ arrives, and so o$ both surviving'
The Moral Fabric: Criticisms on Mackies Bridge between
Metaethical and Normative Considerations Pagsibigan, Page )
"$ they both run away, the enemy will break through immediately, and the chance
o$ either o$ them surviving is markedly less'
But i$ one stays at his #ost while the other runs away, the one who runs will have
an even better chance o$ survival than each will have i$ both remain, while the one
who stays will have an even worse chance than each will have i$ they both run'
2u##ose that these $acts are known to both men, and each calculates in a
thoroughly rational way with a view sim#ly to this own survival' ;9<<8, 99B=
Tom reasons that i$ 4an remains at his #ost, " shall have a better chance o$ surviving i$ "
run than i$ " stayC but also i$ 4an runs away " shall have a better chance i$ " run than i$ " stayC so
whatever 4an is going to do, " would be well advised to run' 2ince both men are o$ the same
sel$ish nature and both undergo the same $actors and know the same things, it is a##arent that
both would think o$ the same thing ;9<<8, 99B=' (owever, it is reasonable $or the two to stay at
their #osts since it gives them a higher chance to survive but since they have no assurance that
the other would stay added to the knowledge that he knows the other is sel$ish then it would also
be reasonable to both o$ them that running would be a better choice' What then is the solution to
such a dilemma where reason seems to be not enough% Mackie, with the hel# o$ the other
#hiloso#hers mentioned, answers that morality is the solution' "$ both men are under a moral
system wherein desertion would lead to #unishment and #roves running to be less bene$icial than
staying, then the men would stay' Mackie states that such $orms o$ systems which would give
those under it reason and motivation to $ollow, would as long as this reason took their egoistic
nature into consideration' For instance, i$ Tom knew that 4an ke#t his #romises and 4an knew
that Tom ke#t his #romises and both were able to #romise not leave their #osts, they would likely
believe it to be so and not run since they would have reason that the other would not leave his
#ost in virtue o$ the habit o$ kee#ing #romises' There$ore, not only does morality counteract
sel$ish tendencies, it does so in a way that may #rove bene$icial'
Evaluation of The Bridge
Now that " #rovided an illustration o$ Mackies !bridging& argument so to s#eak, let us
then see i$ the argument works well' By evaluating the #remises which lead to Mackies claim
that we need morality, we will be able to see whether he was able to establish the connection
between his metaethical considerations and normative considerations' (owever, in order to better
illustrate my evaluation, let us work backwards, starting $irst with Mackies claim itsel$'
Mackies claim to be #recise is sim#ly that we need morality because morality is able to
counteract our sel$ish nature' "n this sense, Mackies solution to such sel$ishness and the
conseuences to such is morality' (e then su##orts this claim with e)am#les which illustrate the
conseuences o$ the egoistic nature o$ humans and the human #redicament which as he states is
that o$ limited sym#athies' , #articular e)am#le he makes use o$ is his variation o$ the 3risoners
4ilemma as illustrated above' The solution to the dilemma as stated is the adherence and
motivation to $ollow a moral system which #roves bene$icial to those who $ollow it and
disadvantageous to those who dont' By this it is clear that the $unction o$ morality is to
counteract our limited sym#athies and by relation, our sel$ish nature since it would seem that
there is only such a limited sym#athy because o$ our egoistic nature' "$ this is the argument
which Mackie #resents to bridge the metaethical and the normative, then it would seem a##arent
that the $oundation o$ the argument is the #remise that human nature is egoistic since it already
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clear that it is the ob-ect morality, that which morality wishes to address and counteract' 0et us
take a closer look at how Mackie uses and views this view o$ human nature'
The way Mackie uses egoism and e)#lains it is as such that human nature is eventually
concerned with his own wel$are' "t makes it clear that when Mackie states that human nature is
that o$ a sel$ish nature, he re$ers to #sychological egoism which has the same descri#tion o$
human nature as mentioned' (owever, what is interesting in this regard is that #sychological
egoism is a descri#tive #osition
5
' 1ather than a normative #osition which #rescribes how one
ought to act, #sychological egoism concerns itsel$ with the nature o$ human beings such that
ultimately the aim o$ each #erson is his sel$*interest
D
and because o$ this, it rules out altruistic
behaviour or motivation ;2tan$ord Encyclo#edia o$ 3hiloso#hy=' By using this, Mackie is able to
give a reason why one would need morality' This seems to be the general line o$ thought within
Mackies argument as well illustrated even in the 3risoners 4ilemma his uses to em#hasiFe the
need $or morality' Thus, egoism is the basis o$ his !bridging& argument such that i$ human nature
is egoistic then we need morality and it so ha##ens that human nature is egoistic so we need
morality' "t would seem that he assumes it without uestion in the whole argument but why
would one assume #sychological egoism at all%
"$ we look at Mackies arguments $or bridging the metaethical and normative
considerations, $or some reason, we cannot $ind any argument $or assuming that human nature is
egoistic' (e sim#ly states it to be readily acce#ted that this is how human nature is and then
makes use o$ (ume, (obbes, and the other #hiloso#hers to strengthen this line o$ thought' "t
would then seem that Mackie does not give su$$icient reason $or us to believe #sychological
egoism and this #recisely, the weak #oint o$ his argument' The central #remise o$ the whole
argument to bridge the metaethical and normative is that which is most #roblematic within the
argument' (owever, let us not be content with -ust saying that Mackie gives no su$$icient reason
$or assuming #sychological egoism' " would attem#t to #resent argument that would serve as
su$$icient reasons to doubt #sychological egoism'
There are various ways to ob-ect #sychological egoism, however, " will state and
illustrate three which " believe is adeuate enough to be used against Mackies argument' First,
the most obvious ob-ection o$ all is that #sychological egoism is not an a##arent truth and is
counter intuitive' Not only are those who believe it to be true reuired to shoulder the burden o$
truth, they must also ultimately account $or situations which are not motivated by sel$ish reason'
For instance, Mackie use the 3risoners 4ilemma to illustrate #sychological egoism and shows
how one desires ones own wel$are or sel$*interests but i$ #sychological egoism is true then it
must be true in all cases' (owever, a counter e)am#le can be given against #sychological egoism
such that the case would be a soldier throws himsel$ on a grenade to save his $riend ;2tan$ord
Encyclo#edia o$ 3hiloso#hy=' "t would seem that his action was motivated by altruistic reason
and not o$ egoistic ones' Mackie cannot say that there is an underlying egoistic reason behind the
act since the soldier dies and gains nothing out o$ the act' Wel$are or sel$*interest cannot be the
reason $or act and so #sychological egoism must be wrong' 2econd, #sychological egoism relies
on an oversim#li$ied conce#tion o$ human motives ;West Galley Hniversity=' "t makes the
(
+ normati#e position in egoism "ould either be ethi"al egoism or rational egoism. ,oth
pres"ribe how one ought to a"t but dier in form.
)
-thi"al egoism belie#es that one should always a"t so as to bene.t himself but rational
egoism belie#es that one should a"t so as to bene.t himself as reason would di"tate.
The Moral Fabric: Criticisms on Mackies Bridge between
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mistake o$ associating two occurrences where the second is the reason $or the $irst such that i$ "
hel# my mom cook and conseuently $eel ha##y, there$ore, wanting to $eel ha##y was the reason
why " hel#ed my mom cook' This may not be the caseC " may have wanted to hel# my mom
sim#ly because " had nothing else to do or because " wanted to eat' The #oint being that the
occurrence o$ me $eeling ha##y has nothing to do with my reason $or hel#ing my mom'
3sychological egoisms $ormulation o$ human nature is basically like this' The last argument
against Mackies argument would be that o$ /ose#h Butlers claim that the #o#ular notion that
there is a natural o##osition between sel$*love and benevolence is $alse and erroneous sim#ly
because the altruistic tendency to hel# others or care $or their ha##iness does not hinder in any
way the attainment o$ my own ha##iness so that a #ursuit to which tends to #romote the good o$
another, yet may have as great tendency to #romote my interest ;4enise et al' 788A, 977=' "$ this
is the case, then it is not necessarily so that ones actions are sel$ish and that even altruistic ways
o$ acting and behaviour may even bene$it ones sel$' By use o$ these three arguments against
#sychological egoism, we are thus given enough reason to doubt Mackies conce#tion o$ human
nature' 0et us then look at the im#lications o$ this evaluation towards the whole o$ Mackies
attem#t to bridge the metaethical and the normative'
The whole o$ Mackies argument is given weight and $orce by his assum#tion that human
nature is that o$ an egoistic nature, that is each #erson aims $or his own sel$*interests and by this
Mackie is commited to #sychological egoism' (e states that the $unction and role o$ morality is
sim#ly to counteract such sel$ish tendencies such limited sym#athies and so enable #eo#le to
achieve mutual bene$icial coo#eration' (owever, Mackie does not give any reason why we
would assume human nature to be egoistic' Furthermore, we have am#le reason to doubt it as
given above' "$ Mackies argument loses this #remise o$ egoism then the whole o$ the argument
loses $orce and weight at the very least' "m not saying that there is no more use $or morality' "m
-ust saying that i$ the need $or morality is based on egoism and egoism can be argued rightly to
be $alse then the need $or morality $ails and the argument #roves to be week' " suggest that an
error theorist use the im#lication o$ the argument $rom relativity to argue $or the need $or
morality instead o$ using egoism as a basis' ,s mentioned in $irst sections o$ the #a#er, the
argument $rom relativity states that moral #rinci#les are more readily e)#lained by ways o$
living' "$ so, then di$$erent ways o$ living would entail di$$erent moral -udgments' "$ that is the
case then it would be advisable to have morality as a $orm o$ controlling and mediating these
di$$erent moral -udgments' (owever, the #oint being o$ my evaluation is that Mackies argument
$or bridging the metaethical and the normative considerations seems to be weak because its main
#remise which rest o$ the argument de#ends u#on is that o$ egoism and egoism has been #roven
to be #roblematic, em#hasiFed moreso because o$ the arguments which " have given and a##lied
to Mackies argument'
Possible b!ections
, #ossible ob-ection to my #a#er is that " have not totally de$eated Mackie in res#ect to
his normative consideration and much less to his metaethical arguments since his #remises do
cohere and $ollow $rom one another' " do not claim that " have answered his metaethical
arguments and " do not claim that normative considerations are o$ no im#ortance' " do admit that
his to#ics as well as arguments regarding his metaethical and normative considerations do cohere
at least in his attem#t to bridge the two considerations' (owever, coherence does not make the
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claim any more correct' "t may be that his #remises $ollows but it does not mean that they are
true' For instance, Mackies general basis o$ thought is that the human condition or the human
nature is egoistic and by egoistic, to use the term in the #sychological sense, we mean a #erson
who is sel$ish or seeks that which he would #ersonally gain $rom' This is an assum#tion he has to
de$end because it is not a readily acce#ted assum#tion' Mackie could have -usti$ied this claim i$
he had given am#le de$ence o$ it but it so ha##ened that he did not' 1ather, Mackie assumed this
claim without so much as an argument and when he does attem#t to -usti$y this claim, he only
states that this view o$ human nature is easily acce#ted' "$ we do not challenge this #remise, then
the bulk o$ arguments works because they cohere, however, we are not given any reason to
acknowledge that this #remise is true, much less -usti$ied' Furthermore, #sychological egoism
has long since been dis$avoured because o$ the arguments which " have already given in the
#revious section' We have am#le reason to at the very least doubt that the human nature is that o$
an egoistic one' "t does not change the $act that morality remains im#ortant in controlling and
guiding the actions o$ #eo#le but it does make Mackies argument $or the need o$ it $aulty or at
least weak since it is the $oundation o$ the whole argument'
Conclusion
0et me reca# what has trans#ired within this #a#er' The $irst hal$ o$ the #a#er was meant
to show how his metaethical considerations and his error theory e$$ectively worked against the
e)istence o$ moral #ro#erties as ob-ectively #rescri#tive as well as o#ening u# the concern
regarding the $unction and role o$ moral #hiloso#hy when there is no such moral #ro#erty that
e)ists and by relation, it would seem that moral claims would hardly be taken seriously' The
second hal$ o$ the #a#er was meant to illustrate how Mackie attem#ted to bridge his metaethical
considerations to that o$ his normative considerations in an attem#t to make and mould morality
since this, he claims, is the new task o$ moral #hiloso#hy' (e did this through various
assum#tions and arguments which #rimarily hinged on the assum#tion that the human condition
or the human nature as he #uts it is that o$ a sel$ish nature or more s#eci$ically, egoistic' (e
makes use o$ $our #hiloso#hers ;3rotagoras, (ume, (obbes, and Wanrock= who share the same
view in order to cohere with his arguments and show that morality or ethics is needed since it
would best serve man and it would kee# in check his sel$ish nature' By doing so, he #rovides the
connection or, more s#eci$ically, the reason to bridge the metaethical consideration o$ there being
no moral #ro#erties and the normative consideration that o$ what can be an acce#table $orm o$
ethics' " then argue that this bridge between the metaethical and the normative is weak since it is
only there because o$ his assum#tion that the human condition is that o$ a sel$ish nature' " de$end
my argument by stating that this assum#tion is un$ounded and Mackie gives no de$ence as to
why he assumes this view' Furthermore, " establish that #sychological egoism is a #roblematic
view which has not been a#tly de$ended by any #hiloso#her and " su##ort this claim by giving
counter e)am#les to Mackies game theory e)am#les' There$ore, without su$$icient reason to
assume that human nature is egoistic and without this assum#tion, Mackies argument to bridge
the metaethical to the normative crumbles because the $oundation o$ his whole argument towards
that o$ making morality is that o$ #sychological egoism'
"E#E"ENCE $IST
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Miller, ,le), 7885' An Introduction to %ontem&orary Metaethic#' Cambridge: Blackwell
3ublishing "nc'
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and the 'abric o The (niver#e' 9@9*9A9
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htt#:>>#lato'stan$ord'edu>entries>egoism> ;accessed March 95, 7895=
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htt#:>>instruct'westvalley'edu>la$ave>Egoism'html ;accesed March 95, 7895=
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in Morality& in *reat Tradition# in Ethic#+ 99@*97A, Hnited 2tates o$ ,merica: Thomson
Wadsworth
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2entiment& in *reat Tradition# in Ethic#+ 97<*9D9, Hnited 2tates o$ ,merica: Thomson
Wadsworth
4enise, Theodore, White, Nicolas, and 3eter$reund, 2heldon, 788A' !/'0' Mackie: "nventing
1ight and Wrong& in *reat Tradition# in Ethic#+ 55A*5DB, Hnited 2tates o$ ,merica: Thomson
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Metaethic#' eds' ,ndrew Fisher, and Taylor Jirchin, @B*@<' 0ondon: 1outledge'
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Iueerness,& in Arguing About Metaethic#' eds' ,ndrew Fisher, and Taylor Jirchin, A8*<B'
0ondon: 1outledge'
:arner, 1ichard, 788?' !+n the :enuine Iueerness o$ Moral 3ro#erties and Facts,& in Arguing
About Metaethic#' eds' ,ndrew Fisher, and Taylor Jirchin, <?*98?' 0ondon: 1outledge'
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Fisher, and Taylor Jirchin, 99@*9DD' 0ondon: 1outledge'
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Taylor Jirchin, 9DB*9@A' 0ondon: 1outledge'
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(organ, Terrence, and Timmons, Mark 788?' !Troubles $or New Wave Moral 2emantics: The
+#en Iuestion ,rgument 1evived,& in Arguing About Metaethic#' eds' ,ndrew Fisher, and
Taylor Jirchin, 9@<*9<<' 0ondon: 1outledge'
/ackson, Frank, 788?' !Critical Notice o$ (urley,& in Arguing About Metaethic#' eds' ,ndrew
Fisher, and Taylor Jirchin, 788*79B' 0ondon: 1outledge'
Mc4owell, /ohn, 788?' !Galues and 2econdary Iualities,& in Arguing About Metaethic#' eds'
,ndrew Fisher, and Taylor Jirchin, 77B*7D8' 0ondon: 1outledge'
2osa, 4avid, 788?' !3athetic Ethics,& in Arguing About Metaethic#' eds' ,ndrew Fisher, and
Taylor Jirchin, 7D9*7AD' 0ondon: 1outledge'
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