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SECONDDIVISION

[G.R.No.158407,January17,2005]
FILOMENADOMAGAS,PETITIONER,VS.VIVIANLAYNO
JENSEN,RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
Thisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorari,underRule45oftheRulesofCourt,ofthe
Decision
[1]
oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCAG.R.CVNo.73995,whichaffirmed
the Decision
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in
Civil Case No. 20000244D, which declared null and void the decision of the
MunicipalTrialCourt(MTC)ofCalasiao,PangasinaninCivilCaseNo.879.
[3]
Theantecedentfactsfollow.
On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible
entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan.
The petitioner alleged in her complaint that she was the registered owner of a
parceloflandcoveredbyOriginalCertificateofTitle(OCT)No.P30980,situatedin
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, and with an area of 827 square meters.
OnJanuary9,1999therespondent,bymeansofforce,strategyandstealth,gained
entry into the petitioners property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter
constructingafencethereon.Assuch,thepetitionerwasdeprivedofa68square
meterportionofherpropertyalongtheboundaryline.Thepetitionerprayedthat,
afterdueproceedings,judgmentberenderedinherfavor,thus:
3.And,aftertrial,judgmentberendered:
a) DECLARING the writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
WritofPreliminaryInjunctionpermanent
b)ORDERINGdefendant,hisrepresentatives,agentsandpersons
acting under her, to vacate the portion of the property of the
plaintiffoccupiedbythemandtodesistfromentering,excavating
and constructing in the said property of the plaintiff described in
paragraph 2 hereof and/or from disturbing the peaceful
ownership and possession of the plaintiff over the said land,
pendingthefinalresolutionoftheinstantaction
c) ORDERING defendant to pay reasonable rental at FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS per month from January 9, 1999
up to the time she finally vacates and removes all constructions
madebyherinthepropertyoftheplaintiffanduptothetimeshe
finallyrestoresthesaidpropertyintheconditionbeforeherillegal
entry,excavationandconstructioninthepropertyoftheplaintiff
d)ORDERINGdefendanttopayactualdamagesintheamountof
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS moral damages in the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS attorneys
fees of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS in retainers fee
andONETHOUSANDFIVEHUNDRED(P1,500.00)PESOSpercourt
appearance fee exemplary damages in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND(P20,000.00)PESOS,and,costs.
Plaintifffurtherpraysforotherreliefsandremediesjustandequitablein
thepremises.
[4]
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 879. The summons and the complaint
were not served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the
country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (the respondents) brother, Oscar
Layno, who was then in the respondents house at No. 572 Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao, Pangasinan. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar
Layno,whoreceivedthesame.
[5]
Nonetheless, on May 17, 1999, the court rendered judgment ordering the
respondentandallpersonsoccupyingthepropertyforandinthelattersbehalfto
vacate the disputed area and to pay monthly rentals therefor, including actual
damages,attorneysfees,andexemplarydamages.Thefalloofthedecisionreads:
1) Ordering the defendant, her representatives, agents and persons
acting under her, to vacate the 68square meters which she
encroachedupon
2) Ordering the defendant to pay a monthly rental of P1,000.00 to the
plaintiff
3) To pay plaintiff actual damages of P20,000.00 attorneys fees of
P15,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 plus
thecosts.
SOORDERED.
[6]
Therespondentfailedtoappealthedecision.Consequently,awritofexecutionwas
issuedonSeptember27,1999.
OnAugust16,2000,therespondentfiledacomplaintagainstthepetitionerbefore
theRTCofDagupanCityfortheannulmentofthedecisionoftheMTCinCivilCase
No.879,onthegroundthatduetotheSheriffsfailuretoservethecomplaintand
summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired
jurisdictionoverherperson.Therespondentallegedthereinthattheserviceofthe
complaint and summons through substituted service on her brother, Oscar Layno,
wasimproperbecauseofthefollowing:(a)whenthecomplaintinCivilCaseNo.879
wasfiled,shewasnotaresidentofBarangayBuenlag,Calasiao,Pangasinan,butof
Oslo, Norway, and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the
summonsandthecomplaint,shehadthenleasedittoEduardoGonzales(b)she
wasinOslo,Norway,atthetimethesummonsandthecomplaintwereserved(c)
her brother, Oscar Layno, was merely visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag and
was not a resident nor an occupant thereof when he received the complaint and
summonsand(d)OscarLaynowasneverauthorizedtoreceivethesummonsand
thecomplaintforandinherbehalf.
[7]
The respondent further alleged that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 because the petitioner, the plaintiff
therein, failed to show prior possession of the property. She further claimed that
theallegedforcibleentrywassimplybasedontheresultofthesurveyconductedby
Geodetic Engineer Leonardo de Vera showing that the property of the respondent
encroachedonthatofthepetitioner.
TherespondentfiledaManifestationdatedAugust31,2000,andappendedthereto
the following: (a) a copy
[8]
of her passport showing that she left the country on
February 17, 1999 (b) a copy
[9]
of the Contract of Lease dated November 24,
1997,executedbyherandEduardoD.Gonzalesoverherhouseforaperiodofthree
(3) years or until November 24, 2000 (c) her affidavit
[10]
stating, inter alia, that
sheownedthehouseatBarangayBuenlag,Calasiao,Pangasinan,whichsheleased
to Eduardo Gonzales that she was married to Jarl Jensen, a citizen of Norway, on
August23,1987andhadresidedinNorwaywithherhusbandsince1993thatshe
arrivedinthePhilippinesonDecember31,1998,butleftonFebruary17,1999
she returned to the Philippines on July 30, 2000 and learned, only then, of the
complaint against her and the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 her
brotherOscarLaynowasnotaresidentofthehouseatBarangayBuenlagandthat
sheneverreceivedthecomplaintandsummonsinsaidcase(d)theaffidavit
[11]
of
Oscar Layno declaring that sometime in April 1999, he was in the respondents
housetocollectrentalsfromEduardoGonzalesthattheSheriffarrivedandserved
himwithacopyofthesummonsandthecomplaintinCivilCaseNo.879andthat
he never informed the respondent of his receipt of the said summons and
complaint(e)anaffidavit
[12]
ofEduardoGonzalesstatingthatheleasedthehouse
of the respondent and resided thereat the respondent was not a resident of the
said house although he (Gonzales) allowed the respondent to occupy a room
therein whenever she returned to the Philippines as a balikbayan and that Oscar
Laynowasnotresidingthereinbutonlycollectedtherentals.
In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a
resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the
subjectpremiseswhereOscarLaynowaswhentheSheriffservedthesummonsand
complaintthattheserviceofthecomplaintandsummonsbysubstitutedserviceon
therespondent,thedefendantinCivilCaseNo.879,waspropersinceherbrother
Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan,receivedthecomplaintandsummonsforandinherbehalf.
Thepetitionerappendedthefollowingtoheranswer:(a)acopy
[13]
oftheDeedof
AbsoluteSaleexecutedbyJoseLaynoinherfavor,datedAugust26,1992,showing
thattherespondentwasaresidentofBarangayBuenlag,Calasiao,Pangasinan(b)
a Real Estate Mortgage
[14]
executed by the respondent, dated February 9, 1999
showingthatshewasaresidentofBarangayBuenlag,Calasiao,Pangasinan(c)the
Joint Affidavit
[15]
of Vicenta Peralta and Orlando Macalanda, both residents of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, declaring that the respondent and her
brotherOscarLaynoweretheirneighborsthattherespondentandherbrotherhad
been residents of Barangay Buenlag since their childhood that although the
respondent left the country on several occasions, she returned to the Philippines
and resided in her house at No. 572 located in the said barangay and (d) the
VotersRegistrationRecord
[16]
ofOscarLayno,approvedonJune15,1997.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent.Thedispositiveportionreads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Vivian Layno
JensenandagainstdefendantFilomenaDomagas,asfollows:
1. TheDecisionoftheMunicipalTrialCourtofCalasiao,Pangasinanin
CivilCaseNo.879,entitledFilomenaDomagasversusVivianLayno
Jensen is declared null and void, for lack of jurisdiction over the
personoftheplaintiffandthesubjectmatter.
2. Defendant Filomena Domagas is ordered to pay plaintiff, the
following:
a.)Actualdamages,representinglitigationexpensesintheamount
ofP50,000.00
b.)AttorneysfeesintheamountofP50,000.00
c.)MoralDamagesintheamountofP50,000.00
d.)ExemplaryDamagesintheamountofP50,000.00and
e.)Costsofsuit.
SOORDERED.
[17]
The trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and
summonsontherespondent,thedefendantinCivilCaseNo.879,consideringthat
she left the Philippines on February 17, 1999 for Oslo, Norway, and her brother
Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for
andinherbehalf.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which, on May 6, 2003, rendered
judgment affirming the appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that
thecomplaintinCivilCaseNo.879wasoneforejectment,whichisanactionquasi
inrem.Theappellatecourtruledthatsincethedefendantthereinwastemporarily
out of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via
extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the
RulesofCourt,whichlikewiserequirespriorleaveofcourt.Consideringthatthere
wasnopriorleaveofcourtandnoneofthemodesofserviceprescribedbytheRules
ofCourtwasfollowedbythepetitioner,theCAconcludedthattherewasreallyno
validserviceofsummonsandcomplaintupontherespondent,thedefendantinCivil
CaseNo.879.
Hence,thepresentpetition.
ThepetitionerassailsthedecisionoftheCA,allegingthattheappellatecourterred
inholdingthattherespondentscomplaintforejectmentisanactionquasiinrem.
Thepetitionerinsiststhatthecomplaintforforcibleentryisanactioninpersonam
therefore,substitutedserviceofthesummonsandcomplaintontherespondent,in
accordance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, is valid. The petitioner,
likewise,assertsthatOscarLaynoisaresidentandaregisteredvoterofBarangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan hence, the service of the complaint and summons
ontherespondentthroughhimisvalid.
The respondent, on the other hand, asserts that the action for forcible entry filed
against her was an action quasi in rem, and that the applicable provision of the
Rules of Court is Section 15 of Rule 14, which calls for extraterritorial service of
summons.
The sole issue is whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and
complaintinCivilCaseNo.879ontherespondenthereinwhowasthedefendantin
thesaidcase.Theresolutionofthematterisanchoredontheissueofwhetheror
not the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent herein is an
actioninpersonamorquasiinrem.
The ruling of the CA that the petitioners complaint for forcible entry of the
petitioneragainsttherespondentinCivilCaseNo.879isanactionquasiinrem,is
erroneous.Theactionofthepetitionerforforcibleentryisarealactionandonein
personam.
Thesettledruleisthattheaimandobjectofanactiondetermineitscharacter.
[18]
Whetheraproceedingisinrem,orinpersonam,orquasiinremforthatmatter,is
determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only.
[19]
A proceeding in
personamisaproceedingtoenforcepersonalrightsandobligationsbroughtagainst
the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve
hisrightto,ortheexerciseofownershipof,specificproperty,orseektocompelhim
to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court.
[20]
The
purposeofaproceedinginpersonamistoimpose,throughthejudgmentofacourt,
someresponsibilityorliabilitydirectlyuponthepersonofthedefendant.
[21]
Ofthis
characteraresuitstocompeladefendanttospecificallyperformsomeactoractions
to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.
[22]
An action in personam is said to be one
which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a
judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an
actionin personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations such
action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are
concerned,itiswellsettledthatitisaninjunctiveactinpersonam.
[23]
InCombsv.
Combs,
[24]
theappellatecourtheldthatproceedingstoenforcepersonalrightsand
obligationsandinwhichpersonaljudgmentsarerenderedadjustingtherightsand
obligationsbetweentheaffectedpartiesisinpersonam.Actionsforrecoveryofreal
propertyareinpersonam.
[25]
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed.
[26]
Inanactionquasiinrem,anindividualisnamedasdefendantandthe
purposeoftheproceedingistosubjecthisintereststhereintotheobligationorloan
burdeningtheproperty.
[27]
Actionsquasiinremdealwiththestatus,ownershipor
liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to
ascertainorcutofftherightsorinterestsofallpossibleclaimants.Thejudgments
thereinarebindingonlyuponthepartieswhojoinedintheaction.
[28]
Section1,Rule70oftheRulesofCourtprovides:
Section1.Whomayinstituteproceedings,andwhen.Subjecttothe
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possessionofanylandorbuildinginforce,intimidation,threat,strategy,
orstealth,oralessor,vendor,vendee,orotherpersonagainstwhomthe
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expirationorterminationoftherighttoholdpossessionbyvirtueofany
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of
any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against
thepersonorpersonsunlawfullywithholdingordeprivingofpossession,
oranypersonorpersonsclaimingunderthem,fortherestitutionofsuch
possession,togetherwithdamagesandcosts.
Under Section 15, Rule 70 of the said Rule, the plaintiff may be granted a writ of
preliminaryprohibitionormandatoryinjunction:
Sec. 15. Preliminary Injunction. The court may grant preliminary
injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to
prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession
againsttheplaintiff.
Apossessordeprivedofhispossessionthroughforcibleentryorunlawful
detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint,
presentamotionintheactionforforcibleentryorunlawfuldetainerfor
theissuanceofawritofpreliminarymandatoryinjunctiontorestorehim
in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30)
daysfromthefilingthereof.
If, after due proceedings, the trial court finds for the plaintiff, it shall then render
judgmentinhisorherfavor,thus:
Sec.17.Judgment.If,aftertrial,thecourtfindsthattheallegations
of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the
plaintifffortherestitutionofthepremises,thesumjustlydueasarrears
ofrentorasreasonablecompensationfortheuseandoccupationofthe
premises,attorneysfeesandcosts.Ifitfindsthatsaidallegationsare
not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his
costs.Ifacounterclaimisestablished,thecourtshallrenderjudgment
forthesumfoundinarrearsfromeitherpartyandawardcostsasjustice
requires.
From the aforementioned provisions of the Rules of Court and by its very nature
andpurpose,anactionforunlawfuldetainerorforcibleentryisarealactionandin
personambecausetheplaintiffseekstoenforceapersonalobligationorliabilityon
thedefendantunderArticle539oftheNewCivilCode,
[29]
for the latter to vacate
the property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the
plaintiff,andpayactualdamagesbywayofreasonablecompensationforhisuseor
occupationoftheproperty.
[30]
AsgleanedfromtheavermentsofthepetitionerscomplaintintheMTC,shesought
a writ of a preliminary injunction from the MTC and prayed that the said writ be
madepermanent.Underitsdecision,theMTCorderedthedefendanttherein(the
respondent in this case), to vacate the property and pay a monthly rental of
P1,000.00totheplaintifftherein(thepetitionerinthiscase).
Ontheissueofwhethertherespondentwasvalidlyservedwiththesummonsand
complaint by the Sheriff on April 5, 1999, the petitioner asserts that since her
action of forcible entry against the respondent in Civil Case No. 879 was in
personam, summons may be served on the respondent, by substituted service,
through her brother, Oscar Layno, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the
RulesofCourt.ThepetitioneraversthatOscarLayno,apersonofsuitableageand
discretion,wasresidinginthehouseoftherespondentonApril5,1999.Sheavers
thatthefactthatthehousewasleasedtoandoccupiedbyEduardoGonzaleswasof
no moment. Moreover, the Sheriff is presumed to have performed his duty of
properlyservingthesummonsontherespondentbysubstitutedservice.
Thecontentionofthepetitionerhasnomerit.
InAsiavestLimitedv.CourtofAppeals,
[31]
theCourthadtheoccasiontostate:
Inanactioninpersonam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
isnecessaryforthecourttovalidlytryanddecidethecase.Jurisdiction
overthepersonofaresidentdefendantwhodoesnotvoluntarilyappear
in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided
under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted
servicemaybemadeinaccordancewithSection8ofsaidRule.Ifheis
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service
may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8 (2)
personalserviceoutsidethecountry,withleaveofcourt(3)serviceby
publication,alsowithleaveofcourtor(4)anyothermannerthecourt
maydeemsufficient.
[32]
Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendantisnullandvoid.
[33]
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his
marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay
Buenlag,Calasiao,Pangasinan.ThiscanbegleanedfromtheDeedofAbsoluteSale
dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared that she was a resident of said
barangay.Moreover,intheRealEstateMortgageContractdatedFebruary9,1999,
ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, the petitioner
categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a resident of Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao,Pangasinan.ConsideringthattherespondentwasinOslo,Norway,having
leftthePhilippinesonFebruary17,1999,thesummonsandcomplaintinCivilCase
No. 879 may only be validly served on her through substituted service under
Section7,Rule14oftheRulesofCourt,whichreads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannotbeservedwithinareasonabletimeasprovidedinthepreceding
section,servicemaybeeffected(a)byleavingcopiesofthesummonsat
the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent
personinchargethereof.
Strictcompliancewiththemodeofserviceisrequiredinorderthatthecourtmay
acquirejurisdictionoverthepersonofthedefendant.
[34]
Thestatutoryrequirement
of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted
serviceotherthanthatauthorizedbythestatuteisrenderedineffective.
[35]
Asthe
CourtheldinHamiltonv.Levy:
[36]
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service
cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogationoftheusualmethodofservice.Itisamethodextraordinary
in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was
made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the
requirementsofsubstitutedservicerenderssaidserviceineffective.
[37]
In Keister v. Narcereo,
[38]
the Court held that the term dwelling house or
residence are generally held to refer to the time of service hence, it is not
sufficienttoleavethesummonsattheformersdwellinghouse,residenceorplace
ofabode,asthecasemaybe.Dwellinghouseorresidencereferstotheplacewhere
thepersonnamedinthesummonsislivingatthetimewhentheserviceismade,
eventhoughhemaybetemporarilyoutofthecountryatthetime.Itis,thus,the
service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the
person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant.
Compliancewiththerulesregardingtheserviceofsummonsisasmuchimportant
astheissueofdueprocessasofjurisdiction.
[39]
The Return of Service filed by Sheriff Eduardo J. Abulencia on the service of
summonsreads:
Respectfully returned to the court of origin the herein summons and
enclosures in the aboveentitled case, the undersigned caused the
serviceonApril5,1999.
DefendantVivianLaynoJensenisoutofthecountryasperinformation
from her brother Oscar Layno, however, copy of summons and
enclosureswasreceivedbyherbrotherOscarLaynoonApril5,1999as
evidencedbyhissignatureappearingintheoriginalsummons.
Calasiao,Pangasinan,April6,1999.
(Sgd.)
EDUARDOJ.ABULENCIA
JuniorProcessServer
[40]
Asgleanedfromthesaidreturn,thereisnoshowingthatasofApril5,1999,the
housewheretheSherifffoundOscarLaynowasthelattersresidenceorthatofthe
respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain
wheretheresidenceoftherespondentwasonthesaiddate.Itturnedoutthatthe
occupantofthehousewasalessor,EduardoGonzales,andthatOscarLaynowasin
thepremisesonlytocollecttherentalsfromhim.Theserviceofthesummonsona
personataplacewherehewasavisitorisnotconsideredtohavebeenleftatthe
residenceorplaceorabode,wherehehasanotherplaceatwhichheordinarilystays
andtowhichheintendstoreturn.
[41]
The Voters Registration Record of Oscar Layno dated June 15, 1997 wherein he
declaredthathewasaresidentofNo.572BarangayBuenlag,Calasiao,Pangasinan,
aswellastheJointAffidavitofVicentaPeraltaandOrlandoMacasaldacannotprevail
over the Contract of Lease the respondent had executed in favor of Eduardo
Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and occupied the house of the
respondent as lessee since November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of Eduardo
GonzalesthatOscarLaynowasnotresidinginthesaidhouseonApril5,1999.
In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the
complaintinCivilCaseNo.879onApril5,1999,bysubstitutedservice.Hence,the
MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent as such, the
decisionoftheMTCinCivilCaseNo.879isnullandvoid.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Puno,(Chairman),AustriaMartinez,Tinga,andChicoNazario,JJ.,concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. with Associate Justices
MercedesGozoDadoleandRosmariD.Carandang,concurringRollo,pp.2533.
[2]
PennedbyJudgeCrispinC.Laron(Retired).
[3]
EntitledFilomenaDomagasv.VivianLaynoJensen.
[4]
Records,p.13.
[5]
Id.at20.
[6]
Id.at79.
[7]
Records,p.2.
[8]
Id.at5456.
[9]
Id.at5758.
[10]
Id.at53.
[11]
Id.at60.
[12]
Id.at59.
[13]
Id.at46.
[14]
Id.at47.
[15]
Id.at50
[16]
Exhibit6.
[17]
Records,p.126.
[18]
NationalSuretyCo.v.AustinMachineryCorporation,35F.2d842(1929).
[19]
Sandejasv.Robles,81Phil.421(1948).
[20]
Id.at424.
[21]
AsiavestLtd.v.CourtofAppeals,296SCRA539(1998).
[22]
Hughesv.Hughes,278S.W.121(1925).
[23]
GreenOaksApartments,Ltd.v.Cannon,696S.W.2d415(1985).
[24]
60S.W.2d368(1933).
[25]
PNBv.CourtofAppeals,153SCRA435(1987).
[26]
Freemanv.Alderson,30L.Ed.372(1886).
[27]
BancodoBrasilv.CourtofAppeals,333SCRA545(2000).
[28]
Perryv.Young,182S.W.577(1916).
[29]
ART. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession and
should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said
possessionbythemeansestablishedbythelawsandtheRulesofCourt.
possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within ten days
from the filing of the complaint present a motion to secure from the competent
court,intheactionforforcibleentry,awritofpreliminarymandatoryinjunctionto
restorehiminhispossession.Thecourtshalldecidethemotionwithinthirty(30)
daysfromthefilingthereof.
[30]
ProgressiveDevelopmentCorporation,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,301SCRA637
(1999).
[31]
296SCRA539(1998).
[32]
Id.at552553.
[33]
Lamv.Rosillosa,86Phil.447(1956).
[34]
Venturanzav.CourtofAppeals,156SCRA305(1987).
[35]
Umandapv.Sabio,Jr.,339SCRA243(2000).
[36]
344SCRA821(2000).
[37]
Id.at829.
[38]
77SCRA209(1977).
[39]
AngPingv.CourtofAppeals,310SCRA343(1999).
[40]
Records,p.20.
[41]
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Gooley, 118 ALR 1484 (1938)
Albersv.Bramberg,32N.E.2d362(1941).

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