PAVEL KOVALY

IS IT POSSI BLE TO HUMANI ZE MARXI SM?

In recent times, we can observe a rapid growth of interest in the philosophy
of man or philosophical anthropology among some Marxist philosophers.
Approximately 10 to 15 years ago, some Marxists all over the world
turned their attention to the investigation of Marx's early writings, his
interpretation of human nature, man' s essence and existence, dimensions
of man, human alienation, ethical problems; in general, problems of man.
Starting from the acknowledgement of the possibility of a social change
in any society, including the Marxist ones, the question upon which many
of these discussions is based is to what extent Marxism, as a theoretical
formulation of social development, can apply the dialectical method to
itself and develop and change in connection with social realities of the
20th century, through the return to the early Marx.
Another presupposition, sometimes openly expressed but predomi-
nantly tacit, is that the development of Soviet Marxism and Soviet society
is an accidental rather than essential and necessary process and that with
the purification of Marxism from the Stalinist distortions another type of
socialist revolution can occur, resulting in a society built upon the original
Marxian ideas, a society that will be fully humane and deprived of the
excesses of the Soviet type of totalitarianism. 1
With some Marxist philosophers, thus, the basic presupposition is that
it is possible to transcend the 'erroneous', dogmatic character of Stalinism.
Marxist philosophy has only been deformed and distorted and they believe
that a return to the original Marx and to the original Lenin and Leninism
would correct all the wrongs. They propose to replace the dogmatized
version of Stalinist Marxism, conceived as a closed thought-system, by
such a conception of Marxist philosophy that would be anti-dogmatic,
open for new developments, and creative. Such views assume that the
original Marxian philosophic ideas were anti-dogmatic, humanistic and
capable of development, and that the same character marked Lenin's
interpretation of Marxist philosophy. They assume that Marxist phi-
losophy was dogmatized, petrified and spoiled by Stalin himself and
Studies in Soviet Thought 11 (1971) 276-293. All Rights Reserved
Copyright 1971 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
IS IT POSSI BLE TO HUMANI ZE MARXI SM 9. 277
subsequently by his followers. Hence, it was contended that it could be
revived as a humanistic, open, creative philosophic system.
The early Marx's investigations are studied as a possible basis for the
process of humanization of Marxism as a whole, and Marxist philosophy
in particular. These trends are hardly noticeable in the Soviet Union and
its official philosophy (on the contrary they are attacked and refuted as
revisionistic), but they have been obvious in Yugoslavia, Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia and among Western Marxists. Time and again
they have been crushed by different means, both political and ideological,
including police and military involvement.
I do not propose to solve the problem in a brief article; rather I want to
mention a few major problems of such attitudes and reasons for a deeply
sceptical view about them.
In contemporary Czechoslovakia, recently, a large group of philoso-
phers and sociologists suggested a conception of 'the scientific techno-
logical revolution' which developed into an important basis for the investi-
gations of the problems of man. This conception tries to examine the role
of science in the modern epoch and civilization, and it contains inquiries
into such questions as: the character of contemporary changes in tech-
nology, changes in the status of sciences in modern civilization, economics
and the scientific technological revolution, changes in the division of
labor, education and environment. The studies focus on the character of
human life, anthropological problems of contemporary civilization,
related philosophical and methodological questions, changes in social
structure, forms of human life and human interrelations, etc.
The research is complex and bears an interdisciplinary character,
penetrating a wide range of disciplines. It deals with the science and
technology of a civilization, investigates the epistemological, ontological,
anthropological and axiological aspects of man, as well as practical
questions of the transformation of the world and self-transformation of
man. In general, the research deals - on the philosophic level - with the
fundamental categories, with the changes in the subject- object rela-
tionship in the whole of modern civilization. It intends to overcome the
gap between the anthropological and scientific models of man, and to
create a synthetic theory of man and modern civilization.
In connection with these themes major problems of contemporary forms
of humanism started to be examined. Philosophers, sociologists and
278 PAVEL KOVALY
psychol ogi st s concent r at ed on such quest i ons as what is t he meani ng and
cont ent of human life, what is t he posi t i on of an i ndi vi dual and of human
i nt errel at i ons; t hey i nqui r ed i nt o t he social and i ndi vi dual f or ms of human
self-realization, changes in t he char act er and devel opment of personal i t y,
and images of man in moder n phi l osophi es on t he worl d scale.
It was a wide and ambi t i ous research proj ect , and phi l osopher s in
Czechosl ovaki a f or med t he l eadi ng research cent r e concer ned wi t h all of
these pr obl ems in t he ' di vi si on of l abor ' in phi l osophy of t he socialist bl oc
at t he recent phi l osophi cal conf er ence in Bulgaria. The t heme itself is a par t
of a l arger t heoret i cal campai gn in ' t he fight agai nst bour geoi s phi l osophy' . 2
The sudden and growi ng concer n wi t h t he pr obl ems of man behi nd t he
i r on cur t ai n is somet i mes expl ai ned as a resul t of t he influences of West ern
t hought upon cont empor ar y Mar xi st phi l osophy - namel y existentialism
in whi ch t he concept of man qua man is t he maj or concern. Such an
expl anat i on can be f ound - par adoxi cal l y - bot h in t he Soviet at t i t udes
t o t he rise of t he i nt erest in man as well as in some West er n sources. In
enumer at i ng t he dangers of cont empor ar y ' bour geoi s phi l osophy' ,
Sovi et phi l osopher s never f or get to condemn non- Mar xi st t h e o r i e s -
i ncl udi ng t he existentialist concept of ma n - as pet t y- bour geoi s, un-
scientific, and t her ef or e r eact i onar y. And, of course, t he mai n t arget s of
t hei r crushi ng criticism are t hose phi l osopher s who, in defence of man,
pl ead f or a di fferent model of social devel opment . Thus, f or i nst ance, all
t hose who suggest such social model s as et hi cal socialism, et hi cal democ-
racy, socialism with a human face, democr at i c socialism, or simply mor e
par t i ci pat i on and social cont r ol or bal ance of power in soci et y are
consi dered - t oget her wi t h some recent f or m of neo- Mar xi sm - by t he
Sovi et Marxi st s t o be t he wor st enemies of Mar xi st phi l osophy and
consequent l y of socialism. 3 On t he ot her hand, t her e is no doubt t hat
t rends in West er n phi l osophi cal t hought have an i mpact on cont empor -
ar y Mar xi st phi l osophy (especially exi st ent i al i sm and phenomenol ogy) ,
even t hough this influence seems to be somewhat exaggerat ed by West ern
observers.
But one of t he maj or reasons why dur i ng t he last years t he at t ent i on of
some Mar xi st phi l osopher s t ur ned to pr obl ems of man, lies, most pr ob-
ably, wi t hi n t he sphere of Mar xi st phi l osophy itself, and in t he political
and" i deol ogi cal conflicts in t he socialist count ri es themselves.
Let us i nqui re i nt o t hree selected basic t heori es in Marxi st phi l osophy,
IS I T POSSI BLE TO HUMANI ZE MARXI SM. 9 279
namely the epistemological theory of reflection, the social theory of class
struggle, and the conception of man' s alienation.
The starting point of the Marxist conception of the subject-matter of
philosophy can be seen in the ' fundamental question of philosophy' .
Even t hough Marx probabl y fully shared the view, it was Engels who
explicitly and at great length explored and stated the fundamental ques-
tion of all philosophy as the relation of mind and matter, thinking and
being, consciousness and reality. In his Ludwig Feuerbach Engels comes
to the conclusion that this question played the decisive role in the whole
development of the history of philosophy. The answer to this question
divides all philosophy into two great camps, materialistic and idealistic
philosophy which stand against each other in a continuous fight.
The fundamental question of philosophy and the answer to it forms
also the foundations of the theory of knowledge. In Marxist philosophy,
man' s cognition has been for a long time explained by the theory of reflec-
tion. Its beginnings are supposed to be in Marx' s philosophy, but in the
20th century it has been Lenin' s formulation which has been defended by
the majority of Marxists. The theory of r ef l ect i on- in Lenin' s vi e w-
means that all our spiritual life is basically a reflection. The forms of our
consciousness are different forms of the subjective reflection of objective
reality. Because the theory of reflection became the basis of the entire
Marxist theory of knowledge, truth is also explained as a reflection. A
correct subjective reflection of objective reality is, in the Marxist corres-
pondence theory, a truth.
Lenin' s formulation of the theory of reflection became an inseparable
part of the dogmatic interpretation of Marxist epistemology, especially in
its Stalinist version. The reasons which led to the canonization of the
theory of reflection in the Stalinist revision of philosophy are obviously
related to the main characteristics of Stalinist dogmatism as containing
' many features of vulgar and mechanical materialism' (Roger Garaudy).
The theory of reflection had been formulated by Lenin in his Material-
ism and Empirio-Criticism, in an attempt to refute Berkeley' s subjectivism
and related epistemological theories. Its essence lies in the contention
that man' s cons i ous nes s - a subj ect - r ef l ect s objective reality. The
separate existence of mind and matter, subject and object seems to be taken
for granted as a tacit presupposition of the theory of reflection. If objective
reality is reflected, pictured, copied, then man' s consciousness is taken as
280 PAVEL KOVALY
standing in front of the reality, apart from this reality and it contemplates
and perceives reality from this distinct standpoint.
Both in the ' fundamental question of philosophy' and in the theory of
reflection a similar separation of subject from the object can be noticed.
In the ' fundamental question' of philosophy the object is defined as
independent of the subject (Marx, Engels, Lenin) and thus the basic
presupposition that it is the subject who maintains it is somewhat forgot-
ten. And in the theory of reflection, the conscious mind becomes dependent
upon the reflection of objective reality, which in its turn, is turned into
something incompatible with the subjectivity of human mind. Hence,
both conceptions tend to defend the separation of mind and matter and,
at the same time, set hindrances to man's existence in the world, not to
mention man's creative possibilities, his subjectivity, his being in the
world. Such conceptions restrict man' s activity in cognition and allow
the development of a rigid determination in the explanation of society,
and lead to the assertion of man' s determination by socio-economic
processes.
The concept of reflection was later conceived by some Marxists as a
dialectical reflection, stressing the term 'dialectical', in agreement with
Lenin's view that the reflection of nature in the human mind should be
understood not without movement, not without conflicts, but as an eternal
process of movement, including the conflict of opposites. The concept of
dialectical reflection is in this case too general and too abstract, and does
not explain the role of the subject in cognition, anyway. It is my conten-
tion that neither the concept of reflection, nor the concept of dialectical
reflection can explain man' s activity in cognition and his freedom, without
subjecting man's subjectivity to the dictate of the objective determina-
tions. No matter how strongly one stresses the activity of man in reflec-
tion, or even takes reflection as a creative activity, the very notion of
reflection leads to the conception of man as a rather passive resultant of
external impulses. Using Kant' s epistemological views, we might range
the theory of reflection among the 'passivist' theories of knowledge, un-
able not only to develop any kind of 'activist' approach, but virtually
combating it as its philosophical foe. It is doubtful whether the contem-
porary return of a few Marxists from the theory of reflection to Marx's
notion of the spiritual reproduction of reality, or to the concept of praxis
(based after all predominantly upon the class conception of society) can
IS 1T POSSI BLE TO HUMANI ZE MARXI SM. 9 281
change anything in the limitations imposed in Marxist philosophy upon
man' s subjectivity and his activity in cognitive (and other) relations.
We saw that in Marxist philosophy the subject is separated from the
object and vice versa. The being of the world has been separated from the
being of the subject. Even t hough the whole development of philosophy
of the 20th century has been directed t oward attempts to overcome the
subject-object dichotomy, explicitly formulated in modern philosophy at
its beginnings by Ren6 Descartes, the development of Marxist philosophy
seems not only not to be able to overcome this gap, but it perpetuates it
and deepens it. As compared, for instance, with the realistic conception
of cognition in referential transcendance in Roy Wood Sellars, various
existentialist conceptions of man' s transcendence, or especially with the
phenomenological views on intentionality in Edmund Husserl, Marx' s
and the Marxist conception remains in the grip of mechanistic, reduction-
istic, of' passivist' attitudes.
The second suggested problem is the theory of class struggle. It has been
a perennial foundation of Marxist explanation of the development of
society. It is the basis of Marxist philosophy of history and political
theory, and it is the guiding light of the day-to-day internal and external
political practice of Marxist parties. In this theory, Marx' s views based
upon the analysis of limited economic material at a given time serves as
a methodological basis for the explanation of social phenomena through-
out the whole development of society, past present and future. The theory
of class struggle in its application to the whole history of mankind is
maintained t oday in its Marxian form despite the fact that many presup-
positions with which it had been created in the middle of the 19th century
in England do not exist any more. Economic evolution in the 20th
century industrial world refutes a number of conclusions made by Marx
in his philosophy of history, including his theory of class struggle, absolu-
tized into the main moving force in history. The socialist revolution did
not occur in the developed industrial countries on the basis of the conflict
between the productive forces and relations of product i on; industrial
societies did not develop a polarization of capital and proletariat as Marx
had expected. From partial material, Marx extrapolated these theories
into the expectation of a linear development bot h in economics and social
processes. The tendency t oward social polarization, as Marx observed it
282 PAVEL KOVALY
in his time, has in some cases changed its course completely and in other
cases became more complex. Both Marx in creating his theory and the
Marxists in its application show a definite tendency toward dogmatism
in the application of the partial observations to the general theory of
social development.
Economic crises which were supposed to occur with increasing fre-
quency, have taken a very different course of development than Marx
presupposed. Economics and in general social sciences had been instru-
mental in the change of this development. Moreover, capital, instead of
becoming increasingly concentrated, has given rise to a new category of
shareholders who form an intermediary group. The division of labor and
the great increase of productivity led to the rise of those who coordinate
work, a whole social group whose social function and importance has
been growing. Marx's theory of absolute and relative pauperization of the
proletariat also proved to be completely false. Actually, the contrary has
happened: reforms and the labor movement have brought about a rise
in the standard of living and an amelioration of working conditions. Can
we say that the contemporary worker in an industrialized country res-
embles in any way the proletarian whom Marx described? Can, for that
matter, Marx's analysis be applied to contemporary realities of economic
development in highly industrialized countries? The content of the
Communist Manifesto is no longer strictly correct a few decades after it
had been written. The generalization of the class struggle theory into an
entire theory of social development tends to be an unsubstantiated dogma.
Hence, we can consider it a gross oversimplification which subsequently
has had a number of imminent effects.
If we study the development of Marxist theory of class struggle, we may
come to the point of view that its direct outcome is Stalin's theory of the
intensification of the class struggle in the period of imperialism. It is my
contention that Marx's oversimplification of some real conflicts in the
history of 19th century England and his generalization of such a theory
into a general social theory made it possible for the conception of the
intensification of the class struggle to be created and applied. It is hardly
necessary to stress the extremely dogmatic, arbitrary, subjectivistic
character and use of this theory, on the basis of which the worst and most
numerous crimes in the history of mankind have been committed. This
theory, despite its criticism at the 20th Congress of the CP of U.S.S.R. is
IS IT POSSI BLE TO HUMANI ZE MARXISM9. 283
still in full oper at i on in Communi s t part i es and f or ms t he basis of t hei r
policies. It is a t heor y whi ch bel ongs t o t hose whi ch have cont r i but ed the
most t o t he dehumani zat i on of man in t he 20t h cent ury.
The t hi r d suggested pr obl em is t he concept i on of man' s al i enat i on. All
cont empor ar y t heori es of al i enat i on are di rect l y rel at ed t o t he respective
t heori es of man or phi l osophi cal ant hr opol ogi es upon whi ch t hey are
f ounded. The Stalinist i nt er pr et at i on of Mar xi st phi l osophy has vi rt ual l y
el i mi nat ed bot h t he pr obl ems of man and t he whol e sphere of ethics f r om
phi l osophy. It di d not creat e any t heor y of man or phi l osophi c ant hr o-
pol ogy. Ther e is a di rect rel at i onshi p bet ween t he t heoret i cal lack of
phi l osophi c ant hr opol ogy and t he pract i cal abol i t i on of t he basic human
rights and physical l i qui dat i on of many millions of peopl e. In t he Stalinist
i nt er pr et at i on of t he subj ect - mat t er of phi l osophy t he quest i on of man
qua man pl ayed an insignificant rol e or was ent i rel y dismissed.
Even t hough t here is no phi l osophi cal ant hr opol ogy in t he Stalinist
i nt er pr et at i on of Mar xi st phi l osophy - a fact t hat enabl ed Sart re t o offer
his existentialist concept i on of man t o t he Marxi st s t o i ncor por at e i nt o
Mar xi sm - we cannot say t hat t here are no ideas on ma n at all. On t he
cont r ar y, Stalinism needs a cert ai n t ype of ma n and it cont ai ns bot h
t heoret i cal post ul at es on man and pract i cal demands. And these post u-
lates and demands can be r ead of f f r om t he devel opment of cont empor ar y
Marxi st phi l osophy.
For Marxi st phi l osophy man qua man has never been a phi l osophi c
pr obl em. It is onl y man qua bourgeoi s, or man qua pr ol et ar i an t hat
mat t er s; man is always consi der ed in this social rel at i onshi p. Marxi st
phi l osophy demands f r om man t o be wi t hi n t he movement , t aki ng par t
in t he class struggle, socialist r evol ut i on, di ct at or shi p of t he prol et ari at ,
building up socialism and Communi s m. For Mar xi st phi l osophy t he
cause, t he movement is decisive and ma n is ent i rel y subj ect t o t he cause.
Consequent l y, man has been consi der ed t o be devot ed t o t he cause, t o a
movement t hat is gover ned by forces ot her t han himself: he is a man
devot ed t o class struggle and socialist r evol ut i on. He is supposed t o
subj ect all his needs and desires t o this goal, i ncl udi ng his life. Man
becomes an obedi ent servant of t he cause and movement , or a mer e cog
in t he wheel of t he social machi ne, ei t her of t he St at e or Par t y organi zat i on.
The bet t er he subjects himself, or serves t he goal, t he gr eat er val ue he has.
284 PAVEL KOVALY
Man as an individual is annihilated, because he is himself t ransformed or
is pushed into transforming himself into a functional organ of the cause,
movement, state, and is totally mani pul at ed from above by them. Man
is never able to decide for himself, because he is directly and t horoughl y
manipulated by forces ot her than himself, decisions are imposed upon
him. He is deprived of any personal choice and consequently of personal
freedom. His only freedom is the freedom to obey. Thus, he is deprived
of personal responsibility in relation to himself and others in matters of
vital i mport ance and consequently he has no moral conscience. He lives
a lie, because he is deprived of the responsibility to j udge for himself what
is right and what is wrong, what is just and what is unjust, etc. ; because
he obeys orders given him. His maj or characteristic is that he is a function-
ary, a man who functions, and thus he is comparabl e to a programmed
robot. He is not supposed to be critical, to laugh or to suffer. In a sense
he doesn' t even die, because he is a particle of the whole that is replaceable.
The dimensions of the comic, tragic, absurd, grotesque, ethical dimension
- including death - elude him. He is totally deprived of his subjectivity
and he becomes an object, an object for manipulation. In such a system
of social relations, man' s existence has been levelled to the perform-
ance of functions, and man is virtually t ransformed into a manipulated
object.
Thus we can say that the Stalinist i nt erpret at i on of Marxist philosophy
did not develop any consistent account of man; but, on the ot her hand,
t hrough its practical functioning it did create a certain image of man
that could best be called homo bureaucraticus, the bureaucratic man, a
man who stopped being a free subject able to make his own choices and
who became a directly and almost totally manipulated object in the name
of the movement, the glorious future, the building up a new social order,
etc. Many Marxist philosophers, knowingly or unknowingly, have
accepted this conception without any further inquiries into its substance.
Its substance is the universalistic solution of the relationship between
society and man. Man is here entirely subjected to society, not only in
his physical existence, but also in his conscience. Man as an individual
does not exist in the concept i on of homo bureaucraticus; he exists only as
a part of a whole and is governed by it. It introduces a new split into an
individual, a split between man' s bureaucratic existence and his human
essence. Man can realize himself only as a bureaucratic existence which is
IS I T POSSI BLE TO HUMANI ZE MARXI SM 9. 285
actually taken as his essence. Man cannot realize his potentialities other-
wise than within the bureacratic framework. But this split between homo
bureacraticus and man himself opens an ever widening gap yawning at
every man with increasing force. The resultant problem is posited not
only on the level of theory, but as a vital question for every man, including
every Marxist philosopher, to become a homo bureaucraticus or to be
himself. If one takes the terms 'progressive' and 'reactionary' - so often
used by Marxist philosophers to label philosophic beliefs - the concep-
tion of man implicit here belongs to the most reactionary in the history of
modern times.
The description of homo bureaucraticus suggests an inquiry into the
problem of alienation of man in Marxist philosophy. Marx's theory of
alienation is directly related to his oversimplification of the class struggle
theory and its generalization into the major conflict of capitalist society
to be overcome by socialist revolution. Marx traces the origin of alienation
to private ownership of the means of production and, having thus reduced
the conception of alienation primarily to its economic and historic
dimensions, the abolition of private property appears to him as the road
to de-alienation of man. The following passage is usually quoted and taken
by the Marxists as a proof of Marx's humanism :
Communi s m is t he positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and t hus
t he real appropri at i on of human nat ure t hr ough and for man. It is therefore, t he ret urn of
man to hi msel f as a social, i.e., really human being .... Communi s m is the definitive resolution
of the ant agoni sm between man and nature, and between man and man. It is t he true solu-
tion of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirma-
tion, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. 4
Marx's conception of alienation is mainly economic and historical in
character. Its starting point is economi c- in the conception of work as
the realization of human potentialities and work as alienated labor. In
the society of private ownership, the sphere of material production - of
mechanized and standardized performances- is considered as a sphere
of alienation. Marx's conception of alienation is historical, because it is
related to the historical development of society and points to Communism
as the positive supersession of all alienation of man.
In the development of Soviet philosophy the conception of alienation
was practically cancelled from Marxist philosophy. And in practice it has
been left out on the basis that Soviet society overcame alienation in
286 PAVEL KOVALY
its socialist construction of Communism. It has been maintained that
Soviet society has been the ground for the full development of the in-
dividual.
The origin of a tendency toward dogmatism can be found in the
assumption that it is the economic alienation that is the primary cause of
all alienation and that the individual ownership of the means of produc-
tion is the primary cause of all alienation. Such an assumption can easily
be followed by the point of view which maintains that abolition of private
property is humanism and that it means at the same time the road toward
the abolition of alienation or even abolition of alienation itself. Not only
that such a conception tends toward a mechanistic and almost automatic
solution of the problem of alienation, but another question appears,
namely, whether the abolition of capitalist forms of property means
really the abolition of all forms of alienation, or at least could lead to it.
Such a question can be posited not only from the standpoint of an
existentialist, who definitively conceives the phenomenon of alienation
as a structural human element, rather than economic and historical, but
it can be asked also on the basis of both theoretical and practical experi-
ences of those countries which have attempted to construct such a 'non-
alienated' society. To mention only the social sources of alienation among
others, such experiences show that many sources of alienation in these
countries appear in the same form as compared with the period before
the so-called socialist revolution. But many new social causes of alienation
appear with greater strength and depth. They are especially connected
with centralized and bureaucratized power - incomparably stronger than
any seemingly similar phenomena in the parliamentary democracies-
and with the practically unlimited and direct manipulation of man. Deep
dehumanization of man is reached through enormous limitations of basic
human rights and liberties, brought either by Stalinist oppression or a
similar type of unlimited power of the ruling political organization and
the State. Moreover, the extreme growth of bureaucracy- not only in
the Party or the State, but as a main form of functioning of such a 'non-
alienated' society - makes for the change of an individual into an object
of manipulation, rather than a subject capable of making his own decisions.
A number of traditional social sources of alienation deepen and sharpen
in the process of the construction of such societies, such as group con-
flicts, minority conflicts, conflicts between rich and poor, between the
IS IT POSSI BLE TO HUMANI ZE MARXI SM. 9 287
individual and the state bureaucracy and party bureaucracy, between
those in power and those deprived of any power. Military conflicts
between the nations and states must also be included.
All these conflicts can be expected to develop beyond where they are
at present. And together with them, the social sources of the alienation
of man will increase in number and intensity, rather than diminish. The
road toward de-alienation in suchsocieties seemed to promise to reach
the vision of a total man in the very near future, but it is constantly
postponed by newly arising conflicts and, at the same time, by deeper
sources of alienation of man. Hence, even on the basis of the theory of
alienation - conceived mainly in economic and historical terms - we are
justified in our doubts as to whether the radical social change, realized
with so many limitations of human rights and freedoms and at the
expense of so many lives, leads finally to a non-alienated man and a
humanized society.
At the beginning of this study I mentioned that changing problems could
be noticed also in recent Marxist treatments of some ethical and social
questions. Let us consider a few more important ones.
After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (1956), during the period
of a partial ' thaw' , a widespread reaction against Stalinism developed in
a number of Marxist countries, especially among intellectuals. In philos-
ophy, the fundamental questions of philosophic anthropology were
discovered, including the problem of the meaning of human life. This
period is also marked by the revival of interest in Marx's early writings,
namely his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, until then kept
under lock and key in the safes of the libraries, and therefore unknown.
Philosophers started to raise a number of ethical and social questions.
In the dogmatic Stalinist interpretation of Marxist philosophy,
ethics - an important part of philosophy since its very beginnings - has
been either completely neglected and abandoned, or distorted. Marxist
philosophers, busily constructing ideological apologetics, concentrated on
economic and political problems. Since the revival of interest in the
philosophic problems of man, some Marxist philosophers have dared to
turn their attention to the investigation of ethical problems. They also
started to develop ethics as a part of the whole philosophic system. The
destruction of philosophy by the Stalinist interpretation is particularly
288 PAVEL KOVALY
marked by the fact that ethics has been either non-existent, or the funda-
mental ethical categories have been reversed and totally subjected to the
interests of the working class, the Party and its Central Committee.
One of the many ethical problems considered at the time of renewed
interest in ethics and which maintains its relevance even in the present
day concerns the relationship between the social duty of man as a citizen
or as a member of an organization, and his individual conscience. Homo
bureaucraticus in his restricted existence - as we have seen - is character-
ized by the non-existence of any individual conscience; he obeys only the
orders of an organization to which he belongs. But periods of painful
development showed that this conflict exists both in practice and in
theory. One of the common problems occurring in the everyday life of an
individual has been what kind of an action a man should take, if individual
conscience is brought into conflict with man' s obligation toward society.
The importance of this conflict is directly related to the importance of the
situation a man is confronted with. The Stalinist interpretation either
dismisses the problem or solves it automatically in favor of social uni-
versalism. That such a conflict in morality exists appeared as a novelty
for Marxist philosophy of the second half of the 20th century. Since the
times of Karl Marx, Marxist philosophy subjected man' s moral behavior
and his individual conscience entirely to the class struggle. It accepted
only one criterion of all ethical categories and moral behavior: that
which served the cause of the Communist movement. Everything that
served the cause has been considered as moral, everything that did not
serve this goal has been proclaimed immoral. A modification of this
dictum accepts as moral whatever serves the interest of the working class.
But in a centralized society, ruled by the principle of the leading role of the
Communist Party, decisions about what is in the interests of the working
class are made by the Party, especially by its Central Committee. Hence,
moral laws depend entirely upon arbitrary decisions of those in power
and upon their will. Consequently, what is moral today can become
immoral tomorrow and vice versa. According to such arbitrary and
relativistic criteria, everybody who obeys and serves is good, and who-
ever does not serve unconditionally is bad or an enemy. Who is not with
us, the Marxists used to say, is against us - a saying completely consistent
with and based upon Marx' s theory of class struggle and its more recent
continuation in Stalin's theory of the intensification of the class struggle.
IS IT POSSI BLE TO HUMANI ZE MARXI SM? 289
The logical and only possible result of such an attitude - as histori-
cal development shows us - is absolute, unchecked and uncontrolled
power.
Philosophers dealing with ethics were led to the examination of Western
philosophical t rends- especially those interested in man, such as the
philosophy of existentialism and modern religious philosophies- until
then either rejected or largely unknown among the Marxists.
As a result of these studies many Marxist philosophers changed their
attitude toward the concept of the so-called 'bourgeois philosophy'.
Instead of the dogmatic methodology that entirely rejected all kinds of
non-Marxist philosophies, a new attitude developed, connected partly
with the work of Roger Garaudy. 5 The new methodology presupposes
that the major problems of contemporary philosophy are similar both
for Marxist and non-Marxist philosophy, only their solutions differ. And
in spite of the continuation of the 'ideological fight' between them, at
least some problems of non-Marxist philosophy could be 'integrated' into
Marxist philosophy. Hence, Marxist philosophers started to study
contemporary developments in Western philosophical thought more
closeIy. Naturally, from the point of view of the dogmatic explanation,
such an integration is considered revisionistic and therefore highly
suspicious.
From the social problems, let us consider a problem of major importance,
unresolved up to now and widely discussed by those philosophers and
social scientists who turned against Stalinism. The question could be
formulated as follows: Where are the guarantees against the worst
excesses of Stalinist theory and practice? So far, Marxist philosophy has
not provided a solution to this problem and it is doubtful whether it can
ever do so, unless it transcends its own boundaries. The lack of a theoreti-
cal formulation of the problem and its application to political theory and
practice points to the fact that Marxist philosophy as a whole cannot
transcend itself toward its own humanization, unless it changes its own
fundamental presuppositions and thus stops being Marxist.
After the revelation of Stalin's crimes and the so-called 'cult of person-
ality', the majority of Marxist-oriented intellectuals became aware that
no 'personality' could alone have taken possession of such a totally
destructive power without the help of the entire system. More and more
290 PAVEL KOVALY
people realized that the Soviet explanation of the personality cult has
been superficial and completely insufficient, because it dealt only with
appearances and manifestations, and did not t ouch the social structure
that actually had been the basis for the personality cult. They realized that
even after the personality disappeared, the social basis of oppression
remained. It was this structure that had enabled the ' personality' to get
hold of absolute power, and to use the entire social system for mass
oppression. Now, the main question was whether under this social
structure there can be given any guarantees that the same oppression
woul d not continue, even after the cult of personality had been criticized.
It remained unanswered and it is clear that it cannot be solved within a
Marxist philosophy that had been instrumental in creating that social
system. 6
Stalinism had neither been created by one ' personality' , nor is it a
deformation of an originally correct and humanistic philosophy. It is a
logical out come of a century of development of the Marxian philosophy,
and of its application under certain social conditions. Here also lies the
reason why the official Soviet philosophy, after a brief period of criticism
of Stalin's theory and practice, has devoted much of its time and attention
to the defence of bot h Stalin and his practices. ' Moral ' defence of Stalin
t oday goes so far that Soviet philosophers developed an ingenious theory
that not only minimizes Stalin's crimes, but evaluates them as minor
' mistakes' . The apologetics of Stalin can be expected to continue. And
this line of development of Marxist philosophy is again entirely coherent
and logical, because Stalin's activities strictly applied fundamental
principles of Marx' s philosophy in social practice.
The question about guarantees against the continuation of Stalinism
points far beyond the explanation given by Soviet Marxism about the
personality cult. It shows the necessity of the re-examination of all social
sources of the phenomenon. Such analysis woul d lead to a major revision
of the theory and the whole social structure, and consequently to a fight
against both, with the goal of changing it from within.
Here lies also the main reason why the Soviet and the contemporary
rulers in the occupied Czechoslovakia direct their attacks against the
'revisionistic and right-wing opportunistic' trends, i.e., against those who
directed their efforts against bureaucratized and centralized power.
Today, the fight against ' the right-wing opportunists and rightist revision-
IS I T P OS S I B L E TO HUMANI Z E MAR XI S M 9. 291
ists' is the major ideological and political task of the Czechoslovak leaders.
The entire system of social relations under the uncontrolled monoply of
the leading role of the CP and its power-centers up to the Central Com-
mittee must be kept at all costs; only minor changes will be tolerated, but
even those must be introduced through manipulation by the central power.
This picture - as far as the basic structure is concerned - represents only
a slight modification of Stalinism. In Czechoslovakia, the question about
the guarantees against Stalinism has been answered definitively and for a
very long time. The guarantees are not given by the balance of political
power in the state and by public control. It is the leading role of the CP
and its Central Commi t t ee- i t is mai nt ai ned- which provides the
guarantee. But, in fact, such a position can guarantee only one single
thing: the return of the centralized governing power to drastic means of
oppression on a mass scale, if other means available are not sufficient to
secure the status quo. Thus, we see in contemporary Czechoslovakia the
unchanged structure of the social and political relations that prevailed in
Stalin's times. And the centralized power will fight all changes and all
those who are not willing to put their bodies and minds into the service
of the new course introduced by the 'Soviet liberators'. The tank has
again put an end to theoretical and practical attempts to humanize
Marxist philosophy and politics.
The contemporary conflict between the dogmatically and humanisti-
cally oriented representatives of Marxist philosophy is based upon the
illusion that it is possible to humanize Marxist philosophy and politics.
The dilemma of every single philosopher who has accepted Marxist
philosophical starting points - presented as 'the only scientific philosophy
of our times' - develops as a personal drama. Every one of them faces the
problem, in which direction to develop philosophical investigations. And
it is my contention that the only way to oppose sterile and dogmatized
Marxism is to pursue the ethical problems, and generally the problems
of man and, thus, to develop a course of philosophic thought contrary
to the entire heritage of Stalinist interpretation. This is the reason why the
tendency to develop the philosophy of man is so strong, as is the case in
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. Of course, this direction has
very often led many former Marxists to a definitive break with the Marxist
philosophy, toward the acceptance of some other philosophies.
Even though the conflict between the dogmatic Marxists and the
292 PAVEL KOVALY
huma ni s t i c a l l y or i e nt e d de f e nde r s o f maj or s oc i al c ha ng e has be e n
c o n s t a n t l y s uppres s ed by t he Rus s i a n d o mi n a t i o n o f cent ral Eur ope , t here
i s n o d o u b t t hat i t wi l l c o n t i n u e i n t he f ut ure. It wi l l t ake o n s ubt l e and
hi dde n f orms , but i t wi l l be carri ed o u t i n de f e nc e o f t he basi c ri ghts o f
man. An d , i n a n y case, al l at t empt s t o h u ma n i z e Mar xi s m wi l l be al ways
t hr e at e ne d by t he o r t h o d o x St al i ni s t i de o l o g i s t s a nd pol i t i ci ans . The
q u e s t i o n - o f c o u r s e - ma y ari se, t o wha t e xt e nt t he de v e l o pme nt o f
Mar xi s t p h i l o s o p h y o f ma n wi l l be us e d - as a ki nd o f c o mf o r t i ng i l l u-
s i o n - by t ho s e i n po we r t o vei l i nhuma ni s t i c at t i t udes . Eve n t hat i s a real
pos s i bi l i t y. Af t er all, i t is a very wel l k n o wn f act t hat e v e n St al i n cl ai med
t hat hi s t heori es and pol i c i e s l ed t o t he ha ppi ne s s o f ma n i n Co mmu n i s t
s oci et y.
Th e ma i n que s t i o n remai ns whe t he r t he at t e mpt s t o h u ma n i z e Marxi s t
p h i l o s o p h y are pos s i bl e at all. Our c o n t r i b u t i o n po i nt s t o a def i ni t e
ans wer. I n a ny case, s uc h at t empt s have hi t he r t o be e n c r us he d bo t h i n
p h i l o s o p h y and pol i t i cs .
NOTES
1 'We have to try it (the socialist revolution) again and again', Prof. Hilary Putnam, Hegel
Congress, Boston, December, 1970, unpublished lecture.
2 It can be expected that this topic will be the main contribution of Czechoslovak philoso-
phers at the up-coming International Congress of Philosophy in Bulgaria in 1972.
a For instance, Herbert Marcuse is considered by official Soviet philosophers as one of the
leaders of anti-Marxism in the U.S.A. See M. Modrzinskaja in the main theoretical journal
of the CPSU, Kommunist, January, 1970.
4 Karl Marx, Early Writings, New York, 1963, p. 155.
s Garaudy, formerly a chief philosopher of the French CP, was recently expelled from its
ranks on charges of 'revisionism' and for his negative attitude toward the Soviet intervention
in Czechoslovakia.
6 It is interesting to note that so far no proper scientific analysis of the social and philosophic
causes of the 'cult of personality' has been made by the Marxists. Khrushchev's report at
the 20th Congress of the CPSU enumerates a great number of facts and crimes, depicts the
'cult of personality' only as actions of Stalin himself and does not give any explanation of
the social and philosophical causes of it. The examination of the social and philosophical
causes of the 'cult of personality' led many former Marxists away from Marxism; among the
Marxists, especially the Soviets, any such examination has been made a tabu by pressures
of political power.
But the awareness of the problem is vivid among some Marxist philosophers of the
younger generation. The thorough analysis of the major causes of the 'cult of personality'
is still a 'desideratum' in contemporary Marxist philosophy, and it is the younger genera-
tion to whom are directed the words of the Polish philosopher Adam Schaff in his examina-
tion of "Marxist humanism' :
"'These are questions that should be taken up in the searching sociological analysis we
IS IT POSSI BLE TO HUMANI ZE MARXI SM. 9 293
are still awai t i ng of the so called "cult of personality' , whi ch had its root s in social pheno-
mena and not in the personal charact er of an ' i ndi vi dual ' . Suffice it to say t hat many of the
undesi rabl e elements in the educative model of socialist man can be traced to the Stalinist
period and its distortions. Wi t hout a penet rat i ng i nqui ry into its social root s and causes,
it is impossible to underst and t hese phenomena and so effectively to count er and overcome
them.' " ( Adam Schaff, Marxi sm and the Human Individual, McGraw-Hi l l , 1970, p. 208).
Schaff hi msel f does not offer any analysis.