Serfino v.

CA (GR L-40858, 15 September 1987)

Ponente: Paras, J.
Facts: On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land was
patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor (OCT
1839). On 14 December 1945, he sold said land in favor
of Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18 January
1946). OCT 1839 was lost during the war and upon
petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental ordered the reconstitution
thereof. Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R (1839) was issued
on 18 January 1946 in the name of Pacifico Casamayor.
On that same day, TCT 57-N was issued in the name of
Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT 14-R
(1839). On 15 August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said
property to Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., and the latter
did not present the documents for registration until 17
December 1964 to the Office of the Registry of Deeds.
Said office refused registration upon its discovery that
the same property was covered by another certificate of
title, TCT 38985, in the name of Federico Serfino. On 19
November 1964, the spouses Serfinos mortgaged the
land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a
loan in the amount of P5,000.00; which was inscribed in
TCT No. 38985.
The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to
recover said land; and the lower court rendered a
decision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985;
issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintiff; and the
payment of the plaintiff PNB the loan of spouses
Serfinos secured by said land. Both parties appealed
from this decision of the trial court. Ruling on the
assignment of errors, the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court with modification in its
decision setting aside the decision of the trial court
declaring plaintiff liable to PNB for payment, however,
ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the Serfino spouses
of the sum P1,839.49, representing the unpaid taxes
and penalties paid by the latter when they repurchased
the property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfino
and PNB to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed
property was null and void.

Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court
declares that the prescribed procedure in auction sales
of property for tax delinquency being in derogation of
property rights should be followed punctiliously. Strict
adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is
imperative not only for the protection of the tax payers,
but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion
between the buyer and the public officials called upon
to enforce such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent
land owners and to the public in general is an essential
and indispensable requirement of law, the non-
fulfillment of which vitiates the sale. In the present
case, Lopez Sugar Central was not entirely negligent in
its payment of land taxes. The record shows that taxes
were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt
therefor was obtained in its name. The sale therefore by
the Province of Negros Occidental of the land in dispute
to the spouses Serfinos was void since the Province of
Negros Occidental was not the real owner of the
property thus sold. In turn, the spouses Serfinos title
which has been derived from that of the Province of
Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact
that the public auction sale of the disputed property
was not valid cannot in any way be attributed to the
mortgagees fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds
to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the
scheduled public auction sale was partly due to the
failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare the land in its
name for a number of years and to pay the complete
taxes thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to the payment
of the mortgage loan as ruled by the trial court and
exempted from the payment of costs.
The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed
decision, with modification that PNB mortgage credit
must be paid by Lopez Sugar Central.

Manahan v. ECCGR L-44899, 22 April 1981 (104 SCRA
198)First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring.

Facts: Maria E. Manahan, the petitioner, is the widow
of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of Enteric Fever
while employed as classroom teacher in Las Pias
Municipal High School, Las Pias, Rizal, on 8May, 1975.
The deceased was in perfect health when he entered
government service on 20 July 1969,and that in the
course of his employment in 1974, he was treated for
epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric fever on May
8, 1975. Thus, the petitioner filed a claim with the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death
benefit under Presidential Decree 626. In a letter dated
19 June1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding
that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid
fever,is not an occupational disease, and that
enteric fever or paratyphoid is similar in effect to
typhoid fever, in the sense that both are produced by
Salmonella organisms. The petitioner appealed to the
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which
affirmed the decision of the GSIS on a finding that the
ailment of the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced
by or aggravated by the nature of the duties of Nazario
Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. Thus, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the Workmens Compensation should
be resolved in favor of the worker

Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of the New
Labor Code provides that all actions and claims accruing
prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined
in accordance with the laws in force at the time of
their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article
292, Title II (Prescription of Offenses
and Claims), workmens compensation claims accruing
prior to the effectivity of this Code and during
the period from 1 November 1974 up to 31 December
1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance
with the laws and rules at the time their causes of
action accrued Hence, this Court
applied the provisions of the Workmens Compensation
Act, as amended, on passing upon petitioners
claim.. The illness that claimed the life of the deceased
may had its onset before 10 December 1974,thus, his
action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, In any
case, and case of doubt, the same should be resolved in
favor of the worker, and that social legislations like the
Workmens
Compensation Act and the Labor Code should be
liberally construed to attain their laudable objective,
i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his
dependents in the event that the former should die or
sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and
applying now the provisions of the Workmens
Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of
compensability subsists in favor of the claimant. The
Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and
ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner the
amount of P6,000.00 as death compensation benefit
and P600.00 as attorneys fees, to reimburse the
petitioners expenses incurred for medical
services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased
Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper
receipts, and to pay administrative fees.

Villavert v. ECCGR L-48605, 14 December 1981 (110
SCRA 233) First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring

Facts: Domina N. Villavert, the petitioner, is the
mother of the late Marcelino N. Villavert who died
of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis on 12 December
1975 employed as a Code Verifier in the Philippine
Constabulary. The deceased also performed the duties
of a computer operator and clerk typist. On
11December 1975, the deceased reported as usual to
the Constabulary Computer Center in Camp Crame. He
performed his duties not only as Code Verifier but also
handled administrative functions, computer operation
and typing jobs due to shortage of civilian personnel.
Although he was complaining of chest pain and
headache late in the afternoon of said day, he was
required to render overtime service until late in the day,
typing voluminous classified communications,
computing allowances and preparing checks for the
salary of PC-INP personnel throughout the country for
distribution on or before 15 December 1975. Gasping
for breath, perspiring profusely, and mumbling
incoherent words while asleep, and when he was not
able to regain consciousness, he was rushed to the
University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay (UERM)
Memorial Hospital where he died at 5:30 am. The NBI
stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis is still unknown, although most research
data agree that physical and mental stresses are strong
causal factors in the development of the disease. On 18
March 1976, she filed a claim for income benefits
for the death of her son under PD 626, as amended,
with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
GSIS denied the claim on the ground that acute
hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease
and that the petitioner had failed to show that there
was a causal connection between the fatal ailment
of Marcelino N. Villavertand the nature of his
employment. The petitioner appealed to the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC). On 31 May 1978, the
ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS denying the claim.
Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to her sons
death benefits.

Held: The Medico Legal Officer of the NBI stated that
the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis
(acute inflammation with hemorrhagic necrosis of the
pancreas) is still unknown despite extensive researches
in this field, although most research data are agreed
that physical and mental stresses are strong causal
factors in the development of the disease. There is no
evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a
bout of alcoholic intoxication shortly before he died,
neither is there a showing that he used drugs; negating
the association provided by Principles of Internal
Medicine (by Harrison 7th Edition, p. 1571). From the
foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N.
Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which
was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties
he performed as code verifier, computer operator and
clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. Further, Article
4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that
all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of
this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC
and ordered the GSIS to pay the petitioner
deathbenefits in the amount of P6,000.00.

DIOSDADO C. TY vs. FIRST NATIONAL SURETY & ASSURANCECO.
INC.G.R. NO. L-16138, April 29, 9611 SCRA 1324

Facts: Petitioner obtained personal accident policies
which stipulated, among others, that for partial
disability resulting to the loss e i t h e r
h a n d , t h e i n s u r e r s h a l l b e l i a b l e
f o r P 6 5 0 . 0 0 . I t wa s f ur t her s t at ed i n
t he pol i c i es t hat , That l os s of a hand
s hal l mean the loss by amputation through the bones
of the wrist. Afire broke out which totally destroyed
Broadway Cotton
Factory, T y s e mp l o y e r . F i g h t i n g h i s wa y
o u t o f t h e f a c t o r y , T y wa s
i n j u r e d o n t h e l e f t h a n d b y a h e a
v y o b j e c t . A s a r e s u l t , T y
s u f f e r e d a t e mp o r a r y t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y
o f h i s l e f t h a n d wh i c h prevented him from
performing his work or labor necessary in the pursuance
of his occupation.

Issue: Whether or not the insurer is liable

Held: The insurer was not liable. We cannot go beyond
the clear and express conditions of the insurance
policies, all of which defined partial disability as loss of
either hand by amputation through the bones of the
wrist. There was no such amputation. All that
was found was that the physical injuries caused
temporary total disability of Tys left hand. We
might add that the
agreementc o n t a i n e d i n t h e i n s u r a n c e p
o l i c i e s a r e c l e a r , e x p r e s s a n d s p e c i f i
c t h a t o n l y a m p u t a t i o n o f t h e
l e f t h a n d s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d a s
a l o s s t h e r e o f , a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a
t wo u l d i n c l u d e t h e me r e f r a c t u r e o r o
t h e r t e mp o r a r y d i s a b i l i t y n o t covered by the
policies would certainly be unwarranted.
WHEREFORE, the deci si on
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the plaintiff-appellant.

Home Insurance Company vs. Eastern Shipping Lines
[GR L-34382, 20 July 1983];
Home Insurance vs. Nedlloyd Lijnen [GR L-34383]

Facts: [GR L-34382] On or about 13 January 1967, S.
Kajita & Co., on behalf of Atlas Consolidated Mining &
Development Corporation, shipped on board the SS
Eastern Jupiter from Osaka, Japan, 2,361 coils of Black
Hot Rolled Copper Wire Rods. The said VESSEL is owned
and operated by Eastern Shipping Lines. The shipment
was covered by Bill of Lading O-MA-9, with arrival
notice to Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation of
the Philippines at Manila. The shipment was insured
with the Home Insurance Company against all risks in
the amount of P1,580,105.06 under its Insurance Policy
AS-73633. The coils discharged from the VESSEL
numbered 2,361, of which 53 were in bad order. What
the Phelps Dodge ultimately received at its warehouse
was the same number of 2,361 coils, with 73 coils loose
and partly cut, and 28 coils entangled, partly cut, and
which had to be considered as scrap. Upon weighing at
Phelps Dodge's warehouse, the 2,361 coils were found
to weight 263,940.85 kilos as against its invoiced weight
of 264,534.00 kilos or a net loss/shortage of 593.15
kilos, or 1,209,56 lbs., according to the claims presented
by the Phelps Dodge against Home Insurance, the
Eastern Shipping, and Angel Jose Transportation Inc. For
the loss/damage suffered by the cargo, Home Insurance
paid the Phelps Dodge under its insurance policy the
amount of P3,260.44, by virtue of which Home
Insurance became subrogated to the rights and actions
of the Phelps Dodge. Home Insurance made demands
for payment against the Eastern Shipping and the Angel
Jose Transportation for reimbursement of the aforesaid
amount but each refused to pay the same."

[GR L-34383] On or about 22 December 1966, the Hansa
Transport Kontor shipped from Bremen, Germany, 30
packages of Service Parts of Farm Equipment and
Implements on board the VESSEL, SS 'NEDER RIJN'
owned by N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen, and represented in the
Philippines by its local agent, the Columbian Philippines,
Inc.. The shipment was covered by Bill of Lading No. 22
for transportation to, and delivery at, Manila, in favor of
International Harvester Macleod, Inc. The shipment was
insured with Home Insurance company under its Cargo
Policy AS-73735 'with average terms' for P98,567.79.
The packages discharged from the VESSEL numbered
29, of which seven packages were found to be in bad
order. What International Harvester ultimately received
at its warehouse was the same number of 29 packages
with 9 packages in bad order. Out of these 9 packages, 1
package was accepted by International Harvester in
good order due to the negligible damages sustained.
Upon inspection at International Harvester's
warehouse, the contents of 3 out of the 8 cases were
also found to be complete and intact, leaving 5 cases in
bad order. The contents of these 5 packages showed
several items missing in the total amount of $131.14;
while the contents of the undelivered 1 package were
valued at $394.66, or a total of $525.80 or P2,426.98.
For the short-delivery of 1 package and the missing
items in 5 other packages, Home Insurance paid
International Harvester under its Insurance Cargo Policy
the amount of P2,426.98, by virtue of which Home
Insurance became subrogated to the rights and actions
of International Harvester. Demands were made on N.V.
Nedlloyd Lijnen and International Harvester for
reimbursement thereof but they failed and refused to
pay the same."

When the insurance contracts which formed the basis
of these cases were executed, Home Insurance had not
yet secured the necessary licenses and authority; but
when the complaints in these two cases were filed,
Home Insurance had already secured the necessary
license to conduct its insurance business in the
Philippines. In both cases, Home Insurance made the
averment regarding its capacity to sue, as that it "is a
foreign insurance company duly authorized to do
business in the Philippines through its agent, Mr. Victor
H. Bello, of legal age and with office address at Oledan
Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal." The Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, however, dismissed the
complaints in both cases, on the ground that Home
Insurance had failed to prove its capacity to sue. Home
Insurance filed the petitions for review on certiorari,
which were consolidated.

Issue: Whether Home Insurance, a foreign corporation
licensed to do business at he time of the filing of the
case, has the capacity to sue for claims on contracts
made when it has no license yet to do business in the
Philippines.

Held: As early as 1924, the Supreme Court ruled in the
leading case of Marshall Wells Co. v. Henry W. Elser &
Co. (46 Phil. 70) that the object of Sections 68 and 69 of
the Corporation Law was to subject the foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines to the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts. The Corporation Law
must be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh,
interpretation which does not hamper the development
of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial
intercourse among countries. The objectives enunciated
in the 1924 decision are even more relevant today
when we commercial relations are viewed in terms of a
world economy, when the tendency is to re-examine
the political boundaries separating one nation from
another insofar as they define business requirements or
restrict marketing conditions. The court distinguished
between the denial of a right to take remedial action
and the penal sanction for non-registration. Insofar as
transacting business without a license is concerned,
Section 69 of the Corporation Law imposed a penal
sanction imprisonment for not less than 6 months
nor more than 2 years or payment of a fine not less
than P200.00 nor more than P1,000.00 or both in the
discretion of the court. There is a penalty for transacting
business without registration. And insofar as litigation is
concerned, the foreign corporation or its assignee may
not maintain any suit for the recovery of any debt,
claim, or demand whatever. The Corporation Law is
silent on whether or not the contract executed by a
foreign corporation with no capacity to sue is null and
void ab initio. Still, there is no question that the
contracts are enforceable. The requirement of
registration affects only the remedy. Significantly, Batas
Pambansa 68, the Corporation Code of the Philippines
has corrected the ambiguity caused by the wording of
Section 69 of the old Corporation Law. Section 133 of
the present Corporation Code provides that "No foreign
corporation transacting business in the Philippines
without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be
permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative agency in the
Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or
proceeded against before Philippine courts or
administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action
recognized under Philippine laws." The old Section 69
has been reworded in terms of non-access to courts and
administrative agencies in order to maintain or
intervene in any action or proceeding. The prohibition
against doing business without first securing a license is
now given penal sanction which is also applicable to
other violations of the Corporation Code under the
general provisions of Section 144 of the Code. It is,
therefore, not necessary to declare the contract null
and void even as against the erring foreign corporation.
The penal sanction for the violation and the denial of
access to Philippine courts and administrative bodies
are sufficient from the viewpoint of legislative policy.
Herein, the lack of capacity at the time of the execution
of the contracts was cured by the subsequent
registration is also strengthened by the procedural
aspects of these cases. Home Insurance averred in its
complaints that it is a foreign insurance company, that it
is authorized to do business in the Philippines, that its
agent is Mr. Victor H. Bello, and that its office address is
the Oledan Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati. These are
all the averments required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court. Home Insurance sufficiently alleged its
capacity to sue.

Benjamin Co vs. Republic of the Philippines GR L-
12150, 26 May 1960
Facts:
Petitioner was born in Abram and his parents are both
Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the Nationalist
Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the
marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic Church
of Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as the
Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from
theAbram Valley College, and finished his primary
studies in the Colegio in Bangued, both schools being
recognized by the government. He has a child two
months old. He has never been accused of any crime
involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to
organized government, nor is he a member of any
subversive organization. He does not believe in, nor
practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone
abroad. Hemingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a
democratic form of government and stated that if his
petition is grantedhe would serve the government
either in the military or civil department. He is a
merchant dealing in the buyand sell of tobacco. He also
is part owner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco
business, he has a workingcapital of P10, 000.00 which
he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He
contributes to civic andcharitable organizations like the
Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes
the customs of theFilipinos because he has resided in
the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he
claims to have earned P1, 000.00 in his tobacco
business. With respect to the store of which he claims
to be a part owner, hestated that his father gave him a
sum of less than P3, 000.00 representing one-fourth of
the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he
receives a monthly salary of P120, 00as a salesman
therein. He took a coursein radio mechanics and
completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind.
He claims that he has neverbeen delinquent in the
payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file
his income tax return when heallegedly received an
amount of not less than P3, 000 from his father which
he claims to have invested in histobacco business.A
petition for naturalization was filed before the trial
court in which after hearing was granted. Courtordered
that a certificate of naturalization be issued to
petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date
thedecision becomes final and all the requisites
provided for in Republic Act 503 have been complied.
Issue:Whether or not the lower court erred in granting
the petition for naturalization.
Decision: Philippine law requires that an alien must
conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
duringthe entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the constituted
government as well aswith the community in which he
is living. In the case at bar, petitioners failure to comply
with his obligation toregister his wife and child with the
Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien
Registration Act as well as hisfailure to file his income
tax return despite his fixed salary of P1, 440.00 a year
and his profit of P1, 000.00 in histobacco business
indicates that he failed to conduct himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner in hisrelation with our
government. It is also claimed that he has not stated
(during the cross-examinations) that hebelieves in the
principles underlying our Constitution.In construction,
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the governmentand against
the applicant.Hence, the petition appealed from is
reversed without pronouncement as to cost.

Lee Cho alias Sem Lee vs Republic of the PhilippinesGR.
No. 12408 December 28, 1959FACTS:
Lee Cho alias Sem Lee filed a petition for naturalization.
He was born in Amoy, China of Chinese parentsand
came to the Philippines in 1921. He was given alien
certificate of residence and registration and settled
inCebu up to the present time, managing his business.
He is married and has 13 children. Though he had
hisprimary and secondary education in Cebu Chinese
High School, most of his children are studying on
privateschools and college recognized by the
government and were given alien certificate of
registration, exceptWilliam who is not of school age,
Angelita who is out of school, that of Lourdes Lee who
married to a naturalizedFilipino and Angelita Lee who
stopped at her Third year in secondary school.
Petitioner Lee Cho by far possessesall qualifications
prescribed by the law and is residing in the Philippines
for more than 30 years now. Thus heargued exemption
from filing declaration of intention to become a Filipino
and should be entitled to a Filipinocitizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Lee Cho failed to
comply with the requirement of the Naturalization Law
RULING: The petition was denied by the affiliate court
and found merit in the contention that he fail to
complywith the requirements of the Naturalization Law
hence, fail to qualify to become a Filipino citizen. For
one,Naturalization requires filing declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior to
the filing of application which Lee Cho did not
accomplished. He will then be exempted from
complying with saidrequirement only (1) if he is born in
the Philippines and has received primary and secondary
education in anyschool recognized by the government;
or (2) if he has continuously resided in the Philippines
for a period of 30years or more provided that he has
given primary and school or in private schools
recognized by thegovernment. The petitioner was
unable to fulfill any of the two exempting condition.
Basis for contention wassignified by the case of his
children Angelita Lee and Lourdes Lee. While Angelita
Lee was deprived withsecondary education limiting her
exposure to Philippine Civics and History, Lourdes Lee
was enrolled on aChinese School with strict Chinese
curriculum. This contradicts petitioners desire to
embrace Filipino citizenshipthat comes along with
appreciating Philippine History, Civics and Government.
This circumstances questionedhis sincerity become a
Filipino citizen as he have tolerated such deviation from
the educational requirement of the law and its
nationalistic purpose.
R I C H A R D V E L A S C O V S
R E P U B L I C O F T H E P H
I L I P P I N E S (108 PHIL 234, L-14214 25 MAY
1960)
F A C T S : T h e c a s e i f a p e t i t i o n f o r
n a t u r a l i z a t i o n w h i c h w a s d e n i e d
b y t h e C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e o f
M a n i l a d u e t o t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e pet
itioner to meet the requirements of the
law.Petitioner and appellant Richard Velasco
was born to spousesPet er Vel as c o and
Mi guel Ti u on 12 May 1932 and has
s i nc e resided, fini shed school and worked in the
Philippines. Althoughhis father has been naturalized
as a Filipino citizen, petitioner didnot follow his fathers
citizenship as he was already 23 years oldat t he t i me
of nat ur al i z at i on and c ont i nues t o be a
c i t i z en of Formosa, Republ ic of Chi na. He
earns P150.00/month from
hisc u r r e n t e mp l o y me n t a t Wi l s o n D r u g
S t o r e , wh i c h wa s p a r t l y owned by his
mother, and has savings in Phil ippine banks
andshares of stocks in two Philipppine
companies.I n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e t r i a l , p e t
i t i o n e r s mo r a l c h a r a c t e r wa s at t es t ed
by Sant i ago Mar i ano, a s er geant at t he
Mani l a Pol i c eDepartment and who was also a
character witness in the petitionfor naturalization of
petitioners brother, and, Mrs. Paz Eugenio,
ahous ekeeper and s oon- t o- be mot her - i n-
l aw of t he pet i t i oner wh i c h l e d t h e t r i a l
c o u r t t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r h
a s a l i m i t e d c i r c l e o f F i l i p i n o f r i e n
d s . T h e t r i a l c o u r t a l s o f o u n d d i s c
r e p a n c i e s i n t h e d o c u m e n t a r y e v i
d e n c e p r e s e n t e d b y petitioner with regards
to his full name, Richard Velasco,
RichardC h u a V e l a s c o , a n d R i c h a r d
C . V e l a s c o . N o e v i d e n c e w a s sub
mitted to prove that all three names are one
and the sameperson. His income of P150.00/month
was also not substantial tomeet the requirement of
the naturali zation law consideri ng thelow
purchasing power of the peso and hi gh cost of
living in thePhilippines.I S S U E : W h e t h e r o r
n o t p e t i t i o n e r / a p p e l l a n t s h o u l d
i s q u a l i f i e d t o b e c o m e a naturalized
Filipino Citizen.H E L D : T h e S u p r e m e
C o u r t a f f i r m e d t h e d e c i s i o n
o f t h e C o u r t o f
F i r s t I n s t a n c e o f Ma n i l a d e n y i n g t h e
p e t i t i o n f o r n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f petitioner
/appellant Richard Vealsco. The Court averred that his
employment was merely a convenientarrangement
planned by the petitioner and his family in order
tocomply with the requirement of the law that to
become a Filipinoc i t i z en, one
mus t have a l uc r at i ve
i nc ome or oc c upat i on. Thec o u r t f u r t h e
r s t a t e d t h a t
nat ur al i z at i on l aws s houl d ber i gi dl y enf
or c ed and s t r i c t l y c ons t r ued i n f av or of t
hegovernment and against the applicant.

Manuel Guerrero and Maria Guerrero vs Hon. Court of Appeals
and Apolinario Benitez GR No. L-44570, May 30, 1986

FACTS: In 1969, Apolinario Benitez was asked by spouses
Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their
60heads of cows and to clean the already fruit-bearing
coconut trees and burn dried leaves and grass and,
duringharvest time, which is usually every three
months, to pick coconuts and gather the fallen ones
from a 16-hectare portion of the 21-hectare plantation
and process the meat of the coconut in the copra kiln of
thedefendants. He had a 1/3 share of the proceeds
from the copra that he processed and sold in the
market and aP500 a year salary for attending the cows.
In 1973, Benitez was keep from doing the job he had
always done foralmost four years. Thus, he brought the
matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit in
the Office of thePresident in Malacanang, Manila,
where spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero agreed to
let Benitez continueworking on the 16-hectare portion
of the plantation as tenant and that their relationship
will be guided by theprovisions of RA No. 1199, known
as The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
However, on July of 1973,he was again refrained from
gathering nuts from the 10-hectare and was threatened
if he persists. Benitez fileda case for reinstatement with
damages. The lower court decided in favor of Benitez,
ordering spouses Manueland Maria Guerrero to
reinstate Benitez to the 10-hectare portion of the 16-
hectare coconut plantation. Hence,this petition,
claiming that Benitez is a mere farmhand and not a
tenant. The petitioners contend that the courtsapplied
erroneous definitions of tenancy found in repealed
laws. They assert that the Agricultural Tenancy Actand
the Agricultural Land Reform Code have been
superseded by the Code of Agrarian Reforms, Rep. Act
6389,which the trial court and the Court of Appeals
failed to cite and apply.
ISSUE: Whether a tenancy relationship exists between
Manuel Guerrero et al and Apolinario Benitez et al as
todetermine their respective rights and obligations to
one another.
RULING: Although Republic Act 3844 abolished and
outlawed share tenancy and replaced it with the
agriculturalleasehold system and Republic Act 6389
amending Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy
relationships ascontrary to public policy, the Court
contends that the phasing out of share tenancy was
never intended to meana reversion of tenants into
mere farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial
rights. Thus, the respondent hasbeen unlawfully
deprived of his right to security of tenure. Therefore,
the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The decision
of the appellate court is affirmed.
Bello vs. Court of Appeals G. R. L-38161 (March 29,
1974)
FACTS: The petitioner falsely appealed a case to the
court of first instance. and taken directly to
respondentcourt. The prosecutor filed a petition to
dismiss appeal. Petitioner did not notified the dismissal
of their appeal. They filed with the city court their
"motion to elevate appeal to Court of Appeals".
Respondent city court deniedpetitioners' motion.
Petitioners spouses filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus against people andrespondent to prohibit
the execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to
Respondent Court. They dismissedthe petition.
Although the respondent recognized that the Court of
First Instance may have exercised itsinherent powers to
direct appeal to Respondent Court, it held that
Petitioners did not implead the Court of FirstInstance as
principal party respondent and thus it could not
grant any relief at all even on the assumptionthat
Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the case should be elevated to
Respondent Court despite the finality of judicial
decision.
RULING: The Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion. The Supreme Court cautions against
narrowlyinterpreting a statute, defeating its purpose
and stressed that it is the essence of judicial duty to
construestatutes as to avoid such a deplorable result of
injustice or absurdity. The provision should also be
taken withinthe context and spirit of Rule 50, Sec. 3 as
an analogous provision. The Supreme Court finds no
reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and
justice to be boundby the same rule.
The Ci t y of Mani l a, pl ai nt i f f -
appel l ant , vs . Chi nes e Communi t y of Man
i l a, et al . , def endant s - appellees.G. R. No. L-
145355 October 21, 1919
FACTS: On December 11, 1916, the City of Manila filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila
prayingthat certain lands be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing public improvement--extension
of RizalAvenue. The Chinese Community of Manila,
defendants answered the petition and denied that it
was eithernecessary or expedient that the said parcels
be expropriated for street purposes; and that the land
in questionwas used for cemetery purposes. The Court
of First Instance decided that there was no necessity for
the expropriation of the particularstrip of land in
question. The plaintiff then filed an appeal on the
grounds that under the law, it has authority to
expropriate anyland it may desire and that the courts
are mere appraisers of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings.
ISSUES: Whether or not in expropri ation
proceedings of the City of Manila, the courts
may inquire into, andhear proof upon, the necessity
of the expropriation.
RULING: When the legisl ature conferred upon
the courts of the Phili ppine Islands the ri ght to
ascertain upon tri alwhether there exists for the
exercise of eminent domain, it intended that
the courts shoul d inqui re into, andhere proof
upon, those questions.It is not alleged and not denied,
that the cemetery in question may be used by the
general community of Chinese, when in fact, in the
general acceptation of the definition of a public
cemetery, would make thecemetery in question public
property. If that is true, then of course, the petition of
the plaintiff must be denied,for the reason that City of
Manila has no authority or right under the law to
expropriate public property. The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
In the matter of the TESTATE ESTATE of PETRONILA TAMPOY vs.
DIOSDADA ALBERASTINEG.R. No. L-14322. February 25,
1960Facts:
This concerns the probate of a document which
purports to be the last will and testament of
Petronila Tampoy. After the petition was published in
accordance with law and petitioner had presented oral
anddocumentary evidence, the trial court denied the
petition on the ground that the left hand margin of the
firstpage of the will does not bear the thumbmark of
the testatrix. Petitioners contend that the will expresses
thetrue intention of the testatrix to give the property to
her whose claims remain undisputed. She wishes
toemphasize that no one has filed any opposition to the
probate of the will and that while the first page does
notbear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the second
however bears her thumbmark and both pages were
signed bythe three testimonial witnesses. Moreover,
despite the fact that the petition for probate is
unopposed, the threetestimonial witnesses testified
and manifested to the court that the document
expresses the true and voluntarywill of the
deceased.Petitioner appealed from this ruling but the
Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme
Court as itinvolves purely a question of law.
Issue: Petition to probate a will on the ground that the
left hand margin of the first page of the document
doesnot bear the thumb mark of the testatrix.
Ruling: Section 618 of Act 190, as amended, requires
that the testator sign the will and each and every
pagethereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that
the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof
in thepresence of the testator and of each other, which
requirement should be expressed in the attestation
clause. This requirement is mandatory, for failure to
comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will
(Rodriguez vs.Alcala, 55 Phil., 150). Thus, it has been
held that "Statutes prescribing the formalities to be
observed in theexecution of wills are very strictly
construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, 'A will
must be executed inaccordance with the statutory
requirements; otherwise it is entirely void.' All these
requirements stand as of equal importance and must be
observed, and courts cannot supply the defective
execution of a will. No power ordiscretion is vested in
them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense
with those enumerated in thestatutes" (Uy Coque vs.
Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407; See also Sao vs.
Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs.Gorecho 50 Phil.,
30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481).Since the will in
question suffers from the fatal defect that it does not
bear the thumbmark of thetestatrix on its first page
even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental
witnesses, the same still fails to comply with the law
and therefore, cannot be admitted to probate.The
order appealed from is affirmed.
CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARDOF
CANVASSERS OF DOLORES, QUEZON, VIVENCIO
G. LIRIO respondents.G.R. No. L-54718 December 4,
1985

Facts: On January 25, 1980, petitioner filed a certificate
of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for the
January30 elections in substitution for his companion
Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon
filing on January 4. Petitioner won in the election but
the respondent Board disregarded all his votes and
proclaimedrespondent candidate as the winner on the
presumption that petitioners candidacy was not duly
approved byrespondent. Petitioner filed a petition for
the annulment of the proclamation but was dismissed
by respondentCommission on the grounds that
Mendozas unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and
that assuming it waseffective, petitioners candidacy
was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after
January 4.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be disqualified
on the ground of formal or technical defects.
RULING: No. The fact that Mendozas withdrawal was
not sworn is a technicality, which should not be used
tofrustrate the peoples will in favor of petitioner as the
substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the
verysame day that he filed his candidacy should be
considered as having been made substantially and in
truth afterthe last day, even going by the literal reading
of the provision by respondent Commission. The spirit
of the lawrather than its literal reading should have
guided respondent Commission in resolving the issue of
last-minutewithdrawal and substitution of other
persons as candidates.

Abellana V. Marave independent civil actions
Case: Petition for certiorari from the decision of the
Judge of RTC of Ozamiz City was issuedwith grave abuse
of discretion, to dismiss the Independent civil action
filed bydefendants for failure to reserve their right to
institute it separately, when thecriminal case
for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
was commenced.
Facts: Abellana while driving his cargo truck hitting a
motorized pedicab resulting in injuriesto its passengers,
private respondents, Lamason, Gurrea, Flores, Nemeno
resulting inthe crime of physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence.
RTC of Ozamis found Abellan guilty of the said crime
in the criminal case, damageswas in favor awarded to
the offended parties. Abellana appealed this
decision.Likewise, the offended parties filed a separate
and independent civil action fordamages allegedly
suffered by them for reckless driving of Abellana.
CrispinAbellana, as employer of Francisco was included
as defendants in the complaint.
Both Crispin and Francisco sought the dismissal of
such action principally on theground that there was no
reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court
of Ozamis. They argued it was not allowable at the stage where
the criminal case wasalready on appeal.
Issue:
W/N respondent judges decision was of grave abuse
of discretion?
Ruling:
Petition for Certiorari is Dismissed.
Their motion to dismiss and MR was rejected by the
court, stating that, petitionersstand was anchored on
the thought that, the civil action for recovery of civil
liabilityfrom the offense charge is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless theoffended party
reserves his right to institute it separately. The legal
proposition that a separate civil action can be legally
filed and allowed by the court only at theinstitution, or
the right to file such separate civil action reserved of
waived, at such institution of the criminal action, and
never on appeal to the next higher court. Thiswas the
stand of the petitioners.
Such interpretation, as noted, ignores the de novo
aspect of appealed cases from city courts. On appeal to
this court, the judgment of the city court was vacated
and a trial de novo will have to be conducted.
Section 7 of Rule 123 of RC, an appealed case shall be
tried in all respects anew inthe CFI as if it had been
originally instituted in that court. Respondent judge
wasduly mindful of such norm.
Art 33 of the Civil code states that, in cases of
physical injuries, a civil action fordamages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action,
maybe brought bythe injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminalprosecution
and shall require only preponderance of evidence.
AQUINO, C.J., dissenting:
Vivencio G. Lirio of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan was the
candidate for vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon Province in
the election held on January 30, 1980.
The other candidate for vice mayor was Narciso L.
Mendoza, Jr., who filed as certificate of candidacy on
January 4, 1980, the last day for filing certificates of
candidacy. But at 7:27 in the evening of that day,
Mendoza withdrew his candidacy by means of a
handwritten letter of withdrawal which was not under
oath. He handed that letter to the election registrar of
Dolores.
Five days before the election or on January 25, 1980,
Crisologo Villanueva filed his certificate of candidacy for
vice mayor in substitution for Mendoza. On January 26
the election registrar transmitted Villanueva's
certificate of candidacy and Mendoza's withdrawal
letter to the provincial election registrar who, in turn,
indorsed the same to the Commission on Elections.
These papers were received by the Comelec Law
Department only on February 11, 1980 or after the
election and after the proclamation of Lirio as the duly
elected vice mayor.
Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of
candidates. However, on the eve of the election or on
January 29, he addressed a letter to all chairmen and
members of the board of election inspectors of Dolores
wherein he informed them of his candidacy in
substitution for Mendoza. He requested them to count
the votes cast in his favor.
The municipal election registrar asked the provincial
election registrar to clarify the status of Villanueva's
candidacy. On election day, the provincial election
registrar replied that since Villanueva's name was not
included in the official list of candidates it could be
legally presumed that the Comelec did not approve his
certificate of candidacy.
On January 31, 1980 the municipal board of canvassers
proclaimed Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor. The
votes cast for Villanueva were not counted because he
was not an official candidate. They were regarded as
stray votes. It cannot be assumed that he received
3,112 votes as against 2,600 votes for Lirio.
Villanueva filed a petition to annul Lirio's proclamation.
The Comelec dismissed it on the grounds (1) that
Mendoza's withdrawal had no legal effect because it
was not under oath as required in section 27 of the
Election Code and (2) that even assuming that it was
effective, Villanueva's substitute candidacy was not
valid under section 28 of the Election Code since
Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4 but on that
very day.
Any votes cast for Villanueva were stray votes under
section 155 (15) of the Election Code. It cannot be said
that Villanueva obtained more votes than Lirio, a
reelectionist.
It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law
which we cannot see nor handle and which we do not
know very much.
The Comelec resolution was affirmed by this Court.
Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration. I vote to
deny said motion.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, C.J., dissenting:
Vivencio G. Lirio of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan was the
candidate for vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon Province in
the election held on January 30, 1980.
The other candidate for vice mayor was Narciso L.
Mendoza, Jr., who filed as certificate of candidacy on
January 4, 1980, the last day for filing certificates of
candidacy. But at 7:27 in the evening of that day,
Mendoza withdrew his candidacy by means of a
handwritten letter of withdrawal which was not under
oath. He handed that letter to the election registrar of
Dolores.
Five days before the election or on January 25, 1980,
Crisologo Villanueva filed his certificate of candidacy for
vice mayor in substitution for Mendoza. On January 26
the election registrar transmitted Villanueva's
certificate of candidacy and Mendoza's withdrawal
letter to the provincial election registrar who, in turn,
indorsed the same to the Commission on Elections.
These papers were received by the Comelec Law
Department only on February 11, 1980 or after the
election and after the proclamation of Lirio as the duly
elected vice mayor.
Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of
candidates. However, on the eve of the election or on
January 29, he addressed a letter to all chairmen and
members of the board of election inspectors of Dolores
wherein he informed them of his candidacy in
substitution for Mendoza. He requested them to count
the votes cast in his favor.
The municipal election registrar asked the provincial
election registrar to clarify the status of Villanueva's
candidacy. On election day, the provincial election
registrar replied that since Villanueva's name was not
included in the official list of candidates it could be
legally presumed that the Comelec did not approve his
certificate of candidacy.
On January 31, 1980 the municipal board of canvassers
proclaimed Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor. The
votes cast for Villanueva were not counted because he
was not an official candidate. They were regarded as
stray votes. It cannot be assumed that he received
3,112 votes as against 2,600 votes for Lirio.
Villanueva filed a petition to annul Lirio's proclamation.
The Comelec dismissed it on the grounds (1) that
Mendoza's withdrawal had no legal effect because it
was not under oath as required in section 27 of the
Election Code and (2) that even assuming that it was
effective, Villanueva's substitute candidacy was not
valid under section 28 of the Election Code since
Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4 but on that
very day.
Any votes cast for Villanueva were stray votes under
section 155 (15) of the Election Code. It cannot be said
that Villanueva obtained more votes than Lirio, a
reelectionist.
It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law
which we cannot see nor handle and which we do not
know very much.
The Comelec resolution was affirmed by this Court.
Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration. I vote to
deny said motion.
CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES
L-2877 (38 SCRA 284); March 31, 1971
FACTS: In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix
Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law
spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and
Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the
deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or
September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant
Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister
and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a
claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of
self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land
declared in her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon
declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was
made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet
spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code
inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between
spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship.
HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as
void a donation between the spouses during marriage,
policy consideration of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality requires that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG
3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is
every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the
deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in
appellant having exclusive right to the disputed
property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half
of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other
half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and
sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.
People of the Philippines v. Moro MacarandangCase
No. 211G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959)Chapter II, Page
69, Footnote No.87
FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal
possession of firearms inLanao. Defendant,admitting
the ownership and possession of thefirearm
andammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the
appointment issued to him byGovernorDimakuta as
secret agent shown in theGovernor s letter which he
presented asandevidence. He was granted this
appointment for having shown good faith by previously
surrenderingto the office of the Governor a firearm. He
has thenbeenappointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on
themaintenance of peace and ordercampaigns and
isauthorized to hold and carry in his possession 1Riot
shotgun.
ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in
themaintenance of peace and order falls among
thoseauthorized to possess firearms.
HELD: Yes. It may be true that the Governor has
noauthority to issue any firearmlicense or permit
butsection 879 of the Revised Administrative
Codeprovides the peace officers are exempted
fromthe requirements relating to the issuance
oflicenseto possess firearms. The appointment
sufficientlyput him in the category of peace
officer equivalent even to a Municipal Police
expresslycovered by section879. Wherefore the
decisionappealed from is reversed and theDefendant
acquitted.
People of the Philippines v. Mapa Case No. 213G.R. No.
L-22301 (August 30, 1967)Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote
No.89
FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possessionof
firearms. He invokes in hisdefense that he wasan
appointed Secret Agent of the provincialGovernor
ofBatangas. He sought to be acquitted asthe case of
People v. Macarandang usedthe samedefense providing
evidences of his appointment.
ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized
to possess firearms.
HELD: No. The court held that the law cannot be any
clearer. The law does not contain any exception for
secret agent therefore holding this position would not
constitute a sufficient defense to aprosecution for a
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions.
Wherefore theconviction of the accused must stand.
TheCourt ruling overturned that of People v.
Macarandang.

People v. Santayana Case No. 115No. L-22291 (November
15, 1976)
FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms andsentenced to
anindeterminate penalty from one year and one dayto
two years,and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as
aspecial agent of the CIS, whichapparentlyauthorizes
him to carry and possess firearms,exempts him from
securing alicense or permitcorresponding thereto.
HELD: Yes. At the time of appellants apprehension,the
doctrine then prevailing wasenunciated in thecase of
People vs. Macarandang wherein it washeld that
theappointment of a civilian as secretagent to assist in
the maintenance of peaceandorder campaigns and
detection of crimessufficiently puts him within the
category ofa peaceofficer equivalent even to a
member of themunicipal police expresslycovered
by Section 879.
People v. Estenzo
GR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651)First
Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur
Facts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the
Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastrewas
declared public land. Respondent Aotes filed on23
February 1972 a petition to reopen the decisionof the
Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act 931 as amended by
Republic Act 6236. Aotes claim that sincethe time limit
for filing applications for free patents and applications
for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect
titles have been extended up to 31 December 1980, the
reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until 31
December 1980. The judge denied the opposition for
lack of sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and rendered
decision on 22 July 1972 after due hearing, declaring
Lot4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of
the Aoetes in undivided interest in equal share of
each. Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower
court, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Issue:Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263
also applies to Re-opening of CadastralProceedings.
Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (ExpressMention is
Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in
a law, as a general rule, means theexclusion of others
not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to
probable legislative intent, is basedupon the rules of
logic and the natural workings of the human mind. If RA
6236 had intended that theextension it provided for
applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would
have so provided in thesame way that it provided the
extension of time to file applications for free patent and
for judicialconfirmation of imperfect or incomplete title.
The intention to exclude the reopening of
cadastralproceedings or certain lands which were
declared public land in RA 6236 is made clearer by
reference toRA2061 which includes the reopening of
cadastral cases, but not so included in RA 6236. Thus,
RA 6236,the very law on which Aotes bases his petition
to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply
anybasis for respondents contention. It will be noted
that while RA 2061 fixed the time to reopen
cadastralcases which shall not extend beyond 31
December 1968, no similar provision is found in RA
6236expressly extending the time limit for the
reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land
declaredpublic land. As correctly pointed out by
petitioners, the extension as provided for by the RA
6236 makesno reference to reopening of cadastral
cases as the earlier law, RA2061, expressly did. Truly,
theextension provided for by RA 6236 applies only to
the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not
to reopening of cadastral proceedings likethe instant
case, a proceeding entirely different from filing an
application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles. The Supreme Court
set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent
Judge and reiterating the 28September 1940 decision of
the Cadastral Court; without pronouncement as to
costs.
Mutuc v. Comelec
GR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228)First
Division, Fernando (p): 7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in
separate opinion
Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate forthe
position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
from using jingles in his mobile unitsequipped with
sound systems and loud speakers on 22 October
1970. Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as
violative of his right to free speech. Respondent
however contended that the prohibitionwas premised
on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act,
which made it unlawful forcandidates to purchase,
produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or
electoral propaganda gadgetssuch as pens, lighters, fans
(of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets,bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin. It was its contention that the jingle proposed to
be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a
singerand therefore a tangible propaganda material,
under the phrase and the like.
Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase
and the like.
Held:Under the well-known principle of ejusdem
generis, the general words following any
enumerationare applicable only to things of the same
kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is
quiteapparent that what was contemplated in the Act
was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred toas
a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for
the candidate responsible for its distribution.The
Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the
prohibition on the distribution of gadgets of thekind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible forits
distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda
gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters,fans,
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes,
andconcluding with the words and the like. ). Taped
jingles therefore were not prohibited.The Supreme
Court decision was made to expound on the reasons
behind the minute resolution of 3November 1970. The
Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited
the Comelec fromenforcing or implementing or
demanding compliance with its order banning the use
of political taped jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of
3 November 1970; without pronouncement as to costs.
People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)En Banc, Regala
(p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that
Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a
violation of Section 54 of the Revised ElectionCode. A
preliminary investigation conducted by said court
resulted in the finding of a probable causethat the
crime charged was committed by the defendant.
Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant splea of
not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of thepeace,
the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.The lower court
denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of
the peace is within the purviewof Section 54. A second
motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in
support thereof the decisionof the Court of Appeals
(CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a
justice of the peace isexcluded from the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on
various motions andpleadings, the lower court
dismissed the information against the accused upon the
authority of theruling in the case cited by the defense.
Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded
from the coverage of Section 54 of the RevisedElection
Code
Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso
habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted froman
enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. The maxim casus omisus canoperate and
apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established. The application of therule of casus omisus
does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but ratherfrom a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislativeenumeration.
Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most
extensive sense the term judgeincludes all officers
appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in
that capacity, including justiceof the peace, and even
jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention
of the Legislature did notexclude the justice of the
peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no
necessity to include the justice of peace in the
enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the
Revised AdministrativeCode, as the legislature has
availed itself of the more generic and broader term
judge, includingtherein all kinds of judges, like judges of
the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of
AgrarianRelations, judges of the courts of Industrial
Relations, and justices of the peace.The Supreme Court
set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court
and remanded the case fortrial on the merits.

Lopez vs. CTA; GR L-9274, 1 February 1957 (100 Phil
850)En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concur
Facts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting
from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector
of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties
on the importation on the basis of consular andsupplier
invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the
shipments were released. Subsequently,however, the
Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost and
freight of said wire netting and as aresult of the
reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount
of P1,966.59 were levied andimposed upon petitioner.
Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment
and levy of additionalcustoms duties, Lopez & Sons
appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a
motion to dismiss theappeal, filed by the Solicitor
General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax
Court, by its resolutionof 23 May 1955, dismissed the
appeal on the ground hat it had no jurisdiction to
review decisions of theCollector of Customs of Manila,
citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax court. From
said resolutionof dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to
the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of said resolution
of dismissal.
Issue: Whether the decision of the Collector of Customs
is directly appealable to the Court of TaxAppeal.
Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125
specifically provides that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
hasappellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand,
section11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating the
persons and entities who may appeal mentions
amongothers, those affected by a decision or ruling of
the Collector of Customs, and fails to mention
theCommissioner of Customs. While there is really a
discrepancy between the two sections, it is
morereasonable and logical to hold that in section 11 of
the Act, the Legislature meant and intended to say,the
Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of
Customs. If persons affected by a decision of
theCollector of Customs may appeal directly to the
Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and
controlof the Commissioner of Customs over his
Collector of Customs, under the Customs Law found in
sections1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative
Code, and his right to review their decisions upon
appeal tohim by the persons affected by said decision
would, not only be gravely affected but even
destroyed.The Courts are not exactly indulging in
judicial legislation but merely endeavoring to rectify and
correct aclearly clerical error in the wording of a
statute, in order to give due course and carry out the
evidentintention of the legislature.The Supreme Court
affirmed the appealed order, holding that under the
Customs Law and RA 1125, theCTA has no jurisdiction to
review by appeal decision of the Collector of Customs;
with costs.

Sanciangco v. Rono
GR L-68709, 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___)En Banc,
Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate
opinion, 1 took no part
Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of
Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the 17 May
1982Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President
of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz
City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. As
the President of the Association,petitioner was
appointed by the President of the Philippines as a
member of the Citys SangguniangPanlungsod. On 27
March 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the 14 May 1984 BatasanPambansa elections for
Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao
Alliance. He was notsuccessful in the said election.
Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of BP 697, petitioner
informed Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was
resuming hisduties as member of that body. The matter
was elevated to the Minister of Local Government Jose
A.Roo, who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive
official, he is deemed to have resigned
from hisappointive position upon the filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy.
Issue: Whether the accused is considered resigned from
the latters filing of a certificate of candidacyfor the
Batasan.
Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2), Batas
Pambansa 697, admits of more than oneconstruction,
taking into sconsideration the nature of the positions of
the officials enumerated therein,namely, governors,
mayors, members of the various sanggunians or
barangay officials, the legislativeintent to distinguish
between elective positions in section 13(2), as
contrasted to appointive positions insection 13(l) under
the all-encompassing clause reading any person holding
public appointive office orposition, is clear. It is a rule of
statutory construction that when the language of a
particular section of a statute admits of more than one
construction, that construction which gives effect to the
evidentpurpose and object sought to be attained by the
enactment of the statute as a whole, must be
followed.A statute s clauses and phrases should not
be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the
wholeand every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts. The
legislativeintent to cover public appointive officials in
subsection (1), and officials mentioned in subsection
(2)which should be construed to refer to local elective
officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of
theBatasan Pambansa. Since petitioner is
unquestionably an appointive member of the
SangguniangPanlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was
appointed by the President as a member of the City s
SangguniangPanlungsod by virtue of his having been
elected President of the Association of Barangay
Councils, he isdeemed to have ipso facto ceased to
be such member when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the14 May 1984 Batasan elections.The
Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the
writs prayed for, holding that there was nograve abuse
of discretion on the part of the officials; without costs.

In RE exemption from SSS coverage: Archbishop of
Manila v. SSC [ GR L-15045, 20 January 1961]
En Banc, Gutierrez-David (p): 5 concur, 3 concur in
result, 1 reserves vote
Facts: On 1 September 1958, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with theSocial
Security Commission a request that Catholic
Charities, and all religious and charitable
institutionsand/or organizations, which are directly or
indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the
RomanCatholic Archbishop of Manila, be exempted
from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, as amended
(SocialSecurity Law of 1954). Acting upon the
recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social
SecurityCommission in its Resolution 572 (s. 1958),
denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising
constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration
of the resolution. The request, however, was denied by
the Commission in its Resolution 767 (s. 1958);hence,
this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5 (c) of RA
1161, as amended.The Supreme Court affirmed
Resolution 572 and 767, s. 1958 of the Social Security
Commission, withcosts against appellant.
1. Definition of employer, employee, and
employment (as defined in law)
The term employer as used in the law is defined as
any person, natural or juridical, domestic orforeign,
who carries in the Philippines any trade, business,
industry, undertaking, or activity of any kindand uses
the services of another person who is under his orders
as regards the employment, except theGovernment and
any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities, including corporationsowned or
controlled by the Government (par. [c], sec. 8), while
an employee refers to any personwho performs
services for an `employer in which either or both
mental and physical efforts are usedand who receives
compensation for such services (par. [d] sec. 8).
Employment , according toparagraph [j] of said
section 8, covers any service performed by an employer
except those expresslyenumerated thereunder, like
employment under the Government, or any of its
political subdivisions,branches or instrumentalities
including corporations owned and controlled by the
Government,domestic service in a private home,
employment purely casual, etc.
2. Ejusdem generis applies only if there is uncertainty
The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is
uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plainpurpose
and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered
and defeated. In the case at bar, it isapparent that the
coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship of
more or less permanent nature and extends to
employment of all kinds exceptthose expressly
excluded. The definition of the term employer is,
thus, sufficiently comprehensive asto include religious
and charitable institutions or entities not organized for
profit within its meaning. Hadthe Legislature really
intended to limit the operation of the law to entities
organized for profit or gain, itwould not have defined an
employer in such a way as to include the
Government and yet make anexpress exception of it.
3. Intent of legislature: exemption excluded in new law
When RA 1161 was enacted, services performed in the
employ of institutions organized for religious
orcharitable purposes were by express provisions of
said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par.[j],
subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has
been deleted by express provision of RA1792, which
took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the
Legislature intended to includecharitable and religious
institutions within the scope of the law.
4. Intent of law limited to corporations and industries
The discussions in the Senate dwelt at length upon
the need of a law to meet the problems
of industrializing society and upon the plight of an
employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily
explained by the fact that the majority of those to be
affected by the operation of the law arecorporations
and industries which are established primarily for profit
or gain.
5. Valid exercise of police power; Social justice
The enactment of the law is a legitimate exercise of the
police power, pursuant to the policy of theRepublic of
the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and
perfect a social security system whichshall be suitable
to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines
and shall provide protection toemployees against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death. It
affords protection to labor,especially to working women
and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional
provisions on the promotion of social justice to insure
the well being and economic security of all the
people.
6. Inclusion of religious organization does not violate
prohibition on application of public funds forthe
benefit of a priest; does not violate right
to disseminate religious information
The funds contributed to the System created by the law
are not public funds, but funds belonging to
themembers which are merely held in trust by the
Government. Even assuming that said funds
areimpressed with the character of public funds, their
payment as retirement, death or disability
benefitswould not constitute a violation of the cited
provision of the Constitution, since such payment
shall bemade to the priest not because he is a priest but
because he is an employee. Further, the
contributionsare not in the nature of taxes on
employment. Together with the contributions imposed
upon theemployees and the Government, they are
intended for the protection of said employees against
thehazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in
line with the constitutional mandate to promotesocial
justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people.