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Viray v. People
FACTS: An information for qualified theft was filed against petitioner. Private complainant Vedua
maintains 75 dogs in her compound. To assist her in the feeding of the dogs and cleaning their cages,
Vedua employed accused who would report for work from morning till afternoon. One day, private
complainant left for Batangas and left the accused to attend to her dogs. Before leaving, she locked the
doors of her house. Later in the evening, when Vedua returned, she noticed that some of her things
were missing. This includes her jacket, jewelries, gamboy, a compact disk player, a cellular phone and a
Nike air cap. Private complainant immediately checked her premises and discovered that the main doors
of her house were destroyed. According to 2 witnesses, when Vedua was in Batangas, they saw accused
inside the house of Vedua. For his defense, Viray averred that he did not report for work on the date of
the alleged incident as he was down with the flu. Petitioners aunt and sister corroborated with his
The RTC held that the offense charged should have been robbery and not qualified theft as there was an
actual breaking of the screen door and the main door to gain entry into the house. The accused cannot
be properly charged with qualified theft since he was not a domestic servant but more of a laborer. The
CA found that the information filed against accused shows that the prosecution failed to allege one of
the essential elements of the crime of robbery, which is use of force upon things. Thus, to convict him
of robbery, a crime not necessarily included in a case of qualified theft, would violate the constitutional
mandate than an accused must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
CA ruled that accused should be convicted of qualified theft considering that accused enjoyed Veduas
confidence, being the caretaker of the latters pets.

ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of qualified theft?

RULING: Art.308 in relation to Art. 310 of the RPC described the felony of qualified theft
Art.308: Who are liable for theft Theft is committed by any person, who with intent to gain but
without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property
of another without the latters consent.
Art. 310: Qualified theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by 2 degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding acrticle, if committed by a domestic servant, of
with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or
consist of coconuts taken from the premised of the plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity ,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
The crime charged against petitioner is qualified theft by grave abuse of confidence. These elements
must first be met:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence
First, it was proved that the subjects of the offense were all personal or movable properties, consisting
as they were of jewelry, clothing, cellular phone, a media player and a gaming device. Second, these
properties belong to private complainant Vedua. Third, circumstantial evidence portray a chain of
events that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner took the personal properties with
intent to gain, especially considering that, fourth, Vedua had not consented to the removal and/or
taking of these properties. The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by
petitioner cannot be qualified by the breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the Information.
However, it disagreed from its finding that the same breaking of the door constitutes the qualifying
element of grave abuse of confidence to sentence petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for qualified
theft. Instead, it agreed with the RTC that private complainant did not repose on Viray "confidence" that
the latter could have abused to commit qualified theft.
The very fact that petitioner "forced open" the main door and screen because he was denied access to
private complainants house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private complainant.
Without ready access to the interior of the house and the properties that were the subject of the taking,
it cannot be said that private complaint had a "firm trust" on petitioner or that she "relied on his
discretion" and that the same trust reposed on him facilitated Virays taking of the personal properties
justifying his conviction of qualified theft. To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the
penalty for qualified theft, there must be an allegation in the information and proof that there existed
between the offended party and the accused such high degree of confidence or that the stolen goods
have been entrusted to the custody or vigilance of the accused. In other words, where the accused had
never been vested physical access to, or material possession of, the stolen goods, it may not be said that
he or she exploited such access or material possession thereby committing such grave abuse of
confidence in taking the property. Without the circumstance of a grave abuse of confidence and
considering that the use of force in breaking the door was not alleged in the information, petitioner can
only be held accountable for the crime of simple theft under Art.308 in relation to art.309 of the RPC.
Aristotle Valenzuela vs people
Gr 160188 June 21, 2007

On May 19,1994 pet and Calderon were sighted outside the supersale club, a supermarket within the sm
complex along north edsa, by Lago, a security guard. Lago saw pet hauling a push cart with cases of
detergent (tide). Pet unloaded these cases in an open parking space where Calderon was waiting. Pet
then returned inside the supermarket, and after 5 minutes, emerged with more cartons of tide and
again unloaded these boxes to the same area.
Then pet left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking
space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of tide inside the taxi and boarded the
vehicle. Lago stopped the taxi as it was leaving the parking area and asked for a receipt for the
merchandise, then pet and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot. Pet and calderon were apprehended at
the scene and the stolen merchandise was recovered.

RTC and CA Ruling: consummated theft

Pet contends that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended,
he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen

WON Under the given circumstances, the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely

Completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of another establishes, at least,
that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage.

Art 308- theft is already produced upon the taking of personal property of another without the latter's
consent as provided for in the language of the law.

The fact that the offender was able to succeed on obtaining physical possession of the stolen item, no
matter how momentarily, was able to consummate theft.

Disposition of the property is not an element or statutory characteristic of the crime

Theft cannot have a frustrated stage

Petition denied.
P v. Diu
Perlie and her sister Nely were eployed as waitresses at Halla Hotel in Angeles City. As the sisters were
walking home from work, they saw accused-appellants and De la Cruz. The petitioners and co-accused
De la Cruz stole Perlies shoulder bag that contained the amount of P1,800. Meanwhile, accused-
appellant Dayaon and De la Cruz were embracing Nely from behind. As she tried to go near Nely, Perlie
saw accused-appellant and De la Cruz stabbing Nely, passing a knife to each other. Perlie described the
knife as double bladed and approximately seven inches long. After the stabbing, Nely was left lying face
down on the ground, covered in blood. The entire incident took place within two minutes. Two men
then helped Perlie bring Nely to the Ospital Ning Angeles, where Nely was pronounced dead on arrival.
Only accused-appellants were arrested, while their co-accused De la Cruz remained at large.
RTC charged appellant Robbery with Homicide. CA affirmed the judgement but the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime was not appreciated.
1.WON Perlies testimony is credible
Perlie is more than just an eyewitness, she is a surviving victim of the crime. Her testimony, as described
by the RTC, was categorical and straightforward.Perlie had positively identified both accused-appellants
and described specifically the role each played, together with De la Cruz, in the commission of the crime.
The physical injuries Perlie and her sister Nely suffered were consistent with Perlies account of the
events of October 3, 2003
2.WON accused-appelants are guilty of robbery with homicide?
As the RTC declared, *t+he actions of the three accused, from the deprivation of the eyewitness [Perlie]
of her personal belongings by accused Diu to the stabbing of the victim Nely by accused Dayaon and De
la Cruz, Jr., are clear and indubitable proofs of a concerted effort to deprive [Perlie] and Nely of their
personal belongings, and that by reason or on the occasion of the said robbery, stabbed and killed victim
Nely Salvador. The absence of proof that accused-appellants attempted to stop Nelys killing, plus the
finding of conspiracy, make accused-appellants liable as principals for the crime of Robbery with
Accused-appellants Welvin Diu y Kotsesa and Dennis Dayaon y Tupit are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.


Facts: A group of men entered the house of spouses Hashiba, accordingly they were NPA and only need
money. The wife (emelie) was brought upstairs and was divested of money and jewelries. Not satisfied
with the loot value, demanded 3M pesos and if not provided they would bring her son with them. The
wife insisted that her son was sick, offered herself as hostage. The group brought the husband
(yasumitsu) instead. Before leaving the house threatened the wife, that failure to provide such they will
kill her husband. Thereafter, left using the car of the husband.

Accused - appellants called to demand cellphone, was obliged by the wife. Then received a call
informing her not to withdraw money until further instructions. No calls received for several days, she
then was only informed by the policemen that kidnappers released her husband.

Issue: WON accused-appellants guilty of robberry with violence of person by a band?

Held: Elements of robbery Art. 293 Of rpc.
1. Intent to gain
2. Unlawful taking
3. Personal property belonging to another
4. Violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

Under 296 of the same code when two or more than 3 armed malefactors take part in the commission
of robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. There were at least 5 people
including the appellants barged into and forcibly took possession of properties belonging to spouses.
And made their clear intent when they assured their victims that they were only after the money.

People v Hipona

Facts: AAA(aunt of the accused) was found dead, she was raped, physically manhandled and strangled,
which eventually led to her death. AAAs necklace and handbag were missing.

AAAs sister BBB, who is appellants mother, declared that her son-appellant had told her that Mama,
Im sorry, I did it because I did not have the money, and he was thus apologizing for AAAs death. In an
interview which was broadcasted, when asked by a radio reporter, appellant answered that he did it
because of his friends and of poverty.

Because of his failure to explain why he was in possession of victims stolen necklace with pendants, plus
his confession to the media in the presence of his relatives, and to another radio reporter, RTC found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with Homicide (and Robbery). Court of Appeals
sustained appellants conviction. It was then elevated to the Court.

Ruling: The confluence of the following established facts and circumstances sustains the appellate
courts affirmance of appellants conviction: First, appellant was frequently visiting AAA prior to her
death, hence, his familiarity with the layout of the house; second, appellant admitted to his relatives and
the media that he was present during commission of the crime, albeit only as a look-out; third, appellant
was in possession of AAAs necklace at the time he was arrested; and fourth, appellant extrajudicially
confessed to the radio reporter that he committed the crime due to his peers and because of poverty.
We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.

Appellant argues that he should only be held liable for robbery and not for the complex crime of Rape
with Homicide (and Robbery) since DNA expert found the vaginal smears taken from AAA to be
negative of appellants DNA.

Appellants argument fails. Presence of spermatozoa is not essential in finding that rape was committed,
the important consideration being not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female
genitalia by the male organ.14 As underlined above, the post-mortem examination of AAAs body
revealed fresh hymenal lacerations which are consistent with findings of rape.

The Court gathers, however, that from the evidence for the prosecution, robbery was the main intent of
appellant, and AAAs death resulted by reason of or on the occasion thereof. Following Article 294(1)
and Article 62(1)1 of the Revised Penal Code, rape should have been appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance instead.

Appellant, Michael A. Hipona is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide

Escamilla V. P
Homicide; intent to kill. The intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at whatever stage, may be
before or simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist
of,inter alia, the means used; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and
the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim.
Accuseds intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. Using a gun, he shot the victim in
the chest. Despite a bloodied right upper torso, the latter still managed to run towards his house to ask
for help. Nonetheless, accused continued to shoot at the victim three more times, albeit unsuccessfully.
These belie the absence of petitioners intent to kill the victim.
Serrano v. People

At around 9:30 pm of March 8, 1999, the victim with his 2 friends were on their way to Fatima II in Pook
Dagihoy, UP Campus when they came across Gener Serrano, the accused's brother, with his group of
friends. The victim with his 2 friends approached Gener and his friends to settle a previous quarrel
between Gener and Roberto Comia. Comia suddenly appeared and hurled invectives at Gener and they
fought. The accused then appeared with other members of the group. When Gener lost the fight,
accused sought to get back at the victim and his friends. The victim and his friends saw that the accused
had a knife and used it to chase away the members of their group. The victim was left alone and was
ganged up by the accused's group. He was stabbed by the accused on the left side of his stomach while
he was standing and while Gener and Orieta holding his arms. They continued beating and stoning the
victim until he fell into a nearby creek where the accused and his group left him. The victim saw that a
portion of his intestines showed. He was taken to the UP infirmary but was reffered to East Avenue
Medical Center and underwent surgery.

RTC- frustrated homicide
CA- attempted homicide

1. W/N the accused was not positively identified by a credible testimony.
2. W/N the accused can only be convicted of serious physical injuries as the intent to kill the victim was
nof sufficiently proven.
3. W/N the victim be convicted of attempted homicide instead of frustrated homicde.

1. The accused was positively identified.
-evidences: (1) the manner of attack wich was done frontally and a close range, allowing the victim to
see his assaultant (2) the lightning conditions at the scene of stabbing provided by 2 meralco posts and
illuminated by white flourescent type of light coming from a steel manufacturing shop (3) that the victim
and the accused knew each other also allowed the victim to readily identify the accused as his assailant.
-the victims credibilty is further strenghtened by his lack of improper motive to falsely accused the
petitioner of the crime.
-the petitioner was the only one seen in possession of a knife during rumble.

2. Factor to determine the presence of an intent to kill:
(1) the means used by the malefactors
(2) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim
(3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim.
(4) the circumstances under which the crime was commitrd and the motives of the accused
-the SC is conviced that the accused in stabbing, beating and stabbing the victim intends to kill him.

3. The SC agree with CA's conclusion. Although the stab wound could have been fatal since the victim
testifieed that he saw his intestines showed, no exact evidence exists to prove the gravity of the wound,
it cannot consider the stab wound as sufficient to cause death. The victim's attending physician did not
testify on the gravity of the wound inflicted on the victim.
-elements of frustrated homicide
(1) accused intends to kill his victim as manifestedd by his use of deadly weapon in his assault
(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wounds but did not die because of timely medical assistance
(3) non of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Art.243 of RPC.
-prosecution failed to prove the 2nd element. Accused, therefore, is liabale for ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE.
Consing v. People
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz)
various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured by a real
estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land (property) Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could
develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names
of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that warranted
the suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.

Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the
effect that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because the Makati civil
case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was
wrong for him to do considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his
case with Plus Builders and his case with Unicapit
A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on
fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing
and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as
security and later object of sale, a property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious
title."22 As such, the action was one that could proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as follows:
we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case
(the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in
Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the
purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the
transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability.
An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the
guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document.25 (Words in parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

1994: Lateo and Elca proposed that Lucero finance the titling of the 122 hectares of land located in
Muntinlupa allegedly owned by Elca as the sole heir of Gregorio Elca. Title to the property had not been
transferred to Elca's name because of a certain discrepancy between the Deed of Sale and TCT No.
77730. Elca offered to assign to Lucero 70 hectares of said land. She was then introduced to Baldemor,
Orlando Lalota and Nolasco de Guzman.
Lucero released to petitioners about P4.7 million in staggered amounts.
Elca told Lucero that certain portions of the property will first be put in the name of Lateo and would
later be assigned to her. Lucero was given a Deed of Sale dated March 27, 1987. Elca likewise executed
an irrevocable Special Power of Attorney in favor of Lucero.
Later, she was presented certified true copies of three (3) titles, issued by the Register of Deeds of
Makati City in the name of Lateo covering approximately twenty-seven (27) hectares of Plan A-7 of the
Muntinlupa Estate, situated in Barrio Magdaong, Poblacion, Muntinlupa.
December 1994: Lucero verified with the Registry of Deeds of Makati, she discovered that the
aforesaid titles of the property were actually registered in the names of Marc Oliver R. Singson, Mary
Jeanne S. Go and Feliza C. Torrigoza.
Lucero confronted petitioners and demanded from them return of the money. She was told that they
did not have any money to return. They instead offered a five (5) hectare property identified as Lot
10140 of Plan Sgs 04213-000441 located at Bacoor, Cavite allegedly owned by Elca. Elca, however,
demanded an additional P2 million for the transfer of title. Through a letter, he said that the current
valuation of the property is P450.00 per square meter and hence, the property will be more than
sufficient to cover obligates
As it turned out, Elca did not own 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite. He merely had an inchoate right over
the Bacoor property, derived from his Application to Purchase Friar Lands, which covered only 7
hectares. Elca's application was later amended to cover only 4 hectares, in view of the protest by Alfredo
Salenga (Salenga).
Lucero verified this with the Land Management Bureau (LMB), she discovered that Elca only had a
pending application for the sales patent over a four 4-hectare area of the subject land. These
misrepresentations prompted her to file a complaint with the Task Force Kamagong, PACC, Manila.
April 26, 1995: the task force conducted an entrapment at Furosato Restaurant. Petitioners were
apprehended in possession of marked 100-peso bills amounting to P100,000.00, supposedly in exchange
for the Deed of Assignment prepared by Lucero for their transaction.

1. Whether there was attempted estafa not consummated? YES. ATTEMPTED ESTAFA (not
consummated because as yet no damage to Lucero)
2. What penalty to impose?

Elements of estafa Art. 315 (2) (a): 2.By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name,
or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
o That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
o That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
o That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means,
that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act,
or fraudulent means.
o That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage
Transaction involving the Bacoor property was a continuation of the transaction involving parcels of
land in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. When Lucero discovered that Elca's certificates of title over the
Muntinlupa property were fake, Elca offered, as substitute, the 5-hectare portion of his purported 14-
hectare lot in Bacoor, Cavite, but asked for an additional P2,000,000.00, through a letter.
Elca was in no position to transfer ownership of the 5-hectare Bacoor property at the time petitioners
offered it to Lucero because his right was merely inchoate and was still under protest.
o Fraud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken
of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and
which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by
suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which
another is cheated.
o Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
ATTEMPTED NOT CONSUMMATED: Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself
had been shown, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted petitioners of attempted estafa
o The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded.
o IF CONSUMMATED: Lucero would have been defrauded in the amount of P100,000.00. Hence, the
applicable penalty under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) would have been prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, with an additional one (1)
year for every P10,000.00 in excess of the first P22,000.00; provided, that the total penalty should not
exceed twenty years.
o BEC. ATTEMPTED: Two degrees lower than that of consummated pursuant to Article 51. Accordingly,
the imposable penalty would be arresto mayor in its medium period to arresto mayor in its maximum
period, or an imprisonment term ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. And
because the amount involved exceeded P22,000.00, one (1) year imprisonment for every P10,000.00
should be added, bringing the total to seven (7) years.
o However, we agree with the OSG that it would be inequitable to impose the additional incremental
penalty of 7 years to the maximum period of penalty, considering that petitioners were charged and
convicted merely of attempted and not consummated estafa.
Pamintuan vs people #10

Facts: the petitioner received from jerimiah a diamond ring worth P765,000.00 on the condition that it
would be sold on commission basis. At the time she received the ring, the petitioner signed a document
entitled Katibayan, authorizing the sale of the ring under the following express conditions: the petitioner
was to sell the ring for cash and with an overprice as her profit, and remit the full payment to Jeremias;
she would not entrust the ring to anybody; and if unsold within three days, she must return the ring, or
pay for it in cash.

The petitioner failed to remit payment for the diamond ring despite the lapse of the agreed period.
Neither did she return the diamond ring. Subsequently, Jeremias, through his lawyer, sent two (2)
formal demand letters for the petitioner to comply with her obligations under the Katibayan. The
demand letters went unheeded. Thus, the petitioner failed to comply with her obligations to Jeremias.

Issue: Won the elements of the crime estafa under art 315 par 1(b) of the revised penal code, as
amended, were duly proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: Yes

The elements of estafa under this provision are: (1) the offenders receipt of money, goods, or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender
of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended
party that the offender return the money or property received.

The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to
the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made.The words convert and misappropriate
connote the act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon.To misappropriate for ones own use includes not only
conversion to ones personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another
without right.In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items
to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.

* when the accused failed at the first instance despite demand, to return at least the value of the ring,
the crime of estafa was consummated
Obando v. People


Following the death of Jose Figueras, his wife Alegria was named the administrator of his estate without
opposition from their stepsons Eduardo and Francisco Figueras. When Alegria died, the administration
of her estates and that of Joses estates were left to Eduardo. Alegrias brother, Fritz Strebel claimed to
have a part on his sisters estate and to such claim, the Figueras brothers have no contention.

Subsequently, Fritz Strebel and Eduardo were served of copies of a petition for probate of the last will
and testament of Alegria filed by petitioner Felizardo Obando along with Juanito Obando. In this
petition, Obando claims that he be the executor of Alegrias last will and testament and that the rights
and interest of Alegria in the real and personal properties be transmitted to him.

Strebel and Eduardo now claims that the aforesaid last will and testament is allegedly forged. Hence, the
former charged the petitioners with the crime of Estafa through falsification of public documents.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of Estafa through falsification of public document.

Held: Yes

Ratio decidendi:

The courts gave credence to the expert opinion of the NBI finding the signatures contained in the
alleged last will and testament as not written by one and the same person. The report revealed that
there were substantial differences from the standard signatures of Alegria from that contained in the
allegedly forged last will and testament after a complete, thorough and scientific examination.

The court finds the elements of falsification of public document present in the case. Essentially, the
elements of the crime of Falsification of Public Document (Art. 172, RPC) are:

(1) that the offender is a private individual;
(2) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under art. 171;
(3) that the act of falsification of a public document is committed in a public document.

Under par. 2 of Art. 171, a person may commit falsification of public document by causing it to appear in
a document that a person or persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or persons
did not, in fact, so participate in the act or proceeding.

In this case, petitioners, private individuals made it appear that Alegria signed the alleged will disposing
of her rights and interest in the real and personal properties to petitioners when in fact petitioners knew
that Alegria never signed such alleged will as her signatures were forged.

Furthermore, the crime of falsification of public document was the means for petitioners to commit
Estafa. The elements of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 of RPC are:

(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery to or return of
the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; and
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.

By virtue of the falsified will which petitioners presented for probate, and by which petitioner Felizardo
became co- administrator of the estate of Figueras couple, and had gained possession of the jewelry, he
was not able to account for the same when ordered to do so and petitioners misappropriation of the
jewelry was to the prejudice of Eduardo who also has the right to such jewelry on general which were
part of the declared conjugal estate of his father and Alegria.

Petitioners are guilty of Estafa through falsification of public document. Being a complex crime, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.

Brokmann vs People

Facts: The criminal charge stemmed from the failure of the petitioner, Carmina G. Brokmann, to return
or remit the proceeds of jewelries amounting to P1,861,000.00. The prosecution anchored its case on
the testimony of Anna de Dios (private complainant), and the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
executed between the private complainant and the petitioner. The gist of the MOA provides: (1) the
petitioners acknowledgment and receipt, on various dates, of jewelries from the private complainant
amounting to P1,861,000.00; (2) the petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of the sale of the subject
jewelries; and (3) the private complainant filed the estafa case against the petitioner for the non-
remittance of the proceeds of the sale of the jewelries.

The petitioner asserted in defense her lack of bad faith and intention to deceive the private
complainant. She prays for her acquittal for the prosecutions failure to prove the element of deceit.

whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the judgment of the RTC finding her guilty of
estafa beyond reasonable doubt.

No. The offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a) abuse of confidence or (b) means of
deceit.8 The acts constituting estafa committed with abuse of confidence are enumerated in item (1) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed
by means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa by abuse of confidence; the breach of
confidence takes the place of fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas.9 In this case,
the charge against the petitioner and her subsequent conviction was for estafa committed by abuse of
confidence. Thus, it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove deceit as this was not an element of
the estafa that the petitioner was charged with.

Lopez vs People

Ralph Lopez, President and CEO of Primelink Real Estate Developer entered into a joint venture with
Pamana. The former handled the capital and marketing, the latter took the title. A private complainant
(Sy) through sales officer Ragonjan placed reservation to purchased Club share and fully paid thereafter.
Upon discovery that Primelink had no liscense from Security and Exchange Commission to sell securities
and that said club remained undeveloped filed criminal complaint for failure to return the payment.

Issue: WON petitioner is guilty of estafa, on the ground that there was false pretense.

Held: Elements of estafa (see art. 315 par. 2)

Petitioner contends that prosecution failed to prove the element of false pretense (one of the element
of estafa). The court however finds merit on the allegation that Subic Island would be developed by
Primelink. On the other hand, the allegation that Primelink was duly authorized to sell membership
certificate, the court finds sufficient evidence to prove false pretense. The capability of Primelink to
develop the club is not penalized under the above mentioned provision. In this case, allegation in
question is false pretense of power. The development of the club remained unfinished even after the
lapse of target completion.

In art. 315 sec.2 (a) requires that false pretense be used prior to or simultaneous with the execution of
the fraud. Sales officer Ragonjan offered false selling of membership shares to Sy, the latter bought
share (October 10, 1996) or afterwards. False representation made by sales officer to Sy in purchasing
share belongs to category of false pretense of qualification (to sell securities)

Petition denied
Fernando Espino vs people
Gr 188217 July 3,2013

Accused was a senior sales executive in charge of liaising with import coordinators of company KN inc.
his duties included the delivery of its commissions to the import coordinators.

Oct 14,2002, he was charged with 6 counts of estafa under art 315 par 1b for allegedly rediscounting the
checks that were meant to be paid to the company's import coordinators.

RTC and CA convicted him of estafa under art 315 par 2a.

WON The RTC was correct in convicting him of estafa under art 315 par 2a instead of par 1b

Please see the elements (Reyes book)

The accused represented to the injured party that he would be delivering the commissions to mr.
Banaag and because of this representation, KN inc turned over the checks payable to mr. Banaag to the

In this case, there was no use of fictitious name, or false pretense of power, influence, qualification,
property, credit, agency or business.

True offense: par 1b
First, the personal property in the form of checks was recovered by the offender in trust or in
commission, with the duty to deliver it to mr. Banaag. Even though the accused misrepresented the
existence of a deliverable commission, it is a fact that he was obliged by kn inc to deliver the check and
account for it.
Second, the accused rediscounted the checks to his aunt-in-law
Third, the rediscounting resulted in the wrongful encashment of the checks by someone who was not
the payee and therefore not lawfully authorized to do so.
Finally, this wrongful encashment prejudiced kn inc which lost the proceeds of the check, when
accounting was demanded from the accused, he could not conjure any justifiable excuse.

Petition denied

Galvez vs Asia United


In the Galvez case, Asia United Bank (AUB) granted a P250 Million Omnibus Credit Line in favor of Radio
Marine Network, Inc. (RMSI). Subsequently, this credit line was increased to P452 Million. RMSI was
doing business under the name Smartnet Philippines and/or Smartnet Philippines, Inc. (SPI).

A group of directors and officers of RMSI then created a separate subsidiary and named it SPI. This
group represented to AUB that their subsidiary was the same as Smartnet Philippines in order to secure
a US$29,300 worth of irrevocable letter of credit from AUB when in fact, this company had only P62,500
of paid-up capital.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SPI group is guilty of syndicated estafa under PD 1869

PD 1689 imposes capital punishment for swindling committed by five or more persons where the
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of
rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.

AUB filed a criminal complaint for syndicated estafa under PD 1869 against the bogus SPI group. The
Supreme Court however ruled that this SPI group can only be charged simple estafa under Article 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code. Under the Penal Code, estafa is committed by any person who shall
defraud another by, among others, false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneous
with the commission of fraud.

The Court noted that PD 1689 speaks of a syndicate of five or more individuals who are members of the
association or corporation formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful scheme for the
misappropriation of the money contributed by the members of the same association or corporation or
the money collected from the general public.

In the case of the spurious SPI group, the individuals were not in any way related either by
employment or ownership to AUB. They were outsiders who, by their machinations, were able to
defraud a corporation, which is AUB in this case. If they had been members or officers of AUB, then
syndicated estafa would have been the proper charge.

The Court summarized how PD 1689 should be interpreted:

1. PD 1689 also covers commercial banks;
2. The swindling must be committed through the association or corporation, which operates on funds
solicited from the general public;
3. When the number of the accused are five or more, the crime is syndicated estafa and the penalty is
capital punishment;
4. When the number of accused is less than five, the criminal liability is reclusion temporal (12 years and
1 day to 20 years) to reclusion perpetua (20 years and 1 day to 40 years); and
5. PD 1689 does not apply regardless of the number of the accused, when, (a) the entity soliciting funds
from the general public is the victim and not the means through which the estafa is committed, or (b)
the offenders are not owners or employees who used the association to perpetrate the crime, in which
case, Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code applies.