IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1283

CATHERINE BURNS;
SHEILA SCHROEDER;
MARK THRUN;
GEOFFREY BATEMAN;
RACHEL CATT;
CASSIE RUBALD;
BREANNA ALEXANDER;
STACY PARRISH;
ANGELA CRANMORE;
JULIANNE DELOY;
KAREN COLLIER; and
DENISE LORD,

Plaintiffs–Appellees

v.

JOHN SUTHERS, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Colorado;

Defendant–Appellant, and

JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER, JR., in his official capacity as Governor of
Colorado; and
PAM ANDERSON, in her official capacity as Clerk and Recorder for
Jefferson County,

Defendants.



ATTORNEY GENERAL’ S MOTION FOR
STAY PENDING APPEAL
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This Court has recently issued stays in both the Utah and Oklahoma
same-sex marriage cases. See Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, slip op.
64–65 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014) (stayed pending appeal); Bishop v.
Smith, Nos. 14-5003, 5006, slip op. 46 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014) (same).
In an indistinguishable case, the district court below has ruled against
Colorado’s marriage laws, but refused to grant a full stay pending
appeal. See Ex. 1, July 23, 2014 Order.
The Colorado Attorney General must now ask this Court to exercise
its authority to stay the district court decision so the appeals process can
proceed uniformly and orderly throughout the circuit. Without a stay,
Colorado alone will be faced with legal chaos and the prospect of invalid
same-sex marriage licenses being forced upon the State while these
weighty and substantial constitutional cases continue down the path of
final judicial resolution.
The district court issued a temporary stay until 8:00 am on August
25, 2014, to permit this Court to consider the Attorney General’s
anticipated motion for a longer-term stay pending appeal. This is
consistent with how the courts handled Utah’s request for a stay in
Evans v. Herbert, No. 14-4060 (10th Cir. July 11, 2014). In addition to
the full stay pending appeal, the Attorney General seeks a stay pending
appeal during the time required by this Court to consider this motion.
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Jurisdiction
(10th Cir. R. 8.1(A) Compliance)
A stay pending appeal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
(interlocutory decisions), Fed. R. App. P. 8, and 10th Cir. R. 8.1. The
district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question)
and 1343 (civil rights), as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Attorney
General has standing to defend constitutional challenges to Colorado’s
laws in this case. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1.
Summary
This case is about the government institution of marriage. Plaintiffs,
all of whom challenge the constitutionality of Colorado’s non-recognition
of same-sex marriages, are same-sex couples who are either married
under other states’ laws or are unmarried and desire to be married
under Colorado’s laws. Plaintiffs filed suit six days after the Tenth
Circuit issued its decision in Kitchen v. Herbert, Case No. 13-4178, in
which a divided panel of this Court held that Utah’s ban on same-sex
marriage was unconstitutional.
Relevant Procedural History: The district court has entered a
preliminary injunction in favor of the Plaintiffs, denied Defendants
motion to stay the preliminary injunction (granted a stay as to all other
proceedings until final mandate issues in Kitchen), and issued a
temporary stay “until 8:00 am on Monday, August 25, to allow
Defendants time to seek relief” from the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme
Court. Ex. 1, p.10–11. This order followed briefing and oral argument.
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On July 2, 2014, in light of the Kitchen decision, the Attorney General,
along with his fellow defendants, the Colorado Governor and the
Jefferson County Clerk, filed a “Motion to Stay Proceedings and Non-
Opposition to Proposed Preliminary Injunction.” See Ex. 2. The
Defendants indicated that they did not oppose the entry of a preliminary
injunction in Plaintiffs’ favor, “to be stayed pending until all final
appeals in the Kitchen case are resolved.” Id. at 2. Although the Attorney
General “d[id] not oppose” a preliminary injunction, he reiterated his
belief that the majority’s decision in Kitchen is incorrect for the reasons
articulated in briefing he filed in a pending state case, Brinkman et al. v.
Long, et al., Case No. 13cv32572 (Adams County Dist. Ct.), as well as an
amicus brief Colorado joined in support of Utah in the Kitchen case at
the Tenth Circuit. Id.
The Defendants filed separate reply briefs in support of the motion to
stay. The Attorney General’s reply clarified that non-opposition to a
preliminary injunction “is a mere recognition of the impact that Kitchen
will have on this case in the event that the Tenth Circuit’s findings of
unconstitutionality become final and binding,” and reiterated that he
does not oppose a preliminary injunction “provided that it is
accompanied by a stay.” See Ex. 3, at 10 (emphasis added).
On July 22, 2014, the district court held oral argument on the
Defendants’ motion to stay. The district court entered his order the
following day. See Ex. 1. The Attorney General immediately appealed
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that order and now seeks relief to preserve the status quo pending
appeal.
Related State Proceedings: As noted above, a lawsuit challenging
the constitutionality of Colorado’s non-recognition of same-sex marriages
is pending in the state court system. Brinkman et al. v. Long, et al., No.
13cv32572 (Adams County Dist. Ct.); appealed at No. 2014SA212 (Colo.
Sup. Ct.). Brinkman is a multi-district consolidation of two cases
commenced in Denver and Adams County district courts against the
State, the Governor, the Denver County Clerk and Recorder, and the
Adams County Clerk and Recorder. Same-sex couples who are either
married under other states’ laws or are unmarried and wish to be
married under Colorado’s laws brought the case to challenge the
constitutionality of Colorado’s non-recognition of same-sex marriages.
On July 9, 2014, after full briefing on the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment and a motions hearing, the Adams County District
Court granted summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor and stated its
decision pending a resolution of the issue on appeal. See Ex. 4.
The State of Colorado appealed the case directly to the Colorado
Supreme Court, which has initial appellate jurisdiction under Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 13-4-102(1)(b). That same day, on July 14, the State filed an
“Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal,” pursuant to Rule 8
of the Colorado Rules of Appellate Procedure, which mirrors Rule 8 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Later that week, following
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briefing, the Colorado Supreme Court stayed the Denver and Adams
County Clerk and Recorders from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples pending resolution of the appeal. See Ex. 5, July 18, 2014 Order.
Additionally related, on June 25, 2014, shortly after the Tenth Circuit
issued its decision concerning Utah’s same-sex marriage ban, the
Boulder County Clerk and Recorder Hillary Hall declared that she
would begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and she
began to do so that same day. On July 3, 2014, the Attorney General
commenced litigation against Clerk Hall by filing a verified complaint
for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief along with a motion for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. People ex rel.
Suthers, et al. v. Hall, No. 14cv30833 (Boulder County District Court).
After full briefing and a half-day evidentiary hearing, the Boulder
County District Court denied the motion on July 10, 2014. The State
appealed that order and subsequently sought a stay pending appeal in
the trial court (denied on July 23, 2014) and in the Colorado Court of
Appeals (denied on July 24, 2014). Days later, on July 27, 2014, the
State filed an original proceeding in the Colorado Supreme Court
seeking relief against the Boulder Clerk. See Ex. 6. That petition is
currently pending.
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Reasons for Granting Stay Pending Appeal
(F.R.A.P. 8(a)(2)(B)(i); 10th Cir. R. 8.1(B)-(F) Compliance)
I. Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court Precedent Compel a
Stay for Colorado, no less than Utah and Oklahoma.
The Tenth Circuit stayed its decision in the same-sex marriage cases
out of Utah and Oklahoma. Kitchen v. Herbert, slip op. at 64–65; Bishop
v. Smith, slip op. at 46. Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court has twice
ordered stays in the Utah same-sex marriage cases. Herbert v. Evans,
No. 14A65 (U.S. July 18, 2014) (stay pending appeal granted); Herbert v.
Kitchen, 134 S.Ct. 893 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2014) (stay pending appeal granted).
This precedent compels a stay in favor of Colorado.
As one judge on the Ninth Circuit noted, the Supreme Court has sent
a “clear message” that “district court injunctions against the application
of laws forbidding same-sex unions should be stayed at the request of
state authorities pending court of appeals review.” Latta v. Otter, No. 14-
35420 slip op. at 3–5 (9th Cir. May 20, 2014) (Hurwitz, J., concurring).
Looking at all federal precedent, the challenge to Colorado’s marriage
laws is indistinguishable from the relevant cases in Idaho, Indiana,
Kentucky, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia – all
subject to a stay pending appeal.
1


1
Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. May 20, 2014) (Idaho case - same);
DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (Michigan case - same);
see also Tanco v. Haslam, No.14-5297 *2 (6th Cir. April 25, 2014) (Tennessee
case) (per curium) (“Because the law in this area is so unsettled, in our
judgment the public interest and the interests of the parties would be best
served by this Court imposing a stay on the district court’s order until this case
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Consistent with this overwhelming authority, specific to Colorado, the
Colorado Supreme Court acted unanimously to grant a stay pending
appeal in the parallel state court litigation challenging Colorado’s
marriage laws. See Ex. 5. The district court’s contrary ruling in this case
would have the potential effect of conflicting directly with the Colorado
Supreme Court’s order that is specific to the two party clerks (Adams
County and Denver County). For example, if the district court’s
temporary stay expires, then the federal injunction will require all
Colorado clerk’s to issue same-sex marriage licenses, when at least the
Denver and Adams County clerks are prohibited from doing so by order
of the Colorado Supreme Court. See generally McClendon v. City of
Albuquerque, 49 F.3d 1014, 1022 (10th Cir. 1996) (granting a stay
pending appeal when a district court’s order demanding release of state
inmates and prison population caps “will interfere with … state judicial
power”).This unseemly clash of judicial systems should be avoided by
simply issuing a stay pending appeal in the federal case. It benefits

is reviewed on appeal.”); Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2386 (7th Cir. June 27, 2014)
(Indiana case - granting stay pending appeal).District Court decisions granting
stay: Bishop v. United States, ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla.
2014); Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13cv395, 2014 WL 561978 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13,
2014); De Leon v. Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982-OLG, 2014 WL 715741 (W.D.
Tex. Feb. 26, 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, No.3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at
*14 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014) (stay granted, noting “[i]t is best that these
momentous changes occur upon full review, rather than risk premature
implementation or confusing changes. That does not serve anyone well”);
Henry v. Himes, No. 14-cv-129, 2014 WL 1512541, *1-2 (S.D. Ohio April 16,
2014) (stay pending appeal granted); Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-cv-64-bbc, 2014
WL 2693963 *12 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2014) (same).
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nobody for conflicting court orders to issue from federal courts and the
Colorado Supreme Court, particularly given the not-yet-final nature of
the substantive legal claims being litigated.
To be sure, there are three same-sex marriage cases where the state
government failed to defend their marriage laws on appeal and there
was no stay pending appeal.
2
Those cases – where the government did
not ask for a stay – do not undermine the overwhelming conclusion that
stays must be entered in same-sex marriage cases, preventing clerks
from issuing same-sex marriage licenses before the constitutional cases
have been decided on appeal.
II. A stay would preserve the status quo.
Stay orders serve the important interest of preserving the status quo
pending final resolution of the merits of the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage. See, e.g., Merrimack River Sav. Bk. v. Clay Center, 219 U.S.
527, 536 (1911) (“That the circuit court, to the end that the status quo
might be preserved pending such appeal, had the power to continue an
injunction in force by virtue of its inherent equity power, is not
doubtful.”). A stay in this case, as in the parallel state court case in
Brinkman, would not interfere with the swift resolution of the merits of
claims for same-sex marriage in Colorado. See Monatt v. Pioneer Astro
Indus., 592 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Colo. App. 1979) (“A stay does not

2
Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719 (N.D. Ill.), Whitewood v. Wolf, No. 13-cv-1861
(M.D. Pa.), and Geiger v. Kitzhaber, No. 6:13-cv-01834 (D. Or.)).
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adjudicate rights; it merely preserves the status quo.”). Valley Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n. v. Aspen Accommodations, 716 P.2d 483, 484 (Colo. App.
1986) (“If a party desires to maintain the status quo pending appeal he
may … seek … a stay.”).
A stay pending appeal is necessary to preserve the status quo in
Colorado. See, e.g., Mantle Ranches, Inc. v. United States Park Serv., 945
F. Supp. 1449, 1452 (D. Colo. 1996) (status quo is “the last existing state
of peaceable, noncontested conditions which preceded the pending
controversy.”). The need to preserve the status quo is particularly apt
when state courts have ordered the status quo be preserved by issuing
stays in parallel state court litigation. Compare Ex. 1; with Ex. 5.
III. The likelihood of success, balance of harms, and
public interest strongly favor a stay.
A. There is likely of success on the merits.
In both the Kitchen and Bishop cases this Court was divided by 2-1 on
the merits of the constitutional claim for same-sex marriage. Utah has
already announced its intention to seek certiorari review and the Eighth
Circuit decision in Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859
(8th Cir. 2006), upholding Nebraska’s traditional marriage laws, already
creates a circuit split on the merits. Indeed, as all parties know, the
numerous cases across the country litigating the merits of same-sex
marriage are likely to be decided, ultimately, by the U.S. Supreme
Court.
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Given the limited time such an order pending appeal is in place, and
the circumstances in which it will generally arise (after one party has
already lost on the merits), courts have recognized that motions seeking
to preserve the status quo pending appeal have to be analyzed somewhat
differently than a typical injunction. In these circumstances, “court[s]
ha[ve] required only that the petitioner demonstrate a ‘substantial case
on the merits,’ even if ultimate success is not a mathematical
probability.” Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 702 F. Supp.
60, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v.
Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
As the court in Morgan Guarantee Trust so succinctly put it, “because
of the difficulties of the issues … presented, it would be foolhardy to
predict that there is no likelihood of success on appeal.” Id. Given the
litigation raging around the country regarding same-sex marriage that
is headed quickly to the U.S. Supreme Court, it is inarguable that the
case presents a substantial and difficult legal question.
So substantial is the legal question in these cases that the issuance of
same-sex marriage licenses in the interim, and compelled recognition of
same-sex marriage, while merits appeals are pending, presents a
circumstance that has twice warranted a stay order from the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d at 844 (Under Fed. R.
App. P. 8, courts may stay an order on an “admittedly difficult legal
question” when “the equities of the case suggest that the status quo be
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maintained.”); McClendon, 79 F.3d at 1020 (“The purpose of a stay is to
preserve the status quo pending appellate determination.”); see also
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 778 (1987) (Fed. R. App. P. 8 allows
an injunction when there is a “substantial case on the merits” and other
factors “militate in movant’s favor.”) (citation omitted); Acrow Corp. of
Am. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 182, 184 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (same). A stay
of the district court order is necessary for the status quo in Colorado, as
in Utah and Oklahoma, to be preserved pending appeal.
Colorado has preserved its disagreements with this Court’s panel
decision in Kitchen (and now Bishop), and believes the U.S. Constitution
does not mandate that states recognize or adopt same-sex marriage.
Ex.2. Re-stating those well-known constitutional arguments in this
motion would hardly be fruitful. At a minimum, the recent dissents from
Judge Kelly in this Circuit in Kitchen and Bishop bolster the already
existing body of case law supporting the right of states to decide the
issue of same-sex marriage outside the courts. See Jackson v.
Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Hawaii 2012); Sevcick v.
Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012); Hernandez v. Nobles, 855
N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y.2006). In short, the claim that the federal constitutional
compels states to recognize same-sex marriage poses a difficult legal
question and Colorado (along with other states defending traditional
marriage laws) have presented a substantial case on the merits in
defense of the state law definition of marriage as between one-man and
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one-woman. The reasoned position of three judges in the Eight Circuit in
Bruning and Judge Kelly in dissent in the Tenth Circuit’s Kitchen and
Bishop decisions bolster Colorado’s case on the merits and favor a stay
pending appeal.
B. The balance of harms in this case favors a stay.
The violation of a state’s laws, by itself, constitutes irreparable harm.
See Port of New York Auth. v. City of Newark, 85 A.2d 815, 818–19 (N.J.
Sup. Ct 1952); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep’t of Health Air
Pollution Variance Bd., 553 P.2d 800 (Colo. 1976). Many courts,
including Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, have recognized the
inherent harm in rejecting duly enacted laws. Coal. for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 122 F.3d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1997); O Centro Espirita Beneficiente
Uniao De Vegetal. v. Ashcroft, 314 F.3d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 2002);
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott,
134 S.Ct. 506, 506 (2013); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) (“It also seems
to me that any time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating
statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of
irreparable injury.”).
The district court’s injunction, without a stay, irreparably harms the
state and works to instantly invalidate a part of the Colorado
constitution and its uniform marriage laws. Even more, with the
prospect that Clerks will be compelled to issue same-sex marriage
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licenses on behalf of the State of Colorado, there are positive acts,
contrary to current state law, which are public in nature and are
expected to be relied upon by third parties.
In addition, the forced recognition of same-sex marriage licenses,
even temporarily, may well render this appeal moot. Garrison v.
1 Hudson, 468 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1984) (Burger, C.J., in chambers)
(“When … the normal course of appellate review might otherwise cause
the case to become moot, issuance of a stay is warranted.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); See In re Bart, 82 S. Ct. 675, 675
(1962) (Warren, C.J., Circuit Justice) (granting motion to stay execution
of contempt citation, in part because “the normal course of appellate
review might otherwise cause the case to become moot by the petitioner
serving the maximum term of commitment before he could obtain a full
review of his claims”); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 488 U.S.
1306, 1309 (1989) (Marshall, J., Circuit Justice) (granting stay pending
certiorari petition in a FOIA case because “disclosure would moot that
part of the Court of Appeals’ decision [and] create an irreparable
injury”). The temporary nature of a stay pending appeal in this case
likewise favors a stay to mitigate harms to the State. The claimed harms
to the Plaintiffs can be addressed by a final decision on the merits.
Critically, the U.S. Supreme Court’s balancing of the harms in the
nearly identical situation in Kitchen and then Evans strongly favor a
stay on account of the harms caused by having a district court injunction
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not subject to a stay pending appeal. The Supreme Court necessarily
decided that the balance of harms favors the State. Cf. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 189 (2010) (per curium) (when ruling on a stay,
court must consider the “likelihood that irreparable harm will result
from the denial of a stay”). Forcing Colorado to act contrary to its own
Constitution is a significant harm: “[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a
court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people,
it suffers a form of irreparable injury.” New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal.,
434 U.S. at 1351 (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). The balance of harms
soundly favors a stay pending appeal.
C. The public interest favors a stay.
Colorado has a strong public interest in having its laws enforced and
in having certainty and clarity about its laws. The relief requested in
this motion will not decide the merits of claims for a federal right to
same-sex marriage that would invalidate Colorado’s Constitution and
statutes – those substantial and weighty claims will be decided for
Colorado by state or federal court in the near future. Either way, the
merits can and should be decided in due course for all of Colorado. The
relief here requested, however, is immediately necessary to preserve the
status quo pending those appeals and to affirm the legal responsibility of
county officials to comply with Colorado law.
Critically, even if the Attorney General proves to be wrong on the
constitutional question on the merits of same-sex marriage that would
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not automatically validate the prematurely issued certificates. See
Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 497 (Cal. 2004)
(“[A]ccordingly, we view Family Code section 300 itself as an explicit
statutory provision establishing that the existing same-sex marriages at
issue are void and invalid.”); and Dep’t of Health v. Hanes, 78 A.3d 676,
690-92 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (clerks lack authority to issue same-sex
marriage licenses post-Windsor). Thus, even if the Attorney General
loses this appeal, the couples obtaining these certificates likely would
not be winners.
The legal process, including appeals, can be cumbersome, unwieldy,
and downright frustrating. The process may even seem pointless in a
particular case when the “right” outcome may be so obvious to so many.
Yet true as that might be in the immediate term, the long-term stability
of our system of government and rule of law depends on those structures
and divisions standing up in the face of pressure, even where the
immediate result might appear unjust. This case shows the wisdom of
the fundamental understanding that even if the legal process is not as
fast or simple as anyone may want, the protection of our system of laws
and divided power depends on an orderly process. A rush to get to the
“right” result by shortcuts, no matter how well-intentioned, is a
precedent this Court should refuse to set. The public interest strongly
favors a stay.
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Reasonable Notice to All Parties
(F.R.A.P. 8(a)(2)(C) Compliance)
At the hearing on July 23, the Attorney General advised all parties of
his intention to immediately seek Rule 8 relief in the Tenth Circuit in
the event the trial court did not issue a stay. Notice of intent to seek a
stay pending appeal was previously provided to counsel for all parties.
Timely Relief Requested
(10th Cir. R. 8.2 Compliance)
This motion was filed as soon as possible following the district court’s
order. The underlying order was issued at the end of the day July 23,
2014. See Ex. 1. With a temporary stay, the order becomes effective at
8:00 am on Monday, August 25, 2014.
Conclusion
The Attorney General hereby requests a stay pending appeal
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8 to preserve the status quo as the state and
federal judicial branches consider the merits of constitutional claims for
same-sex marriage in Colorado.
If necessary, the Attorney General likewise requests temporary stay
pending appeal to cover the time necessary for this Court to deliberate
on the full stay request should this motion be pending after 8:00 am on
August 25, 2015. See Evans v. Herbert, No. No. 14-4060 (10th Cir. July
11, 2014) (temporary stays issued pending decision on motion for stay).
Respectfully Submitted, July 28, 2014.

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JOHN W. SUTHERS
Attorney General

/s Michael Francisco
MICHAEL FRANCISCO
Assistant Solicitor General

KATHRYN A. STARNELLA*
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
John Suthers, in his official capacity
as Attorney General of Colorado

Ralph L. Carr Colo. Judicial Ctr.
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80203
Telephone: 720-508-6551
Email:michael.francisco@state.co.us;
kathryn.starnella@state.co.us
*Counsel of Record






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Relevant Parts of the Record
(F.R.A.P. 8(a)(2)(B)(iii) Compliance)

Exhibit 1: Burns et al. v. Hickenlooper et al., No. 14-cv-01817-RM-KLM (D.
Colo.) Order, 7/23/14.

Exhibit 2: Burns et al. v. Hickenlooper et al., Def’s Mot. for Stay, 7/2/14.

Exhibit 3: Burns et al. v. Hickenlooper et al., Att’y Gen. Reply to Def’s Mot
for Stay, 7/18/14.

Exhibit 4: Brinkman et al. v. Long et al., No. 13-CV-32527 (Adams County
Dist. Ct.), Order 7/9/14.

Exhibit 5: State v. Brinkman, et al., No. 2014SA212 (Colo.) Order 7/18/14.

Exhibit 6: State v. Hall, No. 2014SA228 (Colo.), Pet. for Relief Pursuant to
Rule 21, 7/27/14.

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2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I hereby certify that on July 28, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing
using the court’s CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing
counsel for the Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Defendants



/s Michael Francisco
MICHAEL FRANCISCO
Assistant Solicitor General
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
John Suthers, in his official capacity
as Attorney General of Colorado

Ralph L. Carr Colo. Judicial Center
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80203
Telephone: 720-508-6551;
E-Mail: michael.francisco@state.co.us;

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