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Digest: People vs.

Vera Reyes
By nutshellgirl Posted in General Tagged digest, labor Leave a comment
People v. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil 190
Subject: Labor Standards
Doctrine: Police Power (Basis of States power to intervene)
Facts:
The defendant was charged with a violation of Act No. 2549, as amended by Acts Nos. 3085 and
3958 The information alleged that from September 9 to October 28, 1936, and for the
sometime after, the accused, in his capacity as president and general manager of the
Consolidated Mines, having engaged the services of Severa Velasco de Vera as stenographer, at
an agreed salary of P35 a month willfully and illegally refused to pay the salary of said
stenographer corresponding to the above-mentioned period of time, which was long due and
payable, in spite of her repeated demands.
The accused interposed a demurrer on the ground that the facts alleged in the information do
not constitute any offense, and that even if they did, the laws penalizing it are unconstitutional.
After the hearing, the court sustained the demurrer, declaring unconstitutional the last part of
section 1 of Act No. 2549 as last amended by Act No. 3958, which considers as an offense the
facts alleged in the information, for the reason that it violates the constitutional prohibition
against imprisonment for debt, and dismissed the case, with costs de oficio.

In this appeal the Solicitor-General contends that the court erred in declaring Act No. 3958
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the said constitutional provision is unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. The last part of section 1 considers as illegal the refusal of an employer to pay, when he can
do so, the salaries of his employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on
Saturday of every week, with only two days extension, and the nonpayment of the salary within
the periods specified is considered as a violation of the law.
The same Act exempts from criminal responsibility the employer who, having failed to pay the
salary, should prove satisfactorily that it was impossible to make such payment.
The court held that this provision is null because it violates the provision of section 1 (12),
Article III, of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt.
We do not believe that this constitutional provision has been correctly applied in this case. A
close perusal of the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549, as amended by section 1 of Act No.
3958, will show that its language refers only to the employer who, being able to make payment,
shall abstain or refuse to do so, without justification and to the prejudice of the laborer or
employee. An employer so circumstanced is not unlike a person who defrauds another, by
refusing to pay his just debt. In both cases the deceit or fraud is the essential element
constituting the offense. The first case is a violation of Act No. 3958, and the second is estafa
punished by the Revised Penal Code. In either case the offender cannot certainly invoke the
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
Another doctrine:
Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits,
to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. (12 C. J., p. 904.) In
the exercise of this power the Legislature has ample authority to approve the disputed portion
of Act No. 3958 which punishes the employer who, being able to do so, refuses to pay the
salaries of his laborers or employers in the specified periods of time.
Undoubtedly, one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the part of
employers who hire laborers or employees without paying them the salaries agreed upon for
their services, thus causing them financial difficulties.
Without this law, the laborers and employees who earn meager salaries would be compelled to
institute civil actions which, in the majority of cases, would cost them more than that which
they would receive in case of a decision in their favor.




Digest: Cebu Royal Plant vs. Minister of Labor
By nutshellgirl Posted in General Tagged digest, labor Leave a comment
G.R. No. L-58639 August 12, 1987
CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION), vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES
Subject: Labor Standards
FACTS:
Ramon Pilones, private respondent, was employed on February 16, 1978 on a probationary
period of employment for six (6) months with petitioner CRP. After said period, he underwent
medical examination for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is
suffering from PTB minimal. Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his
employment by respondent since his illness was not curable within 6 months.
Pilones complained against his termination before the Ministry of Labor which dismissed the
same. The dismissal was reversed by the public respondent who ordered the reinstatement and
payment of back wages.
Granting reinstatement, the public respondent argues that Pilones was already a permanent
employee at the time of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. The alleged
ground for his removal, to wit, pulmonary tuberculosis minimal, was not certified as incurable
within six months as to justify his separation and that the petitioner should have first obtained
a clearance, as required by the regulations then in force, for the termination of his
employment.
CRP claims that the private respondent was still on probation at the time of his dismissal and so
had no security of tenure. The dismissal was necessary for the protection of the public health,
as he was handling ingredients in the processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the
public.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal was proper.
HELD:
No. The dismissal was not proper. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. Pilones
was already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after
he ceased to be a probationer. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed
to him by the Constitution and the Labor Code.
The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the x-
ray examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately
available. That excuse is untenable. We note that when the petitioner had all of six months
during which to conduct such examination, it chose to wait until exactly the last day of the
probation period.
The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book VI,
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code which states that the employer
shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a
period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. The record does not contain the
certification required by the above rule. Hence, dismissal was illegal.
It is also worth noting that the petitioners application for clearance to terminate the
employment of the private respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on August 28,
1978, or seven days after his dismissal. As the NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior
clearance rule (which was in force at that time) was not a trivial technicality. It required not
just the mere filing of a petition or the mere attempt to procure a clearance but that the said
clearance be obtained prior to the operative act of termination.
Although we must rule in favor of his reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness to
resume his work, as certified by competent authority.
**Another Doctrine under Sec4 of Labor Code on construction:
Concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his employers, must look up to the law
for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and even favor and always
with faith and hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nations future. It is error to take him
for granted. He deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will determine whether
the knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry weapon of
defiance and revenge. The choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should, we must
resolve to lighten the weight of centuries of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but
does not bow his head.
Digest: Calalang vs. Williams
By nutshellgirl Posted in Digest, Digest: Labor Standards, General Tagged digest, labor, social justice
Leave a comment
MAXIMO CALALANG vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of th
eCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles
are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment
not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the
National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
Digest: Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corp vs. De
los Santos
By nutshellgirl Posted in General Tagged Lawschool, Torts: Digest Leave a comment
Subject: Torts and Damages
Doctrine: Violation of Rules and Statutes
[G.R. No. 152033, March 16, 2011]
FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS,
BENITO JOSE DE LOS SANTOS, MARIA ELENA DE LOS SANTOS AND CARMINA VDA. DE LOS
SANTOS, RESPONDENTS.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
On September 30, 1984, Teresa Elena Legarda-de los Santos, the wife of respondent Wilfredo
de los Santos was fetched by Wilfredos brother Armando, husband of respondent Carmina
Vda. de los Santos, from Rizal Theater to after Teresas theater performance. Armando drove a
1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma, a company car assigned to Wilfredo. Two other members of the
cast of production joined Teresa Elena in the Galant Sigma.
Around 11:30 p.m., while travelling along the Katipunan Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma
collided with the shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia), an
employee of petitioner Filipinas Synthetic Corp. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12 meters
from the point of impact, across the White Plains Road landing near the perimeter fence of
Camp Aguinaldo, where the Galant Sigma burst into flames and burned to death beyond
recognition all four occupants of the car.
A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple
homicide was brought against Mejia, which was decided in favor of Mejia (shuttle driver). A
consolidated civil case was filed by the families of the deceased against Mejia. The RTC ruled in
favor of herein respondents. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner
appealed to the CA and the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition stating that
the respondent court erred in finding Mejia negligent, such not being supported by evidence on
record.
ISSUE: Whether Mejia was negligent
HELD:
Petitioner argues that the RTC admitted that De los Santos made a turn along White Plains
Road without exercising the necessary care which could have prevented the accident from
happening. According to petitioner, the sudden turn of the vehicle used by the victims should
also be considered as negligence on the part of the driver of that same vehicle, thus, mitigating,
if not absolving petitioners liability. However, the said argument deserves scant consideration.
It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by
law, specifically Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136. Under the New Civil Code, unless
there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in the
present case, Mejias violation of the traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was
the one negligent at the time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed,
a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of
speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered which will enable him to keep the
vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury
to others using the highway.
A closer study of the Police Accident Report, Investigation Report and the sketch of the accident
would reveal nothing but that the shuttle bus was traveling at such a reckless speed that it
collided with the car bearing the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated August 15, 2001, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
moral damages be reduced to P50,000.00.