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An Introduction to the Chitsuroku Shobun:

Part Two
Thomas Schalow
University of Marketing and Distribution Sciences, Kobe, Japan
ijinkan@mac.com


Abstract: This paper examines the nal stages in the
reform of the samurai pension system in the earl Meiji
period. It examines the differences between the
regulations of 1873 and 1876, and takes an in-depth look
at the inequalities and peculiarities of the 1876 regulation
that turned annual salaries into a one-time payment of
government bonds. The reasons for the change in
regulations is discussed, and there is also a brief
discussion of the role of the government bonds in the
creation of the modern Japanese banking system.

I. Pension Reform, Phase Two: 1873-1876

The Meiji governments rst attempt to solve the problem
of stipend obligations on a permanent basis came in late
1870 when it announced that it would provide the
equivalent of ve years of stipend income for samurai who
chose to return to agricultural production.(1) The offer did
not, however, appeal to many in the samurai class and this
privilege was revoked a year later.(2) The failure of the
samurai class to respond to the only possible solution of
the stipend problem did not, however, alter the solution. It
merely suggested that a new approach to the problem
would have to be tried. That new approach involved
creating an economic incentive for commutation.

On 27 December 1873 it was announced that henceforth
all stipends not commuted under the conditions
announced on the same day in a separate proclamation
were to be taxed. The tax was progressive and
established rates of from one who (.01 koku) for stipends
of 5 koku or less to 22,750 koku for stipends above 64,000
koku.(3) The tax yielded an income of 505,778 koku in its
rst year, which was equivalent to approximately 2.8
million yen at current rice prices. Tax revenues from
stipends remained above 2 million yen per year until all
stipends were commuted in 1876.(4)

Although the tax on stipends did not provide the Meiji
government with signicant revenue, it did provide a great
incentive for commutation of stipends by the samurai. By
the terms of the 1873 commutation regulations, only
samurai with stipends below 100 koku were eligible for
commutation. Those with stipends above 100 koku
became eligible for commutation at the end of the
following year.(5) In the rst year during which the
commutation regulations were in effect 64,249 individuals
voluntarily surrendered their rights to their stipends. That
number increased to 78,609 individuals in 1875, when
samurai with stipends above 100 koku also became
eligible for commutation. In this way, the Meiji government
disposed of stipend obligations valued at 6,352,900 yen in
1874 and 10,205,550 yen in 1875.(6) Over 30% of all
stipend holders agreed to a voluntary commutation in the
two years during which the voluntary commutation
regulations were in effect.(7)

One of the important questions in regard to the chitsuroku
shobun concerns the reason why stipend commutations
were made mandatory. The data seems to indicate that
voluntary commutation was proceeding very well and that
mandatory commutation may not have been required. The
commutation was, under the circumstances, apparently
quite popular, if for no other reason than for purposes of
tax evasion. Yet, as popular as the commutation may have
been, it was inevitable that certain members of the bush
class would have refused to voluntarily commute their
stipends. Although the tax on stipends was relatively
severe at upper income levels, it was not so severe that
certain individuals would not have opted for a lifetime
pension in lieu of a one-time cash payment. Moreover,
from the standpoint of the central government, there was
room in the regulations for improvement. Unlike the
mandatory commutation of 1876, the 1873 regulations
provided that stipends be commuted into both bonds and
a cash payment.(8) The Meiji government could not afford
to be as generous as it was in the 1873 regulations to all
450,000 stipend holders.

The amount involved in cash payments was no small
matter to the Meiji government. In 1874 the government
distributed 7.68 million yen in addition to the 6.35 million
yen in bonds it issued to those commuting stipends. In
1875 the gure jumped to 11.63 million yen in cash
payments, which was approximately ve times the
governments income from its tax on stipends and a gure
almost equal to the capital Japan gained from its 7% loan
in London, of which the principal was still outstanding.
Moreover, although 30% of all stipend holders had already
commuted their stipends by the end of 1875, those
140,000 individuals accounted for only about 17% of all
stipends in yen amounts. Since the 1873 regulations
stipulated that stipends were to be commuted at the rate
of one-half in bonds and one-half in cash, the central
government could anticipate another 10 million yen in
cash payments along with its bond issues before the
problem of samurai stipends was resolved.

There were other major differences between the 1873 and
1876 commutation regulations that made the 1873
regulations less than ideal from the governments point of
view. Whereas the period of redemption for the 1876
bonds was 30 years, the 1873 regulations required that all
principal be paid before 1880. since it seemed likely that
the governments rst decade in existence would be its
most difcult from a nancial point of view, the 1873
regulations only served to compound that difculty. The
1873 regulations also set annual interest payments on the
bonds at 8 per cent.(9) Though such rates were low in
comparison with the double-digit interest rates that were
prevalent in Tokyo at the time, they were a full one to three
per cent higher than the rates paid of the 1876 bonds.

The 1873 commutation also tended to be more generous
to samurai holding larger stipends than the 1876
commutation due to the fact that the price at which
commutation of stipends was set was higher in 1873. The
1876 commutation was based on a rice price of 5.32 yen
per koku, whereas the 1873 regulations required that
stipends be commuted at the rice prices that prevailed at
the time of commutation.(10) That price was 7.28 yen per
koku in 1874. This disparity in rice prices was offset,
however, for anyone who held a stipend under 7,500 koku
by the fact that the 1873 commutation was based on only
six years of income, whereas the 1876 commutation was
based on from 6.25 to 14 years of income for those with
stipends below the 7,500 koku level.(11) Since the majority
of samurai did indeed hold stipends below an amount of
7,500 koku it would have been advantageous for them to
make their conversions on the basis of the 1876
regulations. Those samurai did not, however, have the
benet of hindsight on this particular matter and we know
that at least 45% of those samurai who commuted their
stipends under the 1873 regulations held stipends far
below 7,500 koku.

Perhaps the most interesting fact about the type of
samurai who was involved in the 1873 commutation is that
the samurai of Kagoshima were among the least likely to
commute their stipends under the terms of the 1873
commutation. Samurai in Saga han were also not
particularly amenable to the idea of voluntarily commuting
their stipends. These areas, of course, were the sites of
major rebellions against the central government in the rst
decade of the Meiji period. The low numbers of samurai
who chose commutation in these areas stand in marked
contrast to the large number of voluntary commutations in
Wakayama (formerly Kii han), which along with Owari
(Aichi prefecture) and Mito (Ibaraki prefecture) constituted
the Tokugawa go-sanke. However, samurai from other
areas where unrest occurred, such as Hagi in Yamaguchi
prefecture, Akitsuki in Fukuoka prefecture, and Kumamoto
in Shirokawa prefecture did not appear to be particularly
opposed to the idea of voluntary commutation. It would
seem to be a mistake, therefore, to attempt to relate
stipend commutation with samurai rebellion except
perhaps in Kagoshima and Saga.

II. Pension Reform, Phase Three: 1876-1890

Commutation of all stipends became mandatory by
Dajokan ordinance 108 of 5 August 1876.(12) The bonds
involved in the commutation were not actually issued,
however, until July of 1878.(13) Moreover, not all the bonds
were issued at once. Over 25% of the 10 per cent bonds
were not issued until 1879 and a small amount of bonds
continued to be issued until 1890.(14) These bonds began
to be redeemed in 1882, but redemption for the vast
majority did not occur after the Matsukata deation.
Redemption of bonds continued until 1906.

The kinroku kosai represented the vast majority of bonds
issued in the commutation of stipend obligations. The total
amount of bonds issued was approximately 174 million
yen. They were issued in denominations of 10, 15, 50,
100, 300, 500, 100, and 5,000 yen with interest rates of 5,
6, 7, and 10 per cent. There were 20 coupons attached to
the bonds, which could be clipped in November and May
of each yea beginning in November of 1877 until May of
1887.(15) Total interest paid on the bonds amounted to
156,041..849 yen, with the vast majority of that amount
being paid on the 7 per cent bonds.(16) In total, therefore,
the chitsuroku shobun cost the Meiji government over 366
million yen, which represented approximately 6 years of
revenue from the land tax at 1873 levels.

At rst glance, the gures associated with the kinroku
kosai might appear to be rather cold and lifeless. We
know, for example, that there were 519 people who held 5
per cent bond, 15377 people who held 6 per cent bonds,
262,317 people who held 7 per cent bonds, and 35,304
people who held 10 per cent bonds.(17) These gures,
however, provide a very interesting insight into the socio-
economic composition of one part of the Meiji and
previous Tokugawa society. Each type of bond was issued
only to samurai from a certain income level. Five per cent
bonds were issued only to samurai with stipends over 100
yen, 6 per cent bonds were issued to samurai with
stipends between 100 and 100 yen, and 7 per cent bonds
were issued to samurai with stipends under 100 yen. This
provides a covenant means to measure samurai incomes
within each han as well as nationwide.

The data from the bonds produces the conclusion that
over 94 per cent of the samurai population throughout
Japan held stipends denominated below 100 yen, which
translates into less than 19 koku. Less than 6 per cent of
the samurai population held stipends denominated
between 100 and 1,000 yen, which translates into an
income of between 19 and 188 koku. Less than 0.2 per
cent of the bush class held stipends in excess of 1,000
yen. These gures, of course, represent stipend incomes
after the reductions carried out by the han and Meiji
government, but the percentage of samurai in the various
income levels remains the same regardless of the
reductions.

It is necessary, however, to add a qualication to the
above statement. There existed among those receiving
kinroku kosai a small but signicant number of people who
can not be classied in terms of income. These were the
people who received the 10 per cent bonds, for which the
original commutation regulations made no provision. The
only signicant fact we know about these people is that
the majority were from Satsuma han. Other recipients in
the 10 per cent group included samurai from Kochi
prefecture (Tosa han) and Yamaguchi prefecture
(Choshu), with a relatively signicant but unidentied
group in Tokyo and scattered groups in Osaka, Shiga
prefecture, and Yamagata prefecture.(18) The phenomenon
of the 10 per cent bond remained, however, primarily a
Satsuma experience.(19)

After the chitsuroku shobun made it essential that the
samurai assume a productive life in order to support
themselves, they began to apply their talents in a number
of ways. A very large number of them applied the capital
they had received from the commutation to the purchase
of stock in the 148 national banks that had been formed to
date were either shizoku or kazoku.(20) Approximately 10%
of all samurai were involved in the capitalization of
national banks.

The participation of samurai in the capitalization of the
national banks was made possible only by a change in
those bank regulations. The national bank regulations
created on 15 December 1872 had required that over 60%
of all bank reserves be held in the form of specie.(21)
However, Dajokan ordinance 109, issued on the same day
as the regulations requiring commutation of stipends, had
made the sale or hypothecation of all bonds issued in
connection with the commutation illegal.(22) This regulation,
obviously intended to maintain the price of the bonds and
to prevent the samurai from unwise investments or
wasteful consumption, also made it impossible for the new
bondholders to sell their bonds for the specie necessary to
capitalize new banks. Therefore, in anticipation of the
problem the government had changed the bank
regulations previous to the commutation announcement.(23)
The new regulations made it possible for commutation
bonds to be substituted for specie reserve, and thereby
made samurai participation in the banks not only possible,
but also one of the few investment opportunities open to
the samurai.

The fteen national bank, about which this author has
written in another article, was only one of the 153 national
banks the samurai played a part in creating. It was,
however, more than any other national bank, truly the
creation of the chitsuroku shobun. Its stockholders were
by denition all from the kazoku or shizoku class. It idd not
accept bods from heimin for purchase of its stock before
1890.(24) The bank was exceptional in many respects, but
most noticeably so for its size. This one bank was
capitalized at an amount equal to nearly all other national
banks combined. Its initial capitalization was set at
17,826,100 yen, and over 90% of that total was provided
by bonds issued for purposes of stipend commutation.

The fteenth national bank was more than just another
investment opportunity for former members of the bush
class. It was a bank that was dominated by the capital
from former daimyo. Almost 67% of the banks stock was
held by former domain lords.(25) It is particularly interesting
that over half of these daimyo stockholders were fudai
daimyo, who had been at least nominally allied to the
Tokugawa family and therefore at least potential
opponents of the Meiji forces in the Boshin War. The fact
that they were allowed to play such a signicant role in the
Meiji economic world would suggest that either the Meiji
government was extremely lenient in its treatment of
former enemies or that a large number of former
Tokugawa allies proved to be not quite so faithful during
the military struggle with the Meiji forces.(26)

Those samurai who did not participate in the capitalization
of the banks found it necessary to seek other means of
supplementing the income they received from their bonds.
It is quite obvious that the majority of them could not live
on the interest income alone.(27) Therefore, a number of
them found employment in police work, a large number
became teachers, and some entered into business.(28)

The fact that there were alternate means of support
available to samurai did not mean that all were able to
smoothly make the adjustment to the new way of life.(29)
There were doubtlessly many who were dissatised with
positions they felt to be below their status, and many who
were never able to make the transition to the world of work
and therefore fell into an impoverished condition.
However, poverty was not something that was unknown
among the bush class until the Meiji period. There was
certainly a sufcient amount during the previous Tokugawa
period. Whether there was more poverty among the bush
class during the Meiji period than there was in the
Tokugawa period is difcult to say. What is certain,
however, is that there were more individuals within the
bush class who were working for an income and in some
way contributing to the economic development of Japan
during the Meiji period than there were during the
Tokugawa period. Japan was stronger during the Meiji
period than it had been during the Tokugawa period in
large part because of the contribution of the many men of
talent within the bush class.

III. Conclusions

The way in which the chitsuroku shobun shaped Japans
future can best be analyzed by removing, for a moment,
the reform and considering what the future would have
been without that reform. By doing so it becomes apparent
that there may in fact have been no future for the Meiji
government without that reform. There are a number of
reasons for this conclusion, not the least important of
which is economic. It has been shown that the stipend
obligations exerted a heavy demand upon the limited
income of the new government. In the period 1873-1875
the stipend obligations deprived the Meiji government of
approximately 40% of its yearly revenues from the land
tax. The ability of the central government to increase its
tax base was limited, as was its ability to increase the rate
of the tax. The tax rate, in fact, fell from 3% to 2.5% in
January of 1877 in response to pressure from agricultural
producers, and the Meiji government did not seem
capable of enforcing a higher rate in they immediate
future. A lower tax rate meant lower revenue, and any
xed costs the Meiji government faced thereby became a
larger percentage of total revenues.

The ability of the Meiji government to raise revenue from
sources other than the land tax was also limited. The trade
and customs treaties that had been signed in the 1850s
and 1860s deprived Japan of its ability to set tariff rates
and thereby made an increase in revenue from this source
possibly only by an increase in actual volume of trade.
Taxes on income or sales would have been difcult for the
Meiji government to enforce and would doubtlessly have
provided little new revenue for the government. An
ination of the money supply would have initially provided
the government with additional revenue, but this means for
supplementing the national income had already been
pushed to its limit, and was effective at any rate only until
the markets reacted with price increases. It was denitely
easier for the government to reduce or maintain its
existing level of expenditure than it was to expand its
revenue to meet new needs in the initial years of the Meiji
period.

Although it is probably that the Meiji government could
have continued to meet its stipend obligations from
existing sources of income for an indenite time, this was
true only if there was no additional demand for funds for
other projects. Unfortunately, economic progress,
increased defense appropriations, or the implementation
of social welfare programs would have been either
impossible or close to impossible given such a constraint
on the government budget. The Meiji government may
have continued to function, but it could not have provided
the country with direction. Under those circumstances, it
seems doubtful it would have endured. The international
situation demanded the government provide economic
and military leadership. If the Meiji government had not
been prepared or able to offer that leadership, another
government, whether domestic or foreign, eventually
would have.

The Meiji government could not have continued without
the chitsuroku shobun or some other solution to the
problem of stipend obligations because the forces of
history demanded a solution. Japan could not have
continued on the same course it had followed for the last
two hundred and fty years. The world situation no longer
made that a viable option. Japan was not able to break
step with the forces of change that were reshaping the
world around it, and which had already begun to reshape
its feudal society. Japan had approached that critical
moment in time when change was not only possible, but
inevitable. The choice the Meiji government faced was
whether to decide the direction of change or have that
decision made for it.

The decision to implement the chitsuroku shobun proved
to be the right decision for the Meiji government. It brought
change to Japan without destroying the society in the
process, though there were disruptions and reactions. In
the end, the way had been prepared for economic and
social progress. The men of talent were given a chance
to prove their ability in a society where class was no
longer the primary or only means for determining ones
position in that society. By their success they proved that
there were many talents that had been underutilized
during the Tokugawa period. They proved that Japan was
capable of taking its place as an equal member of the
industrialized world society that was emerging.

Endnotes

(1) Meiji zenkai zaisei keizai shiryo shusei, volume 8,
pages 438-439.

(2) Fukata Hakuji, Kashizoky chitsuroku shobun no kenkyu
(shintei), page 24, notes that only about 4,500 samurai
actually returned to the land under the conditions
established by the government. One reason for the low
number of samurai who took advantage of this offer was
that only samurai in the Kyoto, Osaka, Tokyo, Sakai, and
Nara areas were eligible for the grant of ve years of
stipend income. One other reason was that samurai who
returned to the land lost their status as samurai. This
obstacle was overcome, after the offer for a grant of ve
years of income had been revoked, on 27 January 1872
when samurai were given permission to work in commerce
or agriculture without the loss of samurai status. See Horei
zensho, volume 4, page 447.

(3) Horei zensho, volume 6, page 685 provides the text for
Dajokan ordinance 426. Pages 665-685 in that same
volume provide the tax tables for Dajokan ordinance 424,
which established the tax stipends.

(4) Kashizoku chitsuroku shobun no kenkyu (shintei), page
354.

(5) Horei zensho, volume 7, page 162.

(6) Meiji zaiseishi hensankai. Meiji zaiseishi. Tokyo:
Maruzen, 1904, volume 8, page 429.

(7) One of the analytical problems associated with
research on t he st i pend ref orms concerns t he
incompatibility of certain statistics. Although there were
over 450,000 individuals involved in stipend commutations
during the 1870s, census data indicates that this number
should have been no larger than 430,000. (See Nihon
tokei kyokai. Nihon zenkoku kosekihyo: Meiji 5 men - 9
men.)

(8) There was a very small payment made in connection
with the 1876 commutation, but it amounted to only
734,822 yen (total bond issues amounted to 173 million
yen). That amount does not appear to have been divided
equally among the 313,264 samurai who commuted their
bonds in 1876. See Meiji zaisei keizai shiryo shusei,
volume 8, pages 258-259.

(9) There were nine interest coupons attached to each
bond, to be clipped once each year. Meiji zaiseishi,
volume 8, pages 688-689.

(10) On 7 September 1875, by Dajokan ordinance 138, all
stipends became denominated in cash amounts. See
Horei zensho, volume 8, page 171 for the text of this
regulation. This price was established on the basis of
average rice prices for the years 1872, 1873, and 1874. All
stipend commutations in 1876 were therefore based on
stipend amounts denominated in cash at the rate of 5.32
yen per koku.

(11) As an example, consider an average samurai with a
stipend of 100 koku. By the terms of the 1873 regulations
his stipend is commuted as follows: 100 koku times the
current rice price of 7.28 yen per koku times 6 years of
income, for a total remittance of 4368 yen, one half to be
paid in bonds and one half in cash. That same samurai
commuting his stipend on the basis of the 1876
regulations would have received 5852 yen of bonds (100
koku) times 5.32 yen per koku times 11 years of income.

(12) Horei zensho, volume 9, pages 147-151.

(13) Fujitsu Seiji, Kokuritsu ginko to shizoku kabunushi,
Hitotsubashi ronso 69 (February 1973), page 41. This fact
is veried by a table in Meiji zenki zaisei keizai shiryo
shusei, volume 8, pages 258-259, which indicates that the
majority of bonds were issued in 1878. A table in Meiji
zaiseishi, volume 8, inserted between pages 18 and 19,
which indicates that there were already 173.9 million yen
in kinroku kosai bonds in circulation in 1877 would seem
to be incorrect. The fact that the bonds were not issued
until 1878 might help to explain an issue raised by
Yamamura Kozo in A Study of Samurai Income and
Entrepreneurship: Quantitative Analysis of Economic and
Social Aspects of the Samurai in Tokugawa and Meiji
Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, page
175. Yamamura has insisted that the 15th National Bank,
which opened its doors for business on 27 May 1877,
was literally forced upon the kazoku by the government,
especially by Iwakura Tomomi. He then states that the
governments concern that all members of the kazoku
class join in subscribing to the capitalization of the bank
prompted the Meiji government to lend funds to 294
(unwilling?) nobles who were unable to nd sufcient
capital to invest in the bank. If the bonds were not issued
until 1878 this might explain why these 294 nobles, who
were sure to receive bonds by the 1876 commutation
regulations, were unable to nd the capital in 1877 to join
in the capitalization of the bank.

(14) Fujimura Toru, page 102, Meiji zenki zaisei shiryo
shusei, volume 8, pages 258-259 and Fujitsu Seiji, page
41. Interestingly, the original commutation regulations, as
embodied in Dajokan ordinance number 108, did not even
make provisions for the issue of a 10 per cent bond.

(15) Meiji zaiseishi, volume 8, pages 688-689. Since the
bonds were not issued until July of 1878, bond holders
were entitled to two interest payments on receipt of the
bonds.

(16) Meiji zaiseishi, volume 9, page 207-208. Some
bondholders apparently did not clip their coupons during
the time periods specied, and interest actually continued
to be paid until 1899.

(17) Meiji zaiseishi, volume 8, page 437.

(18) Appendix 2, Meiji zaiseishi, volume 8, pages 444-446.

(19) There is a signicant discrepancy between the Meiji
zaiseishi and Meiji zaisei keizai shiryo shusei concerning
the total amount of bonds issued to Satsuma samurai. The
Meiji zaiseishi, pages 444-446, records that Satsuma
samurai received only 13,146,225 yen of bonds, but the
Meiji zaisei keizai shiryo shusei, pages 476,477 records
that Satsuma samurai received 46,983,991 yen in bonds,
which was 27% of the total amount of bonds issued. This
discrepancy is partially resolved by the fact that the total
for bonds issued to samurai residing in Tokyo is
approximately 29 million yen larger in the Meiji zaiseishi
than it is in the Meiji zaisei keizai shiryo shusei. It is quite
possible that there were very large numbers of Satsuma
samurai residing in Tokyo who were included in the Tokyo
totals by the Meiji zaiseishi, but it seems rather unlikely
that the number was as large as the totals would suggest.
See Appendix 2 and 3.

(20) Fujitsu Seiji, page 43, indicates that there were
34,360 stockholders in 1878, of which 29,630 were either
shizoku or kazoku. By contrast, only 4,730 heimin held
stock in the banks. This tends to disprove the thesis
advanced by Yamamura Kozo that heimin played a
dominant role in the creation of national banks. See
Yamamura Kozo, A Study of Samurai Income and
Entrepreneurship.

(21) Horei zensho, volume 5, pages 287-348.

(22) Horei zensho, volume 9, page 151. The sale of bonds
was made legal shortly after the bonds were actually
delivered, by Dajokan ordinance 25 of 9 September 1878.
Horei zensho, volume 11, page 21.

(23) Horei zensho, volume 9, pages 81-146.

(24) The rst person to hold stock in the bank who was
neither from the shizoku nor kazoku classes was Noguchi
Riemon, about whom nothing substantial is known.
ishikawa Kenjiro, Meiji zenki ni okeru kazoku no nk toshi:
dai jugo kokuritsu ginko no bay, Osaka daigaku
keizaigaku 22 (December 1972), page 80. Ishikawas
article, which provides a listing of all original stockholders
in the bank, as well as the stipend and amount of stock
purchase of each individual, is the basis for much of this
discussion.

(25) Ishikawa Kenjiro, page 69.

(26) The latter explanation would seem to be the most
likely possibility, though there is undoubtedly some truth in
the former opinion. Harold Bolitho. Treasures Among Men:
The Fudai Daimyo in Tokugawa Japan. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1974 has suggested some reasons why
one might be inclined to accept the latter explanation.

(27) Ando Yoshio, ed. Kindai Nihon keizaishi yoran. Tokyo:
Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1983, page 9 estimates that in
1880 the average living cost per individual was 95,65 yen.
Since the average samurai held a stipend of 100 yen or
less, the mean yearly interest income from the
commutation bonds amounted to no more than 80 yen.
Some supplementary income was essential.

(28) Harry Harootunian. The progress of Japan and the
Samurai Class, 1868-1882, Pacic Historical Review 28
(August 1959), 255-266.

(29) There were certain societies set up, such as Itagaki
Taisukes Risshisha, to assist the samurai in adapting to
the values of the new world, and the Meiji government
also contributed to assistance programs for the samurai.
The fact that such societies and support was needed is
evidence of difculty in making the transition to the
working world. jansen, page 373. See also Azuma Tosaku.
Meiji shakai seisakushi: shizoku jusan no kenkyu. Tokyo:
Mikasa shobo, 1940, and Shizoku jugyoshi. Tokyo: Mikasa
shoo, 1943 for a more in depth discussion of relief
measures for the samurai.

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