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SUMMARY ON MARRIAGE:
Characteristics of Marriage.
To emphasize how society treats and considers the importance of marriage, the Supreme Court said that marriage
is not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment. ence, it was said in Santos vs. CA, et al., !.". #o. 11$%1&,
'anuary (, 1&&), )* SC+, 1-, that.
/0e should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even
now still indelible in +rticle 1 of the 1amily Code, is that
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/3arriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. 4t is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, conse5uences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, e6cept
that
marriage settlements may 76 the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.88
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity o the amily lie an! shall protect an! strengthen the amily as
a "asic autonomous social institution. #t shall e$ually protect the lie o the mother an! the lie o the un"orn rom
conception. The natural an! primary right an! !uty o parents in the rearing o the youth or civic e%ciency an!
the !evelopment o moral character shall receive the support o the &overnment.'
Section 1. The State recognizes the (ilipino amily as the oun!ation o the nation. Accor!ingly, it shall strengthen
its soli!arity an! actively promote its total !evelopment.'
Section 2. )arriage, as an inviola"le social institution, is the oun!ation o the amily an! shall "e protecte!
"y the State.' *Article +,, 1-./ Constitution0. The a"ove provisions e1press so 2ell an! so !istinctly
the "asic nucleus o our la2s on marriage an! the amily, an! they are no !ou"t the tenets 2e still hol! on to.'
9Santos vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. !"#, $an%ar& ', ##(, () SCA* +,.
+long the same vein, the Supreme Court, in Republic vs. Nolasco, !!" SCRA !" -March +, ##.:, said that
spouses should not be allowed, by the mere simple e6pedient that one of them left the conjugal home and never to
return again to circumvent the laws on marriage which is not an ordinary but a special contract of
permanent union. The Supreme Court in this case considered as not serious e;orts to loo< for a missing wife the
acts of simply as<ing friends or neighbors the whereabouts of his wife and sending a letter to her former place of
wor< and when there was no answer he as<ed the court to declare her as presumptively dead. They were
considered
as merely s<etchy acts of loo<ing for the missing spouse. 4t was said that such acts do not warrant the declaration
of presumptive death, for the law see<s to preserve the marriage instead of wrec<ing it.
Article !. No /arriage shall 0e vali1, %nless these essential re2%isites are 3resent:
-, =egal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female> and
9$: Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing
o?cer. -(.a,
Article .. 4he for/al re2%isites of /arriage are:
91: +uthority of the solemnizing o?cer>
9$: + valid marriage license e6cept in the cases provided
for in Chapter $ of this Title> and
9@: + marriage ceremony which ta<es place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
o?cer and their personal declaration that they ta<e each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age. 9)@a, ))a:
Article '. 4he a0sence of an& of the essential or for/al re2%isites shall ren1er the /arriage voi1 ab
initio, e5ce3t as state1 in Article .(-!,.
+ defect in any of the essential re5uisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article '(. +n
irregularity in the formal re5uisites shall not a;ect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 9n,
6egal Ca3acit&.
=egal capacity means that the parties must have attained the age re5uirement and that there should be no legal
impediment to marry each other. The minimum marriageable age is 1*.
So that if a man and a woman at the age of seventeen 91-: marry each other with the consent of their parents, the
marriage is void because they must be eighteen 91*: years of age as re5uired 0& Article
( of the 7a/il& Co1e. They have no legal capacity.
4n the same manner, if one of them has an e6isting valid marriage, the marriage is void since the married party
could not have had the legal capacity to contract a second marriage because of the
legal impediment to marry a second time. 4n fact, even if the marriage referred to above is void, a subse5uent
marriage cannot be contracted before the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. 9+rt. (%, 1amily Code:.
This is so because even a void marriage is now a legal impediment to remarry because the law now re5uires that
even void marriage has yet to be declared void in a 7nal judgment before a
person may remarry. The concept of legal capacity here refers to the age of the parties to the marriage as well as a
situation where there should be no pree6isting marriage of either or both parties to the marriage or what is <nown
as legal impediment. The minimum marriageable age is 1* years 9+rticle ), 1amily Code:, so that if a party or both
of them isAare below this age would contract marriage, even with the consent of their parents, as well as all the
other re5uisites of marriage, the same would still be void
because of lac< of capacity. Bven if the marriage is celebrated abroad and valid there as such, the same would still
be void since the law that determines the validity of the marriage of the 1ilipino is hisAher
national law. 9+rt. 1), #ew Civil Code> +rts. $CDpar. 1E, @)D1E, 1amily Code:.
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Illustration:
+, a man at the age of (% and F, only 1C years of age, and both 1ilipinos, met in ong<ong where F was wor<ing as
an overseas 1ilipino wor<er. They fell in love with one another and decided to get married with all the other
re5uisites of marriage.
8E6*:
The marriage is void because of lac< of capacity of F, as she was below the age of 1* at the
time of the marriage. Bven if the marriage is valid in ong<ong, the same is still void in the Philippines because the
law that determines the legal capacity of F is Philippine law as it is binding upon her even if she is living abroad.
9+rt. 1), #ew Civil Code:. 0hile it is true that her marriage with + is valid in ong<ong, it is still void, for again the
1amily Code provides all marriages solemnized outside of
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, e6cept those under Article .(-,. The law ma<es reference to +rticle @)91:
which declares as void marriages of 1ilipino citizens if anyone or both of them isAare below 1* years even with the
consent of their parents or guardians. This void marriage
cannot even 0e /a1e vali1 0& coha0itation, for a void marriage is void. It cannot 0e c%re1 by subse5uent
cohabitation. 4here is nothing that 9o%l1 3revent the s3o%ses fro/ rene9ing their /arriage vo9s 0&
getting /arrie1 again. The marriage would then be valid if in the meantime, they have already reached 1* or so.
Fut this subse5uent marriage is not going to validate the previous void marriage. It 1oes not cleanse the 1efect
of the 3revio%s one.
Gne 5uestion may be as<ed. If A an1 : a0ove 9o%l1 0eget chil1ren, 9hat is the stat%s of the latter; They
are illegiti/ates because they were born out of a void marriage. 4n fact, the& cannot even 0e legiti/ate1 0&
the s%0se2%ent /arriage of + and F. 4he re/e1& of + and F to elevate them to the status of legitimate
children is to a1o3t the/, for even the parents can adopt their illegitimate children. 9+rt. 1*), 1amily Code:.
ARROYO vs. <AS=UE> 1e ARROYO GR No. 6?+"', A%g%st , #!
3ariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife.
8E6*: #G.
4t is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with,
and render conjugal rights to, the other.
Men1e@ona vs O@a/is, '! Ahil ('
The petitioners initiated the suit to remove a cloud on their said respective titles caused by the inscription thereon
of a notice of lispen!ens.
+llegedly there is simulation of contract and the time that e6ecution of the contract the mental faculties of
Carmen Gzamiz were already seriously impaired.
8E6*:
Simulation is de7ned as /the declaration of a 7ctitious will, deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order
to produce, for the purposes of deception, the appearances of a juridical act which does not e6ist or is di;erent from
what that which was really e6ecuted.HThe re5uisites of simulation are. 9a: an outward declaration of will di;erent
from the will of the parties> 9b: the false appearance must have been intended by mutual agreement> and 9c: the
purpose is to deceive third persons.#one of these were clearly shown to e6ist in the case at bar. 4t is signi7cant to
note that the ,eed of +bsolute Sale dated +pril $*, 1&*&is a notarized document duly ac<nowledged before a
notary public. +s such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due e6ecution. 4t is admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
<oi1 /arriage as a legal i/3e1i/ent to re/arr&.
Gne 5uestion has been as<ed. If there is a 3rior e5isting /arriage of A an1 :, 0%t it is voi1, can an&one of
the/ B%st get /arrie1;
The authors say NO. This is so because of the present rule that there is a need to have a void marriage to be
declared void. 4n fact, Article .# of the 7a/il& Co1e provides that the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. 1urthermore, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invo<ed for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a 7nal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
9Art. '", 7a/il& Co1e:. 4t is therefore clear that even if a marriage is void, it must be declared void 7rst because
the parties cannot decide for themselves the invalidity of their marriage.
4n 3onato vs. 4una, !.". #o. )@C($, +pril 1), 1&**, it was ruled that assuming that the 7rst marriage was null and
void on the ground alleged by the petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity is so declared can it be held as void. So long as
there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage e6ists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the 7rst marriage assumes the ris< of being prosecuted for
bigamy. 9See also 0eigel vs. SempioI,iy, 1(@ SC"+ (&&> +tienza vs. Frillantes, 'r., +.3. #o. 3T'I &$I-%C, 3arch $&,
1&&), C% SC+, 11&> 3ercado vs. Tan:.
Since there is a need for a prior declaration of nullity of a void marriage, that void marriage can be considered a
legal impediment to contract a subse5uent marriage because of the presumption of its validity prior to its
declaration of nullity.
6egal I/3e1i/ent.
The rule that if there is an e6isting marriage, there can be no subse5uent valid marriage is not an absolute rule. 1or
under +rticle (1 of the 1amily Code, if one of the spouses has been absent from the conjugal dwelling for two 9$: or
four 9(: years, depending upon the circumstances of the absence, the present spouse may marry again,
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but he has to 7le a summary action for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse. 4f there is a
judgment declaring the absent spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse can marry again. The present
spouse must not <now the whereabouts of the absent spouse. +fter the declaration of presumptive death, the
present spouse becomes capacitated to remarry, but the 7rst marriage is still e6isting, unless it has been declared
void or annulled in a previous proceeding.
4n the aboveIcited situation, while there was a prior marriage, the present spouse can remarry under peculiar
circumstances, that is, were it not for the absence of the spouse and the declaration of presumptive death, the
present spouse could not have been capacitated to contract a valid subse5uent marriage. Fut what the
law recognizes as a valid marriage is the marriage of the present spouse who does not <now the whereabouts of the
absent spouse, for if heAshe <nows, then the marriage is void and bigamous.
Consent of the 3arties.
The consent referred to by law as a preIre5uisite of a valid marriage is the consent of the parties, not their parents.
1or, if there is no consent at all, the marriage is void. 4f there is vitiation of consent by fraud, intimidation, etc., then
the marriage is only voidable> it is valid but it can be annulled. 4f there is no consent of the parents, the
marriage is only voidable until it is annulled.
A%thorit& of Sole/ni@ing OCcer.
The law 9+rt. -, 1amily Code: enumerates the authorities who can solemnize marriages. 'ustices of the Supreme
Court, the Court of +ppeals, the Sandiganbayan can solemnize marriages all over the Philippines because their
jurisdiction covers the whole country. Fut a judge of the "egional Trial Court and 3unicipal or 3etropolitan
Trial Court judges can only solemnize marriages within their territorial jurisdiction. That is, if we have to loo< into
the literal provisions of the law. Fut the Supreme Court has liberalized the law, saying that if a judge solemnized a
marriage in a place other than his o?cial station, still it would be valid. The reason that, such solemnization is only
a formal re5uisite. + defect in a formal re5uisite of marriage does not go into the validity of the marriage. Fut it
a;ects the threeIfold responsibility of the solemnizing o?cer, li<e criminal, civil and administrative responsibility.
AraDes vs. $%1ge Salva1or M. Occiano A.M. No. M4$?"!?.#", A3ril , !""!
7acts:
The 3TC 'udge of Falatan, Camarines Sur solemnized a marriage in #abua, Camarines Sur. 4t was li<ewise
solemnized without a marriage license. +fter the death of the husband, her right to inherit vast properties left by
her husband was not recognized. She as<ed that the judge be sanctioned. 0as the actuation of the judge properJ
0hyJ
8el1:
#o. The authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is con7ned
in their territorial jurisdiction as de7ned by the Supreme Court. The case at bar is not without precedent. 4n 5avarro
vs.
3omagtoy, $)& SC"+ 1$&, a judge held o?ce and had jurisdiction in the 3unicipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. 3onicaI
Furgos, Surigao del #orte. owever, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of ,apa, Surigao
del #orte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. 3onica and
Furgos. 0here a judge solemnizes a marriage outside of his court8s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal re5uisite laid down in +rticle @, which while it may not a;ect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the o?ciating o?cial to administrative liability. 0hile the re5uirement of authority is prescribed by the law for a
marriage to be valid, yet, its defect or in7rmity does not go into the validity of the marriage, but it merely a;ects
the liability of the solemnizing o?cer. The reason is obvious, as authority is only a formal re5uisite of marriage.
Marriage cere/onio%s in character.
Fut let us say that + and F were legally married in 1&(C in ,ingras, 4locos #orte. 4n 1&&C, they celebrated their
golden wedding anniversary in 3anila, with 3ayor 0ilfredo Parado, the 3ayor of ,ingras, solemnizing the same at
the 3anila otel. Can 9e consi1er it vali1 consi1ering that the /a&or has no a%thorit& to sole/ni@e the
/arriage in Manila;
The marriage is still valid considering that it is only a marriage ceremonious in character which does not have to
comply with the re5uisites of a valid marriage. 4t is only a renewal of their marriage vows> a mere ceremony. The
rule laid down in 5avarro vs. 3omagtoy does not apply. e cannot even be held liable administratively, civilly and
criminally. 4n this <ind of marriage, license is not even necessary.
Marriage license sho%l1 0e e5isting at the ti/e of the /arriage.
Gne of the re5uisites of a valid marriage is license. 0ithout license, the marriage is void. 4t must be e6hibited at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. 4f it is issued thereafter, the marriage is void. This is one of the means by
which the State intervenes in the formation of the family. 4t must be recalled that the Constitution recognizes the
family as a Fasic social institution which is the basis of the society.
Solemnizing o?cer should marry couple with e6isting marriage license otherwise will be held civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Marriage 9itho%t license voi1.
The marriage between +ngelina 3. Castro and Bdwin Cardenas was without the <nowledge of their parents. They
called it a /secret marriage,H a phrase un<nown in law. They did not live together immediately after the marriage,
but later on lived for four 9(: months> then a child was born. Problem arose when +ngelina wanted to go to the KS+.
+s she was trying to put in order her marital status, it was discovered that there was no marriage license issued
prior to the celebration of their marriage. This was supported by a certi7cation by the =ocal Civil "egistrar of Pasig,
3etro 3anila, that the alleged license cannot be located. The petition for judicial declaration of nullity was denied
on
the ground that the inability of the certifying o?cial to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued.H The Court of +ppeals reversed the decision, hence,
this petition. 4n a?rming the Court of +ppeals decision, the Supreme Court hel1:
The Civil Code 9now the 1amily Code: provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license
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7rst issued by the local civil registrar. Feing one of the essential 9should be formal: re5uisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void a" initio. The presentation of the certi7cation of /due search
and inability to 7ndH issued by the "egistrar enjoys probative value, he being the o?cer charged under the law to
<eep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The subject matter is one of those commonly
<nown as /secret marriagesH a legally nonIe6istent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the <nowledge of the relatives andAor friends of either or both of the contracting parties.88
9Re3%0lic vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. "."'+, Se3te/0er !, ##', (( SCA* (+:.
+nother purpose of the marriage license is to prevent hasty marriages which in some cases are bigamous and
marriages between minors without parental consent. This purpose is di?cult to attain, unless a marriage license is
made an essential re5uisite of marriage. 9Capistrano, Civil Co!e o the 6hilippines, 1&)% ed., p. *%E NiDal vs.
:a&a1og, supra.,.
4n the case of an application for a marriage license, the law re5uires its publication for a period of ten 91%: days in
cons3ic%o%s 3laces in the locality before the issuance of the marriage license. The 3%r3ose here is to give notice
to the public, so that if there are interested parties who are aware of any impediment to the prospective marriage of
the applicants for a license, they can manifest the same to the local civil registrar who shall note the same in the
application that there is an impediment to the marriage. 4t is also for this purpose that the law re5uires an open
ceremony so that, if during the marriage ceremony, anyone may object to its proceedings if he <nows of an
impediment to the marriage.
4here are, ho9ever e5ce3tions to the rule as when a man and a woman have been living together as husband
and wife without the bene7t of marriage but without legal impediment to marry each other for a period of 7ve 9):
years prior to the day of the celebration of the marriage. Fut if there was a legal impediment to marry each other
during the period of cohabitation, no matter how long it may be, the marriage, if celebrated without a license is
void. 4t is not enough that they have no legal impediment to marry at the time of the celebration of the marriage, it
is necessary that during the )Iyear period of cohabitation, they did not have any legal impediment to marry. To say
otherwise would be to sanction immorality.
Engrace NiDal, et al. vs. Nor/a :a&a1og G.R. No. ..++), March ', !"""
+fter their father8s death, petitioners 7led a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to #orma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lac< of a marriage license. The case was 7led under the assumption
that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would a;ect petitioner8s successional rights.
ISSUES:
1. 0hat law should govern the disposition of the caseJ
$. 0hat is the signi7cance of the re5uirement of a marriage licenseJ
@. 0hat is the length and nature of the cohabitation of the spouses who got married without a marriage licenseJ
(. ,o the children in the 7rst marriage have the personality to 5uestion the validity of their father8s second
marriage
even after his death and what forJ
B=,.
1I /The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code, the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in e;ect at the time of their
celebration.
+ valid marriage license is a re5uisite of marriage under +rticle )@ of the Civil Code 9#ow +rticle @, 1amily Code:,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to +rticle *%9@: 9#ow +rticle (, 1amily Code: in
relation to +rticle )*. The re5uirement and issuance of marriage license is the State8s demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
owever, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code 9now the 1amily Code: wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in +rticle -C 9now +rticle @(, 1amily Code:, referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and e6clusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbro<en period of at least 7ve years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is re5uired
in such case is to avoid e6posing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant8s name for a
marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status.
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under +rticle
-C of the Civil Code 9now +rticle @(, 1amily Code: to warrant the counting of the 7veIyear period in order to e6empt
the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire 7veIyear continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties have lived together and e6clusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire 7veIyear
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation periodJ
+ny marriage subse5uently contracted during the lifetime of the 7rst spouse shall be illegal and void 9+rticle *@,
#ew Civil Code> +rt. (1, 1amily Code:, subject only to the e6ception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage
was dissolved or annulled. The "evised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and having of e6tramarital a;airs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.
Pepito8s 7rst marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Bven assuming that Pepito and his 7rst wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for 7ve years, the fact remains that their
7veyear period of cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. 4t should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. 4t is immaterial that when they lived
with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
aving determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the e6ception to the
re5uirement of a marriage license, it is void a" initio because of the absence of such element.
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*o chil1ren fro/ 3rior /arriage have the 3ersonalit& to Fle a 3etition to 1eclare their fatherGs
/arriage voi1 after his 1eath;
The Supreme Court said, Les.
+rticle (- pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can 7le an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
<oi1a0le an1 voi1 /arriages are not i1entical.
1I + marriage that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by a court> whereas a marriage that is void a" initio
is considered as having never to have ta<en place 9Suntay vs. Cojuangco, 1%1 SC+, 11C1, @%% SC"+ -C% D1&&*E:
and cannot be the source of rights.
$I The 7rst can be generally rati7ed or con7rmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
rati7ed.
@I + voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally e6cept in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attac<ed collaterally.
(I Conse5uently, void marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of
either, in which case the parties and their o;spring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
)I That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unli<e voidable marriages where the action
prescribes.
CI Gnly the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attac< a void marriage.
-I Moid marriages have no legal e;ects e6cept those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution 9+rticles 1(*I1(&, 1amily Code>
+rticle 1((, #ew Civil Code:, and its e;ect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in +rticle )% in
relation to +rticles (@ and (( as well as +rticles )1, )@ and )( of the 1amily Code.
*I Gn the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriage is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment is legitimate.
&I 'urisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. + void marriage does not re5uire a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to ma<e
the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sa<e of good
order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is e6pedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.
1%I +nd therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the
fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as nonIe6istent by the courts. 4t is not li<e a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attac<ed e6cept in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good a" initio.
owever, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolutely
nullity. 1or other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to 5uestion the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case.
4AHE NO4E: Cohabitation for ) years must be continuous. 4t must be recalled that the type of marriage referred to
by law is valid as an e6ception to the general rule because it is valid in spite of the absence of a marriage license
but considering that it is only an e6ception, the law must be restrictively construed that without complying with the
re5uirements the marriage cannot be considered valid.
Mere non?recor1ing of the /arriage 9o%l1 not /aIe it voi1.
The only purpose of the recording of the marriage is for e6pediency. 4ts recording is not a re5uisite of marriage.
4n Geronimo vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. "(('", $%l& (, ##., '. SCA* ., it was the contention of the
petitioner that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses Bsman because the copies of the marriage
contract did not state the marriage license number.
Is the contention correct;
#o. The Naw in such reasoning is all too obvious. This was refuted when respondent presented a copy of the
marriage contract on 7le with the #ational +rchives and "ecords Section where the marriage license number does
appear. The evidence adduced by the petitioner could only serve to prove the nonIrecording of the marriage
license number but certainly not the nonIissuance of the license itself.
4f the marriage license came after the solemnization of the marriage, the same is void. 9People vs. =ara, DC+E =I
1$)**I", 1ebruary 1), 1&)):.
owever, even if illegally obtained, if there is a marriage license, it is still valid. 9People vs. Fabu, ()%C, Supp. #o. ),
p. **:.
Marriages of e5ce3tional character.
#ot all marriages without marriage licenses are void. The law recognizes the validity of certain marriages even
without marriage license, li<e, those in +rticles $-, $*, @1, @$, @@, @( of the 1amily Code.
C | P a g e
Art. !+. 4n case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized
without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subse5uently survives.
Art. !). 4f the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party
to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a
marriage license. 9-$a:
Art. .. + marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship
captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in Night, but also during stopovers at
ports of call. 9-(a:
Art. .!. + military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned o?cer, shall li<ewise have authority to solemnize
marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed
forces or civilians. 9-(a:
Art. ... 3arriages among 3uslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed
validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs,
rites or practices. 9-*a:
Art. .'. #o license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least 7ve years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an a?davit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
o?cer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the 5uali7cations of the contracting parties are found no legal
impediment to the marriage. 9-Ca:
*efect in essential re2%isites.
The law ma<es a cross reference to +rticle () which enumerates the voidable marriages. 4f there is any vitiation of
consent of a party, li<e fraud, violence, intimidation, undue inNuence, physical incapacity or aOiction with a
se6uallyItransmissible disease or that one has not obtained the consent of the parents, the marriage is voidable.
Such defects however may be cured if the parties freely cohabit or if the action has already prescribed because
+rticle (- of
the 1amily Code prescribes the period of 7ve 9): years as a rule within which the aggrieved party must move for the
annulment.
Art. '+. The action for annulment of marriage must be 7led by the following persons and within the periods
indicated herein.
91: 1or causes mentioned in number 1 of +rticle () by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her
consent, within 7ve years after attaining the age of twentyIone, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal
charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twentyIone>
9$: 1or causes mentioned in number $ of +rticle (), by the same spouse, who had no <nowledge of the otherPs
insanity> or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of
either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity>
9@: 1or causes mentioned in number @ of +rticle (), by the injured party, within 7ve years after the discovery of the
fraud>
9(: 1or causes mentioned in number ( of +rticle (), by the injured party, within 7ve years from the time the force,
intimidation or undue inNuence disappeared or ceased>
9): 1or causes mentioned in number ) and C of +rticle (), by the injured party, within 7ve years after the marriage.
9*-a:
4f there is irregularity in the formal re5uisites, that would only ma<e the party or parties liable criminally, civilly or
administratively.
0hile a marriage ceremony is re5uired 9+rt. C, 1C:, the law does not prescribe a speci7c form of ceremony. 0hat
the law re5uires is the personal appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing o?cer where they
have to declare that they are ta<ing each other as husband and wife. This is a re5uirement that a;ects the validity
of the marriage if celebrated in the Philippines because it is not possible to have a /marriage by pro6y.H Fut if a
/marriage by pro6yH is celebrated abroad and valid there as such it is valid in the Philippines because of the
doctrine of lex loci celebrationis.
4n case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage
certi7cate, it shall be su?cient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact
shall be attested by the solemnizing o?cer. 1urthermore, +rticle * of the 1amily Code re5uires that the marriage
shall be solemnized publicly in the chamber of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
o?ce of the consulIgeneral, consul or viceIconsul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, e6cept in remote places
in accordance with +rticle $& of this Code, or where both of the parties re5uest the solemnizing o?cer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
e;ect. Public ceremony is necessary because the state ta<es active interest in the marriage, it being an inviolable
social institution. The public celebration li<ewise noti7es people who may <now of any impediment of the parties to
marry, for the protection of the innocent party as well as the State.
Article (. An& /ale or fe/ale of the age of eighteen &ears -), or %39ar1s not %n1er an& of the
i/3e1i/ents /entione1 in Articles .+ an1 .), /a& contract /arriage. -('a,
Art. .+. 3arriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate.
91: Fetween ascendants and descendants of any degree> and
9$: Fetween brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. 9*1a:
Art. .). The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy.
91: Fetween collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree>
9$: Fetween stepIparents and stepIchildren>
- | P a g e
9@: Fetween parentsIinIlaw and childrenIinIlaw>
9(: Fetween the adopting parent and the adopted child>
9): Fetween the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child>
9C: Fetween the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter>
9-: Fetween an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter>
9*: Fetween adopted children of the same adopter> and
9&: Fetween parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, <illed that other personPs spouse, or his or her
own spouse. 9*$:
R%les on vali1it& of /arriage.
The marriage is valid if there is consent of the parents. 0ithout the consent of the parents, the marriage would only
be voidable. 4f it is without the consent of the parties, the marriage is void. 4f the parties to a marriage are below
the ages of eighteen 91*:, even with the consent of their parents, the marriage would still be void. This is because
they lac< the legal capacity to marry.
1ilipinos related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity cannot marry in the Philippines. The marriage is void.
Bven if they get married outside the Philippines where the marriage is valid there as such, the same is void because
of +rticles $C 9par. 1: and @*91: of the 1amily Code. 0hat determines the capacity to marry is the national law of the
1ilipino and not the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated. Knder +rticle 1) of the Civil Code, laws
relating to family rights and duties and to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons shall be binding upon
them even if they are living abroad.
Gen1er re2%ire/ent.
The law re5uires that the parties to a marriage must be a male and a female. This reason is obvious, for two males
or two females cannot reproduce. 4t must be remembered that no less than the law itself says that /arriage is a
s3ecial contract of 3er/anent %nion 0et9een a /an an1 a 9o/an entere1 into in accor1ance 9ith la9
for the esta0lish/ent of conB%gal an1 fa/il& life. -Art. , 7a/il& Co1e,.
4t must be recalled that one of the ends of marriage is the reproduction or rearing of children, that is why, marriage
is for the establishment of conjugal and family life. This rule must therefore be considered with +rticle C* of the
1amily Code which mandates among other things that the husband and wife shall /live together.H
if one spouse refuses to provide se6 to the other, such refusal being constant and senseless, it can be said that
heAshe is refusing to perform hisAher essential marital obligation. Senseless and protracted refusal is e5uivalent to
/psychological incapacity,H hence, in Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA, G.R. No. ##", $an%ar& J, ##+, +) SCA* (+,
the Supreme Court declared as void the marriage of a man and a woman when the man refused to provide se6 to
his wife for a period of ten 91%: months despite the marriage.
Article J. No 3rescri0e1 for/ or religio%s rite for the sole/ni@ation of the /arriage is re2%ire1. It shall
0e necessar&, ho9ever, for the contracting 3arties to a33ear 3ersonall& 0efore the sole/ni@ing oCcer
an1 1eclare in the 3resence of not less than t9o 9itnesses of legal age that the& taIe each other as
h%s0an1 an1 9ife. 4his 1eclaration shall 0e containe1 in the /arriage certiFcate 9hich shall 0e signe1
0& the contracting 3arties an1 their 9itnesses an1 atteste1 0& the sole/ni@ing oCcer. In case of a
/arriage in articulo mortis, 9hen the 3art& at the 3oint of 1eath is %na0le to sign the /arriage
certiFcate, it shall 0e s%Ccient for one of the 9itnesses to the /arriage to 9rite the na/e of the sai1
3art&, 9hich fact shall 0e atteste1 0& the sole/ni@ing
oCcer. -((a,
Act%al /arriage cere/on& is necessar&.
0hile the form of ceremony is immaterial, what is important is that, there is actual solemnization of the marriage,
otherwise, it would be void even if it is just a formal re5uisite of marriage. The law says that its total absence ma<es
the marriage void. ence, in Morigo vs. People, G.R. No. '(!!J, 7e0r%ar& J, !""', it was said that the
marriage was void and never e6isted in the eyes of the law when the parties merely signed the marriage contract
without ceremony. Their act of signing without the re5uisite of marriage ceremony was merely a private act. There
is not even a necessity to have it declared void before a party to said marriage can contract a subse5uent marriage.
Aro5& /arriage.
+ pro6y marriage in the Philippines is void if celebrated here. This is so because the law re5uires the personal
presence of the parties before the solemnizing o?cer. 1urthermore, the law re5uires as one of the re5uisites of a
valid marriage that a ceremony should ta<e place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing o?cer and their personal declaration that they ta<e each other as husband and wife. 9+rt. @, 1amily
Code:.
Fut the 5uestion is that, if that 3ro5& /arriage is cele0rate1 a0roa1 an1 vali1 there as s%ch, is it vali1 in
the Ahili33ines;
The answer is yes. + scrutiny of +rticle $C, paragraph 1 of the 1amily Code says that all marriages solemnized
outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, e6cept those prohibited under +rts. @)91:, 9(:, 9):, and 9C:, @C, @-,
@*.
So, if the law of the place of celebrationAsolemnization allows the validity of a pro6y marriage, even if it is void in
the Philippines, if valid where celebrated, it is valid here.
4n that case, Philippine law recognizes its validity by way of applying the general principle that if valid where
celebrated, it is valid here and the rule of e1pression unius est exclusio alterius applies. 0hat the law e6cludes,
it does not include. 1inally, this is a rea?rmation of the principle that in case of doubt, the law leans towards the
validity of the marriage as a means of preserving it due to the public policy that the State ta<es interest in the
marriage as the foundation of the family and society.
Article +. Marriage /a& 0e sole/ni@e1 0&:
-, An& inc%/0ent /e/0er of the B%1iciar& 9ithin the co%rtGs B%ris1ictionE
* | P a g e
-!, An& 3riest, rabbi, imam, or /inister of an& ch%rch or religio%s sect 1%l& a%thori@e1 0& his ch%rch or
religio%s sect an1 registere1 9ith the civil registrar general, acting 9ithin the li/its of the 9ritten
a%thorit& grante1 hi/ 0& his ch%rch or religio%s sect an1 3rovi1e1 that at least one of the contracting
3arties 0elongs to the sole/ni@ing oCcerGs ch%rch or religio%s sectE
-., An& shi3 ca3tain or air3lane chief onl& in the cases /entione1 in Article .E
-', An& /ilitar& co//an1er of a %nit to 9hich a cha3lain is assigne1, in the a0sence of the latter,
1%ring a /ilitar& o3eration, liIe9ise onl& in the cases /entione1 in Article .!E or
-(, An& cons%l?general, cons%l or vice?cons%l in the case 3rovi1e1 in Art. ". -(Ja,
A%thorit& of /a&ors.
3ayors are now authorized to solemnize marriage. They have been e6cluded by the 1amily Code, but they are now
authorized by the =ocal !overnment Code to solemnize marriages 9Sec. ((( Das to municipal mayorsE and Sec. ())
Das to city mayorsE, ".+. #o. -1C%:. + mayor of 3anila cannot solemnize a marriage in Pasay City because he has no
authority there. is authority can only be e6ercised in 3anila. 4f he performs the ceremony outside of his territorial
jurisdiction, the marriage is void for lac< of authority. Bven a vice Q mayor, acting as mayor> or a member of the
Sangguniang Fayan can solemnize marriage because if he is an acting mayor, he can e6ercise the powers of the
mayor.
A%tative /arriage is vali1.
#ote that this case of Car!enas vs. Car!enas 7nds more applicability now, in view of the second paragraph of
+rticle @) of the 1amily Code which declares, by way of e6ception, the validity of marriage solemnized by a person
not authorized to solemnize marriage where the parties, or anyone of them, was unaware of the o?cer8s lac< of
authority. This is otherwise <nown as a putative marriage, one where the solemnizing o?ce has no authority but the
lac< of authority is not <nown to the parties.
4aIe Note: =iterally, it would seem that a judge cannot solemnize a marriage outside of the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, but the Supreme Court in a case ruled that the re5uirement is only formal. The defect is only a mere
irregularity that does not a;ect the validity of the marriage.
A/0assa1ors cannot solemnize marriages anymore. They are e6cluded by the law.
Cons%ls or cons%ls?general can solemnize marriages only in the areas where they hold o?ce.
+ /ilitar& co//an1er can solemnize marriages only in cases of articulo mortis.
B6ample. 4f in the problem above, it was C, the girlfriend of + who was in articulo mortis, the military commander
can li<ewise solemnize the marriage in the absence of the chaplain assigned. The rule is so because it does not
re5uire that the member of the military alone be in articulo mortis. Such marriage is allowed even if a civilian is the
one under articulo mortis.
Fut if +, after having been shot was brought to a hospital outside of the military operation, the marriage would be
void since the law re5uires that the marriage must be made during military operation and within the
area of military operation.
The shi3 ca3tain or air3lane chief can solemnize marriages in articulo mortis. The authority e6ists even
while the vessel is sailing or the plane is Nying, or even in stopovers.
Marriage contracte1 in goo1 faith.
+ 5uestion has been as<ed as to whether a marriage may be valid if solemnized by one who has no authority at all.
+n e6ample . is when a man and a woman, with capacity and no legal impediment to marry, with a marriage license
go to the City all of 3anila. + 76er approaches them and since they are really loo<ing for someone to solemnize
their marriage, they are brought to a room where somebody who introduces himself as a judge solemnized their
marriage. They do not <now the person but they were made to believe that he is a judge, but the truth is, he is not
a judge and they relied upon such representation. The 5uestion now is, is the /arriage vali1;
The answer is in the aCr/ative because it is a marriage contracted in good faith. This is otherwise <nown as a
putative marriage, one which is ordinarily void because it lac<s one of the re5uisites of a valid marriage, that is, the
authority of the solemnizing o?cer, but valid because of the good faith of the parties of the absence of authority of
the solemnizing o?cer. #either of them can 5uestion the validity of the marriage> or if one of them was aware that
the solemnizing o?cer had no authority, he cannot 5uestion the validity of the marriage as he was in bad faith. The
law does not allow a person to bene7t out of his own wrongdoing.
AR4IC6E ) points to remember on place to celebrate the marriage.
Bven as the law re5uires that the marriage ceremony be made public as it must be done publicly in the chambers
of the judge, or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, yet, if there is a written re5uest of the parties that it
be solemnized elsewhere in a sworn statement, the same can be done. +n e6ample is a situation where the parties
re5uested that it be solemnized at a function room of the 3anila otel, then, it can be solemnized therein. +gain,
even if there is no such re5uest, or even if it is not in writing or it is not in a sworn statement, still the marriage is
valid as such re5uisite is not an essential one. The total absence of the same does not go into the validity of the
marriage.
=et us say for e6ample that the marriage of + and F was solemnized by the mayor at the town plaza without any
re5uest and during the period of the political campaign, the marriage is valid provided that all the essential
re5uisites are present. Bven if no re5uest was made, it is still valid as the failure to comply with that formal
re5uirement does not a;ect the validity of the marriage.
Article #. A /arriage license shall 0e iss%e1 0& the local civil registrar of the cit& or /%nici3alit& 9here
either contracting 3art& ha0it%all& resi1es, e5ce3t in /arriages 9here no license is re2%ire1
in accor1ance 9ith Cha3ter ! of this 4itle.
The law re5uires that the marriage license shall be issued in the place of habitual residence of the parties. This is a
formal re5uirement that a violation of the same does not render the marriage void. 4t is merely an irregularity which
if committed may result in the liability of the =ocal Civil "egistrar who issued it <nowing that the applicants for a
marriage license do not reside in the place where they applied for a license.
& | P a g e
Article ". Marriages 0et9een 7ili3ino citi@ens a0roa1 /a& 0e sole/ni@e1 0& a cons%l?general, cons%l
or vice?cons%l of the Re3%0lic of the Ahili33ines. 4he iss%ance of the /arriage license an1 the 1%ties
of the local civil registrar an1 of the sole/ni@ing oCcer 9ith regar1 to the cele0ration of /arriage
shall 0e 3erfor/e1 0& sai1 cons%lar oCcial. -+(a,
1rom a reading of the law, the consulIgeneral, consul, or vice consul acts as a local civil registrar for 1ilipinos
abroad. This is so because the issuance of the marriage license to 1ilipinos abroad is done by him. e also
solemnizes marriages between 1ilipino citizens abroad.
4f the marriage is solemnized by a consul or viceIconsul, there is no need for the contracting parties, who are
1ilipinos, to secure a certi7cate of legal capacity to marry. The re5uirement however lies if the marriage is to be
solemnized by another person other than the consul or consulIgeneral or viceIconsul.
4AHE NO4E: The rule applies only if the marriage is solemnized by a consul and the 3arties are citi@ens of the
Philippines.
SUMMARY O7 AR4IC6ES , ! an1 . ?
The law merely enumerates the contents of an application for a marriage license. 3ore speci7cally, the law re5uires
the age and civil status of the applicants so that if the applicant is not of age as re5uired by law, or if there is legal
impediment as shown by the application, the =ocal Civil "egistrar would still issue the license, but with a notation of
the same. 4t is also re5uired that if there was a previous marriage and it has been annulled or nulli7ed, the
applicant concerned must attach it to the application in order to prove his capacity to contract marriage.
The law further re5uires the presentation of the original of their birth certi7cates, or if not available, copies attested
by the custodian of the same. Such presentation is not necessary if the parents appear before the local civil
registrar and swear the correctness of the lawful age of the parties as stated in the application.
4f either of the parties was previously married but the spouse is already dead, heAshe is merely re5uired to produce
the certi7cate of death of the spouse. 4f he cannot produce it, heAshe may e6ecute an a?davit setting forth hisAher
actual civil status and the name and date of death of the deceased spouse.
SUMMARRY AR4C6E '?
4f the parties to the marriage are between the ages of 1* and $1, they must secure the consent of their parents,
otherwise it is voidable. 9+rt. ()D1E, 1amily Code:. Such consent in the form of a written instrument by the person
concerned who personally appears before the local civil registrar or in the form of an a?davit made in
the presence of two witnesses and attested before any o?cial authorized to administer oaths. 4t is re5uired that
such manifestation of consent be attached to the application for marriage license.
AR4C6E (:
Knder +rticle 1) of the 1amily Code, if the parties are between the ages of $1 and $), they need parental advice. 4t
provides too that if not secured or if unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued until after three 9@:
months following the publication of the application for marriage license. They are also re5uired to state those facts
in an a?davit.
4f the marriage license is issued without waiting for the lapse of the threeImonth period, still the marriage is valid,
but the party and the public o?cer e;ecting such issuance may be subjected to criminal and administrative
responsibility.
The parties are also re5uired to attach to their application for a marriage license a certi7cation that they have
undergone marriage counseling before a duly accredited agency. 1ailure to attach it shall cause the suspension of
the issuance of the marriage license for a period of three 9@: months.
AR4IC6E J:
The mere fact that the advice was not given and the marriage was solemnized does not ma<e the marriage void.
The formalities re5uired by law must however be complied with. The issuance of the marriage license even before
the lapse of the &%Iday period if no advice was granted does not ma<e the marriage void. 4t is still valid, but
criminal, civil or administrative sanctions may be imposed on the o?cer issuing the license.
AR4IC6E +:
=C" must post for 91%: days at the bulletin board outside of his o?ce in conspicuous places or even in places
accessible to the public. 4t calls upon anyone who has any <nowledge of any legal impediment of either or both of
the contracting parties to report to the local civil registrar.
AR4IC6ES ) an1 #:
#ote that if the local civil registrar has <nowledge of any legal impediment of the parties or if one is brought to his
<nowledge by anyone, he would just note down the same in the application. owever, if there is a court order
preventing him from issuing it, then, he would not issue it.
Article !". 4he license shall 0e vali1 in an& 3art of the Ahili33ines for a 3erio1 of one h%n1re1 t9ent&
1a&s fro/ the 1ate of iss%e, an1 shall 0e 1ee/e1 a%to/aticall& cancelle1 at the e53iration of sai1
3erio1 if the contracting 3arties have not /a1e %se of it. 4he e53ir& 1ate shall 0e sta/3e1 in 0ol1
characters on the face of ever& license iss%e1.
4f the marriage is solemnized after one hundred twenty 91$%: days from the date of the issuance of such license, the
marriage is void for lac< of a marriage license. 9See +rts. $% and @, 1amily Code:.
The law allows the use of the marriage license anywhere in the Philippines. So, if a marriage license was obtained in
3anila, it can be used in 4locos #orte provided that the 1$%Iday period has not yet lapsed.
1% | P a g e
Article !. Khen either or 0oth of the contracting 3arties are citi@ens of a foreign co%ntr&, it shall 0e
necessar& for the/ 0efore a /arriage license can 0e o0taine1, to s%0/it a certiFcate of legal ca3acit&
to contract /arriage, iss%e1 0& their res3ective 1i3lo/atic or cons%lar oCcials.
Stateless 3ersons or ref%gees fro/ other co%ntries shall in lie% of the certiFcate of legal ca3acit&
herein re2%ire1, s%0/it an aC1avit stating the circ%/stances sho9ing s%ch ca3acit& to contract
/arriage. -JJa,
The reason for the rule is that the capacity of foreigners to marry is determined by their personal law or national
law. The certi7cate will ensure that the foreigner is capacitated to marry.
The rule is that if they are allowed to marry under their national law, the marriage is valid, e6cept 2
1: immoral, bigamous or polygamous marriages>
$: immorally considered incestuous marriages>
a: between ascendants and descendants of any degree, legitimate or illegitimate>
b: collateral line, between brothers and sisters of the full or halfIblood, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate.
4he /arriage is still vali1 even 9itho%t the sai1 certiFcate of legal ca3acit&. This is not one of the
re5uirements of a valid marriage. 4t is a mere added re5uirement before a marriage license is issued.
Fut if it turns out that the foreigner is not really capacitated, then, the marriage is not valid because of lac< of
capacity. + subse5uent issuance of such certi7cate may be an evidence to declare such marriage void.
4f a foreigner is a refugee or a stateless person, then a mere a?davit stating the circumstance of his legal capacity
would be su?cient. The reason for the latter is obvious, as no diplomatic or consular o?cial would issue such
certi7cate.
AR4C6E !.:
The law merely states the contents of the marriage certi7cate.
AR4IC6ES !', !(:
The solemnizing o?cer has to give the parties a copy of the marriage certi7cate. e is re5uired to send a copy of
the certi7cate to the local civil registrar. This is e5uivalent to registration or recording. Fut mere nonIrecording of
the marriage does not ma<e it void. 4t is not one of its essential re5uisites. + copy of the document can be shown to
prove it.
Article !J.
All /arriages sole/ni@e1 o%tsi1e the Ahili33ines in accor1ance 9ith the la9s in force in the co%ntr&
9here the& 9ere sole/ni@e1, an1 vali1 there as s%ch, shall also 0e vali1 in this
co%ntr&, e5ce3t those 3rohi0ite1 %n1er Articles .(-,, -',, -(, an1 -J,, .J, .+ an1 .).
Khere a /arriage 0et9een a 7ili3ino citi@en an1 a foreigner is vali1l& cele0rate1 an1 a 1ivorce is
thereafter vali1l& o0taine1 a0roa1 0& the alien s3o%se ca3acitating hi/ or her to re/arr&, the 7ili3ino
s3o%se shall have ca3acit& to re/arr& %n1er Ahili33ine la9. -As a/en1e1 0& E.O. No. !!+,
R%les on foreign /arriages of 7ili3inos.
4f a marriage is celebrated between 1ilipino citizens in a foreign country and valid there as such, generally, it is valid
in the Philippines. There are however, e6ceptions to the rule as cited in Articles .(-, ', (, an1 J,, .J, .+ an1
.) of the 1amily Code. The secon1 3aragra3h of Article !J of the 1amily Code has cured the injustice under the
old principles in the Civil Code for, while before, if a 1ilipina married a foreigner and the latter obtained a decree of
divorce in his own country, the 1ilipina was still considered married because +rticle 1) of the Civil Code mandated
that she was still married since the law that governed her legal capacity and status was Philippine law. Fut such an
injustice has been cured where the law now allows her to remarry.
Strict a33lication of R%le !J.
The rule as contemplated by the framers of the 1amily Code is that, the marriage must be a mi6ed marriage,
between a foreigner and a 1ilipino in order that +rticle $C, paragraph $ may apply and that it must have been mi6ed
from the very beginning. 4f it was mi6ed after its celebration, the law does not apply. 4t must be noted that despite
such intention of the framers of the 1amily Code, the Supreme Court ruled otherwise in Republic vs. Orbecio III,
Octo0er (, !""( which will be discussed elsewhere. 4t is also a re5uirement that it must have been the foreigner
who obtained a divorce decree. 4f it were the 1ilipino who obtained the divorce decree, the law does not apply.
The rule in paragraph $, +rticle $C could have been precipitated by the doctrine in !an "orn vs. Romillo, G.R.
No. J)'+", Octo0er ), #)(. 4n such case, a 1ilipina got married to a foreigner and obtained a divorce decree
from the courts of the country of her husband. The wife came bac< to the Philippines, engaged in business and
became successful. =ater on, the foreigner came to the Philippines and tried to enforce his rights as a husband, as
administrator of the conjugal partnership and his rights as an heir.
The Supreme Court ruled out his contentions. 4t said that while public policy and our concept of morality abhor
absolute divorce, because of the nationality principle adhered to under +rticle 1) of the Civil Code, nonetheless, the
absolute divorce obtained abroad may be recognized in the Philippines provided it is valid according to his national
law. 9Man ,orn vs. "omillo:. 4n view of this, the Supreme Court said that an +merican national who had divorced his
1ilipina wife cannot justi7ably maintain that, under our laws, the 1ilipina, despite the divorce, has to be considered
still married to him and still subject to a wife8s obligation.
+ 1ilipina should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. She should
not be obliged to live with him, to support him, or to observe respect and 7delity to the e6Ihusband. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to the conjugal properties.
Note, however, that this case is an e5ce3tion to the r%le es3eciall& so that it 9as the 7ili3ino 9ho
co//ence1 the divorce proceedings.
The 1amily Code followed with the conditions that.
91: the marriage must be originally a mi6ed marriage>
11 | P a g e
9$: the divorce must be obtained by the foreigner capacitating himAher to remarry under hisAher national
law. So that if the foreigner obtains that divorce, the 1ilipino is li<ewise capacitated to remarry.
The better situation is that even if the marriage is not originally a mi6ed marriage, both must be
capacitated to remarry in case a divorce is obtained by the foreigner. Fut the remedy is for Congress to do.
4t would seem therefore, that she cannot because +rticle $C9$: of the 1amily Code refers only to mi6ed
marriages. 9JJJJ:
ELect is 7ili3ino o0tains 1ivorce against a foreigner s3o%se.
+s can be clearly gleaned from the law, the e;ects of a foreign divorce are now recognized in the Philippines but
subject to certain conditions. Gne such situation where the e;ects of a foreign divorce were recognized is in Pilapil
vs. Iba#$%omera, et al., G.R. No. )"J, $%ne .", #)#, where it was said that when the foreigner divorced
the 1ilipina, the marital relationship was severed. She can no longer be prosecuted for adultery if she cohabits with
another man. + 1ilipina should not be discriminated against in her own country.
*octrine of lex loci celebrationis.
R and L, both 1ilipino citizens went to ong<ong. They got married there before a lawyer. Knder ong<ong laws the
marriage is valid. Is it also vali1 in the Ahili33ines;
Les, by way of implication from the provision of +rticles $C and @)9$ and @:, 1amily Code. 4f the marriage is valid
where it was celebrated, it shall also be valid in the Philippines. This is not one of the marriages declared void in the
Philippines by law. +uthority to solemnize is only a formal re5uirement that if valid where it was celebrated, it is
valid in the Philippines in view of the doctrine of le1 loci cele"rationis.
+rticle $C, paragraph 1 of the 1amily Code ma<es a crossIreference to +rticles @)91:, 9(:, 9):, 9C:> @C> @-> @*. +ll
these laws refer to void marriages that even if they are valid where they were celebrated, still, they are void in the
Philippines in view of the controlling rule that what determines the status, condition and legal capacity of
1ilipinos is Philippine law. 9+rt. 1), #CC:. 4f the marriage is void because of lac< of legal capacity li<e when the
parties or anyone of them is below 1* years, or if it is bigamous or polygamous, or where there was mista<e in the
identity of a party, or there was no recording of the documents under +rticles )$ and )@ of the 1amily Code> or if
one of the parties is su;ering from /psychological incapacityH> or if the parties are related by blood under +rticle @-,
or what is otherwise <nown as incestuous marriage> or if it is contrary to public policy, the marriage is still void even
if valid where celebrated. This is so because the law that determines their validity is Philippine law which
binds them even though they are living abroad.
4n the case of Republic vs. Crasus &. I#o#, G.R. No. (!(++, Se3te/0er !, !""( Crasus 4yoy and 1ely +da
"osalI4yoy got married in Cebu City. They had 7ve children. 1ely went to the KS+ in 1&*( where after one year, she
sent a letter to her husband re5uesting him to sign the divorce papers. 4n 1&*), she got married to an +merican
citizen. Crasus 7led a complaint to declare their marriage void on the ground of /psychological incapacityH invo<ing
+rticles C*, -% and -$ of the 1amily Code. 4t was also alleged that she got married during the e6istence of their
marriage. 1ely contended that she is no longer governed by Philippine law considering that she was an +merican
citizen as early as 1&**. She alleged that after securing divorce from her husband, she married an +merican citizen
and ac5uired +merican citizenship. ence, she argued that her marriage was valid because now being an +merican
citizen, her status is governed by her present national law.
RU6ING:
+s it is worded, +rticle $C, paragraph $, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couples is a
foreigner who divorces his or her 1ilipino spouse. Fy its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife 1ely because at the time 1ely obtained her divorce, she was
still a 1ilipino citizen. +t the time she 7led for divorce, 1ely was still a 1ilipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in +rticle 1) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, conditions, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws,
then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between 1ilipino spouses. Thus, 1ely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from Crasus.
4n a series of cases, the Supreme Court has e6pressed its pity to couples under certain situations li<e this. 4ts has
always said that while the Court commiserated with respondent Crasus for being continuously shac<led to what is
now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society
can provide the speci7c answer to every individual problem. 9citing Carating?Sia&ngco, '' SCRA '!! M!""'NE
*e1el vs. CA, et al., '! SCRA 'J M!""'NE Santos vs. CA, !'" SCRA !" M##(E:.
4n a span of e6actly two wee<s, the Supreme Court rendered a judgment holding that even if the marriage becomes
mi6ed after the celebration of the marriage, the former 1ilipino citizen divorcing the 1ilipino spouse and getting
married again, the Court ruled that the 1ilipino can get married now. This is the better law although it is
not really in accordance with the intention of the framers of the 1amily Code, for as has been said, the intention of
the law is that, it must have been a mi6ed marriage from the very beginning. The Court gave emphasis to the
principle that the law must be interpreted in accordance with the spirit that gives it life, rather than the letter
that <ills it.
93ao diay nagpasalamat si +tty. sa case nga Grbecido <asi dito na nag change ang concept ng mi6ed marriage
strictly adhered by article $C STS:
Re3%0lic vs. Ci3riano O0reci1o III
G.R. No. ('.)", Octo0er (, !""( O the case 2as !eci!e! this year...ta7e note o the year as attorney might
give a $uestion 2ith a year an! as7, i to give your opinion as legal counsel "ase! on the governing 8urispru!ence,
i the given year is not yet 299: then strict a!herence on the principle o article 2; shoul! "e the ans2er * it shoul!
only "e mi1e! marriage0
1$ | P a g e
7acts:
4n 1&*1, Cipriano and =ady 3iros got married and they were blessed with two children. =ady 3iros and one of her
children went to the KS+, became an +merican citizen. This was later on learned by the husband. Then,
she divorced him. +gain, he learned it from his son. Thereafter, she got married to a certain 4nnocent Standby.
e 7led a petition with the "TC for authority to marry invo<ing paragraph $ of +rticle $C of the 1amily Code. #o
opposition was 7led, hence, the court granted the same. The GS! representing the "epublic 7led a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied, hence a petition for certiorari was 7led with the Supreme Court contending
that paragraph $ of +rticle $C of the 1amily Code is not applicable to Cipriano because it applies only to a valid
mi6ed married, that is a marriage celebrated between a 1ilipino citizen and an alien. Cipriano on the other hand,
contended and admitted that the law is not directly applicable to his case but insisted that when his naturalized
wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated by operation of law to remarry, then, he should li<ewise be
capacitated
to remarry. The novel issue which is of 7rst impression is that, given a valid marriage between two 1ilipino citizens,
where one party is naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to reI
marry, can the 1ilipino spouse li<ewise reImarry under Philippine lawJ
8el1.
Les. Paragraph $ of +rticle $C of the 1amily Code should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were 1ilipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The 1ilipino spouse should li<ewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. 0here the interpretation of statute according to its e6act and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to
its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. + statute may therefore be e6tended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
4f we are to give meaning to legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the 1ilipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the 1ilipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph $ of +rticle $C of the 1amily
Code.
4n order, however that the law may apply, the following re5uirements must be met, thus.
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a 1ilipino citizen and a foreigner> and
$. + valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to reImarry.
4he recIoning 3oint is not the citi@enshi3 of the 3arties at the ti/e of the cele0ration of the /arriage,
0%t their citi@enshi3 at the ti/e a vali1 1ivorce is o0taine1 a0roa1 0& the alien s3o%se ca3acitating the
latter to re?/arr&.
4n order that the 1ilipino may reImarry, it is necessary that the naturalization of his wife be proven. =i<ewise, before
a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. -Garcia vs. Recio, .JJ SCRA '.+ M!""N,.
Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot ta<e judicial notice of foreign laws. =i<e any other fact,
such laws must be alleged and proved. 1urthermore, it must also be shown that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to reImarry as speci7cally re5uired in +rticle $C, otherwise, there would be no evidence su?cient
to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
EPEMA4E* MARRIAGES AR4IC6E !+?.':
4AHE NO4E:
Article .! of the 7a/il& Co1e a%thori@es a /ilitar& co//an1er 9ho is a co//issione1 oCcer to
3erfor/ the /arriage of an&one 9ithin the area of /ilitar& o3eration if it is %n1er articulo mortis. Fut
let us say that R, a member of the armed forces was injured in an area of military operation, for instance, 3indanao.
e was airlifted to 3anila where he was con7ned at the Philippine !eneral ospital. +t one point in time, he was at
the point of death. Can a military commander solemnize his marriage with L, his girlfriend
without a marriage licenseJ The answer is no because the law contemplates of a situation where the marriage must
be solemnized in the zone of military operation. Such commander does not have the authority outside of it,
especially so that such authority is granted to him only under e6traordinary circumstances. The marriage is void for
lac< of a marriage license. Fut suppose it was the mayor of the City of 3anila who solemnized the marriage of R
and L, then the marriage is valid, but this time Article !+ of the 7a/il& Co1e a33lies, not Article .!.
Article !+ of the 7a/il& Co1e spea<s of a marriage in articulo mortis or at the point of death. 4f one or both
contracting parties are at the point of death, there is no need for a marriage license. The reason is obvious. 4f there
is a need for the license, then, they have yet to apply for the same, have it published for ten 91%: days, etc.
ow can they do these things when they are, or one of them, is at the point of deathJ
Article .. of the 7a/il& Co1e ma<es valid a marriage of 3uslims or members of ethnic cultural minorities even
without a marriage license provided that the ceremony is in accordance with their customs, rites and practices. 4f
the marriage is between two 9$: 3uslims who are residents of 3anila and solemnized by a judge of 3anila in
accordance with Christian rites and practices, there is a need for a marriage license, otherwise it is void. This is so
because the
condition for the validity of such a marriage without a license is that the same must be solemnized in accordance
with their customs, rites and practices.
Article .' of the 7a/il& Co1e dispenses with the re5uirement of a marriage license where the parties have been
living together as husband and wife without the bene7t of marriage for a period of 7ve 9): years or even more. 4t
further re5uires that there must be no legal impediment to marry one another during such coverture.
4n lieu of the license, an a?davit stating that they have been living together for more than ) years and without any
legal impediment to marry one another is su?cient. This 7veIyear period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a cohabitation characterized by e6clusivity 2 meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 7ve years and continuity 2 that is %n0roIen.
1@ | P a g e
6egal RatiFcation of Coha0itation.
4n order that there may be legal rati7cation of marital cohabitation the following re5uisites must concur.
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least 7ve years before the
marriage>
$. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other>
@. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage>
(. The parties must e6ecute an a?davit stating that they have lived together for at least 7ve years>
). The solemnizing o?cer must e6ecute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the 5uali7cations of the parties
and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. 9ForjaI3anzano vs. 'udge Sanchez, +.3. #o. 3T'I
%%I1@$&, 3arch *, $%%1, @)( SC"+1:.
<oi1 an1 <oi1a0le Marriages
Article .(. 4he follo9ing /arriages shall 0e voi1 fro/ the 0eginning:
-, 4hose contracte1 0& an& 3art& 0elo9 eighteen &ears of age even 9ith the consent of 3arents or
g%ar1iansE
-!, 4hose sole/ni@e1 0& an& 3erson not legall& a%thori@e1 to 3erfor/ /arriages %nless s%ch
/arriages 9ere contracte1 9ith either or 0oth 3arties 0elieving in goo1 faith that the sole/ni@ing
oCcer ha1 the legal a%thorit& to 1o soE
-., 4hose sole/ni@e1 9itho%t a license, e5ce3t those covere1 0& the 3rece1ing cha3terE
-', 4hose 0iga/o%s or 3ol&ga/o%s /arriages not falling %n1er Article 'E
-(, 4hose contracte1 thro%gh /istaIe of one contracting 3art& as to the i1entit& of the otherE
-J, 4hose s%0se2%ent /arriages that are voi1 %n1er Article (.
Art. (.. Bither of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the re5uirements of the immediately
preceding +rticle> otherwise, the subse5uent marriage shall be null and void.
S%0se2%ent /arriage %n1er Article (.
The law ma<es reference to a situation where there was annulment or a declaration of nullity of marriage. The law
re5uires that these documents, together with the document delivering the 3res%/3tive legiti/e of the
co/3%lsor& heirs of the 3arties, 0e registere1 in the 3ro3er civil registr& or registr& of 3ro3ert&. 4f they
faile1 to co/3l& 9ith this re2%ire/ent an1 one or 0oth of the/ contracte1 a s%0se2%ent /arriage, the
sa/e is voi1. 9See Arts. (! an1 (., 7a/il& Co1e:. 'ven i( t)e marriage mentione above is celebrate
abroa an vali t)ere as suc), it is voi in t)e P)ilippines. -Arts. (, Ne9 Civil Co1eE !J M3ar. N,
7a/il& Co1e,.
9(: MistaIe in the i1entit& of the 3art&
4f a marriage is contracted through mista<e of one of the contracting parties as to the identity of the other, the
same is void. The reason is that, it is as if the party who committed that mista<e in the identity of the other did not
give hisAher consent. This marriage used to be only voidable under the Civil Code, but it has been made void by the
1amily Code.
MG.R. No. .!'(. $an%ar& .", !""!N MIGUE6 HA4IAUNAN vs HA4IAUNAN
e averred that his brother 3iguel, +tty. Falguma and 4nocencio Maldez 9defendants therein, now petitioners:
convinced him to wor< abroad. The circumstances surrounding the e6ecution of the contract manifest a vitiated
consent on the part of respondent. Kndue inNuence was e6erted upon him by his brother 3iguel and 4nocencio
Maldez 9petitioners: and +tty. Falguma.
8E6*:
+rticle $( of the Civil Code enjoins courts to be vigilant for the protection of a party to a contract who is placed at a
disadvantage on account of his ignorance, mental wea<ness or other handicap, li<e respondent herein. 0e give
substance to this mandate.
IIIIIII
T'N'*RO !% CA
Civil &a+ , -amil# Coe , *igam# , 'xists even i( one marriage is eclare voi
+ncajas thereafter 7led a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Millegas countered that his marriage with
Millareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. e further argued that his second marriage,
with +ncajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. ence he cannot be charged for
bigamy.
8E6*: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the 7rst marriage. +s a second or subse5uent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of petitioner8s valid marriage to Millareyes, petitioner8s marriage to +ncajas would
be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner8s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not
per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, +rticle @(& of the "evised Penal
Code criminalizes /any person who shall contract a second or subse5uent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedingsH.
Republic vs. "a#ot GR No. ./001., Marc) 21, 2331
ISSUE: 0hether or not 'ose8s marriage with 1elisa is valid considering that they e6ecuted a sworn a?davit in lieu of
the marriage license re5uirement.
8E6*: 'ose and 1elisa started living together only in 'une 1&*C, or barely 7ve months before the celebration of
their marriage on #ovember 1&*C.
A::AS <S A::AS

7AC4S
Petitioner Syed +zhar +bbas 9Syed: see<s annulment of his marriage to !loria !ooI+bbas 9!loria:, alleging the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in +rt. (, 1amily Code, as a ground. 4n the 3arriage Contract of !loria
1( | P a g e
and Syed, it is stated that 3= &&C&&C-, issued at Carmona, Cavite, was presented to the solemnizing o?cer. +t the
trial court, Syed, a Pa<istani citizen, testi7ed that he met !loria in Taiwan and married her there, and arrived in the
Philippines, where his motherIinIlaw entered him into a ceremony which he claimed that he did not <now was a
marriage until !loria told him later. e further testi7ed that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. The record in the 3C"of Carmona certi7es that
&&C&&C- was the number of another marriage license issued to another couple. Thus, the Pasay City "TC held that
no valid marriage license was issued
8E6*:
The case of S%san Nic1ao CariDo vs. S%san Yee CariDo !" #o. 1@$)$& 1ebruary $, $%%1 further held that the
presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party
alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the re5uired marriage license had been
secured. !loria has failed to discharge that burden. All the evi!ence cite! "y the CA to sho2 that a 2e!!ing
ceremony 2as con!ucte! an! a marriage contract 2as signe! !oes not operate to cure the a"sence o a vali!
marriage license. +rticle ( of the 1amily Code is clear.+s the marriage license, a formal re5uisite, is clearly absent,
the marriage of !loria and Syed is void ab initio.
S%san Nic1ao CariDo vs. S%san Yee CariDo GR No. .!(!# 7e0r%ar& !, !""

7AC4S:
SPG( Santiago C+riUo married petitioner Susan #icdao on 'une $%, 1&C&, with whom he had two children,
Sahlee and Sandee. Gn #ovember 1%, 1&*$, SPG( CariUo also married respondent Susan Lee. 4n 1&**, SPG(
CariUo became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on #ovember $@, 1&&$, under the care of
Susan Lee who spent for his medical and burial e6penses. Foth Susans 7led claims for monetary bene7ts and
7nancial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. #icdao was able to collect
P1(C,%%% from 3F+4, PCCM4, commutation, #+PG=CG3 and PagIibig, while Lee received a total of P$1,%%% from !S4S
burial and SSS burial insurance.
Gn ,ecember 1(, 1&&@, Lee 7led for collection of money against #4cdao, praying that #icdao be ordered
to return to her at least oneIhalf of the P1(C,%%% #4cdao had collected. 1or failing to 7le her answer, #4cdao was
declared in default.
Lee admitted that her marriage to the deceased too< place during the subsistence of and without 7rst
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between #icdao and CariUo. Fut she claimed good faith,
having no <nowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met #icdao who introduced herself as
the wife of the deceased. Lee submitted that CariUo8s marriage to #icdao was void because it was solemnized
without the re5uired marriage license.
ISSUES: 91: 0hether or not the subse5uent marriage is null and void>
9$: 0hether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death bene7ts from
government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.
8E6*:
Knder +rticle (% of the 1amily Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invo<ed for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a 7nal judgment declaring such marriage void. 3eaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invo<ed for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal in7rmity, is a 7nal judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. owever, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. 1or other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to 5uestion the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case.
Knder the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was
solemnized in 1&C&, a valid marriage license is a re5uisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain
e6ceptions, renders the marriage void a" initio.
4t does not follow, however, that since the marriage of #icdao and the deceased was void a" initio, the
death bene7ts would now be awarded to Lee. To reiterate, under +rticle (% of the 1amily Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage> otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Gne of the e;ects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses
according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void a" initio, the applicable
property regime would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the
provisions of +rticles 1(- and 1(* of the 1amily Code, on Property "egime of Knions 0ithout 3arriage.
Cha3ter +. Aro3ert& Regi/e of Unions Kitho%t Marriage
Art. '+. 0hen a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live e6clusively with each other as
husband and wife without the bene7t of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in e5ual shares and the property ac5uired by both of them through their wor< or industry shall be governed
by the rules on coIownership.
4n the absence of proof to the contrary, properties ac5uired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint e;orts, wor< or industry, and shall be owned by them in e5ual shares. 1or purposes of
this +rticle, a party who did not participate in the ac5uisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the ac5uisition thereof if the formerPs e;orts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family and of the household.
#either party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property ac5uired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
0hen only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coI
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. 4n case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. 4n
the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. 4n all cases, the forfeiture shall ta<e
place upon termination of the cohabitation. 91((a:
1) | P a g e
Art. '). 4n cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding +rticle, only the properties ac5uired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. 4n the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be e5ual. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
4f one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coIownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership e6isting in such valid marriage. 4f the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
+rticle.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall li<ewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. 91((a:
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
AERI*O vs AERI*O March !, #+( O
ISSUEQs an1 RU6ING:
1. Are the ( chil1ren of 6%cio Aeri1o to Marcelina :alig%at legiti/ate; LBS because.
there was su?cient evidence that =ucio8s 7rst wife died before he married 3arcelina and the presumption that
persons living together husband
a. and wife are married to each other specially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, and may overcome
only by convincing proof on the part alleging that it is illegitimate.
*E6A ROSA vs 8EIRS O7 <IU*A *AMIAN
Gn 3ay *, 1&-), =uisa ,elgado, Mda. ,e ,anao 7led a Petition for =etters of +dministration of the intestate estate of
the deceased spouses 'osefa ,elgado, who died on September *, 1&-$, and ,r. !uillermo "ustia who died on
1ebruary $*, 1&-(. 0ith the permission of the trial court, !uillerma S. "ustiaI9+laras: was allowed to intervene in
the proceedings upon her assertion of the status of an ac<nowledged natural child, and thus, the only surviving
child and sole heir, of ,r. !uillermo '. "ustia. Gn +pril @, 1&-*, =uisa ,elgado 7led an +mended Petition for =atters of
+dministration, this time alleging that the deceased 'osefa ,elgado and !uillermo "ustia had been living
continuously as husband and wife, but without the bene7t of marriage.

ISSUES:
4n the ensuing proceedings, the parties presented their respective evidence upon the following issues, as
enumerated by the estate court.
1. 0hether or not the deceased 'osefa ,elgado was legally married to ,r. !uillermo "ustia>
$. 4n the negative, whether or not the petitioner and the other claimants to the estate of the late 'osefa ,elgado are
entitled to her estate, if any>
@. 0hether or not the intervenor was ac<nowledged as a natural or illegitimate child by the deceased ,r. !uillerma
"ustia in his lifetime>
(. 0hether or not the oppositor !uillerma "ustia has any right or interest in the estate in controversy>
). 0hether or not the estate of 'osefa ,elgado was legally settled> and
C. 0ho is entitled to the estate8s administrationJ
D1E
B=,.
1I #o, they were not legally married.
As for the stat%s of G%iller/a R%stia?Alaras as an acIno9le1ge1 chil1 of *r. G%iller/o R%stia, Article
+(, in conB%nction 9ith Article +. an1 +! of the 7a/il& Co1e 3rovi1es for the /eans for 3roving
Fliation.
+rt. 1-). 4llegitimate children may establish their illegitimate 7liation in the same way and on the same, evidence
as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period speci7ed in +rticle 1-@, e6cept when the action is based on the
second paragraph of 1-$, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent
Art. +!. The 7liation of legitimate children is established by any of the following.
91: The record of birth appearing, in the civil register or a 7nal judgment> or
9$: +n admission of legitimate 7liation is a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
4n the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate 7liation shall be proved by.
91: The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child> or
9$: +ny other means allowed by the "ules of Court and special laws. 9$C)a, $CCa, $C-a:
666
Art. +.. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. 4n these cases, the heirs shall
have a period of 7ve years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
9$*Ca:
The cases relied upon in the trial court8s decision, pointing to a child8s action for establishing 7liation even beyond
the putative parent8s death are modi7ed by the enactment of the aboveIcited provisions of the 1amily Code, which
cite de7nite periods within which such actions must be interposed. The ac<nowledgment of !uillerma +laras as an
ac<nowledged 9illegitimate: child of ,r. !uillermo "ustia, represents a crucial bar in the claim of the private
respondents, as under +rticles &**
D1@E
and 1%%@
D1(E
of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. +.('", $an%ar& !!, !"'
AEREGRINA MACUA <*A. *E A<ENI*O, 6etitioner, v. 4EC6A 8OY:IA A<ENI*O,
1C | P a g e
T)e -acts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now
deceased.
"espondent Tecla oybia +venido 9Tecla: instituted on 11 #ovember 1&&*, a Complaint for ,eclaration of #ullity of
3arriage against Peregrina 3acua Mda. de +venido 9Peregrina: on the ground that she 9Tecla:, is the lawful wife of
the deceased Busta5uio +venido 9Busta5uio:. 4n her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Busta5uio was
solemnized on @% September 1&($ in Talibon, Fohol in rites o?ciated by the Parish Priest of the said town.
+ccording to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a 3arriage Certi7cate recorded with the G?ce of the
=ocal Civil "egistrar 9=C": of Talibon, Fohol. owever, due to 0orld 0ar 44, records were destroyed. Thus, only a
Certi7cation
@
was issued by the =C".
4n 1&-&, Tecla learned that her husband Busta5uio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous I an action she sought to protect the rights
of her children over the properties ac5uired by Busta5uio.
Perigrina was married to the decedent year 1&-&, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case
was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of
Busta5uio> hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney8s fees.
8E6*: 4n the present case, due e6ecution was established by the testimonies of +dela Pilapil, who was present
during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subse5uent loss was shown by
the testimony and the a?davit of the o?ciating priest, 3onsignor Lllana, as relevant, competent and admissible
evidence. Since the due e6ecution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidenceItestimonial and documentaryImay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The marriage between petitioner Peregrina 3acua +venido and the deceased Busta5uio +venido is hereby
declared NU66 and <OI*.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTT
G.R. No. !""J $%l& ., !".
SA66Y GO?:ANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. :EN$AMIN :ANGAYAN, $R
7AC4S:
Gn 1) 3arch $%%(, Fenjamin Fangayan, 'r. 9Fenjamin: 7led a petition for declaration of a nonIe6istent marriage
andAor declaration of nullity of marriage before "TC. . Fenjamin alleged that on 1% September 1&-@, he married
+zucena +legre 9+zucena: in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, "izalyn, Bmmamylin, and Fenjamin 444.
4n 1&-&, Fenjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally !oFangayan. 4n ,ecember 1&*1, +zucena left for
the Knited States of +merica. 4n 1ebruary 1&*$, Fenjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Fenjamin
and Sally8s cohabitation produced two children, Fernice and Fentley. The relationship of Fenjamin and Sally ended
in 1&&( when Sally left for Canada, bringing Fernice and Fentley with her. She then 7led criminal actions for bigamy
and falsi7cation of public documents against Fenjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Fenjamin, in turn, 7led a petition for declaration of a nonIe6istent marriage andAor declaration of nullity of marriage
before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lac<ed the formal re5uisites
to a valid marriage. Fenjamin also as<ed the trial court for the partition of the properties he ac5uired with Sally in
accordance with +rticle 1(* of the 1amily Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties. Sally was
the one who initiated for their marriage and assured Fenjamin that it will not come out <nowingly that there was a
prior marriage of Fenjamin.
8E6*:
The certi7cation from the local civil registrar is ade5uate to prove the nonIissuance of a marriage license and
absent any suspicious circumstance> the certi7cation enjoys probative value, being issued by the o?cer charged
under the law to <eep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
11
Clearly, if indeed
Fenjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lac< of a
marriage license. The fact that Fenjamin was the informant in the birth certi7cates of Fernice and Fentley was not a
proof of the marriage between Fenjamin and Sally. The marriage between Fenjamin and Sally is null and void ab
initio, and, at the same time, nonIe6istent. Knder +rticle @) of the 1amily Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, e6cept those covered by +rticle @( where no license is necessary, Vshall be void from the beginning.V 4n this
case, the marriage between Fenjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license.
+pplying the general rules on void or ine6istent contracts under Article '"# of the Civil Co1e, contracts which
are absolutely simulated or 7ctitious are Vine6istent and void from the beginning.
On 9hether or not the 3artiesG /arriage is 0iga/o%s %n1er the conce3t of Article .'# of the Revise1
Aenal Co1e, the /arriage is not 0iga/o%s
4t is re5uired that the 7rst or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to +zucena
shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity
or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. owever, if the second marriage was void not because of the
e6istence of the 7rst marriage but for other causes such as lac< of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
9hala mao baJJJ:
7or 0iga/& to e5ist, the secon1 or s%0se2%ent /arriage /%st have all the essential re2%isites for
vali1it& e5ce3t for the e5istence of a 3rior /arriage.

9ah 4 seeWWWW: 4n this case, there was really no subse5uent
marriage. Fenjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the #ational Statistics G?ce. In short, the /arriage
0et9een :enBa/in an1 Sall& 1i1 not e5ist. 4he& live1 together an1 re3resente1 the/selves as
h%s0an1 an1 9ife 9itho%t the 0eneFt of /arriage.
Aro3ert& relations of :enBa/in an1 Sall& is governe1 0& Article ') of the 7a/il& Co1e 9hich states:
1- | P a g e
Art. '). 4n cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding +rticle, only the properties ac5uired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. 4n the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be e5ual. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
4f one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coIownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership e6isting in such valid marriage. 4f the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
+rticle.
XXXXXThe foregoing rules on forfeiture shall li<ewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Fenjamin and Sally cohabitated without the bene7t of marriage. Thus, only the properties ac5uired by them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions.
TTTTTTTTTTT
NO66ORA <S REAU:6IC
+ 3uslim man claiming that he can marry more than one for it is allowed under 3uslim custom and religion.
ISSUE:
0hether or not the second marriage is bigamousJ
RU6ING:
Les, the marriage between the #ollora and !eraldino is bigamous under +rticle @(& of the "evised Penal Code, and
as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under +rticle @) of the 1amily Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case. that 1: +tilano is legally married to 'esusa> $: that
their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage> @:that +tilano admitted the
e6istence of his second marriage to "owena> and (: the second marriage has all the essential re5uisites for validity
e6cept for the lac< of capacity of +tilano due to his prior marriage.
Fefore the trial and appellate courts, +tilano put up his 3uslim religion as his sole defense. !ranting arguendo that
he is indeed of 3uslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, he cannot deny that both marriage
ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with +rticles 1(, 1), 1- up to $% of the Code of 3uslim Personal
=aws
4n +rticle 1@ 9$: of the Code of 3uslim Personal =aws states that any marriage between a 3uslim and a nonI3uslim
solemnized not in accordance with the 3uslim law, hence the 1amily Code of the Philippines shall apply. #olloraPs
religious a?liation or his claim that his marriages were solemnized according to 3uslim law. Thus, regardless of his
professed religion, he cannot claim e6emption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
is second marriage did not comply with the +rticle $- of the 3uslim Personal =aws of the Philippines providing.
VD#Eo 3uslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in e5ual companionship and just
treatment as enjoined by 4slamic =aw and only in e6ceptional cases.V Only 2ith the permission o the Shari<a Circuit
Court can a )uslim "e permitte! to have a secon!, thir! or ourth 2ie. The cler7 o court shall serve a copy to the
2ie or 2ives, an! shoul! any o them o"8ects, an Agama Ar"itration Council shall "e constitute!. 4f the said council
fails to secure the wifePs consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall subject to +rticle $-, decide whether on
not to sustain her objection 9+rt. 1C$, 3uslim Personal =aws:
+tilano asserted in his marriage certi7cate with "owena that his civil status is Vsingle.V Foth of his marriage
contracts do not state that he is a 3uslim. +lthough the truth or falsehood of the declaration of onePs religion in the
marriage is not an essential re5uirement for marriage, his omissions are su?cient proofs of his liability for bigamy.
is false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
4t is not for him to interpret the ShariPa law, and in apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, he recelebrated
their marriage in accordance with the 3uslim rites. owever, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has
already been violated.
TTTTTTTTTTTTT
>AMORANOS <S AEOA6E
7AC4S:
Gn 3ay @, 1&*$, Yamoranos wed 'esus de !uzman, a 3uslim convert, in 4slamic rites. Prior thereto, Yamoranos was
a "oman Catholic who had converted to 4slam on +pril $*, 1&*$. Subse5uently, on 'uly @%, 1&*$, the two wed again,
this time, in civil rites before 'udge Perfecto =aguio 9=aguio: of the "TC, Zuezon City.
+ little after a year, on ,ecember 1*, 1&*@, Yamoranos and ,e !uzman obtained a divorce by tala5. The court held
that after evaluating the testimonies of the parties, it is fully convinced that both the complainant and the
respondent have been duly converted to the faith of 4slam prior to their 3uslim wedding and 7nding that there is no
more possibility of reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce. Conse5uently, the
marriage between 3arietta 93ariam: ,. Yamoranos de !uzman and 'esus 93ohamad: de !uzman was dissolved by
the Shari8a Circuit ,istrict Court in 4sabela, Fasilan. Yamoranos married anew on ,ecember $%, 1&*&. +s she had
previously done in her 7rst nuptial to ,e !uzman, Yamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. 9Pacasum:, her
subordinate at the Fureau of Customs where she wor<ed, under 4slamic rites and in order to strengthen the ties of
their marriage, Yamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony. Yamoranos and Pacasum
were then de facto separated. Pacasum 7led cases for the annulment of their marriage, criminal case for bigamy
and an administrative case for disbarment against Yamoranos. Pacasum contracted a second marriage.
8E6*:
The "egional Trial Courts are vested the e6clusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
e6clusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. DSec. $% 9b:, FP Flg. 1$&E The Code of 3uslim Personal
=aws 9P, 1%*@: created the Sharia ,istrict Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. #either court
1* | P a g e
was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the "evised Penal Code. There is nothing in P,
1%*@ that divested the "egional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. ence, this Court
has jurisdiction over this case. The subject matter of the o;ense of Figamy dwells on the accused contracting a
second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. +t the very least, the "TC, Franch
C, 4ligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Yamoranos and ,e
!uzman8s marriage before the Shari8a Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved
despite the divorce by tala5 entered into by Yamoranos and ,e !uzman.
Trying Yamoranos for Figamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the o;ense defeats
the purpose for the enactment of the Code of 3uslim Personal =aws and the e5ual recognition bestowed by the
State on 3uslim 1ilipinos.
4f both parties are 3uslims, there is a presumption that the 3uslim Code or 3uslim law is complied with. 4f together
with it or in addition to it, the marriage is li<ewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in
a soIcalled combined 3uslimICivil marriage rites whichever comes 7rst is the validating rite and the second rite is
merely ceremonial one. Fut, in this case, as long as both parties are 3uslims, this 3uslim Code will apply.
Gne of the e;ects of irrevocable tala5, as well as other <inds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond,
entitling one to remarry.4t stands to reason therefore that Yamoranos8 divorce from ,e !uzman, as con7rmed by an
Kstadz and 'udge 'ainul of the Shari8a Circuit Court, and attested to by 'udge Ksman, was valid, and, thus, entitled
her to remarry Pacasum in 1&*&. Conse5uently, the "TC, Franch C, 4ligan City, is without jurisdiction to try
Yamoranos for the crime of Figamy.
TTTTTTTTTTTTT
Morigo vs. People
GR No. .40225, -ebruar# 5, 2334
7AC4S:
=ucio 3origo and =ucia Farrete were boardmates in Fohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card
from Farrete and various e6changes of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1&&%. Farrete went
bac< to Canada for wor< and in 1&&1 she 7led petition for divorce in Gntario Canada, which was granted. 4n 1&&$,
3origo married =umbago. e subse5uently 7led a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that
there was no marriage ceremony. 3origo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of
arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial 5uestion in the bigamy case. 3origo pleaded not guilty
claiming that his marriage with Farrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in
good faith.
ISSUE: 0hether 3origo must have 7led declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Farrete before his second
marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
8E6*:
3origo8s marriage with Farrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between them by a solemnizing o?cer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does
not need to 7le declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with =umbago.
ence, he did not commit bigamy and is ac5uitted in the case 7led.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from )erca!o v. Tan.
D$)E
4n the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the 7rst marriage was li<ewise obtained ater the second marriage was already celebrated.
0e held therein that.
A 8u!icial !eclaration o nullity o a previous marriage is necessary "eore a su"se$uent one can "e legally
contracte!. One 2ho enters into a su"se$uent marriage 2ithout =rst o"taining such 8u!icial !eclaration is guilty o
"igamy. This principle applies even i the earlier union is characterize! "y statutes as voi!.>
?2;@
4t bears stressing though that in )erca!o, the 7rst marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice. 7rst
before a judge where a marriage certi7cate was duly issued and then again si6 months later before a priest in
religious rites. Gstensibly, at least, the 7rst marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void a"
initio.
4n the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all 2as perorme! "y a !uly authorize! solemnizing o%cer.
Petitioner and =ucia Farrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. 4he /ere 3rivate act of signing a
/arriage contract 0ears no se/0lance to a vali1 /arriage an1 th%s, nee1s no B%1icial 1eclaration of
n%llit&. 9 ah diayJJJWWW: Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage
for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he 7rst secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subse5uent marriage.
TTTTTTTTTT
$ARI66O <S AEOA6E:
+ woman contracted two marriages. The 7rst 1&-(, then later on a civil case was 7led by the second husband for
allegedly being Figamous. The woman 7led a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground for lac< of marriage
license. Fut the judgment declared the marriage void for the 7rst husband then was psychologically incapacitated.

8E6*:
Petitioner8s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be a?rmed. The subse5uent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioner8s two marriages to +locillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment
petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the
crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
petitioner8s marriage to +locillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent second
marriage, petitioner8s marriage to +locillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. #either would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner8s
marriage to jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
1& | P a g e
G.R. No. #)+)" Octo0er J, !". REAU:6IC O7 48E A8I6IAAINES, Petitioner, vs. 6I:ER4Y *. A6:IOS,
4he facts
Gn Gctober $$, $%%(, 1ringer, an +merican citizen, and +lbios were married before 'udge Gfelia 4. Calo of the
3etropolitan Trial Court, Franch)&, 3andaluyong City 93eTC:, as evidenced by a Certi7cate of 3arriage with
"egister #o. $%%(I1)**. 1ringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived
as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio. She contracted 1ringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to ac5uire +merican citizenship> that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of [$,%%%.%%> that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways> that 1ringer returned to the Knited States and never again communicated with her> and that, in
turn, she did not pay him the [$,%%%.%% because he never processed her petition for citizenship.
RU6ING:
Res3on1entGs /arriage not voi1.
Consent was not lac<ing between +lbios and 1ringer. 4n fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent.
"espondent claimed that their marriage is marriage in jest cannot be given due merit. 3arriages in jest are void ab
initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no
genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent8s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. +lbios and 1ringer had an undeniable
intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to ac5uire +merican
citizenship. Gnly a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only
a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter
into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. !enuine consent was,
therefore, clearly present.
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or
law declares, such as the ac5uisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
re5uisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid.
+lthough the Court views with disdain the respondent8s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, 4t cannot
declare the marriage void. ence, though the respondent8s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for
the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
#either can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under +rticle () 9@: of the 1amily Code.
Gnly the circumstances listed under +rticle (C of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, -, nonI disclosure
of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude> -!, concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man>
-., concealment of a se6ually transmitted disease> and -', concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or
homose6uality. #o other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage.
Bntering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not 5ualify under any of the listed
circumstances. 1urthermore, under Article '+ -.:, the gro%n1 of fra%1 /a& onl& 0e 0ro%ght 0& the inB%re1
or innocent 3art&. 4n the present case, there is no injured party because +lbios and 1ringer both conspired to
enter into the sham marriage.
These unscrupulous iniviuals cannot "e allo2e! to use the courts as instruments in their rau!ulent schemes.
Al"ios alrea!y misuse! a 8u!icial institution to enter into a marriage o convenienceA she shoul! not "e allo2e! to
again a"use it to get hersel out o an inconvenient situation.
#o less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.

#t must, thereore, "e saeguar!e! rom the 2hims an! caprices o the
contracting parties.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTT
A0la@a v. Re3%0lic, G. R. ()!#), A%g%st , !"" 9 importante ang date of <asal <ung unsa law ang mu
govern <ung pede ba ma<a 7le mas<i dili asawa\e6clusive ang daan nga law while amendment sa 1C pede na
mas<i <insa as in the ruling of #4#+= vs F+,+LG! case: STS
7AC4S. Gn Gctober 1-, $%%%, the petitioner 7led in the "TC 3asbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage contracted on ,ecember $C, 1&(& between his late brother + and F.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between + and F had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to
such license being issued only on 'anuary &, 1&)%, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license.
ISSUE. 0hether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the G=, Civil CodeJ
RU6ING. LBS. Fefore anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of +dministrative
3atter 9+.3.: #o. %$I11I1%ISC 9"ule on ,eclaration of +bsolute #ullity of Moid 3arriages and +nnulment of Moidable
3arriages:, which too< e;ect on 3arch 1), $%%@.
Section $, paragraph 9a:, of +.3. #o. %$I11I1%ISC e6plicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be 7led solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line
to distinguish between marriages covered by the 1amily Code and those solemnized under the regime of the
CivilCode. Speci7cally, +.3. #o. %$I11I1%ISC e6tends only to marriages covered by the 1amily Code, which
too< e;ect on +ugust @, 1&**, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is con7ned only to
proceedings commenced after 3arch 1), $%%@.
Fased on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are e6cepted
from the limitation, to wit.
$% | P a g e
Those commenced before 3arch 1), $%%@, the e;ectivity date of +.3. #o. %$I11I1%ISC> and
Those 7led visI]Ivis marriages celebrated during the e;ectivity ofthe Civil Code and, those celebrated under the
regime of the 1amily Code prior to 3arch 1), $%%@.
Considering that the marriage between + and F was contracted on ,ecember $C, 1&(&, the applicable law was the
old Civil Code, the law in e;ect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. ence, the rule on the e6clusivity of
the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under
+.3. #o. %$I11I1%ISC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
TTTTTTTTT
G.R. No. !"!.+" Se3te/0er !., !". $UAN SE<I66A SA6AS, $R., Petitioner, vs. E*EN <I66ENA
AGUI6A, "espondent
4he 7acts
Gn - September 1&*), petitioner 'uan Sevilla Salas, 'r. 9Salas: and respondent Bden Millena +guila 9+guila: were
married. 1ive months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with +guila or
their daughter. Gn - Gctober $%%@, +guila 7led a Petition for ,eclaration of #ullity of 3arriage 9petition: citing
psychological incapacity under +rticle @C of the 1amily Code. The "TC found that the ,iscovered Properties are
among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed between Salas and +guila. owever, the "TC held
that Salas failed to prove the e6istence of the 0aived Properties.
Gn 11 #ovember $%%*, "ubina 7led a ComplaintIinI4ntervention, claiming that. 91: she is "ubina Cortez, a widow
and unmarried to Salas> 9$: the ,iscovered Properties are her paraphernal properties> 9@: Salas did not contribute
money to purchase the ,iscovered Properties as he had no permanent job in 'apan> 9(: the "TC did not ac5uire
jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in the case> and 9): she authorized her brother to purchase the
,iscovered Properties but because he was not wellIversed with legal documentation, he registered the properties in
the name of V'uan S. Salas, married to "ubina C. Salas.V 4n a "esolution dated $* 'une $%1$,

the C+ denied the
3otion for "econsideration

7led by Salas. ence, this petition
ISSUE:
0G# The Court of +ppeals erred in a?rming the trial court8s decision in not allowing "ubina C. Cortez to intervene
in this case
8E6*:
The petition lac<s merit.
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division of the property, unless
it 7rst ma<es a determination as to the e6istence of a coIownership. Fasic is the rule that the party ma<ing an
allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence.

Salas alleged that contrary to
+guila8s petition stating that they had no conjugal property, they actually ac5uired the 0aived Properties during
their marriage. owever, the "TC found, and the C+ a?rmed, that Salas failed to prove the e6istence and
ac5uisition of the 0aived Properties during their marriage.
Gn the other hand, +guila proved that the ,iscovered Properties were ac5uired by Salas during their marriage. Foth
the "TC and the C+ agreed that the ,iscovered Properties registered in Salas8 name were ac5uired during his
marriage with +guila.
On 0oth Salas an1 R%0inaGs contention that R%0ina o9ns the *iscovere1 Aro3erties, 9e liIe9ise Fn1
the contention %n/eritorio%s.
The TCTs state that V'uan S. Salas, married to "ubina C. SalasV is the registered owner of the ,iscovered Properties.
+ Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong
presumption that it is valid and regularly issued.
$)
The phrase Vmarried toV is merely descriptive of the civil status of
the registered owner. Considering that "ubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the ,iscovered
Properties, she has no right to intervene in this case. The "ules of Court provide that only Va person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely a;ected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an o?cer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
4n ,iUo v. ,iUo,we held that +rticle 1(- of the 1amily Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared
void under +rticle @C of the 1amily Code, as in this case. +rticle1(- of the 1amily Code provides.
AR4. '+. 0hen a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live e6clusively with each other as
husband and wife without the bene7t of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in e5ual shares and the property ac5uired by both of them through their wor< or industry shall be governed
by the rules on coIownership.
#n the a"sence o proo to the contrary, properties ac$uire! 2hile they live! together shall "e presume! to have
"een o"taine! "y their 8oint eBorts, 2or7 or in!ustry, an! shall "e o2ne! "y them in e$ual shares.
0hen only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coI
ownership shall 0e forfeite1 in favor of their co//on chil1ren. 4n case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall 0elong to the res3ective s%rviving
1escen1ants. 4n the absence of descendants, s%ch share shall 0elong to the innocent 3art&. 4n all cases, the
forfeiture shall ta<e place upon termination of the cohabitation.
TTTTTTTTTT
AERE> <S CA?CA4IN*IG, !""J
7AC4S:
Private respondent Tristan +. Catindig married =ily !omez Catindig

twice on 3ay 1C, 1&C*. Several years later, the
couple encountered marital problems that they decided to separate from each other. They obtained divorce from
,ominican Church. Tristan married petitioner Blmar G. Perez in the State of Mirginia in the Knited States

and both
$1 | P a g e
lived as husband and wife until Gctober $%%1. Their union produced one o;spring. Tristan 7led a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to =ily with the "TC.
Subse5uently, petitioner Blmar Perez 9 the second wife <unu: 7led a 3otion for =eave to 1ile 4ntervention

claiming
that she has a legal interest in the matter in litigation because she <nows certain information which might aid the
trial court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the annulment case, which the trial court granted on September
@%, $%%$. Petitioner8s complaintIinIintervention was also ordered admitted.
Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 1- years vests her with the re5uisite legal
interest re5uired of a wouldIbe intervenor under the "ules of Court.

RU6ING: Petitioner8s claim lac<s merit. Knder the law, petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence her
claim of legal interest has no basis.
0G 3+L 4#TB"MB#BJ =egal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and
of such !irect an! imme!iate character that the intervenor 2ill either gain or lose "y !irect legal operation an!
eBect o the 8u!gment.

Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and e6pectant.
0hen Tristan and =ily married on 3ay 1*, 1&C*, their marriage was governed by the provisions of the Civil Co1e

9hich tooI eLect on A%g%st .", #(". 4n the case of Tenchavez v. Cscano

we held.

91: That a foreign divorce between 1ilipino citizens, sought and decreed after the e;ectivity of the present Civil
Code 9"ep. +ct #o. @*C:, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction> an1 neither is the /arriage
contracte1 9ith another 3art& 0& the 1ivorce1 consort, s%0se2%entl& to the foreign 1ecree of 1ivorce,
entitle1 to vali1it& in the co%ntr&.
Thus, petitioner8s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lac<s
merit. Thus, petitioner never ac5uired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based.

Since petitioner8s motion for leave to 7le intervention was bereft of the indispensable re5uirement of legal interest,
the issuance by the trial court of the order granting the same and admitting the complaintIinIintervention was
attended with grave abuse of discretion.
Aranes vs. 6uge Occiano AM No. MT6 32$.738, April .., 2332
refer above mentioned case
Ancheta vs. Ancheta CA%' "IG'%T: G.R. No. .407/3, Marc) 4, 2334 Annulment o( Marriage, Civil &a+,
Marriage
I%%9':
:)et)er or not t)e eclaration o( nullit# o( marriage +as vali;
<'&":
NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor de7ed +rticle (* of the 1amily Code and "ule 1*, Section C of the
1&*) "ules of Court 9now "ule &, Section @DeE of the 1&&- "ules of Civil Procedure:.
+ grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion, says the
Court. /ence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting
attorney or 7scal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between
the parties and to ta<e care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.H
/4f the defendantIspouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead,
should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion e6ists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney
or 7scal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.H
ere, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent e6Iparte and rendered judgment against
the petitioner /without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to
declare petitioner in default.H
The Supreme Court reiterates. The tas7 o protecting marriage as an inviola"le social institution re$uires vigilant
an! zealous participation an! not mere proDorma compliance. The protection o marriage as a sacre! institution
re$uires not 8ust the !eense o a true an! genuine union "ut the e1posure o an invali! one as 2ell.>
G.R. No. '+" A3ril !(, #' GO*O7RE*O :UCCA4, 3laintiL?a33ellant, vs. 6UI*A MANGONON *E
:UCCA4, 1efen1ant?res3on1ent
7AC4S
!odofredo Fuccat and =uida 3angonon de Fuccat met in 3arch 1&@*, became engaged in September, and got
married in #ov $C.
Gn 1eb $@, 1&@& 9*& days after getting married: =uida, who was & months pregnant, gave birth to a son. +fter
<nowing this, !odofredo left =uida and never returned to married life with her.
Gn 3arch $@, 1&@&, he 7led for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married
=uida, she assured him that she was a virgin. The =ower court decided in favor of =uida.
ISSUE
Should the annulment for !odofredo Fuccat8s marriage be granted on the grounds that =uida concealed her
pregnancy before the marriageJ
8E6*
#o. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is
$$ | P a g e
interested and where society rests.
4n this case, the court did not 7nd any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a
ground for annulment. 4t was unli<ely that !odofredo, a 7rstIyear law student, did not suspect anything about
=uida8s condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy 9highly developed physical
manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach : when they got married.
TTTTTTTTT
G.R. No. 6?.((. 7e0r%ar& !., #J" $OSE *E OCAMAO, 3etitioner, vs. SERA7INA 76ORENCIANO,
res3on1ent.
7AC4S:
'ose de Gcampo and Sera7na 1lorenciano were married in 1&@*. They begot several children who are not living
with plainti;. 4n 3arch 1&)1, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with 'ose +rcalas. aving found out, he sent the wife to 3anila in 'une 1&)1 to study
beauty culture where she stayed for one year. +gain plainti; discovered that the wife was going out with several
other man other than +rcalas. 4n 1&)$, when the wife 7nished her studies, she left plainti; and since then they had
lived separately. 4n 'une 1&)), plainti; surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with #elson Grzame.
e signi7ed his intention of 7ling a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided
she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. +ccordingly, Gcampo 7led a petition for legal separation in
1&)).
ISSUE: 0hether the confession made by 1lorenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the
1amily Code.
8E6*:
1lorenciano8s admission to the investigating 7scal that she committed adultery, in the e6istence of evidence of
adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of B%1g/ent 1isallo9e1 0& Article ') of the
7a/il& Co1e. 0hat is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading.
0here there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendant8s statement agreeing to the legal
separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the
evidence presented by the plainti;. 0hat the law prohibits is a judgment based e6clusively on defendant8s
confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
Art. '). 4n all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or 7scal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to ta<e steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to ta<e care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
4n the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
TTTTTTTT
OCA vs A=UINO
4n a letter, 1 dated 1ebruary C, $%%*, a group which calls itself as the Trial =awyers of Cagayan charged respondent
'udge =yliha +. +5uino 9'udge +5uino:, Presiding 'udge, Franch (, "egional Trial Court,
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, with V nefarious activities and impeachable activities and malpractices.V +side from the
foregoing, the complainants also charged her with nonIpayment of her indebtedness to a sta; member,
enrichment, selling mangoes and jewelry to litigants, and habitual absenteeism.

The letter, addressed to then Chief 'ustice "eynato S. Puno, prompted a judicial audit conducted by the G?ce of the
Court +dministrator 9GC+: in 'uly $%%&.
The noIcollusion reports were submitted by the public prosecutor only after the hearings and the formal o;ers of
e6hibits by a petitioner. 'udge +5uino indeed admitted that she had violated the rules when she proceeded to hear
some cases despite nonIcompliance with the re5uirements. 4n annulment of marriage cases, the investigation
report of the prosecutor is a condition sine 5ua non for the setting of preItrial. ShortIcuts in judicial processes
cannot be countenanced by this Court because speed is not the principal objective of trial.
Considering that 'udge +5uino was not motivated by bad faith, malice and caused no harm to any litigant, the
Court will not mete out a serious administrative penalty at this time, but rather, will impose a 7ne and warn 'udge
+5uino that procedural omissions in the hearing of cases would not always be tolerated.
14#B,. " tho%san1 3esos
RRRRRRRRRRRRRR
"omingo vs. CA 225 %CRA 0/2
7AC4S:
Soledad ,omingo, married with "oberto ,omingo in 1&-C, 7led a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
and separation of property. She did not <now that ,omingo had been previously married to Bmerlinda dela Paz in
1&C&. She came to <now the previous marriage when the latter 7led a suit of bigamy against her. 1urthermore,
when she came home from Saudi during her oneImonth leave from wor<, she discovered that "oberto cohabited
with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by "oberto. The latter
claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and
superNuous. Gn the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of
remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties ac5uired during the
marriage.
ISSUE: Khether or not a 3etition for B%1icial 1eclaration sho%l1 onl& 0e Fle1 for 3%r3oses of
re/arriage.
8E6*:
$@ | P a g e
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed re5uired for purposed of remarriage. owever, it is also
necessary for the protection of the subse5uent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not
lawfully married marries the same. 0ith this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy.
0hen a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that 7nal judgment shall provide for the li5uidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery
of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Soledad8s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary conse5uence of the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage. ence, the petitioner8s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The 1amily Code has clearly provided the
e;ects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime
of property relations governing them.
ENRICO <S 8EIRS O7 ME*INACE66I, Se3te/0er !), !""+ -importante ni na case <ay gi overturned nya ang
#4#+= vs F+,+LG! case ^9
7AC4:
4t is petition assailing the "TC8s reinstatement order on the formerly dismissed 7led action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between the petitioner and respondents father. Bulogio 3edinaceli and Trinidad CatliI3edinaceli,
were married on 'une 1(, 1&C$, begotten seven children. Trinidad died on 3ay 1, $%%(> Bulogio married another
woman named =olita Bnrico on +ugust $C, $%%(. Si6 months later, Bulogio passed away. "espondents 7led an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage between Petition
er and the respondent8s late father on two grounds. 1. that the marriage lac<s the re5uisite of marriage license,
and> $. the lac< of marriage ceremony due to respondent8s father serious illness that made its performance
impossible. =oleta, defend her stand by citing +rticle @( of the family code arguing her e6emption from getting
marriage license.
Art. .'. 5o license shall "e necessary or the marriage o a man an! a 2oman 2ho have live! together as hus"an!
an! 2ie or at least =ve years an! 2ithout any legal impe!iment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the oregoing acts in an a%!avit "eore any person authorize! "y la2 to a!minister oaths. The solemnizing
o%cer shall also state un!er oath that he ascertaine! the $uali=cations o the contracting parties are oun! no legal
impe!iment to the marriage.
She sought then the dismissal of the respondent8s 7led action by citing the +3 I%$I11I1%ISC, Sec. $, par.9a: "ule of
the family code.
Pursuant to /+3 I%$I11I1%I SCH embodied the rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages "TC dismissed the respondents 7led action. "espondents 7led motion for
reconsideration invo<ing the ruling in the case of #iUal v. Fayadog, holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse
have the standing to assail a voidable marriage even after death of one of the spouses. "TC granted the motionand
issued an order for reinstatement of the case. Petitioner 7led motion for reconsideration but denied, thereby
petitioner assailed a petition directly to Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.:0hether or not respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death of Bulogio.
$.: 0hether which of the two rule /+3 %$I11I1%ISCH or /#iUal v. FayadogH shall govern the instant case
8E6*:
Petition is !"+#TB,. "espondentAheirs have #G legal standing to assail the validity of the second marriage after the
death of their father> because the rule on /+3 %$ I11I1%I SCH shall govern the said petition, under the 1amily Code
of the Philippines. Particularly Sec $, par. 9a: Provides that a petition for ,eclaration of +bsolute #ullity of a Moid
3arriage may be 7led solely by the husband or the wife. Zuestion. 0hy the rule on +3 %$I11I1%ISC should govern
this case not the held decision on #iUal v. Fayadog case whereas the two cases e6pressed a common cause of
issueJ ere the court resolved that> in #iUal v. Fayadog case the heirs were allowed to 7le a petition for the
declaration
of nullity of their father8s second marriage even after their father8s death because the impugned marriage there
was solemnized prior to the a;ectivity of the 1amily Code. Knli<e in this case Bnrico v eirs of 3edinaceli where
same holding cannot be applied because the marriage here was celebrated in $%%( where the 1amily Code is
already e;ective and under family code is embodied the rule on /+3 %$
I11I1%I SCH where this rule shall govern petitions for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages.
1: +dministrative 3atter #o. %$I11I1%ISC promulgated by the Supreme Court which too< e;ect on 3arch 1),
$%%@ provides in Section $, par. 9a:

that a petition for ,eclaration of +bsolute #ullity of a Moid 3arriage may be 7led
solely by the husband or the wife. 4he lang%age of this r%le is 3lain an1 si/3le 9hich states that s%ch a
3etition /a& 0e Fle1 solel& 0& the h%s0an1 or the 9ife. 4he r%le is clear an1 %ne2%ivocal that onl& the
h%s0an1 or the 9ife /a& Fle the 3etition for *eclaration of A0sol%te N%llit& of a <oi1 Marriage. 4he
rea1ing of this Co%rt is that the right to 0ring s%ch 3etition is e5cl%sive an1 this right solel& 0elongs to
the/. Conse5uently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to
declare the marriage null and void
4he categorical lang%age of A.M. No. "!??"?SC leaves no roo/ for 1o%0t. 4he coverage e5ten1s
onl& to those /arriages entere1 into 1%ring the eLectivit& of the 7a/il& Co1e 9hich tooI eLect on .
A%g%st #)).

3oreover, +.3. #o. %$I11I1%ISC too< e;ect on 1) 3arch $%%@, following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the "TC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of +.3. #o. %$I11I
1%ISC with the ruling in 5iEal, 9 year $%%% ang F+,+LG!:because they vary in scope and application. +s has been
emphasized, +.3. #o. %$I11I1%ISC covers marriages under the 1amily Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in
its application. The marriage of petitioner to Bulogio was celebrated on $C +ugust $%%(, and it s5uarely falls within
the ambit of +.3. #o. %$I11I1%ISC.

#onetheless, as the heirs major concern here, the court supplied> that the heirs have still remedy to protect their
successional rights not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse 7led in the regular courts
$( | P a g e
SUMMARRY 7OR ASYC8O6OGICA6 INCAAACI4Y:
Article .J. A /arriage contracte1 0& an& 3art& 9ho, at the ti/e of the cele0ration, 9as 3s&chologicall&
inca3acitate1 to co/3l& 9ith the essential /arital o0ligations of /arriage, shall liIe9ise 0e
voi1 even if s%ch inca3acit& 0eco/es /anifest onl& after its sole/ni@ation. -As a/en1e1 0& E.O. No.
!!+, 1ate1 $%l& +, #)+,.
Re2%isites of S3s&chological inca3acit&.T
The 1amily Code has not de7ned the concept of /psychological incapacity.H The only criterion given is the failure of
a party to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage.
To be a ground for declaration of nullity of the marriage, /psychological incapacityH must.
9a: be serious or grave>
9b: have e6isted upon the celebration of or after the marriage>
9c: be incurable.
6sychological incapacity> is incurable even if it involves time and e6penses beyond the means of the victim.
The psychological incapacity> must be present at the time of the marriage. 4n this case, it is as if the person
su;ering from /psychological incapacityH did not give consent at all. The same need not be apparent at the time of
the marriage. 4t is su?cient if it becomes manifest after the marriage.
6sychological incapacity> refers to no less than mental 9not physical: incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage. 4n the case of Tsoi vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. ##", $an%ar& J, ##+, +) SCA* (+, however,
the
Supreme Court said that failure of a spouse to provide se6 to the other party is an in!icium of /psychological
incapacity.H
The rule applies even on mi6ed marriages. 1ilipina marrying a foreigner and the other way around
8o9 S3s&chological inca3acit&T /a& 0e esta0lishe1.
6sychological incapacity,> as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no re5uirement, however, that the respondent should be e6amined by a physician or a
psychologist as a condition sine $ua non for such declaration 9Marcos vs. Marcos, G.R. No. .J'#", Octo0er
#, !"""E Choa vs. Choa, !.". #o. 1(@@-C, #ovember $C, $%%$:.
4t is su?cient that the totality of the evidence, even without physician8s e6amination be present. 4t is enough that
the three basic re5uirements mandated by the Court in %antos vs. Court o( Appeals -!'" SCRA !": that it be
characterized by 9a, gravit& -0, B%ri1ical antece1ence -c, inc%ra0ilit& 0e 3resent. The foregoing guidelines
do
not re5uire that a physician e6amine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 4n fact, the root cause
may be /medically or clinically identi7ed.H 0hat is important is the presence of evidence that can ade5uately
establish the party8s psychological condition. 1or indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
7nding of /psychological incapacity,H then actual medical e6amination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. 9Re3%0lic vs. CA U Molina, !J) SCRA #)E Marcos vs. Marcos, supra.> Choa vs. Choa, supra.:.
/Psychological incapacityH as ground for declaration of nullity of marriage may not be e5uated with divorce or legal
separation. +rticle @C of the 1amily Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. 4t refers to a serious psychological illness aOicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. 4t is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those
provided under +rticle C* to -1, $$%, $$1 and $$) of the 1amily Code.
Art. J). The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and 7delity, and render
mutual help and support. 91%&a:
Art. +. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The e6penses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of +rticle -%. 911)a:
Art. !!". The parents and those e6ercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated
children on wards the following rights and duties.
91: To <eep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good e6ample, and
to provide for their upbringing in <eeping with their means>
9$: To give them love and a;ection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding>
9@: To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, selfIdiscipline, selfI
reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic a;airs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of
citizenship>
9(: To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from ac5uiring habits detrimental to
their health, studies and morals>
9): To represent them in all matters a;ecting their interests>
9C: To demand from them respect and obedience>
9-: To impose discipline on them as may be re5uired under the circumstances> and
9*: To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. 9@1Ca:
Art. !!. Parents and other persons e6ercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. 9$1*%9$:a and 9(:a :
$) | P a g e
Art. !!(. The father and the mother shall jointly e6ercise legal guardianship over the property of the
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. 4n case of disagreement, the fatherPs
decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
0here the mar<et value of the property or the annual income of the child e6ceeds P)%,%%%, the parent concerned
shall be re5uired to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum
91%_: of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for
general guardians.
+ veri7ed petition for approval of the bond shall be 7led in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or,
if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is
situated.
The petition shall be doc<eted as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the
performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this +rticle shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory e6cept when the child is under substitute parental
authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship
shall apply. 9@$%a:
#either is +rticle @C to be e5uated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in /psychological
incapacityH but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, se6ual in7delity, abandonment and the li<e. 9Marcos vs. Marcos, supra:.
Se5%al inF1elit& an1 a0an1on/ent 1o not constit%te S3s&chological
inca3acit&.T
Case:
*avi1 :. *e1el vs. CA, et al. G.R. No. ()J+, $an%ar& !#, !""'
7acts:
+ man complained about the se6ual in7delity of the wife. +side from that, he said that during their marriage, she
turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had e6tramarital a;airs with several men> She
was once con7ned in the 3edical City for treatment by ,r. =ourdes =apuz, a clinical psychiatrist. e alleged that
despite the treatment, she did not stop her illicit relationship with the 'ordanian national named 3ustafa 4brahim,
whom she married and with whom she had two children. owever, when 3ustafa 4brahim left the country, she
returned to him bringing along her two children by 4brahim. e accepted her bac< and even considered the two
illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on ,ecember &, 1&&), she abandoned him to join 4brahim in 'ordan with
their two children. Since then, Sharon, would only return to the country on special occasions.
8el1:
#o. 4n the earlier case of Santos vs. CA, @1% Phil. $1 91&&):, it was said that.
6 6 6 /psychological incapacity88 should refer to no less than a mental 9not physical: incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so e6pressed in +rticle C* of the 1amily Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and 7delity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to con7ne the meaning of /psychological incapacity88 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and signi7cance
to the marriage.
/The other forms of psychoses, if e6isting at the inception of marriage, li<e the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homose6uality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to +rticle (C, 1amily Code. 4f drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homose6uality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under +rticle )) of the 1amily Code.
4n this case, her se6ual in7delity can hardly 5ualify as being mentally or physically ill to such an e6tent that she
could
not have <nown the obligations she was assuming, or <nowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof. 9Re3%0lic vs. *ag1ag, .( SCRA '!( M!""N,. 4t must appear that her promiscuity did not e6ist prior to
or at the inception of the marriage. 0hat was in fact, disclosed by the records was a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later a?rmed in church rites, and which produced four children. #either could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be e5uated with /psychological incapacity.H 9*esca vs. *esca, .(J SCRA '!(
M!""N,. 4t must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a !isor!ere! personality which ma<e her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity
98ernan1e@ vs. CA: or se6ual promiscuity.
Mere a0an1on/ent of s3o%se for fo%r -', &ears 1oes not a/o%nt to S3s&chological inca3acit&.T
SAN4OS <S CA
Fefore the Supreme Court, the husband asserted that there is no love and a;ection from her because of her failure
to communicate with him for three years. ence, she is su;ering from /psychological incapacity.H
8el1:
The factual settings in the case in no measure come close to the standards re5uired to declare a nullity the
marriage of spouses. This is so because /psychological incapacityH must be characterized by. 9a: gravity> 9b:
juridical antecedence> 9c: incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would not be
capable of
carrying out the ordinary duties re5uired in marriage> it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage> and it must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
4en /onths 9itho%t se5 is eno%gh evi1ence of serio%3ersonalit& 1isor1ers s%Ccient to 1eclare a
/arriage voi1. - Chi Ming 4soi Case,
$C | P a g e
Senseless and protracted refusal is e5uivalent to /psychological incapacity. /Bvidently, one of the essential marital
obligations under the 1amily Code is. `To procreate chil!ren "ase! on the universal principle that procreation o
chil!ren through se1ual cooperation is the "asic en! o marriage.8 Constant nonIful7llment of this obligation will
7nally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
One 2%estion has 0een asIe1: If 0oth 3arties are s%Lering fro/ S3s&chological inca3acit&,GG an1 one of
the/ 9o%l1 Fle a s%it to 1eclare the /arriage voi1, can the other 3art& invoIe the 3rinci3le of in pari
elicto to 1efeat the action;
4t is believed that the principle of in pari !elicto does not apply in a suit for declaration of a marriage
void on the ground of /psychological incapacity.88 1or, while the law says /a marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration was psychologically incapacitatedH there is nothing to prevent the court from
declaring the marriage void if both of them are su;ering from /psychological incapacity.88 4f the /psychological
incapacity88 of only one of the parties is su?cient to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage, how much
more if both of them
are su;ering from /psychological incapacity88J 4n the 7rst, only one is incapacitated to comply with the essential
duties to the marriage bond. 4n the second, none of them can comply with their duties to the bond, so, necessarily
and with more reason, the marriage must be put to an end.
ELect of 3artial S3s&chological inca3acit&.T
Fut let us say that one of the parties was declared as one su;ering from /psychological incapacityH and thus, the
marriage was declared void, can heAshe get married againJ The answer is in the a?rmative> for there can be partial
/psychological incapacityH in relation to a partner, but heAshe may not be in relation to another.
Irreconcila0le conVicts 1o not constit%te S3s&chological inca3acit&.T
+nother development on /psychological incapacity88 is the case of Republic vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. ")+J.,
1ebruary 1@, 1&&-, where an action for declaration of nullity of marriage was brought due to irreconcilable
di;erences and conNicting personalities of the parties. 4t was said that in no wise do these things constitute
/psychological incapacity.88 They were more of di?culties, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations.
/The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plainti;. +ny doubt should be resolved in
favor of the e6istence and continuation of the marriage against its dissolution and nullity. /The root cause of the
`psychological incapacity8 must be. -a, /e1icall& or clinicall& i1entiFe1E -0, allege1 in the co/3laintE -c,
s%Ccientl& 3roven 0& e53ertsE an1 -1, clearl& e53laine1 in the 1ecision. +rticle @C of the 1amily Code
re5uires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations andA or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to
such e6tent that the person could not have <nown the obligations he was assuming, or <nowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.
$%ris3r%1ential evol%tion on As&chological Inca3acit&. 4he Molina g%i1elines on S3s&chological
inca3acit&.T
4n Republic vs. Molina, the Supreme Court came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of +rticle @C of the 1amily Code for the guidance of the bench and the bar.
91: The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plainti;. +ny doubt should be resolved in
favor of the e6istence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in
the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
-!, 4he root ca%se of the S3s&chological inca3acit&T /%st 0e: -a, /e1icall& or clinicall& i1entiFe1, -0,
allege1 in the co/3laint, -c, s%Ccientl& 3roven 0& e53erts an1 -1, clearl& e53laine1 in the 1ecision.
+rticle @C of the 1amily Code re5uires that the incapacity must be psychological QQ not physical, although its
manifestation andAor symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an e6tent that the person could not have <nown the obligations he was
assuming, or <nowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. +lthough no e6ample of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of e8us!em generis 9Salita
vs. 3agtolis, $@@ SC"+ 1%%, 'une 1@, 1&&(:, nevertheless such root cause must be identi7ed as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully e6plained. B6pert evidence may be given by 5uali7ed psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
9@: The incapacity must be proven to be e6isting at /the time of the celebrationH of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was e6isting when the parties e6changed their /4 do8sH. the manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
9(: Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same se6. 1urthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, li<e the e6ercise of a profession or employment in a job. ence, a pediatrician
may be e;ective in diagnosing illness of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his or her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
9): Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of
marriage. Thus, /mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outburstsH cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
di?culty, much less ill will. 4n other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that e;ectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
9C: The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by +rticles C* up to -1 of the 1amily Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as +rticles $$%, $$1 and $$) of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
$- | P a g e
Such nonIcomplied marital obligations must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
te6t of the decision.
9-: 4nterpretations given by the #ational +ppellate 3atrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 6 6 6
9*: The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or 7scal and the Solicitor !eneral to appear as counsel for
the State. #o decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor !eneral issues a certi7cation, which will be 5uoted
in the
decision, brieNy stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor !eneral, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the Court such certi7cation within
7fteen 91): days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor !eneral shall
discharge the e5uivalent function of the !eensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1%&). 9"epublic vs. C+, et al.,
$C* SC"+ 1&* D1&&$E:.
The foregoing guidelines do not re5uire that a physician e6amine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. 4n fact, the root cause may be /medically or clinically identi7ed.H 0hat is important is the presence
of evidence that can ade5uately establish the party8s psychological condition. 1or indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a 7nding of /psychological incapacity,H then actual medical e6amination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to. 9Marcos vs. Marcos, .'. SCRA +(( M!"""E:.
4he Molina *octrine has given certain 3ara/eters in S3s&chological inca3acit&T cases.
4AHE NO4E: Kpon the enactment of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage, the mental capacity, or lac< thereof,
of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void a" initio. 9+rt. *%, #CC:. Similarly
among the marriages classi7ed as voidable under +rticle ()9$: of the 1amily Code is one contracted by a party of
unsound mind.
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just li<e any insanity on consent freely
given which is one of the essential re5uisites of a contract. The initial common consensus on /psychological
incapacityH under +rticle @C of the 1amily Code was that it did not constitute a species of vice of consent.
CASES:
8A6I6I <S 8A6I 6I, !""#
e alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thin<ing that it was a jo<e. +fter the ceremonies, they never lived
together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. owever, they started 7ghting constantly a year
later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. 4mmediately
thereafter, he received pran< calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. 4t was
only upon ma<ing an in5uiry that he found out that the marriage was not fa<e.
8E6*:
Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity 9as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage: on a caseItoIcase basis guided by e6perience, the 7ndings of e6perts and
researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
4n Te, this Court de7ned dependent personality disorder as.
A personality !isor!er characterize! "y a pattern o !epen!ent an! su"missive "ehavior. Such in!ivi!uals usually
lac7 selDesteem an! re$uently "elittle their capa"ilitiesA they ear criticism an! are easily hurt "y others
comments. At times they actually "ring a"out !ominance "y others through a $uest or overprotection.
4n her psychological report, ,r. ,ayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact
that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioner8s mother
even had to be the one to tell him to see< legal help when he felt confused on what action to ta<e upon learning
that his marriage to respondent was for real.
Kltimately, ,r. ,ayan concluded that petitioner8s personality disorder was grave and incurable and already e6istent
at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent
1rom the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed su;ering from psychological incapacity that
e;ectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. +ccordingly, the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
CO? OKNERS8IA
:%enavent%ra <S. CA G.R. Nos. !+.() an1 G.R. Nos. !+''# March ., !""(
7acts: #oel Fuenaventura 7led a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and
his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The "TC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation
ordered the li5uidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property> ordered petitioner a regular support in
favor of his son in the amount of 1),%%% monthly, subject to modi7cation as the necessity arises, and awarded the
care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the C+. 0hile the appeal was pending, the C+, upon respondent8s motion issued a
resolution increasing the support pendants li<e to P$%, %%%.
The C+ dismissal petitioner appeal for lac< of merit and a?rmed in to the "TC decision. Petitioner motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Iss%e: 0hether or not coIownership is applicable to valid marriage.
8el1: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of article )% in
relation to articles (1, ($ and (@ of the 1amily Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. "ather the general rule applies, which is in case a
marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be li5uidated, partitioned and distributed is
that of e5ual coIownership.
$* | P a g e
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a 5uo were found, both by the "TC and the C+, to have
been ac5uired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the coIownership. #o fruits of a
separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution.
TTTTTTTTTTTT
<I66ANUE<A vs. COUR4 O7 AAAEA6S
7AC4S:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of +ppeals. Grland Millanueva was married to =ilia
CanalitaIMillanueva in 1&**. Grland eventually 7led for annulment of their marriage by reason of force and duress
employed on him in order to marry =ilia who was then pregnant. e claims to have received harassing phone calls
and visits from three men. e also claims that the never cohabited and that he couldn8t have impregnated her
before marriage and that the child died upon delivery. =ilia however contests that he freely entered into the
marriage and that they lived together for one month and he wrote her letters while he was in 3anila. e visited her
and <new of her pregnancy and the child dying because of premature birth. The case was dismissed and Grland was
ordered to pay =ilia damages.
ISSUE
0hether or not the marriage may be annulled
RU6ING
The court ruled in the negative. The court said that it too< Grland four years to claim that he was coerced into the
marriage which then justi7es the possibility that he is as<ing for the annulment of said marriage by reason of a
bigamy case he is facing. +lso, his being a security guard must have given him proper <nowledge when it comes to
defending himself ma<ing the claims of force due to facts stated above untenable. +lso, his claim that they did not
cohabit is not a ground for the annulment of marriage especially since he failed to prove that this was duet fraud,
intimidation, lac< of consent and the other grounds for annulment.
AN4ONIO <S REYES * grante! the 6#0
8E6*:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical
psychologist who attested that constant lying and e6treme jealousy of "eyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife8s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. "espondent8s
fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of 7ctitious characters enabled her to live in a world of ma<eI
believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and signi7cance
to her marriage. The root causes of "eyes8 psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identi7ed that
was su?ciently proven by e6perts. The gravity of respondent8s psychological incapacity was considered so grave
that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the #ational +ppellate 3atrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. 4t would be di?cult for an inveterate pathological liar to
commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. 1urthermore, "eyes8
case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
ence, the court concludes that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under +rticle
@C of the 1amily Code.
:acca& vs :acca& an1 Re3%0lic
7AC4S:
#oel and 3aribel were sweethearts. e found 3aribelPs snobbish and hardIto get traits
attractive.
+round 1&&-, he decided to brea< up with 3aribel because he was already involved with another woman. They
agreed to see each other on a friendly basis but the two had several romantic episodes.
4n #ovember 1&&*, 3aribel informed #oel that she was pregnant with his child. Kpon advice of his mother, #oel
grudgingly married 3aribel. The two lived on #oelPs family. 3aribel remained aloof and didnPt contribute to his
familyPs co;er. She refused to have se6 with him.
Sometime in 1&&&, #oel and 3aribel had an intense 5uarrel about 3aribelPs alleged miscarriage causing the latter
to leave the house and never came bac<.
#oel 7led a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the "TC of 3anila. "TC declared the marriage null and
void on the ground of 3aribelPs alleged psychological incapacity. #edy =. Tayag, a clinical psychologist who
presented as #oelPs witness, found 3aribel unable to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage due to a
#arcissistic Personality ,isorder.
ISSUE:
0hether or not the marriage between #oel and 3aribel null and void under +rticle @C of the 1amily Code.
RU6ING:
#o. #oel failed to provide su?cient evidence to sustain a 7nding that 3aribel was psychologically incapacitated.
#oelPs evidence merely established that 3aribel refused to have se6ual intercourse with him after their marriage,
and that she left him after their 5uarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. The psychologist
failed to establish that 3aribelPs alleged #arcissistic Personality ,isorder incapacitated her from validly assuming
the essential obligations of the marriage. The same psychologist even testi7ed that 3aribel was capable of entering
into marriage e6cept that it would be di?cult for her to sustain one. 3ere di?culty, it must be stressed, is not the
incapacity contemplated under the +rticle @C of the 1amily Code.
$& | P a g e
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a Vdi?culty,V a Vrefusal,V or a VneglectV in the performance of some
marital obligations. +n unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
P'R'= !% -'RRARI%
Article F;: 6sychological #ncapacity
+rmida and Fri6 are a showbiz couple. The couple8s relationship before the marriage and even during their brief
union 9for well about a year or so: was not all bad. ,uring that relatively short period of time, +rmida was happy
and contented with her life in the company of Fri6. +rmida even admits that Fri6 was a responsible and loving
husband. Their problems began when +rmida started doubting Fri68 7delity. 4t was only when they started 7ghting
about the calls from women that Fri6 began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his soIcalled
marital obligations. Fri6 could not understand +rmida8s lac< of trust in him and her constant naggings. e thought
her suspicions irrational. Fri6 could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. +rmida presented a psychological
e6pert 9,r. ,ayan: who 7nds Fri6 to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Fri68s
/leavingItheIhouseH attitude whenever they 5uarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attac<s, the se6ual
in7delity, the abandonment and lac< of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than
his family.
ISSUE: 0hether or not P4 is attendant in the case at bar.
8E6*: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mi6ed personality disorder, the /leavingItheI
houseH attitude whenever they 5uarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attac<s, the se6ual in7delity, the
abandonment and lac< of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are
not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and these do not constitute P4. 1urther, the e6pert was not able to prove her 7ndings.
#otably, when as<ed as to the root cause of respondent8s alleged psychological incapacity, ,r. ,ayan8s answer was
vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder /can be part of his family upbringingH She stated
that there was a history of Fri68s parents having di?culties in their relationshipI this is of course inconclusive for
such has no direct bearing to the case at bar.
4UASON vs COUR4 O7 AAAEA6S *annulment case0
7AC4S
3aria Tuason and Bmilio Tuason were a married in 1&-$ and this relationship produced children. 3aria now claims
that Bmilio manifested psychological incapacity through violence causing her physical injuries and drug use which
causes him a suspended penalty. 3aria then 7led a petition for annulment by reason of this. Tuason responded with
denial stating that their relationship was lived in harmony until some di;erences manifested themselves. The
marriage was annulled and eventually 3aria 7led for administration of conjugal properties which Bmilio opposed.
is counsel as<ed the court to have the hearing moved because the counsel was out of the country. Gn the day of
the hearing Bmilio failed to show up and so he was declared to have waived his right to present evidence. The court
declared the marriage null and void. 3aria then 7led a /3otion for ,issolution of Conjugal Partnership of !ains and
+djudication to Plainti; of the Conjugal PropertiesH which was eventually contested by Bmilio and he later on 7led
for relief from the decision of the court. This was denied and the C+ a?rmed this decision.
ISSUE
0hether or not Bmilio may claim for relief from the judgment of the C+
RU6ING
The court ruled in the negative. 4t is necessary when attempting to have a 7nal judgment set aside to be justi7ed by
fraud, accident or mista<e. 4n this case it was the negligence of petitioner which caused his failure to present
evidence. e claims that it was for medical reasons that he was not able to ma<e it to the hearing but failure to
notify counsel is not the fault of the court. e was given the chance to be in court but he negligently threw away
this chance. e cannot blame the court for this because said decision was well within due process of law. This
means, he cannot claim relief from judgment.
Te vs. Te >grante! 6#0
GR No. .5./87, -ebruar# .7, 2338
7AC4S:
Petitioner Bdward Te 7rst met respondent "owena Te in a gathering organized by the 1ilipinoIChinese association in
their college. 4nitially, he was attracted to "owena8s close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the
young man decided to court "owena, which happened in 'anuary 1&&C. 4t was "owena who as<ed that they elope
but Bdward refused bic<ering that he was young and jobless. er persistence, however, made him relent. They left
3anila and sailed to Cebu that month> he, providing their travel money of P*%,%%% and she, purchasing the boat
tic<et.
They decided to go bac< to 3anila in +pril 1&&C. "owena proceeded to her uncle8s house and Bdward to his parents8
home. Bventually they got married but without a marriage license. Bdward was prohibited from getting out of the
house unaccompanied and was threatened by "owena and her uncle. +fter a month, Bdward escaped from the
house, and stayed with his parents. Bdward8s parents wanted them to stay at their house but "owena refused and
demanded that they have a separate abode. 4n 'une 1&&C, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives
and they then parted ways.
+fter four years in 'anuary $%%%, Bdward 7led a petition for the annulment of his marriage to "owena on the basis of
the latter8s psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: 0hether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
8E6*:
The parties8 whirlwind relationship lasted more or less si6 months. They met in 'anuary 1&&C, eloped in 3arch,
e6changed marital vows in 3ay, and parted ways in 'une. The psychologist who provided e6pert testimony found
both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner8s behavioral pattern falls under the classi7cation of
1e3en1ent 3ersonalit& 1isor1er, an1 res3on1entGs, that of the narcissistic an1 antisocial 3ersonalit&
1isor1er
4here is no re2%ire/ent that the 3erson to 0e 1eclare1 3s&chologicall& inca3acitate1 0e 3ersonall&
e5a/ine1 0& a 3h&sician, if the totalit& of evi1ence 3resente1 is eno%gh to s%stain a Fn1ing of
@% | P a g e
3s&chological inca3acit&. Merily, the evidence must show a lin<, medical or the li<e, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of e6pert proof presupposes a thorough and inIdepth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or e6pert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.
4ndeed, petitioner, aOicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and 7delity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to ma<e
everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to ma<e most of his important decisions 9such as
where to live:. +s clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around
him. e is insecure, wea< and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to spea< of,
and has no goals and clear direction in life.
+s for the respondent, her being aOicted with antisocial personality disorder ma<es her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. 3oreover, as shown in this case, respondent
is impulsive and domineering> she had no 5ualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blac<mail and of
committing suicide.
Foth parties being aOicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that
they contracted on +pril $@, 1&&C is thus, declared null and void.
CARA4ING?SIAYNGCO vs SIAYNGCO
7AC4S
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of +ppeals.
'uanita Carating Siayngco was married to 3anuel Siayngco. Their marriage did not produce children however, the
adopted a boy. 3anuel, after being married for $( years 7led a petition to the court see<ing the nulli7cation of their
marriage by reason of psychological incapacity e6hibited through over domineering attitude and causing him
embarrassment and humiliation. The lower court denied his petition. The C+ on the other hand reversed the
decision relying on the doctor8s 7ndings that bith parties are psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE
0hether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically incapacitated su?cient to warrant the
nulli7cation of their marriage.
RU6ING
The court ruled in the negative. 3anuel8s relationship with another was caused merely by his se6ual in7delity which
does not fall within the purview of psychological incapacity. This act is caused by his desire to have children which
he himself admitted. The testimonies of the doctor failed to show that this in7delity is caused by a psychological
illness or disorder. 4t is necessary that it his by reason of a psychological disorder that he will be completely unable
to perform his marital obligations.
REAU:6IC < CA:AN4UG?:AGUIO G.R. NO. +"'! $UNE .", !"")
7AC4S: Petition for review on the declaration of the nullity of marriage between =ynette CabantugIFaguio and
3artini ,ico Faguio for being a 3+3+8S boy STS
8E6*:
=+4, ,G0# TB "K=B G# 3G=4#+ C+SB refer above STS
4n petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proving the nullity of marriage lies on the
plainti;. +ny doubt should be resolved in favor of the e6istence and continuation of the marriage, and against the
dissolution and nullity 9semper praesumitur pro matrimonio:
+s seen in this case, =ynette failed to provide su?cient evidence to prove 3artini8s psychological incapacity. 0hile
the court sympathizes with her predication, its 7rst and foremost duty is to apply the law.
Men1o@a v. Re3%0lic, G.R. No. (+)(', Nove/0er !, !"!
7acts:
+rabelle and ,ominic 3endoza got married while +rabelle was eight months pregnant. They lived together but
depended on their parents for 7nancial support.
Allegations: in7delityA 7rst salary of the husband spent with his friendsA gave her a car but did not pay itA
dismissed in the job because he had embezzled moneyA charged with estafaA wants to reconcile with her and
threaten to commit suicide if she would not
ISSUE: 0A# psychological incapacity of ,ominic was established
8E6*:
#o. 1indings of ,r. Samson were oneIsided, because ,ominic was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric
evaluation by petitioner8s e6pert. e also did not participate in the proceedings. +nd that the 7ndings and
conclusions on his psychological pro7le by her e6pert were solely based the testimonies of the petitioner.
Re3%0lic v CA an1 =%intos -G.R. No. (#(#',
7acts:
Bduardo and Catalina were married in civil rites. owever, the couple were not blessed with a child because
Catalina had a hysterectomy following her second marriage.
Bduardo 7led a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing psychological incapacity as a ground.
e alleged that Catalina always left the house without his consent> that she engaged in petty arguments with him>
that she constantly refused to give in to his se6ual needs> that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors
@1 | P a g e
instead of caring for their adopted daughter> that she gambled away all his remittances as an overseas wor<er> and
that she abandoned the conjugal home with her paramour.
+s support to his claim of psychological incapacity, he also presented the results of a neuroIpsychiatric evaluation
conducted by ,r. +nnabelle "eyes stating that Catalina e6hibited traits of a borderline personality disorder that was
no longer treatable.
Catalina did not appear during trial but admitted her psychological incapacity. She denied Nirting with di;erent men
and abandoning the conjugal home.
Iss%e:0hether or not Catalina was psychologically incapacitated to ful7ll marital duties.
8el1:#o. 3arriage remains valid.
Psychological incapacity is an incapacityAinability to ta<e cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and
is not merely the di?culty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.
4n Gepu"lic v CA*)olina0, the Supreme Court has established guidelines involving the nullity of marriage based on
the ground of psychological incapacity. These were not met in the instant case since the gravity, root cause and
incurability of CatalinaPs purported psychological incapacity were not su?ciently established.
CatalinaPs behavior of fre5uent gossiping, leaving the house without BduardoPs consent, refusal to do household
chores, and ta<e care of their adopted daughter were not established. Bduardo presented no other witness to
corroborate these allegations.
+lso, the "TC and C+ heavily relied on ,r. "eyesP evaluation despite any factual foundation to support this claim.
The report was vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of the incapacity.Bven the testimony of ,r.
"eyes stated a general description of borderline personality disorder which did not e6plain the root cause as to why
Catalina was diagnosed as such. They did not specify the acts or omissions or the gravity which constituted the
disorder. 0hat was established was that Catalina was childish and immature.
1urthermore, ,r. "eyes had only one interview with Catalina. This lac<s the depth and objectivity of an e6pert
assessment.
1rom the scant evidence presented, it can be adduced that CatalinaPs immaturity and apparent refusal to perform
her marital obligations do not constitute psychological incapacity alone. 4t must be shown that such immature acts
were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage.
SUA>O vs. SUA>OG.R. No. J''#. March ", !""
7acts:
'ocelyn and +ngelito were 1C years old when they 7rst met in 'une 1&*)> they were residents of =aguna at that
time. +fter months of courtship, 'ocelyn went to 3anila with +ngelito and some friends. aving been gone for three
days, their parents sought 'ocelyn and +ngelito and after 7nding them, brought them bac< to FiUan, =aguna. Soon
thereafter, 'ocelyn and +ngelito8s marriage was arranged and they were married. 0ithout any means to support
themselves, 'ocelyn and +ngelito lived with +ngelito8s parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped
schooling. 'ocelyn too< odd jobs and wor<ed for +ngelito8s relatives as household help. +ngelito, on the other
hand, refused to wor< and was most of the time drun<. 'ocelyn urged +ngelito to 7nd wor< and violent 5uarrels
often resulted because of 'ocelyn8s e;orts.
'ocelyn left +ngelito sometime in 'uly 1&*-. +ngelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since
lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on Gctober *, 1&&-, 'ocelyn 7led with the "TC a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage under +rticle @C of the 1amily Code, as amended.
R%ling: #o. Foth the psychologist8s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root
cause, gravity and incurability of +ngelito8s alleged psychological condition. The psychologist derived all her
conclusions from information coming from 'ocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. 'ocelyn
merely testi7ed on +ngelito8s habitual drun<enness, gambling, refusal to see< employment and the physical
beatings she received from him Q all of which occurred after the marriage.
Signi7cantly, she declared in her testimony that +ngelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be
indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with
him. She testi7ed on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings e6actly too< place Q whether it was near or at the time of
celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially a;ects her
cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence re5uire that the psychological incapacity must e6ist at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. abitual drun<enness, gambling and refusal to 7nd a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. Standing alone, physical violence
does not constitute psychological incapacity XXX Psychological 4ncapacity cases end here STS
AR4IC6E .) 0& reason of A%0lic Aolic&:
Ste3?3arents an1 ste3chil1ren.
+ and F are married. They have a son R. 0hen F died, + married C. Then + died, C and R got married. ,e7nitely,
their marriage is void because it is a marriage between a stepmother and a stepson.
The invalidity of the marriage is based on morals and good customs. 4n fact, it is void by reason of public policy.
Aarents?in?la9 an1 Chil1ren?in?la9.
+ and F are married. They have a son R, who married L. F and R died. L and + cannot contract a valid marriage
because they are inIlaws. 3arriage between a parentIinIlaw and a childIinIlaw is void by reason of public policy.
<oi1 0& reason of a1o3tion.
+ and F are married. They adopted R. 0hen + died, F and R wanted to get married. They cannot, otherwise, the
marriage is void, as they have the relationship of adopting parent and adopted child.
0hile the relationship is arti7cial, yet, the law is founded on public policy as the adopted child has the same rights
as that of a legitimate child.
The rule is true even if + in the aboveIcited e6ample is single. e cannot marry his adopted daughter by reason of
public policy. The rule is li<ewise applicable if R got married to L and R would die. + cannot marry L, the surviving
spouse of R, since a surviving spouse of the adopted cannot marry the adopter. Still, the marriage is void if it is
@$ | P a g e
between the legitimate child of + and F and R, because R has been elevated to the status of a legitimate child. So,
it is as if R and the legitimate child of + and F are brothers and sisters. Still, that is abhorred by law and public
policy.
Suppose + and F adopted R and L, still, the latter cannot get married because the law prohibits the marriage of
both adopted children. They are elevated to the status of legitimates> hence, it is as if they are now brothers and
sisters.
Article .#. 4he action or 1efense for the 1eclaration of a0sol%te n%llit& of a /arriage shall not
3rescri0e. -As a/en1e1 0& R.A. No. )(..,.
Action to 1eclare a voi1 /arriage voi1 is i/3rescri3ti0le.
4f the marriage is void, an action for the declaration of its nullity does not prescribe. + defense based thereon does
not also prescribe. This is similar to +rticle 1(1%, #ew Civil Code, where the law says that an action or defense
based on the nullity of a contract does not prescribe.
4n Hiegel vs. Iu!ge SempioD3iy 91(@ SC"+ (&&:, it was ruled that a subse5uent marriage of one of the spouses of a
prior void marriage is itself void if it is contracted before a judicial declaration
of nullity of the previous marriage. Prior to ".+. #o. *)@@, where the marriage was contracted under
the Civil Code, i.e., before the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code, an action to declare it void on the ground of
/psychological incapacityH of one of the parties prescribes in ten 91%: years after the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code.
4he general r%le is that, if a contract is void, there is no use to have it declared void. This used to be the
jurisprudential law. 9People vs. +ragon, 1%% Phil. 1%@@:. :%t later on it 9as sai1 that even if a /arriage is
voi1, there is a nee1 to have it 1eclare1 voi1 0eca%se no one sho%l1 1eci1e for hi/self the invali1it& of
his /arriage.
Article '". 4he a0sol%te n%llit& of a 3revio%s /arriage /a& 0e invoIe1 for 3%r3oses of re/arriage on
the 0asis solel& of a Fnal B%1g/ent 1eclaring s%ch 3revio%s /arriage voi1. -n, 4here is a nee1 to have
a voi1 /arriage 1eclare1 voi1E reasonsE r%les.
E5ce3tion: Lung case na void because of no marriage license. The court ruled there na dili na <inhahnglan ang
judgment on the nullity of the case. 9see Morigo vs. People GR No. .40225, -ebruar# 5, 2334?
RATIONA&' @unu: #n a nutshell, 2hat is contemplate! "y the provisions o Article J9 o the (amily Co!e as the
voi! marriage that must "e !eclare! voi! "eore a party may contract a su"se$uent marriage is one that must e1ist
although it is voi!. (or, even i it is voi! it is a legal impe!iment to marry, such that i there is no prior !eclaration o
its nullity, a person cannot contract a su"se$uent marriage, other2ise, he can "e charge! 2ith an! convicte! o
"igamy.
5aay na7a o"serve ug nag comment ani: Observation: The authors 2oul! li7e to ma7e this o"servation. #n
Mercao vs. Tan, 2333 * ni sya so mas controlling na ang )origo0, 2hen the =rst marriage 2as contracte!, there
2as no license, hence, voi!. Ket, the Supreme Court sai! that there is a nee! to have it !eclare! voi! "eore a
secon! marriage may "e contracte!, other2ise, the accuse! may "e convicte! o the crime o "igamy. #n Morigo
vs. People, there 2as no ceremony, hence, the marriage shoul! also "e voi! !ue to a"sence o one o the ormal
re$uisites o marriage.
Ket, the Supreme Court sai! that there is no nee! to have it !eclare! voi! as in the eyes o the la2, the marriage
never e1iste!. #n "oth marriages, there 2as a"sence o one o the ormal re$uirements. Ket, in )erca!o, it 2as hel!
that there is a nee! to have it !eclare! voi! "eore a party can contract a su"se$uent marriage.
Hhere lies the !iBerence "et2een )erca!o an! )origoL He "elieve here is some inconsistency in the rulings o the
Supreme Court 2hich nee!s a secon! loo7 "y the Monora"le Court. #t 2oul! appear that the Supreme Court in
)origo is suggesting a return to the ol! principle in the Civil Co!e that i the marriage is voi!, there is no nee! to
have !eclare! voi!. This is inconsistent 2ith Article J9 o the (amily Co!e. A revie2 o )origo is necessary
to ma7e 8urispru!ence consistent 2ith the la2.
4n Antonio !aleA vs. RTC, *ranc) .32, BueAon Cit#, et al., G.RNo. !!+'#, $%l& ., ##J, +! SCA* #J+
9annulment case ni:, it was said that the declaration of nullity of a prior marriage is a rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are ine6istent from the very beginning and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. 4n now re5uiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of
nullity by 7nal judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away
with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage.
Note that the general r%le is that, if a contract is void, it is non Ie6istent. 4t creates no rights, it establishes no
obligations. Fut the law treats marriage di;erently as it says that it is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
/Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under +rticle
@C has become 7nal and e6ecutory, shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subse5uent
marriage under +rticle )@ shall li<ewise be legitimate.H
<oi1 /arriage as a legal i/3e1i/ent to Sre/arr&.T
Gne 5uestion has been as<ed. If there is a 3rior e5isting /arriage of A an1 :, 0%t it is voi1, -a, can an&one
of the/ B%st get /arrie1; -0, Is that voi1 /arriage a legal i/3e1i/ent to /arr& once again;
-a, No. This is so because of the present rule that there is a need to have a void marriage declared void. 4n fact,
+rt. @& of the 1amily Code provides that the action or defense for the declaration
of absolute nullity of a previous marriage shall not prescribe.
1urthermore, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invo<ed for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a 7nal judgment declaring such previous marriage void. 9+rt. (%, 1amily Code:. 4t is therefore clear that
even if a marriage is void, it must be declared void 7rst because the parties cannot decide for themselves
the invalidity of their marriage.
9b: Yes. Since there is a need for a prior declaration of nullity of a void marriage that void marriage can be
considered a legal impediment to contract a subse5uent marriage because of the presumption of its validity prior to
@@ | P a g e
its declaration of nullity. 1urthermore, the absolute nullity of a marriage may be invo<ed for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a 7nal judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9+rt. (%, #CC:.
4t should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial 5uestion to
obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for
bigamy.
ELect of A.M. No. "!??"?SC.
The Supreme Court has promulgated the aforesaid circular governing the declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages under the 1amily Code. Section $9a: of the same provides that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be 7led solely by the husband or the wife.
The aforementioned Circular has changed totally the very beautiful and enlightening decision in 5iEal vs. Naya!og,
that any person who has an interest in the estate of the parties to the marriage which is sought to be declared void
has the personality to 5uestion the validity of such marriage. This opens the 5uestion on the imprescriptibility
of the action to declare it void. 4t can now be said that it prescribes after the death of the parties considering the
use of the phrase /solely by the husband or the wife.H The reason for the rule is obvious that the right to 5uestion
the nullity of a marriage is personal to the husband and wife.
+ 3reB%1icial 2%estion is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a
prejudicial 5uestion is to avoid two conNicting decisions. 94e vs. CA, .'J SCRA .!+ M!"""NE
SUMMARY ON ARESUMA4I<E *EA48
AR4IC6ES ' AN* '!: CON4EMA6A4ES <A6I* :IGAMOUS MARRIAGE
There may be a valid bigamous marriage where a spouse has been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a wellIfounded belief that the absent spouse is already dead. This period has been reduced to
two years if in the disappearance of the absent spouse, there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in
+rticle @&1 of the Civil Code.
The mere absence, however, of the spouse does not give rise to a right of the present spouse to remarry. e must
7rst institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee without prejudice to the e;ect of reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present must not <now
of the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
Instances of 3res%/3tive 1eath.
The #ew Civil Code provides for the instances when a person is presumed dead, thus.
/Art. .#. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs.
91: + person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane>
9$: + person in the armed forces who has ta<en part in war, and has been missing for four years>
9@: + person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his e6istence has not been <nown for
four years. 9n:H #ote that the period of four 9(: years has been reduced to two
9$: years by the 1amily Code. The law says that if the absent spouse reappears or if there is
registration of an a?davit of reappearance by any interested person with due notice to the spouses in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties, the marriage is automatically terminated.
Marriage that is vali1 in Art. '.
4t is not the marriage of the absent spouse that is valid. 4t is the marriage of the present spouse, after complying
with the following fundamental re5uirements that is valid, thus.
91: The absent spouse must have been absent for four or two years under the circumstances provided by law>
9$: The present spouse must not <now the whereabouts of the absent spouse>
9@: There must be a wellIfounded belief that the absent spouse is already dead>
9(: There must be institution of a summary action for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse>
9): There must be a 7nal judgment declaring the absent spouse presumptively dead
ELect of 1eclaration of 3res%/3tive 1eath.
,espite the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse and the subse5uent marriage of the present
spouse, the 7rst marriage is not dissolved or terminated. 4t is still subsisting, e6cept if it has been previously
annulled or declared void. Such rule is so because of the fact that the mere registration of an a?davit of
reappearance by an interested person, with notice to the spouses in the second marriage, automatically terminates
the second marriage
without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. So, the
present spouse has the right to 5uestion or dispute the reappearance of the absent spouse such that if the
reappearance is not proven, the termination of the second marriage would have no e;ect later. 4t would remain to
be valid if the reappearance is not proven. The registration of the a?davit of reappearance is merely a presumptive
notice of reappearance which is disputable.
#ow, the 5uestion is this. S%33ose, there is no aC1avit of rea33earance registere1 0%t the a0sent s3o%se
3ersonall& or 3h&sicall& a33ears, 9o%l1 the secon1 /arriage 0e ter/inate1;
4he ans9er is &es. +s said above, the registration of an a?davit of reappearance is a mere notice of
reappearance, disputable in character. Fut if the absent spouse appears physically, then, how can the present
spouse dispute itJ 4f the mere registration of an a?davit of reappearance terminates the subse5uent marriage,
then, with more reason if heAshe personally reappears.
@( | P a g e
Prior to the 7ling of an action for declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, it is re5uired that the
present spouse must e6ert serious e;orts to locate the absent spouse, not mere scanty or super7cial e;orts to loo<
for the same.
REAU:6IC <S NO6ASCO
8el1:
#olasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a wellIfounded belief
that she is already dead.
4here are fo%r re2%isites for the declaration of presumptive death under +rticle (1 of the 1amily Code.
/91: That the absentee spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years, if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in +rticle @&1, Civil
Code>
9$: That the present spouse wishes to remarry>
9@: That the present spouse has a wellIfounded belief that the absentee is dead> and
9(: That the present spouse 7les a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the deceased.88
0e do not consider that wal<ing into a major city li<e =iverpool or =ondon with a simple hope of
somehow bumping into one particular person there 2 which is in e;ect what #olasco says he did 2 can be
regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
+ 5uestion may be as<ed. S%33ose A an1 : are /arrie1, 0%t A has 0een a0sent fro/ the conB%gal
19elling for a 3erio1 of ) &ears 9itho%t : Ino9ing 9hether he is still alive, can : get /arrie1 9itho%t
going to co%rt an1 Fle an action for 1eclaration of 3res%/3tive 1eath;
#G. ,eclaration of presumptive death is necessary before the present spouse may get married.
MANUE6 <S AEOA6E
is wife was charged with estafa in 1&-) and thereafter imprisoned. e visited her in jail after three months and
never saw her again.
e insisted that he married the second spouse believing that his 7rst marriage was no longer valid because he had
not heard from his 7rst spouse for more than $% years.
ere what is applicable is +rticle (1 of the 1amily Code which amended +rticle @&%
8el1:
#o, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, otherwise, the spouse who
contracted the second marriage may be convicted of the crime of bigamy. Such judicial declaration also constitutes
proof that he acted in good faith and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the complainant
and,
as a conse5uence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case, but he failed to discharge his burden.
Article ', 7.C.E 9hen a s3o%se /a& 0e 1eclare1 3res%/3tivel& 1ea1.
Re3%0lic vs. CA, et al. G.R. No. (#J', *ece/0er #, !""( -CalleBo, 6.,
<ung tan awun ang facts ani muarag mu comply sya sa re5uisite <ay adtu sya sa house, as< for the help of police
and even had a declaration of presumptive death on his favor\. 9hmm:
Gn 'anuary *, $%%$, the court rendered judgment granting the petition, declaring "osalina presumptively death for
the purpose of +lan8s subse5uent marriage under +rticle (1 of the 1amily Code of the Philippines, without prejudice
to the e;ect of reappearance of the said absent spouse. The GS! 7led a petition for review on certiorari of the C+8s
decision alleging that +lan failed to prove that he had a wellIfounded belief that =ea was already dead, alleging that
he failed to e6ercise reasonable and diligent e;orts to locate his wife. "ule on the contention of the Solicitor
!eneral.
8el1:
The petition is meritorious. Felief if a state of mind or condition prompting the doing of an over act. 4t may be
proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the
in5uiry or assist to a determination of probability founded in truth. 4t is also ma6im that /men readily believe what
they wish to be true.H
The totality of the evidence showed that he failed to prove that he had wellIfounded belief before he 7led the
petition that his spouse was already dead.
SSS <S $AR=UE
7AC4S
4n 1&)) Clemente Failon and +lice ,iaz married in Farcelona, Sorsogon. 1)a years later, Clemente 7led an action
to declare the presumptive death of +lice she being an absentee. The petition was granted in 1&-%. 4n 1&*@,
Clemente married 'ar5ue. The two live together untile Clemente8s death in 1&&*. 'ar5ue then sought to claim her
husband8s SSS bene7ts and the same were granted her. Gn the other hand, a certain Cecilia FaionILap who claimed
that she is the daughter of Failon to a certain Blisa 'ayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the
reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial e6penses of Clemente.
They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages> one with +lice, another with Blisa and the other with
'ar5ue. Cecilia also averred that +lice is alive and <ic<ing and +lice subse5uently emerged> Cecilia claimed that
Clemente obtained the declaration of +lice8s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of
+lice or if not he could have easily located her in her parent8s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents8
place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having e6traImarital a;airs. SSS then ruled that
'ar5ue should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the
burial e6penses and that the bene7ts should go to +lice because her reappearance had terminated Clemente8s
marriage with ar5ue. 1urther, SSS ruled that the "TC8s decision in declaring +lice to be presumptively death is
@) | P a g e
erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social Security Comission and the SSC a?rmed SSS.
The C+ however ruled the contrary.
ISSUE: 0hether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead automatically
terminates the subse5uent marriage.
8E6*: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente8s death. =i<ewise there is no
subse5uent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Clemente8s death. SSS is correct in ruling that it
is futile for +lice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar through an a?davit or a
court action. Fut it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the "TC. The SSC or the SSS has
no judicial power to review the decision of the "TC. SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the
rightful bene7ciary of the bene7ts obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not
include the appellate power to review a court decision or declaration. 4n the case at bar, the "TC ruling is binding
and 'ar5ue8s marriage to Clemente is still valid because no a?davit was 7led by +lice to ma<e <nown her
reappearance legally. +lice reappeared only after Clemente8s death and in this case she can no longer 7le such an
a?davit> in this case the bad faith Dor good faithE of Clemente can no longer be raised Q the marriage herein is
considered voidable and must be attac<ed directly not collaterally Q it is however impossible for a direct attac<
since there is no longer a marriage to be attac<ed for the same has been terminated upon Clemente8s death.
REAU:6IC <. GRANA*A G.R. No. )+(!, M$%ne ., !"!N
*OC4RINE:
Bven if the "TC erred in ruling that therespondent was able to prove her /wellIfounded beliefH that her absent
spouse was already dead, such order already 7nal and can no longer be modi7ed or reversed. 4ndeed, /DnEothing is
more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes 7nal and e6ecutory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modi7ed in any respect, even if the modi7cation is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.H
The husband went to Taiwan after & years of waiting 7led a petition to declare her spouse presumptively dead.
ISSUES:
1. 0hether the order of the "TC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately
7nal and e6ecutory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.
$. 0hether the C+ erred in a?rming the "TC8s grant of the petition for declaration of presumptive death based on
evidence that respondent had presented.
8E6*:
Les, the declaration of presumptive death is 7naland immediately e6ecutory. Bven if the "TC erred in granting the
petition, such order can no longer be assailed.
+pplying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Lolanda did not initiate
a diligent search to locate her absent husband. 0hile her brother ,iosdado Cadacio testi7ed to having in5uired
about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter8s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate
,iosdado8s testimony. 4n short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner
argues
that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular G?ce or assistance from
othergovernment agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but
she did not. 0orse, she failed to e6plain these omissions.
owever by e6press provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately 7nal
and e6ecutory. +s a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court8s judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under +rticle (1 of the 1amily
Code. 4t goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may 7le a petition for certiorari to 5uestion abuse of
discretion amounting to lac< of jurisdiction. Such petition should be 7led in the Court of +ppeals in accordance with
the,octrine of ierarchy of Courts.
Re3%0lic vs. CA an1 Alegro
7AC4S:
+lan +legro, the petitioner, was married with =ea in 'anuary 1&&). =ea arrived home late in 1ebruary 1&&) and +lan
told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go bac< to her parents.
=ea left after that 7ght. +llan chec<ed if she went to her parents8 house but was not there and even in5uired to her
friends. e went bac< to the parentsbinblaw8s house and learned that =ea had been to their house but left without
notice. e then sought help from the Farangay Captain. 1or some time, +lan decided to wor< as partbtime ta6i
driver
and during his free time he would loo< for =ea in the malls. 4n 'une $%%1, +lan reported =ea8s disappearance to the
local police station and an alarm notice was issued. e also reported the disappearance in #F4
on 'uly $%%1. +lan 7led a petition in 3arch $%%1 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife.
ISSUE:
0hether +lan has a wellbfounded belief that his wife is already dead.
8E6*:
The court ruled that +lan failed to prove that he has a wellbfounded belief, before he 7led his petition with "TC, that
his spouse was dead. e failed to present a witness other than the Farangay Captain. e even failed to present
those friends of =ea which he in5uired to corroborate his testimony. e also failed to ma<e in5uiries from his
parentsbinblaw regarding =ea8s whereabouts before 7ling his petition in the "TC. 4t could have enhanced his
credibility had he made in5uiries from his parentsbinblaw about =eaPs whereabouts considering that =eaPs father was
the owner of "adio ,L3S. e did report and see< help of the local police authorities and #F4 to locate =ea but he did
so only
after the GS! 7led its notice to dismiss his petition in "TC.
Re3%0lic of the Ahili33ines <S. :er/%1e@ O 6orino
G.R. No. J"!(). $an%ar& #, !""(
@C | P a g e
7acts: !loria Fermudez and 1rancisco =orino were married in 'une 1&*-. The wife was unaware that her husband
was a habitual drin<er with violent attitude and character and had the propensity to go out with his friends to the
point of being unable to wor<. 4n 1&&1 she left him and returned to her parents together with her three children. She
went abroad to wor< for her support her children. 1rom the time she left him, she had no communication with him
or his relatives.
4n $%%%, nine years after leaving her husband, !loria 7led a veri7ed petition with the "TC under the rules on
Summary 'udicial Proceedings in the 1amily =aw. The lower court issued an order for the publication of the petition
in a newspaper of general circulation.
4n #ovember -, $%%1, the "TC granted the summary petition. +lthough the judgment was 7nal and e6ecutors under
the provisions of +ct. $(- of the 1amily Code, the GS! for the "epublic of the Philippines 7led a notice of appeal.
Iss%e:
0hether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under +rt (1 of the 1amily
Code were duly established.
8el1:
+rt. $@* of the 1amily Code under Title R4 Summary 'udicial Proceeding in the 1amily =aw, sets the tenor for cases
scoured by these rules, to wit.
+rt$@*. Kntil modi7ed by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in
this Code re5uiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall be decided in an e6pedition8s manner with out
regards technical rules.
The judge of the "TC fully complied with the aboveIcited provision by e6peditiously rending judgment within ninety
9&%: days after the formal o;er of evidence by the petitioner.
REAU:6IC O7 48E A8I6IAAINESv . 7ER<EN4INO U. 4ANGOG.R. No. J"J!, . $%l& !""#, SECON*
*I<ISION -=%is%/0ing, ' .,
4n 1&*-, 1erventino Tango, respondent, and 3aria 'ose Millarba were married in civil
rites. Tango and Millarba had only spent a night together and had been intimate once when Millarba told 1erventino
that she and her family will soon be leaving for the KS+. Millarba assured Tango that the former will 7le a petition so
that the latter can live with her in the KS+ and in the event that the petitions denied, Millarba promised to return to
the Philippines to live with Tango. Thereafter, Millarba and her family New to Seattle, KS+. Tango and Millarba <ept in
touch for a year before Millarba stopped responding to Tan
go8s letters. Tango had in5uired from Millarba8s uncle of Millarba8s whereabouts but it turned out that even the
latter8s relatives had no idea. Tango solicited the assistance
of a friend in Te6as, but to no avail. 1inally, Tango sought the aid of his parents in =os +ngeles and his aunt in
Seattle, but again, to no avail. This prompted Tango to 7le a petition before the "TC for the declaration of
presumptive death of Millarba under +rticle (1 of the 1amily Code. The "TC issued an Grder declaring Millarba
presumptively dead. Gn appeal by the "epublic of the Philippines, the C+ a?rmed the "TC8s order.

ISSUE:
0hether Tango has established a basis to form a wellIfounded belief that his absent spouse is already dead
8E6*:
Fy e6press provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately 7nal and
e6ecutory. +s a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
court8s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under +rticle (1 of the 1amily Code. 4t goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may 7le a
petition for certiorari to 5uestion abuse of discretion amounting to lac< of jurisdiction. Such petition should be 7led
in the Court of +ppeals in accordance with the ,octrine of ierarchy of Courts. To be
sure, even if the Court8s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the "TCs and
the Court of +ppeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum. 1rom the decision of the Court of +ppeals, the losing party may then 7le a petition for review on
certiorari under "ule () of the "ules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the
court may commit in the e6ercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal. 4n the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when it 7led a notice of appeal in the
Court of +ppeals instead of a petition for certiorari. The "TC e5ually erred in giving due course to said appeal and
ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. Fy no means did the Court of +ppeals
ac5uire jurisdiction to review the judgment of the "TC which, by e6press provision of law, was immediately 7nal and
e6ecutory. +dding to the confusion, the Court of +ppeals entertained the appeal and treated the same as an
ordinary appeal under "ule (1 of the "ules of Court. +s it were, the Court of +ppeals committed grave reversible
error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the "epublic on the ground of lac< of jurisdiction because, by
e6press provision of the law, the judgment was not appealable Fefore us, petitioner 7led a petition for review on
certiorari under "ule () of the "ules of Court. Fut, even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at this level,
the hands of the Court are
tied. 0ithout a doubt, the decision of the trial court had long become 7nal. ,eeply ingrained in ourjurisprudence is
the principle that a decision that has ac5uired 7nality becomes immutable and unalterable. +s such, it may no
longer be modi7ed in any respect even if the modi7cation is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law
and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 4n light of the
foregoing, it would be unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the issues raised by petitioner. The doctrine of 7nality
of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the ris< of
occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of 5uasiIjudicial agencies must become 7nal on some
de7nite date 76ed by law. The only e6ceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the 7nality of the decision which render its e6ecution unjust and ine5uitable. #one of the e6ceptions
obtains here to merit the review sought.
G.R. No. )'J!, *ece/0er ", !". REAU:6IC O7 48E A8I6IAAINES, 6etitioner, v. MARIA 7E ESAINOSA
CAN4OR
4he 7act%al Antece1ents
The respondent and 'erry were married on September $%, 1&&-. They lived together as husband and wife in their
@- | P a g e
conjugal dwelling in +gan omes, coronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in 'anuary 1&&*, the couple had a
violent 5uarrel brought about by. 91: the respondent8s inability to reach /se6ual clima6H whenever she and 'erry
would have intimate moments> and 9$: 'erry8s e6pression of animosity toward the respondent8s father.
+fter their 5uarrel, 'erry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him.
Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from 'erry or about his whereabouts.
ISSUE: 0hether the respondent had a wellQfounded belief that 'erry is already dead.
8E6*: +rticle $@* of the 1amily Code, under Title R4. SK33+"L 'K,4C4+= P"GCBB,4#!S 4# TB 1+34=L =+0,
establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the 1amily Code.
/+"T. $@*. Kntil modi7ed by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for
in this Code re5uiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an e6peditious manner without
regard to technical rules.H
4n turn, +rticle $)@ of the 1amily Code speci7es the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the
same title. 4t states.
/+"T. $)@. The foregoing rules in Chapters ! and @ hereof shall li<ewise govern s%//ar& 3rocee1ings 7led under
+rticles ', )1, C&, -@, &C, 1$( and $1-, insofar as they are applicable.H
4n plain te6t, +rticle $(- in Chapter $ of the same title reads.
/+"T. $(-. The judgment of the court shall be immediately 7nal and e6ecutory.H
Fy e6press provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately 7nal and
e6ecutory. +s a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court8s judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under +rticle (1 of the 1amily Code. It
goes 9itho%t sa&ing, ho9ever, that an aggrieve1 3art& /a& Fle a 3etition for certiorari to 2%estion
a0%se of 1iscretion a/o%nting to lacI of B%ris1iction. S%ch 3etition sho%l1 0e Fle1 in the Co%rt of
A33eals in accor1ance 9ith the *octrine of 8ierarch& of Co%rts.
T)e 'ssential ReCuisites (or t)e "eclaration o( Presumptive "eat) 9ner Article 4. o( t)e -amil# Coe
Fefore a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a wellQfounded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Knder +rticle (1 of the 1amily Code, there are four 9(: essential re5uisites for the declaration of
presumptive death.chan"oblesvirtual=awlibrary
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in +rticle @&1,
Civil Code>
$. That the present spouse wishes to remarry>
@. 4hat the 3resent s3o%se has a 9ellOfo%n1e1 0elief that the a0sentee is 1ea1E and
(. That the present spouse 7les a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
1$
T)e ReCuirement o( :ell,-oune *elie(
The law did not de7ne what is meant by /wellQfounded belief.H 4t depends upon the circumstances of each particular
case. 4ts determination, so to spea<, remains on a caseQtoQcase basis. To be able to comply with this re5uirement,
the present spouse must prove that hisAher belief was the result of1iligent an1 reasona0le eLorts an1
in2%iries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these e;orts and in5uiries, heAshe believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It re2%ires e5ertion of active eLort -not a /ere 3assive
one,.
4n sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a /passive searchH where she relied on
uncorroborated in5uiries from her inQlaws, neighbors and friends. She faile1 to con1%ct a 1iligent
search because her alleged e;orts are insu?cient to form a wellQfounded belief that her husband was already
dead. +s held in Gepu"lic o the 6hilippines v. Court o Appeals *Tenth 3iv.0,
$$
/DwEhether or not the spouse present
acted on a wellQfounded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the in5uiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and e6tent
of the in5uiries made by DtheE present spouse.H
Article '.. 4he ter/ination of the s%0se2%ent /arriage referre1 to in the 3rece1ing Article shall
3ro1%ce the follo9ing eLects:
-, 4he chil1ren of the s%0se2%ent /arriage conceive1 3rior to its ter/ination shall 0e consi1ere1
legiti/ate, an1 their c%sto1& an1 s%33ort in case of 1is3%te shall 0e 1eci1e1 0& the co%rt in a
3ro3er 3rocee1ingE
-!, 4he a0sol%te co//%nit& of 3ro3ert& or the conB%gal 3artnershi3, as the case /a& 0e, shall 0e
1issolve1 an1 li2%i1ate1, 0%t if either s3o%se contracte1 sai1 /arriage in 0a1 faith, his or her share of
the net 3roFts of the co//%nit& 3ro3ert& or conB%gal 3artnershi3 3ro3ert& shall 0e forfeite1 in favor
of the co//on chil1ren or, if there are none, the chil1ren of the g%ilt& s3o%se 0& a 3revio%s /arriage
or, in 1efa%lt of chil1ren, the innocent s3o%seE
-., *onations 0& reason of /arriage shall re/ain vali1, e5ce3t that if the 1onee contracte1 the
/arriage in 0a1 faith, s%ch 1onations /a1e to sai1 1onee are revoIe1 0& o3eration of la9E
-', 4he innocent s3o%se /a& revoIe the 1esignation of the other s3o%se 9ho acte1 in 0a1 faith as
0eneFciar& in an& ins%rance 3olic&, even if s%ch 1esignation 0e sti3%late1 as irrevoca0leE an1
@* | P a g e
-(, 4he s3o%se 9ho contracte1 the s%0se2%ent /arriage in 0a1 faith shall 0e 1is2%aliFe1 to inherit
fro/ the innocent s3o%se 0& testate an1 intestate s%ccession. -n,
This share shall be forfeited in favor of. 91: their commom children> 9$: in the absence of the latter, the children of
the guilty
spouse in the previous marriage> 9@: in default of the latter, to the innocent spouse. The reason for the law is very
simple. #o one shall bene7t out of his wrongdoing. The law on forfeiture is absolute in that, even if it was only the
spouse in bad faith who was earning, he would still lose his share.
Knder paragraph ), the dis5uali7cation to inherit, the revocable nature of the designation in an insurance policy as
well as the
donation to the spouse in bad faith is the fact that no one should bene7t out of his own wrongdoing, otherwise, he
would be enriching himself at the e6pense of the innocent spouse.
Article ''. If 0oth s3o%ses of the s%0se2%ent /arriage acte1 in 0a1 faith, sai1 /arriage shall 0e voi1
ab initio an1 all 1onations 0& reason of /arriage an1 testa/entar& 1is3ositions /a1e 0& one in favor
of the other are revoIe1 0& o3eration of la9.
There is not even a need to perform a positive act of revocation. The law itself revo<es the same, with the net e;ect
of these donations or testamentary dispositions being rendered void and the properties being reverted to the
former owner.
Article '(. A /arriage /a& 0e ann%lle1 for an& of the follo9ing ca%ses, e5isting at the ti/e of the
/arriage:
-, 4hat the 3art& in 9hose 0ehalf it is so%ght to have the /arriage ann%lle1 9as eighteen &ears of
age or over 0%t 0elo9 t9ent&?one, an1 the /arriage 9as sole/ni@e1 9itho%t the consent of the
3arents, g%ar1ians or 3erson having s%0stit%te 3arental a%thorit& over the 3art&, in that or1er, %nless
after attaining the age of t9ent&?one, s%ch 3art& freel& coha0ite1 9ith the other an1 0oth live1
together as h%s0an1 an1 9ifeE
-!, 4hat either 3art& 9as of %nso%n1 /in1, %nless s%ch 3art& after co/ing to reason, freel& coha0ite1
9ith the other as h%s0an1 an1 9ifeE
-., 4hat the consent of either 3art& 9as o0taine1 0& fra%1, %nless s%ch 3art& after9ar1s, 9ith f%ll
Ino9le1ge of the facts constit%ting the fra%1, freel& coha0ite1 9ith the other as h%s0an1 an1 9ifeE
-', 4hat the consent of either 3art& 9as o0taine1 0& force, inti/i1ation or %n1%e inV%ence, %nless the
sa/e having 1isa33eare1 or cease1, s%ch 3art& thereafter freel& coha0ite1 9ith the other as h%s0an1
an1 9ifeE
-(, 4hat either 3art& 9as 3h&sicall& inca3a0le of cons%//ating the /arriage 9ith the other, an1 s%ch
inca3acit& contin%es an1 a33ears to 0e inc%ra0leE or
-J, 4hat either 3art& 9as aWicte1 9ith a se5%all&?trans/issi0le 1isease fo%n1 to 0e serio%s an1
a33ears to 0e inc%ra0le.
4aIe note: 4f it is the party to the marriage who would 7le the action it must be done by himAher within 7ve 9):
years
after attaining the age of twentyIone. 4f it is the parent or guardian who should 7le it, then, it should be done at any
time before the party reaches the age of twentyIone. 9+rt. (-, 1amily Code:. #ote that there is a longer period for
the party to go to court and 7le an action for annulment of hisAher marriage, that is, within 7ve 9): years after
attaining the age of $1. is parents or guardians have up to the time before he reaches the age of $1.
owever, the period to 7le such action is di;erent in case of insanity, in that, it must be 7led at any time before the
death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity. 9+rt. (-D$E, 1amily
Code:. 4t may be 7led by the same spouse, who had no <nowledge of the insane8s insanity or by any relative or
guardian or person having charge of the insane.
Paragraph ) of +rticle () refers to impotency, which is the incapability of procreation. 4n here, the incapability must
continue to be so and appears to be incurable. Sterility is not contemplated by the law, for even if a person is
sterile, he can still perform acts of copulation.
:%r1en of 3roof in i/3otenc&.
4t is a rule that he who claims the impotency of another must prove the same. ence, in Iimenez vs. Gepu"lic, 1%&
Phil. $-@, it was
held that.
/+lthough the wife8s refusal to be e6amined or failure to appear in court show indi;erence on her part yet from such
attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women
of this country are by nature coy, bashful, and shy unless compelled to by competent authority. This the court may
do without doing violence to and infringing
upon her constitutional right. + physical e6amination in this case is not selfIincrimination. She is not charged with
any o;ense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. 4mpotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed.88
The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
se6ual intercourse
is insu?cient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
Article 'J. An& of the follo9ing circ%/stances shall constit%te fra%1 referre1 to in N%/0er . of the
3rece1ing Article:
-, Non?1isclos%re of a 3revio%s conviction 0& Fnal B%1g/ent of the other 3art& of a cri/e involving
/oral t%r3it%1eE
-!, Conceal/ent 0& the 9ife of the fact that at the ti/e of the /arriage, she 9as 3regnant 0& a /an
other than her h%s0an1E
-., Conceal/ent of a se5%all&?trans/issi0le 1isease, regar1less of its nat%re, e5isting at the ti/e of
the /arriageE or
-', Conceal/ent of 1r%g a11iction, ha0it%al alcoholis/ or ho/ose5%alit& or les0ianis/ e5isting at the
ti/e of the /arriage. No other /isre3resentation or 1eceit as to character, health, ranI, fort%ne or
chastit& shall constit%te s%ch fra%1 as 9ill give gro%n1s for action for the ann%l/ent of /arriage.
@& | P a g e
The law spea<s of concealment and nonIdisclosure, hence, very clearly, the grounds referred to must be already
e6isting at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The judgment referred to in paragraph 1 of +rticle (C must
be 7nal, otherwise, it would not constitute a ground for the annulment of the marriage. + crime involving moral
turpitude is one where the
penalty imposed is more than si6 9C: years imprisonment. The reason for the law is that, besides the social
humiliation and moral su;ering endured by the innocent spouse, the guilty one in serving his sentence cannot
perform his or her purely personal duties as a spouse.
Article '+. 4he action for ann%l/ent of /arriage /%st 0e Fle1 0& the follo9ing 3ersons an1 9ithin the
3erio1s in1icate1 herein:
-, 7or ca%ses /entione1 in n%/0er of Article '( 0& the 3art& 9hose 3arent or g%ar1ian 1i1 not give
his or her consent, 9ithin Fve &ears after attaining the age of t9ent&?oneE or 0& the 3arent or
g%ar1ian or 3erson having legal charge of the /inor, at an& ti/e 0efore s%ch 3art& has reache1 the
age of t9ent&?oneE
-!, 7or ca%ses /entione1 in n%/0er ! of Article '(, 0& the sane s3o%se, 9ho ha1 no Ino9le1ge of the
otherGs insanit&E or 0& an& relative or g%ar1ian or 3erson having legal charge of the insane, at an&
ti/e 0efore the 1eath of either 3art&, or 0& the insane s3o%se 1%ring a l%ci1 interval or after regaining
sanit&E
-., 7or ca%ses /entione1 in n%/0er . of Article '(, 0& the inB%re1 3art&, 9ithin Fve &ears after the
1iscover& of the fra%1E
-', 7or ca%ses /entione1 in n%/0er ' of Article '( 0& the inB%re1 3art&, 9ithin Fve &ears fro/ the
ti/e the force, inti/i1ation or %n1%e inV%ence 1isa33eare1 or cease1E
-(, 7or ca%ses /entione1 in n%/0ers ( an1 J of Article '(, 0& the inB%re1 3art&, 9ithin Fve &ears after
the /arriage.
Article '). In all cases of ann%l/ent or 1eclaration of a0sol%te n%llit& of /arriage, the Co%rt shall
or1er the 3rosec%ting attorne& or Fscal assigne1 to it to a33ear on 0ehalf of the State to taIe ste3s to
3revent coll%sion 0et9een the 3arties an1 to taIe care that evi1ence is not fa0ricate1 or s%33resse1.
In cases referre1 to in the 3rece1ing 3aragra3h, no B%1g/ent shall 0e 0ase1 %3on a sti3%lation of facts
or confession of B%1g/ent.
4UASON <S CA
8el1:
+rticle (* of the 1amily Code is inapplicable. 1or one, + was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer. e
7led his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by F. e actively participated in the
proceedings by 7ling
several pleadings and crossIe6amining the witnesses of F. 4t is crystal clear that every stage of the proceeding was
characterized by a noIholdsIbarred contest and not by collusion. The role of the prosecuting attorney or 7scal in the
annulment of marriage is to determine whether collusion e6ists between the parties and ta<e care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. +8s vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion e6isted between the parties. #either was there any allegation by + that evidence was
suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. ence, the nonIintervention of the prosecuting attorney was not
fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court. 9See also Pacete vs. Carriaga, $@1 SC"+ @$1> 3acias vs.
'udge Gchotorena, 'uly @%, $%%(:.
4he Solicitor General is a%thori@e1 to intervene in 3rocee1ings for n%llit& an1 ann%l/ent of /arriages.
That +rticle (* does not e6pressly mention the Solicitor !eneral does not bar him or his G?ce from intervening in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. B6ecutive Grder #o. $&$, otherwise <nown as the
+dministrative Code of 1&*-, appoints the Solicitor !eneral as the principal law o?cer and legal defender of the
!overnment.
0hile it is the prosecuting attorney or 7scal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for
annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the "TC, the G?ce of the Solicitor !eneral ta<es over when the case is
elevated
to the Court of +ppeals or the Supreme Court. 9Ta<e note that even if the case is still in "TC, Sol !en can still
intervene.:
Article '#. *%ring the 3en1enc& of the action an1 in the a0sence of a1e2%ate 3rovisions in a 9ritten
agree/ent 0et9een the s3o%ses, the Co%rt shall 3rovi1e for the s%33ort of the s3o%ses an1 the
c%sto1& an1 s%33ort of their co//on chil1ren. 4he Co%rt shall give 3ara/o%nt consi1eration to the
/oral an1 /aterial 9elfare of sai1 chil1ren an1 their choice of the 3arent 9ith 9ho/ the& 9ish to
re/ain as 3rovi1e1 for in 4itle IP. It shall also 3rovi1e
for a33ro3riate visitation rights of the other 3arent.
+s a rule, a child below the age of seven 9-: cannot be separated from the mother, e6cept if there is a compelling
reason to separate the child from the mother. 9+rt. $1@, 1amily Code:. owever, if the child is seven 9-: years old
and above, he has a right of choice of the parent with whom he would li<e to stay with and the court must consider
it. Fut even if the child has chosen one of his parents, if the best interest of the child would be served if the choice
is not considered, the court may give the custody of the child to another. This is so because the best interest of the
child is of paramount importance.
Article (". 4he eLects 3rovi1e1 for 0& 3aragra3hs -!,, -.,, -', an1 -(, of Article '. an1 0& Article ''
shall also a33l& in the 3ro3er cases to /arriages 9hich are 1eclare1 voi1 ab initio or ann%lle1 0& Fnal
B%1g/ent %n1er Articles '" an1 '(. 4he Fnal B%1g/ent in s%ch cases shall 3rovi1e for the li2%i1ation,
3artition an1 1istri0%tion of the 3ro3erties of the s3o%ses, the c%sto1& an1 s%33ort of the co//on
chil1ren, an1 the 1eliver& of their 3res%/3tive legiti/es, %nless s%ch /atters ha1 0een a1B%1icate1 in
3revio%s B%1icial 3rocee1ings.
All cre1itors of the s3o%ses as 9ell as of the a0sol%te co//%nit& or the conB%gal 3artnershi3 shall 0e
notiFe1 of the 3rocee1ings for li2%i1ation.
(% | P a g e
In the 3artition, the conB%gal 19elling an1 the lot on 9hich it is sit%ate1, shall 0e a1B%1icate1 in
accor1ance 9ith the 3rovisions of Articles "! an1 !#.
Since this immediatelyI5uoted provision directs the court ta<ing jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage
to resolve the custody of common children, by mere motion of either party, it could only mean that the 7ling of a
new action is not necessary for the court to consider the issue of custody of a minor.
The only e6plicit e6ception to the earlierI5uoted second paragraph of +rt. )% of the 1amily Code is when /such
matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings,H which is not the case here.
Article (. In sai1 3artition, the val%e of the 3res%/3tive legiti/es of all co//on chil1ren, co/3%te1
as of the 1ate of the Fnal B%1g/ent of the trial co%rt, shall 0e 1elivere1 in cash, 3ro3ert& or so%n1
sec%rities, %nless the 3arties, 0& /%t%al agree/ent B%1iciall& a33rove1, ha1 alrea1& 3rovi1e1 for s%ch
/atters.
4he chil1ren or their g%ar1ian, or the tr%stee of their 3ro3ert&, /a& asI for the enforce/ent of the
B%1g/ent.
4he 1eliver& of the 3res%/3tive legiti/es herein 3rescri0e1 shall in no 9a& 3reB%1ice the %lti/ate
s%ccessional rights of the chil1ren accr%ing %3on the 1eath of either or 0oth of the 3arentsE 0%t the
val%e of the 3ro3erties alrea1& receive1 %n1er the 1ecree of ann%l/ent or a0sol%te n%llit& shall 0e
consi1ere1 as a1vances on their legiti/e. -n,
4n the proceedings for the li5uidation of the community of properties, the creditors shall be noti7ed. This is for the
protection
of the creditors where they would come forward to present their claims against the absolute community of
properties or the conjugal partnership. So that if they can prove their credits, the court would order the payment.
4n the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling is, as a rule, given to the spouse with whom majority of the
children choose
to remain. 9+rt. 1%$, 1amily Code:. The rule is not absolute, because there can be a contrary agreement between
the spouses. 4t means that even if the majority of the children had chosen the mother, if the spouses agreed that
the conjugal dwelling shall be given to the husband, then the agreement must be respected by the court as it is the
law between them. 9+rt. 11)&, #CC:. 4n case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, but such decision
should ta<e the best interest of the children. 9+rt. 1%$, 1amily Code> See also +rt. 1$&, 1amily Code:.
Article (!. 4he B%1g/ent of ann%l/ent or of a0sol%te n%llit& of the /arriage, the 3artition an1
1istri0%tion of the 3ro3erties of the s3o%ses, an1 the 1eliver& of the chil1renGs 3res%/3tive legiti/es
shall 0e recor1e1 in the a33ro3riate civil registr& an1 registries of 3ro3ert&E other9ise, the sa/e shall
not aLect thir1 3ersons. -n,
Article (.. Either of the for/er s3o%ses /a& /arr& again after co/3l&ing 9ith the re2%ire/ents of the
i//e1iatel& 3rece1ing ArticleE other9ise, the s%0se2%ent /arriage shall 0e n%ll an1 voi1.
NO4ES:
+rticle )$ re5uires the registration of the judgment annulling the marriage, or the decree declaring the marriage
void, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses as well as the delivery of the children8s presumptive legitimes in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property. 4f they do not comply with the re5uirement of recording,
then, the same shall not a;ect third persons.
Gne 5uestion has been as<ed. If the& 1i1 not co/3l& 9ith the re2%ire/ent of recor1ing in Article (! of the
7a/il& Co1e an1 the& contracte1 s%0se2%ent /arriages, are the /arriages vali1; 4t is believed that they
are void, as the law says that either of the former spouse may marry again after compliance with the re5uirements
of the provisions of +rticle )$.
Article ('. Chil1ren conceive1 or 0orn 0efore the B%1g/ent of ann%l/ent or a0sol%te n%llit& of the
/arriage %n1er Article .J has 0eco/e Fnal an1 e5ec%tor&, shall 0e consi1ere1 legiti/ate. Chil1ren
conceive1 or 0orn of the s%0se2%ent /arriage %n1er Article (. shall liIe9ise 0e legiti/ate.
Prescinding from said rule, suppose there is a marriage of + and F, which has been declared void by reason of
/psychological
incapacity.H Gn appeal, C was conceived or born. The child C, is legitimate because the judgment is not yet 7nal and
e6ecutory.
The reason for the legitimacy of such children born or conceived as referred to in +rticles )(, @C and )@ of the
1amily Code is obvious.
The children cannot be blamed for the misfortunes or misgivings of their parents. 4n fact, a child born within
wedloc< is presumed to be legitimate. +nyone who alleges the illegitimacy of such child has the burden to prove it.
Knder +rticle )@, the marriage subse5uently contracted by any one of the spouses in violation of the rule in +rticle
)$ is void. Foth are void marriages, but these two marriages can produce legitimate children provided that they
were conceived prior to the judgment that declares them void and that has become 7nal and e6ecutory.
The marriages in +rticles @C and )@ of the 1amily Code can produce legitimate children because without their
defects, they would have been valid
SUMMARY on. 4itle II 6EGA6 SEAARA4ION
Article ((. A 3etition for legal se3aration /a& 0e Fle1 on an& of the follo9ing gro%n1s:
-, Re3eate1 3h&sical violence or grossl& a0%sive con1%ct 1irecte1 against the 3etitioner, a co//on
chil1, or a chil1 of the 3etitionerE
-!, Ah&sical violence or /oral 3ress%re to co/3el the 3etitioner to change religio%s or 3olitical
aCliationE
-., Atte/3t of res3on1ent to corr%3t or in1%ce the 3etitioner, a co//on chil1, or a chil1 of the
3etitioner, to engage in 3rostit%tion, or connivance in s%ch corr%3tion or in1%ce/entE
-', 7inal B%1g/ent sentencing the res3on1ent to i/3rison/ent of /ore than si5 &ears, even if
3ar1one1E
(1 | P a g e
-(, *r%g a11iction or ha0it%al alcoholis/ of the res3on1entE
-J, 6es0ianis/ or ho/ose5%alit& of the res3on1entE
-+, Contracting 0& the res3on1ent of a s%0se2%ent 0iga/o%s /arriage, 9hether in the Ahili33ines or
a0roa1E
-), Se5%al inF1elit& or 3erversionE
-#, Atte/3t 0& the res3on1ent against the life of the 3etitionerE or
-", A0an1on/ent of 3etitioner 0& res3on1ent 9itho%t B%stiFa0le ca%se for /ore than one &ear.
7or 3%r3oses of this Article, the ter/ Schil1T shall incl%1e a chil1 0& nat%re or 0& a1o3tion. -#+a,
There are two <inds of divorce namely. 91: absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimoniiA 9$: relative divorce, or a mensa
et thoro. The
former dissolves the marriage tie and the divorcees are free to marry again, while the latter does not dissolve the
marriage bond> they are only entitled to live apart from bed and board. The latter one is that which is adopted in
the Philippines and is otherwise <nown as legal separation.
A!ultery is committed when a married woman has carnal <nowledge with a man other than her husband.
Concubinage is committed
when a married man performs the following acts. 91: by <eeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling> 9$: by
cohabiting with her in any other place> 9@: having carnal <nowledge with a woman other than his wife under
scandalous circumstances.
+ttempt to <ill is su?cient. There is no need for conviction. owever, if there was a mere recIless or i/3r%1ent
act, where there is no intent to <ill, as when one spouse accidentally hit the other while driving their car, the act
does not constitute a ground for legal separation. This is so because of the use of the word /attemptH which
presupposes the e6istence of intent.
Conviction is not necessar& 0efore legal se3aration /a& 3ros3er.
4s conviction necessary before action for legal separation may prosperJ
No, said the Supreme Court in &an!ionco vs. Mon. 6eEaran!a, et al., =I-$&*(, #ovember $-, 1&*-. + decree of
legal separation, on
the ground of concubinage, may issue upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation.
=i<ewise, support pen!ente lite can be availed of in an action for legal separation and is granted at the discretion of
the judge.
9+raneta vs. Concepcion, et al., && Phil. -%&:. 4f petitioner 7nds the amount of support pen!ente lite ordered as too
onerous, he can always 7le a motion to modify or reduce the same.
Article (J. 4he 3etition for legal se3aration shall 0e 1enie1 on an& of the follo9ing gro%n1s:
-, Khere the aggrieve1 3art& has con1one1 the oLense or act co/3laine1 ofE
-!, Khere the aggrieve1 3art& has consente1 to the co//ission of the oLense or act co/3laine1 ofE
-., Khere there is connivance 0et9een the 3arties in the co//ission of the oLense or act constit%ting
the gro%n1 for legal se3arationE -', Khere 0oth 3arties have given gro%n1 for legal se3arationE
-(, Khere there is coll%sion 0et9een the 3arties to o0tain the 1ecree of legal se3arationE or
-J, Khere the action is 0arre1 0& 3rescri3tion. -""a,
Con1onation is the forgiveness of a marital o;ense. Condonation may be e6press or implied. 4t has been said that
condonation comes after the commission of the act constituting a ground for legal separation. Condonation is
implied from se6ual intercourse after <nowledge of the other8s in7delity. Such act necessarily implies forgiveness.
Consent may come prior to the act of in7delity. 4n fact, in People vs. %c)nec@enburger, the parties agreed in
writing that they would separate and can ta<e other partners. The Supreme Court said that if one of the parties
ta<es another woman, the wife cannot secure a decree of legal separation because of a prior consent to the
in7delity.
Connivance is the corrupt consenting by one spouse to an o;ense by the other, and will bar a suit for legal
separation.
Illustration: > in pari elicto?
+ is married to F. + caught F in Oagrante !elicto of having se6ual intercourse with R. The following day, F li<ewise
caught + in Oagrante !elicto of having se6ual intercourse with L. #either of them can go to court to see< for relief
because they are both guilty.
The coll%sion between the parties in an action for legal separation may cause the denial of the action. 4t is
suspected that
there is collusion between the parties if the defendant does not 7le an answer despite service of summons. ence,
it is incumbent upon the court to order the prosecuting attorney or 7scal assigned to it to ta<e steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to ta<e care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 9+rt. C%, 1amily
Code:.
4AHE NO4E: Arescri3tive &ear is ( &ears XRX
Co%rt can taIe B%1icial notice of 3rescri3tion.
+ and F are married. 4n F8s action for legal separation, she alleged that in 1&*$, she discovered that + committed
concubinage.
The action was 7led on #ovember @, 1&&1. 4f you were the judge, would you dismiss the action even if prescription
is not alleged in
the answerJ 0hyJ
($ | P a g e
Ans9er:
Les. 4n *ro+n vs. Dambao, "! Ahil. J), it was held that it is true that the wife has not interposed prescription
as a defense.
#evertheless, the courts can ta<e cognizance thereof, because actions see<ing a decree of legal separation, or
annulment of marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued, if any
legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
4f prescription is apparent from the allegations in the complaint for legal separation, the court can dismiss it motu
proprio. 4f
prescription is not interposed as a defense but becomes manifest after trial, the court may still dismiss the
complaint motu proprio. This is a means employed by the State to preserve the sanctity of the marriage and the
solidarity of the family.
*eath of a 3art& a0ates an action for legal se3aration. Case:
6a3%@?S& vs. E%fe/io '. SCRA ++
7acts:
This is a petition 7led by the heir of the deceased to dismiss the case for legal separation on the ground that the
death of the plainti; Carmen G. =apuzISy, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of
action, as well as the action itself.
Iss%e:
,oes the death of the plainti; before 7nal decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the actionJ 4f it does, will
abatement also
apply if the action involves property rightsJ
8el1:
+n action for legal separation which involves nothing more than bedIandIboard separation of the spouses is purely
personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its +rticle 1%%, by allowing only the innocent spouse to
claim legal separation, and in +rt. 1%*, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Feing personal in character, it follows
that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself 2 actio personalis moritur cum
persona.
+n action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plainti;, even if property rights are involved, these
rights are mere e;ects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself. 0ithout the decree, such rights
do not come into e6istence, so that before the 7nality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in e6pectation. 4f
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical
and de7nite separation and the e6pected conse5uential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
4AHE NO4E:
The spouses shall be entitled to live separately> that a petition for legal separation 7led in bad faith by a spouse
cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support>
Article (). An action for legal se3aration shall in no case 0e trie1 0efore si5 /onths shall have ela3se1
since the Fling of the 3etition. -"., 9 cooling o; period:
The basic purpose of the law in suspending the trial of an action for legal separation until after the lapse of C
months since its 7ling
is to give the parties an elbow room to reconcile. 9+raneta vs. Concepcion, && Phil. -%&> SomosaI"amos vs.
Mamenta, 'r., et al., (C
SC"+ 11%:. 1or, if there is reconciliation prior to the trial, the court can dismiss the action. 4n fact, even after a
judgment has been
rendered, if the parties manifest that they have already reconciled, the Court in the same proceedings can still set
aside the decree of legal separation. 4t was li<ewise ruled in 6acete vs. Carriaga, (& SC+, C-@, $@1 SC"+ @$1, that
legal separation must not be tried before C months have elapsed since the 7ling of the petition.
Article (#. No legal se3aration /a& 0e 1ecree1 %nless the Co%rt has taIen ste3s to9ar1s the
reconciliation of the s3o%ses an1 is f%ll& satisFe1, 1es3ite s%ch eLorts, that reconciliation is highl&
i/3ro0a0le.
Article J". No 1ecree of legal se3aration shall 0e 0ase1 %3on a sti3%lation of facts or a confession of
B%1g/ent.
In an& case, the Co%rt shall or1er the 3rosec%ting attorne& or Fscal assigne1 to it to taIe ste3s to
3revent coll%sion 0et9een the 3arties an1 to taIe care that the evi1ence is not fa0ricate1 or
s%33resse1. -"a,
#o decree of legal separation can be issued on the basis of stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. 4n fact,
even under
+rticle $%@) of the Civil Code, the parties cannot compromise on the ground for legal separation. Such a stipulation
or confession may be evidence of connivance, or collusion between the parties. owever, if aside from confession
of judgment, there is evidence aliun!e to prove a ground for legal separation, still, it can be granted.
Article J. After the Fling of the 3etition for legal se3aration, the s3o%ses shall 0e entitle1 to live
se3aratel& fro/ each other. 4he co%rt, in the a0sence of a 9ritten agree/ent 0et9een the s3o%ses,
shall 1esignate either of the/ or a thir1 3erson to a1/inister the a0sol%te co//%nit& or conB%gal
3artnershi3 3ro3ert&. 4he a1/inistrator a33ointe1 0& the co%rt shall have the sa/e 3o9ers an1 1%ties
as those of a g%ar1ian %n1er the R%les of
Co%rt. -"'a,
Article J.. 4he 1ecree of legal se3aration shall have the follo9ing eLects:
-, 4he s3o%ses shall 0e entitle1 to live se3aratel& fro/ each other, 0%t the /arriage 0on1s shall not
0e severe1E
-!, 4he a0sol%te co//%nit& or the conB%gal 3artnershi3 shall 0e 1issolve1 an1 li2%i1ate1 0%t the
oLen1ing s3o%se shall have no right to an& share of the net 3roFts earne1 0& the a0sol%te
co//%nit& or the conB%gal 3artnershi3, 9hich shall 0e forfeite1 in accor1ance 9ith the 3rovisions of
Article '.-!,E
(@ | P a g e
-., 4he c%sto1& of the /inor chil1ren shall 0e a9ar1e1 to the innocent s3o%se, s%0Bect to the
3rovisions of Article !. of this Co1eE an1
-', 4he oLen1ing s3o%se shall 0e 1is2%aliFe1 fro/ inheriting fro/ the innocent s3o%se 0& intestate
s%ccession. Moreover, 3rovisions in favor of the oLen1ing s3o%se /a1e in the 9ill of the innocent
s3o%se shall 0e revoIe1 0& o3eration of la9. -"Ja,
The guilty spouse shall be dis5uali7ed from inheriting from the innocent spouse under the law of intestacy. The
reason is based on
the grounds of unworthiness and indignity. Fut it must be noted that the dis5uali7cation is from intestacy> but not
from testacy, hence, if after a decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse would e6ecute a will instituting the
guilty spouse as an heir, the institution is valid since the institution is a matter of right of the testator. 4n fact, such
institution can even be considered as a condonation of the act or acts of the guilty spouse.
The law further provides that if prior to the act that gave rise to legal separation, the innocent spouse has already
e6ecuted a will
instituting the guilty spouse, then, such institution is revo<ed by operation of law. The testator need not even
perform a positive act of revocation as it is by operation of law.
Article J'.
The law provides for other e;ects of legal separation, such as.
91: the innocent spouse may revo<e donations made by himA her to the o;ending spouse>
9$: the innocent spouse may revo<e the designation of the guilty spouse as bene7ciary in any insurance policy even
if such designation is stipulated as irrevocable> The revocation of the donation must be recorded in the proper
registry of property where the property is located. This is to protect the parties against the rights of innocent third
persons.
Illustration:
+, prior to his marriage to F, donated real property to the latter. 4t was registered later under her name, but
1% years after their marriage, F gave rise to a cause for legal separation. + sued for legal separation and it was
granted, pronouncing F as the guilty spouse. + revo<ed the donation but the revocation was not recorded in the
registry of property. 4n the meantime, or after the revocation, F sold the property to C, a buyer in good faith
and for value, and obtained a title. The revocation is not e;ective as against C, the buyer in good faith and for value
because of the protection given by the Torrens System to a buyer in good faith and for value. 1or C need not even
loo< beyond the title of F to determine if there is a defect therein. 4n fact, +rticle C( of the Code says that
alienations,
liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation is registered in
the registries of property shall be respected.
The law further says that the revocation is not by operation of law. There must be an action 7led in court to that
e;ect and the law
prescribes a period of 7ve years from the time the decree of legal separation has become 7nal. That means that the
inaction of the
innocent spouse for 7ve years is e5uivalent to a waiver of his right to revo<e the donation as this is a right that can
be waived whether impliedly or e6pressly and the waiver is valid. Gn the matter of the revocation of the designation
in an insurance policy, the law re5uires for its e;ectivity that a written notice be given to the insured.
Article JJ. 4he reconciliation referre1 to in the 3rece1ing Article shall have the follo9ing
conse2%ences:
-, 4he legal se3aration 3rocee1ings, if still 3en1ing, shall there0& 0e ter/inate1 at 9hatever stageE
an1
-!, 4he Fnal 1ecree of legal se3aration shall 0e set asi1e, 0%t the se3aration of 3ro3ert& an1 an&
forfeit%re of the share of the g%ilt& s3o%se alrea1& eLecte1 shall s%0sist, %nless the s3o%ses
agree to revive their for/er 3ro3ert& regi/e. 4he co%rt or1er containing the foregoing shall 0e
recor1e1 in
the 3ro3er civil registries. -")a,
Article J+. 4he agree/ent to revive the for/er 3ro3ert& regi/e referre1 to in the 3rece1ing Article
shall 0e e5ec%te1 %n1er oath an1 shall s3ecif&:
-, 4he 3ro3erties to 0e contri0%te1 ane9 to the restore1 regi/eE
-!, 4hose to 0e retaine1 as se3arate 3ro3erties of each s3o%seE an1
-., 4he na/es of all their Ino9n cre1itors, their a11resses an1 the a/o%nts o9ing to each.
4he agree/ent of revival an1 the /otion for its a33roval shall 0e Fle1 9ith the co%rt in the sa/e
3rocee1ing for legal se3aration, 9ith co3ies of 0oth f%rnishe1 to the cre1itors na/e1 therein. After
1%e hearing, the co%rt shall, in its or1er, taIe /eas%res to 3rotect the interest of cre1itors an1 s%ch
or1er shall 0e recor1e1 in the
3ro3er registries of 3ro3erties.
4he recor1ing of the or1er in the registries of 3ro3ert& shall not 3reB%1ice an& cre1itor not liste1 or
not notiFe1, %nless the 1e0tor?s3o%se has s%Ccient se3arate 3ro3erties to satisf& the cre1itorGs
clai/. -#(a, ")a,
CASES:
&apuA$%# vs. 'u(emio 47 %CRA .//
7AC4S:
Carmen =apuzISy 7led a petition for legal separation against Bufemio Bufemio on +ugust 1&)@. They
were married civilly on September $1, 1&@( and canonically after nine days. They had lived together
as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1&(@ when her husband abandoned her.
They ac5uired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited
with a Chinese woman named !o io< on or about 1&(&. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of
(( | P a g e
legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Bufemio should be deprived of
his share of the conjugal partnership pro7ts.
Bufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with =apuzISy on the ground of
his prior and subsisting marriage with !o io<. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. owever, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to
present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on 3ay 1&C&. er counsel duly
noti7ed the court of her death. Bufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on 'une
1&C& on the grounds that the said petition was 7led beyond the oneIyear period provided in +rticle 1%$
of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner8s
counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, 3acario =apuz.
ISSUE: Khether the 1eath of the 3laintiL, 0efore Fnal 1ecree in an action for legal
se3aration, a0ate the action an1 9ill it also a33l& if the action involve1 3ro3ert& rights.
8E6*:
+n action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plainti;, even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere e;ects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself>
without the decree such rights do not come into e6istence, so that before the 7nality of a decree, these
claims are merely rights in e6pectation. 4f death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no
decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and de7nitive separation> and the
e6pected conse5uential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Bufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the 5uestioned union.
+ny property rights ac5uired by either party as a result of +rticle 1(( of the Civil Code of the
Philippines C could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or
by the heirs of the appellant.
TTTTTTT
6egal se3aration alone is not a gro%n1 for 9ifeYs change of na/e. A 9o/anGs /arrie1
stat%s is not aLecte1 0& a 1ecree of legal se3aration, there 0eing no severance of the
vinc%l%/, an1 %n1er Article .+! of the Ne9 Civil Co1e, she /%st contin%e %sing the na/e
an1 s%rna/e e/3lo&e1 0& her 0efore the se3aration.
Z 4t is doubtful whether "ule 1%@ of the "ules of Court, which refers to change of name in general, may
prevail over the speci7c provisions of +rticle @-$ of the #ew Civil Code with regard to married women
legally separated from their husbands. Bven, however, applying "ule 1%@, the fact of legal separation
alone is not su?cient ground to justify a change of name, because to hold otherwise, would be to
provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of said +rticle @-$.
7acts. 4n 1&)*, petitioner Blisea =. Santamaria was decreed legally separated from her husband
Bnri5ue ". Santamaria. 4n 1&C%, she 7led a petition to be allowed to change her name andAor be
permitted to resume using her maiden name Blisea =aperal. The City +ttorney of Faguio opposed the
petition on the ground that the same violates the provisions of +rticle @-% 9should be @-$: of the Civil
Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the "ules of Court.
The court denied the petition. Kpon petitionerPs motion, however, the court, treating the petition as
one for change of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow
petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her
married name would give rise to confusion in her 7nances and the eventual li5uidation of the conjugal
assets. ence, this appeal by the State.
Iss%es:
Sho%l1 3etitioner 0e allo9e1 to change her na/e or 0e 3er/itte1 to res%/e %sing her
/ai1en na/e;
8el1:
No. +rticle @-$ of the Civil Code reads.
+"T. @-$. 0hen legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation.
The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been
decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so
because her married status is una;ected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.
4t seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her
unchanged status for the bene7t of all concerned.
Bven applying "ule 1%@, the fact of legal separation alone 2 which is the only basis for the petition 2
() | P a g e
is, not a su?cient ground to justify a change of the name of petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be
to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of +rticle @-$.
The 7nding that petitioner8s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her
7nances was without basis. 4t must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation
in 1&)*, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Bnri5ue had automatically been
dissolved and li5uidated. ence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual li5uidation of the
conjugal assets. >&aperal vs Republic, GR No. &$.1331, October 73, .852?.
RRRRRRRRRRRR
Ma& a /arrie1 9o/an revert to %se of /ai1en na/e in 3ass3ort 1%ring s%0sistence of
/arriage
7acts:
Mirgie F. 3ora is married to 1rancisco ". "allonza. 4n her passport, the following entries appeared.
/"allonzaH as her surname, /3aria MirginiaH as her given name, and /"emoH as her middle name. She
applied for the renewal of her passport with the ,epartment of 1oreign +;airs 9,1+: o?ce in Chicago,
4llinois, KS+ with a re5uest to revert to her maiden name and surname 9Mirgie F. 3ora: in the
replacement passport. The ,1+ denied the re5uest.

R%ling:
"+ *$@&, the Philippine Passport +ct of 1&&C, and its implementing rules and regulations do not
prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. The ,1+ in fact allows a
married woman who applies for a passport for the 7rst time to use her maiden name. 4n the case of
renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband8s surname or continuously use
her maiden name. owever, once a married woman opts to adopt her husband8s surname in her
passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name e6cept in cases of. 91: death of husband,
9$: divorce, 9@: annulment, or 9(: declaration of nullity of marriage. Since Mirgie8s marriage to her
husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport -Re/o vs.
Secretar& of 7oreign ALairs, G.R. J#!"!, March (, !"",.
RRRRRR
I cannot Fn1 Aeo3le vs Sche9eIen0%rger - 3lease refer a0ove /entione1 case,
RRRRRR
7ili3ina Kife No 6onger G%ilt& of A1%lter&
Case: Aeo3le vs Sansano an1 Ra/os (# Ahil. +.
7acts of the Case: + and F, husband and wife, respectively, were legally married. =ater, F abandoned
+. F =ived with C. + did nothing to interfere with the relations of his wife and her paramour. e event
went to awaii, completely abandoning his wife F for more than seven years. =ater, + returned and
charged F and C with adultery.
Iss%e: Is : g%ilt& of a1%lter&;
*ecision of the S%3re/e Co%rt: F should be ac5uitted because +Ps conduct warranted the
inference that in truth, as well as in fact, he had consented to the philandering of his wife.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
7C, (J. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds.
91: 0here the aggrieved party has condoned the o;ense or act complained of>
9$: 0here the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the o;ense or act complained of>
9@: 0here there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the o;ense or act constituting
the ground for legal separation>
9(: 0here both parties have given ground for legal separation>
9): 0here there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation> or
9C: 0here the action is barred by prescription.
Aeo3le v. Sansano an1 Ra/os
(acts. Mentura left Sansano for @ years without writing to her or sending support. Sansano began to
live with "amos. 0hen Mentura returned, he 7led adultery charges against Sansano and "amos. Foth
were convicted. +fter serving sentence Sansano as<ed Mentura to ta<e her bac< but he told her to do
what she wanted. She again lived with "amos. Mentura went abroad for - years. 0hen he returned to
the Philippines, he 7led a second charge of adultery and 7led a case for legal separation. Mel!. Mentura
consented to the adulterous relations of his wife. e is therefore barred from instituting a case for
adultery. The sole purpose of 7ling the charge is to use it as a ground for legal separation.
TTTTTTTTTTTT
:ene1icto vs. *ela Ra/a
7acts:
1.G# 'uly ), 1&%$, the C14 entered a 7nal judgment decreeing a divorce to the plainti; 9+gueda
Fenedicta dela "ama: on the ground of husband8s adultery and ordered Bsteban ,ela "ama to pay
(C | P a g e
her P*1,%($.-C due her as her unpaid share of the property belonging to the conjugal partnership, as
well as the sum of P@,$%% as an allowance for their support.
Iss%e: Khether the C7I has B%ris1iction to hear 1ivorce cases;
R%ling:
The partidas recognized adultery as a ground for divorce. Therefore, according to the civil as well
as the canonical law in force here on +ugust 1@, 1*&*, the commission of that o;ense gave the injured
party the right to a divorce. That provision of the substantive civil law was not repealed by the change
of sovereignty. The complete separation under the +merican !overnment of church and state, while it
changed the tribunal in which this right should be enforced, could not a;ect the right itself. The fact
that the ecclesiastical courts no longer e6ercise such power is not important. The jurisdiction formerly
possessed by them is now vested in Courts of 1irst 4nstance, by virtue of +ct #o. 1@C. Section )C, 7rst
and 7fth paragraphs of that act, provides that VCourts of 1irst 4nstance shall have original jurisdiction,
7rst, in all civil actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation> 7fth, . . .
and in all such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for.V The result is
91: that Courts of 1irst instance have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for divorce>
9$: that the only ground therefore is adultery>
9@: that an action on that ground can be maintained by the husband against the wife, or by the wife
against the husband> and
9(: that the decree does not dissolve the marriage bond. The Court of 1irst 4nstance of 4loilo, therefore,
committed no error in assuming jurisdiction of this case.
9$: + motion for a new trial having been made in the court below on the ground that the 7ndings of
fact contained in the decision were not justi7ed by the evidence, it becomes necessary to e6amine
that evidence. The adultery of the defendant was duly proved. The 7nding that the plainti; had not
committed adultery is, however, plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. 1or the sin
of each one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other. Gur conclusion is that neither
one of the parties is entitled to a divorce. The result ma<es it unnecessary to consider that part of the
judgment which relates to the settlement of the conjugal partnership.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
Mat%0is v. Ara5e1es
7acts:
Petitioner and respondent agreed to separate. Petitioner 7led a complaint for legal separation and
change of surname. 4n 'anuary 1&)), respondent begun cohabitating with another. Petitioner instituted
the complaint in +pril 1&)C.
Iss%es:
1. 0hether or not the action had not yet prescribed.
$. +ssuming it had not yet prescribed, 0G# the agreement amounts to consent precluding the action
for legal separation.
8el1:
1. #o, it already prescribed.
+rticle 1%$ of the new Civil Code provides.
+n action for legal separation cannot be 7led e6cept within one year from and after the date on which
the plainti; became cognizant of the cause and within 7ve years from after the date when cause
occurred.
$. Les, there was already an e6press consent.
The condonation and consent here are not only implied but e6pressed. The law 9+rt. 1%% Civil Code:,
speci7cally provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there
has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. aving condoned andAor
consented in writing, the plainti; is now undeserving of the courtPs sympathy 9People vs.
Schenec<enburger, -@ Phil., (1@:.
TTTTTTTTTT
6imeneA vs. CaniAares
&$.2/83, August 7., .853
7AC4S:
'oel 'imenez, the petitioner, 7led a petition for the annulment of his marriage with "emedios Canizares
on the ground that the ori7ce of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male
organ for copulation. 4t has e6isted at the time of the marriage and continues to e6ist that led him to
leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court summoned and gave a
copy to the wife but the latter did not 7le any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to
physical e6amination and to 7le a medical certi7cate within 1% days. She was given another ) days to
comply or else it will be deemed lac< of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor
of the petitioner.
ISSUE: 0hether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.
8E6*:
(- | P a g e
The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend
herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. 4t is a wellI<nown fact that women in
this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical
e6amination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical e6amination in this case is not
selfIincriminating. She is not charged with any o;ense and li<ewise is not compelled to be a witness
against herself. 4mpotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The case was
remanded to trial court.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTT
6acson v. San $ose
-acts:
The spouses have been separated in fact for more than ) years. They had an amicable settlement
wherein they agree to dissolve their CP! subject to judicial approval.
<el:
The propriety of the dissolution of the CP! is manifest. The spouses have had a lengthy separation.
Separation of property between the spouses d the dissolution of the CP since is allowed by law
provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Such approval was obtained d it doesn8t appear that
they have creditors who will be prejudiced by the arrangements. Separation in fact for at least ) yrs
ma<es it proper to sever their 7nancial d proprietary interests. owever, in so approving the regime of
separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, this court does
not hereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses.
TTTTTTTTTTTTT
Re&es v. Ines?6%ciano
-acts: "eyes 7led for legal separation on the ground that her husband attempted to <ill her. She was
granted alimony pendente lite by the judge. usband claims that wife is not entitled to support
because she is facing a charge of adultery.
<el: 3ere allegation will not deprive the wife of her right to receive support pendente lite. +dultery
must be established by competent evidence. Support pendente lite comes from the conjugal funds and
not the personal funds of the husband.
TTTTTTTT
Contreras v. Macaraig
)ay 2-, 1-/9, 3izon, I.
-acts:
4n Sept. 1&C$, family driver told Blena Contreras that her husband 3acaraig was living with another
woman. She failed to verify the rumor from her husband. 4n +pril 1&C@, she heard rumors that her
husband was seen with another woman who was pregnant. 4n 3ay of the same year she once more
failed to ascertain the veracity of the allegations because she was afraid that it would precipitate a
5uarrel and drive him away. owever she 7nally found out about her husband`s mistress and the birth
of the latter`s child. 4n ,ecember 1&C@, wife 7nally met with her husband and pleaded him to give up
his mistress and return to the conjugal home, assuring him that all would be forgiven. e declined. 4n
the same month, she 7led suit for legal separation but the case was dismissed because prescription
had, according to the court, already ta<en place from Sept. 1&C$ when she had found out about her
husband`s illicit relationship from the family driver. The C+ dismissed the complaint because of
prescription.
Issue:
0G# the period of prescription is counted from Sept. 1&C$ or from ,ecember 1&C@.
<elERatio:
,ecember 1&C@. This was the only time when she became truly cognizant of her husband`s in7delity.
earsay information would not have been legally su?cient as a basis for legal separation.
TTTTTTTTTT
Ma2%ilan v. Ma2%ilan
(acts.
0ife convicted of adultery. usband 7led for ,eclaration of #ullity of 3arriage. ,uring preItrial,
spouses entered into a compromise agreement 9partial settlement of CP!:, which was given judicial
imprimatur.
Mel!. Moluntary separation of property may ta<e place while other cases are pending. Proceedings for
the same do not re5uire the intervention of the Solicitor !eneral. 1inal
6i2%i1ation an1 *issol%tion of Aro3ert&
(* | P a g e
7C, .+. Gnce the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains shall be li5uidated in conformity with this Code. ,uring the pendency of
the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall
pay for the support of the spouses and their children.
7C, .). +fter dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions
on complete separation of property shall apply.
7C, .#. The petition for separation of property and the 7nal judgment granting the same shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property.
7C, '". The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously ac5uired by creditors
7C, '. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, 7le
a motion in court for a decree reviving the property regime that e6isted between them before the
separation of property in any of the following instances. 91: 0hen the civil interdiction terminates> 9$:
0hen the absentee spouse reappears> 9@: 0hen the court, being satis7ed that the spouse granted the
power of administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power, authorizes the
resumption of said administration> 9(: 0hen the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a
decree of legal separation resumes common life with the other> 9): 0hen parental authority is
judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof> 9C: 0hen the spouses who have
separated in fact for at least one year, reconcile and resume common life> or 9-: 0hen after voluntary
dissolution of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed
upon the joint petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime. #o
voluntary separation of property may thereafter be granted. The revival of the former property regime
shall be governed by +rticle C-.
7C, '!. The administration of all classes of e6clusive property of either spouse may be transferred
by the court to the other spouse. 91: 0hen one spouse becomes the guardian of the other> 9$: 0hen
one spouse is judicially declared an absentee> 9@: 0hen one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction> or 9(: 0hen one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding
as an accused in a criminal case. 4f the other spouse is not 5uali7ed by reason of incompetence,
conNict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the
administrator.
(. Sole +dministration of Gther Spouse8s property
7C, '!. The administration of all classes of e6clusive property of either spouse may be transferred
by the court to the other spouse. 91: 0hen one spouse becomes the guardian of the other> 9$: 0hen
one spouse is judicially declared an absentee> 9@: 0hen one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction> or 9(: 0hen one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding
as an accused in a criminal case. 4f the other spouse is not 5uali7ed by reason of incompetence,
conNict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the
administrator.
B. "egime of Separate Property
7C, '.. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property relations
during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions of this
Chapter shall be suppletory.
7C, ''. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. 4t may be total or
partial. 4n the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute
community.
7C, '(. Bach spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate
estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or
her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the
marriage from his or her separate property.
7C, 'J. Foth spouses shall bear the family e6penses in proportion to their income, or, in case of
insu?ciency or default thereof, to the current mar<et value of their separate properties. The liabilities
of the spouses to creditors for family e6penses shall, however, be solidary.
1. Property "egimes of Knions 0ithout 3arriage
7C, '+. 0hen a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live e6clusively with
each other as husband and wife without the bene7t of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in e5ual shares and the property ac5uired by both of them
through their wor< or industry shall be governed by the rules on coIownership. 4n the absence of proof
to the contrary, properties ac5uired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained
by their joint e;orts, wor< or industry, and shall be owned by them in e5ual shares. 1or purposes of
this +rticle, a party who did not participate in the ac5uisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the ac5uisition thereof if the formerPs e;orts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household. #either party can encumber or dispose by
acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property ac5uired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. 0hen only one of the
parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coIownership shall
be forfeited in favor of their common children. 4n case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
(& | P a g e
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. 4n the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. 4n all
cases, the forfeiture shall ta<e place upon termination of the cohabitation.
7C, '). 4n cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding +rticle, only the properties
ac5uired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. 4n the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be e5ual. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. 4f one of the
parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coIownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership e6isting in such valid marriage. 4f the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding +rticle. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall li<ewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
=UIAO v. =UIAO G.R. No +J((J, $%l& "', !"!? 7orfeit%re of the Share -Aro3erties, of the
G%ilt& S3o%se in 6egal Se3aration Cases
7AC4S:

"ita C. Zuiao 9"ita: 7led a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Frigido F. Zuiao 9Frigido:.
"TC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their @ minor
children in favor of "ita and all remaining properties shall be divided e5ually between the spouses
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Frigido8s share, however, of the net pro7ts earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children because Frigido is the o;ending spouse.

#either party 7led a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period. +fter more than nine
months from the promulgation of the ,ecision, the petitioner 7led before the "TC a 3otion for
Clari7cation, as<ing the "TC to de7ne the term /#et Pro7ts Barned.H

"TC held that the phrase /#BT P"G14T B+"#B,H denotes /the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties of each Dof theE spouse and the debts.H 4t further held
that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children because the o;ending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net pro7ts earned,
pursuant to +rticles C@, #o. 9$: and (@, #o. 9$: of the 1amily Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a 5uo is wrong when it applied +rticle 1$& of the 1amily Code,
instead of +rticle 1%$. e argues that +rticle 1%$ applies because there is no other provision under the
1amily Code which de7nes net pro7ts earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

0hen a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. 0hatever property each spouse brings into the marriage,
and those ac5uired during the marriage 9e6cept those e6cluded under +rticle &$ of the 1amily Code:
form the common mass of the couplePs properties. +nd when the couplePs marriage or community is
dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, e5ually or in
the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally
owned.

4n this case, assuming arguendo that +rt 1%$ is applicable, since it has been established that the
spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided e5ually between them is simply the /net
pro7ts.H +nd since the legal separation decision states that the e share of Frigido in the net pro7ts
shall be awarded to the children, Frigido will still be left with nothing.

Gn the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under +rticle
1($ of the Civil Code, /the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate
property and income from their wor< or industry, and divide e5ually, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or bene7ts obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.H 1rom the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property
and debts. The law does not intend to e;ect a mi6ture or merger of those debts or properties between
the spouses. "ather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

4n the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are
considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the aboveIlisted
properties should be divided e5ually between the spouses andAor their respective heirs. owever,
since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net pro7ts of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to +rticle C@9$: of the 1amily Code.
+gain, lest we be confused, li<e in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be
accounted for in the guilty partyPs favor.
TTTTTTTTTT
<al1es v. R4C
)% | P a g e
-acts: Maldez and !omez sought for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under +rticle @C, which
the court granted.
<el: CoIownership is the property regime between the two since their marriage is void ab initio.
TTTTTTTTT
!ales vs. RTC 253 %CRA 22.
7AC4S:
+ntonio Maldez and Consuelo !omez were married in 1&-1 and begotten ) children. Maldez 7led a
petition in 1&&$ for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to +rticle @C of the 1amily Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and 'oa5uin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other @ siblings
are free to choose which they prefer.
!omez sought a clari7cation of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the li5uidation
of common property in /unions without marriageH. ,uring the hearing on the motion, the children 7led
a joint a?davit e6pressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: 0hether or not the property regime should be based on coIownership.
8E6*:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on coIownership. +ny property ac5uired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint e;orts. + party who did not
participate in the ac5uisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said party8s e;orts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
TTTTTTTTTTTTT
6AIN M. *I[O , G.R. No. +)"''Aetitioner,? vers%s
?MA. CARI*A* 6. *I[O, Aro/%lgate1:Res3on1ent. $an%ar& #, !"CARAIO, $.:
7AC4S:
Gn 1( 'anuary 1&&*, Petitioner and "espondent were married. Gn @% 3ay $%%1, petitioner 7led an
action for ,eclaration of #ullity of 3arriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under
+rticle @C of the 1amily Code. B6trajudicial service of summons was e;ected upon respondent who, at
the time of the 7ling of the petition, was already living in the Knited States of +merica. ,espite receipt
of the summons, respondent did not 7le an answer to the petition within the elementary period.
Petitioner later learned that respondent 7led a petition for divorceAdissolution of her marriage with
petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on $) 3ay $%%1. Petitioner also
learned that on ) Gctober $%%1, respondent married a certain 3anuel M. +lcantara.Trial court granted
petition for declaration of #ullity and dissolved the regime of absolute community of property.
Petitioner 7led a motion for partial reconsideration 5uestioning the dissolution of the absolute
community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with +rticles )% and )1 of the 1amily Code. Trial court partially granted the motion.D
ORIGINA6 RU6ING: S
+ ,BC"BB G1 +FSG=KTB #K==4TL G1 3+""4+!B shall only be issued upon compliance with +rticleDsE )%
and )1 of the 1amily Code.
T

NEK ONE: S
+ ,BC"BB G1 +FSG=KTB #K==4TL G1 3+""4+!B shall be issued after li5uidation, partition
an1 1istri0%tion of the 3artiesG 3ro3erties %n1er Article '+ of the 7a/il& Co1e.T
EPetitioner assails the 9new: ruling as well arguing that Section 1&91: of the "ule on ,eclaration
of +bsolute #ullity of #ull 3arriages and +nnulment of Moidable 3arriages 9the "ule: does not apply to
+rticle 1(- of the 1amily Code.
ISSUE:
0o# the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only
0e iss%e1 after li2%i1ation, 3artition, an1 1istri0%tion of the 3artiesG 3ro3erties %n1er
Article '+ of the
1amily Code
8E6*:
LBS 9they erred:. Sec 1& 91: of the "ule does not apply. 4t is clear from +rticle )% of the 1amily Code
that Section 1&91: of the "ule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
7nal judgment under +rticles (% 9bigamous: and () 9voidable: of the 1amily Code. 4n this case,
petitionerGs /arriage to res3on1ent 9as 1eclared void under +rt @C of the 1amily Code and not
under +rticle (% or (). Thus, what governs the li5uidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on coIownership. 4t is not necessary to li5uidate the properties of the
spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
S
0B"B1G"B, we +114"3 the ,ecision of the trial court with the 3G,414C+T4G# that the decree
of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finalit& of the trial co%rtGs 1ecision
)1 | P a g e
9itho%t 9aiting for the li2%i1ation, 3artition, an1 1istri0%tion of the 3artiesG 3ro3erties
%n1er Article '+ of the 7a/il&
Code.
T

NO4ES -3ertinent 3rovision,:Sec. #. *ecision. ? -,
4f the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute
nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with +rticles )% and
)1 of the 1amily Code as implemented under the "ule on =i5uidation, Partition and ,istribution of
Properties.
7C, Art. (".
The e;ects provided for by paragraphs 9$:, 9@:, 9(: and 9): of +rticle (@ and by +rticle (( shall also
apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by 7nal judgment under
+rticles (% and ().The 7nal judgment in such cases shall provide for the li5uidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the
delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings. +ll creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be noti7ed of the proceedings for li5uidation. 4n the partition, the conjugal dwelling
and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of +rticles
1%$ and 1$&.
7C, Art. (
. 4n said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the 7nal judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities,
unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may as< for the enforcement of
the judgment. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice
the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the
parents> but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute
nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. 9n:
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
CARINO <S CARINO
Article 43
4n 1&C& SPG( Santiago Carino married Susan #icdao Carino. e had $ children with her. 4n 1&&$, SPG(
contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Lee Carino. 4n 1&**, prior to his second marriage,
SPG( is already bedridden and he was under the care of Lee. 4n 1&&$, he died 1@ days after his
marriage with Lee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the bene7ts of SPG(. #icdao was able to
claim a total of P1(%,%%%.%% while Lee was able to collect a total of P$1,%%%.%%. 4n 1&&@, Lee 7led an
action for collection of sum of money against #icdao. She wanted to have half of the P1(%<. Lee
admitted that her marriage with SPG( was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage bAn
SPG( and #icdao but the said marriage between #icdao and SPG( is null and void due to the absence
of a valid marriage license as certi7ed by the local civil registrar. Lee also claimed that she only found
out about the previous marriage on SPG(8s funeral.
ISSUE: 0hether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invo<ed to claim presumptive
legitimes.
8E6*: The marriage between #icdao and SPG( is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage
license. The marriage between Lee and SPG( is li<ewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between #icdao and SPG(.
Knder +rticle (% of the 1C, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invo<ed for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a 7nal judgment declaring such previous marriage void. 3eaning,
where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invo<ed for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
in7rmity, is a 7nal judgment declaring the previous marriage void. owever, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. 1or other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to 5uestion the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. 4n such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary,
to prove the e6istence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier 7nal judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Lee has no right to the bene7ts earned by SPG( as a policeman for their marriage is
void due to bigamy> she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. 0ages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to
him or her e6clusively 9+rt. 1(* of 1C:. #icdao is entitled to the full bene7ts earned by SPG( as a cop
even if their marriage is li<ewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other
for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lac< of a marriage license> in
their situation, their property relations is governed by +rt 1(- of the 1C which provides that everything
they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been e5ually contributed by each party Q
this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not
have contributed at all.
TTTTTTTTTTT
Alca@ar v Alca@ar, G.R. No. +''(, Octo0er ., !""#
)$ | P a g e
7AC4S: Meronica and "ey got married. +fter their wedding, they lived in "ey8s house in Gccidental
3indoro. Then they returned to 3anila, but "ey did not live with Meronica in her home in Tondo. "ey
then left for "iyahd where he was wor<ing. e never contacted his wife since he left. +bout a year and
a half, Meronica was informed that her husband is coming home. Fut she was surprised that he did not
go directly to her in Tondo but to his house in 3indoro instead. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing su?cient cause
for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph ), +rticle () of the 1amily Code. "espondent
has been uncooperative to the investigation. ,r. Tayag testi7ed that "ey was su;ering from #arcissistic
Personality ,isorder, hence, it is a su?cient ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. "TC denied.
C+ also denied. ence, this petition.
ISSUE 0A# the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marriage
obligations
8E6*: SC denied. The action originally 7led was annulment of marriage based on +rticle (),
paragraph ) of the 1amily Code. +rticle ()9): of the 1amily Code refers to lac< of power to copulate.
D1CE 4ncapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform
the complete act of se6ual intercourse. #o evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that
respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner.
Petitioner even admitted during her crossIe6amination that she and respondent had se6ual intercourse
after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. Petitioner was actually see<ing for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latter8s psychological incapacity to
comply with his marital obligations of marriage under +rticle @C of the 1amily Code. he Court declared
that /psychological incapacityH under +rticle @C of the 1amily Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. 4t should refer, rather, to no less than a mental 9not physical: incapacity
that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by
TTTTTTT
<illan%eva vs. Co%rt of A33eals
G.R. No. .!#(( October 2/, 2335
P"GCB,K"+= 4STG"L.
This petition for review under "ule () of the "ules of Court assails the 'anuary $C, 1&&* ,ecision of the
Court of +ppeals in C+I!.". CM #o. )1*@$, a?rming with modi7cation the ,ecision dated 'anuary 1$,
1&&C of the "egional Trial Court of Malenzuela, 3etro 3anila, and Franch 1-$ in Civil Case #o. @&&-IMI
&$ 9a: dismissing petitioner8s petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and 9b:
ordering him to pay moral and e6emplary damages, attorney8s fees and costs. +lso assailed is the
3arch ), 1&&* "esolution denying petitioner8s motion for reconsideration.
7AC4S:
4n +pril 1&**, Grlando Millanueva married =ilia CanalitaI Millanueva before a trial court judge in Puerto
Princesa. 4n #ovember 1&&$, Grlando 7led before the trial court a petition for annulment of his
marriage. e claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry =ilia who was then
pregnant. Grlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to =ilia. e cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable
and wellIgrounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit. the harassing
phone calls from =ilia and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the
Kniversity of the Bast after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain ca Celso, a
supposed member of the #ew People8s +rmy whom appellant claimed to have been hired by =ilia and
who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. Gn the other hand =ilia
denied Grlando8s allegations and she said that Grlando freely cohabited with her after the marriage
and she showed 1( letters that shows Grlando8s a;ection and care towards her.
ISSUE:
9a: 0hether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent under +rticle ()
of the 1amily Code> and
A5SHCG:
5o. The court rule! that vitiation o consent is not atten!ant in this case.Therefore, the petition for
annulment, which is anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his consent, should be
dismissed.

REASONING:
The SC ruled that Grlando8s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. Gn its face, it is obvious
that Grlando is only see<ing to annul his marriage with =ilia so as to have the pending appealed
bigamy case D7led against him by =iliaE to be dismissed.
Gn the merits of the case, Grlando8s allegation of fear was not concretely established. The Court is not
convinced that appellant8s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him
of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. 4t is not disputed that at the time he was
allegedly being harassed, appellant wor<ed as a security guard in a ban<. !iven his employment at
that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant <new the rudiments of selfIdefense, or, at the very
)@ | P a g e
least, the proper way to <eep himself out of harm8s way. 1or sure, it is even doubtful if threats were
indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the
security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening
him. +nd neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
1raud cannot be raised as a ground as well. is allegation that he never had an erection during their
se6ual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. is counsel also conceded before the lower court
that his client had a se6ual relationship with =ilia.
8O6*ING:
Thus, the petition or annulment 2as grante!, "ut the a2ar! o moral and e6emplary damages
is 1elete1 for lac< of basis.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
4I46E:
ONE ENG HIAM a.I.a. KI66IAM ONG, petitioner vs 6UCI4A ONG, respondent
*A4E Gctober $%%C AONEN4E: '. +ustriaI3artinez
7AC4S
0illiam Gng and =ucita Gng were married on 'uly 1@, 1&-). Knion wasblessed with @ children. Gn
3arch $1, 1&&C, =ucita 7led a complaint for legalseparation under +rt )) 91: of 1C on grounds of
physical violence, threats,intimidation and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner. "TC granted prayer
for legalseparation. C+ upheld "TC8s decision when herein petitioner 7led a 3otion for"econsideration
93":. The clima6 of the couple8s drama was on ,ecember 1(, 1&&)when the respondent as<ed
petitioner to bring cingston, their son, bac< fromFacolod which turned into a violent 5uarrel with
the petitioner hitting therespondent on the head, left chee<, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately
pointing agun at respondent8s head as<ing her to leave the conjugal house.
ISSUES:

0hether or not C+ erred in upholding the "TC8s decision granting legalseparation to =ucita when she
herself has given ground for legal separation whenabandoned her family.

8E6*:
#o.
RA4IO:

4t is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted whenboth parties have given ground
for legal separation 9+rt )C 9(: 1C:. owever, theabandonment referred to in the 1amilu Code
is abandonment without justi7ablecause for more than one year. +lso, it was established that =ucita
left 0illiam due tohis abusive conduct which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated inthe
said provision.
*ISAOSI4ION:
Petition denied for lac< of merit
TTTTTTTTTTT
Mario Siochi vs. Alfre1o Go@on, Kinifre1 Go@on, Elvira Go@on Inter?*ei/ensional Realt&,
IncE GR No. J##""E March ), !""
7AC4S. +lfredo and Blvira are married. 0inifred is their daughter.The property involved in this case is a
@%,%%% s5. m. lot in 3alabon which is registered in the name of +lfredo. The property regime of the
couple is conjugal partnership of gains.
Blvira 7led for legal separation. F 7led a notice of lis pendens overthe title of the lot in 3alabon.
0hile the legal separation case was still pending, +lfredo entered into an agreement with 3ario who
paid P) million in earnest money and too< possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis
pendens.
Cavite "TC granted legal separation. CP! was dissolved and li5uidated. +lfredo, the guilty spouse, did
not receive his share in the net pro7ts, which instead went to their daughter, 0inifred. Cavite "TC ruled
land in 3alabon as conjugal property.
+lfred e6ecuted a ,eed of ,onation over the property in favour of 0inifred. 3alabon "TC issued new
TCT in the name of 0inifred without annotating the agreement between +lfredo and 3ario Siochi, nor
the notice of lis pendens 7led by Blvira, the wife. Then, through an SP+, 0inifred gave authority to her
father, +lfred, to sell the lot. +lfred sold it to 4nterI,imensional "ealty for P1* million. + TCT was issued
to 4nterI,imensional "ealty.
3ario 7led a case with 3alabon "TC 9property was in 3alabon: to +nnul donation to 0inifred, +nnul the
Sale to 4nterI,imensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land.
3alabon "TC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between3ario and +lfredo and declared
void the sale by +lfredo and 0inifred to 4nterI,imensional.
)( | P a g e
owever, Court of +ppeals said agreement between 3ario and +lfredo is void because 91: it was
entered into without the consent of Blvira, +lfredo8s wife> and, 9$: +lfredo8s e undivided share has
been forfeited in favour of 0inifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite "TC. 9#ote these
reasons given by the C+.:
ISSUES:
-, Kas the agree/ent 0et9een Mario an1 Alfre1o vali1; 3arioargues that even if the
sale to 3ario was done without the consent of Blvira, the sale should be treated as a continuing o;er
which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the o;er is
withdrawn. 3ario alleges that Blvira8s conduct showed her ac5uiescence to the sale.
SC says the C+ was right in declaring the sale between 3ario and +lfredo as void. Knder +rt 1$( of the
1amily Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the properties which re5uire a court
order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is void in its entirety, not just to the
share of the husband, +lfredo. The Court however said that the C+ erred in saying that the e undivided
share of +lfredo was forfeited in favour of 0inifred. +s regards 3ario8s contention that the +greement
is a continuing o;er which may be perfected by Blvira8s acceptance before the o;er is withdrawn, the
fact that the property was subse5uently donated by +lfredo to 0inifred and then sold to 4,"4 clearly
indicates that the o;er was already withdrawn.
The Court said the C+ erred in saying that +lfredo forfeited his e share in the conjugal property as a
result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite "TC. +rt C@ 9B;ects of legal separation: in relation
to +rt (@9$: 9B;ects of termination of subse5uent marriage: provides that the guilty spouse in legal
separation forfeits his share in the net pro7ts of the property. The Court said, /Clearly, what is forfeited
in favor of 0inifred is not +lfredo8s share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net
pro7ts of the conjugal partnership property.H Thus, as regards this point, the C+ erred.
-!, Kas the 1onation to Kinifre1 vali1; #o, the donation was not valid. Blvira8s consent was
absent.
-., Kas the sale to Inter?*i/ensional vali1; 4nterI,imensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC
says no. 4nterI,imensional <new of the notice of lis pendens.
TTTTTTTTT
XRX en1 as to legal Se3aration
4itle III
RIG84S AN* O:6IGA4IONS :E4KEEN 8US:AN* AN* KI7E
Article +"? + $OIN4 SUAAOR4
$oint o0ligation to s%33ort the fa/il&E so%rce.
+s administrators of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership, the spouses are jointly responsible
for the
support of the family. 9See also +rt. 1&), 1amily Code:. Such support shall be ta<en from the following properties in
this order.
a: from the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership>
b: from the income or fruits of the separate properties of each spouse>
c: from the separate properties of the spouses.
Khen se3arate 3ro3erties are res3onsi0le for s%33ort. Support from the separate properties of each spouse
shall be
ta<en only if there is insu?ciency or absence of income or fruits of the separate properties of each spouse.
Gtherwise, support shall be satis7ed from the income or fruits of the separate properties of each spouse.
Article +!. Khen one of the s3o%ses neglects his or her 1%ties to the conB%gal %nion or co//its acts
9hich ten1 to 0ring 1anger, 1ishonor, or inB%r& to the other or to the fa/il&, the aggrieve1 3art& /a&
a33l& to the co%rt for relief.
Article +.. Either s3o%se /a& e5ercise an& legiti/ate 3rofession, occ%3ation, 0%siness or activit&
9itho%t the consent of the other. 4he latter /a& o0Bect onl& on vali1, serio%s, an1 /oral
gro%n1s.
In case of 1isagree/ent, the co%rt shall 1eci1e 9hether or not:
-, 4he o0Bection is 3ro3erE an1
-!, :eneFt has accr%e1 to the fa/il& 3rior to the o0Bection or thereafter. If the 0eneFt accr%e1 3rior to
the o0Bection, the res%lting o0ligation shall 0e enforce1 against the se3arate 3ro3ert&
of the s3o%se 9ho has not o0taine1 consent.
4he foregoing 3rovisions shall not 3reB%1ice the rights of cre1itors 9ho acte1 in goo1 faith.
9ta<e note of this mao ni <adto gi e6ample ni attorney nga confused ta:
E2%al rights of /an an1 9o/anE r%les.
The aboveI5uoted provision is a departure from the provisions of +rticle 11- of the Civil Code where it was only the
husband who
had the right to object if the wife would engage in or e6ercise a profession or occupation or business. #ow, the wife
has been given
)) | P a g e
the same right to object. 4f there is a disagreement between the husband and wife, then, the court shall decide
whether or not, the objection is proper and bene7t has already accrued to the family, prior to the objection or
thereafter. The objecting spouse has to present evidence to prove the justi7cation for the objection and that it has
not redounded to the bene7t of the family. + spouse cannot just object. There must be a good reason for the
objection.
R%les if 0%siness 0eneFte1 fa/il&.
There may be 5uestions on the matter of who is liable if bene7ts would accrue to the family. ere are certain
distinctions.
a: 4f bene7ts have accrued to the family before the objection, the absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership is liable for damages or the obligations incurred because all the pro7ts and income from the acts
or transactions of the spouse who acted without the consent of the other spouse became part of the absolute
community
of property or the conjugal partnership. The reason for this rule is that no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the
e6pense of another.
b: 4f bene7ts accrued after the objection, the separate property of the spouse who did not secure the consent of
the other shall be solely liable for obligations incurred.
c: The law says that creditors who acted in good faith are protected. So that, if one of the spouse transacted with a
creditor without the consent of the other spouse but the creditor did not <now of the absence of such consent, the
absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership shall be liable. This is particularly so if the
family bene7ted out of the transaction. +gain, the rule is that, no one shall enrich himself at the e6pense of
SUMMARY ON. 4itle I< AROAER4Y RE6A4IONS :E4KEEN 8US:AN* AN* KI7E
Cha3ter
General Arovisions
Article +'. 4he 3ro3ert& relations 0et9een h%s0an1 an1 9ife shall 0e governe1 in the follo9ing or1er:
-, :& /arriage settle/ents e5ec%te1 0efore the /arriageE
-!, :& the 3rovisions of this Co1eE an1
-., :& the local c%sto/s. -),
Article +(. 4he f%t%re s3o%ses /a&, in the /arriage settle/ents, agree %3on the regi/e of a0sol%te
co//%nit&,
conB%gal 3artnershi3 of gains, co/3lete se3aration of 3ro3ert&, or an& other regi/e. In the a0sence of
a /arriage settle/ent, or 9hen the regi/e agree1 %3on is voi1, the s&ste/ of a0sol%te co//%nit& of
3ro3ert& as esta0lishe1 in this Co1e shall govern. -#a,
Ares%/3tion that s3o%ses are governe1 0& a0sol%te co//%nit&.
4t is now a rule that if there is no agreement between the husband and wife, the property relationship between
them is absolute
community of property. This is a departure from the old rule that in the absence of any stipulation, the property
relationship shall be governed by the conjugal partnership regime. The rule also holds true if the regime agreed
upon is void.
Hin1s of 3ro3ert& regi/es.
The future spouses can agree on either of the following property regimes
a: absolute community>
b: conjugal partnership>
c: complete separation of property>
d: dowry system, where the wife would bring in property to help the husband in supporting the family, subject to
the
condition that at the end of the marriage the property or its value shall be returned.
Khen /arriage settle/ent /%st 0e /a1e.
The marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of the marriage and not thereafter in order that the
same may be
valid. 9+rticles -C and --, 1amily Code:. 4n fact, they cannot change it during the marriage e6cept as authorized by
law.
Article +J. In or1er that an& /o1iFcation in the /arriage settle/ents /a& 0e vali1, it /%st 0e /a1e
0efore the cele0ration of the /arriage, s%0Bect to the 3rovisions of Articles JJ, J+, !),
.( an1 .J. -!,
Article ++. 4he /arriage settle/ents an1 an& /o1iFcation thereof shall 0e in 9riting, signe1 0& the
3arties an1 e5ec%te1 0efore the cele0ration of the /arriage. 4he& shall not 3reB%1ice thir1 3ersons
%nless the& are registere1 in the local civil registr& 9here the /arriage contract is recor1e1 as 9ell as
in the 3ro3er registries of 3ro3ert&. -!!a,
Khen /arriage settle/ent /a& 0e change1.
The general rule is that, the parties cannot change or even modify their property relationship during the marriage.
+ny
modi7cation or change must be made before the celebration of the marriage. +ny agreement to the contrary is
void. 9Zuintana vs. =erma, $( Phil. $*)> Tim vs. ,el "io, @- G.!. @*C:.
E5ce3tions to the r%le.
0hile the general rule is that the parties cannot ma<e any change or modi7cation in their property relationship
during the
marriage, the rule however is not absolute. 4t admits of certain e6ceptions as provided for in the following rules.
9a: 4n case of legal separation, the property relationship of the spouses shall be dissolved. Fut in case of
reconciliation
between the parties, the 7nal decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any
)C | P a g e
forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already e;ected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their
former property regime. The court8s order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries.
9+rticle CC,
paragraph $, 1amily Code:. 4n this situation, while the parties may have originally agreed on the <ind of property
relationship
during the marriage, or even if there is none as the law presumes absolute community to govern them, the same
is dissolved in case of legal separation. 4n case of reconciliation between the parties, still, they are free to
revive their former property relationship or agree on another <ind. The agreement to revive must be with the
approval of the court. 9+rticle C-, 1amily Code:.
9b: Knder the provisions of +rticle C- of the 1amily Code, the agreement to revive the former property regime
referred to in the preceding +rticle shall be e6ecuted under oath and shall specify.
91: The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime>
9$: Those to be retained as separate properties of each spouse> and
9@: The names of all their <nown creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be 7led with the court in the same proceeding for
legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. +fter due hearing, the court shall, in
its order, ta<e measures to
protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. The
recording of the order in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not noti7ed, unless
the debtorIspouse has su?cient separate properties to satisfy the creditor8s claim.
9c: +nother e6ception is where a spouse without just cause abandons the other. 4n that case, the other spouse may
as< for judicial separation of property. 9+rticle 1$*, 1amily Code:.
9d: There may also be judicial separation of property on the following grounds.
/+rt. 1@). +ny of the following shall be considered su?cient cause for judicial separation of property.
/91: That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction>
/9$: That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee>
/9@: That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court>
/9(: That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the
family as provided for in +rticle 1%1>
/9): That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power> and
/9C: That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly
improbable.
/4n the cases provided for in #umbers 91:, 9$: and 9@:, the presentation of the 7nal judgment against the guilty or
absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.88 91&1a:
9e: 1inally, +rticle 1@C of the 1amily Code provides that the spouses may jointly 7le a veri7ed petition with the court
for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation
of their common properties.
+ll creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal
creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and noti7ed of the 7ling thereof. The court shall ta<e measures
to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. 4n short, the rule that there can be no change in
the
property relationship during the marriage is not absolute as it accepts of some e6ceptions. 0hat is important is that
the parties cannot just agree on any separation of properties during the marriage> they must go to court 7rst
and secure authority to do so. 4n case of nonIcompliance with such re5uirement, the agreement to separate
properties is void.
taIe note: Gn the other hand, if the parties agree to have a separation of properties, that agreement by itself
cannot be valid. 4t is still prohibited by +rticle -- of the Code. Fut under +rticle 1@C of the 1amily Code, they can
jointly 7le a petition for separation of
properties. So, if there was a prior agreement, such action can be 7led for the purpose of having their joint
agreement approved by the court.
Article +). A /inor 9ho accor1ing to la9 /a& contract /arriage /a& also e5ec%te his or her /arriage
settle/ents, 0%t the& shall 0e vali1 onl& if the 3erson 1esignate1 in Article ' to give consent to the
/arriage are /a1e 3arties to the agree/ent, s%0Bect to the 3rovisions of 4itle IP of this Co1e. -!"a,
Article +#. 7or the vali1it& of an& /arriage settle/ent e5ec%te1 0& a 3erson %3on 9ho/ a sentence of
civil inter1iction has 0een 3rono%nce1 or 9ho is s%0Bect to an& other 1isa0ilit&, it shall 0e
in1is3ensa0le for the g%ar1ian a33ointe1 0& a co/3etent co%rt to 0e /a1e a 3art& thereto. -!.a,
Article +) no longer a33lies.
,ue to the reduction of the age of majority to 1* years under ".+. #o. C*%&, the rule under +rticle -* may no longer
be applicable.
#o minor can get married, otherwise, it is void. The law is deemed repealed by ".+. #o. C*%&.
0ith respect to other persons, li<e those who have been sentenced with civil interdiction having been pronounced
or subject to
other disabilities, the law re5uires that a guardian be appointed for them by a court of competent jurisdiction. This
rule is so because a person under civil interdiction cannot e6ecute a document inter vivos, although he can do so
mortis causa. + marriage settlement ta<es e;ect during hisAher lifetime> hence, he needs a guardian to give his
consent to his marriage settlement.
STS 94mportante ni nga +rticle mao diay ni ang 5uestion no. $ sa ConNicts of =aw ni +tty CruzW: I 9+rt. *%:
Article )". In the a0sence of a contrar& sti3%lation in a /arriage settle/ent, the 3ro3ert& relations of
the s3o%ses shall 0e governe1 0& Ahili33ine la9s, regar1less of the 3lace of the cele0ration of the
/arriage an1 their resi1ence.
4his r%le shall not a33l&:
)- | P a g e
-, Khere 0oth s3o%ses are aliensE
-!, Kith res3ect to the e5trinsic vali1it& of contracts aLecting 3ro3ert& not sit%ate1 in the Ahili33ines
an1 e5ec%te1 in the co%ntr& 9here the 3ro3ert& is locate1E an1
-., Kith res3ect to the e5trinsic vali1it& of contracts entere1 into in the Ahili33ines 0%t aLecting
3ro3ert& sit%ate1 in a foreign co%ntr& 9hose la9s re2%ire 1iLerent for/alities for its e5trinsic vali1it&.
-!'a,
6a9 that governs 3ro3ert& relationsE r%les.
This is an application of the national law principle regardless of the place of celebration of the marriage. The law
applies if the
spouses are living in the Philippines or abroad, or even if they have properties located in the Philippines or abroad.
Their national law follows them wherever they are.
4f the spouses are aliens, their national law shall govern their property relationship. +gain, this is an application of
the national
law principle.
E5ce3tions.
The two 9$: e6ceptions under paragraphs $ and @ are applications of the principle of le1 situs.
Article ). Ever&thing sti3%late1 in the settle/ents or contracts referre1 to in the 3rece1ing articles in
consi1eration of a f%t%re /arriage, incl%1ing 1onations 0et9een the 3ros3ective s3o%ses /a1e
therein, shall 0e ren1ere1 voi1 if the /arriage 1oes not taIe 3lace. 8o9ever, sti3%lations that 1o not
1e3en1 %3on the cele0ration of the /arriage shall 0e vali1.
The rule is not, however, absolute. There may be stipulations in the marriage settlement which remain valid even if
the marriage
is not celebrated. +n e6ample is a stipulation where a natural child may be recognized. This remains valid even if
the marriage is not celebrated because this stipulation does not depend upon the celebration of the marriage for its
validity. 4f at all, the document
would be considered as an authentic writing.
Cha3ter !
*onations 0& Reason of Marriage
Article )!. *onations 0& reason of /arriage are those 9hich are /a1e 0efore its cele0ration, in
consi1eration of the sa/e, an1 in favor of one or 0oth of the f%t%re s3o%ses. -!J,
Article ).. 4hese 1onations are governe1 0& the r%les on or1inar& 1onations esta0lishe1 in 4itle III of
:ooI III of the Civil Co1e, insofar as the& are not /o1iFe1 0& the follo9ing articles. -!+a,
Re2%isites of 1onations propter nutias.
4n order that donations propter nuptias may be valid, the following re5uisites must be present.
9a: they must be made before the celebration of the marriage>
9b: they must be made in consideration of the marriage>
9c: they must be made in favor of one or both of the future spouses.
Knder +rticle *- of the 1amily Code, the spouses cannot donate or grant gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,
during the e6istence of the marriage, e6cept moderate gifts which the spouses may give during family celebrations
or rejoicings.
4t must be noted that a donation is an act of liberality by which a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in
favor of another, who accepts it. 9+rticle -$), #ew Civil Code:.
,onations by reason of marriage are li<ewise <nown as donations propter nuptias. They may even be made by third
persons in
favor of one or both the future spouses or by one spouse in favor of another. 4f made to only one of the spouses, the
same belongs to himA her as e6clusive property, e6cept if the donor provides that it shall form part of the absolute
community of properties. 9+rt. &$, 1amily Code:.
,onations propter nuptias are governed by the Statute of 1rauds in +rticle 1(%@ of the Civil Code as they are
agreements based upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry.
ence, to be enforceable, it must appear in writing pursuant to the Statute of 1rauds. Such writing need not be in a
public instrument. 4t may be in a private writing. This is true with respect to donations in consideration of marriage
but not in ordinary donations which re5uire a public instrument and acceptance. 9+rticle -(&, #ew Civil Code:.
Article )'. If the f%t%re s3o%ses agree %3on a regi/e other than the a0sol%te co//%nit& of 3ro3ert&,
the& cannot 1onate to each other in their /arriage settle/ents /ore than one?Ffth of their
3resent 3ro3ert&. An& e5cess shall 0e consi1ere1 voi1. *onations of f%t%re 3ro3ert& shall 0e governe1
0& the 3rovisions on testa/entar& s%ccession an1 the for/alities of 9ills. -."a,
6i/itation on 1onations 3rior to /arriage.
4mplicit from the law is that, if the spouses are governed by the absolute community regime, there is no limit as to
the e6tent of the
donation the future spouses may give to one another before or in consideration of the marriage. The reason for the
rule is, if the future spouses are governed by the absolute community property, the same is a virtual donation of
properties to one another before the marriage. +ll their properties e6cept those enumerated by +rticle &$ of the
1amily Code are put into a common fund to form parts of their absolute community properties.
4f they are governed by the conjugal partnership or complete separation of properties or dowry system, the limit of
the donations to one another before and in consideration of the marriage is only oneI7fth 91A): of their present
property.
,onations of future properties are allowed under the law, by way of an e6ception to +rticle -)1 of the Civil Code
which says that a future property is a thing which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of the donation. They
are governed by the law on testamentary succession, both as to their intrinsic validity and e6trinsic validity. They
can be reduced if they are ino?cious, but since they are donations propter nuptias, they cannot be revo<ed at will
or at the discretion of the donor. owever, they can be revo<ed on the basis of +rticle *C of the 1amily Code.
)* | P a g e
Article )(. *onations 0& reason of /arriage of 3ro3ert& s%0Bect to enc%/0rances shall 0e vali1. In
case of foreclos%re of the enc%/0rance an1 the 3ro3ert& is sol1 for less than the total a/o%nt of the
o0ligation sec%re1, the 1onee shall not 0e lia0le for the 1eFcienc&. If the 3ro3ert& is sol1 for /ore
than the total a/o%nt of sai1 o0ligation, the 1onee shall 0e entitle1 to the e5cess.
R%les if 3ro3ert& 1onate1 is enc%/0ere1.
+, the future spouse of F, donated a parcel of land to the latter. Fefore the donation however, the same was
mortgaged with the P#F. That donation is considered valid by law, even if there is an e6isting lien or encumbrance.
The reason for the law is that, the donor is still the owner, even if it is encumbered. 4f the mortgage is foreclosed
and sold at a lesser price, the done is not liable for the de7ciency. 4f it is sold for more, the donee is entitled to the
e6cess.
Article )J. A 1onation 0& reason of /arriage /a& 0e revoIe1 0& the 1onor in the follo9ing cases:
-, If the /arriage is not cele0rate1 or B%1iciall& 1eclare1 voi ab initio e5ce3t 1onations /a1e in the
/arriage settle/ents, 9hich shall 0e governe1 0& Article )E
-!, Khen the /arriage taIes 3lace 9itho%t the consent of the 3arents or g%ar1ian, as re2%ire1 0& la9E
-., Khen the /arriage is ann%lle1, an1 the 1onee acte1 in 0a1 faithE
-', U3on legal se3aration, the 1onee 0eing the g%ilt& s3o%seE
-(, If it is 9ith a resol%tor& con1ition an1 the con1ition is co/3lie1 9ithE
-J, Khen the 1onee has co//itte1 an act of ingratit%1e as s3eciFe1 0& the 3rovisions of the Civil
Co1e on 1onations in general. -.!a, -See Art. +J(, NCC,
If the /arriage is not cele0rate1 or B%1iciall& 1eclare1 voi ab initio e5ce3t 1onations /a1e in the
/arriage settle/ents, 9hich shall 0e governe1 0& Article )E
91: The celebration of the marriage is a condition sine $ua non for the validity of a donation propter nuptias.
9$: The donation may either be made by one spouse in favor of the other. 4t may be made by a stranger.
9a: 4f the donation is made by a stranger, the action for revocation may be brought under the ordinary rules on
prescription since the 1amily Code is silent about it. ence, if the donation is in writing, it must be brought within
ten 91%: years under paragraph 1,
+rticle 11(( of the #ew Civil Code. 4f oral, it must be brought within C years.
Khen the /arriage is ann%lle1, an1 the 1onee acte1 in 0a1 faithE
91: R, a stranger to + and F, future spouses, donated property to the latter in consideration of and before their
marriage.
The marriage was annulled and the donees acted in bad faith. The donor can 7le an action for revocation. The
action
shall be governed by +rticle 11((, par. 1, of the #ew Civil Code, that is, the action must be brought within 1% years.
4f oral, it must be brought within C years under +rticle 11(), par. 1, of the #ew Civil Code.
9$: 4f the donation was made by one spouse in favor of another and the donee is in bad faith, the donation is
revo<ed by
operation of law pursuant to +rticles (@9@:, ((, and )% of the 1amily Code. There is no need, therefore, for the
spouse, who acted in good faith or the innocent spouse to 7le an action for revocation.
U3on legal se3aration, the 1onee 0eing the g%ilt& s3o%seE
91: Gne of the e;ects of legal separation is the dissolution of the absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership. 1urthermore, under +rticle C( of the 1amily Code, after the 7nality of the decree of legal separation,
the innocent spouse may revo<e the donations made by him or her in favor of the o;ending spouse. The law,
however, re5uires that the action for revocation be brought within 7ve 9): years from the 7nality of the decision.
9+rt.
C(D$E, 1C:.
$: The action by the innocent spouse can be waived because
if heAshe does not 7le such action for revocation, it would
prescribe. is or her inaction can mean waiver of such
right.
If it is 9ith a resol%tor& con1ition an1 the con1ition is co/3lie1 9ithE
91: Fefore the marriage of + and F, + donated to F a property worth P13. The property was immediately delivered
to
her. The condition of the donation is that the moment F graduates from college and is able to loo< for a job, F shall
give bac< the property to +. F was able to 7nish college and was luc<y to land a job. F now is under obligation to
return the property because the resolutory condition has been complied with or has already happened.
9$: + resolutory condition is one by which the happening of an event e6tinguishes an obligation. 4n an obligation,
subject to a resolutory condition, the thing is delivered to the other party and the latter ac5uires ownership over the
same, subject to the condition that if the event happens, the obligation is e6tinguished.
Khen the 1onee has co//itte1 an act of ingratit%1e as s3eciFe1 0& the 3rovisions of the Civil Co1e on
1onations in
generalE
91: +rticle -C) of the #ew Civil Code provides for the following acts of ingratitude which may be grounds for
revocation of
a donation by reason of marriage.
9a: if the donee should commit some o;ense against the person, the honor, or the property of the donor, or of
his wife or children under his parental authority>
9b: if the donee imputes to the donor any criminal o;ense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he
should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or
children under his authority>
9c: if he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor.
AR4 )+ -ill%stration,
8%s0an1 an1 9ife cannot 1onate to one another.
The general rule is that the husband and wife cannot donate to one another during the marriage. The reason is
founded on public
)& | P a g e
policy. This is to prevent the wea<er spouse from being inNuenced by the stronger one. The law also see<s to
protect the creditors, as they would be defrauded if the law would allow them to donate to one another.
E5ce3tions.
The spouses, however, can give to one another gratuitous advantage during family rejoicings, such as birthdays,
anniversaries,
Christmas and the li<e. Fut these moderate gifts may be moderate to one, but may not be moderate to others.
4n Agapay vs. CA, !.". #o. 11CCC*, 'uly $*, 1&&-, *) SC+, 1(), it was said that if a married man marries
another woman and gives the amount of P$%,%%%.%% to the second wife during their coverture and the said woman
uses the money to purchase a property and registers it under her name, such property has to be reverted to the
community of properties in the 7rst marriage. The reason is obvious from the fact that it is a donation during the
marriage. The donee merely holds the property in trust for the conjugal partnership in the 7rst marriage.
- 4aIe Note ani, Re2%ire/ent of coha0itation.
4t must be emphasized however, that for the prohibition to apply, there must be cohabitation between the man and
the woman,
otherwise, the donation is valid. 4f, for e6ample, a man and a woman have amorous relationship, where there are
repeated acts of intercourse in those nights of clandestine trysts, but they do not live together as husband and wife,
the donation by one in favor of the other is valid because there is no cohabitation. + good e6ample is where they
merely meet each other secretly in nights of clandestine trysts in a hotel or a motel and have repeated acts of
se6ual intercourse that is not cohabitation. 4n order that there may be cohabitation, they must deport to the public
that they are husband and wife. Cohabitation is not limited to se6ual intercourse for even without se6ual
intercourse, there can be cohabitation. +ny donation by one to the other is valid.
Other 3rohi0itions.
+side from the prohibition against donation to one another, the spouses cannot also sell to one another, e6cept.
9a: where a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements>
9b: when there has been a judicial separation of property. 9+rticle 1(&%, #ew Civil Code:.
The husband and wife cannot enter into a universal partnership. 9+rticle 1-*$, #ew Civil Code:.
The reason for the law in prohibiting the spouses from entering into a universal partnership is that, it is virtually a
donation to one
another which is prohibited by law. The law li<ewise prohibits the spouses from leasing to one
another. 9+rt. 1C(C, #CC:. The reason is the same as the prohibition against selling to one another.
Aersons 9ho can 2%estion 1onations.
0ho can 5uestion the donation, sale and partnership of the spouses during the marriageJ
4n Coo7 vs. )c)ic7ing, $- Phil. 1%, the Supreme Court said that strangers cannot assail them. 4f they bear no
relation to the
parties at the time of the sale or transfer, they cannot 5uestion the transaction.
So that if +, the husband, sold or donated to his spouse, F, in 'anuary, and enters into a contract with C, in 3arch,
then C has no
interest to 5uestion the validity of the sale or donation. e has no interest yet at the time of the donation or sale.
The State or the Fureau of 4nternal "evenue, however, is always in possession of a personality to 5uestion any
donation or sale
between the husband and wife.
4n <aring vs. Com. 9nion Assurance Co., .) Ahil. 'J', the husband donated a car to his wife who insured it.
4n an accident
where the car was totally destroyed, the wife sought to collect indemnity from the insurance company which
5uestioned the validity
of the policy, contending that it is void. 4n brushing aside such contention, the Supreme Court said that the
insurance company
cannot challenge the donation, since it had no rights or interests in the car in 5uestion, whether present, remote or
inchoate.
4t has been said that donations during the marriage are outlawed as they disturb the system of property relations
between the
spouses. They can also be used as instruments of defrauding their creditors. The wea<er one should also be
protected from e6ploitation by the stronger one. Fut if the donations are donations mortis causa or those that will
ta<e e;ect after the death of the donor, then, the same are valid, because at the time they ta<e e;ect, the
marriage is already dissolved by the death of the donorIspouse. 4n fact, such a donation mortis causa is in the form
of a will. The donation is li<e an institution of heirs.
A s3o%se /a& 0e 0eneFciar& of ins%rance.
#ote, however, that the prohibition against donations during the marriage does not include a spouse being the
bene7ciary of an
insurance contract over the life of the other spouse. 9!ercio vs. Sunlife +ssurance Co. of Canada, (* Phil. )@:.
Cha3ter .
S&ste/ of A0sol%te Co//%nit&
Section . General Arovisions
Article )). 4he a0sol%te co//%nit& of 3ro3ert& 0et9een s3o%ses shall co//ence at the 3recise
/o/ent that the /arriage is cele0rate1. An& sti3%lation, e53ress or i/3lie1, for the co//ence/ent of
the co//%nit& regi/e at an& other ti/e shall 0e voi1. -'(a,
Article )#. No 9aiver of rights, interests, shares an1 eLects of the a0sol%te co//%nit& of 3ro3ert&
1%ring the /arriage can 0e /a1e e5ce3t in case of B%1icial se3aration of 3ro3ert&.
C% | P a g e
Khen the 9aiver taIes 3lace %3on a B%1icial se3aration of 3ro3ert&, or after the /arriage has 0een
1issolve1 or ann%lle1, the sa/e shall a33ear in a 3%0lic instr%/ent an1 shall 0e recor1e1 as 3rovi1e1
in Article ++. 4he cre1itors of the s3o%se 9ho /a1e s%ch 9aiver /a& 3etition the co%rt to rescin1 the
9aiver to the e5tent of the a/o%nt s%Ccient to cover the a/o%nt of their cre1its. -'Ja,
The law con7nes to the fact that during the e6istence of the marriage, there can be no changes in the property
relationship. 4n
order that there may be modi7cations of the same, they must be done prior to the celebration of the marriage>
otherwise, the same would be void, e6cept if they are done by judicial action. Such modi7cations include any waiver
of rights, interests, shares and e;ects of the absolute community of properties.
1or purposes of binding third persons, the waiver mentioned above must appear in a public instrument and that it
be recorded in
the local civil registry of marriage and in the proper registries of property. Creditors may petition the court for the
rescission of such
waiver to the e6tent that they may be prejudiced.
Article #". 4he 3rovisions on co?o9nershi3 shall a33l& to the a0sol%te co//%nit& of 3ro3ert& 0et9een
the s3o%ses in all /atters not 3rovi1e1 for in this Cha3ter. -n,
The law provides for the property regime in case of commonlaw relationships or void marriages. 9See +rts. 1(- and
1(*, 1amily
Code:. 4n fact, the Supreme Court in !aleA vs. RTC o( BueAon Cit#, et al., G.R. No. !!+'#, $%l& ., ##J,
-$ SC+, &C-, said that the property relationship in void marriages a" initio is coIownership and if ever there is a
declaration of nullity of a void marriage, even if based on psychological incapacity, the dissolution of the properties
or distribution shall be based on the law on coIownership where the parties shall share and share ali<e.
Note, however, that the Supreme Court in +gapay vs. C+, !.". #o. 11CCC*, 'uly $*, 1&&-, *) SC+, 1(), had ruled
that if the
marriage is void, it does not follow that they are always governed by the rule on coIownership. 4n the
aforementioned case, the Supreme Court laid down the rule that for coIownership to govern them, there must be
proof of actual material contribution, otherwise, if there is no such proof, then, the spouse in that void marriage who
cannot show how much he contributed would receive no share out of the properties ac5uired during their coverture.
4n fact, the Court further said that, upon the dissolution of their relationship, they shall divide their properties in
proportion to their contributions. So that, if in a void marriage, F can prove that she contributed @%_ of the
purchase price of a property, then, it is to the e6tent of @%_ of such property that she could get as her share when
such relationship is terminated or dissolved.
Article #. Unless other9ise 3rovi1e1 in this Cha3ter or in the /arriage settle/ents, the co//%nit&
3ro3ert& shall consist of all the 3ro3ert& o9ne1 0& the s3o%ses at the ti/e of the cele0ration of the
/arriage or ac2%ire1 thereafter. -#+a,
e5ce3tion:
Article #!. 4he follo9ing shall 0e e5cl%1e1 fro/ the co//%nit& 3ro3ert&:
-, Aro3ert& ac2%ire1 1%ring the /arriage 0& grat%ito%s title 0& either s3o%se, an1 the fr%its as 9ell
as the inco/e thereof, if an&, %nless it is e53ressl& 3rovi1e1 0& the 1onor, testator or grantor that the&
shall for/ 3art of the co//%nit& 3ro3ert&E
-!, Aro3ert& for the 3ersonal an1 e5cl%sive %se of either s3o%se. 8o9ever, Be9elr& shall for/ 3art of
the co//%nit& 3ro3ert&E
-., Aro3ert& ac2%ire1 0efore the /arriage 0& either s3o%se 9ho has legiti/ate 1escen1ants 0& a
for/er /arriage, an1 the fr%its as 9ell as the inco/e, if an&, of s%ch 3ro3ert&. -!"a,
c+SG ni 'K=BS =B,BS3+ STS 4f there is a property ac5uired by a spouse before the marriage and such spouse has
legitimate descendants by a former marriage, such property and its fruits are e6clusive property of said spouse.
Article #.. Aro3ert& ac2%ire1 1%ring the /arriage is 3res%/e1 to 0elong to the co//%nit&, %nless it is
3rovi1e1 that it is one of those e5cl%1e1 therefro/. -J"a, in relation to Article #!
Section .. Charges U3on an1 O0ligations of the A0sol%te Co//%nit&
Article #'. 4he a0sol%te co//%nit& of 3ro3ert& shall 0e lia0le for:
-, 4he s%33ort of the s3o%ses, their co//on chil1ren, an1 legiti/ate chil1ren of either s3o%seE
ho9ever, the s%33ort of illegiti/ate chil1ren shall 0e governe1 0& the 3rovisions of this Co1e on
S%33ortE
-!, All 1e0ts an1 o0ligations contracte1 1%ring the /arriage 0& the 1esignate1 a1/inistrator?s3o%se
for the 0eneFt of the co//%nit&, or 0& 0oth s3o%ses, or 0& one s3o%se 9ith the consent of the otherE
-., *e0ts an1 o0ligations contracte1 0& either s3o%se 9itho%t the consent of the other to the e5tent
that the fa/il& /a& have 0een 0eneFte1E
-', All ta5es, liens, charges an1 e53enses, incl%1ing /aBor or /inor re3airs, %3on the co//%nit&
3ro3ert&E
-(, All ta5es an1 e53enses for /ere 3reservation /a1e 1%ring /arriage %3on the se3arate 3ro3ert& of
either s3o%se %se1 0& the fa/il&E
-J, E53enses to ena0le either s3o%se to co//ence or co/3lete a 3rofessional or vocational co%rse, or
other activit& for self?i/3rove/entE
-+, Ante?n%3tial 1e0ts of either s3o%se insofar as the& have re1o%n1e1 to the 0eneFt of the fa/il&E
-), 4he val%e of 9hat is 1onate1 or 3ro/ise1 0& 0oth s3o%ses in favor of their co//on legiti/ate
chil1ren for the
e5cl%sive 3%r3ose of co//encing or co/3leting a 3rofessional or vocational co%rse or other activit&
for self?i/3rove/entE
-#, Ante?n%3tial 1e0ts of either s3o%se other than those falling %n1er 3aragra3h -+, of this Article, the
s%33ort of illegiti/ate chil1ren of either s3o%se, an1 lia0ilities inc%rre1 0& either s3o%se 0& reason of
C1 | P a g e
a cri/e or a 2%asi?1elict. In case of a0sence or ins%Ccienc& of the e5cl%sive 3ro3ert& of the 1e0tor?
s3o%se, the 3a&/ent of 9ihch shall 0e consi1ere1 as a1vances to 0e 1e1%cte1 fro/ the share of the
1e0tor?s3o%se %3on li2%i1ation of the co//%nit&E an1
-", E53enses of litigation 0et9een the s3o%ses %nless the s%it is fo%n1 to 0e gro%n1less. If the
co//%nit& 3ro3ert& is ins%Ccient to cover the foregoing lia0ilities, e5ce3t those falling %n1er
3aragra3h -#,, the s3o%ses
shall 0e soli1aril& lia0le for the %n3ai1 0alance 9ith their se3arate 3ro3erties. -Ja, J!a, J.a,
!"!a?!"(a,
Ante?n%3tial 1e0ts.
+ spouse owns a house and lot> during the time that he is not yet married, he borrowed money to repair the same.
That loan has
not yet been paid at the time of the marriage. 4f he later on gets married and the house and lot becomes part of the
absolute
community of property, such anteInuptial debt shall be borne by the absolute community of property as the loan
redounded to the bene7t of the family.
+nteInuptial debts which did not redound to the bene7t of the family shall not be borne by the absolute community
of property. 4f
that spouse who contracted it has no separate property to answer the same, then, the absolute community of
property shall answer
the same, but this shall be treated as advances from the absolute community of property, chargeable against his
share upon li5uidation of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership.
This is true also if one spouse is held civilly liable for a $uasi!elict or crime. 4f the spouse liable does not have
su?cient properties
or if his properties are not su?cient to answer for the same, then, the same shall be advanced by the conjugal
partnership or absolute community of property. Such advances shall be deducted from hisA her share of said
community of property or conjugal partnership at the time of li5uidation.
Illustration:
4f R, the husband of L, hits a pedestrian and <ills the latter, and when sued for damages, he is held liable for
the same, the foregoing rule shall apply. The law says that if the community property is not su?cient to answer for
all the liabilities aside from those mentioned in paragraph &, the spouses shall be liable solidarily with their
separate properties.
Article #(. Khatever /a& 0e lost 1%ring the /arriage in an& ga/e of chance, 0etting, s9ee3staIes, or
an& other Iin1 of ga/0ling, 9hether 3er/itte1 or 3rohi0ite1 0& la9, shall 0e 0orne 0& the loser an1
shall not 0e charge1 to the co//%nit& 0%t an& 9innings therefro/ shall for/ 3art of the co//%nit&
3ro3ert&. -J'a,
Section '. O9nershi3, A1/inistration, EnBo&/ent an1 *is3osition of the Co//%nit& Aro3ert&
Article #J. 4he a1/inistration an1 enBo&/ent of the co//%nit& 3ro3ert& shall 0elong to 0oth s3o%ses
Bointl&. In case of 1isagree/ent, the h%s0an1Gs 1ecision shall 3revail, s%0Bect to reco%rse to the co%rt
0& the 9ife for 3ro3er re/e1&, 9hich /%st 0e availe1 of 9ithin Fve &ears fro/ the 1ate of the contract
i/3le/enting s%ch 1ecision.
In the event that one s3o%se is inca3acitate1 or other9ise %na0le to 3artici3ate in the a1/inistration
of the co//on 3ro3erties, the other s3o%se /a& ass%/e sole 3o9ers of a1/inistration. 4hese 3o9ers
1o not incl%1e the 3o9ers of 1is3osition or enc%/0rance 9itho%t a%thorit& of the co%rt or the 9ritten
consent of the s3o%se. In the a0sence of s%ch a%thorit& or consent, the 1is3osition or enc%/0rance
shall 0e voi1. 8o9ever, the transaction shall 0e constr%e1 as a contin%ing oLer on the 3art of the
consenting s3o%se an1 the thir1 3erson, an1 /a& 0e
3erfecte1 as a 0in1ing contract %3on the acce3tance 0& the other s3o%se or a%thori@ation 0& the co%rt
0efore the oLer is 9ith1ra9n 0& either or 0oth oLerors. -!"Ja,
R%les on Boint a1/inistration.
Knli<e in the Civil Code, the 1amily Code now provides for a joint administration and enjoyment of the community
property by
the husband and wife. Knder the Civil Code, it was the husband who was the administrator of the conjugal
partnership property.
4n spite of joint administration of the community property by the husband and wife, the husband8s decision prevails
in case of
disagreement. The wife, however, has a remedy against such decision, for she can 5uestion it in court within 7ve
9): years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. +fter that period, the action shall prescribe.
Khen a s3o%se /a& ass%/e sole 3o9er of a1/inistration.
There are instances when one spouse may assume sole powers of administration as when. 9a: one spouse is
incapacitated> or 9b: one spouse is unable to participate in the administration of the common property. Such power
as administrator, however, does not include the power to sell properties of the community property. 1or such
administratorIspouse to validly sell properties of the community property, there must be an authorization from the
court or the written consent of the other spouse.
Ta<e note. 0"4TTB# CG#SB#T judW
0hile the law provides for administration of the husband and wife, yet, they are free to agree that one of them may
administer the
absolute community of properties. That agreement is valid and binding between the parties.
4f the administratorIspouse leases a property of the absolute community of properties beyond one 91: year, it must
bear the consent of the other spouse, because a lease beyond one 91: year is more than an encumbrance.
Article #+. Either s3o%se /a& 1is3ose 0& 9ill of his or her interest in the co//%nit& 3ro3ert&. -n,
C$ | P a g e
The disposition does not re5uire the consent of the other spouse because the same shall ta<e e;ect only after the
death of the testator.
Article #). Neither s3o%se /a& 1onate an& co//%nit& 3ro3ert& 9itho%t the consent of the other.
8o9ever, either s3o%se /a&, 9itho%t the consent of the other, /aIe /o1erate 1onations fro/ the
co//%nit& 3ro3ert& for charit& or on occasions of fa/il& reBoicing or fa/il& 1istress. -n,
Section (. *issol%tion of A0sol%te Co//%nit& Regi/e
Article ##. 4he a0sol%te co//%nit& ter/inates:
-, U3on the 1eath of either s3o%seE
-!, Khen there is a 1ecree of legal se3aration
., Khen the /arriage is ann%lle1 or 1eclare1 voi1E or
-', In case of B%1icial se3aration of 3ro3ert& 1%ring the /arriage %n1er Articles .' to .). -+(a,
Article "". 4he se3aration in fact 0et9een h%s0an1 an1 9ife shall not aLect the regi/e of a0sol%te
co//%nit& e5ce3t that:
-, 4he s3o%se 9ho leaves the conB%gal ho/e or ref%ses to live therein, 9itho%t B%st ca%se, shall not
have the right to 0e s%33orte1E
-!, Khen the consent of one s3o%se to an& transaction of the other is re2%ire1 0& la9, B%1icial
a%thori@ation shall 0e o0taine1 in a s%//ar& 3rocee1ingE
-., In the a0sence of s%Ccient co//%nit& 3ro3ert&, the se3arate 3ro3ert& of 0oth s3o%ses shall 0e
soli1aril& lia0le for the s%33ort of the fa/il&. 4he s3o%se 3resent shall, %3on 3ro3er 3etition in a
s%//ar& 3rocee1ing, 0e given B%1icial a%thorit& to a1/inister or enc%/0er an& s3eciFc se3arate
3ro3ert& of the other s3o%se an1 %se the fr%its or 3rocee1s thereof to satisf& the latterGs share.
-+)a,
Illustration:
+ and F are married. F, without any justi7able reason, left the conjugal dwelling. She cannot as< for
support. Fut if she left the conjugal dwelling because she is being maltreated, insulted by her husband, +> then, she
can as< for the support.
Suppose there is a need to sell or encumber the property of the spouses where the consent of the other is
necessary and it cannot be obtained because of the fact that F has left the conjugal dwelling. Then, + can go to
court and as< for judicial authorization for such sale. The authorization shall be su?cient substitute for such
consent.
Illustration:
+ and F are married. +, left the conjugal dwelling without justi7able cause. F can as< for judicial authority to
administer some properties of F and use the fruits to satisfy +8s share.
Aoints to re/e/0er. 4f nay pangutana <ung conjugal ba ang property or dili to determine if pede ba mu answer
sa utang sa isa <a spouse> 7rst loo< at how the property is obtained by either spouse to rule out e6clusive
ac5uiescence of the one spouse> then if proven nga conjugal sya ..ne6t is to 7nd out <ung ang utang ba sa usa <a
spouse redounded to the bene7t of the family\if no proof from the creditor then the subject property cannot be
levyWWW o<is STS
Article ". If a s3o%se 9itho%t B%st ca%se a0an1ons the other or fails to co/3l& 9ith his or her
o0ligations to the fa/il&, the aggrieve1 s3o%se /a& 3etition the co%rt for receivershi3, for B%1icial
se3aration of 3ro3ert& or for a%thorit& to 0e the sole a1/inistrator of the a0sol%te co//%nit&, s%0Bect
to s%ch 3reca%tionar&
con1itions as the co%rt /a& i/3ose.
4he o0ligations to the fa/il& /entione1 in the 3rece1ing 3aragra3h refer to /arital, 3arental or
3ro3ert& relations.
A s3o%se is 1ee/e1 to have a0an1one1 the other 9hen he or she has left the conB%gal 19elling
9itho%t intention of ret%rning. 4he s3o%se 9ho has left the conB%gal 19elling for a 3erio1 of three
/onths or has faile1 9ithin the sa/e 3erio1 to give an& infor/ation as to his or her 9herea0o%ts shall
0e prima (acie 3res%/e1 to have no intention of ret%rning to the conB%gal 19elling. -+)a,
4f the spouse left for abroad to loo< for a job but he communicates with the present spouse and gives support to the
family, there is no abandonment.
Section J. 6i2%i1ation of the A0sol%te Co//%nit& Assets an1 6ia0ilities
Article "!. U3on 1issol%tion of the a0sol%te co//%nit& regi/e, the follo9ing 3roce1%re shall a33l&:
-, An inventor& shall 0e 3re3are1, listing se3aratel& all the 3ro3erties of the a0sol%te co//%nit& an1
the e5cl%sive 3ro3erties of each s3o%se.
-!, 4he 1e0ts an1 o0ligations of the a0sol%te co//%nit& shall 0e 3ai1 o%t of its assets. In case of
ins%Ccienc& of sai1 assets, the s3o%ses shall 0e soli1aril& lia0le for the %n3ai1 0alance 9ith their
se3arate 3ro3erties in accor1ance 9ith the 3rovisions of the secon1 3aragra3h of Article #'.
-., Khatever re/ains of the e5cl%sive 3ro3erties of the s3o%ses shall thereafter 0e 1elivere1 to each
of the/.
-', 4he net re/ain1er of the 3ro3erties of the a0sol%te co//%nit& shall constit%te its net assets,
9hich shall 0e 1ivi1e1 e2%all& 0et9een h%s0an1 an1 9ife, %nless a 1iLerent 3ro3ortion or 1ivision 9as
agree1 %3on in the /arriage settle/ents, or %nless there has 0een a vol%ntar& 9aiver of s%ch share as
3rovi1e1 in this Co1e. 7or 3%r3oses of co/3%ting the net 3roFts s%0Bect to forfeit%re in accor1ance
9ith Articles '., No. -!, an1 J., No. -!,, the sai1 3roFts shall 0e the increase in val%e 0et9een the
/arIet val%e of the co//%nit& 3ro3ert& at the ti/e of the cele0ration of the /arriage an1 the /arIet
val%e at the ti/e of its 1issol%tion.
-(, 4he 3res%/3tive legiti/es of the co//on chil1ren shall 0e 1elivere1 %3on 3artition, in accor1ance
9ith Article (.
-J, Unless other9ise agree1 %3on 0& the 3arties, in the 3artition of the 3ro3erties, the conB%gal
19elling an1 the lot on 9hich it is sit%ate1 shall 0e a1B%1icate1 to the s3o%se 9ith 9ho/ the /aBorit&
of the co//on chil1ren choose to re/ain. Chil1ren 0elo9 the age of seven &ears are 1ee/e1 to have
chosen the /other, %nless the co%rt has 1eci1e1 other9ise. In case there is no s%ch /aBorit&, the co%rt
shall 1eci1e, taIing into consi1eration the 0est interests of sai1 chil1ren. -n,
C@ | P a g e
Article ".. U3on the ter/ination of the /arriage 0& 1eath, the co//%nit& 3ro3ert& shall 0e
li2%i1ate1 in the sa/e 3rocee1ing for the settle/ent of the estate of the 1ecease1.
If no B%1icial settle/ent 3rocee1ing is instit%te1, the s%rviving s3o%se shall li2%i1ate the co//%nit&
3ro3ert& either B%1iciall& or e5tra?B%1iciall& 9ithin one &ear fro/ the 1eath of the 1ecease1 s3o%se. If
%3on the la3se of the sai1 3erio1, no li2%i1ation is /a1e, an& 1is3osition or enc%/0rance involving
the co//%nit& 3ro3ert&
of the ter/inate1 /arriage shall 0e voi1.
Sho%l1 the s%rviving s3o%se contract a s%0se2%ent /arriage 9itho%t co/3liance 9ith the foregoing
re2%ire/ents, a /an1ator& regi/e of co/3lete se3aration of 3ro3ert& shall govern the 3ro3ert&
relations of the s%0se2%ent /arriage. -n,
O0servation: 0hat if naa sya mga legitimate na mga ana<J Knya maminyu sya usab\ in the previous provision
ang properties ac5uired during the prior marriage <ay didtu ra jud tu sa surviving spouse\to protect the legitime of
the children. 9<aso ni 'ules: !eneral "ule ning 1%@J Tapos e6ception <ung naa mga legitimate childrenJJJ
ELect of fail%re to co/3l& 9ith 1%t& to li2%i1ate.
Should the surviving spouse fails to comply with the li5uidation re5uirement within one 91: year from the death of
the deceased, and heAshe gets married, the subse5uent marriage shall be governed by the regime of mandatory
complete separation of property. Fasically, the reasons for the law are to prevent any prejudice to the compulsory
heirs of the 7rst marriage and to prevent fraud to creditors.
-+hh\so dapat jud diay naa li5uidation dayun within one year mas<i naa <a legitimate children or else covered sya
sa mandatory separation of property\o<is STS
4t is re5uired by +rticle 1%$, paragraph ) of the 1amily Code that the presumptive legitimes of the legitimate
common children shall be delivered upon the li5uidation of the community property. This is one reason for
paragraph @ of +rticle 1%@ of the 1amily Code. 4t cannot be said that their shares may be safe in the subse5uent
marriage. 4t is possible that they may be dissipated in the subse5uent one.
The law imposes upon the subse5uent marriage the regime of mandatory complete separation of property if the
spouse, whose community of property has been terminated, did not li5uidate the same. This is an e6ception to
+rticle -) of the 1amily Code which says that in the absence of marriage settlements, or when the regime agreed
upon is void, the system of absolute community of property shall govern.
Article "'. Khenever the li2%i1ation of the co//%nit& 3ro3erties of t9o or /ore /arriages
contracte1 0& the sa/e 3erson 0efore the eLectivit& of this Co1e is carrie1 o%t si/%ltaneo%sl&, the
res3ective ca3ital, fr%its an1 inco/e of each co//%nit& shall 0e 1eter/ine1 %3on s%ch 3roof as /a&
0e consi1ere1 accor1ing to the r%les of evi1ence. In case of 1o%0t as to 9hich co//%nit& the e5isting
3ro3erties 0elong, the sa/e shall 0e 1ivi1e1 0et9een or a/ong the 1iLerent co//%nities in
3ro3ortion to the ca3ital an1 1%ration of each. -)#a,
4n ,!a. !e 3elizo vs. 3elizo, C& SC"+ $1C, the Supreme Court held that if one marriage lasted for 1* years and the
other for (C years, the properties should be divided in the proportion of 1* to (C, if the capital of either marriage or
the contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical certainty.
Cha3ter '
ConB%gal Aartnershi3 of Gains
Section . General Arovisions
Article "(. In case the f%t%re s3o%ses agree in the /arriage settle/ents that the regi/e of conB%gal
3artnershi3 of gains shall govern their 3ro3ert& relations 1%ring /arriage, the 3rovisions in this
Cha3ter shall 0e of s%33le/entar& a33lication. 4he 3rovisions of this Cha3ter shall also a33l& to
conB%gal 3artnershi3 of gains alrea1& esta0lishe1 0et9een s3o%ses 0efore the eLectivit& of this Co1e,
9itho%t 3reB%1ice to veste1 rights alrea1& ac2%ire1 in accor1ance 9ith the Civil Co1e or other la9s, as
3rovi1e1 in Article !((. -n,
Article "J. Un1er the regi/e of conB%gal 3artnershi3 of gains, the h%s0an1 an1 9ife 3lace in a
co//on f%n1 the 3rocee1s, 3ro1%cts, fr%its an1 inco/e fro/ their se3arate 3ro3erties an1 those
ac2%ire1 0& either or 0oth s3o%ses thro%gh their eLorts or 0& chance, an1, %3on 1issol%tion of the
/arriage or of the 3artnershi3, the net gains or 0eneFts o0taine1 0& either or 0oth s3o%ses shall 0e
1ivi1e1 e2%all& 0et9een the/, %nless other9ise
agree1 in the /arriage settle/ents. -'!a,
Article "+. 4he r%les 3rovi1e1 in Articles )) an1 )# shall also a33l& to conB%gal 3artnershi3 of gains.
-n,
Article "). 4he conB%gal 3artnershi3 shall 0e governe1 0& the r%les on the contract of 3artnershi3 in
all that is not in conVict 9ith 9hat is e53ressl& 1eter/ine1 in this Cha3ter or 0& the s3o%ses in their
/arriage settle/ents. -'+a,
The spouses retain ownership and administration of their separate properties. They also retain possession and
enjoyment of the
same. 9+rt. 11%, 1amily Code:. Fut either of them may transfer the administration to each other by means of a
public instrument which must be recorded in the registry of property of the place where the property is located.
9+rt. 11%, 1amily Code:.
Section !. E5cl%sive Aro3ert& of Each S3o%se
Article "#. 4he follo9ing shall 0e the e5cl%sive 3ro3ert& of each s3o%se:
-, 4hat 9hich is 0ro%ght to the /arriage as his or her o9nE
-!, 4hat 9hich each ac2%ires 1%ring the /arriage 0& grat%ito%s titleE
-., 4hat 9hich is ac2%ire1 0& right of re1e/3tion, 0& 0arter or 0& e5change 9ith 3ro3ert& 0elonging to
onl& one of the s3o%sesE an1
-', 4hat 9hich is 3%rchase1 9ith e5cl%sive /one& of the 9ife or of the h%s0an1. -')a
C( | P a g e
A9ar1 of 1a/ages.
4f a spouse meets an accident and in a suit for damages, he is awarded damages for hospitalization e6penses,
medical assistance
and loss of salary, the Supreme Court said that these are conjugal properties. 9=iluis vs. 3"", C$ Phil. )C:. Fut any
moral damages
awarded for personal injury in such accident are e6clusive properties of each spouse.
Khen /arriage is 1escri3tive of stat%s onl&.
+ is the owner of a parcel of land. The title states. /+, married to F.H + is the owner. The description or reference to
marriage is
merely descriptive of his civil status. 9!onzales vs. 3iller, C& Phil. @(%:.
4f a property is purchased partly with money of the wife and partly on conjugal money, the same is partly conjugal
and partly
paraphernal. 9,e Padilla vs. Paterno, !.". #o. =I(1@%, September @%, 1&)@:.
4f during the marriage, property was ac5uired by the spouses but the same was registered in the name of one of the
spouses only,
the law presumes that the property is conjugal, unless the contrary is proved.
The adjudication of real property to one of the spouses does not necessarily mean that it is his or her e6clusive
property, if said land was ac5uired during the marriage. Fut if the title, for instance, says that the land is registered
in the name of /Teodulo ,iaz married to 3aria Bspejo,H this shows that the property was ac5uired during the
e6istence of the conjugal partnership. 9,iaz vs. C+, !.". #o. =I($1@%, #ovember 1%, 1&*C:.
4he h%s0an1 cannot 0in1 the se3arate 3ro3erties of 9ife.
Case:
Ro0erto 6a3eral, $r. an1 A%riFcacion 6a3eral vs. Ra/on Hatig0aI an1 Evelina Hatig0aI #" Ahil. ++"
7acts:
Plainti; alleged that defendants.
9a: Forrowed P1(,%%%.%% in four 9(: promissory notes dated 3arch, +pril, and 3ay, 1&)% 9b: "eceived eleven pieces
of jewelry valued at P&-,)%%.%% for sale on commission basis. Plainti;s also alleged that the notes are still unpaid,
and that
neither the jewelry nor the money has been returned. The facts show that only "amon catigba< signed. Bvelina did
not sign and that only "amon received the jewelry, as shown in the receipts therefor. Bvelina moved to dismiss on
the ground that there was no cause of action against her. ence, this appeal.
Iss%e:
0as there a cause of action against BvelinaJ
8el1:
4t is obvious that defendant Bvelina is not personally liable on the notes. "amon was not her agent and he did not
contract for her.
The husband cannot by his contract bind the paraphernal property unless its administration has been transferred to
him, which is not the case. #either can the paraphernal property be made to answer for debts incurred by the
husband> "amon was personally responsible with his own private funds, and at most, the assets of the conjugal
partnership. To reach both <inds of property, it is not necessary for plainti;s to implead the wife Bvelina. 0here the
husband alone is liable, no action lies against the wife, and she is not a necessary partyIdefendant.
Article . A s3o%se of age /a& /ortgage, enc%/0er, alienate or other9ise 1is3ose of his or her
e5cl%sive 3ro3ert&, 9itho%t the consent of the other s3o%se, an1 a33ear alone in co%rt to litigate 9ith
regar1 to the sa/e. -n,
Article !. 4he alienation of an& e5cl%sive 3ro3ert& of a s3o%se a1/inistere1 0& the other
a%to/aticall& ter/inates the a1/inistration over s%ch 3ro3ert& an1 the 3rocee1s of the alienation
shall 0e t%rne1 over to the o9ner?s3o%se. -n,
Article (. Retire/ent 0eneFts, 3ensions, ann%ities, grat%ities, %s%fr%cts an1 si/ilar 0eneFts shall
0e governe1 0& the r%les on grat%ito%s or onero%s ac2%isitions as /a& 0e 3ro3er in each case. -n,
C1amples:
91: + donated a parcel of land to R and L, spouses with designation of shares, li<e 1A$ to R and 1A$ to L. The share of
each spouse belongs to himAher e6clusively.
9$: 4n the problem above, if there is no designation of shares, then, the property shall be divided into two, share and
share ali<e and still, the share of each shall belong e6clusively to them.
The rule aboveIcited is without prejudice to the right of accretion.
Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance, devise or
legacy, the part
assigned to the one who renounces or cannot receive his share, or who died before the testator, is added or
incorporated to that of his coIheirs, coIdevisees or coIlegatees. 9+rt. 1%1), Civil Code:.
So that, if L in the problems above would remove her share, or cannot receive it, or dies before the testator or
donor, her share would go to, or would be added to, the share of R by virtue of the right of accretion.
Note that, as a rule, there is no right of accretion in case a donation is made to several persons jointly 9+rticle -)@,
#CC:> however,
+rticle 11@ of the 1amily Code is considered as an e6ception to such rule.
+rticle 11( spea<s of a donation that is onerous> and if ever it is given to a spouse, then, hisAher e6clusive property
shall answer
for the charges. +n onerous donation is one where there are burdens and charges or future services e5ual in value if
not greater than that of the thing donated. 4f + donates a one hectare lot to F in Zuezon City, with the obligation to
C) | P a g e
construct a children8s centerApar< worth P)%%,%%%.%%, then, his e6clusive property shall answer for such a charge or
burden. 4f the P)%%,%%%.%% was advanced by the conjugal partnership, then, the e6clusive properties of F must
reimburse the conjugal partnership.
Ann%it&.
The aleatory contract of life annuity binds the debtor to pay an annual pension or income during the life of one or
more determinate
persons in consideration of a capital consisting of money or other property, whose ownership is transferred to him
at once with the
burden of the income. 9+rt. $%$1, #CC:. C1ample: + gave to F a building with the condition that F will give an
annual income of
P$%%,%%%.%% as long as + lives. ere, the ownership of the building is immediately transferred to F with the burden
of the annual income.
4f the building is e6clusive property, the annuity of P$%%,%%%.%% is separate property of the recipient. e who
constitutes an annuity by gratuitous title upon his property, may provide at the time the annuity is established that
the same shall not be subject to e6ecution or attachment on account of the obligations of the recipient of the
annuity. 4f the annuity was constituted in fraud of creditors, the latter may as< for the e6ecution or attachment of
the property. 9+rt. $%$C, #CC:.
Us%fr%cts.
Ksufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance,
unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. 9+rt. )C$, #CC:. 4f the usufruct is ac5uired through
gratuitous title, it is e6clusive property. Fut the fruits thereof are conjugal.
6ife Ins%rance :eneFts.
4f the bene7ciary is somebody other than the insured or his estate, the bene7ciary is the owner of the insurance
indemnity regardless of whether or not the premiums were paid out of the insured8s separate property or the
conjugal funds. 9,el Mal vs. ,el Mal, $& Phil. )@(:. The contract of life insurance is a special contract and the
destination of the proceeds thereof is determined by special law which deals e6clusively on the subject. *#"i!.0.
owever, if the insured made his estate as the bene7ciary and the premiums were paid by conjugal funds, the
proceeds of the insurance constitute conjugal property.
9FP4 vs. Posadas, )C Phil. $1):. The distinction is, in Posadas, the proceeds of the insurance formed part of the
estate, whereas in
,el Mal, the proceeds did not form part of the estate.
Social Sec%rit& S&ste/.
This law 9".+. #o. 11C1: is not a law of succession. Grdinarily, it is not the heirs of the employee who are to receive
the bene7ts or compensation. 4t is only when the bene7ciary is the estate, or when there is none designated, or if
the designation is void, that the System is re5uired to pay the employee8s heirs. + nonIrelative or a third person
may be designated as bene7ciary. The bene7ciary or bene7ciaries should be the ones to primarily pro7t under the
System where the government had not contributed anything. The contributions came from the employees and their
employers. 9Tecson vs. SSS, @ SC"+ -@):.
Section .. ConB%gal Aartnershi3 Aro3ert&
Article J. All 3ro3ert& ac2%ire1 1%ring the /arriage, 9hether the ac2%isition a33ears to have 0een
/a1e, contracte1 or registere1 in the na/e of one or 0oth s3o%ses, is 3res%/e1 to 0e conB%gal
%nless the contrar& is 3rove1. -J"a,
Article +. 4he follo9ing are conB%gal 3artnershi3 3ro3erties:
-, 4hose ac2%ire1 0& onero%s title 1%ring the /arriage at the e53ense of the co//on f%n1, 9hether
the ac2%isition 0e for the 3artnershi3, or for onl& one of the s3o%sesE
-!, 4hose o0taine1 fro/ the la0or, in1%str&, 9orI or 3rofession of either or 0oth of the s3o%sesE
-., 4he fr%its, nat%ral, in1%strial, or civil, 1%e or receive1 1%ring the /arriage fro/ the co//on
3ro3ert&, as 9ell as the net fr%its fro/ the e5cl%sive 3ro3ert& of each s3o%seE
-', 4he share of either s3o%se in the hi11en treas%re 9hich the la9 a9ar1s to the Fn1er or o9ner of
the 3ro3ert& 9here the treas%re is fo%n1E
-(, 4hose ac2%ire1 thro%gh occ%3ation s%ch as Fshing or h%ntingE
-J, 6ivestocI e5isting %3on the 1issol%tion of the 3artnershi3 in e5cess of the n%/0er of each Iin1
0ro%ght to the /arriage 0& either s3o%seE an1
-+, 4hose 9hich are ac2%ire1 0& chance, s%ch as 9innings fro/ ga/0ling or 0etting. 8o9ever, losses
therefro/ shall 0e 0orne e5cl%sivel& 0& the loser?s3o%se. -(.a, (', ((, (#,
#llustration:
+ and F are married. ,uring the marriage, they ac5uired a parcel of land using conjugal funds but the same was
registered in the name of F. Knder +rticle 11-9a: of the 1amily Code, the property is conjugal. 4n )arasigan vs.
)aca"untos, 1- Phil. 1%-, the Supreme Court ruled that the registration in the husband8s name alone is immaterial
if the property is ac5uired with conjugal
funds.
4n (lores vs. (lores, (* Phil. $**, a man married three 9@: times. ,uring the second marriage, he bought a parcel of
land with some
conjugal funds. e was able to register the land after his second wife died. Knder this situation, the land belongs to
the partnership of the second marriage.
Salaries are conB%gal.
Fene7ts obtained from the salaries of the spouses and their businesses are considered as conjugal properties of the
husband and
wife. The reason if that, they were obtained thru labor or industry of a spouse during the marriage.
O9nershi3 of fr%its of se3arate 3ro3erties.
A owns a 1%Idoor apartment leased to di;erent lessees for P$,%%%.%% per month. 4n 'anuary 1&**, he collected oneI
year advance
rentals. Gn 'une 1, 1&**, he got married to N. Knder such a situation, A is supposed to deliver to the conjugal
CC | P a g e
partnership the rentals from 'une 1&**, to ,ecember 1&** because such rentals are considered fruits of the
separate properties of A which form part of their conjugal partnership. 4n short, A is indebted to the conjugal
partnership for the rentals beginning 'une 1&**. 1ruits of the common and separate properties of the spouses are
conjugal properties.
4t must also be noted that in NA (inance Corp. vs. CA, !.". #o. C1(C(, 3ay $*, 1&**, it was ruled that a business
9single proprietorship: established during the marriage is presumed conjugal and that the fact that it is registered in
the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature.
Article ). Aro3ert& 0o%ght on install/ents 3ai1 3artl& fro/ e5cl%sive f%n1s of either or 0oth s3o%ses
an1 3artl& fro/ conB%gal f%n1s 0elongs to the 0%&er or 0%&ers if f%ll o9nershi3 9as veste1 0efore the
/arriage an1 to the conB%gal 3artnershi3 if s%ch o9nershi3 9as veste1 1%ring the /arriage. In either
case, an& a/o%nt
a1vance1 0& the 3artnershi3 or 0& either or 0oth s3o%ses shall 0e rei/0%rse1 0& the o9ner or o9ners
%3on li2%i1ation of the 3artnershi3. -n,
Aro3ert& ac2%ire1 on install/ents.
P 0o%ght a ho%se an1 lot on install/ent 0asis fro/ Y for A(","""."". 8e 3ai1 A!",""" 0%t there is a
sti3%lation that %3on the e5ec%tion of the contract, o9nershi3 shall 0e veste1 %3on P. A fe9 /onths
later, P /arrie1 >. *%ring the /arriage, the a/o%nt of A!","""."" 9as 3ai1 o%t of conB%gal f%n1s. Kho
o9ns the ho%se an1 lot;
R is the owner, because ownership was vested in him before the marriage. The fact that the amount was paid on
installment basis
does not matter. 0hat matters is the stipulation that the ownership shall be vested before the marriage. Knder
+rticle 1(-* of the Civil Code, the parties may stipulate that ownership of the thing shall not pass to the purchaser
until he has fully paid the price. Conversely, they can agree that even if the price has not yet been fully paid,
ownership shall be ac5uired by the vendee. 1urthermore, +rticle 1(&* of the Civil Code provides that when the sale
is made through a public instrument, the e6ecution thereof shall be e5uivalent to the delivery of the thing which is
the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred.
4f the ownership in the case aboveIcited is vested during the marriage, the house and lot are owned by the conjugal
partnership.
The law, however, re5uires that in either case, R must reimburse the conjugal partnership for whatever he
advanced or paid. 4n
the same vein, in the second case, the conjugal partnership shall reimburse R the amount of P1$%,%%%.%% he paid
to L. 9See +rt. 11*,1amily Code:.
Article #. Khenever an a/o%nt or cre1it 3a&a0le 9ithin a 3erio1 of ti/e 0elong to one of the
s3o%ses, the s%/s 9hich /a& 0e collecte1 1%ring the /arriage in 3artial 3a&/ents or 0& install/ents
on the 3rinci3al shall 0e the e5cl%sive 3ro3ert& of the s3o%se. 8o9ever, interests falling 1%e 1%ring
the /arriage on the 3rinci3al
shall 0elong to the conB%gal 3artnershi3. -(Ja, (+a,
+ lent F the amount of P)%,%%%.%% payable in one year starting 'anuary 1&**. Gn 'une 1, 1&**, + married C. 4n such
a case, any
amount collected by + from F in payment of the principal is his e6clusive property. owever, if the obligation earns
interest, any interest falling due from 'une 1&** is conjugal. The reason for this is that, interests are considered as
fruits of the separate properties of each spouse. owever, with respect to the capital, the same is e6clusive
property, because that is considered as e6clusive property of each spouse.
Article !". 4he o9nershi3 of i/3rove/ents, 9hether for %tilit& or a1orn/ent, /a1e on the se3arate
3ro3ert& of the s3o%ses at the e53ense of the 3artnershi3 or thro%gh the acts or eLorts of either or
0oth s3o%ses shall 3ertain to the conB%gal 3artnershi3, or to the original o9ner?s3o%se, s%0Bect to the
follo9ing r%les:
Khen the cost of the i/3rove/ent /a1e 0& the conB%gal 3artnershi3 an1 an& res%lting increase in
val%e are /ore than the val%e of the 3ro3ert& at the ti/e of the i/3rove/ent, the entire 3ro3ert& of
one of the s3o%ses shall 0elong to the conB%gal 3artnershi3, s%0Bect to rei/0%rse/ent of the val%e of
the 3ro3ert& of the o9ner?s3o%se at the ti/e of the i/3rove/entE other9ise, sai1 3ro3ert& shall 0e
retaine1 in o9nershi3 0& the o9ner?s3o%se, liIe9ise
s%0Bect to rei/0%rse/ent of the cost of the i/3rove/ent. In either case, the o9nershi3 of the entire
3ro3ert& shall 0e veste1 %3on the rei/0%rse/ent, 9hich shall 0e /a1e at the ti/e of the li2%i1ation
of the conB%gal 3artnershi3.
-()a,
O9nershi3 of lan1 an1 0%il1ing.
R is the owner of a parcel of land. e married L. Gut of the conjugal funds, a 7veIstorey building was constructed on
the land.
Kho o9ns the lan1 or the 0%il1ing;
+rticle 1$% of the 1amily Code ma<es a distinction depending upon the value of each property at the time of the
improvement. 4f
the building is more valuable than the land, then the conjugal partnership shall become the owner of the land and
the building. Gn the other hand, if the land is more valuable than the building, then, the building shall become the
property of R. 4n both cases, however, the conjugal partnership or R has the obligation to reimburse the cost of the
land or the building at the time of the li5uidation of the conjugal partnership.
"eimbursement shall be done during the li5uidation of the conjugal partnership. 0hile the law says that the
conjugal partnership or the owner of the land is the owner of the building or land, the law, however, says that
ownership of the entire property shall be vested only upon the li5uidation of the conjugal partnership. The reason
for the law is that, it is only during li5uidation that payment shall be made to the conjugal partnership or R. Prior to
the li5uidation of the properties, the improvement is conjugal.
Section '. Charges U3on an1 O0ligations
of the ConB%gal Aartnershi3
Article !. 4he conB%gal 3artnershi3 shall 0e lia0le for:
C- | P a g e
-, 4he s%33ort of the s3o%ses, their co//on chil1ren, an1 the legiti/ate chil1ren of either s3o%seE
ho9ever, the s%33ort of illegiti/ate chil1ren shall 0e governe1 0& the 3rovisions of this Co1e on
S%33ortE
-!, All 1e0ts an1 o0ligations contracte1 1%ring the /arriage 0& the 1esignate1 a1/inistrator?s3o%se
for the 0eneFt of the conB%gal 3artnershi3 of gains, or 0& 0oth s3o%ses or 0& one of the/ 9ith the
consent of the otherE
-., *e0ts an1 o0ligations contracte1 0& either s3o%se 9itho%t the consent of the other to the e5tent
that the fa/il& /a& have 0een 0eneFte1E
-', All ta5es, liens, charges an1 e53enses, incl%1ing /aBor or /inor re3airs %3on the conB%gal
3artnershi3 3ro3ert&E
-(, All ta5es an1 e53enses for /ere 3reservation /a1e 1%ring the /arriage %3on the se3arate
3ro3ert& of either s3o%seE
-J, E53enses to ena0le either s3o%se to co//ence or co/3lete a 3rofessional, vocational, or other
activit& for self?i/3rove/entE
-+, Ante?n%3tial 1e0ts of either s3o%se insofar as the& have re1o%n1e1 to the 0eneFt of the fa/il&E
), 4he val%e of 9hat is 1onate1 or 3ro/ise1 0& 0oth s3o%ses in favor of their co//on legiti/ate
chil1ren for the e5cl%sive 3%r3ose of co//encing or co/3leting a 3rofessional or vocational co%rse or
other activit& for self?i/3rove/entE an1
-#, E53enses of litigation 0et9een the s3o%ses %nless the s%it is fo%n1 to 0e gro%n1less.
If the conB%gal 3artnershi3 is ins%Ccient to cover the foregoing lia0ilities, the s3o%ses shall 0e
soli1aril& lia0le for the %n3ai1 0alance 9ith their se3arate 3ro3erties. -Ja,
R%le on s%33ort.
Un1er Article #( of the 1amily Code, the following are obliged
to support each other.
91: The spouses>
9$: =egitimate ascendants and descendants>
9@: Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter>
9(: Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter> and
9): =egitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or halfblood. 9$&1a:
Support of illegitimate children of each spouse shall be charged from their separate properties. owever, if a
spouse does not have
separate properties, then, the conjugal partnership shall advance the same, but the said advances shall be
deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the li5uidation of the conjugal partnership. 9+rt. 1&-, 1amily
Code:. The said spouse is considered as a debtor of the conjugal partnership because there is no obligation of the
conjugal partnership to support the illegitimate children of each spouse.
ELect if 1e0ts 9ere contracte1 1%ring the /arriage.
,ebts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the administratorIspouse shall be chargeable against the
conjugal partnership for as long as they redounded to the bene7t of the family. 1or said property to be held liable,
the obligation contracted by the administratorIhusband must have redounded to the bene7t of the family.
ConB%gal 3ro3erties cannot ans9er for the s%ret& %n1er?taIing of a s3o%se.
4n this case, it was shown that Ching signed as surety. 4t is incumbent upon PF3 to prove that Ching8s acting as
surety
redounded to the bene7t of the conjugal partnership. +bsent such proof, the conjugal partnership is not liable.
9=uzon Surety, 4nc. vs. ,e !arcia, @% SC"+ 111:.
Carlos vs. A0elar1o G.R. No. 'J("', A3ril ', !""!
7acts:
Petitioner lent to the respondent but without the consent of his spouse the amount of [$),%%%.%% for the purchase
of a house and lot. 4n fact, when he in5uired from them the status of their loan, they ac<nowledged it but they failed
to pay despite demand, hence, a suit for sum of money was 7led. "espondent claimed that the amount was his
share in the corporation8s pro7ts. The "TC decided for the plainti; but the C+ decided for the defendant. +re the
conjugal partnership properties answerable for the obligationJ 0hyJ
8el1:
Les, because the loan redounded to the bene7t of their family.
:eneFt to the fa/il& is re2%ire1 for ante?n%3tial 1e0ts, etc.
to 0e ans9ere1 0& the 3ro3erties of the s3o%ses.
Conformably to +rticle 1$1 of the 1amily Code, anteInuptial debts of either spouse may be charged against the
conjugal partnership
as long as they redounded to the bene7t of the family. ,ebts contracted by either spouse during the marriage are
also chargeable to the conjugal partnership. The condition is that, they must have redounded to the bene7t of the
family.
Article !.. Khatever /a& 0e lost 1%ring the /arriage in an& ga/e of chance, or in 0etting,
s9ee3staIes, or an& other Iin1 of ga/0ling 9hether 3er/itte1 or 3rohi0ite1 0& la9, shall 0e 0orne 0&
the loser an1 shall not 0e charge1 to the conB%gal 3artnershi3 0%t an& 9innings therefro/ shall for/
3art of the conB%gal 3artnershi3
3ro3ert&. -J'a,
AROAER4Y RE6A4IONS.
$oa2%ino vs. Re&es
7acts:
=ourdes "eyes was the widow of "odolfo "eyes, having been married in 1&(- in 3anila. "odolfo, however, in the
course of their marriage, had illicit relations with one 3ilagros 'oa5uino, to whom he allegedly Vput into custodyV
some of the couplePs conjugal properties. Said properties speci7cally include his earnings and retirement bene7ts
from wor<ing as the Mice President and Comptroller of 0arner Farns and two cars> and that the amount herein
stated was used to pay o; the loan and monthly mortgage of a house in Parana5ue, registered under 'oa5uinoPs
C* | P a g e
name. =ourdes then prayed that the properties be declared conjugal, that 3ilagros surrenders the possession
thereof, and that damages be awarded. 3ilagros, on the other hand, contends that she purchased the mentioned
properties in her e6clusive capacity, that she had no <nowledge of the "odolfoPs 7rst marriage, that she had was
never a bene7ciary of the latterPs earnings, and that her living together with "odolfo for nineteen 91&: years, along
with the fact that she had children with him, be considered by the court in rendering judgment. =ourdes, however,
died and was later represented by her children with "odolfo. Subse5uently, the trial court granted =ourdesP
complaint. Kpon appeal to the C+, however, 3ilagros reiterated her stand and 5uestioned the 7ndings of the trial
court. Fut to no avail, the C+ li<ewise held that the property had been paid out of the conjugal funds of "odolfo and
=ourdes, because the funds used to pay the house o; was sourced from "odolfoPs earnings as part of the conjugal
partnership.
4ssue. 0G# the properties in 5uestion were conjugal
0G# the petitionerPs commonIlaw relationship with "odolfo validates her claim of ownership
eld.
Les. The property regime applicable is the CP!, having been the default property regime during the time of =ourdesP
marriage. Such properties include the following, as enumerated by +rticle 1)@.91: That which is ac5uired by onerous
title during the marriage at the e6pense of the common fund, whether the ac5uisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses>9$: That which is obtained by the industry, or wor<, or as salary of the spouses, or of either
of them>9@: The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or
from the e6clusive property of each spouse. Subject properties fall s5uarely within the said categories. +rticle 1C%
then prescribes that all properties of the marriage are presumed tobe conjugal and covered by the CP! unless
rebutted and proven otherwise. 'oa5uino, having failed to prove that she was 7nancially capable and that she
purchased said properties in her e6clusive capacity, could not ma<e a valid claim of ownership. +s to 'oa5uin8s
claim of having the bene7t of coIownership conferred by the commonIlaw relationship under +rticle 1(( of the Civil
Code 9in connection with +rticle 1(* of the 1amily Code:, the Court reiterated that the said provision is inapplicable
to commonIlaw relations amounting to adultery or concubinage. 'urisprudence holds that for +rticle 1(( to apply,
the couple must not have any legal impediment to contract a marriage. +nd since "odolfo and 'oa5uino were
incapacitated to marry due to "odolfoPs marriage with =ourdes, she cannot validly invo<e the right conferred. Thus,
only the property ac5uired by themIthrough their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industryIshall be
owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contribution. 3ilagros li<ewise failed to prove that
she was indeed 7nancially capable of purchasing the house and lot, that she actually contributed to the payments,
and that she was employed anytime after 1&C1 when the property was purchased. The Certi7cation and +?davits
stating that she borrowed money from her siblings and had earnings from a jewelry business were also deemed
to have no probative value as they were not crossIe6amined by the respondents. The petition is therefore denied
and the decision of the C+ is a?rmed.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
C8ING vs. GOYANHO, $R. GR No. J()+#Nove/0er ", !""J
7AC4S:
The respondents are the seven children out of the legal union of 'oseph !oyan<o, Sr. and Bpifania dela Cruz.
"espondents claim that in 1&C1, their parents ac5uired a real property in Cebu which was 7rst registered in the
name of their aunt as their parents were still Chinese citizens this time.
4n 3ay, 1&&@, their aunt e6ecuted a ,eed of +bsolute Sale over the subject property in favor of their father. 4n turn,
on Gctober 1&&@, respondent8s father e6ecuted a ,eed of +bsolute Sale in favor of the petitioner, 3aria Ching, his
commonIlaw wife.
+fter !oyan<o Sr.8s death, the respondents discovered that the property had been transferred to the name of the
petitioner.
Thus, the respondents 7led a Complaint for the recovery of the property and damages against petitioner and they
prayed for the nulli7cation of the deed of sale and the issuance of a new one in favor of their father.
ISSUES:
0hether or not the subject property was part of the conjugal property of Spouses 'oseph !oyan<o and Bpifania
dela Cruz.
0hether or not the ,eed of +bsolute Sale in favor of herein petitioner was void and ine6istent.
8E6*:
1: LBS. The subject property was part of the conjugal property of the Spouses. +s it was ac5uired during the
e6istence of a valid marriage between 'oseph Sr. and Bpifania. 3oreover, there was no
decree of dissolution of marriage, nor of their conjugal partnership.
$: LBS. Supreme Court held that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public
policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of his concubine.
Cali/li/?Can%llas vs. 7ort%n
Iune 22, 1-.J, )elencioDMerrera, I *Parl 4an!oy0
Nature:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the C14 of Pangasinan
-acts:
3ercedes CalimlimICanullas 9petitioner: and 1ernando Canullas were married ,ec 1&, 1&C$. They begot ) <ids.
They lived in a house on the residential land in 5uestion, located at Facabac, Fugallon, Pangasinan. +fter
1ernando`s dad died in 1&C), he inherited the land. 4n 1&-*, 1ernando abandoned this family and lived with Corazon
,aguines 9private "espondent: ,uring the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage by the C14,
which judgment had become 7nal. Gn april 1), 1&*%, 1ernando sold the subject property with the house thereon to
Corazon ,aguines for the sum of P$%%%. 4n the deed of sale, 1ernando described the house as falso inherited by
me from my deceased parentsg. Corazon however was unable to ta<e possession of the house and lot because of
3ercedes, so she initiated a complaint against 3ercedes for the 5uieting of title and for damages. 3ercedes claims
that the house in dispute where she and her children were residing, including the coconut trees on the land, were
built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry> she also claims that the sale of land together with
the house and improvements to Corazon was null and void because they are CG#'K!+= P"GPB"T4BS and she had
#GT !4MB# CG#SB#T to the sale.
C& | P a g e
The original judgment declared Corazon as the lawful owner of the land in 5uestion as well as the e of the house
erected on said lands. Kpon reconsideration prayed for by 3ercedes, respondent court amended the prior decision
and resolved that the plainti; 9Corazon: is 9still: the true owner of the land in 5uestion and the 1% coconut trees,
9but: declared the sale of the conjugal house to plainti; including @ coconut trees and other crops planted during
the conjugal relation between 1ernando Canullas and his legitimate wife 93ercedes:. ence this case.
IssuesE<elERatio:
1: 0G# the construction of a conjugal house on the e6clusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the
character of conjugal property
Les. + correct interpretation of +rt 1)*@) yields that. Foth the land and the building belong to the conjugal
partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning
the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at
the li5uidation of the conjugal partnership. 1ernando could not have alienated the house lot to Corazon since
3ercedes had not given her consent to said sale.
9$: 0G# the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon were valid under the circumstances
surrounding the transaction No, the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public
policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the
conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was
subversive of the stability of the family. +s provided by +rt 1(%&, contracts such as this shall be void and ine6istent.
+lso, art 1@)$ states contracts with unlawful cause produce no e;ect whatsoever. +dditionally, the law emphatically
prohibits the spouses from donating or selling property to each other subject to certain e6ceptions. This applies
even to couples who are not married but are living fas husband and wifeg
@) Fuildings constructed at the e6pense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the
spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the
same. Hhereore, the !ecision o respon!ent 8u!geQ an! his resolution on petitioner's motion or reconsi!erationQ
are here"y set asi!e an! the sale o the lot, house an! improvements in $uestion, is here"y !eclare! null an! voi!.
RRRRRRRRRRRRRRR
A:A6OS <S MACA4ANGAY, $R.
!.". #o. 1))%(@ September @% $%%(
7AC4S:
Spouses +rturo and Bsther +balos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with improvements. +rturo made a
"eceipt and 3emorandum of +greement in favor of 3acatangay, binding himself to sell to latter the subject
property and not to o;er the same to any other party within @% days from date. 1ull payment would also be e;ected
as soon as possession of the property shall have been turned over to 3acatangay. 3acatangay gave an earnest
money amounting to P),%%%.%% to be deducted from the purchase price of P1,@%%,%%%.%% in favor of the spouses.
Subse5uently, +rturo and Bsther had a marital s5uabble brewing at that time and 3acatangay, to protect his
interest, made an annotation in the title of the property. e then sent a letter informing them of his readiness to
pay the full amount of the purchase price. Bsther, through her SP+, e6ecuted in favor of 3acatangay, a Contract to
sell the property to the e6tent of her conjugal interest for the sum of PC)%,%%% less the sum already received by her
and +rturo. She agreed to surrender the property to 3acatangay within $% days along with the deed of absolute
sale upon full payment, while he promised to pay the balance of the purchase price for P1, $&%,%%%.%% after being
placed in possession of the property. 3acatangay informed them that he was ready to pay the amount in full. The
couple failed to deliver the property so he sued the spouses.
"TC dismissed the complaint, because the SP+ could not have authorized +rturo to sell the property to 3acatangay
as it was falsi7ed. C+ reversed the decision, ruling the SP+ in favor of +rturo, assuming it was void, cannot a;ect
the transaction between Bsther and 3acatangay. Gn the other hand, the C+ considered the "3G+ e6ecuted by
+rturo valid to e;ect the sale of his conjugal share in the property.
ISSUE:
0hether or not the sale of property is valid.
RU6ING:
#o. +rturo and Bsther appear to have been married before the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code. There being no
indication that they have adopted a di;erent property regime, their property relations would automatically be
governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The subject land which had been admittedly ac5uired
during the marriage of the spouses forms part of their conjugal partnership.
Knder the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This right is clearly granted to
him by law. 3ore, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration.
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal partnership, cannot validly
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife8s consent. Similarly, the wife
cannot dispose of any property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of the husband. The
law is e6plicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband8s consent, e6cept in cases
provided by law.
3ore signi7cantly, it has been held that prior to the li5uidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each
spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere e6pectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an e5uitable
estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the
li5uidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or /remanente li$ui!oH
9ha"er ganancial: resulting from the li5uidation of the a;airs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right
of the husband or wife to oneIhalf of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and li5uidation of the
conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is 7nally determined that, after settlement of
conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.
-% | P a g e
The 1amily Code has introduced some changes particularly on the aspect of the administration of the conjugal
partnership. The new law provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint underta<ing of
the husband and the wife. 4n the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. owever,
the power of administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal
partnership. 4n all instances, the present law speci7cally re5uires the written consent of the other spouse, or
authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without which, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
4nescapably, herein +rturo8s action for speci7c performance must fail. Bven on the supposition that the parties only
disposed of their respective shares in the property, the sale, assuming that it e6ists, is still void for as previously
stated, the right of the husband or the wife to oneIhalf of the conjugal assets does not vest until the li5uidation of
the conjugal partnership. 5emo !at $ui non ha"et. #o one can give what he has not.
TTTTTTTTTTTTT
MANA6O <S CAMAISA
The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner Thelma +. 'aderI3analo allegedly came across an
advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses #orma 1ernandez C. Camaisa and Bdilberto Camaisa, in the
Classi7ed +ds Section of the newspaper FK==BT4# TG,+L in its +pril, 1&&$issue, for the sale of their tenIdoor
apartment in 3a<ati, as well as that in Taytay, "izal. Petitioner was interested in buying the two properties so she
negotiated for the purchase through a realIestate bro<er, 3r. Proceso Breno, authorized by respondent spouses.D1E
Petitioner made a visual inspection of the said lots with the real estate bro<er and was shown the ta6 declarations,
real property ta6 payment receipts, location plans, and vicinity maps relating to the properties.D$E Thereafter,
petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses. She made a de7nite o;er to buy the
properties to respondent Bdilberto Camaisa with the <nowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent #orma
Camaisa in the presence of the real estate bro<er.D@E +fter some bargaining, petitioner and Bdilberto agreed upon
the purchase price of P1,)%%,%%%.%% for the Taytay property andP$,1%%,%%%.%% for the 3a<ati propertyD(E to be paid
on installment basis with down payments of P1%%,%%%.%% and P$%%,%%%.%%, respectively, on +pril 1), 1&&$.This
agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Bdilberto.DCE 0hen petitioner pointed out the conjugal
nature of the properties, Bdilberto assured her of his wife s conformity and consent to the sale. +fter Bdilberto
signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two chec<s, in the presence of the real estate bro<er and an
employee in Bdilberto s office. The contracts were given to Bdilberto for the formal affi6ing of his wife8s signature.
The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent #orma, re5uesting a meeting to clarify some
provisions of the contracts. ,uring the meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell, so they
arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts. 0hen petitioner
met again with respondent spouses and the real estate bro<er at Bdilberto s office for the formal affi6ing of
#orma s signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were bac<ing out of the
agreement because they needed spot cash for the full amount of the consideration. Petitioner reminded
respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and #orma s refusal to sign the
same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, #orma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to 7le a
complaint for speci7c performance and damages against respondent spouses before the "egional Trial Court of
3a<ati, Franch 1@C on +pril $&, 1&&$, to compel respondent #orma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.Gn
Gctober $%, 1&&$, respondent #orma 1. Camaisa 7led a 3otion for Summary 'udgmentD$1E asserting that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact on the basis of the pleadings and admission of the parties considering that
the wife s written consent was not obtained in the contract to sell, the subject conjugal properties belonging to
respondents> hence, the contract was null and void. The Court of +ppeals e6plained that the properties subject of
the contracts was conjugal properties and as such, the consent of both spouses is necessary to give e;ect to the
sale. Since private respondent #orma Camaisa refused to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected. 4n fact,
the down payment was returned by respondent spouses and was accepted by petitioner. The Court of +ppeals also
stressed that the authority of the court to allow sale or encumbrance of a conjugal property without the consent of
the other spouse is applicable only in cases where the said spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
ISSUE:
The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the
wife8s written consent.
8E6*:
The Court does not 7nd error in the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of +ppeals. The law re5uires that
the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator inappropriate cases re5uires the written
consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. The properties subject of the contracts in this case was
conjugal> hence, for the contracts to sell to be e;ective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.
"espondent #orma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. owever,
being merely aware of transaction is not consent. 1inally, petitioner argues that since respondent #orma unjustly
refuses to a?6 her signatures to the contracts to sell, court authorization under +rticle 1$( of the 1amily Code
is warranted. The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent
of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give
such authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances. owever, it should be stressed that court
authorization under +rt. 1$( is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is
incapacitated.D$CE 4n this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent #orma was incapacitated to
give her consent to the contracts. 4n the absence of such showing of the wife8s incapacity, court authorization
cannot be sought. Knder the foregoing facts, the motion for summary judgment was proper considering that there
was no genuine issue as to any material fact. The only issue to be resolved by the trial court was whether the
contract to sell involving conjugal properties was valid without the written consent of the wife. 0B"B1G"B, the
petition is hereby ,B#4B, and the decision of the Court of +ppeals dated #ovember$&, $%%% in C+I!.". CM #o.
(@($1 +114"3B,.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
AE6AYO <S AERE>, G.R NO. '.!. $UNE ),!""(
7AC4S:
,avid Pelayo sold two parcels of agricultural land located in Panabo to mrl<i Perez on 'anuary 1&** +nd the sale is
evidenced by a deed of +bsolute Sale and =oreza Pelayo, wife of ,avid and another one whose signature is illegible
witnessed the e6ecution of the deed. 3rsPelayo signed only the third space in the space provided for the witness,
Perez as<ed =oreza to sign on the 7rst and second pages but the latter refused as a result, 3r Perez instituted
anaction for speci7c performance and Perez countered that the lots were given to him by defendant Pelayo
-1 | P a g e
in consideration of his services as his attorneyIin fact to ma<e the necessary representation and negotiation with
the illegal occupantsIdefendants in the ejectment case. ,efendant Pelayo said that the deed was without the
consent og 3rs perez and invo<ed +rt 1CCof the Civil code to support his argument.
ISSUE:
,id 3rs Pelayo e6press his consent in the deed of Sale e6ecuted by 3rs PelayoJ
8E6*:
The consent need not be e6pressed. 4t can be implied. 4n the present case, although it appears on the face of the
deed of sale that =orenza signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the e6ecution of said
document point to the fact that =orenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the
sal. The petition of 3r. and 3rs Pelayo was denied.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
RA<INA < <I66A?A:RI66E G.R. NO J"+") OC4O:ER J, !""#
7AC4S:
3ary +nn Pasaol Milla +brille and Pedro Milla +brille are husband and wife. 4n 1&*$, the spouses ac5uired lot - in
,avao City with TCT TI**C-( in their names. Said lot was adjacent to lot * which Pedro ac5uired when he was still
single and was registered solely under his name 9TCT TI$C(-1:
Spouses used their conjugal funds and loan from ,FP to build a house on - and Pedro8s lot. Conse5uently,
they made improvements, including a poultry house and an anne6
1&&1 Q The husband got a mistress and started to neglect his family. The wife was forced to sell or
mortgage their movables to support the family.
Gn his own, the husband wanted to dispose of the house and two lots to the petitioners Patrocinia and
0ilfredo "avina. The wife opposed but the husband still sold the property without the wife8s consent and
signature
'uly ), 1&&1 Q 0hile the wife and children were out, the husband and some C+1!K members transferred all
their belongings from the house to an apartment. 0hen they got home, the were prevented from entering
the house. Thus, the wife 7led a complaint for the annulment of sale with damages against the husband
and the petitioners.
,uring the trial, the husband alleged that the house was built from his e6clusive funds
September $C, 1&&) Q "TC ruled in favor of the wife, declaring that the sale of lot * was void, being a
conjugal property while the sale of lot - was valid since it was the husband8s e6clusive property
C+ declared that. sale of lot - to petitioners is valid but the sale of lot * is null and void> that the husband
is ordered to return the value of the consideration for lot * to petitioners> that petitioners are ordered to
reconvey the house and lot to the wife
ISSUE: 0hether or not the husband can sell a property which is part e6clusive and part conjugal
8E6*:
+rt. 1C% #CC provides that /all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
is proven that it pertains e6clusively to the husband or to the wife.H =ot - is an e6clusive property of the husband
since it was ac5uired prior to his marriage with the respondent. owever lot * was ac5uired in 1&*@ during the
marriage of the spouses. There is no evidence proving that the subject property was ac5uired through e6change or
barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of and convincing evidence
to over come the presumption.

+ sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code on +ugust @, 1&** is
governed by +rt. 1$( 1C which states that a disposition or encumbrance is void if done a. 9itho%t the consent
of 0oth the h%s0an1 an1 9ife , orE 0. in case of one s3o%seGs ina0ilit&, the a%thorit& of the co%rt.
+"T. 1$(. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. 4n case of disagreement, the husband8s deciwision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for proper remedy which must be availed of within 7ve years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
4n the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. 4n the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. owever,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing o;er on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the o;er is withdrawn by either or both o;erors. 9Bmphasis supplied.:
Knli<e in the #CC which gives the wife 1% years to annul the alienation or encumbrance, any alienation or
encumbrance under the 1C without the consent of both spouses is #K== +#, MG4,. 'ust li<e in +CP, if the husband,
without the <nowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, the sale is void. 4f the sale was with
<nowledge the not consent of the wife, the wife has ) years from the date of the contract to annul the sale.
4n the present case, the wife 7led within the prescribed period. owever, her action to annul the sale pertains only
to the conjugal house and lot which does not include lot - which is an e6clusive property of the husband.
The petitioners cannot argue that they were buyers of good faith since they <new that at the time of the sale, Pedro
was married to 3ary +nn and her signature did not appear in the deed. Bven if they were to argue that the property
is an e6clusive property of the husband, that they proceeded with the sale regardless of the wife8s contention and
that the she was in actual and public possession of the house at the time of the sale, clearly indicates that they are
not purchasers in good faith. C+ ,BC4S4G# +114"3B,.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
SECURI4Y :ANH AN* 4RUS4 COMAANY v. MAR 4IERRA CORA, KI67RI*O MAR4INE>, MIGUE6 6ACSON,
an1 RICAR*O 6OAA
#ovember $&, $%%C 9)%* SC"+ (1&:
-$ | P a g e
7AC4S:
"espondent 3ar Tierra Corporation, through its president, 0ilfrido C. 3artinez, applied for a P1$,%%%,%%% credit
accommodation with petitioner Security Fan< and Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered
into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. 4t was secured by an indemnity agreement e6ecuted by
individual respondents 0ilfrido C. 3artinez, 3iguel '. =acson and "icardo +. =opa who bound themselves jointly and
severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.
"espondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it su;ered business reversals, eventually ceasing
operations. Petitioner 7led a complaint against respondent corp and individual respondents.
"TC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual
respondent 3artinez including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the
bene7t of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses
3artinez.
Petitioner appealed to C+. 4t a?rmed "TC decision. Petitioned to SC.
ISSUE:
0G# the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to
accommodate a third party
8E6*:
#o. SC upheld the C+. Knder +rticle 1C191: of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for /all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the bene7t of the conjugal partnership.H
The court ruled in =uzon Surety Co., 4nc. v. de !arcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the
husband does not act for the bene7t of the conjugal partnership as the bene7t is clearly intended for a third party.
4n +yala 4nvestment and ,evelopment Corporation v. Court of +ppeals, we ruled that, if the husband himself is the
principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own
business or profession, the transaction falls within the term /obligations for the bene7t of the conjugal partnership.H
4n other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal
presumption that such obligation redounds to the bene7t of the conjugal partnership.
Gn the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the bene7t of the conjugal
partnership. 4t is for the bene7t of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.
4n the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation,
was solely for the bene7t of the latter. The accessory contract 9the indemnity agreement: under which individual
respondent 3artinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter8s
bene7t. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses 3artinez bene7ted from
the transaction. 4t failed to discharge that burden.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
Can8t 1ind 1lora vs Prado
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
8OMEOKNERS SA<INGS U 6OAN :ANH vs. MIGUE6A C. *AI6O,
G.R. No. (.)"!
March , !""(
7AC4S: 3iguela ,ailo and 3arcelino ,ailo, 'r were married on +ugust *, 1&C-. ,uring their marriage the spouses
purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain ,alida. The subject property was declared for
ta6 assessment purposes The ,eed of +bsolute Sale, however, was e6ecuted onl& in favor of the late Marcelino
*ailo, $r. as ven1ee thereof to the e6clusion of his wife.
3arcelino ,ailo, 'r. e6ecuted a Special Power of +ttorney 9SP+: in favor of one !esmundo, authorizing the latter to
obtain a loan from petitioner omeowners Savings and =oan Fan< to be secured by the spouses ,ailo8s house and
lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SP+, !esmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. +s security therefor,
!esmundo e6ecuted on the same day a "eal Bstate 3ortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of
petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the e6ecution of the SP+ in favor of !esmundo, too<
place 9itho%t the <nowledge and consent of respondent.D
Kpon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. +s a result, petitioner instituted e6trajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. +fter the e6trajudicial sale thereof, a Certi7cate of Sale was issued in favor
of petitioner as the highest bidder. +fter the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner
consolidated the ownership thereof by e6ecuting an +?davit of Consolidation of Gwnership and a ,eed of +bsolute
Sale.
4n the meantime, 3arcelino ,ailo, 'r. died. 4n one of her visits to the subject property, 3iguela learned that
petitioner had already employed a certain Frion to clean its premises and that her car, a 1ord sedan, was razed
because Frion allowed a boy to play with 7re within the premises.
Claiming that she had no <nowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in
nature, respondent instituted with the "TC San Pablo City a Civil Case for 5ullity o Geal Cstate )ortgage an!
Certi=cate o Sale, A%!avit o Consoli!ation o O2nership, 3ee! o Sale, Geconveyance 2ith 6rayer or 6reliminary
#n8unction an! 3amages against petitioner. 4n the latter8s Ans2er 2ith Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in 5uestion was the e6clusive property of the late
3arcelino ,ailo, 'r.
+fter trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a 3ecision declaring the said documents null and void and further
ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plainti;, to pay the
plainti; the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorney8s fees, moral and e6emplary
damages.
The appellate court a?rmed the trial court8s 3ecision, but deleted the award for damages and attorney8s fees for
lac< of basis. ence, this petition

ISSUE:
1. 0G# TB 3G"T!+!B CG#ST4TKTB, FL TB =+TB 3+"CB=4#G ,+4=G, '". G# TB SKF'BCT P"GPB"TL +S CGI
G0#B" TB"BG1 4S M+=4, +S TG 4S K#,4M4,B, S+"B.
$. 0G# TB CG#'K!+= P+"T#B"S4P 4S =4+F=B 1G" TB P+L3B#T G1 TB =G+# GFT+4#B, FL TB =+TB
3+"CB=4#G ,+4=G, '". TB S+3B +M4#! "B,GK#,B, TG TB FB#B14T G1 TB 1+34=L.
8E6*: the petition is denied.
1. #G. +rticle 1$( of the 1amily Code provides in part.
+"T. 1$(. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. . . .
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4n the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. 4n the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
4n applying +rticle 1$( of the 1amily Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the
entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted
the sale.
"espondent and the late 3arcelino were married on +ugust *, 1&C-. 4n the absence of a marriage settlement, the
system of relative community or conB%gal 3artnershi3 of gains governe1 the 3ro3ert& relations between
respondent and her late husband. 0ith the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code on +ugust @, 1&**, Chapter ( on Con8ugal
6artnership o &ains in the 1amily Code was /a1e a33lica0le to conjugal partnership of gains alrea1&
esta0lishe1 0efore its eLectivit& unless vested rights have already been ac5uired under the Civil Code or other
laws.
The rules on coIownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late 3arcelino even in
a suppletory manner. 4he regi/e of conB%gal 3artnershi3 of gains is a s3ecial t&3e of 3artnershi3, where
the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those ac5uired by either or both spouses through their e;orts or by chance. Knli<e the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on coIownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership
shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conNict with what is e6pressly
determined in the chapter 9on conjugal partnership of gains: or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus,
the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter ( on Con8ugal
6artnership o &ains of the 1amily Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. 4n case
of conNict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the 1amily Code is
silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the <nowledge and consent of his wife, 3arcelino
constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. Fy
e6press provision of +rticle 1$( of the 1amily Code, in the absence of 9court: authority or written consent of the
other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The afore 5uoted provision does not 5ualify with respect to the share of the spouse who ma<es the disposition or
encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on coIownership under +rticle (&@ of the Civil Code does. 0here
the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are
correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lac< of respondent8s consent.
$. #G. Knder +rticle 1$1 of the 1amily Code, /DTEhe conjugal partnership shall be liable for. . . .
91: ,ebts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the e6tent that the
family may have been bene7ted> . . . .H
Certainly, to ma<e a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and
wellIbeing of the family as a unit.D
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the bene7t of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the
creditorIparty litigant claiming as such. Ci incum"it pro"atio $ui !icit, non $ui negat 9he who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove:. Petitioner8s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late 3arcelino to 7nance the
construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the bene7t of his family, without adducing ade5uate
proof, does not persuade this Court. Conse5uently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment
of the principal obligation.
NO4ES:
4n addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the
subject property was the e6clusive property of the late 3arcelino ,ailo, 'r. #owhere in the answer 7led with the trial
court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the bene7t of the family. Bven on appeal, petitioner
never claimed that the family bene7ted from the proceeds of the loan. 0hen a party adopts a certain theory in the
court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be
unfair to the other party but it would also be o;ensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. +
party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not re5uire presentation of
any f%rther evi1ence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new
theory.
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Tumlos vs -ernaneA
GR No. .7/503, April .2, 2333
7AC4S:
3ario and =ourdes 1ernandez were plainti;s in an action for ejectment 7led against !uillerma, !ina and Toto
Tumlos. 4n the complaint, spouses 1ernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building
that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos8 to occupy the apartment for the last - years without payment
of any rent. 4t was agreed that !uillerma will pay 1,C%% a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,%%%
a month which was not complied with. ,emand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises
as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building.
,efendants appealed to "TC that 3ario and !uillerma had an amorous relationship and that they ac5uired the
property in 5uestion as their love nest. 4t was li<ewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment
building with their $ children for about 1% years and that !ullerma administered the property by collecting rentals
from the lessees until she discovered that 3ario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.
ISSUE: 0G# !uillerma is a coIowner of the said apartment under +rticle 1(*.
8E6*:
SC rejected the claim that !uillerma and 3ario were coIowners of the subject property. The claim was not
satisfactorily proven by !uillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it e6cept for the said
a?davit. Bven if the allegations of having cohabited with 3ario and that she bore him two children were true, the
claim of coIownership still cannot be accepted. 3ario is validly married with =ourdes hence !uillerma and 3ario are
not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under +rticle
1(* of the 1amily Code. +ctual contribution is re5uired by the said provision in contrast to +rt 1(- which states that
e;orts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the ac5uisitions of
-( | P a g e
common property by one who has no salary, income, wor< or industry. Such is not included in +rt 1(*. 4f actual
contribution is not proven then there can be no coIownership and no presumption of e5ual shares.
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ACRE <S YU4IHHI $%%-
I Featriz +cre and Sofronio +cre, 'r. married on #ovember *, 1&)-. ave C children 9petitioners:
I 1&-$ Q Sofronio left conjugal dwelling
I Petitioners 7nd out that Sofronio married Bvangeline Lutti<<i 3ay 1*, 1&-$, while still married to Featriz
I Sofronio dies #ov 1C, 1&&C
I ,uring respondent`s marriage with Sofronio they ac5uired properties, one registered to fBvangeline +cre married
to Sofronio +creg another to fB. +cre, married to S. +cre and #. del 3ar, married to 'ose del 3arg 9#ellie is
Bvangeline`s sister:
I Petitioners 7le with "TC for recovery of properties, saying Sofronio ac5uired it wA his own funds
I TC dismisses, saying that the properties are owned in common by Bvangeline and Sofronio
I C+ dismisses appeal as well, declaring defendantI appellee e6clusive owner
4ssue. 0An the C+ erred in declaring Bvangeline the owner of the contested propertiesJ
eld. #o. Petition denied, C+ decision +114"3B,.
I The marriage between Bvangeline and Sofronio is indeed bigamous, as such their property regime is under 1C Q
1(*
o Properties ac5uired by the parties out of their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
governed by the rules on coIownership
o 4f there is no contribution from either or both of the spouses, clearly there can be no coIownership
I Petitioners did not present any evidence that shows Sofronio made an act%al contri0%tion in ac2%iring the
sai1 3ro3erties. Clearl&, co?o9nershi3 1oes not e5ist here.
C+ correct in saying that the 7rst land in 5uestion was registered under fBvangeline +cre married to Sofronio +cre,
the second land in 5uestion under fBvangeline +cre married to Sofronio +cre, and #ellie ,el 3ar, married to 'ose
,el 3arg Q rule well settled that the words fmarried tog preceding Sofronio +cre 'r. are merely descriptive of the
status of Bvangeline.
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CAR6OS <S SAN*O<A6
Teo7lo Carlos and petitioner 'uan ,e ,ios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of
inheritance. =ater Teo7lo died intestate. e was survived by respondents 1elicidad Sandoval and their son, Teo7lo
Carlos 44. Kpon Teo7lo8s death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of 1elicidad and Teo7lo 44. 4n +ugust
1&&), Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a $uo. 4n his complaint, Carlos asserted
that the marriage between his late brother and 1elicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the re5uired
marriage license. e li<ewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father
of Teo7lo Carlos 44. e argued that the properties covered by such certi7cates of title, including the sums received
by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
8E6*: 4he gro%n1s for 1eclaration of a0sol%te n%llit& of /arriage /%st 0e 3rove1. Neither B%1g/ent
on the 3lea1ings nor s%//ar& B%1g/ent is allo9e1. So is confession of B%1g/ent 1isallo9e1. Carlos
argues that the C+ should have applied "ule @) of the "ules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the
rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. 0hether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment, the C+ was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Foth the
rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
A 3etition for 1eclaration of a0sol%te n%llit& of voi1 /arriage /a& 0e Fle1 solel& 0& the h%s0an1 or
9ife. E5ce3tions: -, N%llit& of /arriage cases co//ence1 0efore the eLectivit& of A.M. No. "!??"?
SCE an1 -!, Marriages cele0rate1 1%ring the eLectivit& of the Civil Co1e. Knder the R%le on *eclaration
of A0sol%te N%llit& of <oi1 Marriages and +nnulment of Moidable 3arriages, the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may not be 7led by any party outside of the marriage. + petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be 7led solely by the husband or the wife. Gnly an aggrieved or injured
spouse may 7le a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be 7led by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to 7le the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only 5uestion the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse 7led in
the regular courts. Gn the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to see< its
dissolution. The "ule e6tends only to marriages entered into during the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code which too<
e;ect on +ugust @, 1&**.
The advent of the "ule on ,eclaration of +bsolute #ullity of Moid 3arriages mar<s the beginning of the end of the
right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. Fut the
"ule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
0hile +.3. #o. %$I11I1%ISC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be 7led
solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse
under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the "ationale of the "ules on
+nnulment of Moidable 3arriages and ,eclaration of +bsolute #ullity of Moid 3arriages, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still 5uestion the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse 7led in the
regular courts.
4t is emphasized, however, that the "ule does not apply to cases already commenced before 3arch 1), $%%@
although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the 1amily Code. This is so, as the new "ule which became
e;ective on 3arch 1), $%%@ is prospective in its application.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent 1elicidad in 1&&). The marriage in
controversy was celebrated on 3ay 1(, 1&C$. 0hich law would govern depends upon when the marriage too<
place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code
which was the law in e;ect at the time of its celebration. Fut the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action
-) | P a g e
to declare the marriage void. ,oes this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of
marriageJ
True, under the #ew Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
1amily Code,there is no speci7c provision as to who can 7le a petition to declare the nullity of marriage> however,
only a party who can demonstrate proper interest> can 7le the same. + petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
li<e any other actions, must "e prosecute! or !een!e! in the name o the real partyDinDinterest and must "e "ase!
on a cause o action . Thus, in 5iEal v. Na!ayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to 7le the
petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it a;ects their
successional rights.
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-rancisco vs. Master Iron :or@s Construction Corporation
GR. No. .0.85/, -ebruar# .5, 2330
7AC4S:
'ose7na Castillo was $( years old when she and Bduardo 1rancisco got married on 'anuary 1&*@. The latter was
then employed as Mice President in a Private Corporation. 'ose7na ac5uired two parcels of land where 4mus Fan<
e6ecuted a deed of absolute sale in favor of 'ose7na, married to Bduardo. +n a?davit of waiver was e6ecuted by
Bduardo where he declared that prior to his marriage with 'ose7na, the latter purchased the land with her own
savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over the property. 0hen 'ose7na mortgaged the property for a
loan, Bduardo a?6ed his marital conformity to the deed. 4n 1&&%, Bduardo who was then a !eneral 3anager,
bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter 7led a complaint for recovery and
trial court rendered judgment against Bduardo. The court then issued a writ of e6ecution and the sheriif issued a
notice of levy on e6ecution over the alleged property of 'ose7na for the recovery of the balance of the amount due
under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner 7led a third party claim over the $ parcels of land in which she
claimed as her paraphernal property.
ISSUE: 0G# the subject property is the conjugal property of 'ose7na and Bduardo.
8E6*:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she ac5uired the property with her personal funds before her
cohabitation with Bduardo and that she was the sole owner. The ,eed of +bsolute Sale on record showed it was
issued after her marriage. Their case fall under +rticle 1(* and since they got married before the 1amily Code, the
provision, pursuant to +rt $)C, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner li<ewise
failed that she had any vested right.
0here the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, +rt 1(* should
be applied. 4n the absence of proof that the wifeAhusband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to
the properties ac5uired during such union the presumption of coIownership will not arise.
The petition was denied for lac< of merit. The decision of C+ that the property was conjugal was a?rmed.
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San 6%is vs. San 6%is
Short Summary. 1ormer =aguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an +merican
citizen who divorced him, then remarried again. e died with his @rd wife but his $nd wife and the children in the
1st marriage contested the standing of the @rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous since the $nd
marriage was still subsisting under "P law 9canPt apply 1C retroactively:. Court held that even with 1C not applied
retroactively, Man ,orn and other jurisprudence su?ciently provides the validity to the @rd marriage, thus
recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the 1ilipino spouse. owever, as the @rd marriage was not
su?ciently proved, the case was remanded in order for the @rd spouse to present further evidence on this.
1acts
1B=4C4S43G S+# =K4S contracted @ marriages.
1. M4"!4#4+ SK=4T. had C children, died before he did in 1&C@
$. 3B""L =BB CG"04#. KS citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before awaiian courts which was
granted in 1&-@
@. 1B=4C4,+, S+!+=G#!GS S+# =K4S. married before a Presbyterian Church in California n 1&-(,
lived with him until he died for 1* years in their +labang residence
Iwhen 1elicisimo died, 1elicidad 7led for ,4SSG=KT4G# G1 CG#'K!+= P+"T#B"S4P +SSBTS +#, SBTT=B3B#T G1
1B=4C4S43GPS BST+TB, 7ling for a letter of administration before "TC 3a<ati
Ipetition was contested 93T,: by 1elicisimoPs children for $ grounds.
1. Menue improperly laid. should have 7led petition in =aguna 9domicile: and not in 3a<ati 9covers
+labang, decedentPs residence at the time of his death:
$. #o legal personality to sue. 1elicidad is only a mistress I marriage to 3erry =ee was still valid
91amily Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it would impair their vested rights in
accordance with Article !(J, 7C:
IIIthese were denied but 1elicidad still 7led Gpposition to 3T,, showing evidence of the ;.
1elicisimo e6ercised o?ce in =aguna, but went home in +labang I to prove proper venue
,ecree of absolute divorce by awaii dissolving the marriage of 1elicisimo to 3erry =ee I to prove
capacity to sue
"TC 3a<ati. ,ismissed petition
C+. reversed and set aside
Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or physical habitation so
petition was properly 7led
+rt$C.$, 1C should be given e;ect, allowing a 1ilipino to remarry under Philippine law
1. 0G# Menue properly laidJ LBS
IThe cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.
-C | P a g e
Ithere is a distinction between VresidenceV for purposes of election laws and VresidenceV for purposes of 76ing the
venue of actions. 4n election cases, VresidenceV and VdomicileV are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the 76ed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. owever, for purposes of 76ing
venue under the "ules of Court, the VresidenceV of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency.
$. 0G# 1elicidad had capacity to sueJ LBS
+s the legal wife. even if 1C not applied retroactively, Man ,orn v. "omillo 91&*): su?ciently
provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the 1ilipino
spouse 9as well as other cases which were in 3aPamPs boo<:
Iit loo< at the legislative intent of 1C provision assailed, it was based on the Man ,orn ruling which validates a
divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus capacitating the 1ilipino spouse to remarry again
III4n this case, as 3erry =ee obtained a divorce, 1elicisimo now is capacitated to marry 1elicidad. owever, as the
marriage between 1elicidad and 1elicisimo was not su?ciently proven, re/an1 the case to R4C
Bven if not 5uali7ed as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of administration as an
V4#TB"BSTB, P+"TLV with +rt1((, CC and +1(* 1C both stating that she is considered a coIowner
of properties owned by persons living as husband and wife but whose marriage is void.
Article !'. 4he a1/inistration an1 enBo&/ent of the conB%gal 3artnershi3 3ro3ert& shall 0elong to
0oth s3o%ses Bointl&. In case of 1isagree/ent, the h%s0an1Gs 1ecision shall 3revail, s%0Bect to reco%rse
to the co%rt 0& the 9ife for 3ro3er re/e1&, 9hich /%st 0e availe1 of 9ithin Fve &ears fro/ the 1ate of
the contract
i/3le/enting s%ch 1ecision.
In the event that one s3o%se is inca3acitate1 or other9ise %na0le to 3artici3ate in the a1/inistration
of the conB%gal 3ro3erties, the other s3o%se /a& ass%/e sole 3o9ers of a1/inistration.
4hese 3o9ers 1o not incl%1e 1is3osition or enc%/0rance 9itho%t a%thorit& of the co%rt or the 9ritten
consent of the other s3o%se. In the a0sence of s%ch a%thorit& or consent, the 1is3osition or
enc%/0rance shall 0e voi1. 8o9ever, the transaction shall 0e constr%e1 as a contin%ing oLer on the
3art of the consenting s3o%se
an1 the thir1 3erson, an1 /a& 0e 3erfecte1 as a 0in1ing contract %3on the acce3tance 0& the other
s3o%se or a%thori@ation 0& the co%rt 0efore the oLer is 9ith1ra9n 0& either or 0oth oLerors. -J(a,
9Pag naa na gani baligya mahitabo..lahi na ang procedure:
Conse5uently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must
observe the procedure
for the sale of the ward8s estate re5uired of judicial guardians under "ule &), of the "evised "ules of Court, not the
summary judicial proceedings under the 1amily Code.
The trial court did not comply with the procedure under the "evised "ules of Court. 4ndeed, the trial court did not
even observe
the re5uirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the 1amily Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve
notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse> it did not re5uire him to show cause why the petition should not
be granted.
4n short, the spouse of the incompetent should 7le a petition for appointment as guardian over the person and
properties of the spouse and following the rules, 7le a motion for leave to sell properties pursuant to "ule &).
Mortgage of conB%gal 3ro3ert& 0& h%s0an1 9itho%t consent of the 9ife is voi1.
There was a certi7cate of sale and due to his failure to redeem, the property was consolidated under the name of
the mortgagee, the petitioner in this case. 0hen the wife learned of the mortgage and sale, she 7led a complaint to
declare the mortgage and sale void invo<ing +rticle 1$( of the 1amily Code. The lower court declared the mortgage
and sale void. Gn appeal, it was contended by the mortgagee that +rticle 1$( of the 1amily Code should be
construed with +rticle (&@ of the Civil Code, thus, the mortgage and sale are valid to the e6tent of the share of the
husband as his share in the coownership. The rules on coIownership do not even apply to the property relations of
the husband and wife even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from
their separate properties and those ac5uired by either or both spouses through their e;orts or bychance. 9+rt. 1%C,
1amily Code:. Knli<e the absolute community of property wherein the rules on coIownership apply in a suppletory
manner 9+rt. &%, 1amily Code:, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in
all that is not in conNict with what is e6pressly determined in the chapter 9on conjugal partnership of gains: or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements. 9+rt. 1%*, 1amily Code:.
ConB%gal Aartnershi3sE ELect of the s3o%ses signing as s%ret&
A67RE*O C8ING an1 ENCARNACION C8ING vs. COUR4 O7 AAAEA6S
MG.R. No. !'J'!. 7e0r%ar& !., !""'.N
CA&&'6O, %R.
7AC4S: The Philippine Flooming 3ills Company, 4nc. 9PF3C4: obtained a loan of P&,%%%,%%% from the +llied Fan<ing
Corporation 9+FC:. Fy virtue of this loan, the PF3C4, through its B6ecutive MiceIPresident +lfredo Ching, e6ecuted a
promissory note for the said amount promising to pay on ,ecember $$, 1&-* at an interest rate of 1(_ per annum.
+s an added security for the said loan, +lfredo Ching, together with Bmilio TaUedo and Chung ciat ua, e6ecuted a
continuing guaranty with the +FC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the
PF3C4 obligations owing to the +FC. The PF3C4 defaulted in the payment of all its loans. ence, on +ugust $1,
1&*1, the +FC 7led a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the
PF3C4 to collect the P1$,C1$,&-$.** e6clusive of interests, penalties and other ban< charges. 4mpleaded as coI
defendants in the complaint were +lfredo Ching, Bmilio TaUedo and Chung ciat ua in their capacity as sureties of
the PF3C4. Citing as one of the grounds for the writ was the fraud defendants employed in incurring the obligations
by representing themselves as having the 7nancial capacity to pay the loan when in fact they did not have such
capacity.
4n the meantime, on 'uly $C, 1&*@, the deputy sheri; of the trial court levied on attachment the 1%%,%%%
common shares of Citycorp stoc<s in the name of +lfredo Ching. Gn #ovember 1C, 1&&@, Bncarnacion T. Ching,
assisted by her husband +lfredo Ching, 7led a 3otion to Set +side the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia
that the 1%%,%%% shares of stoc<s levied on by the sheri; were ac5uired by her and her husband during their
-- | P a g e
marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp 4nvestment Philippines was established in 1&-(. 1urthermore, the
indebtedness covered by the continuing guarantyAcomprehensive suretyship contract e6ecuted by petitioner
+lfredo Ching for the account of PF3C4 did not redound to the bene7t of the conjugal partnership. She, li<ewise,
alleged that being the wife of +lfredo Ching, she was a thirdIparty claimant entitled to 7le a motion for the release
of the properties. She attached therewith a copy of her marriage contract with +lfredo Ching.
The petitionerIspouses aver that the source of funds in the ac5uisition of the levied shares of stoc<s is not the
controlling factor when invo<ing the presumption of the conjugal nature of stoc<s under +rt. 1C% and that such
presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case,
petitioner +lfredo Ching. +ccording to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of
the petitionerIhusbandPs profession or business. +nd where conjugal assets are attached in a collection suit on an
obligation contracted by the husband, the wife should e6haust her motion to 5uash in the main case and not 7le a
separate suit. 1urthermore, the petitioners contend that under +rt. 1$) of the 1amily Code, the petitionerIhusbandPs
gratuitous suretyship is null and void ab initio, and that the share of one of the spouses in the conjugal partnership
remains inchoate until the dissolution and li5uidation of the partnership. The trial court initially granted the lifting of
the preliminary attachment but on appeal, the decision was reversed, the appellate court holding that petitioner
Bncarnacion Ching was not a proper party to the action and that even if she possessed such right, her action was
already barred by laches. The appellate court also ruled that the presumption under +rt. 1C% was inapplicable in the
present case, when petitionerIspouses failed to prove the source of the money used to ac5uire the shares of stoc<.
ence this present petition.
ISSUES:
1. ,o the 1%%,%%% shares of stoc< in the name of +lfredo Ching belong to the conjugal partnershipJ
$. 4s the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liabilityJ
8E6*: 1. YES. +rticle 1C% of the #ew Civil Code provides that all the properties ac5uired during the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership> unless it be proved that it pertains e6clusively to the husband, or
to the wife. 4n Tan v. Court of +ppeals, we held that it is not even necessary to prove that the properties were
ac5uired with funds of the partnership. +s long as the properties were ac5uired by the parties during the marriage,
they are presumed to be conjugal in nature. 4n fact, even when the manner in which the properties were ac5uired
does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. The
presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties ac5uired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the same.
4n this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the "TC is that the 1%%,%%% shares of stoc<s in the Citycorp
4nvestment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate boo<s in the name of the petitionerIhusband
when the said corporation was incorporated on 3ay 1(, 1&-&. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage
of the petitionerIspouses. The shares of stoc<s are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the
petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitionerIhusband ac5uired the stoc<s with
his e6clusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stoc<s were registered in the corporate boo<s of Citycorp
4nvestment Philippines solely in the name of the petitionerIhusband does not constitute proof that the petitionerI
husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
$. NO. 1or the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone,
there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to ma<e a conjugal partnership
responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the #ew
Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The husband,
therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted ris<s to the 7nancial stability of the
conjugal partnership.
4n this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was bene7ted by
the petitionerIhusbandPs act of e6ecuting a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private
respondent for and in behalf of PF3C4. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PF3C4,
solely for the bene7t of the latter. #o presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitionerIhusband
entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be
bene7ted. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such bene7t redounded to the conjugal
partnership.
RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR
S3o%se consent re2%ire1 to sale of conB%gal 3ro3ert&
Zuery.
4s the written consent of one spouse re5uired to dispose or encumber conjugalAcommon propertyJ
There should be no dispute that either spouse cannot alienate or dispose of conjugal property without the written
consent of the other.
The codal reference to this is the second paragraph of +rticle &C and 1$( of the 1amily Code which states.
/4n the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
common properties, the other spouse my assume the sole powers of administration. These powers however do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. 4n the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.H
The Supreme Court has ruled that the authority of the court allowing one spouse to dispose or encumber any
common property may be sought only if the other spouse is incapacitated.
The Supreme Court in Thelma a. 'aderI3analo vs. #orma 1ernandez C. Camaisa and Bdilberto Camaisa D!.". #o.
1(-&-*. 'anuary $@, $%%$E referred to the comment of civil law e6pert +rturo Tolentino who in his boo< said that V+s
a result of this joint ownership, neither spouse may alienate or encumber any common property without the written
consent of the other, or, if the other spouse is incapacitated, authorization of the court.V
4f the other spouse is not incapacitated, his or her written consent to the disposition or encumbrance is
indispensable, subject of course to certain e6ceptions.
+re there instances where the disposal by one spouse of conjugal property without the written consent of the other
may be validJ
Les.
4n Bstela Costuna versus =aureana ,omondon, D!.". *$-)@ ,ecember 1&, 1&*&E, the Supreme Court allowed the
husband to sell his e share of the conjugal property even without the consent of the wife because the wife
unjusti7ably withheld her consent to the sale.
This case tells us that one spouse cannot even sell his own e share without the consent of the other spouse, save
-* | P a g e
only when the refusal to consent was unjusti7able.
4n this case, the wife refused to give her consent to the sale of conjugal land even if the proceeds of the sale were
to be used for the sic< husband8s hospital e6penses.
The Court said the wife was greedy because previously, the husband had e6ecuted a will naming her as the sole
heir.
#aturally, the wife greedily refused to consent to the sale because she wanted the whole conjugal property intact to
herself.
TTTTTTTTTTT
Arcaba vs. Tabancura !a "e *atocael
GR No. .45517, November 22, 233.
7AC4S:
1rancisco Comille and his wife Yosima 3ontallana became the registered owners of =ot #o. (@-I+ located at
Falintawa< St. and "izal +venue in ,ipolog City, Yamboanga del #orte in 'anuary 1&)C. Yosima died in 1&*% hence
1rancisco and his mother in law e6ecuted a deed of e6trajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter
waived her share consisting of h of the property in favor of 1rancisco. Since 1rancisco do not have any children to
ta<e care of him after his retirement, he as<ed =eticia, his niece, =eticia8s cousin, =uzviminda and Cirila +rcaba, the
petitioner, who was then a widow and too< care of 1rancisco8s house as well as the store inside.
+ccording to =eticia, 1rancisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. Gn the other hand, Brlinda
Tabancura, another niece of 1rancisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. owever, Cirila
defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master8s bedroom when 1rancisco as<ed her to
and that 1rancisco was too old for her. She denied having se6ual intercourse with 1rancisco. 0hen the nieces got
married, Cirila who was then @( yearIold widow started wor<ing for 1rancisco who was -) year old widower. The
latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging. 1rancisco8s
health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testi7ed that 1rancisco8s only source of income was the
rentals from his lot near the public streets.
4n 'anuary 1&&1, few months before 1rancisco died, he e6ecuted a /,eed of ,onation 4nter MivosH where he ceded a
portion of =ot (@-I+ composed of 1)% s5 m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger
portion of $C* s5 m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of the 1% year of faithful services of
the petitioner. +tty =acaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
4n Gctoer 1&&1, 1rancisco died and in 1&&@, the lot received by Cirila had a mar<et value of P)-,1%) and assessed
value of P$*,))%. The decedent8s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was
the commonIlaw wife of 1rancisco.
ISSUE: 0hether or not the deed of donation inter vivos e6ecuted by 1rancisco in +rcaba8s favor was valid.
8E6*:
The court in this case considered a su?cient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The
conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of /Cirila
ComilleH such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certi7cate of 1rancisco. +lso, the
fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver Qemployee.
Cohabitation means more than se6ual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no
longer be interested in se6 at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding
themselves out to the public as such.
ence, the deed of donation by 1rancisco in favor of Cirila is void under +rt. *- of the 1amily Code.
TTTTTTTTTTTTT
4 cant 7nd Spouses =indon vs 1lores
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
Cost%na vs. *o/on1on
1*% SC"+ @@@
Sps. +madeo and Bstela Costuna bought @ parcels of land during their marriage and registered the same in the
name of +madeo. +madeo was later hospitalized 9on di;erent dates: for @rd degree burns on his legs. 0hile already
ill due to old age, he went to his relatives in Samar to settle his property documents. Fecause of his failure to
return, Bstela refused to give her consent to the action of partition of their conjugal partnership and the deed of
sale allegedly 7led by +madeo in Samar for the purpose of 7nancing his medical needs. ence, +madeo e6ecuted
the mentioned deed of sale, which sold his e indeterminate share on the @Iparcel property, in favour of =aureana
,omondon. 0hen +madeo died, Bstela sought the e6ecution of +madeo`s will, e6ecuted prior to his trip to Samar,
which named her as sole. =aureana opposed the motion, claimed her e share in the property and sought to have
Bstela give consent to the deed of sale.
C+.
I husband may not sell real estate without consent unless 91: sale of personal properties 9$: real properties ac5uired
before #CC 9@: real properties ac5uired after #CC but wife is in a leprosarium, declared spendthrift or under civil
interdiction, 9(: purpose is to pay conjugal liabilities 9): purpose is to secure future of children or 7nishing a career.
I Support of spouse by conjugal property is not relieved when they do not live on the same roof.
ISSUE:
I 91: 0G# deed of sale should be nulli7ed since it waas without the consent of the wife
I 9$: 0G# conjugal partnership should be made liable for payment of hospital and
medical e6penses of +madeo who allegedly abandoned conjugal home and wife
8E6*:
91: #G
I +madeo sought the petitoner`s consent but petitioner withheld it. owever when deed of sale was made, she did
nothing to impugn it and assailed it for the 7rst time when "espondent 7led a case in "TCIZC.
I +madeo only sold his e share of community property. er share in the property is intact.
I 0hen consent is unreasonably withheld, one should consider law as falling within the recognized e6ceptions
I 9$: LBS
-& | P a g e
it falls under the obligations protected by +rt 1C1 of CC since it gives a discernible advantage or good to the
conjugal partnership, directly or indirectly. ealth would obviously bene7t their conjugal partnership.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
$ACIN4O SAGUI* vs. CA, R4C, :RANC8 #', :OAC, MARIN*U=UE an1 GINA S. REY
7AC4S:
SeventeenIyear old !ina S. "ey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met and
cohabited with petitioner 'acinto Saguid 4n 1&&C, the couple decided to separate and end up their &Iyear
cohabitation. private respondent 7led a complaint for Partition and "ecovery of Personal Property with "eceivership
against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the
amount of P-%,%%%.%%, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
ISSUE: 0G# there are actual contributions from the parties
8E6*:
it is not disputed that !ina and 'acinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly
married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed
by +rticle 1(* of the 1amily Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a
state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple
alliances of the same married man. Knder this regime, /\only the properties ac5uired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions \H Proof of actual contribution is re5uired.
Bven if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 1(* applies because this provision was intended
precisely to 7ll up the hiatus in +rticle 1(( of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not
su?cient proof of coIownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the ac5uisition of the property.
4n the case at bar, t e controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent
alleged in her complaint that she contributed P-%,%%%.%% for the completion of their house. owever, nowhere in
her testimony did she specify the e6tent of her contribution. 0hat appears in the record are receipts in her name
for the purchase of construction materials.
0hile there is no 5uestion that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no
su?cient proof of the e6act amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to +rticle 1(* of the 1amily Code, in
the absence of proof of e6tent of the parties8 respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be e5ual.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
CORNE6IA MA4A:UENA vs. AE4RONI6A CER<AN4ES
=I$*-- 9@* SC"+ $*(:
3arch @1, 1&-1
7AC4S:
4n 1&)C, herein appellant8s brother 1eli6 3atabuena donated a piece of lot to his commonIlaw spouse,
herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. 1eli6 and Petronila got married only in 1&C$ or si6 years after the deed of
donation was e6ecuted. 1ive months later, or September 1@, 1&C$, 1eli6 died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia
3atabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, 7led a claim over the
property, by virtue of a an a?davit of selfIadjudication e6ecuted by her in 1&C$, had the land declared in her name
and paid the estate and inheritance ta6es thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was
valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when 1eli6 and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering +rticle 1@@ of
the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE: 0hether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a commonIlaw
relationship.
8E6*:
0hile +rticle 1@@ of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage,
policy consideration of the most e6igent character as well as the dictates of morality re5uires that the same
prohibition should apply to a commonIlaw relationship.
+s stated in Fuenaventura vs. Fautista 9)% G! @C-&, 1&)(:, if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations
in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and inNuence
upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without the bene7t of nuptials.
The lac< of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant
having e6clusive right to the disputed property. +s a widow, Cervantes is entitled to oneIhalf of the inheritance, and
the surviving sister to the other half.
+rticle 1%%1, Civil Code. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to oneIhalf of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
7%entes v. Conra1o Roca, G.R. +)#"!, A3ril !""
7AC4S. Gn, Gct 11, 1&*$, Tarciano "oca bought a @)*Is5uare meter lot in Yambales from his mother. Si6 years later
in 1&**, Tarciano o;ered to sell the lot to the petitioners 1uentes spouses through the help of +tty. Plagata who
would prepare the documents and re5uirements to complete the sale. 4n the agreement between Tarciano and
1uentes spouses there will be a Php C%,%%% down payment and Php 1(%,%%% will be paid upon the removal of
Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, "osario, would be
attained. +tty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tas<s and claimed that he went to3anila to get the
signature of "osario but notarized the document at Yamboanga . The deed of sale was e6ecuted 'anuary 11, 1&*&.
+s time passed, Tarciano and "osario died while the 1uentes spouses and possession and control over the lot. Bight
years later in 1&&-, the children of Tarciano and "osario 7led a case to annul the saleand reconvey the property on
the ground that the sale was void since the consent of "osario was not attained and that "osarios8 signature was a
mere forgery. The 1uentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the
ground of fraud is ( years from discovery.
The "TC ruled in favor of the 1uentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the testimony of +tty. Plagata
who witnessed thesigning of "osario must be given weight, and that the action has already prescribed.
*% | P a g e
Gn the other hand, the C+ reversed the ruling of the C+ stating that the action has not prescribed since the
applicable law is the 1&)%Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the
other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 1% years. !iven that the transaction was in 1&*&
and the action was brought in 1&&- hence it was well within the prescriptive period.
ISSUES: . 0hether or not "osario8s signature on the document ofconsent to her husband Tarciano8s sale of their
conjugal land to the 1uentes spouses was forged>
!. 0hether or not the "ocas8 action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed> and
.. 0hether or not only "osario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.
RU6ING: . The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the di;erence in the signatures of "osario in the
document givingconsent and another document e6ecuted at the same time period. The SC noted that the C+ was
correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document which stated consent was completely di;erent from
the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to e6plain why there was such di;erence in the handwriting.
!. +lthough Tarciano and "osario was married during the 1&)% civil code, the sale was done in 1&*&, after the
e;ectivity of the 1amily Code. The 1amily Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the
enactment of the 1amily Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent of "osario is
completely void under +rt 1$( of the family code. 0ith that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never
prescribes. Gn the argument that the action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that
prescriptive period applied to the 1uentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed such contract due to
the fraud but they failed to do so. Gn the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the
other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract.
.. 4t is argued by the Spouses 1uentes that it is only the spouse, "osario, who can 7le such a case to assail the
validity of the sale but given that "osario was already dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC ruled
that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Conse5uently, the land
remained the property of Tarciano and "osario despite that sale. 0hen the two died, they passed on the ownership
of the property to their heirs, namely, the "ocas. +s lawful owners, the "ocas had the right, under +rticle ($& of the
Civil Code, to e6clude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
TTTTTTTTTTTTT
Article !(. Neither s3o%se /a& 1onate an& conB%gal 3artnershi3 3ro3ert& 9itho%t the consent of the
other. 8o9ever, either s3o%se /a&, 9itho%t the consent of the other, /aIe /o1erate 1onations fro/
the conB%gal 3artnershi3 3ro3ert& for charit& or on occasions of fa/il& reBoicing or fa/il& 1istress.
-+'a,
*onation, 9hile an act of li0eralit& transfer o9nershi3 over 3ro3erties. It is aIin to sale of the sa/eE
hence, there is a nee1 for the consent of the other s3o%se if one of the/ /aIes a 1onation of an&
conB%gal 3ro3ert&. Other9ise, it is voi1.
Section J. *issol%tion of ConB%gal
Aartnershi3 Regi/e
Article !J. 4he conB%gal 3artnershi3 ter/inates:
-, U3on the 1eath of either s3o%seE
-!, Khen there is a 1ecree of legal se3arationE
-., Khen the /arriage is ann%lle1 or 1eclare1 voi1E or
-', In case of B%1icial se3aration of 3ro3ert& 1%ring the /arriage %n1er Articles .' to .). -+(a,
4t must be emphasized that upon the death of either spouse, the conjugal partnership shall be terminated. 4n such
case, the following rules shall be observed.
Art. ".. Kpon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be li5uidated in the same
proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased. 4f no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall li5uidate the community property either judicially or e6traIjudicially within one year from the death of
the deceased spouse. 4f upon the lapse of the one year period, no li5uidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving
spouse contract a subse5uent marriage without compliance with the foregoing re5uirements, a mandatory regime
of complete separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subse5uent marriage. 9n:88
ELects of 6egal Se3aration
Gne of the e;ects of the granting of a petition for legal separation is the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, +rticles C@
and C( of the 1amily Code lay down the rules as.
SArt. J.. 4he 1ecree of legal se3aration shall have the follo9ing eLects:
6 6 6
9$: The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved or li5uidated but the o;ending spouse
shall have no right to any share of the net pro7ts earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership,
which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of +rticle (@9$:. 6 6 6H
Un1er Article '.-!: of the 7a/il& Co1e, the ter/ination of a s%0se2%ent /arriage 9here there 9as
a0sence of one s3o%se shall
*1 | P a g e
3ro1%ce the follo9ing eLect:
/9$: The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
li5uidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net pro7ts of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse.
6 6 6H
1urthermore, +rticle C( of the 1amily Code provides.
SArt. J'. After the Fnalit& of the 1ecree of legal se3aration, the innocent spouse may revo<e the donations
made by him or by her in favor of the o;ending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as bene7ciary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be
recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. +lienations, liens and
encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the
complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the
designation
of the insurance bene7ciary shall ta<e e;ect upon written noti7cation thereof to the insured. The action to revo<e
the donation under this +rticle must be brought within 7ve years from the time the decree of legal separation has
become 7nal. 91%-a:88
#ote that under the law, the revocation of donations is not by operation of law. +n action must be brought within
7ve years from
the time the decree of legal separation becomes 7nal. That is optional on the part of the innocent spouse. The
registration of such donations must be made in the registry of property in the places where the properties are
located in order to bind third persons who may be buyers in good faith and for value. 4f not registered, then any
conveyance over the properties donated shall not bind third persons who are innocent purchasers in good faith.
ELect of Ann%l/ent of Marriage.
4n case of annulment of marriage or declaration of nullity, the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and li5uidated
but if one
spouse contracted the marriage in bad faith, he shall lose his share of the net pro7ts of the partnership which shall
be forfeited in favor of the common children, or if none, to the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage
or if there be none, to the innocent spouse.
#ote that the guilty spouse is not entitled to the net gains of the conjugal partnership.
ELect of Se3aration of Aro3erties.
Knder +rticle 1@- of the 1amily Code, once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains shall be li5uidated.
Article !+. 4he se3aration in fact 0et9een h%s0an1 an1 9ife shall not aLect the regi/e of conB%gal
3artnershi3, e5ce3t that:
-, 4he s3o%se 9ho leaves the conB%gal ho/e or ref%ses to live therein, 9itho%t B%st ca%se, shall not
have the right to 0e s%33orte1E
-!, Khen the consent of one s3o%se to an& transaction of the other is re2%ire1 0& la9, B%1icial
a%thori@ation shall 0e o0taine1 in a s%//ar& 3rocee1ingE
-., In the a0sence of s%Ccient conB%gal 3artnershi3 3ro3ert&, the se3arate 3ro3ert& of 0oth s3o%ses
shall 0e soli1aril& lia0le for the s%33ort of the fa/il&. 4he s3o%se 3resent shall, %3on 3etition in a
s%//ar& 3rocee1ing, 0e given B%1icial a%thorit& to a1/inister or enc%/0er an& s3eciFc se3arate
3ro3ert& of the other
s3o%se an1 %se the fr%its or 3rocee1s thereof to satisf& the latterGs share. -+)a,
Article !). If a s3o%se 9itho%t B%st ca%se a0an1ons the other or fails to co/3l& 9ith his or her
o0ligations to the fa/il&, the aggrieve1 s3o%se /a& 3etition the co%rt for receivershi3, for B%1icial
se3aration of 3ro3ert&, or for a%thorit& to 0e the sole a1/inistrator of the conB%gal 3artnershi3
3ro3ert&, s%0Bect to s%ch 3reca%tionar&
con1itions as the co%rt /a& i/3ose.
4he o0ligations to the fa/il& /entione1 in the 3rece1ing 3aragra3h refer to /arital, 3arental or
3ro3ert& relations.
A s3o%se is 1ee/e1 to have a0an1one1 the other 9hen he or she has left the conB%gal 19elling
9itho%t intention of ret%rning. 4he s3o%se 9ho has left the conB%gal 19elling for a 3erio1 of three
/onths or has faile1 9ithin the sa/e 3erio1 to give an& infor/ation as to his or her 9herea0o%ts shall
0e prima (acie 3res%/e1 to have no intention of ret%rning to the conB%gal 19elling. -J+a, #a,
Note: Alease refer to the 1isc%ssion in Article ", 7.C.
Section +. 6i2%i1ation of the ConB%gal Aartnershi3
Assets an1 6ia0ilities
Article !#. U3on the 1issol%tion of the conB%gal 3artnershi3 regi/e, the follo9ing 3roce1%re shall
a33l&:
-, An inventor& shall 0e 3re3are1, listing se3aratel& all the 3ro3erties of the conB%gal 3artnershi3 an1
the e5cl%sive 3ro3erties of each s3o%se.
-!, A/o%nts a1vance1 0& the conB%gal 3artnershi3 in 3a&/ent cre1ite1 to the conB%gal 3artnershi3 as
an asset thereof.
-., Each s3o%se shall 0e rei/0%rse1 for the %se of his or her e5cl%sive f%n1s in the ac2%isition of
3ro3ert& or for the val%e of his or her e5cl%sive 3ro3ert&, the o9nershi3 of 9hich has 0een veste1 0&
la9 in the conB%gal 3artnershi3.
-', 4he 1e0ts an1 o0ligations of the conB%gal 3artnershi3 shall 0e 3ai1 o%t of the conB%gal assets. In
case of ins%Ccienc& of sai1 assets, the s3o%ses shall 0e soli1aril& lia0le for the %n3ai1 0alance 9ith
their se3arate 3ro3erties, in accor1ance 9ith the 3rovisions of 3aragra3h -!, of Article !.
-(, Khatever re/ains of the e5cl%sive 3ro3erties of the s3o%ses shall thereafter 0e 1elivere1 to each
of the/.
-J, Unless the o9ner ha1 0een in1e/niFe1 fro/ 9hatever so%rce, the loss or 1eterioration of
/ova0les %se1 for the 0eneFt of the fa/il&, 0elonging to either s3o%se, even 1%e to fort%ito%s event,
shall 0e 3ai1 to sai1 s3o%se fro/ the conB%gal f%n1s, if an&.
*$ | P a g e
-+, 4he net re/ain1er of the conB%gal 3artnershi3 3ro3erties shall constit%te the 3roFts, 9hich shall
0e 1ivi1e1 e2%all& 0et9een h%s0an1 an1 9ife, %nless a 1iLerent 3ro3ortion or 1ivision 9as agree1
%3on in the /arriage settle/ents or %nless there has 0een a vol%ntar& 9aiver or forfeit%re of s%ch
share as 3rovi1e1 in this Co1e.
-), 4he 3res%/3tive legiti/es of the co//on chil1ren shall 0e 1elivere1 %3on 3artition in accor1ance
9ith Article (.
-#, In the 3artition of the 3ro3erties, the conB%gal 19elling an1 the lot on 9hich it is sit%ate1 shall,
%nless other9ise agree1 %3on 0& the 3arties, 0e a1B%1icate1 to the s3o%se 9ith 9ho/ the /aBorit& of
the co//on chil1ren choose to re/ain. Chil1ren 0elo9 the age of seven &ears are 1ee/e1 to have
chosen the /other,
%nless the co%rt has 1eci1e1 other9ise. In case there is no s%ch /aBorit&, the co%rt shall 1eci1e,
taIing into consi1eration the 0est interests of sai1 chil1ren. -)a, )!a, ).a, )'a, )(a,
Article .". U3on the ter/ination of the /arriage 0& 1eath, the conB%gal 3artnershi3 3ro3ert& shall 0e
li2%i1ate1 in the sa/e 3rocee1ing for the settle/ent of the estate of the 1ecease1. If no B%1icial
3rocee1ing is instit%te1, the s%rviving s3o%se shall li2%i1ate the conB%gal 3artnershi3 3ro3ert& either
B%1iciall& or e5tra?B%1iciall& 9ithin one &ear fro/ the 1eath of the 1ecease1 s3o%se. If %3on the la3se
of the si5?/onth 3erio1 no li2%i1ation is /a1e, an& 1is3osition or enc%/0rance involving the conB%gal
3artnershi3 3ro3ert& of the ter/inate1 /arriage shall 0e voi1.
Sho%l1 the s%rviving s3o%se contract a s%0se2%ent /arriage 9itho%t co/3liance 9ith the foregoing
re2%ire/ents, a /an1ator& regi/e of co/3lete se3aration of 3ro3ert& shall govern the 3ro3ert&
relations of the s%0se2%ent /arriage. -n,
5ote: 1or discussion, refer to +rticle 1%@ of the 1amily Code
Article .. Khenever the li2%i1ation of the conB%gal 3artnershi3 3ro3erties of t9o or /ore /arriages
contracte1 0& the sa/e 3erson 0efore the eLectivit& of this Co1e is carrie1 o%t si/%ltaneo%sl&, the
res3ective ca3ital, fr%its an1 inco/e of each 3artnershi3 shall 0e 1eter/ine1 %3on s%ch 3roof as /a&
0e consi1ere1 accor1ing to the r%les of evi1ence. In case of 1o%0t as to 9hich 3artnershi3 the e5isting
3ro3erties 0elong, the sa/e shall 0e 1ivi1e1
0et9een the 1iLerent 3artnershi3s in 3ro3ortion to the ca3ital an1 1%ration of each. -)#a,
5ote: 1or discussion, see the comments in +rticle 1%( of the 1amily Code.
Article .!. 4he R%les of Co%rt on the a1/inistration of estates of 1ecease1 3ersons shall 0e o0serve1
in the a33raisal an1 sale of 3ro3ert& of the conB%gal 3artnershi3, an1 other /atters 9hich are not
e53ressl& 1eter/ine1 in this Cha3ter. -)+a,
Article ... 7ro/ the co//on /ass of 3ro3ert&, s%33ort shall 0e given to the s%rviving s3o%se an1 to
the chil1ren 1%ring the li2%i1ation of the inventorie1 3ro3ert& an1 %ntil 9hat 0elongs to the/ is
1elivere1E 0%t fro/ this shall 0e 1e1%cte1 that a/o%nt receive1 for s%33ort 9hich e5cee1s the fr%its
or rents 3ertaining to the/. -))a,
Cha3ter (
Se3aration of Aro3ert& of the S3o%ses an1 A1/inistration of Co//on Aro3ert& 0& One S3o%se *%ring
the Marriage
Article .'. In the a0sence of an e53ress 1eclaration in the /arriage settle/ents, the se3aration of
3ro3ert& 0et9een s3o%ses 1%ring the /arriage shall not taIe 3lace e5ce3t 0& B%1icial or1er.
S%ch B%1icial se3aration of 3ro3ert& /a& either 0e vol%ntar& or for s%Ccient ca%se. -#"a,
Khere there can 0e se3aration of 3ro3erties 1%ring the /arriage.
Article .(. An& of the follo9ing shall 0e consi1ere1 s%Ccient ca%se for B%1icial se3aration of
3ro3ert&:
-, 4hat the s3o%se of the 3etitioner has 0een sentence1 to a 3enalt& 9hich carries 9ith it civil
inter1ictionE
!, 4hat the s3o%se of the 3etitioner has 0een B%1iciall& 1eclare1 an a0senteeE
-., 4hat loss of 3arental a%thorit& of the s3o%se of 3etitioner has 0een 1ecree1 0& the co%rtE
-', 4hat the s3o%se of the 3etitioner has a0an1one1 the latter or faile1 to co/3l& 9ith his or her
o0ligations to the fa/il& as 3rovi1e1 for in Article "E
-(, 4hat the s3o%se grante1 the 3o9er of a1/inistration in the /arriage settle/ent has a0%se1 that
3o9erE an1
-J, 4hat at the ti/e of the 3etition, the s3o%ses have 0een se3arate1 in fact for at least one -, &ear
an1 reconciliation is highl& i/3ro0a0le.
In the cases 3rovi1e1 for in nos. , !, an1 ., the 3resentation of the Fnal B%1g/ent against the g%ilt&
or a0sent s3o%se shall 0e eno%gh 0asis for the grant of the 1ecree of B%1icial se3aration of 3ro3ert&.
-#a,
*eclaration of a0sence.
+bsence may be declared under the following circumstances provided for under +rticle @*( of the Civil Code.
/Two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and 7ve
years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence may be
declared.H
Knder +rticle @*) of the Civil Code, the following may as< for the declaration of absence.
91: The spouse present>
9$: The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same>
9@: The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy>
9(: Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death.
The judicial declaration of absence, however, shall not ta<e e;ect until Si6 9C: months after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Constr%ctive an1 act%al a0an1on/ent.
+bandonment presupposes that a spouse leaves the conjugal dwelling without the intention of returning. 4t
presupposes an active
*@ | P a g e
act of leaving the conjugal dwelling. The case of 6artosaDIo vs. CA, $1C SC"+ C&$, however is di;erent as the
husband was considered as having abandoned the wife inspite of the fact that he never left the home. e, however,
prevented the wife from returning to the conjugal dwelling after a vacation in her home province. 4t was ruled
therein that the /ere act of 3reventing the s3o%se fro/ ret%rning to the conB%gal 19elling is s%Ccient
act to constit%te a0an1on/ent. This is otherwise <nown as constructive abandonment.
"eclaration o( absence.
4t is obvious from the law that if a spouse has been declared an absentee, the present spouse can 7le an action for
separation of
properties. This is so because administration of the properties is vested upon the spouses jointly and it needs
actual, physical presence to perform such act. 4t is not possible for a person who has been declared absent to
personally administer such properties. So that the law imposes a penalty upon such person by allowing the present
spouse to as< for separation of properties during the marriage in order not to unduly prejudice the present spouse.
1urthermore, if the present spouse wishes to sell, encumber or mortgage the proper ties, the same would not be
valid without the consent of the other spouse. 4n order not to prejudice the present spouse, the law allows himAher
to as< for separation of properties so that if granted, the present spouse may e6ercise hisAher acts of ownership
over hisAher own. 9 <ay di man sya <abaligya so ipa li5uidate na lang nya property para ma partition ug dili sya ma
prejudice:
The creditors are amply protected by law when the spouses 7le an action for separation of properties or dissolution
of the community or properties. That is why they are entitled to notice in order that they may 7le their claims
against the community or the spouses individually. This is to prevent fraud against creditors.
Article .J. 4he s3o%se /a& Bointl& Fle a veriFe1 3etition 9ith the co%rt for the vol%ntar& 1issol%tion
of the a0sol%te co//%nit& or the conB%gal 3artnershi3 of gains, an1 for the se3aration of their
co//on 3ro3erties. All cre1itors of the a0sol%te co//%nit& or of the conB%gal 3artnershi3 of gains, as
9ell as the 3ersonal cre1itors of the s3o%se, shall 0e liste1 in the 3etition an1 notiFe1 of the Fling
thereof. 4he co%rt shall taIe /eas%res to 3rotect the cre1itors an1 other 3ersons 9ith 3ec%niar&
interest. -#a,
Article .+. Once the se3aration of 3ro3ert& has 0een 1ecree1, the a0sol%te co//%nit& or the
conB%gal 3artnershi3 of gains shall 0e li2%i1ate1 in confor/it& 9ith this Co1e. *%ring the 3en1enc& of
the 3rocee1ings for se3aration of
3ro3ert&, the a0sol%te co//%nit& or the conB%gal 3artnershi3 shall 3a& for the s%33ort of the s3o%ses
an1 their chil1ren. -#!a,
Article .). After 1issol%tion of the a0sol%te co//%nit& or of the conB%gal 3artnershi3, the 3rovisions
on co/3lete se3aration of 3ro3ert& shall a33l&. -#a,
Article .#. 4he 3etition for se3aration of 3ro3ert& an1 the Fnal B%1g/ent granting the sa/e shall 0e
recor1e1 in the 3ro3er local civil registries an1 registries of 3ro3ert&. -#.a,
Article '". 4he se3aration of 3ro3ert& shall not 3reB%1ice the rights 3revio%sl& ac2%ire1 0& cre1itors.
-#'a,
Article '. 4he s3o%ses /a&, in the sa/e 3rocee1ings 9here se3aration of 3ro3ert& 9as 1ecree1, Fle
a /otion in co%rt for a 1ecree reviving the 3ro3ert& regi/e that e5iste1 0et9een the/ 0efore the
se3aration of 3ro3ert& in an& of the follo9ing instances: -, Khen the civil inter1iction ter/inatesE
-!, Khen the a0sentee s3o%se rea33earsE
-., Khen the co%rt, 0eing satisFe1 that the s3o%se grante1 the 3o9er of a1/inistration in the
/arriage settle/ents 9ill not again a0%se that 3o9er, a%thori@es the res%/3tion of sai1
a1/inistrationE
-', Khen the s3o%se 9ho has left the conB%gal ho/e 9itho%t a 1ecree of legal se3aration res%/es
co//on life 9ith the otherE
-(, Khen 3arental a%thorit& is B%1iciall& restore1 to the s3o%se 3revio%sl& 1e3rive1 thereofE
-J, Khen the s3o%ses 9ho have 0een se3arate1 in fact for at least one &ear, reconcile an1 res%/e
co//on lifeE or
-+, Khen after vol%ntar& 1issol%tion of the a0sol%te co//%nit& of 3ro3ert& or conB%gal 3artnershi3
has 0een B%1iciall& 1ecree1 %3on the Boint 3etition of the s3o%ses, the& agree to the revival of the
for/er 3ro3ert& regi/e. No vol%ntar& se3aration of 3ro3ert& /a& thereafter 0e grante1.
4he revival of the for/er 3ro3ert& regi/e shall 0e governe1 0& Article J+. -#(a,
Article '!. 4he a1/inistration of all classes of e5cl%sive 3ro3ert& of either s3o%se /a& 0e transferre1
0& the co%rt to the other s3o%se:
-, Khen one s3o%se 0eco/es the g%ar1ian of the otherE
-!, Khen one s3o%se is B%1iciall& 1eclare1 an a0senteeE
-., Khen one s3o%se is sentence1 to a 3enalt& 9hich carries 9ith it civil inter1ictionE or
-', Khen one s3o%se 0eco/es a f%gitive fro/ B%stice or is
in hi1ing as an acc%se1 in a cri/inal case.
If the other s3o%se is not 2%aliFe1 0& reason of inco/3etence, conVict of interest, or an& other B%st
ca%se, the co%rt shall a33oint a s%ita0le 3erson to 0e the a1/inistrator. -n,
Cha3ter J
Regi/e of Se3aration of Aro3ert&
Article '.. Sho%l1 the f%t%re s3o%ses agree in the /arriage settle/ents that their 3ro3ert& relations
1%ring /arriage shall 0e governe1 0& the regi/e of se3aration of 3ro3ert&, the 3rovisions of this
Cha3ter shall 0e s%33letor&. -!!a,
Article ''. Se3aration of 3ro3ert& /a& refer to 3resent or f%t%re 3ro3ert& or 0oth. It /a& 0e total or
3artial. In the latter case, the 3ro3ert& not agree1 %3on as se3arate shall 3ertain to the a0sol%te
co//%nit&. -!.a,
*( | P a g e
Article '(. Each s3o%se shall o9n, 1is3ose of, 3ossess, a1/inister an1 enBo& his or her o9n se3arate
estate, 9itho%t nee1 of the consent of the other. 4o each s3o%se shall 0elong all earnings fro/ his or
her 3rofession, 0%siness or in1%str& an1 all fr%its, nat%ral, in1%strial or civil, 1%e or receive1 1%ring
the /arriage fro/
his or her se3arate 3ro3ert&. -!'a,
Article 'J. :oth s3o%ses shall 0ear the fa/il& e53enses in 3ro3ortion to their inco/e, or, in case of
ins%Ccienc& or 1efa%lt thereof, to the c%rrent /arIet val%e of their se3arate 3ro3erties.
4he lia0ilit& of the s3o%ses to cre1itors for fa/il& e53enses shall, ho9ever, 0e soli1ar&. -!(a,
#llustration:
+ and F are married. 4n their marriage settlement, they agreed on a regime of complete separation of property.
+ earns P$%,%%%.%% per month from the e6ercise of his profession. F earns P1%,%%%.%% in the e6ercise of her
profession. The e6penses of the family shall be borne by them in the 3ro3ortion of !:.
Cha3ter +
Aro3ert& Regi/e of Unions Kitho%t
Marriage
Article '+. Khen a /an an1 a 9o/an 9ho are ca3acitate1 to /arr& each other, live e5cl%sivel& 9ith
each other as h%s0an1 an1 9ife 9itho%t the 0eneFt of /arriage or %n1er a voi1 /arriage, their 9ages
an1 salaries shall 0e o9ne1 0& the/ in e2%al shares an1 the 3ro3ert& ac2%ire1 0& 0oth of the/
thro%gh their 9orI or in1%str&
shall 0e governe1 0& the r%les on co?o9nershi3.
In the a0sence of 3roof to the contrar&, 3ro3erties ac2%ire1 9hile the& live1 together shall 0e
3res%/e1 to have 0een o0taine1 0& their Boint eLorts, 9orI or in1%str&, an1 shall 0e o9ne1 0& the/ in
e2%al shares. 7or 3%r3oses of this Article, a 3art& 9ho 1i1 not 3artici3ate in the ac2%isition 0& the
other 3art& of an& 3ro3ert& shall 0e 1ee/e1 to have contri0%te1 Bointl& in the ac2%isition thereof if
the for/erGs eLorts consiste1 in the care an1 /aintenance of the fa/il& an1 of the ho%sehol1.
Neither 3art& can enc%/0er or 1is3ose 0& acts inter vivos of his or her share in the 3ro3ert& ac2%ire1
1%ring coha0itation an1 o9ne1 in co//on, 9itho%t the consent of the other, %ntil after the
ter/ination of their coha0itation.
Khen onl& one of the 3arties to a voi1 /arriage is in goo1 faith, the share of the 3art& in 0a1 faith in
the co?o9nershi3 shall 0e forfeite1 in favor of their co//on chil1ren. In case of 1efa%lt or of 9aiver 0&
an& or all of the co//on chil1ren or their 1escen1ants, each vacant share shall 0elong to the
res3ective s%rviving 1escen1ants. In the a0sence of 1escen1ants, s%ch share shall 0elong to the
innocent 3art&. In all cases, the forfeit%re shall taIe
3lace %3on ter/ination of the coha0itation. -''a,
Note- spiritual contribution here is su?cient li<ecaring for the children, administering the household,husbanding
scarce resources, freeing her husband from household tas<s, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a
housewife . li<e ang asawa mao tigI ta<e care sa conjugal home> maintenance and everything so naa sya share
gihapun> tapos timanI4 nga ang salary ug wages coIownership pud pero sa 1(* e6clusive ang salaries ug wages..c:
Un1er Article ') of the 1amily Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationship in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, only the properties ac5uired by both of the parties thru their
actual joint contributions of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions.
0ages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her respectively. Contributions in the form of care of the
home, children
and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration are e6cluded in this regime. Since the second marriage is bigamous,
+rticle 1(*
applies.
1or +rticle 1(- to operate however, the man and the woman.
91: must be capacitated to marry each other> 9$: live e6clusively with each other as husband and wife> and 9@: their
union is without the bene7t of marriage or their marriage is void.
Ares%/3tion of co?o9nershi3.
Bven if the man is the only one employed and the properties which were ac5uired during their coverture came from
the salaries
or wages of the man, the law presumes that the parties are coIowners of the said properties. The contributions of
the woman, who may have played the role of a plain housewife, are her e;orts, consisting of the caring and
maintenance of the family and the household.
Article '). In cases of coha0itation not falling %n1er the 3rece1ing Article, onl& the 3ro3erties
ac2%ire1 0& 0oth of the 3arties thro%gh their act%al Boint contri0%tion of /one&, 3ro3ert&, or in1%str&
shall 0e o9ne1 0& the/ in co//on in 3ro3ortion to their res3ective contri0%tions. In the a0sence of
3roof to the contrar&, their contri0%tions an1 corres3on1ing shares are 3res%/e1 to 0e e2%al. 4he
sa/e r%le an1 3res%/3tion shall a33l& to Boint 1e3osits
of /one& an1 evi1ences of cre1it. If one of the 3arties is vali1l& /arrie1 to another, his or her
share in the co?o9nershi3 shall accr%e to the a0sol%te co//%nit& or conB%gal 3artnershi3 e5isting in
s%ch vali1 /arriage. If the 3art& 9ho acte1 in 0a1 faith is not vali1l& /arrie1 to another, his or her
share shall 0e forfeite1 in the /anner 3rovi1e1 in the last 3aragra3h of the 3rece1ing Article. 4he
foregoing r%les on forfeit%re shall liIe9ise a33l& even if 0oth 3arties are in 0a1 faith. -''a,
Note: 9diri sa 1(* <ay bawal man na relasyon> so spiritual share dili irecognized> <elangan pa nila iprove ang actual
contribution nila or else automatic ang properties as conjugal nila in the absence of proof nga separate or e6clusive
ang property:
Ill%stration:
*) | P a g e
The properties owned in common by the spouses are those ac5uired by them during their cohabitation through their
actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry in proportion to their respective contributions. So that, if R and L are
living together as
husband and wife and they ac5uired a house and lot worth P)%%,%%%.%%, with R contributing P(%%,%%%.%% and L
contributing
P1%%,%%%.%%, their shares shall be at the ratio of (.1. 4n the absence, however, of evidence of their respective
contributions, the law presumes the same to be e5ual. There is, however, a need to prove material contribution
unli<e in +rticle 1(- where spiritual contribution is su?cient for an e5ual sharing of the properties.
R%les on forfeit%re of shares:
9a: 4f one of the parties is validly married to another, hisAher share shall redound to the bene7t of the absolute
community
or the conjugal partnership in the valid marriage>
9b: 4f the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another person, his or her share shall be distributed
in the following manner.
b.1. The share of the party in bad faith shall go to their common children>
b.$. 4n default of common children or if they waived their share, the properties shall go to their respective children>
b.@. 4f there are no common children or children of their own, the share of the party in bad faith shall go to the
innocent spouse.
Note further that if both are validly married and no one is in bad faith, the share of each shall go to their respective
marriage.
Note, however, that their salaries and wages shall belong to each of them e6clusively.
4aIe note: Pag ang ipangutana gani is what =aw will givern their marriage tanI awa ang date ganusIa namatay ang
isa <a spouse to chec< what =+0 ang mu govern\ang 1C or Civil Code> note further nga <ung old Civil Code isa
lang ang property regime e6isting ana..automatic conjugal dayun of property\wala pa nang absolute ug e6clusive
regime\c: Pero remember also that <ung walay vested rights nga ma impair or ma prejudice naa jud retroactive
application ang 1+34=L CG,B ha\ mas<i pa gi<asal <a nga dili sa<op sa 1C or prior to 1&** nga cohabitation or
marriage.
4llustration.
A33lication of Arts. '+ an1 '), 7a/il& Co1e.
4n Sy vs. CA, et al., )1 SC+, $(*, $@$ SC"+ )-& 93ay $-, 1&&(:, it appears that #atividad CalaunanIKy and 3enilo
Ky were commonI law husband and wife for @C years. They gave birth to four 9(: children. They also ac5uired
properties during their coverture. Gn September $-, 1&&%, 3enilo died. Khat la9 governs the 3artition of the
3ro3erties;
The provisions of +rticles 1(- and 1(* of the 1amily Code shall govern the partition of properties evidently ac5uired
during the period of their commonIlaw relationship considering that 3enilo died on September $-, 1&&% and the
1amily Code too< e;ect on +ugust @, 1&**.
Antonio A.S. <al1es vs. R4C, =%e@on Cit&, et al. G.R. No. !!+'#, $%l& ., ##J +! SCA* #J+ 9 tutu<i ni
nga case as this case e6plains how conjugal partnership of gains is di;erent from coIownership in application> <ay
mas<i a<o mag libog <o sa duha:
7acts:
+ntonio Maldes and Consuelo !omez got married on 'anuary ), 1&-1. They begot 7ve children. Gn 'une $$, 1&&$,
Maldez 7led an
action for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity 2 which was granted 2
where the court
declared their marriage void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. 4t further directed the parties to start
proceedings on the li5uidation of their common properties as de7ned by +rticle 1(- of the 1amily Code and to
comply with the provisions of +rticles )%, )1, and )$. + clari7cation was as<ed by Consuelo for she asserts that
there are no provisions governing the procedure for the li5uidation of common property in unions without marriage>
hence, the trial court ruled that the provisions on coIownership shall apply. 4t further declared that considering that
the marriage has been declared void, pursuant to +rticle 1(-, the property regime shall be governed by the rules on
coIownership. 4t said that +rticles 1%$ and 1%& are inapplicable as they refer to the absolute community and the
conjugal partnership of gains> hence, a petition was 7led with the Supreme Court arguing that +rts. )%, )1 and )$
are controlling and that.
4. +rticle 1(- of the 1amily Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated>
44. +rticles )%, )1, and )$, in relation to +rticles 1%$ and 1$& of the 1amily Code, govern the disposition of the family
dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void a" initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses>
444. +ssuming, arguen!o, that +rticle 1(- applies to marriages declared void a" initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with +rticle 1$&.
8el1:
The trial court correctly applied the law in that a voi! marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of +rticle 1(- or +rticle 1(*, such as the case
may be, of the
1amily Code. +rticle 1(- is a rema<e of +rticle 1(( of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases.
93a6ey vs. C+, 1$& SC"+ 1*-> +znar, et al. vs. !arcia, 1%$ Phil. 1%)):. 4f this peculiar <ind of coIownership applies
when a man and a woman, su;ering no legal impediment to marry each other, e6clusively live together as husband
and wife under a void marriage or without the bene7t of marriage. The term /capacitatedH in the provision 9in the
7rst paragraph of the law: refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in +rticles @- and @* of the Code.
Knder this property regime, property ac5uired by both spouses through their 2or7 and in!ustry shall be governed
by the rules on
*C | P a g e
e$ual coIownership. +ny property ac5uired during the union is prima acie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint e;orts. + party who did not participate in the ac5uisition of the property shall still be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party8s /e;orts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household 9+rt. 1(-:.88 Knli<e the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple8s separate property are not
included in the coIownership.
+rticle 1(- of the 1amily Code, in substance and to the above e6tent, has clari7ed +rticle 1(( of the Civil Code. 4n
addition, the
law now e6pressly provides that 2
9a: #either party can dispose or encumber by acts inter vivos of his or her share in coIownership property, without
the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation> and
9b: 4n the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the coIownership in favor of
their
common children> in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong
to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall ta<e
place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Hhen the commonDla2
spouses suBer rom a legal impe!iment to marry or 2hen they !o not live e1clusively 2ith each other *as hus"an!
an! 2ie0, only the property ac5uired by both of them through their actual 8oint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contri"utions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima acie presumed to be e5ual. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so e6isting under a
valid marriage. 4f the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner already heretofore e6pressed. 9+rt. 1(*, 1amily Code:.
NO4E: 4t must be observed that the Supreme Court made reference to the phrase /respective contributionsH
suggesting that if one of the parties can show material contribution only to the e6tent of $%_ of the value of the
properties, then, such person is entitled to an e5uivalent of $%_ of the property upon the termination of the
relationship. The mere proof of the e6istence of a coIownership in this case does not mean that the parties shall
divide e5ually the property. 4t shall be divided in proportion to their respective contributions.
+nd if as<ed whether there is a coIownership between the cohabitation of man and woman under +rt. 1(*> the
answer is #G 9timanIi: STS 4n the case of Tumlos vs. Sps. )ario (ernan!ez, !.". #o. 1@-C)%, +pril 1$, $%%%, it held
that No, there is no co?o9nershi3 of Mario 9ith the other 9o/an %nless act%al contri0%tion is 3rove1.
It 9as f%rther r%le1 that the 7a/il& Co1e is retroactive in nat%re.
Un1er Article '), 7a/il& Co1e, only the properties ac5uired by both parties thru their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. 4t
must be stressed that actual contribution is re5uired by +rticle 1(*. If the act%al contri0%tion of the 3art& is
not 3rove1, there 9ill 0e no co?o9nershi3 an1 no 3res%/3tion of e2%al shares.
RRRRRR
4AN <S AN*RA*E
General R%le: SMaEll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains e6clusively to the husband or to the wife.H 1or this presumption to apply, the party invo<ing
the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed ac5uired during the marriage 9in or1er
that Article J" to a33l&:
Art. J". 0hen a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article (( obtains a judgment in his
favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the ma6imum
amount 76ed in Article (+, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale
of the property under e6ecution. The court shall so order if it 7nds that the actual value of the family home e6ceeds
the ma6imum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. 4f the increased actual value e6ceeds the
ma6imum allowed in +rticle 1)- and results from subse5uent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or
persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the bene7ciaries, the
same rule and procedure shall apply.
+t the e6ecution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be
applied 7rst to the amount mentioned in +rticle 1)-, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs.
The e6cess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor
relate to the follo9ing articles:
Art. ((. 4he fa/il& ho/e shall 0e e5e/3t fro/ e5ec%tion, force1 sale or attach/ent e5ce3t.
91: 1or nonpayment of ta6es>
9$: 1or debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home>
9@: 1or debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution> and
9(: 1or debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service
or furnished material for the construction of the building. 9$(@a:
Art. (+. The actual value of the family home shall not e6ceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the
three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as
may hereafter be 76ed by law.
8OK 4O *E4ERMINE EPC6USI<I4Y;
The issuance of the title in the name solely of one spouse is not determinative of the conjugal nature of the
property, since there is no showing that it was ac5uired during the marriage. The presumption under +rticle 1C% of
the #ew Civil Code, that property ac5uired during marriage is conjugal, does not apply where there is no showing as
to when the property alleged to be conjugal was ac5uired. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the
name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. 3oreover, when the property is
registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no showing as to when the property was ac5uired by same
spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs e6clusively to the said spouse.
4n this case, there is no evidence to indicate when the property was ac5uired by petitioner 'ose7na. Thus, we agree
with petitioner 'ose7na8s declaration in the deed of absolute sale she e6ecuted in favor of the respondent that she
was the absolute and sole owner of the property.
4n this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of "osario and her husband was terminated upon the
*- | P a g e
latter8s death on +ugust -, 1&-*
(@
while the transfer certi7cates of title over the subject properties were issued on
September $*, 1&-& and solely in the name of /"osario Mda. de +ndrade, of legal age, widow, 1ilipino.HGther than
their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by the +ndrades to establish that the subject properties were
procured during the coverture of their parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds.
AROAER4Y RE6A4ION IN A MIPE* MARRIAGE
C8EESMAN < IAC #. SCRA #.
G.R. No. +').. $an%ar& !, ##
1+CTS. This appeal concerns the attempt by an +merican citizen 9petitioner Thomas Cheesman: to annul2for lac<
of consent on his part2the sale by his 1ilipino wife 9Criselda: of a residential lot and building to Bstelita Padilla
i,ecember (, 1&-% Q Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married but have been separated since
1ebruary 1), 1&*1
i'une (, 1&-( Q a ,eed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory "ights was e6ecuted by +rmando +ltares, conveying a
parcel of land in favor of /Criselda Cheesman, married to Thomas Cheesman.H Thomas, although aware of the deed,
did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Ta6 declarations for the said property were issued in the
name of Criselda Cheesman alone and she assumed e6clusive management and administration of the property
i 'uly 1, 1&*1 Q Criselda sold the property to Bstelita Padilla without <nowledge and consent of Thomas
i'uly @1, 1&*1 Q Thomas 7led a suit for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been
e6ecuted without his <nowledge and consent. Criselda 7led an answer alleging that the property sold was
paraphernal, having purchased the property from her own money> that Thomas, an +merican was dis5uali7ed to
have any interest or right of ownership in the land and> that Bstelita was a buyer in good faith
i,uring the trial, it was found out that the transfer of property too< place during the e6istence of their marriage as
it was ac5uired on 'une (, 1&-(
i'une $(, 1&*$ Q "TC declared the sale e6ecuted by Criselda void ab initio and ordered the delivery of the property
to Thomas as administrator of the conjugal property
iThomas appealed to 4+C where he assailed the granting of Bstelita8s petition for relief and resolution of matters not
subject of said petition> in declaring valid the sale to Bstelita without his <nowledge and consent. Gn 'anuary -,
1&*C, 4+C a?rmed summary judgment decision
4SSKB. 0hether or not the wife can dispose of the property in 5uestion> 0hether or not Cheesman, being an
+merican citizen, can 5uestion the sale B=,. Section 1(, +rt. R4M of 1&-@ Constitution provides that. /save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed e6cept to individuals, corporations, or
associations 5uali7ed to ac5uire or hold lands of the public domain.H Thus, assuming that it was his intention that
the lot in 5uestion be purchased by him and his wife, he ac5uired no right whatsoever over the property by virtue
of that purchase> and in attempting to ac5uire a right or interest in land, he was <nowingly violating the
Constitution.
+s such, the sale to him was null and void. +t any rate, Cheesman had and has #G C+P+C4TL TG ZKBST4G# TB
SKFSBZKB#TS+=B G1 TB S+3B P"GPB"TL FL 4S 041B G# TB TBG"L T+T 4# SG ,G4#! B4S 3B"B=L
BRB"C4S4#! TB P"B"G!+T4MB G1 + KSF+#, 4# "BSPBCT G1CG#'K!+= P"GPB"TL. To sustain such a theory would
permit indirect controversion of the Constitutional prohibition.
4f the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and
right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
Bven if the wife did use conjugal funds to ma<e the ac5uisition, his recovering and holding the property cannot be
warranted as it is against the constitution. Conse5uently, Bstelita is a purchaser in good faith since she <new that
Thomas cannot intervene in the sale or disposition of the said property.
,BC4S4G#. The Court +114"3B, the appealed decision.
TTTTTTTTTTTTT

KI66EM :EUMER,
Aetitioner, vs.
A<E6INA AMORES,
Res3on1ent.G.R. No. #(J+" *ece/0er ., !"!
SUMMARY
,utch national see<s to reimburse funds he invested in allowing his 1ilipina spouse tobuy parcels of 1ilipino land
after their marriage was declared null.
7AC4S
Petitioner, a ,utch #ational, and respondent, a 1ilipina, married in 3arch $&,
1&*%. +fter several years, the "TC declared the nullity of their marriage. Conse5uently, petitioner 7led a Petition for
,issolution of Conjugal Partnership dated praying for the distribution of properties claimed to have been ac5uired
during the subsistence of their marriage. ,uring trial, petitioner testi7ed that while =ots 0, R, L, and Y, parcels of
land, were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were ac5uired with the money he received from
the ,utch government as his disability bene7t since respondent did not have su?cient income. e also claimed
that the joint a?davit they submitted was contrary to +rticle *& of the 1amily Code, hence, invalid. The "TC ruled
that, regardless of the source of funds for the ac5uisition of =ots 0, R, L and Y, petitioner could not have ac5uired
any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to ac5uire them notwithstanding his
<nowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands. This was made evident by
the sworn statements petitioner e6ecuted purporting to show that the subject parcels of land were purchased from
the e6clusive funds of his wife, the herein respondent.
Petitioner8s plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase
the foregoing properties on the basis of e5uity was li<ewise denied for not having cometo court with clean hands.
C+ a?rmed. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUEKQN a foreigner may reimburse his investment in the purchase of 1ilipino land ,BC4S4G# The Court +114"3B,
the rulings of the "TC and C+. In Re: Aetition 7or Se3aration of Aro3ert&?Elena :%enavent%ra M%ller v.
8el/%t M%ller
the Court had already denied acclaim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land
instituted by a foreigner against his former 1ilipina spouse. 4t held that the foreigner cannot see< reimbursement on
the ground of e5uity where it is clear that he willingly and <nowingly bought the property despite the prohibition
against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section -, +rticle R44 of the 1&*- Philippine
** | P a g e
Constitution. Kndeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he Vis well aware of the aboveIcited constitutional
prohibitionV and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject
properties in the latter8s name.

Clearly, petitioner8s actuations showed his palpable intent to s<irt the constitutional prohibition. Gn the basis of
such admission, the Court 7nds no reason why it should not apply the 3uller ruling. The timeIhonored principle is
that he who has done ine5uity shall not be accorded e5uity. Thus, litigant may be denied relief by a court of e5uity
on the ground that his conduct hasIbeen ine5uitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. Surely, a
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and
produces no legal e;ect at all.
#either can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. 4t does not apply
if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.
4his is the iss%e 1isc%sse1 0& the S%3re/e Co%rt in the case of :orro/eo vs. *escallar, G.R. No.
(#.", 7e0r%ar& !', !""#.

4he facts as state1 in the 1ecision are:
'ambrich, an +ustrian arrived in the Philippines in 1&*@ being assigned in the country and was transferred to Cebu
and met and fell in love with a separated 1ilipina D herein referred to as respondent E, with two <ids and who had no
means of livelihood. Thereafter they bought their house and lots but the "egister of ,eeds refused registration of
the ,eed of +bsolute Sale on the ground that 'ambrich was an alien and could not ac5uire alienable lands of the
public domain and therefore his name was erased and the titles issued in the name of the 1ilipina.

4n 1&*C, 'ambrich sold his rights and interests in the said property to a 1ilipino buyer, Forromeo, D the petitioner in
this case E to pay for his debt but when Forromeo sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that the
titles to the lots have been transferred in the name of the 1ilipina and that the same had been mortgaged.

The buyer, Forromeo then 7led a complaint for recovery of the properties. The 1ilipina girl7riend claimed that she bought it
with her own funds and that 'ambrich being a foreigner, was not entitled to own land in the Philippines. The "egional Trial
Court rendered a decision in favour of the buyer and declared him to be the owner of the properties since the facts show that
the 1ilipina had no means of livelihood or funds to have bought the property.
The 1ilipina appealed and the decision was reversed by the Court of +ppeals stating that the foreigner, 'ambrich,
could not have ac5uired land being a foreigner.

The buyer, Forromeo, appealed by way of petition to the Supreme Court which stated the iss%es :

1. 0ho purchased the subject propertiesJ
$. 0hat is the e;ect of registration of the properties in the name of the 1ilipinaJ


4n upholding the decision of the lower court, the Supreme Court stated.

The evidence presented showed that 'ambrich had all the authority to transfer all his rights, interests and
participation in the subject properties by virtue of the ,eed of +ssignment to the buyer, Forromeo, as it was shown
that the funds to purchase the properties came from 'ambrich, who was therefore the true buyer of the property,
and,

V 1urther, the fact that the disputed properties were ac5uired during the couplePs cohabitation does not help
respondent. The rule that coIownership applies to a man and a woman living e6clusively with each other as
husband and wife without the bene7t of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not
apply. 4n the instant case, the respondent was still legally married to another when she and 'ambrich lived together.
4n such adulterous relationship, no coIownership e6ists between the parties. 4t is necessary for each of the partners
to prove his or her actual contribution in the ac5uisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of
it. Presumptions of coIownership and e5ual contribution does not apply.V

+s to the registration of the properties in the name of the 1ilipina, the Supreme Court said,

V4t is settled that registration is not a mode of ac5uiring ownership. 4t is only a means of con7rming the fact of its
e6istence with notice to the world at large. Certi7cates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a
title does not ma<e one the true owner of the property 6 6 6 6 6 6 This is the situation in the instant case.
"espondent did not contribute a single centavo in the ac5uisition of the properties. She had no income of her own
at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by 'ambrich.V

+s to the capacity of 'ambrich, being an alien, to ac5uire land, the Supreme Court said,

j 6666 the transfer of land 666 to 'ambrich, who is an +ustrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had
not 'ambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a 1ilipino citizen. 666666

The rationale behind the CourtPs ruling in Knited Church Foard for 0orld 3inistries, as reiterated in subse5uent
cases, is this Q since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nationPs land for future generations of 1ilipinos,
that aim is achieved by ma<ing lawful the ac5uisition of real estate by aliens who became 1ilipino citizens by
naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to 1ilipino citizens. +s the property in dispute is already in the
hands of a 5uali7ed person, a 1ilipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of
the constitutional provision to <eep our lands in 1ilipino hands has been achieved.V
Mathe9s vs 4&lor
7AC4S:
1ilipina married to a foreigner. They ac5uired properties in Foracay. The girl fell out of love and eloped with a 1ilipino
man.
Then, afterwards allow the foreigner, to do lease and everything, pursuant to a SP+ e6ecuted by her for the e6I
husband foreigner. The controversy started when the woman entered a contract of lease with 3athews and it was
*& | P a g e
impugned by Taylor the husband as there was no consent given by him. e alleged that since both of them are
married, it is just proper that consent is given by him, otherwise the transaction is void.
RU6ING O7 SC: The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of petitioner and respondent
in light of the Civil Code and 1amily Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicable constitutional
principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.
Section +, Article PII of the #)+ Constit%tion states
Section -. Save in cases of here1itar& s%ccession, no 3rivate lan1s shall 0e transferre1 or conve&e1
e5ce3t to in1ivi1%als, cor3orations, or associations 2%aliFe1 to ac2%ire or hol1 lan1s of the 3%0lic
1o/ain.
+liens, whether individuals or corporations, have been dis5uali7ed from ac5uiring lands of the public domain.
ence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also dis5uali7ed from ac5uiring private lands.
The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.
1urther section ) says.
VSection (. of Article PIII Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred
or assigned e6cept to individuals, corporations, or associations 5uali7ed to ac5uire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines.V
4n light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we 7nd and so hold that Fenjamin has no right to nullify the +greement of
=ease between 'oselyn and petitioner. Fenjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from ac5uiring private and
public lands in the Philippines. Considering that 'oselyn appeared to be the designated VvendeeV in the ,eed of Sale
of said property, she ac5uired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Fenjamin8s claim that he
provided the funds for such ac5uisition. Fy entering into such contract <nowing that it was illegal, no implied trust
was created in his favor> no reimbursement for his e6penses can be allowed> and no declaration can be made that
the subject property was part of the conjugalAcommunity property of the spouses. 4n any event, he had and has no
capacity or personality to 5uestion the subse5uent lease of the Foracay property by his wife on the theory that in
so doing, he was merely e6ercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. 4f the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would
then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
have.
@(
4n 7ne, the +greement of =ease entered into between 'oselyn and petitioner cannot be nulli7ed on the grounds
advanced by Fenjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
48E 7AMI6Y
Cha3ter
4he 7a/il& as an Instit%tion
Article '#. 4he fa/il&, 0eing the fo%n1ation of the nation, is a 0asic social instit%tion 9hich 3%0lic
3olic& cherishes an1 3rotects. Conse2%entl&, fa/il& relations are governe1 0& la9 an1 no c%sto/,
3ractice or agree/ent 1estr%ctive of the fa/il& shall 0e recogni@e1 or given eLect. -!Ja, !)a,
Article (". 7a/il& relations incl%1e those:
-, :et9een h%s0an1 an1 9ifeE
-!, :et9een 3arents an1 chil1renE
-., A/ong other ascen1ants an1 1escen1antsE an1
-', A/ong 0rothers an1 sisters, 9hether of the f%ll or half0loo1. -!+a,
Article (. No s%it 0et9een /e/0ers of the sa/e fa/il& shall 3ros3er %nless it sho%l1 a33ear fro/
the veriFe1 co/3laint or 3etition that earnest eLorts to9ar1 a co/3ro/ise have 0een /a1e, 0%t that
the sa/e have faile1. If it is sho9n that no s%ch eLorts 9ere in fact /a1e, the case /a& 0e 1is/isse1.
4his r%le shall not a33l& to cases 9hich /a& not 0e the s%0Bect of co/3ro/ise %n1er the Civil Co1e.
Re2%ire/ent of allegation of 3rior reco%rse to co/3ro/ise 0et9een i//e1iate /e/0ers of fa/il&E
reasonE 9ho are the /e/0ers of the fa/il&.
4n April )artinez, et al. vs. Go!olo )artinez, !.". #o. 1C$%*(, 'une $*, $%%) 9Callejo, I.:, a complaint for ejectment
was 7led by
the owner of a property against his brother and sisterIinIlaw. There was no allegation of a prior recourse to
compromise, hence, a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with a condition precedent was 7led.
The plainti; contended that there was an allegation of prior recourse to barangay conciliation, hence there was
substantial compliance with the re5uirement of an allegation of prior recourse to compromise. 4s the contention
correctJ E53lain.
4he contention is correct, especially so that the sisterIinIlaw is not an immediate member of the family.
The phrase /members of the familyH must be construed in relation to +rticle 1)% of the 1amily Code, to wit.
Art. (". 1amily relations include those.
91: Fetween husband and wife>
9$: Fetween parents and children>
9@: +mong other ascendants and descendants> and
9(: +mong brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfIblood.
+rticle 1)1 of the 1amily Code must be construed strictly, it being an e6ception to the general rule. ence, a sisterI
inIlaw or
brotherIinIlaw is not included in the enumeration. 9Ga&on vs. Ga&on, .J SCRA "' M#+"E:.
GAYON <S. GAYON
7AC4S:
The records show that on 'uly @1, 1&C-, Pedro !ayon 7led said
complaint against the spouses Silvestre !ayon and !enoveva de !ayon, alleging substantially that, on Gctober 1,
&% | P a g e
1&)$, said spouses e6ecuted a deed 2 copy of which was attached to the complaint,
as+nne6 V+V 2 whereby they sold to Pedro !elera, for the sum of P)%%.%%, a parcel of unregistered land therein
described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of !uimbal, province of 4loilo, including the
improvements thereon, subject to redemption within
7ve9): years or not later than Gctober 1, 1&)-> that said right of redemption had not been e6ercised by Silvestre
!ayon, !enoveva de !ayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite the e6piration of the period therefor> that
said Pedro !elera and his wife Bstelita ,amaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale 2 copy of which was attached to the
complaint, as +nne6 VFV 2 dated 3arch $1, 1&C1, sold theaforementioned land to plainti; Pedro !ayon for the sum
of PC1(.%%>that plainti; had, since 1&C1, introduced thereon improvements worthP1,%%%> that he had, moreover,
fully paid the ta6es on said property upto 1&C-> and that +rticles 1C%C and 1C1C of our Civil Code re5uire
a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a landac5uired through a conditional sale, and,
accordingly, praying that an order be issued in plainti;Ps favor for the consolidation of ownership inland to
the aforementioned property. 4n her answer to the complaint, 3rs. !ayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre !ayon,
died on 'anuary C, 1&)(, long before the institution of this case> that +nne6 V+V to the complaint is 7ctitious, for the
signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers> that
neither she nor her deceased husband had ever e6ecuted Vany document of whatever nature in plainti;Ps favorV>
that the complaint is malicious and had embarrassed her and her children> that the heirs of Silvestre !ayon had to
Vemploy the services of counsel for a fee of P)%%.%% and incurred e6penses of at least P$%%.%%V> and that being a
brother of the deceased Silvestre !ayon, plainti; Vdid not e6ert e;orts for the amicable settlement of the caseV
before 7ling his complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and that plainti; be sentenced to pay
damages.
ISSUE:
0hether or not the contention of the 3r.!ayon that anearnest e;ort toward a compromise before the 7ling of the
suit is tenable.
8E6*:
+s regards, plainti;8s failure to see< a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, +rt. $$$ of our Civil
Code provides. #o suit shall be 7led or maintained between members
of the same family unless it should appear that earnest e;orts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed, subject to the limitations in article $%@).4t is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this
provision applies to suits V7led or maintained between members of the same
family.V This phrase, Vmembers of the same family,V should, however, beconstrued in the light of +rt. $1- of the
same Code, pursuant to which. 1amily relations shall include those.91: Fetween husband and wife>9$: Fetween
parent and child>9@: +mong other ascendants and their descendants>9(: +mong brothers and sisters.
3rs. !ayon is plainti;Ps sisterIin law, whereas her children are his nephews andAor nieces. 4n as much as none of
them is included in the enumeration contained in said +rt. $1- 2 which should be construed
strictly, it being an e6ception to the general rule 2 and Silvestre !ayon must necessarily be e6cluded as party in
the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of +rt. $$$, and plainti;Ps failure to see<
a compromise before 7ling the complaint does not bar the same. 0B"B1G"B, the order appealed from is hereby
set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the
administrator or e6ecutor of the estate of Silvestre !ayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of such
administrator or e6ecutor, of the heirs of the deceased Silvestre !ayon, and for further proceedings, not
inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against defendantIappellee, !enoveva de !ayon. 4t is
so ordered.
Reason for the r%le that ever& eLort /%st 0e /a1e to9ar1 a co/3ro/ise if it is 0et9een i//e1iate
/e/0ers of the fa/il&.
4t is di?cult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. 4t
is necessary that every e;ort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and
passion in the family and it is <nown that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
between strangers. 93agbalita vs. !onong, -C SC"+ )11 D1&--E:. Such hatred may be handed from one generation
to another. 4t may not laid solidarity to the family. 4nstead, it may brea< a family.
4f there is a suit between immediate members of the family, there must be an allegation that prior earnest e;orts
toward a
settlement must have been resorted to but that the same have failed> or if it is shown that no such e;orts were
e6erted, the same can be dismissed, not for lac< of jurisdiction, but only for preImaturity or lac< of cause of action.
Reason for the re2%ire/ent of 3rior reco%rse to settle/ent.
0hen the law re5uires /no suit,H the law is negative and the re5uirement is mandatory, that the complaint or
petition, which must
be veri7ed, shall allege that earnest e;orts toward a compromise have been made but that the same have failed,
so that, if it is shown that no e;orts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
T+cB #GTB. /Since the law forbids a suit being initiated 97led: or maintained unless such e;orts at a compromise
appear,
the showing that e;orts were made is a condition precedent to the e6istence of a cause of action. 4t follows that the
failure of the complainant to plead that the plainti; previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court
renders it assaila0le for lacI of a ca%se of action an1 it /a& 0e so attacIe1 at an& stage of the case
even on a33eal.T
4o reiterate, the Constit%tion 3rotects the sanctit& of the fa/il& an1 en1eavors to strengthen it as a
0asic a%tono/o%s social instit%tion. -Art. II, Sec. !, Constit%tion,. This is also embodied in +rt. 1(& and
given Nesh in +rt. 1)1 of the 1amily Code.
4n this case of &uerrero vs. GTC, the trial court dismissed on the ground of lac< of jurisdiction was not proper
because it should have been 1%e to lacI of a ca%se of action, or prematurity. The reason why it is improper is
because, the failure to allege prior
recourse to settlement is not a jurisdictional re5uirement, but merely a condition precedent.
4AHE NO4E: 9cani sya applicable lang ni sa Grdinary Civil +ctions haA Special Proceedings dili 9F4! #GW: Criminal
Case murag dili pud sya applicable.:
&1 | P a g e
Manalo vs CA GR No. .28242, 6anuar# .5, 233.
7AC4S:
Troadic 3analo who died on 1ebruary 1&&$, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The deceased left several
real properties in 3anila and a business in Tarlac. 4n #ovember 1&&$, herein respondents, * of the surviving
children, 7led a petition with "TC 3anila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for
appointment of their brother "omeo 3analo as administrator thereof. earing was set on 1ebruary 11, 1&&@ and
the herein petitioners were granted 1% days within which to 7le their opposition to the petition.
ISSUE: 0G# the case at bar is covered under +rticle 1)1 where earnest e;orts toward compromise should 7rst be
made prior the 7ling of the petition.
8E6*:
4t is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the
character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of the
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein
petitioners8 claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of +rticle 1)1 is applicable
only to ordinary civil actions. 4t is clear from the term /suitH that it refers to an action by one person or persons
against another or other in a court of justice in which the plainti; pursues the remedy which the law a;ords him for
the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right. 4t is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the
"eport of the Code Commission to ma<e the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance
of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a remedy
whereby the petitioners therein see< to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. ence, it must be
emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant
was pronounced therein.
Cha3ter !
4he 7a/il& 8o/e
Article (!. 4he fa/il& ho/e, constit%te1 Bointl& 0& the h%s0an1 an1 the 9ife or 0& an %n/arrie1 hea1
of a fa/il&, is the 19elling ho%se 9here the& an1 their fa/il& resi1e, an1 the lan1 on 9hich it is
sit%ate1. -!!.a,
Article (.. 4he fa/il& ho/e is 1ee/e1 constit%te1 on a ho%se an1 lot fro/ the ti/e it is occ%3ie1 as
a fa/il& resi1ence. 7ro/ the ti/e of its constit%tion an1 so long as an& of its 0eneFciaries act%all&
resi1es therein, the fa/il& ho/e contin%es to 0e s%ch an1 is e5e/3t fro/ e5ec%tion, force1 sale or
attach/ent e5ce3t as hereinafter 3rovi1e1 an1 to the e5tent of the val%e allo9e1 0& la9. -!!.a,
1rom the moment of its constitution, it is e6empt from e6ecution, forced sale or attachment as a general rule. Fut a
deeper loo< into the law is needed because of the use of the word /resides.H 4f there is a house and lot belonging to
+ and F who are married with children, but they do not reside therein, as it is principally used as a "o!ega and a
store, it is not a family home within the legal contemplation as it is not used as a residence and, hence, not entitled
to the e6emptions granted to a family home. 4t can therefore, as a rule, be attached or levied upon to answer for an
obligation of the owner. Bven if + and F would sleep
there for a few hours during the day as it is there where they have their business, still, it is not a family home since
its principal use is determinative of its classi7cation as a family home for it to be entitled to protection.
9TimanI4 <ung naa <ay utang unya mag abroad <a\cguradua nga ang ibilin sa balay <ay immediate family <ay basi
iIsheri; ang house dili sya protected sa 1amily Code <ay <ailangan actual residing jud or bene7ciaries residing are
immediate family..c:
The law provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner or by any of the bene7ciaries must be
actual.
Such bene7ciaries are the husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is head of the family, their parents,
ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, legitimate or illegitimate, living in the family home. 4t may also
include the inIlaws. Fut the law de7nitely e6cludes maids and overseers. ence, the occupancy of the family home
by an overseer is insu?cient compliance with the law. 4t would have been di;erent if the owners of the family home
left their parents in the same as they can be considered other ascendants as among the bene7ciaries of the family
home.
91urther nga ita<e note> <ung na<a utang <a before natu<ud imung balay you cannot ta<e shelter under the
provision of 1)$ and 1)@..ayaw pag assume nga dili pede ma levy imung balay\ma levy japun sya according to
+rticle 1))
Art. ((. The family home shall be e6empt from e6ecution, forced sale or attachment e5ce3t:
91: 1or nonpayment of ta6es>
9$: 7or 1e0ts inc%rre1 3rior to the constit%tion of the fa/il& ho/eE
9@: 1or debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution> and
9(: 1or debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service
or furnished material for the construction of the building. 9$(@a: 9!BTSJJ: STS
Article ('. 4he 0eneFciaries of a fa/il& ho/e are:
-, 4he h%s0an1 an1 9ife, or an %n/arrie1 3erson 9ho is the hea1 of a fa/il&E an1
-!, 4heir 3arents, ascen1ants, 1escen1ants, 0rothers an1 sisters, 9hether the relationshi3 0e
legiti/ate or illegiti/ate, 9ho are living in the fa/il& ho/e an1 9ho 1e3en1 %3on the hea1 of the
fa/il& for legal s%33ort. -!!Ja, 93ao ni dapat imong mga ibilin sa imung house para safe sa levy ang
balay..lol:
The law merely enumerates the bene7ciaries of the family home.
&$ | P a g e
9+nother nga ita<e note para dili ta masipyat\<ung ang balay nimu gitu<ud before pa sa e;ectivity sa 1amily Code
so Civil Code ang governing =aw nimu\under sa Civil Code <ailangan pa nimu 4 declare judicially nga imung balay
is your family home pero under 1amily Code either dili na <ailangan pa ideclare either judicially or e6tra judicially
automatic pag puyIan, balay dayun na 1+34=L G3B <umbaga by operation of =+0. Pero <ani nga <aso ni
3ode5uillo\tu<ud nya iya balay 1&C& so Civil Code unya iyang utang 1&-C tapos ang 1inal judgment sa money
came out 'anuary 1&** so mas nauna sya e;ectivity sa 1C +ugust $*, 1&**\
so dili sya pede mu insist na iyang balay dili ma e6ecute <ay according +rticle 1)@ of 1+34=L CG,B says so nga dili
pede iyang balay ma e6ecute <ay e6empted sya mas<i pa nga under 1)) ang debt prior sya sa constitution of home
9 'anuary 1&** judgment unya ang e;ectivity 1C,+gust 1&**. Pero ingun sa court either 1)@ or 1)) provisions do
not apply to him <ay dili sya "BT"G+CT4MB e;ect <ung naa ma impair nga MBSTB, rights.: so that means sheri;
japun iya property\+ oc:
The law does not ma<e the 1amily Code retroactive in the sense that upon the e;ectivity of the law, all e6isting
family residences
shall be constituted as family home with the e6emptions provided for by the law. 0hile such e6emptions are
granted, the same shall not, however, prejudice vested rights. The e6emption therefore shall commence from the
e;ectivity of the law, otherwise, it shall operate to impair vested rights.
G.R. No. )J.(( Ma& ., ##"
$OSE MO*E=UI66O, petitioner,
vs.
8ON. AUGUS4O <. :RE<A 7RANCISCO SA6INAS, 76ORIAER A:E66AN?SA6INAS, $UANI4O CU6AN?CU6AN
an1 *EAU4Y S8ERI77 7ERNAN*O A6A4A respondents.
GANCAYCO, 6.:
7AC4S:
+s liability for a vehicular accident on 3arch 1C, 1&-C which <illed +udie Salinas and which injured "enato
Culan, 'ose 3ode5uillo and Fenito 3alubay were ordered to pay indemnity for damages to spouses Salinas and
to 'uanito.
Conse5uently on 'uly -, 1&**, a writ of e6ecution and levy were issued against a parcel of residential lot and an
agricultural land, the titles of which were under the name of 3ode5uillo.
3ode5uillo then motioned to 5uash, alleging that the resi1ential lot 9as their fa/il& ho/e that ha1
0een constit%te1 since #J#, 3rior to the case an1 hence e5e/3t fro/ e5ec%tion, force1 sale or
attach/ent under +rticles 1)$ and 1)@ of the 1amily Code e6cept for liabilities mentioned in +rticle 1)) and
that the judgment debt sought to beenforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those
enumerated under +rticle 1)) of the 1amily Code.
The trial court denied the motion. + motion for reconsideration thereof was 7led by defendant and this was
denied.
ence, the herein petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: KON the ho%se can 0e e5ec%te1;
RU6ING:
YES.
The liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred in 1&-C and the money judgment was rendered on
'anuary $&, 1&**. Foth preceded the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code on +ugust @, 1&**. This case does not fall under
the e6emptions from e6ecution provided in the 1amily Code.
+rt. 1)). The family home shall be e6empt from e6ecution, forced sale or attachment e6cept.
91: 1or nonIpayment of ta6es>
9$: 1or debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home>
9@: 1or debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution> d
9(: 1or debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service
or furnished material for the construction of the building.
4he e5e/3tion 3rovi1e1 is eLective fro/ the ti/e of the constit%tion of the fa/il& ho/e as s%ch, an1
lasts so long as an& of its 0eneFciaries act%all& resi1es therein.
The residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or e6trajudicially
under the Civil Code. It 0eca/e a fa/il& ho/e 0& o3eration of la9 onl& %n1er Article (. of the 7a/il&
Co1e.
Knder +rticle 1C$ of the 1amily Code, it is provided that Vthe provisions of this Chapter shall also govern e6isting
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.V It 1oes not /ean that Articles (! an1 (. of
sai1 Co1e have a retroactive eLect s%ch that all e5isting fa/il& resi1ences are 1ee/e1 to have 0een
constit%te1 as fa/il& ho/es at the ti/e of their occ%3ation and are e6empt from e6ecution for the payment
of obligations incurred before the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code. Article J! si/3l& /eans that all e5isting
fa/il& resi1ences at the ti/e of the eLectivit& of the 7a/il& Co1e, are consi1ere1 fa/il& ho/es an1
are 3ros3ectivel& entitle1 to the 0eneFts accor1e1 to a fa/il& ho/e %n1er the 7a/il& Co1e.
Article (J. 4he fa/il& ho/e /%st 0e 3art of the 3ro3erties of the a0sol%te co//%nit& or the conB%gal
3artnershi3, or of the e5cl%sive 3ro3erties of either s3o%se 9ith the latterGs consent. It /a& also 0e
constit%te1 0& an %n/arrie1 hea1 of a fa/il& on his or her o9n 3ro3ert&. Nevertheless, 3ro3ert& that
is the s%0Bect of a con1itional sale
on install/ents 9here o9nershi3 is reserve1 0& the ven1or onl& to g%arantee 3a&/ent of the
3%rchase 3rice /a& 0e constit%te1 as a fa/il& ho/e. -!!+a, !!)a,
Article (+. 4he act%al val%e of the fa/il& ho/e shall not e5cee1, at the ti/e of its constit%tion, the
a/o%nt of three h%n1re1 tho%san1 3esos in %r0an areas, an1 t9o h%n1re1 tho%san1 3esos in r%ral
areas, or s%ch a/o%nts as /a& hereafter 0e F5e1 0& la9. In an& event, if the val%e of the c%rrenc&
changes after the a1o3tion of this Co1e, the val%e /ost favora0le for the constit%tion of a fa/il& ho/e
shall 0e the 0asis of eval%ation.
&@ | P a g e
7or 3%r3oses of this Article, %r0an areas are 1ee/e1 to incl%1e chartere1 cities an1 /%nici3alities
9hose ann%al inco/e at least e2%als that legall& re2%ire1 for chartere1 cities. All others are 1ee/e1
to 0e r%ral areas. -!.a,
Article (). 4he fa/il& ho/e /a& 0e sol1, alienate1, 1onate1, assigne1 or enc%/0ere1 0& the o9ner
or o9ners thereof 9ith the 9ritten consent of the 3erson constit%ting the sa/e, the latterGs s3o%se,
an1 a /aBorit& of the 0eneFciaries of legal age. In case of conVict, the co%rt shall 1eci1e. -!.(a,
The law merely states the value of the family home depending upon its location.
The family home can be the object of a contract, li<e sale, assignment or donation. 4t can be encumbered as it can
be used to
secure the payment of an obligation. 4t must, however, be with the written consent of the person constituting it, or
his spouse, and a majority of the bene7ciaries of legal age. 4f there is a conNict, the court shall decide for them.
Article (#. 4he fa/il& ho/e shall contin%e 1es3ite the 1eath of one or 0oth s3o%ses or of the
%n/arrie1 hea1 of the fa/il& for a 3erio1 of ten &ears or for as long as there is a /inor 0eneFciar&,
an1 the heirs cannot 3artition the sa/e %nless the co%rt Fn1s co/3elling reasons therefor. 4his r%le
shall a33l& regar1less of
9hoever o9ns the 3ro3ert& or constit%te1 the fa/il& ho/e. -!.)a,
The law e6tends the lifetime of a family home even beyond the death of the spouses or of the unmarried head of
the family and that is ten years after their death or for as long as there is a minor bene7ciary. The heirs cannot
partition it e6cept if there is a compelling reason that may justify it.
Article J". Khen a cre1itor 9hose clai/ is not a/ong those /entione1 in Article (( o0tains a
B%1g/ent in his favor, an1 he has reasona0le gro%n1s to 0elieve that the fa/il& ho/e is act%all& 9orth
/ore than the /a5i/%/ a/o%nt F5e1 in Article (+, he /a& a33l& to the co%rt 9hich ren1ere1 the
B%1g/ent for an or1er 1irecting the sale of the 3ro3ert& %n1er e5ec%tion. 4he co%rt shall so or1er if it
Fn1s that the act%al val%e of the fa/il& ho/e e5cee1s
the /a5i/%/ a/o%nt allo9e1 0& la9 as of the ti/e of its constit%tion. If the increase1 act%al val%e
e5cee1s the /a5i/%/ allo9e1 in Article (+ an1 res%lts fro/ s%0se2%ent vol%ntar& i/3rove/ents
intro1%ce1 0& the 3erson or 3ersons constit%ting the fa/il& ho/e, 0& the o9ner or o9ners of the
3ro3ert&, or 0& an& of the 0eneFciaries, the sa/e r%le an1 3roce1%re shall a33l&. At the e5ec%tion
sale, no 0i1 0elo9 the val%e allo9e1 for a fa/il& ho/e shall 0e consi1ere1. 4he 3rocee1s shall 0e
a33lie1 Frst to the a/o%nt /entione1 in Article (+, an1 then to the lia0ilities
%n1er the B%1g/ent an1 the costs. 4he e5cess, if an&, shall 0e 1elivere1 to the B%1g/ent 1e0tor.
-!'+a, !')a,
#llustration:
+ 7led a suit against F and C, the owners of a family home. 'udgment was rendered for P1,%%%,%%%.%%. cnowing
that the family home is worth more than P@%%,%%%.%%, he moved that the same be sold on e6ecution which was
granted. 4t was sold for P1,)%%,%%%.%%. The proceeds shall be distributed as follows.
91: P@%%,%%%.%%, which is the value of the family home, under the law, to be delivered 7rst to F and C>
9$: P1,%%%,%%%.%% to be delivered to +>
9@: P$%%,%%%.%%, which is the e6cess, to be delivered to F and C.
Article J. 7or 3%r3oses of availing of the 0eneFts of a fa/il& ho/e as 3rovi1e1 for in this Cha3ter, a
3erson /a& constit%te, or 0e the 0eneFciar& of, onl& one fa/il& ho/e. -n,
The law merely states that a person can only have one family home. The rest of his houses and lots are not entitled
to the privileges under +rticle 1)@.
Article J!. 4he 3rovisions in this Cha3ter shall also govern e5isting fa/il& resi1ences insofar as sai1
3rovisions are a33lica0le. -n,
CASES in 7AMI6Y RE6A4IONSQ 7AMI6Y 8OME
Mag0aleta v Gonong
+pril $$, 1&--
"u7no 3agbaleta, his wife "omana 3agbaleta, and another person, Susan !. Faldovi, 7led a petition praying for a
preliminary injunction against the orders of respondent 'udge +rsenio !onong. The assailed orders denied
petitioners` motion to dismiss a complaint 7led against them by "u7no`s brother, Catalino 3agbaleta.
The original case was this. Catalino had 7led a suit to have a parcel of land, which was in "u7no`s name, be
declared in his name instead. Catalino had also claimed that Susana Faldovi, the third petitioner, was trying to ta<e
possession of said land from his representative. Susana, on the other hand, had claimed that she had bought the
land from spouses "u7no and "omana.
The main contention is this. That the assailed orders violated +rticle $$$ of the Civil Code, and Section 1 "ule 1C of
the "ules of Court, which provide that, before suits within the same family can be 7led, an earnest e;orts towards
compromise had been made. 4t is contended that Catalino had not alleged that such earnest e;orts towards
compromise had already been made before he 7led his complaint.
'udge !onong had refused the petitioners`complaint to dismiss because one of the parties, Susana Faldovi, is a
stranger2thus, the aforementioned legal provisions did not apply to this case.
The SC held that 'udge !unning8s ruling was correct. Khile it is necessar& that ever& eLort to9ar1s
co/3ro/ise 0e /a1e 0efore litigation ens%es 9ithin a fa/il&, this is not a 3rere2%isite for the
/aintenance of an action 9henever a stranger to the fa/il& is a 3art& therein. 4t is neither practical, nor
fair, that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family be made to depend on the way how the family
settles its di;erences.
Petition ,ismissed.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
4ri0iana vs. 4ri0iana
G.R. No. .+.(#
&( | P a g e
7acts: this is a petition for habeas corpus 7led by respondent =ourdes Tribiana against her husband petitioner
Bdwin Tribiana. 4n her petition, respondent claims that petitioner left their conjugal home with their daughter and
has since deprived her of lawful custody.
Petioner moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest e;orts at a
compromise were made before its 7ling as re5uired by +rticle 1)1 of the family code.
The "TC denied edwin8s motion, hence this petition.
Iss%e: whether or no the failure to indicate in her petition fpr habeas corpus that the parties e6erted e;orts to
reach a compromise is a ground for the dismissal of said petition.
8el1: although respondent failed to allege that she resorted to compDromise proceedings before 7ling the
petition, attaching a barangay certi7cation to 7le action, nonethelss e;ectively established that parties tried to
compromise but were unsuccessful.
4n addition, the failure of a party to comply with condition precedent is not jurisdictional defect.
3oreover, in habeas corpus proceedings involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender years, the
paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody. Technicalities should not stand in
the way of giving such child full protection.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
<ontiveros vs. RTC
GR No. .20450, 6une 28, .888
7AC4S:
Petitioner spouses +ugusto and 3aria ontiveros 7led a complaint for damages against private respondents
!regorio ontiveros and Teodora +yson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in
Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the 7ling of the land registration case. 4n
the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that !regorio was a widower while
Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. Gn the
contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in 5uestion had already been
transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioner8s motion that while in the
amended complaint, they alleged that earnest e;orts towards a compromise were made, it was not veri7ed as
provided in +rticle 1)1.
ISSUE: 0G# the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lac< of e;orts e6erted towards a compromise as
stated in +rticle 1)1.
8E6*:
SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora +yson as defendant and 3aria ontiveros as petitioner
ta<es the case out of the scope of +rticle 1)1. Knder this provision, the phrase /members of the same familyH
refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters
whether full or halfIblood. "eligious relationship and relationship by a?nity are not given any legal e;ects in this
jurisdiction. Teodora and 3aria as spouses of the ontiveros8 are regarded as strangers to the ontiveros family for
purposes of +rticle 1)1.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
4ri0iana vs. 4ri0iana
G.R. No. .+.(#
7acts: this is a petition for habeas corpus 7led by respondent =ourdes Tribiana against her husband petitioner
Bdwin Tribiana. 4n her petition, respondent claims that petitioner left their conjugal home with their daughter and
has since deprived her of lawful custody.
Petioner moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest e;orts at a
compromise were made before its 7ling as re5uired by +rticle 1)1 of the family code.
The "TC denied edwin8s motion, hence this petition.
Iss%e: whether or not the failure to indicate in her petition fpr habeas corpus that the parties e6erted e;orts to
reach a compromise is a ground for the dismissal of said petition.
8el1: +lthough, respondent failed to allege that she resorted to compromise proceedings before 7ling the
petition, attaching a barangay certi7cation to 7le action, nonetheless e;ectively established that parties tried to
compromise but were unsuccessful.
4n addition, the failure of a party to comply with condition precedent is not jurisdictional defect.
3oreover, in habeas corpus proceedings involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender years, the
paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody. Technicalities should not stand in
the way of giving such child full protection.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
Khat ha33ens if the 3erson constit%ting the fa/il& ho/e 1ies;
4f there are bene7ciaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 1% years, unless at the
e6piration of 1% years, there is still a minor bene7ciary, in which case the family home continues until that
bene7ciary becomes of age. *6atricio vs. 3ario, &.G. 5o. 1/9.2-, 5ovem"er 29, 299;0
The family home shall continue for a period of ten 91%: years or for as long as there is a minor bene7ciary. The heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court 7nds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. 9+rt. 1)&, 1C:
TTTTTTTTTTTTT
A6:INO $OSE7 vs. O4E6IO SAN4OS
7acts:
4n Civil Case #o. &)I11%I3c, Petitioner +lbino 'osef was the defendant, which is a case for collection of sum
of money 7led by herein respondent Gtelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner failed to pay the shoe materials
&) | P a g e
which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in 1&&(. +fter trial, the "egional Trial Court of 3ari<ina
City found petitioner liable to respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Court of +ppeals, which a?rmed the trial
court8s decision in Toto. Petitioner 7led before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a
"esolution dated 1ebruary 1*, $%%$. The 'udgment became 7nal and e6ecutory on 3ay $1, $%%$.
+ writ of e6ecution was issued on +ugust $%, $%%@

and enforced on +ugust $1, $%%@. Gn +ugust $&, $%%@,
certain personal properties subjects of the writ of e6ecution were auctioned o;. Thereafter, a real property located
at 3ari<ina City was sold by way of public auction to fully satisfy the judgment credit.
Gn #ovember ), $%%@, petitioner 7led an original petition for certiorari with the Court of +ppeals,
5uestioning the sheri;8s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real properties. Petitioner claimed that
the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children> and that the real property was his family home
thus e6empt from e6ecution.
Iss%e:
0hether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioner8s children as well as the
attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award in favor of respondent is
legal.
R%ling:
The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred
symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during one8s lifetime. 4t is the sanctuary of
that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution> and li<ewise a shelter for the fruits of that
union. 4t is where both can see< refuge and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms
the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the
family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given e;ect, the trial court8s failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of
petitioner8s allegations, is unjusti7ed.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. ,espite petitioner8s
allegations in his Gpposition, the trial court did not ma<e an e;ort to determine the nature of the same, whether the
items were e6empt from e6ecution or not, or whether they belonged to petitioner or to someone else.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTT
4 cant 7nd Cabang vs Fasay
TTTTTTTTTTTT
Manacop vs. CA GR No. .341/0, November .7, .882
7AC4S:
1lorante 3anacop and his wife Buaceli purchased on 3arch 1&-$, a residential lot with a bungalow located in
Zuezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the subIcontract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between
petitioner8s corporation and private respondent herein 911 Cruz d Co:. The latter 7led a complaint for the recovery
for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Conse5uently, the
corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in
Zuezon City owned by the 3anacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached
property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1&-$ and is therefore e6empt from
attachment.
ISSUE: 0G# the subject property is indeed e6empted from attachment.
8E6*:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under +rticle 1)@ of the
1amily Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive e;ect such that all e6isting family
residences, petitioner8s included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code and henceforth, are e6empt from e6ecution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code on +ugust @, 1&**. Since petitioner incurred debt in
1&*-, it preceded the e;ectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not e6empt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.
TTTTTTTTTTTTT
<I6MA G. ARRIO6A an1 AN48ONY RONA6* G. ARRIO6A, Aetitioners, vs. $O8N NA:OR C. ARRIO6A,
Res3on1ent.
MG.R. No. +++"., $an%ar& !), !"")N
7acts:
1idel +rriola died and is survived by his legal heirs. 'ohn #abor +rriola 9respondent: ,his son with his 7rst wife , and
Milma !. +rriola, his second wife and his other son, +nthony "onald +rriola 9petitioners:.
Gn 1eb. 1C, $%%(, the "TC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT #o
@*@-1( 9*(1&1: left by the decedent 1idel S. +rriola by and among his heirs 'ohn #abor C. +rriola, Milma !. +rriola
and +nthony "onald !. +rriola in e5ual shares of oneIthird 91A@: each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or
mortgagees thereon, if any.
owever, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the above mentioned property and so the respondent
proposed to sell it though public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the
house standing on the subject land. The respondent then 7led an Srgent )aniestation an! )otion or Contempt o
Court but was denied by the "TC for lac< of merit.
0hen a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the "TC, the respondent elevated the case to the C+ with a
petition for certiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land including
the house built on it. The C+ granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of the subject lot including the
house built on it. Petitioners 7led a motion for reconsideration but the C+ denied the said motion. ence this
petition for review on Certiorari.
4ssue. 0hether or not the subject house is covered by the judgement of partition
"uling.
&C | P a g e
The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition but in view of the
suspended proscription imposed under +rticle 1)& of the family code, the subject house immediately partitioned to
the heirs.
+rticle 1)$. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family,
is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
+rticle 1)@. The family home is eeme constitute on a )ouse an lot (rom t)e time it is occupie as a
(amil# resience. 1rom the time of its constitution and so long as any of its bene7ciaries actually resides therein,
the family home continues to be such and is e6empt from e6ecution, forced sale or attachment e6cept as
hereinafter provided and to the e6tent of the value allowed by law. 9Bmphasis supplied.:
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the speci7c portion of the subject land on which it
stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Milma from the moment they
began occupying the same as a family residence $% years bac<.
+rticle 1)&. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of
the family (or a perio o( ten #ears or for as long as there is a minor bene7ciary, and t)e )eirs cannot
partition t)e same unless t)e court Fns compelling reasons t)ere(or. T)is rule s)all appl# regarless
o( +)oever o+ns t)e propert# or constitute t)e (amil# )ome. 9Bmphasis supplied.:
SAOUSES AU48ER G. HE66EY, $R. AN* *ORIS A. HE66EY <S. A6AN4ERS ARO*UC4S, INC.
G.R. No. +!!J.$%l& "#, !"")7IRS4 *I<ISION

7acts:
Petitioner +uther !. celley, 'r. 9+uther: ac5uired agricultural chemical products on consignment from respondent
Planters Products, 4nc. 9PP4: in 1&*&. ,ue to +utherPs failure to pay despite demand, PP4 7led an action for sum of
money against him in the "egional Trial Court of 3a<ati City, Franch )- 9"TC 3a<ati City:.

+fter trial on the merits, the "TC 3a<ati City decided in favor of PP4 and issued a writ of e6ecution. Pursuant thereto,
respondent sheri; 'orge +. "agutana sold on e6ecution real property covered by TCT #o. 1)%-& located in #aga City.
+ certi7cate of sale was issued in favor of PP4 as the highest bidder.

+fter being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners +uther and his wife ,oris +. celley 9,oris: 7led a motion
to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the "TC 3a<ati City on the ground that the subject property was their
family home which was e6empt from e6ecution. PetitionersP motion was denied for failure to comply with the threeI
day notice re5uirement.

Subse5uently, petitioners 7led a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the alleged family home with
damages against "agutana and PP4 in the "egional Trial Court of #aga City, Franch 1& 9"TC #aga City:. This was
doc<eted as Civil Case #o. $%%%I%1**. The case was, however, dismissed for lac< of jurisdiction and lac< of cause of
action. The dismissal was upheld by the C+.

Iss%es:

0hether or not C+ erred in upholding the dismissal of Civil Case #o. $%%%I%1** by the "TC #aga City
0hether or not the property covered is a duly constituted family home and therefore e6empt from e6ecution.

8el1:
#o doubt, a family home is generally e6empt from e6ecution provided it was duly constituted as such. There must
be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a
family. 4t must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The
family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the
e6clusive properties of either spouse with the latterPs consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the
family.

Knder the 1amily Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or e6trajudicially. +ll family homes
constructed after the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code 9+ugust @, 1&**: are constituted as such by operation of law. +ll
e6isting family residences as of +ugust @, 1&** are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
bene7ts accorded to a family home under the 1amily Code.

The rule, however, is not absolute. The 1amily Code, in fact, e6pressly provides for the following e6ceptions.
+rticle 1)). The family home shall be e6empt from e6ecution, forced sale or attachment e6cept.
91: 1or nonIpayment of ta6es>
9$: 1or debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home>
9@: 1or debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution> and
9(: 1or debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
Civil Case #o. $%%%I%1** "B4#ST+TB, and this case is hereby "B3+#,B, to the "egional Trial Court of #aga City.
TTTTTTTTTTTT
$UANI4A 4RINI*A* RAMOS vs. *ANI6O AANGI6INAN
G.R. No. )(#!" $%l& !", !""
7acts:
"espondents 7led a complaint for illegal dismissal against B.3. "amos Blectric, 4nc., a company owned by
Brnesto 3. "amos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered "amos and the company to pay the
respondents8 bac<Iwages, separation pay, 1@th month pay d service incentive leave pay. The decision became 7nal
and e6ecutory so a writ of e6ecution was issued which the ,eputy Sheri; of the #ational =abor "elations
Commission 9#="C: implemented by levying a property in "amos8 name situated in Pandacan.

+lleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, e6empt from e6ecution to satisfy the
judgment award, "amos and the company moved to 5uash the writ of e6ecution. "espondents argued that it is not
the family home there being another one in +ntipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the business
address. The motion was denied and the appeal was li<ewise denied by the #="C.
&- | P a g e
Iss%e:
0hether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
R%ling:
Les. 1or the family home to be e6empt from e6ecution, distinction must be made as to what law applies
based on when it was constituted and what re5uirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. ence, two sets of rules are applicable. 4f the family home was constructed
before the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code or before +ugust @, 1&**, then it must have been constituted either
judicially or e6traIjudicially as provided under +rticles $$), $$&I$@1 and $@@ of the Civil Code. 3eanwhile, +rticles
$(% to $($ governs e6trajudicial constitution.
Gn the other hand, for family homes constructed after the e;ectivity of the 1amily Code on +ugust @,
1&**, there is no need to constitute e6tra judicially or judicially, and the e6emption is e;ective from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its bene7ciaries under +rt. 1)( actually reside therein. 3oreover, the family
home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if e6clusively by one spouse, its
constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not e6ceed certain amounts depending
upon the area where it is located. 1urther, the debts incurred for which the e6emption does not apply as provided
under +rt. 1)) for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after +ugust @, 1&**. 4n
both instances, the claim for e6emption must be proved.
4n the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to +ugust @, 1&**,
or as early as 1&((, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no
proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or e6tra judicially constituted as the "amos8 family home, the law
protecting the family home cannot apply thereby ma<ing the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.
TTTTTTTTTTT
SAOUSES ARACE6I O6I<A?*E MESA, et al. v. SAOUSES C6AU*IO *. ACERO, $R., et al. G.R. No. )("J',
J $an%ar& !"!, SECON* *I<ISION -Re&es, $.,
4t is incumbent upon the debtor to invo<e and prove that the subject property is his family home within the
prescribed period, otherwise laches will set in.
7AC4S:
Claudio ,. +cero 'r., being the highest bidder, ac5uired the ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by
petitioners +raceli GlivaI,e 3esa and Brnesto S. ,e 3esa 9Spouses ,e 3esa:. The property was sold at a public
auction after Spouses ,e 3esa failed to pay the loan they secured from +cero. Thereafter, respondents +cero and
his wife "u7na 9Spouses +cero: leased the subject property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment
of the rent. Knable to collect the rentals due, Spouses +cero 7led a complaint for ejectment with the 3unicipal Trial
Court 93TC: against Spouses ,e 3esa. The 3TC ruled in Spouses +cero8s favor.
4n their defense, Spouses ,e 3esa 7led a complaint with the "egional Trial Court 9"TC:, see<ing to nullify TCT #o. TI
$$1-)) 93: on the basis that the subject property is a family home which is e6empt from e6ecution under the
1amily Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan.
owever, the "TC dismissed their complaint. The Court of +ppeals 9C+: a?rmed the "TC8s ,ecision.
ISSUE:
0hether or not the family home is e6empted from e6ecution
8E6*:
Petition ,B#4B,.
4ndeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last
during one8s lifetime. 4t is li<ewise without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so
long as any of its bene7ciaries actually resides therein, is generally e6empt from e6ecution, forced sale or
attachment.
The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. 4t cannot be seized by
creditors e6cept in certain special cases. owever, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to
set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
1or all intents and purposes, the negligence of Petitioners ,e 3esa or their omission to assert their right within a
reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the
e6emption under +rticle 1)@ of the 1amily Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the ,e 3esa to invo<e and
prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheri;8s duty to presume or raise the status of the
subject property as a family home.
TTTTTTTTTTTTT
SAOUSES C8AR6IE 7OR4A6E>A an1 O7E6IA 7OR4A6E>A vs. SAOUSES RAU6 6AAI4AN an1 RONA 6AAI4AN
A%g%st (, !"!
7acts:
Spouses Charlie and Gfelia 1ortaleza obtained a loan from spouses "olando and +mparo =apitan
9creditors:. +s security, spouses 1ortaleza e6ecuted on 'anuary $*, 1&&* a ,eed of "eal Bstate 3ortgage over their
residential house and lot situated in Farrio +nos, 3unicipality of =os FaUos, =aguna 9subject property:. 0hen
spouses 1ortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for
e6trajudicial foreclosure of the "eal Bstate 3ortgage before the G?ce of the Cler< of Court and B6IG?cio Sheri; of
Calamba City. The public auction sale was set on 3ay &, $%%1.
+t the sale, the creditors8 son ,r. "aul =apitan and his wife "ona emerged as the highest bidders. Then,
they were issued a Certi7cate of Sale

that was registered with the "egistry of ,eeds of Calamba City. The oneIyear
redemption period e6pired without the spouses 1ortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses =apitan e6ecuted
an a?davit of consolidation of ownership on #ovember $%, $%%@ and the registration of the subject property in their
names on 1ebruary (, $%%(. ,espite the foregoing, the spouses 1ortaleza refused spouses =apitan8s formal demand

to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.
Iss%e:
0hether or not the onorable court of appeals gravely erred in not holding that the petitioners were
prevented by the respondent from e6ercising their right of redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a
&* | P a g e
redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption price of a highly e5uitable and more than
double the amount of the foreclosed property, especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is the family home
of petitioners and their children.
R%ling:
The Supreme Court held that +rticle 1))9@: of the 1amily Code e6plicitly allows the forced sale of a family
home Vfor debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution.V 4n this case, there is no
doubt that spouses 1ortaleza voluntarily e6ecuted on 'anuary $*, 1&&* a deed of "eal Bstate 3ortgage over the
subject property, which was even notarized by their original counsel of record. +nd assuming that the property is
e6empt from forced sale, spouses 1ortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheri; such e6emption from forced sale
before it was sold at the public auction.
TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
4itle <I
AA4ERNI4Y AN* 7I6IA4ION
Paternity and 1iliation is the relationship between the parent and the child. 4t is created by nature, or by imitation of
nature in
case of adoption. 4t is either legitimate or illegitimate. 9Capistrano, Civil Co!e o the 6hils., 1&)% ed., p. $$1:.
Paternity is the civil status of a father 9maternity for the mother: with regard to the child, while 7liation is the civil
status of a child with regard to his parents. 9Mitug, (amily Co!e Annotate!, 1irst Bd., p. 1%&:.
Cha3ter
6egiti/ate Chil1ren
Article J.. 4he Fliation of chil1ren /a& 0e 0& nat%re or 0& a1o3tion. Nat%ral Fliation /a& 0e
legiti/ate or illegiti/ate. -n,
Article J'. Chil1ren conceive1 or 0orn 1%ring the /arriage of the 3arents are legiti/ate.
Chil1ren conceive1 as a res%lt of artiFcial inse/ination of the 9ife 9ith the s3er/ of the h%s0an1 or
that of a 1onor or 0oth are liIe9ise legiti/ate chil1ren of the h%s0an1 an1 his 9ife, 3rovi1e1, that
0oth of the/ a%thori@e1 or ratiFe1 s%ch inse/ination in a 9ritten instr%/ent e5ec%te1 an1 signe1 0&
the/ 0efore the 0irth of the chil1. 4he instr%/ent shall 0e recor1e1 in the civil registr& together 9ith
the 0irth certiFcate of the chil1. -!((a, !()a,
7iliation is classiFe1 0& la9 into t9o, na/el&, 0& nat%re or 0& a1o3tion. #atural 7liation may be legitimate
as when a child is conceived or born of parents who are lawfully married. 4t must be recalled, however, that
marriages in violation of +rticles )$ and @C of the 1amily Code, the law provides that there are legitimate children
even if they are void from the very beginning, provided they are conceived or born prior to the declaration of their
absolute nullity 9 so pag gi conceived ang bata tapos human na ang 7nal judgment illegitimate na ang bata:.
1iliation by adoption is created by 7ction of law, but it is limited to those who, by legal and judicial processes, have
been so decreed as adopted by the courts. 4t cannot comprehend a child who has been ta<en by another after birth
without judicial process. This is where the e5tra?B%1icial a1o3tion is not recognized by law> the child has no right
as a legallyIadopted child.
Bven void marriages can produce legitimate children. =et us loo< into +rticle )( of the 1amily Code which says that,
children
conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under +rticle @C has
become 7nal and
e6ecutory, shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subse5uent marriage under +rticle )@ 9
mao ning naminyu ug usab ang papa unya <ay wala pa niya na comply tanan ang re5uirements sa )@ so dili valid
iya subse5uent marriage pero ang bata legitimate: shall li<ewise be legitimate.
Miolation of +rticles )$ and )@ would mean that the spouses failed to partition their properties, deliver the
presumptive legitimes of their compulsory heirs, and failed to record the decree of annulment or declaration of
nullity of the marriage as well as the document delivering the presumptive legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
#llustration:
9a: R and L are married. Gne hundred 7fty days after the marriage, R died. Fefore the lapse of @%% days, L
gave birth to Y. The child here is legitimate because the child was conceived during the marriage even if he was
born after
the death of his father.
Stat%s of chil1ren 0orn o%t of artiFcial inse/ination.
The law re5uires the authority or rati7cation of both spouses in a written instrument and that the same be signed
by the parties before the birth of the child. +n additional re5uirement is that, the instrument must be recorded in
the Civil "egistry together with the birth certi7cate of the child.
0hen the law spea<s of /authorized,H it means that the authority must be given before arti7cial insemination is
conducted.
*oes it /ean that the chil1 9o%l1 not 0e legiti/ate if 3rior a%thorit& is not given;
#o, because the law says that it may be rati7ed. 0hen the law spea<s of /rati7edH it means that an act without
prior authority has
already been done. 4t becomes valid or it is cleansed of any defect when rati7ed.
4n fact, the e;ect of rati7cation retroacts to the time of the performance of the act. 9See +rt. 1(%-, #ew Civil Code:.
owever, if there was no authority and rati7cation at all, it is believed that the child is illegitimate.
&& | P a g e
No nee1 to reveal i1entit& of 1onor of s3er/.
The Code Commission did not re5uire that the donor of the sperm be revealed. The purpose is to prevent any
complication later,
where there may be suits for recognition or support.
4he ratiFcation must be made 0efore the 0irth of the chil1, otherwise, the child is illegitimate. The purpose of
the law is to
prevent the introduction into the family of a child not belonging to the father, where the latter would have to
support the said child.
Contract%al conce3tion.
+ 5uestion of 7rst impression may be as<ed. + woman is married but everytime she becomes pregnant, she has a
miscarriage. To
protect the fertilized ovum, the spouses entered into a contract with another woman for the latter to carry the ovum
with the agreement that when the child is born, the latter shall be given to the natural mother. 4s there any legal
basis for the agreementJ
Gf course, there is, especially so that the intention of the parties is to protect the life of the unborn. There are even
constitutional
bases for the same, such as.
*10 Sec. 12, Article ##. TT The State recognizes the sanctity o the amily an! shall protect an! strengthen the amily
as
a "asic autonomous social intention. #t shall protect the lie o the mother an! the lie o the un"orn rom
conception.
1 1 1.>
*20 Sec. F*10, Article +,. TT The State shall !een!: 1. The right o the spouses to oun! a amily in accor!ance
2ith their religious conviction an! !eman!s o responsi"le parenthoo!.>
The agreement between the parties is valid, such that, if the one who gave birth to the child refuses to comply with
the contract,
the natural parents can 7le a petition for ha"eas corpus because there is unlawful restraint of liberty of the child to
live with the natural parents. Gr the natural parents can 7le a complaint for speci7c performance with damages.
Is there an& 1istinction 0et9een artiFcial inse/ination an1 contract%al conce3tion;
There is. 4n ArtiFcial inse/ination, there is no fertilized ovum yet. 4n contract%al conce3tion, there is a
fertilized ovum such that, the biological mother is entitled to have custody of the child. Gr in plain and simple
language, the child born out of arti7cial insemination belongs to the biological mother even if the sperm may have
come from a person, not the spouse.
Article J(. Chil1ren conceive1 an1 0orn o%tsi1e a vali1 /arriage are illegiti/ate, %nless other9ise
3rovi1e1 in this Co1e. -n,
The marriage in +rticle @- and in violation of +rticle )@ are legitimate 0eca%se the chil1ren sho%l1 not 0e
0la/e1 for the /isfort%nes or /isgivings of their 3arents. 9mas<i incestuous marriage ang +rt. @- ..null and
void because it is against public policy pero ang ana< nila is legitimate. :
Art. .+. 3arriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate.
91: Fetween ascendants and descendants of any degree> and
9$: Fetween brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
-MEMO, Article JJ. 6egiti/ac& of a chil1 /a& 0e i/3%gne1 onl& on the follo9ing gro%n1s:
-, 4hat it 9as p)#sicall# impossible for the h%s0an1 to have se5%al interco%rse 9ith his 9ife +it)in
t)e Frst .23 a#s of the ."" 1a&s 9hich i//e1iatel& 3rece1e1 the 0irth of the chil1 0eca%se of:
-a, 4he p)#sical incapacit# of the h%s0an1 to have se5%al interco%rse 9ith his 9ife -i/3otenc&,E
-0, 4he fact that the h%s0an1 an1 9ife 9ere living se3aratel& in s%ch a 9a& that se5%al interco%rse
9as not 3ossi0leE or
-c, Serio%s illness of the h%s0an1, 9hich a0sol%tel& 3revente1 se5%al interco%rse.
-!, 4hat it is 3rove1 that for 0iological or other scientiFc reasons, the chil1 co%l1 not have 0een that of
the h%s0an1,
e5ce3t in the instance 3rovi1e1 in the secon1 3aragra3h of Article J'E or
-., 4hat in case of chil1ren conceive1 thro%gh artiFcial inse/ination, the 9ritten a%thori@ation or
ratiFcation of either 3arent 9as o0taine1 thro%gh /istaIe, fra%1, violence, inti/i1ation, or %n1%e
inV%ence. -!((a,
7ather can i/3%gn legiti/ac& of chil1.
The law allows the father to 5uestion or impugn the legitimacy of a child under certain circumstances. 4t also allows
the children of
the father to do so under certain circumstances. It cannot 0e 2%estione1 0& the /other, for the law is clear
that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. 4t cannot be anybody or relations of the father. 4t cannot also be done by the
child because he cannot choose his 7liation. The reason why the husband can impugn the legitimacy of the child is
the obvious unfairness in a situation where the child is not his, yet, he is going to maintain the child and the child
will succeed from him. The law abhors such a situation.
The period of 1$% days has been resorted to by law because medical 7ndings show that the period of conception of
a woman is
during the 7rst 1$% days of the @%% days upon the fertilization of the egg cells by the sperm cells.
Ah&sical i/3ossi0ilit& of se5%al act.
1%% | P a g e
R and L are married. R is wor<ing in the Knited States while L is wor<ing in the Philippines. 4n this case, there is a
physical
impossibility of access by the man over the woman. So that if a child is born, there is a doubt as to the paternity of
the child. There was impossibility of se6ual intercourse between the husband and wife. +nother situation, where
there is an impossibility of se6ual
intercourse, is when the man or the woman is a prisoner, unless it can be shown that there was the right to visit
each other. 4n that
case, there would be access to one another.
ELect of i/3otenc&.
0hen the law spea<s of physical incapacity to have se6ual intercourse, the law means that the husband or wife is
impotent, not
just sterile.
sterileI cannot produce children
impotentI no erection 9lol:
+ person who has syphilis or AI*S may fall under such situation where there may be impossibility of se6ual
intercourse or
that it is absolutely prevented.
4%0erc%losis? no cannot impugnA usband8s sic<ness became worse that on or about September 1%, 1&($, he
became so wea< that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. Gn September 1%, 1&($, the woman eloped
with another man. Since 3ay 1&($, the paramour and the woman had se6ual intercourse and treated each other as
husband and wife. Gn 'anuary 1, 1&(@,
the husband died. Gn 'une 1-, 1&(@, the woman gave birth to baby boy.
RU6ING: The husband died on 'anuary 1, 1&(@. The boy whose legitimacy is in 5uestion was born on 'une 1-,
1&(@.
The boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of said husband and his wife, he having been born within @%% days
following the
dissolution of the marriage. +lthough the husband was already su;ering from tuberculosis and his condition then
was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his feet was swollen and his voice hoarse, yet,
that is no evidence of impotency, nor does it prevent carnal intercourse. unfair ^9
4n Iao vs. CA, !.". #o. =I(&1C$, 'uly $*, 1&*-, it has been ruled that bloodIgrouping tests may be conclusive as to
nonpaternity
but inconclusive as to paternity. 4n TiGing vs. CA, .(' SCRA #, it was held that resemblance between parent and
child is, however, competent and material evidence to establish parentage when accompanied by strong evidence,
direct or circumstantial, to prove the parentage of the child.
*eniteA$*aua vs. CA
GR No. .30520, 6anuar# 24, .884
7AC4S:
Spouses Micente Fenitez and 4sabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in =aguna. 4sabel died in
1&*$ while his husband died in 1&*&. Micente8s sister and nephew 7led a complaint for the issuance of letters of
administration of Micente8s estate in favor of the nephew, herein private respondent. The petitioner, 3arissa
FenitezIFadua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by
blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted
documents such as her certi7cate of live birth where the spouses name were reNected as her parents. She even
testi7ed that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. Gn the other hand, the relatives of
Micente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the
biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the
spouses.
ISSUE: 0G# petitioner8s certi7cate of live birth will su?ce to establish her legitimacy.
8E6*:
The Court dismissed the case for lac< of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certi7cate as the
child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. 4t does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the childPs birth or falsi7cation of his or her birth
certi7cate, which is a public document.
4t is worthy to note that Micente and brother of the deceased wife e6ecuted a ,eed of B6traI'udicial Settlement of
the Bstate of the latter. 4n the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole heirs of the deceased
because /she died without descendants and ascendantsH. 4n e6ecuting such deed, Micente e;ectively repudiated
the Certi7cate of =ive Firth of the petitioner where it appeared thathe was the petitioner8s father.
Article J+. 4he chil1 shall 0e consi1ere1 legiti/ate altho%gh the /other /a& have 1eclare1 against
its legiti/ac& or /a& have 0een sentence1 as an a1%lteress. -!(Ja,
Concepcion vs. CA
GR No. .27403, August 7., 2330 >unya unsaun na lang ang gi ingun pu! sa court in their previous 2or!s nga
there is a right o the ather to impugn the legitimacy o the chil! 7ay sya gu! !a2 mag"uhi, #D carry iya name
tapos 2orst ma7a inherit sa iyaQ pro"a"ly in this case gi!a2at ang ana7 sa ga2as sa previous hus"an!Q.0 Hala
man gu! gi impugn sa ol! hu""y so 2ala na issue ang impugnity..pero 7ung iimpugn ni sa previous
hus"an!..illegitimate 8u! la"as aniQang ni !iso2ne! !iri ang mother man nuon Q2ell that's lie's !rama0
7AC4S:
1%1 | P a g e
!erardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and 3a. Theresa +lmonte, private respondent, were married in ,ecember 1&*&,
and begotten a child named 'ose !erardo in ,ecember 1&&%. The husband 7led on ,ecember 1&&1, a petition to
have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain 3ario !opiao sometime in
,ecember 1&*%, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in =oyola eights, ZC. Trial court ruled
that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while !erardo was granted visitation
rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting /visitation rights in favor of the putative father of
an illegitimate childH. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from /Concepcion to +lmonteH,
her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mother8s surname. +fter the re5uested oral argument,
trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of !erardo but of 3ario. ence, the child was a
legitimate child of Theresa and 3ario.
8E6*:
Considering that Theresa8s marriage with !erardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the former8s husband
and never ac5uired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresa8s contention was to have his son be
declared as not the legitimate child of her and 3ario but her illegitimate child with !erardo. 4n this case, the
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. ence, she is not permitted by law to
5uestion the son8s legitimacy. Knder +rticle 1C- of the 1amily Code, /the child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteressH.
aving the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. +s a
legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of 3ario and Theresa, in conformity with the
provisions of Civil Code on surnames. !erardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the
eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.
TTTTTTT

Article J). If the /arriage is ter/inate1 an1 the /other contracte1 another /arriage 9ithin three
h%n1re1 1a&s after s%ch ter/ination of the for/er /arriage, these r%les shall govern in the a0sence of
3roof to the contrar&:
-, A chil1 0orn 0efore one h%n1re1 eight& 1a&s after the sole/ni@ation of the s%0se2%ent /arriage is
consi1ere1 to have 0een conceive1 1%ring the for/er /arriage, 3rovi1e1 it 0e 0orn 9ithin three
h%n1re1 1a&s after the ter/ination of the for/er /arriageE
-!, A chil1 0orn after one h%n1re1 eight& 1a&s follo9ing the cele0ration of the s%0se2%ent /arriage is
consi1ere1 to have 0een conceive1 1%ring s%ch /arriage, even tho%gh it 0e 0orn 9ithin three h%n1re1
1a&s after the ter/ination of the for/er /arriage. -!(#a,
Ki1o9 3rohi0ite1 fro/ getting /arrie1 9ithin ."" 1a&s after 1eath of h%s0an1E 3%r3ose.
#llustration:
+ and F are married. F, the woman, was pregnant by si6 9C: months at the time + died. Three months thereafter,
she gave birth. She can contract a subse5uent marriage even within the @%%Iday period. There would be no more
doubtful paternity of the child.
Reason for the %se of )" 1a&s.
The period of 1*% days of the @%% days is used by law as the basis of the presumption because it is regarded as the
period of
conception.
Article J#. 4he legiti/ac& or illegiti/ac& of a chil1 0orn after three h%n1re1 1a&s follo9ing the
ter/ination of the /arriage shall 0e 3rove1 0& 9hoever alleges s%ch legiti/ac& or illegiti/ac&. -!Ja,
Article +".
4he action to i/3%gn the legiti/ac& of the chil1 shall 0e 0ro%ght 9ithin one &ear fro/ the Ino9le1ge
of the 0irth or its recor1ing in the civil register, if the h%s0an1 or, in a 3ro3er case, an& of his heirs,
sho%l1 resi1e in the cit& or /%nici3alit& 9here the 0irth tooI 3lace or 9as recor1e1.
If the h%s0an1 or, in his 1efa%lt all of his heirs 1o not resi1e at the 3lace of 0irth as 1eFne1 in the Frst
3aragra3h or 9here it 9as recor1e1, the 3erio1 shall 0e t9o &ears if the& sho%l1 resi1e in the
Ahili33inesE an1 three &ears if a0roa1.
If the 0irth of the chil1 has 0een conceale1 fro/ or 9as %nIno9n to the h%s0an1 or his heirs, the
3erio1 shall 0e co%nte1 fro/ the 1iscover& or Ino9le1ge of the 0irth of the chil1 or of the fact of
registration of sai1 0irth,
9hichever is earlier. -!J.a,
Article +.
4he heirs of the h%s0an1 /a& i/3%gn the Fliation of the chil1 9ithin the 3erio1 3rescri0e1 in the
3rece1ing article onl& in the follo9ing cases:
-, If the h%s0an1 sho%l1 1ie 0efore the e53iration of the 3erio1 F5e1 for 0ringing his actionE
-!, If he sho%l1 1ie after the Fling of the co/3laint 9itho%thaving 1esiste1 therefro/E or
-., If the chil1 9as 0orn after the 1eath of the h%s0an1. -!J!a,
4AHE NO4E: The enumeration is e6clusive as no one, e6cept the father and the children of the father, can impugn
the legitimacy of a child. The relatives cannot do so. 9FaduaIFenitez vs. C+, et al., supra.:.
A33lication of Article +, 7a/il& Co1e.
There is a 5uestion, however, whether the heirs of the father can bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his
children before
his deathJ Should it not be 7led only after death of the fatherJ
1%$ | P a g e
The Supreme Court answered in the a?rmative, saying that they are the one who stand to be bene7ted or injured
by the judgment
in the suit, or the parties entitled to the avails of the suit. 9=ee, et al. vs. C+, et al., !.". #o. 11*@*-, Gctober 11,
$%%1:.
6i&ao vs. 6i&ao
GR No. .)#J, March +, !""!
7acts:
Corazon !arcia was legally married to "amon Lulo but, at the time of the 7ling of this case, has been living
separately from him for
more than 1% years. 4n the meantime, Corazon cohabited with 0illiam Lao from 1&C) to the time of his death in
,ecember, 1&-). They lived together in the company of the two children of Corazon by "amon. 0illiam was himself
married to 'uanita Tanhoti with whom he sired $ daughters. 4n 'une, 1&-), Corazon gave birth to a baby boy. 4n the
boy8s certi7cate, the baby was registered as the son of 0illiam and was named 0illiam =iyao, 'r. 0illiam, however,
did not sign the birth certi7cate. 0illiam paid all the medical and hospital e6penses for the birth of the boy. e even
as<ed his secretary to secure a copy of the boy8s birth certi7cate. 0illiam spent for the support of the boy and
introduced him to friends as his goodIloo<ing son. Since birth, the boy had been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of a recognized child of 0illiam by his direct and overt acts. +fter the death of 0illiam in
1&-), Corazon 7led in 1&-C an action against his wife and daughters for the compulsory recognition of the boy as
his illegitimate child to entitle the boy to inherit from him. +t the trial, Corazon and her children by "amon testi7ed
that the boy is, indeed,
the son of 0illiam and was recognized by him as such. The trial court ruled in favor of Corazon on the ground that
the
boy was conceived at the time of her cohabitation with 0illiam, and that the boy had been in continuous possession
and enjoyment of the status of a child of 0illiam through his direct and overt acts. Gn appeal, the C+ reversed the
trial court giving more weight to the testimony of the witness who testi7ed that Corazon and "amon were seeing
each other at the time of the boy8s supposed conception, and that it was not shown that 0illiam had a hand in the
preparation and registration of the boy8s birth certi7cate considering that he did not sign it. ence, this petition to
the Supreme Court. The basic iss%e raise1 9as 9hether the 0o& /a& 0e recogni@e1 as an illegiti/ate chil1
of Killia/;
8el1:
No, he may not. Knder the #ew Civil Code, the law applicable to the facts of this case, the boy is presumed to be
the legitimate
child of Corazon and "amon having been born during their marriage. Therefore, the action 7led by Corazon for the
recognition of the boy as an illegitimate child of 0illiam is in reality an action to impugn the boy8s status as a
legitimate child of "amon. 4t may be true that Corazon and "amon were no longer living together at the time of the
boy8s conception but such fact is just a ground to impugn the status of the boy as a legitimate child of "amon.
Knfortunately, the law does not give the boy the right to impugn his own legitimate status. Gnly "amon, or his heirs
in case he dies before the birth of the boy, or before the lapse of the period to 7le it, or after 7ling it, may 7le and
maintain the action to impugn the status of the boy as his legitimate child. The Civil Code does not also allow
Corazon to impugn the legitimacy of her own child. 4t is settled that a child born within a marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. The testimony of the boy8s siblings by "amon will not wor< to impugn the legitimacy of the boy because
there appears nothing on record that "amon has already passed away. Therefore, the action to impugn the boy8s
legitimate status has to be dismissed not having been brought by "amon. 4n any event, Corazon failed to present
clear, competent and positive evidence to prove that 0illiam had admitted or recognize paternity of the boy.
Ma& legiti/ate chil1ren i/3%gn their o9n stat%s; Kh&;
No. 4he la9 itself esta0lishes the legiti/ac& of chil1ren conceive1 or 0orn 1%ring the /arriage of the
3arents. The presumption of legitimacy 76es a civil status for the child born in wedloc<, and only the father 9+rticle
1-%, 1amily Code:, or in e6ceptional instances the latter8s heirs 9+rticle 1-1, 1amily Code:, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child. + childcannot choose his own 7liation. 9*e $es%s, etc. vs. 4he Estate
of $%an *i@on, et al., G.R. No. '!)++, Octo0er !!, !""E 6i&ao vs. 6i&ao, G.R. No. .)#J, March +,
!""!:.
$INHIE C8RIS4IE A. *E $ESUS an1 $AC=UE6INE A. *E $ESUS, /inors, re3resente1 0& their /other,
CARO6INA A. *E $ESUS,petitioners, vs. 48E ES4A4E O7 *ECE*EN4 $UAN GAM:OA *I>ON, ANGE6INA <.
*I>ON, CAR6OS *I>ON, 7E6IAE *I>ON, $UAN *I>ON, $R. an1 MARY6IN *I>ON an1 as 3ro3er 3arties:
7ORMS ME*IA CORA., =UA* MANAGEMEN4 CORA., 7I6IAINAS AAAER SA6ES CO., INC. an1 AMI4Y
CONS4RUC4ION U IN*US4RIA6 EN4ERARISES, INC.,Responents.
Ara&er of the Aetitioner: Petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent,
embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself su?cient to establish their status as such and does not re5uire a
separate action for judicial approval.
7acts:
The case involves two illegitimate children who having been born in a lawful wedloc<> claim to be the illegitimate
children of the decedent, 'uan !. ,izon in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter8s estate under the
rules on succession.
,anilo F. de 'esus and Carolina +ves de 'esus got married on +ugust $@, 1&C( and during this marriage, herein
petitioners, 'ac5ueline +. de 'esus and 'in<ie Christie +. de 'esus were born.
owever, in a notarized document dated 'une %-, 1&&1, 'uan !. ,izon ac<nowledged 'ac5ueline and 'in<ie de 'esus
as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina +ves de 'esus. Subse5uently, on the following year, 'uan !. ,izon
died intestate leaving behind a considerable amount of assets. Thus, on the strength of his notarized
ac<nowledgment, herein petitioners 7led a complaint for Partition with 4nventory and +ccounting of the ,izon
estate.

Iss%e: 0hether petitioners are indeed the ac<nowledged illegitimate o;springs of the decedent.

R%ling:
1%@ | P a g e
The 7liation of illegitimate children, li<e legitimate children, is established by 91: the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a 7nal judgment> or 9$: an admission of legitimate 7liation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. 4n the absence thereof, 7liation shall be proved by -,
the o3en an1 contin%o%s 3ossession of the stat%s of a legiti/ate chil1E or -!, an& other /eans allo9e1
0& the R%les of Co%rt an1 s3ecial la9s.
4he 1%e recognition of an illegiti/ate chil1 in a recor1 of 0irth, a 9ill, a state/ent 0efore a co%rt of
recor1, or in an& a%thentic 9riting is, in itself, a cons%//ate1 act of acIno9le1g/ent of the chil1, an1
no f%rther co%rt action is re2%ire1.
4n fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition> it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not re5uire a separate action for judicial approval. 0here, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child8s ac<nowledgment.
owever, based on the records presented, the& sho9e1 that 3etitioners 9ere 0orn 1%ring the /arriage of
their 3arents. The certi7cates of live birth would also identify ,anilo de 'esus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more 7rmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedloc< are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the 7rst 1$% days of the @%% days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to 9a: the physical
incapacity of the husband to have se6ual intercourse with his wife> 9b: the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that se6ual intercourse is not possible> or 9c: serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents se6ual intercourse. Zuite remar<ably, upon the e6piration of the periods set forth in +rticle 1-%,
and in proper cases +rticle 1-1, of the 1amily Code 9which too< e;ect on %@ +ugust 1&**:, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes 76ed
and unassailable.
In an atte/3t to esta0lish their illegiti/ate Fliation to the late $%an G. *i@on, 3etitioners, in eLect,
9o%l1 i/3%gn their legiti/ate stat%s as 0eing chil1ren of *anilo 1e $es%s an1 Carolina Aves 1e $es%s.
This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents.
$%ris3r%1ence is strongl& settle1 that the 3ara/o%nt 1eclaration of legiti/ac& 0& la9 cannot 0e
attacIe1 collaterall&, one that can onl& 0e re3%1iate1 or conteste1 in a 1irect s%it s3eciFcall& 0ro%ght
for that 3%r3ose. 4ndeed, a child so born in such wedloc< shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
K8ERE7ORE, the foregoing dis5uisitions considered, the instant petition is ,B#4B,.
TTTTTTTTTTTT
4ISON <S CA
The legitimacy of the petitioners was 5uestioned in anaction for reconveyance of a property.
Iss%e: 0hether or not a third person, not the father nor an heir, may attac< the legitimacy of ermogenes
8el1: #G. the private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. There is no
presumption of the law more 7rmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than
the presumption that children born in wedloc< are legitimate. +nd well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy
cannot be attac<ed collaterally.
Gnly the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. e is the one directly confronted with
the scandal and ridicule which the in7delity of his wife produces> and he should decide whether to conceal that
in7delity or e6pose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. 4t is only in e6ceptional cases that his
heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Gutside of these cases, none 2 even his heirs 2 can impugn
legitimacy> that would amount to an insult to his memory.
TTTTTTTTTTTT
4AHE NO4E: The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties, and within the period limited by law. Kpon the e6piration of the periods provided in, +rt. 1-%, the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption,
therefore, becomes 76ed, and can no longer be 5uestioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status
of a child born in wedloc< from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time.
Cha3ter !
Aroof of 7iliation
Article +!. 4he Fliation of legiti/ate chil1ren is esta0lishe1 0& an& of the follo9ing:
-, 4he recor1 of 0irth a33earing in the civil register or a Fnal B%1g/entE or
-!, An a1/ission of legiti/ate Fliation in a 3%0lic 1oc%/ent or a 3rivate han19ritten instr%/ent an1
signe1 0& the 3arent concerne1E
In the a0sence of the foregoing evi1ence, the legiti/ate Fliation shall 0e 3rove1 0&:
-, 4he o3en an1 contin%o%s 3ossession of the stat%s of alegiti/ate chil1E or
-!, An& other /eans allo9e1 0& the R%les of Co%rt an1s3ecial la9s. -!J(a, !JJa, !J+a,
0ith advances in medical science, 7liation may now be established through forensic ,#+ 9,eo6yribonucleic acid:
and this has
changed the judicial landscape. ence, the Supreme Court has e6pressed its con7dence in the value and
admissibility of ,#+ in TiGing vs. CA, G.R. No. !(#", March ), !"" SCourts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situationspresented since to reject it is to deny progress.H
4n People vs. !alleGo, !.". #o. 1((C)C, 3ay &, $%%$, the Supreme Court 7nally had an appropriate case to use
,#+ evidence to
1%( | P a g e
a?rm the decision of the trial court 7nding the accused guilty of rape with homicide. The #ational Fureau of
4nvestigation obtained
the ,#+ evidence from buccal swabs and hair samples ta<en from the accused, and vaginal swabs ta<en from the
victim during autopsy. The #F4 forensic chemist testi7ed that the vaginal swabs from the victim contained the ,#+
pro7les of both the accused and the victim. The Court admitted the ,#+ evidence as corro"orative evi!ence which,
together with the other evidence, indicated the guilt of the accused.
*NA evi1ence is now available to prove the 7liation of a person, for it is the fundamental building bloc< of all living
matter. The
/blueprint of life,H ,#+ contains the inherited information determining how an organism is built and organized. ,#+
is a
component of virtually all the cells of the body, and is identical in each of those cells.
-, Recor1 of 0irth.
The rule is that an unsigned birth certi7cate of a child is not a good proof of 7liation. 4t must be signed by the
putative father to be
admissible.
4n the case of *alu#ut vs. *alu#ut, )J SCRA ("J, the Supreme Court had the occasion once again to say that a
birth certi7cate, unsigned by the father is li<ewise not enough to establish 7liation. Proof of bare 7liation of an
illegitimate child is insu?cient to the entitlement of successional rights under +rticle **- of the Civil Code.
+c<nowledgment by the father is re5uired by law for proof of recognition but this rule of liberality does not apply to
compulsory recognition where evidence of direct e6press ac<nowledgment is re5uired. The continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child must be of such nature that they reveal, not only the conviction of paternity,
but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations of society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously.
Aroof of FliationE signing of 0irth certiFcate.
4n Rosalina P. 'ceta vs. Ma. T)eresa !ell &agura 'ceta, G.R. No. (+".+, 3ay $%, $%%( 9LnaresISantiago, I.:,
the Supreme Court once again said that the act of the father of signing the birth certi7cate of the daughter is an act
of ac<nowledgment of his paternity.
4he right to Fle an action for co/3%lsor& recognition is a s%0stantive right that vests %3on 0irth of the
illegiti/ate
chil1.
4f ang bata natao 1&*1 unya namatay iya papa nga minor pa sya govern sya sa Gld Civil Code not 1amily Code
under the old =aw even if the father is already dead pwede japun sya mag 7le to bring an action for compolsury
recognition pero under 1amily Code dili na pede. Pero if natao before the 1amily Code, vested right na sa bata nga
govern iyang petition sa Gld Civil Code. STS
Therefore the right granted by +rticle $*) to illegitimate children who were minors at the time of the death of the
putative
parent to bring an action for compulsory recognition within ( years from attaining the age of majority, is a
substantive right that vests from the time of the illegitimate child8s birth. Therefore, the 1amily Code did not impair
or ta<e away the right of +drian to 7le the present petition for recognition despite the death of his putative father.
Unsigne1 0irth certiFcate cannot 0e a 3roof of Fliation.
Gnce again, the Supreme Court in Angeles vs. Angeles, !.". #o. 1)@-&*, September $, $%%) had the occasion to
say that an unsigned birth certi7cate cannot be a proof of 7liation. 4t was merely signed by the attending physician
who certi7ed that she attended to the birth of a child. Such certi7cate, al"eit considered a public record of a private
document is, under "ule 1@$ Section $@ of the "ules of Court evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its
e6ecution> the fact of birth of a child. 'urisprudence teaches that a birth certi7cate, to be considered as validating
proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the
mother alone if the father refuses.
Khat is the eLect if a chil1 is recogni@e1 in a recor1 of/0irth, a 9ill, etc.; E53lain.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of ac<nowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
re5uired. 9!onoI'avier vs. C+, $@& SC"+ )&@:. 4n fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition> it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not re5uire a separate action for judicial
approval. 9,ivinagracia vs. Fellosillo, 1(@ SC"+ @)C:.
Khat is the eLect if the clai/ for recognition is not 0ase1 on the afore/entione1 1oc%/ents; E53lain.
0here, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child8s ac<nowledgment. 9!onoI'avier vs. C+, supra.:.
4here is a 3res%/3tion of legiti/ac& of the chil1ren.
An %nsigne1 0irth certiFcate can 0e %se1 as 3roof of Fliation 9 if it bears the name of the father:
1or while it is true that if the father does not sign the birth certi7cate, the placing of his name therein is
incompetent evidence
of paternity, the rule does not apply if the father himself gave all the data regarding the child8s birth and caused his
name to be placed therein as the child8s father. Bven if he did not sign the birth certi7cate, the same is still
competent proof that he is the father because he was the one who supplied the data to the nurse. 4f he failed to
sign the birth certi7cate, it was only because he left the hospital 5uite early.
This case is the reverse of Geyes vs. CA, !.". #o. @&)@-, 3arch 1&, 1&*), where the Supreme Court observed that
the school records were not signed by the father. The school records were rejected as proof of 7liation.
1%) | P a g e
The case of #lano vs. CA is a reverse of the case of Goces vs. 4ocal Civil Gegistrar *192 6hil. 19.0. 0hile the Supreme
Court said
in "oces that, the unsigned birth certi7cate of the child is inadmissible as proof of 7liation, yet, in #lano it was said
that, even if the birth certi7cate was unsigned, it was admissible in evidence. The reason in #lano was that, the
father was the one who supplied the data in the record of the birth that he is the father of the child. 4n Goces, it was
the mother alone who supplied the data that "oces was the father of the child. 4n "oces, it was said that if the
alleged father did not sign the birth certi7cate of the child, the placing of his name by the mother, the doctor, or the
registrar is not competent evidence of paternity. 9"eyes vs. C+, 1@) SC"+ (@&> Ferciles vs. !S4S, 1$* SC"+)@:. The
case of 4lano is perfect e6ample of estoppel in pais.
A%thentic 9riting.
+n authentic writing as proof of 7liation of a child where the father of the child e6ecuted a will instituting such child
as one of the
heirs and recognizing the child at the same time. Should the father Itestator revo<e the will, that becomes an
authentic writing 9+rt.
*@(, #CC: which the child may use to prove his 7liation and the right of inheritance. S%ch revocation of the 9ill
1oes not carr& 9ithit the revocation of the recognition of a chil1 0eca%se it is not a testa/entar&
1is3osition.
+uthentic writing may be public or private for as long as it can be established as one made by the ac<nowledging
parent. 93adridejo vs. de =eon, )) Phil. *CC> ,e 'esus vs. Sy5uia, )* Phil. *CC> Marela vs. Millanueva, &) Phil. $(*>
Pareja vs. Pareja, 1%@ Phil. @$(:.
Arivate 9riting.
1or a private writing to be admissible in evidence as proof of 7liation, the same must be in the handwriting of the
father and signed
by him. 4f the private writing is typewritten and unsigned, that is not admissible. The re5uirements of the law are
mandatory.
#llustration:
A, a law student of the 1BK 4nstitute of =aw, has a girl friend in the province. They have an illegitimate child.
0hile studying, he was wor<ing and sending half of his earnings to N, his girlfriend, for the subsistence of his son
as C. 4n all his letters, which were in his handwriting and duly signed by him, he always referred to C, his son. The
son, C, can utilize the private documents as proof of 7liation with respect to his father.
O3en an1 contin%o%s 3ossession of the stat%s of an illegiti/ate chil1.
The law allows a child to prove 7liation by way of open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or
illegitimate
child. 4t must be open, and not clan!estineA it must be continuous and not intermittent, in order that the child may
be able to prove
7liation through open and continuous possession. The possession of such status means that the father has treated
the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without
publicity 9since the relation is illegitimate:. There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal a;ection and care.
+n illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed 7liation 0& San& other /eans allo9e1 0& the R%les of
Co%rt an1 s3ecial la9sHor /by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her fatherH under the 1amily
Code. Such evidence may consist of his 0a3tis/al certiFcate, a B%1icial a1/ission, a fa/il& :i0le in 9hich
his na/e has 0een entere1, co//on re3%tation res3ecting his 3e1igree, a1/ission 0& silence, the
testi/onies of 9itnesses and other <inds of proof under "ule 1@% of the "ules of the Court.
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an e6ception to the hearsay rule because it is the best
that the nature
of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its
admission.
0hile 0a3tis/al certiFcates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so speci7ed. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the
veracity of the entries therein with respect to the child8s paternity. There must be showing that the putative father
had participated in its preparation.
:loo1 test, not an evi1ence of Fliation.
Two 9$: accused were sued for rape. =ater on, the victim gave birth. +t the trial, the accused moved that a blood
test, both /3ajor
FloodIgrouping,88 be conducted on the o;ended party, the child and the two accused. Flood testing can show only
the possibility that one is the father but not as to its certainty.
Un%s%al closeness to a chil1 is not convincing 3roof of Fliation.
To establish the lawyer8s immorality in the disbarment proceeding, she presented one of her maids who testi7ed
as to the unusual closeness of the son and the lawyer, li<e playing with him and the act of giving toys and gifts.
Pictures were presented to show their physical li<eness.
Iss%e:
0ere these evidences enough to show the lawyer8s immoralityJ
8el1:
#o. The unusual closeness between the lawyer and the begotten son of Cely, li<e playing with him and giving him
toys, are not
convincing enough to prove paternity.
4n -rancisco 6ison vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. !')(., 7e0r%ar& !', ##), # SCA* )'#,evidence was shown
that 1rancisco recognized her as her child by giving support> having recommended her for employment> having sent
her to school> paid for her hospitalization when she got sic<> paying for the funeral e6penses of her mother>
ac<nowledging his paternal greetings and calling her Mi8a> or child> instructing his o?ce personnel to give her a
monthly allowance> allowing her to use his house in Facolod City> paying for her e6penses during vacations in
3anila and allowing his surname to be used by her in her scholastic and other records.
1%C | P a g e
4he iss%e then 9as 9hether Monina is the illegiti/ate chil1 of 7rancisco.
The Supreme Court held in the a?rmative, saying those enumerated acts show recognition which has been
consistently shown
and manifested throughout the years publicly 9citing Faluyot vs. Faluyot, 1*C SC"+ )%C> +lberto vs. C+, )$ SC+,
C-, $@$ SC"+ -():, spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner. 9Gng
vs. C+, !.". #o. &)@*C, 3ay $&, 1&&-, *$ SC+, *C1:.
The 5uestion on the probative value of the certi7cation issued by the =ocal Civil "egistrar concerning her birth was
raised. Gn this
issue, the Supreme Court said.
/4t is settled that a certi7cate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as
to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certi7cates, and the =ocal Civil "egistrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon
the information of a thirdIperson. 9citing 1ernandez vs. C+, (* SC+, @@@, $@% SC"+ 1@%> "oces vs. =ocal Civil
"egistrar, 1%$ Phil. 1%)%:. Simply put, if the alleged father
did not intervene in the birth certi7cate, e.g., supplying the information himself, the inscription of his name by the
mother or doctor or registrar is null and void>
There were various notes and letters written by 1rancisco8s relatives attesting to 3onina8s 7liation. Fut they were
declared
inadmissible in view of the fact that there was no showing that the authors or declarants were dead or unable to
testify. The relationship between the authors and 3onina was not also shown. 9See "ule 1@%, Section @&, "ules of
Court:. +s to the admissibility of such documents, the Supreme Court said that "ule 1@%, Section (% of the "ules of
Court needs further elaboration.
Thus, the Court said.
Section J9. (amily reputation or tra!ition regar!ing pe!igree. 2 The reputation or tra!ition e1isting in a amily
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pe!igree o any one o its mem"ers, may "e receive! in evi!ence i
the 2itness testiying thereon "e also a mem"er o the amily, either "y consanguinity or a%nity. Cntries in amily
"i"les or other amily "oo7s or charts, engravings on rings, amily portraits an! the li7e, may "e receive! as
evi!ence o pe!igree.
4t is evident that this provision may be divided into two 9$: parts. the portion containing the 7rst underscored clause
which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in 5uestion may not be admitted as the authors
thereof did not ta<e the witness stand> and the section containing the second underscored phrase. 0hat must then
be ascertained is whether such documents, as private documents, fall within the scope of the clause `and the li<e8
as 5uali7ed by the preceding phrase `entries in
family bibles or other family boo<s or charts, engravings on rights DandE family portraits.8H
4t was held that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of
e8us!em generis, is limited to objects which are commonly <nown as /family possession,H or those articles which
represent, in e;ect, a family8s joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been
described as objects /openly e6hibited and wellI<nown to the family,H or those /which, if preserved in a family, may
be regarded as giving a family tradition.H Gther e6amples of these objects which are regarded as reNective of a
family8s reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or co?n plates.H
Plainly then, such documents as private documents not constituting /family possessionsH as discussed above, may
not be admitted on the basis of "ule 1@%, Section (%.
#either may these e6hibits be admitted on the basis of "ule 1@%, Section (1 regarding common reputation, it
having been observed that. /DTEhe weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material
element of evidence going to establish pedigree. 6 6 6 DThusE matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in
the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, e6cept where the pedigree in 5uestion is marriage
which may be proved by common reputation in the community.H
Fut inspite of their inadmissibility, they were however, considered and admitted as part of 3onina8s testimony to
strengthen her
claim that indeed relatives of 1rancisco recognized her as her daughter.
8igh Stan1ar1 of Aroof of Fliation is re2%ire1.
Car/elo Ca0atana vs. CA, et al. G.R. No. !')', Octo0er !, !""'
4n an action to prove 7liation with support, the "egional Trial Court held that /the child was presented before the
court and if the
court is to decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the
plainti;Iminor is the child of the defendant with the plainti;Iminor8s mother. 1lorencia "egodos.H This was a?rmed
by the C+ on appeal. Foth courts anchored their rulings on the basis of the admission by the defendant that he had
se6ual intercourse with the plainti;8s mother who, herself was married.
The Supreme Court found such decisions incorrect because a ver& high stan1ar1 of 3roof of Fliation is
necessar& to 3rove Fliation. /Time and again, the Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is re5uired to
establish paternity and 7liation. 9Faluyot vs. Faluyot, 1*C SC"+ )%C D1&&%E:. An or!er or recognition an! support
may create an un2holesome situation or may "e an irritant to the amily or the lives o the parties so that it must
"e issue! only i paternity or =liation is esta"lishe! "y clear an! convincing evi!ence.
4n this age of genetic pro7ling and deo6yribonucleic acid 9*NA, anal&sis, the e6tremely subjective test of physical
resemblance or
similarity of features will not su?ce as evidence to prove paternity and 7liation before the courts of law. This only
shows the very high standard of proof that a child must present to establish 7liation.
Un3ro0ate1 9ill /a& 0e a 3roof of Fliation.
+ will where there is recognition of child is a proof of 7liation. 4n fact, even if such will has been revo<ed, it can be
presented as
proof of 7liation as it shall then become an authentic writing. The revocation of a will does not carry with the
revocation of the
1%- | P a g e
recognition of a child. 9+rt. *@(, #CC:. Fy inference therefore, even an unprobated will can be presented as proof of
7liation. There is not even a necessity that the child has to go to court as the document itself is a consummated act
of recognition.
The way to prove the 7liation of illegitimate children is provided by the 1amily Code under +rticles
1-$ and 1-). The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of ac<nowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is re5uired.
Knder the 1amily Code, 7liation may li<ewise be established by holographic as well as notarial wills, e6cept that
they no longer need to be probated or to be strictly in conformity with the formalities thereof for purposes of
establishing 7liation.
The argument on the need for probate loses force when weighed against its purpose. 4n probate proceedings, all
that the law re5uires is the court8s declaration that the e6ternal formalities have been complied with. The will is
then deemed valid and e;ective in the eyes of the law. Thus, probate proceedings merely determine the e6trinsic
validity of the will and do not a;ect its contents.
Article +.. 4he action to clai/ legiti/ac& /a& 0e 0ro%ght 0& the chil1 1%ring his or her lifeti/e an1
shall 0e trans/itte1 to the heirs sho%l1 the chil1 1ie 1%ring /inorit& or in a state of insanit&. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a 3erio1 of Fve &ears 9ithin 9hich to instit%te the action. 4he action
alrea1& co//ence1 0& the chil1 shall s%rvive not9ithstan1ing the 1eath of either or 0oth of the
3arties. -!J)a,
Article +'. 6egiti/ate chil1ren shall have the right:
-, 4o 0ear the s%rna/es of the father an1 the /other, in confor/it& 9ith the 3rovisions of the Civil
Co1e on S%rna/esE
-!, 4o receive s%33ort fro/ their 3arents, their ascen1ants, an1 in 3ro3er cases, their 0rothers an1
sisters, in confor/it& 9ith the 3rovisions of this Co1e on S%33ortE an1
-., 4o 0e entitle1 to the legiti/e an1 other s%ccessional rights grante1 to the/ 0& the Civil Co1e.
-!J'a,
ON SURNAME
The child is not mandated to use the surname of the father alone. This is so because, the child under +rticle 1-( of
the 1amily Code may li<ewise use the surname of the mother. 4t means that the law which uses the phrase /shall
have the rightH to bear the surname of the father simply means that it is more of a right, but not a duty on his part
to bear the surname of the father.
ON SUAAOR4
B6ample.
+ and F are married. They have a daughter C. they arranged the marriage of C with ,, the son of their friend
with a warning that if C would refuse to marry ,, they would disinherit her. 4f C refuses and she is disinherited,
the act is not proper as it is not a ground for disinheritanceunder the law.
Cha3ter .
Illegiti/ate Chil1ren
Article +(. Illegiti/ate chil1ren /a& esta0lish their illegiti/ate Fliation in the sa/e 9a& an1 on the
sa/e evi1ence as legiti/ate chil1ren.
4he action /%st 0e 0ro%ght 9ithin the sa/e 3erio1 s3eciFe1 in Article +., e5ce3t 9hen the action is
0ase1 on the secon1 3aragra3h of Article +!, in 9hich case the action /a& 0e 0ro%ght 1%ring the
lifeti/e of the allege1 3arent. -!)#a,
Article +J. Illegiti/ate chil1ren shall %se the s%rna/e an1 shall 0e %n1er the 3arental a%thorit& of
their /other, an1 shall 0e entitle1 to s%33ort in confor/it& 9ith this Co1e. 4he legiti/e of each
illegiti/ate chil1 shall consist of one?half of the legiti/e of a legiti/ate chil1. -!)+a,
Problems on the period to claim 7liation of illegitimates have arisen and +rticle 1-) of the 1amily Code prescribes
the period, that is, during the lifetime of the illegitimate father> otherwise, the defense of prescription is proper. This
is, however, true if the case s5uarely falls under the 1amily Code. 1urthermore, if the child was born under the Civil
Code and the putative father died when he was a minor, he has a period of ( years from the attainment of the age
of majority within while to as< for recognition. 9+rt. $*), #CC:. This is a vested right which cannot be washed ways
by the new law. 9Tayag vs. C+:.
Article !)( of the Civil Co1e which provides.c/The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, e6cept in the following cases.
91: 4f the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may 7le the action before
the e6piration of four years from the attainment of his majority>
The rule applies even if the child8s father admits paternity. So it was held in )ossesgel! vs. Court o Appeals that.
/+rticle 1-C of the 1amily Code of the Philippines provides that `illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.8 This
is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Conse5uently, the =ocal Civil "egistrar correctly
refused to register the certi7cate of live
birth of petitioner8s illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latter8s consent.H 9@%%
SC"+ (C(:.
Knder +rticle 1-C of the 1amily Code as amended by "epublic +ct 9"+: #o. &$)), which too< e;ect on 3arch 1&,
$%%(, illegitimate
children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their 7liation, in which case they may
bear the father8s surname. In :ang vs. Cebu Civil Registrar, it was held that an illegitimate child, whose 7liation
is not recognized by the father, bears only a given name and his mother8s surname. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child identi7es him as such. 4t is only when said child is recognized that he may use his father8s
surname, reNecting his status as an ac<nowledged illegitimate child. 9+lba, et al. vs. C+, et al., supra.:.
1%* | P a g e
Illegiti/ate chil1 has no /i11le na/eE e5ce3tions.
+n illegitimate child whose 7liation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother8s
surname, and does
not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identi7es him as such. 4t is only
when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subse5uent marriage of his parents or ac<nowledged by the father
in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother8s surname as his middle
name and his father8s surname as his surname, reNecting his status as a legitimated child or an ac<nowledged
illegitimate child. 9In Re Aetition for Change of Na/e of $%lian Kang vs. Ce0% Cit&Civil Registrar, G.R. No.
((#JJ, March .", !""(,.
ELect of RA #!(( on Article +J, of the 7a/il& Co1e
The original version of the provisions of +rticle 1-C of the 1amily Code states that illegitimate children shall use the
surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
The law has, however, been amended by "+ &$)) which was approved on 1ebruary (, $%%( otherwise <nown as
/An Act Allo9ing Illegiti/ate Chil1ren 4o Use 4he S%rna/e Of 4heir 7ather.T The law now provides.
SArticle +J. Illegiti/ate chil1ren shall %se the s%rna/e an1 shall 0e %n1er the 3arental a%thorit& of
their /other, an1 shall 0e entitle1 to s%33ort in confor/it& 9ith this Co1e. 8o9ever, illegiti/ate
chil1ren /a& %se the s%rna/e of their father if their Fliation has 0een e53ressl& recogni@e1 0& their
father thro%gh the recor1 of 0irth a33earing in the civil register, or 9hen an a1/ission in a
3%0lic 1oc%/ent or 3rivate han19ritten instr%/ent is /a1e 0& the father. Provie, the father has
the right to instit%te an action 0efore the reg%lar co%rts to 3rove nonFliation 1%ring his lifeti/e. 4he
legiti/e of each illegiti/ate chil1 shall consist of one?half of the legiti/ate of a legiti/e chil1.T
Un1er this la9 -RA #!((, the illegitimate children do not have to go to court to see< leave to use the surname of
their father if their 7liation has been e6pressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten is made by the father. 4t is enough
that such recognition is made in those documents. They do not have to establish 7liation, for these documents are
already considered as consummated acts of recognition. To still go to court and establish 7liation before they may
use the surname of their father would be a mere superNuity.
Cha3ter '
6egiti/ate1 Chil1ren
Article ++. Onl& chil1ren conceive1 an1 0orn o%tsi1e of 9e1locI of 3arents 9ho, at the ti/e of the
conce3tion of the for/er, 9ere not 1is2%aliFe1 0& an& i/3e1i/ent to /arr& each other /a&
0e legiti/ate1. -!J#a,
Conce3t of legiti/ation.
=egitimation is a remedy by means of which those who in fact were not born in wedloc< and should, therefore, be
considered
illegitimate children, are, by 7ction, considered legitimate, it being supposed that they were born when their
parents were validly
married. 91 3anresa, )th Bd., p. ))%:.
Re2%isites of legiti/ation:
9a: the child must have been conceived and born outside of wedloc<>
9b: the child8s parents, at the time of the former8s conception, were not dis5uali7ed by any impediment to marry
each other. #
n Ge Cnri$uez 9$& Phil. 1C-:, it was held that being a Catholic priest is not an impediment.
9c: the subse5uent valid marriage of the parents. 9+rt. 1-*, 1amily Code:.
Conce3t of San& i/3e1i/entT 2 This covers all causes and circumstances that may render a marriage void
such as.
9a: prior e6isting marriage 9+rt. @)D(E:>
9b: close blood relationship 9+rt. @-:>
9c: contravention of public policy 9+rt. @*:>
9d: other causes under +rticles @), @C, and )@ of the 1amily Code>
9e: minority.
4n order that there may be legitimation, the marriage must be valid. 4f it is void, then, there can be no legitimation.
=egitimation
ta<es e;ect by operation of law upon the subse5uent marriage of the parents of the child.
=egitimated children are natural children, a species of illegitimate children, elevated by law to the status of
legitimate children. They enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. 9Capistrano, Civil Co!e o the 6hils., 1&)%
Bd., p. $(1:.
Article +). 6egiti/ation shall taIe 3lace 0& a s%0se2%ent vali1 /arriage 0et9een 3arents. 4he
ann%l/ent of a voi1a0le /arriage shall not aLect the legiti/ation. -!+"a,
Article +#. 6egiti/ate1 chil1ren shall enBo& the sa/e rights as legiti/ate chil1ren. -!+!a,
Article )". 4he eLects of legiti/ation shall retroact to the ti/e of the chil1Gs 0irth. -!+.a,
Retroactive eLect of legiti/ationE 3%r3ose.
The purpose of the law in giving retroactive e;ect to legitimation is to protect the innocent child. e should be
given the right to
enjoy the bene7ts of a legitimate child from the moment of birth, not from the time of marriage of the parents.
Rights even if the 3arents s%0se2%entl& /arr&.
This law spea<s of a situation where even if the child is already dead, if his parents would get married, the marriage
would redound
to the bene7t of his own children.
1%& | P a g e
#llustration:
R and L are living together as husband and wife without the bene7t of a marriage. They begot a child Y who married
+. They have two children, F and C. 4n 1&*&, Y died. 4n 1&&%, R and L got married. The marriage of R and L would
bene7t F and C> hence, they can represent their father in the inheritance of their grandparents.
Article )!. 6egiti/ation /a& 0e i/3%gne1 onl& 0& those 9ho are 3reB%1ice1 in their rights, 9ithin Fve
&ears fro/ the ti/e their ca%se of action accr%es.
Those who are prejudiced in their rights are the legitimate children, as an illegitimate is elevated to the status of a
legitimate
and shall participate in the successional rights of the parents 2 in e5ual footing with the original legitimates. The
legitimates are
prejudiced because of such successional rights, for to elevate an illegitimate to the status of a legitimate child
would cause a reduction of their successional rights. That is the prejudice referred to by law.
7AMI6Y CO*E O7 48E A8I6IAAINES
4I46E <II \ A*OA4ION
Art. ).. A 3erson of age an1 in 3ossession of f%ll civil ca3acit& an1 legal rights /a& a1o3t, 3rovi1e1
he is in a 3osition to s%33ort an1 care for his chil1ren, legiti/ate or illegiti/ate, in Iee3ing 9ith the
/eans of the fa/il&.
Onl& /inors /a& 0e a1o3te1, e5ce3t in the cases 9hen the a1o3tion of a 3erson of /aBorit& age is
allo9e1 in this 4itle. In a11ition, the a1o3ter /%st 0e at least si5teen &ears ol1er than the 3erson to
0e a1o3te1, %nless the a1o3ter is the 3arent 0& nat%re of the a1o3te1, or is the s3o%se of the
legiti/ate 3arent of the 3erson to 0e a1o3te1. -!+a, EO # an1 A* J".,
ELects of A1o3tion.
Case:
4eotico vs. *el <al. SCRA '"J
+doption is a juridical act that creates between two persons certain relations, purely civil, of paternity and 7liation.
The adopted
becomes a legitimate child of the adopter with reciprocal rights and obligations arising from that relationship.
Conse5uently, the child has the right to bear the surname of the adopter, receive support, and to inherit.
+doption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and 7liation with corresponding rights
and duties
that necessarily Now from adoption, such as, but not necessarily con7ned to, the e6ercise of parental authorit, use
of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional rights.
These are matters that cannot be considered inconse5uential to the parties. 9Re3. vs. S3s. 8%ghes, !.". #o.
1%%*@), Gctober 1&&@, $$-SC"+ (%1:.The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting
parents and does not e6tend to their other relatives, e6cept as e6pressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child
cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate
children which they may have after the adoption, e6cept that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by
reason of adoption. #either are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. 9Santos, 'r.
vs. "epublic, $1 SC"+ @-&:. ence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the
adopting parent. +s a conse5uence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter8s but not of the relative
of the adopter.
4n view of "+ &$$) which amended +ct #o. C@, Section ( of the new law provides that the unmarried child, whether
legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted below eighteen 91*: years of age, of those who reac5uire Philippine citizenship upon
e;ectivity of this +CT shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. The reason is that, an adopted child has the same
rights as a legitimate child.
The citizenship of the adopter is a political matter, and not civil in nature, and that ways in which it should be
conferred lie outside
the ambit of the Civil Code.
Article ).. A 3erson of age an1 in 3ossession of f%ll civil ca3acit& an1 legal rights /a& a1o3t,
3rovi1e1 he is in a 3osition to s%33ort an1 care for his chil1ren, legiti/ate or illegiti/ate, in
Iee3ing 9ith the /eans of the fa/il&.
Onl& /inors /a& 0e a1o3te1, e5ce3t in the cases 9hen the a1o3tion of a 3erson of /aBorit& age is
allo9e1 in this 4itle. In a11ition, the a1o3ter /%st 0e at least si5teen &ears ol1er than the 3erson to
0e a1o3te1, %nless the a1o3ter is the 3arent 0& nat%re of the a1o3te1, or is the s3o%se of the
legiti/ate 3arent of the 3erson to 0e a1o3te1. -!+a, E.O. No. # an1 A.*. No. J".,
Re3%0lic Act No. )((!, an +ct Bstablishing the "ules and Policies on the ,omestic +doption of 1ilipino Children
and 1or Gther
Purposes which was approved on 1ebruary $), 1&&* introduced certain amendments to the law on adoption in the
1amily Code.
+mong the salient amendments introduced are the following.
/Sec. -. Hho may a!opt. 2 The following may adopt. +ny 1ilipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full
civil capacity and legal rights, o goo! moral character, has not "een convicte! o any crime involving moral
turpitu!e,
emotionally an! psychologically capa"le o caring or chil!ren, at least si6teen 91C: years older than the adoptee,
and who is in a position to support and care for his her children in <eeping with the means of the family. The
re5uirement of si6teen 91C: years di;erence between the age of the adopted and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee8s parent>
Article )'. 4he follo9ing 3ersons /a& not a1o3t:
-, 4he g%ar1ian 9ith res3ect to the 9ar1 3rior to the a33roval of the Fnal acco%nts ren1ere1 %3on
the ter/ination of their g%ar1ianshi3 relationE
-!, An& 3erson 9ho has 0een convicte1 of a cri/e involving /oral t%r3it%1eE
11% | P a g e
-., An alien, e5ce3t:
-a, A for/er 7ili3ino citi@en 9ho seeIs to a1o3t a relative 0& consang%init&E
-0, One 9ho seeIs to a1o3t the legiti/ate chil1 of his or her 7ili3ino s3o%seE or
-c, One 9ho is /arrie1 to a 7ili3ino citi@en an1 seeIs to a1o3t Bointl& 9ith his or her s3o%se a relative
0& consang%init& of the latter.
Aliens not incl%1e1 in the foregoing e5ce3tions /a& a1o3t 7ili3ino chil1ren in accor1ance 9ith the
r%les on inter?co%ntr& a1o3tion as /a& 0e 3rovi1e1 0& la9. -!)a, E.O. No. # an1 A.*. No. J".,.
G%ar1ian cannot a1o3t 9ar1.
The law has been modi7ed by "+ *$$). 4t now states that /the guardian with respect to the ward after the
termination of
guardianship and clearance of hisAher 7nancial accountabilitiesH may adopt. 9Sec. -:.
ON MORA6 4URAI4U*E:
Conviction is necessary because a person is presumed to be innocent unless the contrary is proved.
The second and third e6ceptions under #o. @ of +rticle 1*( 9now Section -, "+ *))$: contemplate of a situation
where there is a
1ilipino element in the marriage, not where both are aliens. +n e6ample is where + and F, both 1ilipino citizens, got
married but
embraced +merican citizenship while in the K.S.+. They cannot adopt a relative by consanguinity or a?nity within
the fourth 9(th: civil degree, under "+ *))$, but they can do so under the 4nterIcountry +doption =aw.
Aliens to a1o3t.
+s a general rule, an alien cannot adopt. This rule is so because the law imposes certain conditions for an alien to
adopt, hence, alien adoption is not the general rule. 4t is still an e6ception. 4n fact, the 1amily Code has undergone
some amendments by "+ *))$. 4t now provides.
/+ny alien possessing the same 5uali7cations as above stated for 1ilipino nationals. 6rovi!e!, That hisAher
country has diplomatic relations with the "epublic of the Philippines, that heAshe has been living in the Philippines
for at least three 9@: continuous years prior to the 7ling of the application for adoption and maintains such residence
until the adoption decree is entered, that heAshe has been certi7ed by hisAher diplomatic or consular o?ce or any
appropriate government agency that heAshe has the legal capacity to adopt in hisAher country, and that hisAher
government allows the adoptee to enter hisAher country as hisAher adopted sonAdaughter.
6rovi!e!, urther, That the re5uirements on residency and certi7cation of the alien8s 5uali7cation to adopt in hisAher
country may be waived for the following.
i. a former 1ilipino citizen who see<s to adopt a relative within the fourth 9(th: degree of consanguinity or a?nity> or
ii. one who see<s to adopt the legitimate sonAdaughter of hisAher 1ilipino spouse> or
iii. one who is married to a 1ilipino citizen and see<s to adopt jointly with hisAher spouse a relative within the fourth
9(th: degree of consanguinity or a?nity of the 1ilipino spouse.H
There are e6ception to the rule, such as.
a: + former 1ilipino citizen who see<s to adopt a relative by consanguity or a?nity within the fourth civil degree.
R%les %n1er Inter?co%ntr& A1o3tion Act of ##( -RA )"'.,.
The 1amily Code sets down the general rule that aliens cannot adopt in the Philippines, but under the 4nterIcountry
+doption +ct,
they can, but still, by way of e6ception to the rule. #ote that the best interest of the child is to be upheld under the
4nterIcountry +doption +ct. 4t singles out the neglected and abandoned children as the priorities. 4n fact, the general
rule in +rticle
1*( of the 1amily Code still applies, that is, that aliens cannot adopt in the Philipines. 4nterIcountry adoption, where
an alien can adopt, is only an e6ception 2 for the law says that the State shall 7rst endeavor to ta<e measures that
such child shall be adopted by 1ilipinos and that interIcountry adoption shall be bene7cial to the child.
Aolic& on a1o3tion %n1er the Inter?co%ntr& A1o3tion Act.
The policy is that the Foard shall ensure that all possibilities for adoption of the child under the 1amily Code have
been e6hausted
and that interIcountry adoption is in the best interest of the child.
ence, the child must 7rst be placed under adoption in the Philippines before he is placed for interIcountry
adoption. 9Sec. -, #"i!.:.

Kho /a& 0e a1o3te1 %n1er the Inter?co%ntr& A1o3tion ActE its re2%ire/ents.
Gnly a legallyIfree child may be the subject of interIcountry adoption. 9Sec. *, #"i!.:.
Kho can a1o3t %n1er the Inter?co%ntr& A1o3tion Act.
+ny alien or a 1ilipino Citizen, permanently residing abroad, may 7le an application for interIcountry adoption of a
1ilipino child
if heAshe.
a: is at least twentyIseven 9$-: years of age and at least si6teen 91C: years older than the child to be adopted, at
the
time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such
parent>
b: if married, hisAher spouse must jointly 7le for the adoption>
c: has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws,
and
has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counsellor in hisAher country>
d: has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude>
e: is eligible to adopt under hisAher national law>
f: is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and e6ample to all
his
children, including the child to be adopted>
111 | P a g e
g: agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the K.#. Convention on the
"ights
of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of this +ct>
h: comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a
similarly
authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under hisAher national laws> and
i: possesses all the 5uali7cations and none of the dis5uali7cations provided herein and in other applicable Philippine
laws. 9Sec. &, #"i!.:.
Khere to Fle the 3etition for a1o3tion.
+n application to adopt a 1ilipino child shall be 7led either with the Philippine "egional Trial Court having jurisdiction
over the child,
or with the Foard, through an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized and accredited agency,
in the country of the prospective adoptive parents, which application shall be in accordance with the re5uirements
as set forth in the implementing rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Foard. 9Sec. 1%, #"i!.:.
Article )(. 8%s0an1 an1 9ife /%st Bointl& a1o3t, e5ce3t in the follo9ing cases:
-, Khen one s3o%se seeIs to a1o3t his o9n illegiti/ate chil1E or
-!, Khen one s3o%se seeIs to a1o3t the legiti/ate chil1 of the other. -!#a, EO # an1 A* J".,.
Article )J. In case h%s0an1 an1 9ife Bointl& a1o3t or one s3o%se a1o3ts the legiti/ate chil1 of the
other, Boint 3arental a%thorit& shall 0e e5ercise1 0& the s3o%ses in accor1ance 9ith this Co1e. -!#a,
E.O. No. # an1 A.*. No. J".,.
$oint a1o3tion 0& s3o%ses.
/usband and wife must jointly adopt, e6cept in the following cases.
91: 0hen one spouse see<s to adopt his own illegitimate child> or
9$: 0hen one spouse see<s to adopt the legitimate child of the other.H
+rticle 1*) re5uires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with
+rticle 1*(. This
law li<ewise has undergone some modi7cation by "+ *))$ which now states.
The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of hisAher 7nancial
accountabilities.
usband and wife shall jointly adopt, e6cept in the following cases.
i. if one spouse see<s to adopt the legitimate sonAdaughter of the other> or
ii. if one spouse see<s to adopt hisAher own illegitimate sonAdaughter.6rovi!e!, ho2ever, That the other spouse has
signi7ed hisAher consent thereto> or
iii. if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
4n case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate sonAdaughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be e6ercised by the spouses.
The rule laid down in Republic vs. <on. !ergara, et al., )" SCA* )J#, !+" SCRA !"J -March !", ##+: is a
mere reiteration of the earlier case of Gepu"lic vs. CA, () SC+, (&C, $$- SC"+ (%1, wherein the SC said a foreigner
who is married to a former 1ilipino citizen cannot adopt a relative of the wife by consanguinity. The law does not
provide for an alien who is married to a former 1ilipina citizen see<ing to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity as an e6ception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.
Article )+. 4he follo9ing /a& not 0e a1o3te1:
-, A 3erson of legal age, %nless he or she is a chil1 0& nat%re of the a1o3ter or his or her s3o%se, or,
3rior to the a1o3tion, sai1 3erson ha1 0een consistentl& consi1ere1 an1 treate1 0& the a1o3ter as his
or her o9n chil1 1%ring /inorit&E
-!, An alien 9ith 9hose govern/ent the Re3%0lic of the Ahili33ines has no 1i3lo/atic relationsE an1
-., A 3erson 9ho has alrea1& 0een a1o3te1 %nless s%ch a1o3tion has 0een 3revio%sl& revoIe1 or
rescin1e1. -."a, EO # an1 A* J".,
Mo1iFcation of the la9.
"+ *))$ has introduced some changes in the law 9+rt. 1*-:. 4t now provides.
Sec. ). :)o ma# be aopte. 2 The following may be adopted.
a: +ny person below eighteen 91*: years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for
adoption>
b: The legitimate sonAdaughter of one spouse by the other spouse>
c: +n illegitimate sonAdaughter by a 5uali7ed adopter to improve hisAher status to that of legitimacy>
d: + person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the
adopter9s: as hisAher own child since minority>
e: + child whose adoption had been previously rescinded> or
f: + child whose biological or adoptive parent9s: has died.
6rovi!e!, That no proceedings shall be initiated within si6 9C: months from the time of death of said parent9s:.
Article )). 4he 9ritten consent of the follo9ing to the a1o3tion shall 0e necessar&:
-, 4he 3erson to 0e a1o3te1, if ten &ears of age or overE
-!, 4he 3arents 0& nat%re of the chil1, the legal g%ar1ian, or the 3ro3er govern/ent instr%/entalit&E
-., 4he legiti/ate an1 a1o3te1 chil1ren, ten &ears of age or over, of the a1o3ting 3arent or 3arentsE
-', 4he illegiti/ate chil1ren, ten &ears of age or over, of the a1o3ting 3arent, if living 9ith sai1 3arent
an1 the latterGs s3o%se, if an&E an1
-(, 4he s3o%se, if an&, of the 3erson a1o3ting or to 0e a1o3te1. -.a, E.O. No. # an1 A.*. No. J".,
11$ | P a g e
Mo1iFcation in the la9.
"+ *))$ has introduced changes in the law. 4t now provides.
SSec. #. :)ose consent is necessar# to t)e aoption.
2 +fter being properly counselled and informed of hisAher right to give or withhold hisAher approval of the adoption,
the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby re5uired.
a: The adoptee, if ten 91%: years of age or over>
b: The biological parent9s: of the child, if <nown, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality
which has legal custody of the child>
c: The legitimate and adopted sonsAdaughters, ten 91%: years of age or over, of the adopter9s: and adoptee, if any>
d: The illegitimate sonsAdaughters, ten 91%: years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the
latter8s spouse, if any> and
e: The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.88
Consent of a1o3te1.
The law re5uires the consent of the person to be adopted if heA she is ten years of age or over. +t that age, the child
should have the capacity to discern or choose hisAher parents.
4f a threeIday old child was given by its mother to another 2 that person may be considered a guardian e6ercising
patria potestas
over the abandoned child and, hence, competent to give consent to the adoption of the latter. Since there was no
guar!ian a! litem
appointed by the court and the child not being in the custody of an orphan asylum, children8s home or any
benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other than the person to whom the mother of the child gave
the said child, who can be called the guardian. 4t was she who had actual physical custody of the infant and who,
out of compassion and motherly instinct, e6tended the mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infant.
Consent of 3arentsE reason for re2%ire/ent.
4n Santos, et al. vs. Aranzanso, et al., 1C SC"+ @((, the Supreme Court spelled out the rule that while the consent of
the parents
to the adoption of their child is necessary, however, that re5uirement is not absolute. 4f the natural parents have
abandoned their
children, consent by the guardian a! litem su?ces.
Consent of chil1ren of a1o3te1 re2%ire1E reason.
4t is now re5uired that the children, whether legitimate or adopted, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent
or parents, as well as the illegitimate children of the adopting parent who are living with him, to give their consent
to the adoption. The reason for
the law is that these children of the adopter would be prejudiced insofar as their legitimes are concerned, for the
reason that the
adopted child becomes the child of the adopter and is entitled to inherit.
Article )#. A1o3tion shall have the follo9ing eLects:
-, 7or civil 3%r3oses, the a1o3te1 shall 0e 1ee/e1 to 0e a legiti/ate chil1 of the a1o3ters an1 0oth
shall ac2%ire the reci3rocal rights an1 o0ligations arising fro/ the relationshi3 of 3arent an1 chil1,
incl%1ing the right of the a1o3te1 to %se the s%rna/e of the a1o3tersE
-!, 4he 3arental a%thorit& of the 3arents 0& nat%re over the a1o3te1 shall ter/inate an1 0e veste1 in
the a1o3ters, e5ce3t that if the a1o3ter is the s3o%se of the 3arent 0& nat%re of the a1o3te1, 3arental
a%thorit& over the a1o3te1 shall 0e e5ercise1 Bointl& 0& 0oth s3o%sesE an1
-., 4he a1o3te1 shall re/ain an intestate heir of his 3arents an1 other 0loo1 relatives. -.#MNa, M!Na,
M.Na, M.Na, A.*. No. J".,
#o relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parent. +s a conse5uence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopters but not of the relatives of the adopter. 94eotico vs. *el <al, . SCRA '"J:.
ence, in case the adopters predecease their own parents, the adopted can not inherit by right of representation
because the relationship is limited to the adopters.
Right to citi@enshi3.
The rights of a legitimate child given to an adopted child, as stated in +rticle @(1 of our Civil Code 9#ow +rt. 1*&,
1amily Code:
do not include the ac5uisition of the citizenship of the adopter. 9Cheng =ing vs. !alang, =I11&@1, Gctober $-, 1&)*:.
The rule has been changed due to the enactment of "+ &$$) which provides.
/Sec. (. 3erivative citizenship. QQ The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen
91*: years of age, of those who are reIac5uire Philippine citizenship upon e;ectivity of this +ct shall be deemed
citizens of the Philippines.H
Change of na/e to 1ro3 the /i11le na/e of a chil1.
+ uni5ue case was 7led as<ing that a child be allowed to drop his middle name. +ll cases 7led and decided pertain
to change of
name or surname but in this case, the petition was to drop his middle name, alleging as reason therein
convenience, that it would be easier for him to integrate into Singaporean society. e further alleged that the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and di?culty. e was not able to establish that how such
chance of name would ma<e his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient. The Supreme Court
denied it upholding the State interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identi7cation.
4o B%stif& a re2%est for change of na/e, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason
therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and o?cial name. +mong the grounds for change
of name which have been held valid are: -a, when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or e6tremely di?cult to
write or pronounce> -0: when the change results as a legal conse5uence, as in legitimationE -c, when the change
will avoid confusion> -1, when one has continuously used and been <nown since childhood by a 1ilipino name, and
was unaware of alien parentageE -e, a sincere desire to adopt a 1ilipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody> and -f, when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
11@ | P a g e
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
4n the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience.
owever, how such change of name would ma<e his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is
not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and di?culty does not
constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
4n addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name
is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the
age of majority. +s he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his
name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws. >In Re: Petition
(or C)ange o( Name anEor Correction o( 'ntr# in t)e Civil Registr# o( 6ulian &in Carulasan :ang G.R.
.08855, Marc) 73 2330, 404 %CRA 2.00?.
Article #". 6egal or intestate s%ccession to the estate of the a1o3te1 shall 0e governe1 0& the
follo9ing r%les:
-, 6egiti/ate an1 illegiti/ate chil1ren an1 1escen1ants an1 the s%rviving s3o%se of the a1o3te1 shall
inherit fro/ the a1o3te1, in accor1ance 9ith the or1inar& r%les of legal or intestate s%ccessionE
-!, Khen the 3arents, legiti/ate or illegiti/ate, or the legiti/ate ascen1ants of the a1o3te1 conc%r
9ith the a1o3ters, the& shall 1ivi1e the entire estate, one?half to 0e inherite1 0& the 3arents or
ascen1ants an1 the other half, 0& the a1o3tersE
-., Khen the s%rviving s3o%se or the illegiti/ate chil1ren of the a1o3te1 conc%r 9ith the a1o3ters,
the& shall 1ivi1e the entire estate in e2%al shares, one?half to 0e inherite1 0& the s3o%se or the
illegiti/ate chil1ren of the a1o3te1 an1 the other half, 0& the a1o3tersE
-', Khen the a1o3ters conc%r 9ith the illegiti/ate chil1ren an1 the s%rviving s3o%se of the a1o3te1,
the& shall 1ivi1e the entire estate in e2%al shares, one?thir1 to 0e inherite1 0& the illegiti/ate
chil1ren, one?thir1 0& the s%rviving s3o%se, an1 one thir1 0& the a1o3tersE -(, Khen onl& the a1o3ters
s%rvive, the& shall inherit the entire estateE an1
-J, Khen onl& collateral 0loo1 relatives of the a1o3te1 s%rvive, then the or1inar& r%les of legal or
intestate s%ccession shall a33l&. -.#M'Na, A.*. No. J".,
#llustrations:
-, + adopted F. F later married C and they gave birth to B, a legitimate child. 1, an illegitimate child of F before his
marriage with C, his surviving spouse. ,istribute the estate if the estate of F is P1$%,%%%.%%.
B 2 1A$ or PC%,%%%.%%
1 2 1A( or P@%,%%%.%%
C 2 1A( or P@%,%%%.%%
This is the distribution made by paragraph 1 of +rticle 1&% of the 1amily Code. The adopter, however, does not get
any share of the
estate.
-!, + adopted F. F died, leaving an estate of P1%%,%%%.%%, with + and his natural parents, C and ,, as
his survivors. ,istribute the estate.
+ 2 1A$ or P)%,%%%.%%
C d , 2 1A$ or P)%,%%%.%%
9.: + adopted F. e married C and died without an issue. e is survived by C, his wife and +, his adopter. e left an
estate of P1%%,%%%.%%. ,istribute the estate.
C 2 1A$ or P)%,%%%.%%
+ 2 1A$ or P)%,%%%.%%
4f, instead of getting married, F lived with a woman without the bene7t of a marriage and they gave birth to C.
,istribute his
estate which is P1%%,%%%.%%.
C 2 1A$ or P)%,%%%.%%
+ 2 1A$ or P)%,%%%.%%
-', + adopted F. Fefore F8s marriage to C, he had an illegitimate child with ,, named B. e died with an estate of
P1$%,%%%.%%, leaving his spouse, illegitimate child, and +, his adopter, as his survivors. ,istribute the estate.
C 2 1A@ or P(%,%%%.%%
B 2 1A@ or P(%,%%%.%%
+ 2 1A@ or P(%,%%%.%%
9(, + and F adopted C, who died with an estate of P1%%,%%%.%%. e left no survivors e6cept + and F. ,istribute the
estate.
The law says that if the only survivors are the adopters, they shall inherit the entire estate. + and F would therefore
get
P1%%,%%%.%%. 9See par. ), +rt. 1&%, 1amily Code:.
Article #. If the a1o3te1 is a /inor or other9ise inca3acitate1, the a1o3tion /a& 0e B%1iciall&
rescin1e1 %3on
3etition of an& 3erson a%thori@e1 0& the co%rt or 3ro3er govern/ent instr%/entalit& acting on his
0ehalf, on the sa/e gro%n1s 3rescri0e1 for loss or s%s3ension of 3arental a%thorit&. If the a1o3te1 is
at least eighteen &ears of age, he /a& 3etition for B%1icial rescission of the a1o3tion on the sa/e
gro%n1s 3rescri0e1 for 1isinheriting an ascen1ant. -'"a, A.*. No. J".,
Mo1iFcation 0& RA )((!.
The law has been modi7ed by "+ *))$ which provides.
/Sec. #. Grouns (or Rescission o( Aoption. 2
Kpon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the ,epartment if a minor or if over eighteen 91*: years of age
but is incapacitated, as guardianAcounsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds
committed
by the adopters. 9a: repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter9s: despite having undergone
counseling> 9b: attempt on the life of the adoptee> 9c: se6ual assault or violence> or 9d: abandonment and failure to
11( | P a g e
comply with parental obligations.
+doption, being in the best interest of the child, shall be subject to rescission by the adopter9s:. owever, the
adopter9s: may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in +rticle &1& of the Civil Code.H
Right of s%ccession of a1o3te1 9here 1ecree 9as rescin1e1.
Section $%9@: of "+ *))$ provides that succession rights shall revert to its former status prior to adoption, but only
as of the date
of judgment of judicial rescission.
Gro%n1s for 1isinheritance of 1escen1ants.
The adopters, li<e ordinary biological parents have the right to disinherit their child on grounds provided for by law.
"+ *))$
speci7cally ma<es reference to +rticle &1& of the Civil Code which enumerates the grounds for disinheritance. The
law provides.
Article 8.8. The ollo2ing shall "e su%cient causes or the !isinheritance o chil!ren an! !escen!ants, legitimate
as 2ell as illegitimate:
*10 Hhen a chil! or !escen!ant has "een oun! guilty o an attempt against the lie o the testator, his or
her spouse, !escen!ants, or ascen!antsA
*20 Hhen a chil! or !escen!ant has accuse! the testator o a crime or 2hich the la2 prescri"es imprisonment or
si1 years or more, i the accusation has "een oun! groun!lessA
*F0 Hhen a chil! or !escen!ant has "een convicte! o a!ultery or concu"inage 2ith the spouse o the testatorA
*J0 Hhen a chil! or !escen!ant "y rau!, violence, intimi!ation, or un!ue inOuence causes the testator to ma7e a
2ill or to change one alrea!y ma!eA
*:0 A reusal 2ithout 8usti=a"le cause to support the parent or ascen!ant 2ho !isinherits such chil! or !escen!antA
*;0 )altreatment o the testator "y 2or! or !ee!, "y the chil! or !escen!antA
*/0 Hhen a chil! or !escen!ant lea!s a !ishonora"le or !isgraceul lieA
*.0 Conviction o a crime 2hich carries 2ith it the penalty o civil inter!iction. */:;, .:F, ;/Ja0>
Rescission of a1o3tion 0& a1o3ters.
The law has been amended in that only the adopted child can now 7le a petition for rescission of the decree of
adoption. 3ore
speci7cally, Section #-!,, RA )((! says that /adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not 0e
s%0Bect to rescission by the adopters. owever, the adopters may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
+rticle &1& of the Civil Code.H
RA )((! has introduced some modi7cations to the law. 4t provides.
/Sec. !". 'Hects o( Rescission. QQ 4f the petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee8s biological
parent9s:, if <nown, or the legal custody of the ,epartment shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter9s: and the adoptee to each other shall be
e6tinguished.
The court shall order the Civil "egistrar to cancel the amended certi7cate of birth of the adoptee and restore hisAher
original birth certi7cate. Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of
judgment of the judicial rescission. Mested rights ac5uired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected. +ll the
foregoing e;ects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties imposable under the Penal
Code if the criminal acts are properly proven.H
4itle <III
SUAAOR4
Article #'. S%33ort co/3rises ever&thing in1is3ensa0le for s%stenance, 19elling, clothing, /e1ical
atten1ance, e1%cation an1 trans3ortation, in Iee3ing 9ith the Fnancial ca3acit& of the fa/il&. 4he
e1%cation of the 3erson entitle1 to 0e s%33orte1 referre1 to in the 3rece1ing 3aragra3h shall incl%1e
his schooling or training
for so/e 3rofession, tra1e or vocation, even 0e&on1 the age of /aBorit&. 4rans3ortation shall incl%1e
e53enses in going to an1 fro/ school, or to an1 fro/ 3lace of 9orI. -!#"a,
Un0orn chil1 entitle1 to s%33ort.
4n accordance with e6isting jurisprudence, even an unborn child is entitled to support. This is so, because a
conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for purposes favorable
to it and correspondingly, the right to support from its progenitors, even if the said child is only en ventre !e sa
mereA> just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations under +rticle -($, #ew Civil Code.
9Zuimiguing vs. 4cao, @( SC"+ 1@$:.
Marrie1 /an cannot 0e re2%ire1 to acIno9le1ge a chil1 of a 9o/an he ra3e1.
4n 6eople vs. )anahan, @1) SC"+ (-C, it was said that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to
recognize the
o;spring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Fut he can be re5uired to
support the child. 9citing People vs. !uerrero, $($ SC"+ C%C:. The reason for the rule is the e6istence of a legal
impediment to ac<nowledge as the accused is married.
Article #(. S%0Bect to the 3rovisions of the s%ccee1ing articles, the follo9ing are o0lige1 to s%33ort
each other to the 9hole e5tent set forth in the 3rece1ing article:
-, 4he s3o%sesE
-!, 6egiti/ate ascen1ants an1 1escen1antsE
-., Aarents an1 their legiti/ate chil1ren an1 the legiti/ate an1 illegiti/ate chil1ren of the latterE
-', Aarents an1 their illegiti/ate chil1ren an1 the legiti/ate an1 illegiti/ate chil1ren of the latterE
an1
-(, 6egiti/ate 0rothers an1 sisters, 9hether of f%ll or half0loo1.
-!#a,
Article #J. :rothers an1 sisters not legiti/atel& relate1, 9hether of the f%ll or half?0loo1, are liIe9ise
0o%n1 to s%33ort each other to the f%ll e5tent set forth in Article #', e5ce3t onl& 9hen the nee1 for
11) | P a g e
s%33ort of the 0rother or sister, 0eing of age, is 1%e to a ca%se i/3%ta0le to the clai/antGs fa%lt or
negligence. -!#a,
Article #+. 7or the s%33ort of legiti/ate ascen1antsE 1escen1ants, 9hether legiti/ate or illegiti/ateE
an1 0rothers an1 sisters, 9hether legiti/atel& or illegiti/atel& relate1, onl& the se3arate 3ro3ert& of
the 3erson o0lige1 to give s%33ort shall 0e ans9era0le 3rovi1e1 that in case the o0ligor has no
se3arate 3ro3ert&, the a0sol%te co//%nit& or the conB%gal 3artnershi3, if Fnanciall& ca3a0le, shall
a1vance the s%33ort, 9hich shall 0e 1e1%cte1 fro/ the share of the s3o%se o0lige1 %3on the
li2%i1ation of the a0sol%te co//%nit& or of the conB%gal 3artnershi3. -n,
Article #). *%ring the 3rocee1ings for legal se3aration or for ann%l/ent of /arriage, an1 for
1eclaration of n%llit& of /arriage, the s3o%ses an1 their chil1ren shall 0e s%33orte1 fro/ the
3ro3erties of the a0sol%te co//%nit& or the conB%gal 3artnershi3. After the Fnal B%1g/ent granting
the 3etition, the o0ligation of /%t%al s%33ort 0et9een the s3o%ses ceases. 8o9ever, in case of legal
se3aration, the co%rt /a& or1er that the g%ilt& s3o%se shall give s%33ort to the innocent one,
s3ecif&ing the ter/s of s%ch or1er. -!#!a,
The support given is <nown as support pen!ente lite, but the moment there is declaration of nullity of the marriage,
the obligation to support and the right to be supported cease to e6ist. The reason is that, after annulment or
declaration of nullity of the marriage, the relationship ceases to e6ist. Fut in legal separation, the court may still
order the guilty spouse to support the other, but it is discretionary on the part of the court and as such, it cannot
0e 1e/an1e1 as a /atter of right.
4n an action by a wife against her husband for support the defendant may set up as a special defense that the wife
had forfeited
her right to support by committing adultery, the special defense of adultery set up by the defendant is a good
defense and if properlyproved and sustained, will defeat the action.
Article ##. Khenever t9o or /ore 3ersons are o0lige1 to give s%33ort, the lia0ilit& shall 1evolve %3on
the follo9ing 3ersons in the or1er herein 3rovi1e1:
. 4he s3o%seE
!. 4he 1escen1ants in the nearest 1egreeE
.. 4he ascen1ants in the nearest 1egreeE an1
'. 4he 0rothers an1 sisters. -!#'a,
Article !"". Khen the o0ligation to give s%33ort falls %3on t9o or /ore 3ersons, the 3a&/ent of the
sa/e shall 0e 1ivi1e1 0et9een the/ in 3ro3ortion to the reso%rces of each. 8o9ever, in case of %rgent
nee1 an1 0& s3ecial circ%/stances, the B%1ge /a& or1er onl& one of the/ to f%rnish the s%33ort
3rovisionall&, 9itho%t 3reB%1ice to his right to clai/ fro/ the other o0ligors the share 1%e fro/ the/.
Khen t9o or /ore reci3ients at the sa/e ti/e clai/ s%33ort fro/ one an1 the sa/e 3erson legall&
o0lige1 to give it, sho%l1 the latter not have s%Ccient /eans to satisf& all clai/s, the or1er
esta0lishe1 in the 3rece1ing article shall 0e follo9e1, %nless the conc%rrent o0ligees sho%l1 0e the
s3o%se an1 a chil1 s%0Bect to 3arental a%thorit&, in 9hich case the chil1 shall 0e 3referre1. -!#(a,
4n matters of support, the law gives preference to children under patria potestas over all other relatives including
the spouse. 9,ela
Cruz vs. Santillan, DC+E !.". #o. *(&1, 1ebruary 1$, 1&(@:. This is irrespective of whether they are legitimates,
legitimated, or
illegitimate. Such an adopted child is entitled to the same right and preference because he has the same rights as a
legitimate child.
Article !". 4he a/o%nt of s%33ort, in the cases referre1 to in Articles #( an1 #J, shall 0e in
3ro3ortion to the reso%rces or /eans of the giver an1 to the necessities of the reci3ient. -!#Ja,
Article !"!. S%33ort in the cases referre1 to in the 3rece1ing article shall 0e re1%ce1 or increase1
3ro3ortionatel&, accor1ing to the re1%ction or increase of the necessities of the reci3ient an1 the
reso%rces or /eans of the 3erson o0lige1 to f%rnish the sa/e. -!#+a,
$%1g/ent of s%33ort is al9a&s s%0Bect to /o1iFcation.
4n determining the amount of support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver
and the necessities of the recipient. 4t is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence
presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obligated to
support their children as provided for under +rticle 1&) of the 1amily Code> and the monthly e6penses incurred for
the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child.
4n this case, the only evidence presented by the plainti; regarding her claim for support of the child was her
testimony. The
same does not establish the amount needed by the child nor the amount that the parents are reasonably able to
give. -$ose 6a/ vs.A1riana Ch%a, G.R. No. .!)J, March ), !""',.
/'udgment for support does not become 7nal. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional> for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be
modi7ed or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the same means of the giver. 4t
cannot be regarded as subject to 7nal determination.H
Thus, there is no merit to the claim that the compromise agreement between the husband and wife embodied in a
decision in
the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is a bar to any further award of support in favor of
their child. The provision for a common fund for the bene7t of their child as embodied in the compromise
agreement between the parties which had been approved by the court cannot be considered 7nal and res Guicata
since any 8u!gment or support is al2ays su"8ect to mo!i=cation, !epen!ing upon the nee!s o the chil! an! the
capa"ilities o the parents to give support.
11C | P a g e
Article !".. 4he o0ligation to give s%33ort shall 0e 1e/an1a0le fro/ the ti/e the 3erson 9ho has a
right to receive the sa/e nee1s it for /aintenance, 0%t it shall not 0e 3ai1 e5ce3t fro/ the 1ate of
B%1icial or e5tra?B%1icial 1e/an1.
S%33ort 3en1ente lite /a& 0e clai/e1 in accor1ance 9ith the R%les of Co%rt. Aa&/ent shall 0e /a1e
9ithin the Frst Fve 1a&s of each corres3on1ing /onth. Khen the reci3ient 1ies, his heirs shall not 0e
o0lige1 to ret%rn 9hat he has receive1 in a1vance. -!#)a,
Article !"'. 4he 3erson o0lige1 to give s%33ort shall have the o3tion to f%lFll the o0ligation either 0&
3a&ing the allo9ance F5e1, or 0& receiving an1 /aintaining in the fa/il& 19elling the 3erson 9ho has
a right to receive s%33ort. 4he latter alternative cannot 0e availe1 of in case there is a /oral or legal
o0stacle thereto. -!##a,
S%33ort, B%1g/ent for s%33ort is i//e1iatel& e5ec%tor&.
+ judgment for support is immediately e6ecutory because it is needed by the person to be supported. Section (,
"ule @& of the "ules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support
are immediately e6ecutory and
cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an e6ception to the general rule which provides that the ta<ing of an appeal
stays the e6ecution of the judgment and that advance e6ecution will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons
therefore. The provision peremptorily calls for immediate e6ecution of all judgments for support and ma<es no
distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not.
The rule has to be so because in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount
concerns
Khen o0ligation ceases.
+ccording to law, the obligation to give support shall cease when the recipient engages in a trade, profession or
industry, or has
obtained wor< or has improved his fortune in such a way that he no longer needs the allowance for his subsistence.
Thus, if in spite of the ability to practice the profession, art or trade, or even its actual practice, the necessities of
the recipient continue without his fault, the obligation to give what is needed subsists.
The person obliged to give support has the option to give it by either paying a 76ed allowance to the person entitled
to it or
maintaining him in the family dwelling the person entitled to the support, but maintaining and receiving him in the
family dwelling
cannot be done if there is a moral or legal obstacle. Some of these moral or legal obstacles may be.
91: when a daughter is already married as she has to live with the husband>
9$: where the defendant abducted the plainti; and married her to avoid prosecution but never lived with her>
9Sentencia DCubaE of 1ebruary 1), 1&@-:.
9@: if the natural father of a child has already married a woman, not the mother of the child. 9KS vs. +lvin, )-C>
Pascual vs. 3artinez, @- G.!. $(1*:.
Article !"(. 4he right to receive s%33ort %n1er this 4itle as 9ell as an& /one& or 3ro3ert& o0taine1 as
s%ch s%33ort shall not 0e levie1 %3on on attach/ent or e5ec%tion. -."!a,
Article !"J. Khen, 9itho%t the Ino9le1ge of the 3erson o0lige1 to give s%33ort, it is given 0& a
stranger, the latter shall have a right to clai/ the sa/e fro/ the for/er, %nless it a33ears that he
gave it 9itho%t intention of 0eing rei/0%rse1. -!J'a,
Article !"+. Khen the 3erson o0lige1 to s%33ort another %nB%stl& ref%ses or fails to give s%33ort 9hen
%rgentl& nee1e1 0& the latter, an& thir1 3erson /a& f%rnish s%33ort to the nee1& in1ivi1%al, 9ith right
of rei/0%rse/ent fro/ the 3erson o0lige1 to give s%33ort. 4his Article shall a33l& 3artic%larl& 9hen
the father or /other of a chil1 %n1er the age of /aBorit& %nB%stl& ref%ses to s%33ort or fails to give
s%33ort to the chil1 9hen %rgentl& nee1e1.
-!JJa,
4n order that the stranger under +rticle $%C, 1amily Code may recover what he gave to another by way of support,
the following must concur.
9a: the person obliged to give support failed to give it>
9b: support was needed>
9c: support was given without the <nowledge and consent of the person who is re5uired to give it>
9d: support was given with the intention of being reimbursed.
Article !"). In case of contract%al s%33ort or that given 0& 9ill, the e5cess in a/o%nt 0e&on1 that
re2%ire1 for legal s%33ort shall 0e s%0Bect to lev& on attach/ent or e5ec%tion. 7%rther/ore,
contract%al s%33ort shall 0e s%0Bect to
a1B%st/ent 9henever /o1iFcation is necessar& 1%e to changes in circ%/stances /anifestl& 0e&on1
the conte/3lation of the 3arties.
4itle IP
AAREN4A6 AU48ORI4Y
Cha3ter
General Arovisions
Article !"#. A%rs%ant to the nat%ral right an1 1%t& of 3arents over the 3erson an1 3ro3ert& of their
%ne/anci3ate1 chil1ren, 3arental a%thorit& an1 res3onsi0ilit& shall incl%1e the caring for an1 rearing
of s%ch chil1ren for civic conscio%sness an1 eCcienc& an1 the 1evelo3/ent of their /oral, /ental an1
3h&sical character an1 9ell?0eing. -n,
Article !". Aarental a%thorit& an1 res3onsi0ilit& /a& not 0e reno%nce1 or transferre1 e5ce3t in the
cases a%thori@e1 0& la9. -..a,
4t is a rule that parental authority is inalienable and every abdication of this authority by the parents is void. 91
Planiol and
11- | P a g e
"ipert, @$(> Facayo vs. Calum, @) DC+E )@ G.!. *C%-:. 4t cannot be waived e6cept under circumstances allowed by
law li<e adoption, guardianship or surrender to a children8s home or an orphan asylum
4he S%3re/e Co%rt 9ent f%rther an1 sai1 that:
/The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the e6ercise of parental authority. Parental authority or
patria potestas in
"oman =aw is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to
the e6tent re5uired by the latter8s needs.
Article !. 4he father an1 the /other shall Bointl& e5ercise 3arental a%thorit& over the 3ersons of
their co//on chil1ren. In case of 1isagree/ent, the fatherGs 1ecision shall 3revail, %nless there is a
B%1icial or1er to the contrar&.
Chil1ren shall al9a&s o0serve res3ect an1 reverence to9ar1 their 3arents an1 are o0lige1 to o0e&
the/ as long as the chil1ren are %n1er 3arental a%thorit&. -+a, A.*. No. J".,
Article !!. In case of a0sence or 1eath of either 3arent, the 3arent 3resent shall contin%e e5ercising
3arental a%thorit&. 4he re/arriage of the s%rviving 3arent shall not aLect the 3arental a%thorit& over
the chil1ren, %nless the co%rt a33oints another 3erson to 0e the g%ar1ian of the 3erson or 3ro3ert& of
the chil1ren. -+a, A.*. No. J".,
Article !.. In case of se3aration of the 3arents, 3arental a%thorit& shall 0e e5ercise1 0& the 3arent
1esignate1 0& the Co%rt. 4he Co%rt shall taIe into acco%nt all relevant consi1erations, es3eciall& the
choice of the chil1 over seven &ears of age, %nless the 3arent chosen is %nFt. -n, No chil1 %n1er seven
&ears of age shall 0e se3arate1 fro/
the /other %nless the co%rt Fn1s co/3elling reasons to or1er other9ise.
This means that the best interest of the child can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the
custody of their
children. Since the very life and e6istence of the minor is at sta<e and the child is in an age where she can e6ercise
an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce, and give meaning and substance to that
choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical and moral, as well as intellectual
development. 9=una vs. C+, 1@- SC"+ -:.
Unson III vs. 8on. Navarro an1 Araneta
" SCRA ).
7acts:
Petitioner 3iguel ". Knson 444 was married to Bdita #. +raneta on +pril 1&, 1&-1. Gn ,ecember 1, 1&-1 was born 3a.
Teresa Knson, their daughter, which in this case both claimed to have the rightful custody over their minor child.
Spouses were living separately since 'une 1&-$ and an order of separation of properties in Civil Case #o. --1C was
rendered by
respondent 'udge. Since the birth of 3a. Teresa, she has always lived with her mother. 4n 1&-*, Bdita +raneta, with
the <nowledge of petitioner, moved to San =orenzo, 3a<ati and lived with her brotherIinIlaw. owever, petitioner
found out that Bdita +raneta delivered a child fathered by +gustin "eyes, her brotherIinIlaw, on September $(, 1&-*
and another child also by +gustin "eyes, on 3ay $1, 1&*%. So petitioner tightened her custody over his daughter.
Iss%e:
0hat are the criteria in awarding a minor child to one of the parentsJ
8el1:
4t is a6iomatic in our jurisprudence that all controversies regarding the custody of a minor, the sole and foremost
consideration
is the physical, education, social, and moral welfare of the child, ta<ing into account the social and moral situations
of the contending parents. The Court 7nds no di?culty in this case, the custody of the child cannot be awarded to
the wife who might create an immoral inNuence over the child8s moral and social outloo< at her tender age. 9See
Bspiritu vs. C+, et al., )& SC+, C@1, $($ SC"+ @C$, 3arch 1), 1&&):.
6a5a/ana vs. 6a5a/ana G.R. No. ''+J+, Se3te/0er ., !""!
7acts:
+ and F contested the custody of their two 9$: children above the age of seven 9-:. The woman contended that the
man was a drug addict and had undergone rehabilitation, but he was not totally rehabilitated as shown by the
results of the psychiatric evaluation. The Court awarded the custody to the woman on the basis of the evaluation
but did not conduct further trial which was 5uestioned by the man.
*oes 1r%g 1e3en1ence 1is2%alif& the /an fro/ having c%sto1& of his chil1ren;
The Court where it was said that it does not necessarily follow that he may be dis5uali7ed by reason of drug
dependence. 0hile a man may have a history of drug dependence, there must be ade5uate evidence as to his
moral, 7nancial and social wellIbeing.
The result of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not /completely curedH may render him un7t to ta<e
custody of the children, but there must be evidence to show that the man is un7t to provide the children with
ade5uate support, education as well as moral and intellectual development. The children in this case were 1( and
1) years, yet the Court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live with. These inade5uacies
could have been remedied by an e6haustive trial proving the accuracy of the report and the capacity of both parties
to raise their children. So the case was returned to the lower court for trial.
Co//on?la9 relationshi3 of a chil1Gs /other 9ith a /arrie1
/an, a gro%n1 to se3arate the chil1.
4n the case of Cervantes vs. -aGaro, G.R. No. +##((, $an%ar& !+, #)#, the Supreme Court made a very
strong pronouncement that in all cases involving the custody, care, education, and property of children, the latter8s
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 7ve 9): years of age 9now
seven D-E, under +rt. $1@ of the 1amily Code:, will not apply where the Court 7nds compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. Gne compelling reason to separate the child from the mother is when she has a commonIlaw
relationship with another man. The reason given by the Supreme Court is that a commonIlaw relationship of the
mother with a married man will not a;ord the minor child that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and
develop into an upright and moralIminded person.
11* | P a g e
Es3irit%, et al. vs. CA, et al. !'! SCRA .J!, March (, ##( (# SCA* J.
The petition of habeas corpus of the mother here was not granted. the custody was granted to the husband as
there was a showing that the mother is un7t to have the children.
4n ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the 1amily Code to ta<e into
account all relevant
considerations. 4f a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The
presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. 4t can be overcome by /compelling reasons.H 4f a child is over seven,
his choice is paramount, but again, the Court is not bound by that choice. 4n its discretion, the Court may 7nd the
chosen parent un7t and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems 7t under the
circumstances.
6o)ana %ombong vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. )+J, $an%ar& ., ##J, J+ SCA* (!#
4n a?rming the C+8s decision, the Supreme Court said that, in ha"eas corpus proceedings, the 5uestion of identity
is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions, including those as to the identity of a person. 4n fact,
when the case was set for hearing by the C+, primarily for the purpose of observing petitioners8 demeanor towards
the minor Cristina, 'ustice =ourdes 'aguros of the Court of +ppeals made the following observations. The petitioner
appeared in the scheduled hearing of this case late> and she wal<ed inside the courtroom loo<ing for a seat without
even stopping at her alleged daughter8s seat> without even casting a glance on said child> and without even that
tearful embrace which characterizes the reunion of a loving mother with her missing dear child. Throughout the
proceedings, the undersigned ponente noticed no signs of endearment and a;ection e6pected
of a mother who had been deprived of the embrace of her little child for many years. The conclusion or 7nding of
the undersigned ponente, as a mother herself, that petitionerIappellee is not the mother of Cristina #eri, has been
given support by the aforestated observation.
*ECISION: Petitioner has no right of custody over the minor Cristina as she is not identical with her missing
daughter, +rabella.
6es0ianis/ per se is not a gro%n1 to se3arate a chil1 fro/ the /other.
$ocel&n Aa0lo?G%al0erto vs. Crisanto Rafaelito G%al0erto <., G.R. No. ('##' an1 Crisanto Rafaelito
G%al0erto <. vs.
Co%rt of A33eals, et al., G.R. No. (J!(', $%ne !), !""(
8el1:
+s a rule, the mother8s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her custody.
4t is not enough, however, that the woman is a lesbian. e must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported
relationship with a person of the same se6 in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the
child8s proper moral development. Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was
e6posed to the mother8s alleged se6ual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development su;ered
as a result.
Article !'. In case of 1eath, a0sence or %ns%ita0ilit& of the 3arents, s%0stit%te 3arental a%thorit&
shall 0e e5ercise1 0& the s%rviving gran13arent. In case several s%rvive, the one 1esignate1 0& the
co%rt taIing into acco%nt the sa/e consi1eration /entione1 in the 3rece1ing article, shall e5ercise the
a%thorit&. -#a, A.*. No. J".,
Article !(. No 1escen1ant shall 0e co/3elle1, in a cri/inal case, to testif& against his 3arents an1
gran13arents, e5ce3t 9hen s%ch testi/on& is in1is3ensa0le in a cri/e against the 1escen1ant or 0&
one 3arent against the other. -.(a,
#ote that the privilege does not include or e6tend to civil cases.
+n e6ample is a case of support where the child 7les a suit against the parents. The child can testify against his
parents in such a suit. 0hat is covered is that, in criminal cases, a child or descendant has the privilege of refusing
to testify against his parents. They can, however, voluntarily testify against their parents or grandparents. They are
not also dis5uali7ed from testifying against them if their testimony is indispensable in a crime against him or by one
parent against the other.
#llustration:
+, the son of F, was shot and seriously injured by F. + can testify against his father F. Gr, if + is the daughter of F
who raped her, + can testify against her father. Gr, if + and F are married, they have a son C> + then, <illed F. C
can, of course, testify against his father as a crime was committed by + against F. #ote that the privilege was
considered as a good law by the Code Commission, justi7ed by the solidarity of the 1ilipino family and the
traditional respect for ancestors.
Cha3ter !
S%0stit%te an1 S3ecial Aarental A%thorit& Article
!J. In 1efa%lt of 3arents or a B%1iciall& a33ointe1 g%ar1ian, the follo9ing 3ersons shall e5ercise
s%0stit%te 3arental a%thorit& over the chil1 in the or1er in1icate1:
-, 4he s%rviving gran13arent, as 3rovi1e1 in Art. !'E
-!, 4he ol1est 0rother or sister, over t9ent&?one &ears of age, %nless %nFt or 1is2%aliFe1E an1
-., 4he chil1Gs act%al c%sto1ian, over t9ent&?one &ears of age, %nless %nFt or 1is2%aliFe1.
Khenever the a33oint/ent of a B%1icial g%ar1ian over the 3ro3ert& of the chil1 0eco/es necessar&,
the sa/e or1er of3reference shall 0e o0serve1. -.'#a, .(a, .('a
Article !+.
11& | P a g e
In case of fo%n1lings, a0an1one1, neglecte1 or a0%se1 chil1ren an1 other chil1ren si/ilarl& sit%ate1,
3arental a%thorit& shall 0e entr%ste1 in s%//ar& B%1icial 3rocee1ings to hea1s of chil1renGs ho/es,
or3hanages an1 si/ilar instit%tions 1%l& accre1ite1 0& the 3ro3er govern/ent agenc&. -.'a,
Article !).
4he school, its a1/inistrators an1 teachers, or the in1ivi1%al, entit& or instit%tion engage1 in chil1
care shall have
s3ecial 3arental a%thorit& an1 res3onsi0ilit& over the /inor chil1 9hile %n1er their s%3ervision,
instr%ction or c%sto1&. A%thorit& an1 res3onsi0ilit& shall a33l& to all a%thori@e1 activities 9hether
insi1e the 3re/ises of the school, entit& or instit%tion. -.'#a,
The authority e6tends beyond the campus of the school, as it applies to all authorized activities inside or outside
the school premises. +nd, more importantly, their liability is solidary if the minor causes damage to another while
he is under their supervision, instruction or custody. The liability of the parent is only subsidiary.
4f a child is in class and he performs an act that causes injury to a schoolmate, the teacher is liable for this act of
the child, but the
teacher can interpose the defense of the diligence of a good father of a family. Fut if the teacher has already
dismissed the class but the minor students are still in school playing and one of them would bo6 the face of another
causing blindness to one of his eyes, the teacher is no longer liable, because he has no more instruction, custody or
supervision over the students. Fut the school or its administrators would be liable without prejudice to their defense
of the diligence of a good father of a family.
4n both situations, the liability of the parents of the childAstudent is only subsidiary, that is, if the teachers, or school
or administrators or institutions have no properties to answer for their primary liability> then, the parents shall
answer for the same. There must, however, be proof that they have no properties to answer for that liability before
the parents of the child can be subsidiarily liable.
+nother situation covered by the laws is that, the moment the child has already gone out of the school campus and
he is now on his way home, the persons who e6ercise special parental authority and responsibility are no longer
liable as they have no more custody, instruction or supervision. The parents become primarily liable.
In the case of Amaora vs. CA, et al., 6?'++'(, A3ril (, #)), a student at the Colegio de San 'oseI
"ecoletos, Cebu City was <illed inside the campus of the school while complying with certain re5uirements of
graduation. ,ue to the death of said student, several people, including the school, were sued. The Supreme Court
said.
/Knli<e in B6conde and 3ercado, the Colegio de San 'oseI"ecoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be
held liable under +rticle $1*%> and unli<e in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution
of learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the 5uestion of whether or not +rticle $1*% covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and if so, when the o;ending student is
supposed to be `in its custody.8
+fter an e6haustive e6amination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in 5uestion
should apply to all schools, academic as well as nonIacademic. 0here the school is academic rather than technical
or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacheIincharge of
such student, following the 7rst part of the provision. This is the general rule. 4n the case of establishments of arts
and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, shall be held liable as an e6ception to the general rule. 4n other
words, teachers, in general, shall be liable for the acts of their students e6cept where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. 1ollowing the Canon of re!!en!o singular
singulis, `teachers8 should apply to the words `pupils and students8 and `heads of establishments of arts and trades8
to the word `apprentices.8
#t is not necessary that at the time o the in8ury, the teacher "e physically present an! in a position to prevent it.
Custo!y !oes not
connote imme!iate an! actual physical control "ut reers more to the inOuence e1erte! on the chil! an! the
!iscipline instille! in him as a result o such inOuence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and
not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time
when its authority could be validly e6ercised over him.
4f at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head
thereof under the general principle of res3on1eat s%3erior, but then it may e6culpate itself from liability by proof
that it had e6ercised the diligence of a 0on%s 3aterfa/ilias.
:asis of the lia0ilit& of a school.
+ 5uestion has been raised in the Supreme Court as to the source of liability of a school if a student is <illed inside
the campus by a
nonIstudent. 4s it founded on contract or is it founded on 5uasiIdelictJ
4t has been ruled that it is based on contract, because when the student enrols in a school, there is a contract. The
case of 6SNA, et
al. vs. CA, et al., !.". #o. *(C&*, 1ebruary (, 1&&$, is relevant.
Article !#.
4hose given the a%thorit& an1 res3onsi0ilit& %n1er the 3rece1ing Article shall 0e 3rinci3all& an1
soli1aril& lia0le for 1a/ages ca%se1 0& the acts or o/issions of the %ne/anci3ate1 /inor. 4he
3arents, B%1icial g%ar1ians or the 3ersons e5ercising s%0stit%te 3arental a%thorit& over sai1 /inor
shall 0e s%0si1iaril& lia0le.
4he res3ective lia0ilities of those referre1 to in the 3rece1ing 3aragra3h shall not a33l& if it is 3rove1
that the& e5ercise1 the 3ro3er 1iligence re2%ire1 %n1er the 3artic%lar circ%/stances. All other cases
not covere1 0& this an1 the 3rece1ing articles shall 0e governe1 0& the 3rovisions of the Civil Co1e on
2%asi1elicts.-n,
Cha3ter .
ELect of Aarental A%thorit& U3on the Aersons of the Chil1ren
1$% | P a g e
Article !!". 4he 3arents an1 those e5ercising 3arental a%thorit& shall have 9ith res3ect to their
%ne/anci3ate1 chil1ren or 9ar1s the follo9ing rights an1 1%ties:
-, 4o Iee3 the/ in their co/3an&, to s%33ort, e1%cate an1 instr%ct the/ 0& right 3rece3t an1 goo1
e5a/3le, an1 to 3rovi1e for their %30ringing in Iee3ing 9ith their /eansE
-!, 4o give the/ love an1 aLection, a1vice an1 co%nsel, co/3anionshi3 an1 %n1erstan1ingE
-., 4o 3rovi1e the/ 9ith /oral an1 s3irit%al g%i1ance, inc%lcate in the/ honest&, integrit&, self?
1isci3line, self?reliance, in1%str& an1 thrift, sti/%late their interest in civic aLairs, an1 ins3ire in the/
co/3liance 9ith the 1%ties of citi@enshi3E
-', 4o enhance, 3rotect, 3reserve an1 /aintain their 3h&sical an1 /ental health at all ti/esE
-(, 4o f%rnish the/ 9ith goo1 an1 9holeso/e e1%cational /aterials, s%3ervise their activities,
recreation an1 association 9ith others, 3rotect the/ fro/ 0a1 co/3an&, an1 3revent the/ fro/
ac2%iring ha0its 1etri/ental to their health, st%1ies an1 /oralsE
-J, 4o re3resent the/ in all /atters aLecting their interestsE
-+, 4o 1e/an1 fro/ the/ res3ect an1 o0e1ienceE
-), 4o i/3ose 1isci3line on the/ as /a& 0e re2%ire1 %n1er the circ%/stancesE an1
-#, 4o 3erfor/ s%ch other 1%ties as are i/3ose1 0& la9 %3on 3arents an1 g%ar1ians. -.Ja,
Article !!. Aarents an1 other 3ersons e5ercising 3arental a%thorit& shall 0e civill& lia0le for the
inB%ries an1 1a/ages ca%se1 0& the acts or o/issions of their %ne/anci3ate1 chil1ren living in their
co/3an& an1 %n1er their 3arental a%thorit& s%0Bect to the a33ro3riate 1efenses 3rovi1e1 0& la9.
-!)"M!Na an1 M'Na,
6ia0ilit& of father or /other.
4t must be emphasized that the liability of the father or mother of a minor attaches when such minor lives in their
company. So that, if a minor child is staying in 3anila while his parents are in the province, and the child commits
an act or omission causing damage to another, the parents are not liable. 3inority alone of the child does not ma<e
the parents liable for his acts. Such minority must be coupled with the fact that the child is living in the company of
the father or mother.
Note also that for the tortuous act of a minor, the parents are not liable together. The law spea<s of an alternative
situation where
the mother is liable only in case of death or incapacity of the father. ence, if a minor child in the company of his
parents commits a tortuous act, his father should be sued alone. 4n the absence of the father or in his incapacity,
the mother can be made liable. 9"omano, et al. vs. Parinas, et al., 1%1 Phil. 1(%:.
St. Mar&Gs Aca1e/& vs. Car3etanos, et al.
G.R. No. '..J., 7e0r%ar& J, !""!
7acts:
+ suit for damages was 7led due to the death of a high school student. There was an enrollment campaignAdrive
conducted by the
students in ,ipolog City. igh school students were on board a jeep belonging to a certain Millanueva driven by
Sherwin who was a minor. 4t met an accident resulting in the death of one of the students. The lower court held the
school liable for damages, holding that the school is primarily liable as it had special parental authority at the time
of the accident. 4s the decision correctJ
8el1:
Knder +rticle $1* of the 1amily Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while
under their
supervision, instruction or custody. 91: the school, its administrators and teachers> or 9$: the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Such authority and
responsibility applies to 7eld trips, e6cursions and other a;airs of the pupils and students outside the school
premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. owever, to be liable, there must be a 7nding that the
act or omission considered as negligent was the pro6imate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must
have a casual connection to the accident. 9Sanitary Steam =aundry, 4nc. vs. C+, @C% Phil. 1&&&:.
4n order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the /injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate conse5uence of the wrong done> the connection between the negligence and the
injury must be a direct and natural se5uence of events, unbro<en by intervening e?cient causes.H 4n other words,
the negligence must be the pro6imate cause of the injury. 1or, /negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot
create a right of action unless it is the pro6imate cause of the injury complained of.H +nd /the pro6imate cause of an
injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous se5uence, unbro<en by any e?cient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.H 9Cruz vs. C+, @(C Phil. *-$:.
4t was shown that the accident was not due to the negligence of the school or the rec<less driving of the driver but
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. 4n fact, such detachment was admitted. 1urthermore, no
evidence was shown to prove the negligence of the school authorities. #o evidence was shown to prove that the
school allowed the minor to drive the jeep which was under the possession of a certain Ched Millanueva, the
grandson of the owner. The minor was allowed to drive by him.
ence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of
the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor8s parents primarily. The negligence of the school was only a
remote cause of the accident. Fetween the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minor8s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Cresencio 6i0i, et al. vs. Inter/e1iate A33ellate Co%rt, et al. G.R. No. +")#", Se3te/0er ), ##!
9 "omeo and 'uliet case:
B=,. The diligence of a good father of a family re5uired by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a
large e6tent, of the
1$1 | P a g e
instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently
supervising the
activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of 0endell8s
death that they allegedly discovered that he was a C+#K agent and that Cresencio8s gun was missing from the
safety deposit bo6. Foth parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and <nowing the
activities of their children who, for all they <now, may be engaged in dangerous wor< such as being drug informers,
or even drug users.
#either was a plausible e6planation given for the photograph of 0endell, with a handwritten dedication to 'ulie +nn
at the bac<
thereof, holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and onhow or why he was in possession of that 7rearm.H
4a/argo vs. CA, et al. !"# SCRA () -##!,
7acts:
+delberto Fundoc, a 1% yearIold child, shot 'ennifer Tamargo with an air riNe causing her death. +t that time, there
was a petition
for adoption 7led by the "apisura spouses which was granted on #ovember 1*, 1&*$, that is, after the shooting
incident on Gctober $%, 1&*$. 0hen sued for damages, the natural parents of the child pointed to the adopting
parents as the ones liable because of the retroactive e;ect of the adoption to the date of the 7ling of the petition.
The adopting parents contended that +delberto was still living with his natural parents at the time of the incident.
8el1:
0e do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, the "apisura spouses, at the time the air riNe shooting happened. 0e do not
consider that retroactive e;ect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.
"etroactive e;ect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some bene7t or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
Sn!er the Civil Co!e, the "asis o parental lia"ility or the torts o a minor chil! isthe relationship e1isting "et2een
the parents an! the minor chil!living 2ith them an! over 2hom, the la2 presumes, the parentse1ercise supervision
an! control. The reason "ehin! the 8oint an! soli!ary lia"ility o the parentsor the acts or omissions o their minor
chil!ren is their ailure to supervise them in or!er to prevent them rom causing !amage to thir! persons.
Article !!!. 4he co%rts /a& a33oint a g%ar1ian of the chil1Gs 3ro3ert&, or a g%ar1ian a1 lite/ 9hen the
0est interests of the chil1 so re2%ire. -.+,
Article !!.. 4he 3arents or, in their a0sence or inca3acit&, the in1ivi1%al, entit& or instit%tion
e5ercising 3arental a%thorit&, /a& 3etition the 3ro3er co%rt of the 3lace 9here the chil1 resi1es, for
an or1er 3rovi1ing for 1isci3linar& /eas%res over the chil1. 4he chil1 shall 0e entitle1 to the
assistance of co%nsel, either of his choice or a33ointe1 0& the co%rt, an1 a s%//ar& hearing shall 0e
con1%cte1 9herein the 3etitioner an1 the chil1 shall 0e hear1.
8o9ever, if in the sa/e 3rocee1ing the co%rt Fn1s the 3etitioner at fa%lt, irres3ective of the /erits of
the 3etition, or 9hen the circ%/stances so 9arrant, the co%rt /a& also or1er the 1e3rivation or
s%s3ension of 3arental a%thorit& or a1o3t s%ch other /eas%res as it /a& 1ee/ B%st an1 3ro3er. -.)a,
Article !!'. 4he /eas%res referre1 to in the 3rece1ing article /a& incl%1e the co//it/ent of the chil1
for not /ore than thirt& 1a&s in entities or instit%tions engage1 in chil1 care or in chil1renGs ho/es
1%l& accre1ite1 0& the 3ro3er govern/ent agenc&. 4he 3arent e5ercising 3arental a%thorit& shall not
interefere 9ith the care of the chil1 9henever co//itte1 0%t shall 3rovi1e for his s%33ort. U3on
3ro3er 3etition or at its o9n instance, the
co%rt /a& ter/inate the co//it/ent of the chil1 9henever B%st an1 3ro3er. -.#a,
Cha3ter '
ELect of Aarental A%thorit& U3on the
Aro3ert& of the Chil1ren
Article !!(. 4he father an1 the /other shall Bointl& e5ercise
legal g%ar1ianshi3 over the 3ro3ert& of their %ne/anci3ate1
co//on chil1 9itho%t the necessit& of a co%rt a33oint/ent. In case
of 1isagree/ent, the fatherGs 1ecision shall 3revail, %nless there is
a B%1icial or1er to the contrar&.
Khere the /arIet val%e of the 3ro3ert& or the ann%al inco/e
of the chil1 e5cee1s A(",""", the 3arent concerne1 shall 0e re2%ire1
to f%rnish a 0on1 in s%ch a/o%nt as the co%rt /a& 1eter/ine, 0%t
not less than ten per centum -"], of the val%e of the 3ro3ert& or
ann%al inco/e, to g%arantee the 3erfor/ance of the o0ligations
3rescri0e1 for general g%ar1ians.
A veriFe1 3etition for a33roval of the 0on1 shall 0e Fle1 in the
3ro3er co%rt of the 3lace 9here the chil1 resi1es, or, if the chil1
resi1es in a foreign co%ntr&, in the 3ro3er co%rt of the 3lace 9here
the 3ro3ert& or an& 3art thereof is sit%ate1.
4he 3etition shall 0e 1ocIete1 as a s%//ar& s3ecial
3rocee1ing in 9hich all inci1ents an1 iss%es regar1ing the
3erfor/ance of the o0ligations referre1 to in the secon1 3aragra3h
of this Article shall 0e hear1 an1 resolve1.
4he or1inar& r%les on g%ar1ianshi3 shall 0e /erel& s%33letor&
e5ce3t 9hen the chil1 is %n1er s%0stit%te 3arental a%thorit&, or the
g%ar1ian is a stranger, or a 3arent has re/arrie1, in 9hich case the
or1inar& r%les on g%ar1ianshi3 shall a33l&. -.!"a,
owever, if the court appoints a guardian over the properties
of the minor other than the parents, there is a need to post a bond
irrespective of the value of the properties of said child.
1$$ | P a g e
There are instances when the law does not give the power of
administration to the parents over the properties of a minor, li<e.
91: when the parent is disinherited by an ascendant, such
parent cannot administer the legitime which is inherited
by such child by right of representation 9+rt. &$@, #ew
Civil Code:>
9$: when the parent is incapacitated by unworthiness to
succeed an ascendant, he is deprived of the powers of
administration over the legitime transmitted to the child.
9+rt. 1%@), #ew Civil Code:.
Article !!J. 4he 3ro3ert& of the %ne/anci3ate1 chil1 earne1
or ac2%ire1 9ith his 9orI or in1%str& or 0& onero%s or grat%ito%s
title shall 0elong to the chil1 in o9nershi3 an1 shall 0e 1evote1
e5cl%sivel& to the latterGs s%33ort an1 e1%cation, %nless the title
or transfer 3rovi1es other9ise.
4he right of the 3arents over the fr%its an1 inco/e of the chil1Gs
3ro3ert& shall 0e li/ite1 3ri/aril& to the chil1Gs s%33ort an1
secon1aril& to the collective 1ail& nee1s of the fa/il&. -.!a, .!.a,
There is no more complete usufruct that the parents e6ercise
over the properties of their minor child. This has been eradicated by
the 1amily Code.
Article !!+. If the 3arents entr%st the /anage/ent or
a1/inistration of an& of their 3ro3erties to an %ne/anci3ate1 chil1,
the net 3rocee1s of s%ch 3ro3ert& shall 0elong to the o9ner. 4he
chil1 shall 0e given a reasona0le /onthl& allo9ance in an a/o%nt
not less than that 9hich the o9ner 9o%l1 have 3ai1 if the
a1/inistrator 9ere a stranger, %nless the o9ner, grants the entire
3rocee1s to the chil1. In an& case, the 3rocee1s th%s given in 9hole
or in 3art shall not 0e charge1 to the chil1Gs legiti/e. -.!!a,
Cha3ter (
S%s3ension or 4er/ination of Aarental A%thorit&
Article !!). Aarental a%thorit& ter/inates 3er/anentl&:
-, U3on the 1eath of the 3arentsE
-!, U3on the 1eath of the chil1E or
-., U3on e/anci3ation of the chil1. -.!+a
Article !!#. Unless s%0se2%entl& revive1 0& a Fnal B%1g/ent, 3arental a%thorit& also ter/inates:
-, U3on a1o3tion of the chil1E
-!, U3on a33oint/ent of a general g%ar1ianE
-., U3on B%1icial 1eclaration of a0an1on/ent of the chil1 in a case Fle1 for the 3%r3oseE
-', U3on Fnal B%1g/ent of a co/3etent co%rt 1ivesting the 3art& concerne1 of 3arental a%thorit&E or
-(, U3on B%1icial 1eclaration of a0sence or inca3acit& of the 3erson e5ercising 3arental a%thorit&.
-.!+a,
Article !.". Aarental a%thorit& is s%s3en1e1 %3on conviction of the 3arent or g%ar1ian e5ercising the
sa/e of a cri/e 9hich carries 9ith it the 3enalt& of civil inter1iction. 4he a%thorit& is a%to/aticall&
reinstate1 %3on service of the 3enalt& or %3on 3ar1on or a/nest& of the oLen1er. -.."a,
Article !.. 4he co%rt in an action Fle1 for the 3%r3ose or in a relate1 case /a& also s%s3en1 3arental
a%thorit& if the 3arent or the 3erson e5ercising the sa/e:
-, 4reats the chil1 9ith e5cessive harshness or cr%elt&E
-!, Gives the chil1 corr%3ting or1ers, co%nsel or e5a/3leE
-., Co/3els the chil1 to 0egE or
-', S%0Bects the chil1 or allo9s hi/ to 0e s%0Becte1 to acts of lascivio%sness.
4he gro%n1s en%/erate1 a0ove are 1ee/e1 to incl%1e cases 9hich have res%lte1 fro/ c%l3a0le
negligence of the 3arent or the 3erson e5ercising 3arental a%thorit&. If the 1egree of serio%sness so
9arrants, or the 9elfare of the
chil1 so 1e/an1s, the co%rt shall 1e3rive the g%ilt& 3art& of 3arental a%thorit& or a1o3t s%ch other
/eas%res as /a& 0e 3ro3er %n1er the circ%/stances.
4he s%s3ension or 1e3rivation /a& 0e revoIe1 an1 the 3arental a%thorit& revive1 in a case Fle1 for
the 3%r3ose or in the sa/e 3rocee1ing if the co%rt Fn1s that the ca%se therefor has cease1 an1 9ill
not 0e re3eate1. -..!a,
Article !.!. If the 3erson e5ercising 3arental a%thorit& has s%0Becte1 the chil1 or allo9e1 hi/ to 0e
s%0Becte1 to se5%al a0%se, s%ch 3erson shall 0e 3er/anentl& 1e3rive1 0& the co%rt of s%ch a%thorit&.
-n,
The writ of ha"eas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.88
Article !... 4he 3erson e5ercising s%0stit%te 3arental a%thorit& shall have the sa/e a%thorit& over the
3erson of the chil1 as the 3arents. In no case shall the school a1/inistrator, teacher or in1ivi1%al
engage1 in chil1 care e5ercising s3ecial 3arental a%thorit&, inVict cor3oral 3%nish/ent %3on the chil1.
-n,
4itle PIII
USE O7 SURNAMES -n,
1$@ | P a g e
Change of Na/e.
0hile an illegitimate child of a woman maybe allowed to bear the surname of its stepfather without the bene7t of
adoption, a
legitimate child had by a prior marriage may not. To allow said child to adopt the surname of its mother8s second
husband, who is not its father, could result in confusion as to its paternity. 4t could also create the suspicion that the
child who was born during the coverture of the mother the 7rst husband was in fact sired by the second husband,
thus bringing its legitimate status into discredit. 9"epublic vs. Micencio, !.". #o. **$%$, 1( ,ecember 1&&*, 1%1
SC+, CC$:. 4n short, the child might create more troubles than solving them.
Article .+". A /arrie1 9o/an /a& %se:
-, 8er /ai1en Frst na/e an1 s%rna/e an1 a11 her h%s0an1Gs s%rna/eE or
-!, 8er /ai1en Frst na/e an1 her h%s0an1Gs s%rna/eE or
-., 8er h%s0an1Gs f%ll na/e, 0%t 3reF5ing a 9or1 in1icating that she is his 9ife, s%ch as SMrs.T
The law provides for alternatives on the part of the woman when she gets married> hence, it is not mandatory for a
woman to use the surname of her husband.
#llustration:
'anet Calvan got married to +ndy +ncheta. 'anet can use the name 'anet Calvan +ncheta. Gr, she can use the
name 'anet +ncheta> or, she can use 3rs. +ndy +ncheta.
Article .+. In case of ann%l/ent of /arriage, an1 the 9ife is the g%ilt& 3art&, she shall res%/e her
/ai1en na/e an1 s%rna/e. If she is the innocent s3o%se, she /a& res%/e her /ai1en na/e an1
s%rna/e. 8o9ever, she /a& choose to contin%e e/3lo&ing her h%s0an1Gs s%rna/e, %nless:
-, 4he co%rt 1ecrees other9iseE or
-!, She or the for/er h%s0an1 is /arrie1 again to another 3erson.
Note that in case of annulment of marriage or even if the wife was divorced under the 3uslim =aws, she may
automatically resume
the use of her surname without any order of the court.
+ petition for the resumption of maiden name and surname is not a petition for change of name. The true and real
name of a
person is that given to him and entered in the Civil "egistrar. 4t is the only true and o?cial name that may be
changed with judicial
authority.
Article .+!. Khen legal se3aration has 0een grante1, the 9ife shall contin%e %sing her na/e an1
s%rna/e e/3lo&e1 0efore the legal se3aration.
4n case of legal separation, the wife shall continue to use the name and surname of her husband. The reason for this
rule is that
they are still married, legal separation being a mere separation from bed and board without severing the marital
relationship of the
husband and wife. 96a3eral vs. Re3%0lic, J SCRA .(+,. Fut in spite of the use of the word /shall,88 the use of the
husband8s surname by the woman is not mandatory, but merely optional.
Article .+.. A 9i1o9 /a& %se the 1ecease1 h%s0an1Gs s%rna/e as tho%gh he 9ere still living, in
accor1ance 9ith Article .+".
+fter the death of the husband, the wife may still continue to use the name and surname of the husband as
provided in +rticle
@-%. 4n this case, she may use the name /Corazon Cojuangco Mda. de +5uino88 to show that she is the widow of the
late Senator Fenigno +5uino.
Article .+'. In case of i1entit& of na/es an1 s%rna/es, the &o%nger 3erson shall 0e o0lige1 to %se
s%ch a11itional na/e or s%rna/e as 9ill avoi1 conf%sion.
Article .+(. In case of i1entit& of na/es an1 s%rna/es 0et9een ascen1ants an1 1escen1ants, the
9or1 S$%niorT can 0e %se1 onl& 0& a son. Gran1sons an1 other 1irect /ale 1escen1ants shall either:
-, A11 a /i11le na/e or the /otherGs s%rna/eE or
-!, A11 the Ro/an n%/erals II, III, an1 so on.
Article .+J. No 3erson can change his na/e or s%rna/e 9itho%t B%1icial a%thorit&.
4n order that a person may change his name or surname, the same must be with judicial authority. Changing one8s
own name or surname is not a matter of right but a matter of privilege. -Re3%0lic vs. Avila, !! SCRA ').,.
4here /%st 0e s%Ccient gro%n1s to changeoneGs o9n na/e or s%rna/e, liIe:
-1: 0hen the name is ridiculous or tainted with dishonor> e6tremely di?cult to write or pronounce>
9$: 0hen the right to a new name is a conse5uence of a change of status, li<e where a natural child is
ac<nowledged or
legitimated>
9@: 0hen the change is necessary to avoid confusion>
9(: + sincere desire to adopt a 1ilipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which unduly hampers
social
and business life. 9Ky vs. "epublic, 1) SC"+ ()-> =%e vs. Re3%0lic, $C SC"+ 1%-(> Lu vs. "epublic, 1) SC"+ ()(>
Lap vs. "epubilc, $- SC"+ 111(:.
Fut in Re3%0lic vs. $%1ge, .! SCRA 'J!, an application for a change of name was denied as it would sow
confusion in paternity and successional rights. + 5uestion has been raised as to the e;ect of change of name.
The Supreme Court, in Calderon vs. "epublic, 1& SC"+ -$1, said that what is altered is only the label or appellation
by which a person is <nown and distinguished from the others. 4t does not alter family relations. 4t does not create
new family rights and duties. 4t does not a;ect a person8s legal capacity or status or citizenship. 9+ng Chay vs.
"epublic, @( SC"+ $$(:.
1$( | P a g e
Article .++. Us%r3ation of a na/e an1 s%rna/e /a& 0e the s%0Bect of an action for 1a/ages an1 other
relief.
Article .+). 4he %nathori@e1 or %nla9f%l %se of another 3ersonGs s%rna/e gives a right of action to the
latter.
Article .+#. 4he e/3lo&/ent of 3en na/es or stage na/es is 3er/itte1, 3rovi1e1 it is 1one in goo1
faith an1 there is no inB%r& to thir1 3ersons. Aen na/es an1 stage na/es cannot 0e %s%r3e1.
+ 3se%1on&/ has been de7ned by 1errara as a conventional 7ctitious name freely chosen by a person to disguise
his personality. 4t has been said that a pseudonym cannot be used in any transaction with the State, as it is
intended for literary, artistic, scienti7c, and professional activities.
Article .)". E5ce3t as 3rovi1e1 in the 3rece1ing article, no 3erson shall %se 1iLerent na/es an1
s%rna/es.
The "evised Penal Code imposes the penalty of arresto mayor and a 7ne not to e6ceed P)%%.%% upon any person
who shall use a
7ctitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading the e6ecution of a judgment, or causing damage. +ny
person who conceals his true name and other personal circumstances shall be punished by arresto menor or a 7ne
not to e6ceed P$%%.%%. 9+rt. 1-*, "PC:. ence, it is the duty of every individual to use his correct name and
surname in dealing with the government. 4f it is a private dealing, he is not obliged, e6cept if there is a wrongful or
unlawful purpose. 9$ Mon Tuhr &-I&*:.
4itle PI<
A:SENCE
+bsence is that special legal status of one who is not in his domicile, his whereabouts being un<nown and it is
uncertain whether
he is dead or alive. 0here the absentee disappeared under normal circumstances, and without apparent danger,
there is ordinary
absence> but, where the disappearance was under e6traordinary circumstances, or with apparent danger, it is called
5uali7ed absence.91 Castan 1-)> $ 3anresa &-:.
Stages of A0sence.
There are three stages of absence.
91: Temporary or provisional absence>
9$: #ormal or declared absence>
9@: ,e7nite absence or presumptive death. 91 Castan 1-&:.
Cha3ter
Arovisional Meas%res in Case of A0sence
Article .). Khen a 3erson 1isa33ears fro/ his 1o/icile, his 9herea0o%ts 0eing %nIno9n, an1
9itho%t leaving an agent to a1/inister his 3ro3ert&, the B%1ge, at the instance of an intereste1 3art&,
a relative, or a frien1, /a& a33oint a 3erson to re3resent hi/ in all that /a& 0e necessar&.
4his sa/e r%le shall 0e o0serve1 9hen %n1er si/ilar circ%/stances the 3o9er conferre1 0& the
a0sentee has e53ire1. -)a,
#ormal or declared absence is one judicially declared after two years since the last news was heard from him, or
7ve years if he left
an administrator. ,e7nite or presumptive death ta<es place when, after the period provided by law, a person is
presumed dead> the period varies according to the circumstances. 9Tolentino, Civil Code:.
The law re5uires that in order to justify the ta<ing of remedies for provisional absence, it is necessary that no news
be heard of
the person who has disappeared, after a reasonable period shall have lapsed. 1urthermore, there must be an
immediate necessity for his representation in some speci7c urgent matter. 91 Castan 1*$I1*@:.
Article .).. In the a33oint/ent of a re3resentative, the s3o%se 3resent shall 0e 3referre1 9hen there
is no legal se3aration. If the a0sentee left no s3o%se, or if the s3o%se 3resent is a /inor, an&
co/3etent 3erson /a& 0e a33ointe1 0& the co%rt. -).a,
The sole purpose of the 7ling of the petition to declare the husband absent is to establish the absence of the
husband,
who left no property, the petition should be dismissed, because there is no need to declare him judicially absent.
The reason for the rule is that there is no need for such declaration because there is no property to ta<e care
of or administer. Therefore, it would be an e6ercise in futility to have a declaration of absence>
Article .)(. 4he follo9ing /a& asI for the 1eclaration of
a0sence:
-, 4he s3o%se 3resentE
-!, 4he heirs instit%te1 in a 9ill, 9ho /a& 3resent an a%thentic co3& of the sa/eE
-., 4he relatives 9ho /a& s%ccee1 0& the la9 of intestac&E
-', 4hose 9ho /a& have over the 3ro3ert& of the a0sentee so/e right s%0or1inate1 to the con1ition of
his 1eath. -)(,
Article .)J. 4he B%1icial 1eclaration of a0sence shall not taIe eLect %ntil si5 /onths after its
3%0lication in a ne9s3a3er of general circ%lation. -)Ja,
Cha3ter .
A1/inistration of the Aro3ert& of the A0sentee
Article .)+. An a1/inistrator of the a0senteeGs 3ro3ert& shall 0e a33ointe1 in accor1ance 9ith Article
.).. -)+a,
1$) | P a g e
Article .)). 4he 9ife 9ho is a33ointe1 as an a1/inistratri5 of the h%s0an1Gs 3ro3ert& cannot alienate
or enc%/0er the h%s0an1Gs 3ro3ert&, or that of the conB%gal 3artnershi3, 9itho%t B%1icial a%thorit&.
-))a,
Article .)#. 4he a1/inistration shall cease in an& of the
follo9ing cases:
-, Khen the a0sentee a33ears 3ersonall& or 0& /eans of an agentE
-!, Khen the 1eath of the a0sentee is 3rove1 an1 his testate or intestate heirs a33earE
-., Khen a thir1 3erson a33ears, sho9ing 0& a 3ro3er 1oc%/ent that he has ac2%ire1 the a0senteeGs
3ro3ert& 0& 3%rchase or other title.
In these cases, the a1/inistrator shall cease in the 3erfor/ance of his oCce, an1 the 3ro3ert& shall 0e
at the 1is3osal of those 9ho /a& have a right thereto. -#",
Cha3ter '
Ares%/3tion of *eath
Article .#". After an a0sence of seven &ears, it 0eing %nIno9n 9hether or not the a0sentee still lives,
he shall 0e 3res%/e1 1ea1 for all 3%r3oses, e5ce3t for those of s%ccession.
4he a0sentee shall not 0e 3res%/e1 1ea1 for the 3%r3ose of o3ening his s%ccession till after an
a0sence of ten &ears. If he 1isa33eare1 after the age of sevent&?Fve &ears, an a0sence for Fve &ears
shall 0e s%Ccient in or1er that his s%ccession /a& 0e o3ene1.
-n,
4t must be recalled that the computation of the periods provided for in +rticle @&1, #ew Civil Code, shall be
rec<oned from the date
of the last news concerning the absentee is received. 9'ones vs. ortiguela, C( Phil. 1-&:.
4t cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only 5uestion or subject matter
involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. 4t is, therefore, clear that judicial declaration that
a person is presumptively dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption 8uris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot be 7nal.
Article .#. 4he follo9ing shall 0e 3res%/e1 1ea1 for all 3%r3oses, incl%1ing the 1ivision of the estate
a/ong the heirs:
-, A 3erson on 0oar1 a vessel lost 1%ring a sea vo&age, or an aero3lane 9hich is /issing, 9ho has not
0een hear1 of for fo%r &ears since the loss of the vessel or aero3laneE
-!, A 3erson in the ar/e1 forces 9ho has taIen 3art in 9ar, an1 has 0een /issing for fo%r &earsE
-., A 3erson 9ho has 0een in 1anger of 1eath %n1er other circ%/stances an1 his e5istence has not
0een Ino9n for fo%r &ears.
Article .#!. If the a0sentee a33ears, or 9itho%t a33earing his e5istence is 3rove1, he shall recover his
3ro3ert& in the con1ition in 9hich it /a& 0e fo%n1, an1 the 3rice of an& 3ro3ert& that /a& have 0een
alienate1 or the 3ro3ert& ac2%ire1 there9ithE 0%t he cannot clai/ either fr%its or rents. -#',
Fut he cannot claim the fruits or rents. The reason for this is that the distributees and heirs are in good faith.
Knder +rticle )(( of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is entitled to receive the fruits of the thing in his
possession. Fut the moment he reappears, the possessor would no longer be entitled to receive the fruits, as they
would then redound to the bene7t of the owner. There would also be interruption of the possession in good faith
Article .#'. Kitho%t 3reB%1ice to the 3rovisions of the 3rece1ing article, %3on the o3ening of a
s%ccession to 9hich an a0sentee is calle1, his share shall accr%e to his co?heirs, %nless he has heirs,
assigns or re3resentatives. 4he& shall all, as the case /a& 0e, /aIe an inventor& of the 3ro3ert&.
-#Ja,
Article .#(. 4he 3rovisions of the 3rece1ing article are %n1erstoo1 to 0e 9itho%t 3reB%1ice to the
action or 3etition for inheritance or other rights 9hich are veste1 in the a0sentee, his re3resentatives
or s%ccessors in interest. 4hese rights shall not 0e e5ting%ishe1 save 0& la3se of ti/e F5e1 for
3rescri3tion. In the recor1 that is /a1e in the registr& of real estate 9hich accr%es to the co?heirs, the
circ%/stance of its 0eing s%0Bect to the 3rovisions
of this article shall 0e state1. -#+,
This law has something to do with the rules on succession. 4t says that if an absentee is called upon to inherit, his
share shall
accrue to his coIheirs, as a rule.
+ccretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance, devise or
legacy, the part assigned to the one who renounces or cannot receive his share, or who died before the testator,
is added or incorporated to that of his coIheirs, coIdevisees or coIlegatees. 9+rt. 1%1), #ew Civil Code:.
4n order that the right of accretion may ta<e place in a testamentary succession, it shall be necessary.
91: That two or more persons be called to the same inheritance or to the same portion thereof, pro in!ivisoA and
9$: That one of the persons thus called die before the testator, or renounce the inheritance, or be incapacitated to
receive it. 9+rt. 1%1C, #ew Civil Code:.
Article .#J. 4hose 9ho /a& have entere1 %3on the inheritance shall a33ro3riate the fr%its receive1 in
goo1 faith so long as the a0sentee 1oes not a33ear, or 9hile his re3resentatives or s%ccessors in
interest 1o not 0ring the 3ro3er actions. -#),
4itle P<
CI<I6 REGIS4ER
Article '"+. Acts, events an1 B%1icial 1ecrees concerning the civil stat%s of 3ersons shall 0e recor1e1
in the civil register. -.!(a,
Article '"). 4he follo9ing shall 0e entere1 in the civil register:
1$C | P a g e
-, :irthsE -!, /arriagesE -., 1eathsE -', legal se3arationsE -(, ann%l/ents of /arriageE -J, B%1g/ents
1eclaring /arriages voi1 fro/ the 0eginningE -+, legiti/ationsE -), a1o3tionsE -#, acIno9le1g/ents
of nat%ral chil1renE -", nat%rali@ationE -, loss, or -!, recover& of citi@enshi3E -., civil inter1ictionE
-', B%1icial 1eter/ination of FliationE -(, vol%ntar& e/anci3ation of a /inorE an1 -J, changes of
na/e. -.!Ja,
Article '"#. In cases of legal se3aration, a1o3tion, nat%rali@ation an1 other B%1icial or1ers /entione1
in the 3rece1ing article, it shall 0e the 1%t& of the clerI of the co%rt 9hich iss%e1 the 1ecree to
ascertain 9hether the sa/e has 0een registere1, an1 if this has not 0een 1one, to sen1 a co3& of sai1
1ecree to the civil registr&
of the cit& or /%nici3alit& 9here the co%rt is f%nctioning. -n,
Article '". 4he 0ooIs /aIing %3 the civil register an1 all 1oc%/ents relating thereto shall 0e
consi1ere1 3%0lic 1oc%/ents an1 shall 0e prima (acie evi1ence of the facts therein containe1. -n,
Article '. Ever& civil registrar shall 0e civill& res3onsi0le for an& %na%thori@e1 alteration /a1e in
an& civil register, to an& 3erson s%Lering 1a/age there0&. 8o9ever, the civil registrar /a& e5e/3t
hi/self fro/ s%ch lia0ilit& if he 3roves that he has taIen ever& reasona0le 3reca%tion to 3revent the
%nla9f%l alteration. -n,
Article '!. No entr& in a civil register shall 0e change1 or correcte1, 9itho%t a B%1icial or1er. -n,
1: Substantial alterations a;ecting the status and citizenship of a person in the civil registry records are not allowed
unless
7rst threshed out in an appropriate action. Summary proceeding under +rticle (1$, #ew Civil Code only justi7es an
order to correct
innocuous or clerical errors. 9Castro vs. "ep., 'anuary 1-, 1&*):.
#llustration:
!eorge 1. Castro to "amon Castro. There is a substantial alteration. 9$: + petition to enter material corrections in the
record of
birth was 7led so that /Sy PiaoH would be made /Bsteban Sy.H The two names refer to one and the same person. 4t
was published in a newspaper of general circulation. The GS! was served with a copy of the petition and notice of
hearing. The State, through the Civil "egistrar, participated in the proceedings.
The petition was granted in the case of Gep. vs. )acDliDing, 3arch 1*, 1&*). 4n fact, the Supreme Court said in
Gepu"lic vs.
,alencia, 3arch ), 1&*C, that such a petition for correction of entry andAor cancellation of entries in the record of
birth even if 7led under "ule 1%* of the "ules of Court can no longer be considered summary. 4f there is an
opposition and the opposition is actually prosecuted, the proceedings become adversary. 9See also Fumanlag vs.
+lzate, =I @&11&, September $C, 1&*C:.
9@: Clerical mista<es or harmless and innocuous errors may be corrected under the summary proceedings under +rt.
(1$ and "ule 1%*, ""C. Fut substantial changes in the entry in the birth certi7cate such as the change of name
from /,ominador PatawaranH to /,ominador P. ,izonH and the alteration of the word /Kn<nownH after the column
/name of 1atherH to /Policarpio ,izonH cannot be done under "ule (1$ and "ule 1%*. Changes sought not only
involve a change of name, but also principally the issue of paternity or 7liation.
Changes or corrections under +rt. (1$, #CC refer to harmless and innocuous alterations, such as misspelling, or
errors visible to
the eye. 9"ep. vs. 1lojo, =I(&-%@, 'uly @1, 1&*-:. Change of name is to be threshed out in an adversary proceeding
where each is given the opportunity to demolish each case, and the evidence is roughly weighed and considered.
9(: 4n Gep. vs. Mon. Carriaga, et al., !.". #o. )(1)&, 3arch 1*, 1&**, petitioner as<ed for correction of entries in the
record of birth of his children> thus, /Chinese to 1ilipino father> religion, from Catholic to 4slam> race, brown, not
yellowH petitioner was informed of the trial and in fact, it 7led an opposition to the petition. Petitioner maintained
that only innocuous or clerical errors can be corrected. 4t was ruled by the Supreme Court that when petitioner 7led
an opposition, the proceeding was converted into an adversary proceeding. There was a fullIblown trial which
complied with the
re5uirements of appropriate proceeding. 9"epublic vs. Malencia:.
4n Malencia, however, the igh Court en "anc, spea<ing through 'ustice ugo !uttierez, a?rmed the trial court8s
decision granting
petitioner8s prayer that her civil status and citizenship as appearing in two of her child8s birth certi7cates, as well as
the civil status and citizenship of her children, be corrected. /4t is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a
petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality
and citizenship, which is undisputably substantial and controversial, a?rmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. owever, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
remedied as long as the appropriate reme!y is use!.
The proceedings under +rticle (1$ of the #ew Civil Code and "ule 1%* of the "ules of Court may either be summary
or adversary in nature.
4f the correction sought to be made in the civil registry is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. 4f
the recti7cation
a;ects the civil status, nationality, or citizenship of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary.
0hat is meant by /appropriate adversary proceedingHJ Flac<8s =aw ,ictionary says.
/Gne having opposing parties> contested, as distinguished from an e1 parte hearing and proceeding. Gne of which
the party see<ing relief has given legal notice to the other party, and a;orded the latter an opportunity to contest
it.88
4t was further ruled in Gepu"lic vs. ,alencia that if the procedural re5uirements provided in Sections @, ( and ) of
"ule 1%* of the "ules of Court are followed, the procedure ceases to be summary and becomes litigious.
Proceedings following the aforementioned
sections may then be appropriate for the correction of substantial
matters in the civil registry.
1$- | P a g e
ence, for as long as the relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where the opposing counsel is
given the
opportunity to demolish the opposite party8s case, and the evidence is thoroughly weighed and considered, the
proceedings are adversary or appropriate proceedings.
/0here the e;ect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of a petitioner and her children from
legitimate to
illegitimate, the same cannot be granted e6cept only in an adversary proceeding.88
R%les in R.A. No. #"').
Entries in the civil registr& that /a& 0e change1 or correcte1 9itho%t B%ri1ical or1er.
Knder the law, no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, e6cept for clerical
or typographical errors and change of 7rst name or nic<name which can be corrected or changed by the concerned
city or municipal registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of "+ &%(* and its implementing
rules and regulations. 9Sec. 1, "+ &%(*:
Kho an1 9here to Fle a 3etition for correction of a clerical
error or change in a na/e or nicIna/e.
+ny person having direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry
andAor change of 7rst
name or nic<name in the civil register may 7le in person a veri7ed petition with the local civil registry o?ce of the
city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is <ept. 4n case the petitioner has
already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be practical for such party, in terms of
transportation e6penses, time and e;ort to appear in person before the local civil registrar <eeping the documents
to be corrected or changed, the petition may be 7led, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where the
interested party is presently residing or domiciled. The two 9$: local civil registrars concerned will then
communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition. Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or
domiciled in foreign countries may 7le their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates. 9Sec. @, "+
&%(*:.
8o9 /an& ti/es a 3erson avail of the right to change his Frst na/e.
+ll petitions for the correction of clerical or typographical errors andAor change of 7rst names or nic<names may be
availed of only
once. 9Sec. @, "+ &%(*:
CASES:
AGNES GAM:OA?8IRSC8
Aetitioner,vs.
8ON. COUR4 O7 AAAEA6S an1 7RANH6IN 8AR<EY 8IRSC8,
"espondents.This is a petition for certiorari under "ule C) which see<s to set aside the decision of the C+
whichgranted private respondent 1ran<lin joint custody with petitioner +gnes of their minor
daughterSimone.Spouses 1ran<lin and +gnes started to have marital problems as +gnes wanted to stay in
3a<atiCity, while 1ran<lin insisted that they stay in Foracay 4sland. 0hen +gnes came to their conjugal home in
Foracay, and as<ed for money and for 1ran<lin8s permission for her to bring their daughter
to 3a<ati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come bac< to Foracay.1ran<lin then 7led a petition for
habeas corpus before the C+ for +gnes to produce Simone in court,C+ issued a "esolution which ordered that a writ
of habeas corpus be issued ordering that Simonebe brought before said court. C+ granted 1ran<lin joint custody
with +gnes of their minor child.+gnes 7led a 3otion for "econsideration which was denied.ence, this
petition.4ssue.0G# the C+ acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in utter disregard
ofthe provisions of the 1amily Code, as to minors seven 9-: years of age and below.eld.The court held that the C+
committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of theminor child to both parents.The soIcalled
VtenderIage presumptionV under +rticle $1@ of the 1amily Code may be overcome onlyby compelling evidence of
the mother8s un7tness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances. neglect, abandonment, unemployment,immorality, habitual drun<enness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, or aOiction witha communicable disease. ere, the mother was not shown to be
unsuitable or grossly incapable ofcaring for her minor child. +ll told, no compelling reason has been adduced to
wrench the child from the mother8s custody.
Sole custody over Simone #oelle irsch is hereby +0+",B, to the mother, petitioner +gnes!amboaIirsch.
"e Asis vs. CA
GR No. .2/0/1, -ebruar# .0, .888
7AC4S:
Mircel +ndres as legal guardian of !len Camil +ndres de +sis, 7led an action in 1&** for maintenance and support
against the alleged father 3anuel ,e +sis who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated
demands. Mircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1&*& for the reason that 3anuel denied paternity of the said
minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the
dismissal of the complaint with the condition that 3anuel will not pursue his counter claim. owever in 1&&), Mircel
7led a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor8s legal guardianAmother. 3anuel
interposed ma6im of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. e maintained that since the obligation to give
support is based on e6istence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lac< thereof negates the right to
claim support.
ISSUE: 0G# the minor is barred from action for support.
8E6*:
The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original agreement
between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support
which is prohibited by law. 0ith respect to 3anuel8s contention for the lac< of 7lial relationship between him and
the child and agreement of Mircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that e6istence of lac< thereof of
1$* | P a g e
any 7lial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the
Court itself. 0hile it is true that in order to claim support, 7liation or paternity must be 7rst shown between the
parties, but the presence or lac< thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. 4t
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. ence, the 7rst dismissal cannot bar the 7ling of another
action as<ing for the same relief 9no force and e;ect:. 1urthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by 3anuel
was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.
G.R. NO. .)'#J 7e0r%ar& !., !""'CO <S CI<I6 REGIS4RAR O7 MANI6A
7AC4S:
KFB"T T+# CG was born 3arch $@, 1&-(. is sister, +"=B#B T+# CG, was born 3ay 1&, 1&-).4n their respective
certi7cates of birth, it is stated that their parents CG FGG# PB#! +#, =GK",BSM4G#! c. T+# are C4#BSB
C4T4YB#S. CG FGG# PB#! 7led an application for his naturalization as acitizen of the Philippines with the Special
Committee on #aturalization under =BTTB" G1 4#ST"KCT4G#no. $-%. is application was granted and he was
conferred Philippine citizenship under P, 1%)). e wasissued a certi7cate of naturalization and conse5uently too<
an oath as Philippine citizen on 1ebruary 1),1&--.Gn +ugust $-, 1&&*, they 7led with the "TC 3anila a petition
under "ules of Court for correction of entries in the certi7cate of birth which was denied on the ;. grounds.a:
+lthough C+ (-@ and =G4 $-% are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not providethe same
bene7cial e;ects with respect to the minor children of the applicant>XXSec. 1). e;ects of naturalization on the wife
and the childrenb: =G4 $-%. refers to 5uali7ed individuals only>c: Section 1) C+ no. (-@ should not be deemed and
incorporated in and applied to =G4 $-%>d: +pplication of pari material rule of construction is misplaced.
ISSUE:
Khether or not +rlene and ubert are 1ilipino citizens on account of the naturalization of their1ather Co Foon PengJ
8E6*:
4t is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certi7cate of naturalization of theirfather, to entitle
them to Philippine citizenship. They are li<ewise mandated to prove the ;. materialallegations in their petition.1:
That they are legitimate children of Co Foon Peng>$: They were born in the Philippines>@: That they were still minors
when Co Foon Peng was naturalized as a 1ilipino citizen.
6an1ingin vs. Re3%0lic, GR No. J'#'), $%ne !+, !""J
7acts:
,iwata "amos =andingin, a KS citizen of 1ilipino parentage 7led a petition for the adoption of @ minors, natural
children of 3anuel "amos, the former8s brother, and +melia "amos. She alleged in her petition that when her
brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to 4taly, reI
married there and now has $ children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left
up to the institution of the adoption. +fter the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported
by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
+ Social 0or<er of the ,S0, submitted a "eport recommending for the adoption and narrated that +melia, the
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the bene7ts of adoption to her children,
she voluntarily consented.
owever, petitioner failed to present the said social wor<er as witness and o;er in evidence the voluntary consent
of +melia "amos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that +melia
assent to the adoption.
Iss%e. 0G# a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee8s biological mother.
8el1. #o. Section &, par 9b: of "+ *))$, provides that the consent of the biological parent9s: of the child, if <nown
is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will su?ce if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general re5uirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. 4ndeed, the
natural right of a parent to his child re5uires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and reIestablish in adoptive parents. 4n this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent
of +melia "amos to the adoption.
3oreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the 7lial and legal obligations of love and support.
3erely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To
dispense with the re5uirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have e6isted at the time of
adoption.
In Re Petition (or Aoption o( Mic)elle &im an Mic)ael 6ue &im
GR No. .51882$87, Ma# 2., 2338
7AC4S:
3onina =im, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo =im but were childless. 3inor children,
were entrusted to them by =ucia, whose parents were un<nown as shown by a certi7cation of ,S0,. The spouses
registered the children ma<ing it appears as if they were the parents. Knfortunately, in 1&&*, Primo died. She then
married an +merican Citizen, +ngel Glario in ,ecember $%%%. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing
of the amnesty given under "+ *))$ to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. 4n $%%$, she 7led separate
petitions for adoption of 3ichelle and 3ichael before the trial court. 3ichelle was then $) years old and already
married and 3ichael was 1* years and seven months old. 3ichelle and her husband including 3ichael and Glario
gave their consent to the adoption e6ecuted in an a?davit.
ISSUE: 0G# petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
8E6*:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were 7led, petitioner had already remarried. usband and wife shall
jointly adopt e6cept in @ instances which was not present in the case at bar. 4n case spouses jointly adopts, they
shall jointly e6ercised parental authority. The use of the word /shallH signi7es that joint adoption of husband and
wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to re5uire spouses to adopt jointly. The a?davit of
1$& | P a g e
consent given by Glario will not su?ce since there are certain re5uirements that he must comply as an +merican
Citizen. e must meet the 5uali7cations set forth in Sec- of "+*))$. The re5uirements on residency and
certi7cation of the alien8s 5uali7cation to adopt cannot li<ewise be waived pursuant to Sec -. Parental authority is
merely just one of the e;ects of legal adoption. 4t includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness
and e?ciency and development of their moral mental and physical character and wellIbeing.
=+G3 MS S4FK=G!.". #o. 1(@&*& 'uly 1(, $%%@
1+CTS.
+ childless couple adopted the wifePs nephew and brought him up as their own. 4n 1&-$, the trial court granted the
petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil "egistrar to change the name 'ose 3elvin Sibulo to 'ose 3elvin =ahom.
3rs. =ahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her
pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname =ahom and continue to use Sibulo in
all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1&&*, "+ #o. *))$ went into e;ect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption 9Section 1& of +rticle M4:.
These turn of events revealing 'osePs callous indi;erence, ingratitude and lac< of care and concern prompted =ahom
to 7le a petition in Court in ,ecember 1&&& to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way bac< on 3ay ),
1&-$. 0hen =ahom 7led said petition there was already a new law on adoption, speci7cally ".+. *))$ also <nown as
the ,omestic +doption +ct passed on 3arch $$,1&&*, wherein it was provided that. V+doption, being in the interest
of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter9s:. owever the adopter9s: may disinherit the adoptee
for causes provided in +rticle &1& of the Civil CodeV 9Section 1&:.
4SSKB.
0hether or not the subject adoption still be revo<ed or rescinded by an adopter after the e;ectivity of ".+. #o.
*))$, and if in the a?rmative, whether or not the adopter8s action prescribed.
"K=4#!.
'urisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The
controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was 7led. 4n this case, it
was months after the e;ectivity of "+ *))$ that =ahom 7led an action to revo<e the decree of adoption granted in
1&-$. Fy then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and
the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
=ahom after "+ *))$ had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Fesides, even before the passage of "+*))$, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the 7ve year bar rule
under "ule 1%% of the "ules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revo<e the adoption decree after
the lapse of that period. The e6ercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not ful7ll the
re5uirements of a vested right entitled to protection. "ights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment
is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or 76ed and irrefutable. The concept of a Vvested rightV is
a conse5uence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that e6presses a present 76ed interest which in right
reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. 0hile adoption has often been referred to in
the conte6t of a VrightV, it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. 4t is
more of a privilege that is governed by the statePs determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. 3atters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify
the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be
ta<en away at any time before it has been e6ercised.
Fut an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the
forfeiture of certain bene7ts otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, li<e denying him his legitime, and by will
and testament, may e6pressly e6clude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
4hornton v. 4hornton, G.R. No. ('(#), A%g. J, !""'
1+CTS. Petitioner was an +merican, respondent was a 1ilipino. They were married and had one daughter. +fter @
years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job as !"G in a
nightclub. Gne day, the woman left the family home together with their daughter and told her servants that she
was going to Fasilan. The husband 7led a petition for habeas corpus in the designated 1amily Court in 3a<ati City
but was dismissed because the child was in Fasilan. 0hen he went to Fasilan, he didn8t 7nd them and the barangay
o?ce issued a certi7cation that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner 7led another petition for habeas
corpus in C+ which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by
C+ on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case since "+ *@C& 91amily Courts +ct of 1&&-: gave
family courts e6clusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed "+ -&%$ 9+n +ct
B6panding the 'urisdiction of C+: and F.P 1$& 9The judiciary "eorganization +ct of 1&*%.:
4SSKB. 0A# C+ has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in light of the
provision in "+ *@C& giving family courts e6clusive jurisdiction over such petitions.
B=,. Petition granted. C+ should ta<e cognizance of the case because nothing in "+ *@C& revo<ed its jurisdiction
to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of C+ cant be a?rmed because it will
result to ini5uitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody. The minor could be transferred
from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy since family courts ta<e
cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. =iteral interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity,
injustice, and contradiction. The literal interpretation of /e6clusiveH will result in grave injustice and negate the
policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children.
IN 48E MA44ER O7 48E AE4I4ION 7OR 8A:ES CORAUS O7 MINOR S8ANG
The police o?cer was pointed as the culprit of her daughter8s disappearance. The mother 7led a petition of habeas
corpus against the o?cer for illegal detention of her daughter. Fut it was found out all along that her daughter was
in safe institution under the care of abandoned and abused children. The police o?cer accompanied the #F4 in the
institution but insist that matters and place should not be divulged to her mother as the mother used the child to
have an easy tic<et to as< money from the Taiwanese father.
1@% | P a g e
RU6ING: Knder Section 1, "ule 1%$ of the "ules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases
of illegal con7nement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the
rightful custody over a minor.The general r%le is that parents should have custody over their minor children. :%t
the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly
and abusively, impairing their growth and wellIbeing and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout
their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counseled.
Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Facolod City, it would be best that
such issues be resolved by a 1amily Court in that city. 3eantime, considering the presumption that the police
authorities acted regularly in placing Shang co in the custody of Calvary cids the Court believes that she should
remain there pending hearing and adjudication of this custody case. Fesides she herself has e6pressed preference
to stay in that place.
.R. No. )#! $%l& ., !".
AME6IA GARCIA?=UIA>ON, $ENNE48 =UIA>ON an1 MARIA $ENNI7ER =UIA>ON, Petitioners,
vs.MA. 6OUR*ES :E6EN, for an1 in 0ehalf of MARIA 6OUR*ES E6ISE =UIA>ON, "espondent.
Knder Section 1, "ule -@ of the "ules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent
should be 7led in the "TC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Sec. 1. 0here estate of deceased persons settled. Q 4f the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of 1irst 4nstance now "egional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of 1irst 4nstance now "egional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court 7rst ta<ing cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall e6ercise jurisdiction to the e6clusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit
or proceeding, e6cept in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.
0hile the recitals in death certi7cates can be considered proofs of a decedent8s residence at the time of his death,
the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts.
=i<ewise unmeritorious is petitioners8 contention that the Court of +ppeals erred in declaring +melia8s marriage to
Bliseo as void ab initio. 4n a void marriage, it was though no marriage has ta<en place, thus, it cannot be the source
of rights. +ny interested party may attac< the marriage directly or collaterally. + void marriage can be 5uestioned
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 4t must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of
the marriage of Bliseo and +melia, the law in e;ect was the Civil Code, and not the 1amily Code, ma<ing the ruling
in #iUal v. Fayadog
$
applicable fourIs5uare to the case at hand.
Car/elita I. >ag%irre vs. Att&. Alfre1o Castillo
A.C. No. '#!. March J, !""..
Khether or not Att&. Alfre1o Castillo is g%ilt& of gross i//oral con1%ct, /aIing hi/ 3%nisha0le of
In1eFnite S%s3ension.
8el1:
Les. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent, +tty. +lfredo Castillo, is guilty of gross immoral conduct and
should be punished with the penalty of 4nde7nite Suspension. The attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized
statement recognizing and underta<ing to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness
on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to selfI
stulti7cation.
Social Sec%rit& S&ste/ -SSS, vs. Ag%as
8el1: Gnly 'eylnn has su?ciently established her right to a monthly pension.
'eylnn8s claim is justi7ed by the photocopy of her birth certi7cateshowing the signature of Pablo as her father
authenticating that 'eylnn was born on Gctober $&, 1&&1. "ecords show that "osanna and Pablo were married on
,ecember (, 1&-- which continued, as far as the records are concerned, until the death of Pablo on ,ecember *,
1&&C. Fased on the records, 'eylnn was born during the marriage of "osanna and Pablo. Since 'eylnn was conceived
or born during the marriage of the parents, she is considered legitimate.
Petitioner "osanna married "omeo dela Pena during her marriage to Pablo. + wife who is already separated de facto
from her husband cannot be said to be /dependent from supportH upon the husband
Bven if the records show that the spouses adopted 'anet, there were no legal papers to prove it. She therefore does
not 5ualify as a primary bene7ciary
C8ERRY6 :. *O6INA vs. G6ENN *. <A66ECERA
!.". #o. 1*$@C-. ,ecember 1), $%1%.
7AC4S:
4n 1ebruary $%%* Cherryl F. ,olina 7led a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order
against respondent !lenn ,. Mallecera before the "egional Trial Court of Tacloban City for alleged woman and child
abuse under "epublic +ct 9".+.: &$C$. 4n 7lling out the blan<s in the proIforma complaint, ,olina added a
handwritten prayer for 7nancial support from Mallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer on the
latterPs Certi7cate of =ive Firth which listed Mallecera as the childPs father. The petition also as<ed the "TC to order
Philippine +irlines, MalleceraPs employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the "TC may deem
appropriate. Mallecera opposed the petition. e claimed that ,olinaPs petition was essentially one for 7nancial
support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses> that he was not the childPs father> that the
signature appearing on the childPs Certi7cate of =ive Firth is not his> that the petition is a harassment suit intended
to force him to ac<nowledge the child as his and give it 7nancial support> and that Mallecera has never lived nor has
been living with ,olina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him. Gn 3arch 1@, $%%*
1@1 | P a g e
the "TC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment e6ists establishing the 7liation of ,olinaPs son
and granting him the right to support as basis for an order to compel the giving of such support. ,olina 7led a
motion for reconsideration but the "TC denied it in its +pril (, $%%* Grder, with an admonition that she 7rst 7le a
petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a prere5uisite for support. Knsatis7ed, ,olina 7led the present
petition for review.
ISSUE:
0hether or not the "TC correctly dismissed ,olinaPs action for temporary protection and denied her application for
temporary support for her child.
8E6*:
,olina evidently 7led the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of ".+. &$C$ under which she 7led
the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. +lthough the
issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife
and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. To be entitled to legal
support, petitioner must, in proper action, 7rst establish the 7liation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
ac<nowledged. Since ,olinaPs demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is MalleceraPs
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not ac<nowledged him, until ,olina shall have
proved his relation to him. The childPs remedy is to 7le through her mother a judicial action against Mallecera for
compulsory recognition. 4f 7liation is beyond 5uestion, support follows as matter of obligation. 4n short, illegitimate
children are entitled to support and successional rights but their 7liation must be duly proved.
.R. No. )!.(. $%ne !#, !""
S4. $OSEA8YS CO66EGE, SR. $OSEA8INI AM:A4A6I, S7IC, an1 ROSA6IN*A 4A:UGO, Petitioners,
vs. $AYSON MIRAN*A, re3resente1 0& his father, RO*O67O S. MIRAN*A, "espondent.
7AC4S:
B6periment in the Science =ab, the chemical e6ploded causing injury to the student.
Iss%e: 0A# petitioners are liable. YES
Ratio:
Foth courts correctly concluded that the immediate and pro6imate cause of the accident which caused injury to
'ayson was the sudden and une6pected e6plosion of the chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. The
assailed ,ecision of the C+ 5uotes with favor the "TC decision, thus.
4n this case, DpetitionersE failed to show that the negligence of D'aysonE was the pro6imate cause of the latter8s
injury. 0e 7nd that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of D'aysonE when he curiously
loo<ed into the test tube when the chemicals suddenly e6ploded which caused his injury, but the sudden and
une6pected e6plosion of the chemicals independent of any intervening cause. DPetitionersE could have prevented
the mishap if they e6ercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight
The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by DpetitionerE St. 'oseph College will not e6culpate
it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of ine6cusable la6ity in the supervision of its teachers
9despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring: and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe
and secured environment for conducting dangerous e6periments.
VGrdinarily, the liability of teachers does not e6tend to the school or university itself, although an educational
institution may be held liable under the principle of "BSPG#,B#T SKPB"4G". 4t has also been held that the liability
of the employer for the DtortuousE acts or negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate
and not conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee.V
+rticle $1* of the 1amily Code, in relation to +rticle $1*% of the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on the
following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus.
+rt. $1*. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care
shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody.
+uthority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution.
MAHA4I S8ANGRI6A vs 8ARAER
ISSUE: 0hether or not petitioner had committed negligence and corollarily, whether its negligence wasthe
immediate cause of the death of Christian arper.
8E6*: LBS, 3a<ati ShangriI=a otel, to stress, is a 7veIstar hotel. The Vreasonable careV that it must e6ercise for
thesafety and comfort of its guests should be commensurate with the grade and 5uality of theaccommodation it
o;ers. 4f there is such a thing as V7veIstar hotel securityV, the guests at 3a<atiShangriI=a surely deserves just that.
So ho9 co%l1 the hotel 0e lia0le 1es3ite the lacI of an& legal 3rovision a33l&ing s2%arel& to the facts
of the case; #egligence. +nd the C+ was able to determine that the pro6imate cause of the victim8s death was
the hotel8s, and not the victim8s, negligence
The diligence re5uired of a private carrier is only ordinary, that is, the diligence of a good father of the family. 4n
contrast, a common carrier is a person, corporation, 7rm or association engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, o;ering such services to the
public.D1E Contracts of common carriage are governed by the provisions on common carriers of the Civil Code, the
Public Service +ct,D$E and other special laws relating to transportation. + common carrier is re5uired to observe
e6traordinary diligence, and is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of the loss of the e;ects
of passengers, or the death or injuries to passengers.D@E -%ps PereIa vs. %ps =arate, G.R. No. .0/8./, August
28, 23.2, J*ersamin, 6.K,
1@$ | P a g e
<alino vs A1riano
4n 1&&$, +tty. +driano died of acute emphysema. +t that time, "osario was in the Knited States spending Christmas
with her children. +s none of the family members was around, Malino too< it upon herself to shoulder the funeral
and burial e6penses for +tty. +driano. Hhen Gosario learne! a"out the !eath o her hus"an!, she imme!iately
calle! ,alino an! re$ueste! that she !elay the interment or a e2 !ays but her re5uest was not heeded. The
remains of +tty. +driano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Malino at the 3anila 3emorial Par<.
"espondents were not able to attend the interment.
4he Sole Iss%e
4he lone legal iss%e in this 3etition is 9ho 0et9een Rosario an1 <alino is entitle1 to the re/ains of
Att&. A1riano.
4he Co%rtGs R%ling
+rticle @%) of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now +rticle 1&&
C
of the 1amily Code, speci7es the persons who
have the right and duty to ma<e funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus.
+rt. @%). The duty and the right to ma<e arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the
order established for support, under +rticle $&(. 4n case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and
sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. 4n case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right
+rt. 1&&. 0henever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
persons in the order herein provided.
91: The spouse>
9$: The descendants in the nearest degree>
9@: The ascendants in the nearest degree> and
9(: The brothers and sisters. 9$&(a:
7%rther, Article .") of the Civil Co1e 3rovi1es:
+rt. @%*. #o human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or e6humed without the consent of the persons
mentioned in +rticles $&( and @%).
4ndeed, Philippine =aw 1oes not recogni@e co//on la9 /arriages. + man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
The right and 1%t& to ma<e funeral arrangements, li<e any other right, 9ill not 0e consi1ere1 as having 0een
9aive1 or reno%nce1, e5ce3t %3on clear an1 satisfactor& 3roof of con1%ct in1icative of a free an1
vol%ntar& intent to that en1.0hile there was disa;ection between +tty. +driano and "osario and their children
when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to
mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator.
Bven assuming, e1 gratia argumenti, that +tty. +driano truly wished to be buried in the Malino family plot at the
3anila 3emorial Par<, the result remains the same. +rticle @%- of the Civil Code provides.
Art. ."+. 4he f%neral shall be in accordance with the e53resse1 9ishes of the deceased. 4n the absence of such
e6pression, his religious beliefs or a?liation shall determine the f%neral rites. 4n case of doubt, the for/ of the
funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to ma<e arrangements for the same, after consulting the other
members of the family.
+s for Malino8s contention that there is no point in e6huming and transferring the remains of +tty. +driano, it should
be said that the burial of his remains in a place other than the +driano family plot in #ovaliches runs counter to the
wishes of his family. 4t does not only violate their right provided by law, but it also disrespects the family because
the remains of the patriarch are buried in the family plot of his liveQin partner.
+ll this notwithstanding, the Court 7nds laudable the acts of Malino in ta<ing care of +tty. +driano during his 7nal
moments and giving him a proper burial. 1or her sacri7ces, it would indeed be un<ind to assess actual or moral
damages against her.
Antonio Aerla, 3etitioner v. Mirasol :aring an1 Ran1& Aerla, res3on1ents
C.R. No. I +!'+ Nov. !, !"!
7AC4S:
1. 34rasol 9and "andy: 7led before the "TC a Complaint for support against +ntonio.
$. +ccording to 3irasol, she and +ntonio had a common law relationship for $ years, and that "andy was the
result of their a;air.
@. "andy was made to testify in Court, he said that he has been in the house of his +unt =elita 9sister of
+ntonio:,, and that the Perla family treated him as a member of their family.
(. +ntonio denied 3irasol8s allegations, saying that "andy isn8t his 9he came in 3anila only after his
graduation in 1&*1 and e claimed that he had se6ual intercourse with 3irasol only once which happened
in the month of September or Gctober of 1&*1:.
). +ntonio also said that "andy8s birth cert. has a lot of inaccuracies.
"TC Q +ntonio was ordered to support "andy 9as illegitimate child:.
C+ Q upheld "TC decision.
1@@ | P a g e
ISSUE: 0G# "andy is entitled to receive support from +ntonio.
8E6*. #G. "espondents failed to establish "andy8s illegitimate 7liation to +ntonio.
RA4IO:
The rules for establishing 7liation are found in +rticles 1-$ and 1-) of the 1amily Code which provide as follows.
+rticle 1-$. The 7liation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following.

91: The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a 7nal judgment>
or

9$: +n admission of legitimate 7liation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

4n the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate 7liation shall be proved by.
91: The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child> or
9$: +ny other means allowed by the "ules of Court and special laws.
6 6 6 6
+rticle 1-). 4llegitimate children may establish their illegitimate 7liation in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children.
6 6 6 6
"espondents presented the Certi7cate of =ive Firth of "andy identifying +ntonio as the father. owever, said
certi7cate has no probative value to establish "andy8s 7liation to +ntonio since the latter had not signed the
same.C% 4t is settled that /DaE certi7cate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certi7cate.HC1 0e also cannot lend credence to
3irasol8s claim that +ntonio supplied certain information through Brlinda. +side from +ntonio8s denial in having any
participation in the preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did
not
present Brlinda to con7rm that +ntonio indeed supplied certain entries in "andy8s birth certi7cate. Fesides, the
several une6plained discrepancies in +ntonio8s personal circumstances as reNected in the subject birth certi7cate
are manifestations of +ntonio8s nonIparticipation in its preparation. 3ost important, it was 3irasol who signed as
informant thereon which she con7rmed on the witness stand.
Charles Gotar1o v. *ivina :%ling G.R. No. J(JJ A%g%st (, !"!
7AC4S:
1. Gn September C, 1&&), respondent ,ivina Fuling 7led a complaint with the "TC of 3aasin, Southern =eyte,
for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the Charles !otardo is the father of
her child !li;ze. 9answer: Petitioner denied the paternity.
$. Parties8 failed to amicably settle the dispute, the "TC terminated the preItrial proceedings. Trial on the
merits ensued.
@. Bvidence for ,ivina 9casual employee: showed that she met Charles 9accounting supervisor: on ,ecember
1, 1&&$ at the Philippine Commercial and 4ndustrial Fan<, 3aasin, Southern =eyte branch.
(. Charles courted ,ivina in the third wee< of ,ecember 1&&$ and they became sweethearts in the last wee<
of 'anuary 1&&@. Charles gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, 9Malentine8s ,ay and
her birthday:> she reciprocated his love and too< care of him when he was ill.
). 4n September 1&&@, Charles started intimate se6ual relations with the respondent in the former8s rented
room in the boarding house managed by "odulfo 9,ivina8s uncle:. "ented the room from 3arch 1, 1&&@ to
+ugust @%, 1&&(.
C. The se6ual encounters occurred twice a month and became more fre5uent in 'une 1&&(> eventually, on
+ugust *, 1&&(, she got pregnant. Charles was happy and made plans to marry ,ivina. FKT, Charles
bac<ed out of the wedding plan. 9,ivina 7led for damages for breach of promise to marry but was amicably
settled:.
-. ,ivina gave birth to !li;ze on 3arch &, 1&&). 90hen Charles did not show up and failed to provide support
to !li;ze, ,ivina sent him a demand letter on 'uly $(, 1&&) for recognition and support of their son:
*. ,ue to unanswered demand, ,ivina too< her demands in Court.
&. Charles denied being !li;ze8s father in Court.
"TC Q approved monthly child support.
"TC 9appeal: Q reversed former decision
C+ Q ordered Charles to recognize !li;ze and give monthly child support
ISSUE: 0G# !li;ze is entitled to receive child support and to be recognized as Charles8 son.
8E6*: YES.
"+T4G.
Gne can prove 7liation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a 7nal judgment, an admission of 7liation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the "ules of Court and special laws.@$ 0e have held that such
other proof of onePs 7liation may be a /baptismal certi7cate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which DhisE name
has been entered, common reputation respecting DhisE pedigree, admission by silence, the DtestimoniesE of
witnesses, and other <inds of proof DadmissibleE under "ule 1@% of the "ules of Court.H
0e e6plained that a prima facie case e6ists if a woman declares 2 supported by corroborative proof 2 that she had
se6ual relations with the putative father> at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. 0e
e6plained further that the two a?rmative defenses available to the putative father are. 91: incapability of se6ual
relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or 9$: that the mother had se6ual relations
with other men at the time of conception.
4n this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of !li;ze
through testimony that she had been se6ually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. "odulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.
Gn the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had se6ual encounters with the respondent, only that it
occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the
respondent to have been three 9@: months pregnant already in September 1&&( when he was informed of the
1@( | P a g e
pregnancy.(% owever, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of in7delity and insinuations of
promiscuity. is allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lac< of evidentiary support. The petitioner8s
denial cannot overcome the respondent8s clear and categorical assertions.
Since 7liation is beyond 5uestion, support follows as a matter of obligation> a parent is obliged to support his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in <eeping with the 7nancial capacity of the family. Thus, the
amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no 7nal judgment on the amount of support is made as the
amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.(- 4t may
be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient
and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.
4I66 8ERE XRX *iligince is the MO48ER of GOO* 7OR4UNE