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Crimproc cases 3rd batch 1

Ark travel v Presiding Judge 210 SCRA 48
FACTS Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Travel for brevity) filed with the City Prosecutor of Makati a criminal complaint for False
Testimony in a Civil Case against private respondents Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira.
Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira was accused as having given false testimony upon a material fact in a civil complaint for
Collection of sum of money, torts and damages filed by Ark Travel Express against New Filipino Maritime Agencies
(NFMA) in the following manner:
During trial of the said civil case in which one of the principal issues was whether or not payment of the claim of Ark
travel has been made by NFMA, the accused maliciously testified that the claims of Ark Travel supported by
statements of accounts is baseless and/or been paid, which accused very well knew and ought to know, by reason of
accused’s position as cashier, was false.
In a resolution dated November 20, 1996, the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict private respondents for
violation of said law and accordingly filed the respective Informations against each of them before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC).
In a resolution dated March 9, 1998, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo reversed the City Prosecutors’ resolution.
The prosecution office of Makati then filed with the MTC a Motion to Withdraw Information. However, on May 15,
1998, Ark Travel filed an Urgent Petition for Automatic Review with the DOJ. DOJ then directed the City Prosecutor to
proceed with the prosecution of the criminal cases in a resolution dated May 27, 1998. For this reason, the MTC issued
an Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the prosecution. Meanwhile, Baguio and Ira filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the May 27, 1998 resolution. DOJ Undersecretary Jesus Zozobrado granted the Motion
for Reconsideration dated June 26, 1998, ordering the withdrawal of the informations for false testimony.
MTC however, denied the Motion to Withdraw Information in an order dated July 21, 1998. It anchors its decision in
the Crespo vs. Mogul case where the Supreme Court held that once an information is filed in court, such filing sets in
motion the criminal action against the accused before the court, and any motion to dismiss or withdraw information is
always addressed to the discretion of the court. The denial or grant of any motion is done by the court not out of
subservience to the secretary of justice but in faithful exercise of its judicial prerogative. private respondents
questioned the MTC Orders dated June 10, 1998 and July 21, 1998 with the respondent RTC of Makati.
RTC of Makati held that MTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it denied the Motion to Withdraw based solely
on its bare and ambiguous reliance on the Crespo doctrine, since an independent evaluation and assessment of the
existence of a probable cause is necessary before such orders denying the said motions could be issued.
ISSUE Whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it nullified the Orders of MTC and enjoined the
said court from hearing the criminal cases
HELD To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code, the following
requisites must concur:
The testimony must be given in a civil case;
The testimony must relate to the issues presented in the case;
The testimony is false;
The testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false; and
Such testimony must be malicious and given with and intent to affect the issues presented in the case.

There is no doubt that the first two requisites are extant in this case. The records show that Ark Travel filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money, torts and damages against NFMA and Angelina T. Rivera. In said civil case,
private respondents were presented by NFMA as witnesses. They executed their respective sworn statements and
testified before the trial court that NFMA has no outstanding obligation with Ark Travel as the same had been paid in
full.

The existence of the last three requisites is quite dubious. The falsity of the subject testimonies of private respondents
is yet to be established. It is noted that at the time of the filing of the criminal complaints, the civil case filed by Ark
Travel is still pending decision. Ark Travel has yet to prove the validity of its monetary claims and damages against
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NFMA. It is only after trial that the RTC can assess the veracity or falsity of the testimony and correspondingly render a
decision. Thus, the civil case is so intimately connected with the subject crime that it is determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the respondents in the criminal cases. In other words, whether or not the testimonies of private
respondents in the civil cases are false is a prejudicial question. It is clear that the elements of a prejudicial question
are present as provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

SEC. 7 Elements of Prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Section 6, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting
the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, pending determination of the falsity of the subject testimonies of private respondents in the civil case,
the criminal action for false testimony must perforce be suspended. As such, under the attendant circumstances,
although there is no motion to suspend proceedings on the part of the private respondents, orderly administration of
justice dictates that the criminal cases should be suspended.
Abunado v People 426 SCRA 562
FACTS On September 18, 1967, peti ti oner Sal vador marri ed Narci sa Arceño. I n 1988 Narci sa l ef t f or Japan
to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992 when she learned that her husband was having anextra-marital affair
and has left their home. Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with FeCorazon Plato. She also discovered
that on January 10, 1989 Salvador contracted a second marriage withZenaida Biñas.On January 19, 1995, an
annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, a casefor bigamy was filed by Narcisa against
Salvador and Zenaida.On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy. On appeal,
the Courtof Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE Whether or not the peti ti on f or annul ment i s a prej udi ci al questi on to the proceedi ngs
i n the bigamy case.
HELD No. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Petitioner’s assertion wouldonl y del ay the
prosecuti on of bi gamy cases consi deri ng that an accused coul d si mpl y f i l e a peti ti on todeclare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in thecriminal case.The
outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon thedetermination of
petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy. All that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage iscontracted.A marri age, even one whi ch i s
voi d or voi dabl e, shal l be deemed val i d unti l decl ared otherwi se i n a j udi ci al proceedi ng. I n thi s
case, even i f peti ti oner eventual l y obtai ned a decl arati on that hi s f i rstmarriage was void ab initio, the
point is both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before thefirst marriage was annulled.The petition is
denied.
People v Beltran 334 SCRA 106
FACTS In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. They’ve had 4 children since then but after 24 years of
marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felix’s PI. Felix countered that
Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against
Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the
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criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal
case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltran’s petition and so did Judge
Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar.
HELD The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the
case for declaration of nullity of Beltran’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case
to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas,
for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he
can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring
his marriage void.
With regard to Beltran’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be
declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense.
People v Consing 395 SCRA 336
FACTS Someti me i n February 1997, respondent Raf ael Jose Consi ng, Jr. and hi s mother, Ceci l i a de l a
Cruz, represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square meter lot
situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of Cecilia de la Cruz. They
further represented that they acquired said lot, which was previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito Tan
Teng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of respondent and his mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot.
I n Apri l 1999, PBI di scovered that respondent and hi s mother di d not have a val i d ti tl e over the
subj ect l ot. PBI came to know that Juani to Tan Teng and Po Wi l l i e Yu never sol d sai d l ot to
respondent and hi s mother and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is not on file with
the Register of Deeds.I n August 1999, PBI was ousted f rom the possessi on of the di sputed l ot by
Juani to Tan Teng and Po Wi l l i e Yu. Despi te wri tten and verbal demands, respondent and
hi s mother ref used to return the amount of P13, 369, 641. 79alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.On
July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, an action for "Injunctive Relief"
docketed as Civil Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires, Mari ano D.
Marti nez, Ceci l i a de l a Cruz and 20 other John Does. Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely
an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to
the other defendants on the various transactions involving TCT No. 687599.On October 13, 1999, PBI f i l ed
agai nst respondent and hi s mother a compl ai nt f or "Damages and Attachment, “docketed as Civil Case
No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case No. SCA 1759. On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa
through falsification of public document was filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with
the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
ISSUE Whether or not there is a prejudicial question
HELD No. The issue in the Civil case for Injunctive Relief is whether or not Consing merely acted as an agent of his mother;
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while in the Civil case for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether Consing and his mother are liable to pay
damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if Consing is declared merely
an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal
liability. An agent or any person may be liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of
the issue involved in the case for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of Consing in the criminal case
for estafa through falsification of public document. A rulling of the court in the Civil case that PBI should not be paid
the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve Consing of liability in the criminal case where his guilt
may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Samson V Dawa 43SCRA 612
FACTS The petitioner, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufacturing Corporation, allegedly sold or offers the
sale of garment product using the trademark ³Caterpillar´ to the prejudice of Caterpillar, Inc., private respondent in this
case. The respondent filed the case with the RTC. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
offense charged contending that the case should be filed with the MTC because violation of unfair competition
is penalized with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years under RA 7691
ISSUE Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights?
HELD he SC held that under Section 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition shall be brought before the proper courts
with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The law contemplated in Section 163 of IPC is RA 166 otherwise
known as the Trademark Law. Section 27 of the Trademark Law provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement
of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged
with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). Since RA 7691 is a general law and IPC in relation to
Trademark Law is a special law, the latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair competition therefore should be filed with
the RTC.
Umali v IAC 186 SCRA 180
FACTS Petitioners are the officers of the Orosea Development Corporation, hereinafter referred to simply as OROSEA.
Sometime on September 4,1979, the petitioners, as officers of OROSEA, purchased from the spouses Honorio and
Solina Edano, Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, Bo. Casay, Mulanay, Province of Quezon, covered by TCT
No. RT-(T-36471), in the name of spouses Edano, for the sum of P1,036,500.00 payable in four installments, as follows:
1
st
instalment & downpayment- P225,000.00 September 28, 1979
2
nd
instalment- P271,500.00 March 31, 1980
3
rd
instalment- P270,000.00 September 30, 1980
4
th
instalment- P270,000.00 March 31, 1981
Issuing for this purpose four checks drawn against the Chartered Bank, Manila Branch. The first check for P225,000.00
was honored upon its presentment. By arrangement of the petitioners with the Edano spouses, a deed of absolute sale
was executed by the vendors, inspire of the fact that the purchase price has not yet been Idly paid. Thus, TCT No.
(T36471) was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title was issued in the name of OROSEA. Thereafter, OROSEA
secured a loan of P1,000,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank using this property as security. When the check for
the second installment fell due, petitioners asked, for two times, deferment of its presentation for payment, the first
to June 30, 1980, and the second to July 31, 1980. In the first deferment petitioners issued a check that matured on
June 30, 1980 to replace the check that matured on March 31, 1980. On the second deferment petitioners issued
another check dated July 31, 1980 to replace the check dated June 30, 1980. This second renewal check was presented
with the bank but it was dishonored due to lack of funds. So were the checks postdated September 30, 1980 and
March 31, 1981. They were also dishonored upon their presentment for lack of funds. As a consequence of the
dishonor of these checks, the Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners. The information was filed
by the Provincial Fiscal against petitioners on May 21, 1981, and it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1423-I.
Arraignment was set on September 4, 1981 but petitioners failed to appear. It was reset to October 5, 1981 but this
was postponed upon motion of petitioners. On October 14, 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon against the Edano spouses, docketed as Civil Case No. 8769, for the annulment/rescission of the
Contract of Sale executed on September 4, 1979 by and between OROSEA and the Edano spouses covering Lot No. 49
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of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, and for which the petitioners issued the checks, subject of Criminal Case No. 1423-
1. Criminal Case No. 1423-I was again set for arraignment on November 5, 1980. This was postponed. With the entry
of a new counsel, petitioners filed a motion to quash Criminal Case No. 1423-I, on ground of improper venue, but this
motion was withdrawn by petitioners before it could be resolved. The arraignment was again set for January 4, 1982
which was again postponed; then to February 5, 1982, again postponed; then to March 23, 1982. However, before
March 23, 1982, petitioners filed, in Criminal Case No. 1423-I, a 'Motion to Suspend Arraignment and Further
Proceedings, with a Supplemental Motion To Suspend Proceedings'. This was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal of
Quezon. Resolving the motion to suspend, respondent Judge issued his orders, now under question, denying the
motion.
2
Acting on the "Motion to Suspend Arraignment and Further Proceedings," the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, Branch II, in said CR Case No. 1423-1 in its order dated 29 April 1982
3
denied the same for lack of merit; and
the motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied in the Order dated 24 June l982.
4

A petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14504, was then filed by herein petitioners with
the respondent Court of Appeals. The appellate court, resolving the said petition, rendered the now assailed decision
dated 23 September 1982 affirming the questioned orders of the trial court and dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals ruled that, inasmuch as the issues in CV No. 8769 and CR No. 1423-I are completely
different from each other, and that the resolution of one is not necessary for the resolution of the other, the issue
involved in CV No. 8769 is not a prejudicial question vis-a-vis the issue in CR No. 1423-I so as to warrant the suspension
of the proceedings in the latter case, until the termination of the civil case. In its resolution dated 3 February 1983, the
Court of Appeals also denied for lack of merit the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
ISSUE Whether or not civil case No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question in relation to CR No. 1423-I so as to require a
suspension of proceedings in the latter case, until the civil case is disposed of.
HELD In arguing that the principle of prejudicial question applies in the case at bar, petitioners contend that, since in CV No.
8769 they seek to annul the deed of sale executed in their favor by the private respondents, on the grounds that the
latter committed fraud in misrepresenting that the land they sold to petitioners is free from all liens and
encumbrances, and that it is not tenanted, when in truth and fact, as petitioners later discovered, the land is covered
by the land reform program and that vast portions thereof are timber land, hence, allegedly indisposable public land,
therefore, according to petitioners, CV No. 8769 involves issues, the resolution of which will determine whether or not
petitioners are criminally liable in CR No. 1423-I. They further argue that, if and when the court hearing CV No. 7869
annuls the subject deed of sale, then, their obligation to pay private respondents under the said deed would be
extinguished, resulting in the dismissal of CR No. 1423-I. Petitioners, therefore, in CV No. 8969, in seeking the
annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation, are in effect saying that said deed is
voidable, vitiated consent being one of the grounds mentioned in Article 1390
5
of the Civil Code for voiding or
annulling contracts. Indeed the well-settled rule is that a contract where consent is vitiated is voidable. It can not be
denied, however, that at the time the acts complained of in CR No. 1423-I were committed, the deed of sale sought to
be later annulled in CV No. 8769 was binding upon the parties thereto, including the petitioners. The two (2) essential
elements for a prejudicial question to exist are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue in the civil action determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. Given the nature of a prejudicial question, and considering the issues raised in CV No.
8769 and CR No. 1423-I, we agree with the ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that the resolution of the issues
in CV No. 8769 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I, hence, no
prejudicial question is involved between the said two (2) cases. As correctly observed by the appellate court, the issue
in CR No. 1423-I is whether or not the petitioners could be found guilty under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or under Article
315, No. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. More specifically, what private respondents complained of in CR No. 1423-I is
that the checks issued by petitioners in their favor were dishonored for lack of funds upon due presentment to the
drawee bank. Undeniably, at the time of said dishonor, petitioners' obligation to pay private respondents pursuant to
the deed of sale, continued to subsist. And because petitioners' checks were dishonored for lack of funds, petitioners
are answerable under the law for the consequences of their said acts. And even if CV No. 8769 were to be finally
adjudged to the effect that the said deed of sale should be annulled, such declararion would be of no material
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importance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I. Petition is
dismissed.
Vilaflor V Vivar 349 SCRA 194
FACTS Information for slight physical injuries was filed against Dindo Vivar for beating
Gian Paul o Vivar outside the Fat Tuesday Bar. On his way out, Gian met Dindo who told that next time, I will use
my gun on you. The injuries sustained by Gi a n t ur ne d out t o be mor e s er i ous t ha n t hey ha d
appeared so an Information for serious physical injuries
wasf i l e d a n d t h e c h a r g e f o r s l i g h t p h y s i c a l i n j u r i e s wa s withdrawn. Another information for
grave threats was filed against Vivar. Vivar, instead of filing a counter affidavit, he filed a Moti on to Quash the
Information for grave threats since it was made in connection with the charge of serious physical injuries should
have been absorbed by the latter, and because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.MTC denied the motion to
quash. Vivar filed for a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
Vivar filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC RTC granted the motion to quash and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Villaflor. Villaflor filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE Can the court motu proprio order the dismissal of the
c a e o n t h e g r o u n d o f l a c k o f p r e l i m i n a r y investigation?Should the failure of the
publi c prosecutor to conductpreliminary investigation be considered a ground toquash the informations?
HELD T he Cour t r ul ed t ha t t he a bs enc e of a pr el i mi nar y i nv e s t i g at i on doe s not i mpai r t he v a l i
di t y of t he i n f o r ma t i o n . I n t h e c a s e a b a r , a p r e l i mi n a r y investigati on
was for sl ight physical i njuries wasconducted by the assistant city prosecutor. But theInformation was
however amended when petitioner’sinjuries turned out to be more serious. However
thec h a n g e i n t h e i n f o r ma t i o n w a s o n l y a f o r ma l amendment and did not violate the right
of Vivaragainst hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution,since it still involves the same facts.Section 3, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Crimi nal Procedure provides the grounds on which an accusedcan move to quash the
compl aint or information.Nowhere in the rule mention of a lack of
preliminaryi nv e s t i g at i on a s a gr ound f or a mot i on t o qua s h. Whe n a c c us e d f ai l e d t o a s s er t
a ny gr ound f or a motion to quash before arraignment, he has deemedwaived his right.
People V CA 301 SCRA 475
FACTS On August 30, 1993, Rosalinda Dy, according to the petition, was shot at pointblank range by private respondent
Jonathan Cerbo in the presence and at the office of his father, private respondent Billy Cerbo at Purok 9, Poblacion,
Nabunturan, Davao. On September 2, 1993, eyewitness Elsa B. Gumban executed an affidavit positively identifying
private respondent Jonathan Cerbo as the assailant. On September 20, 1993, private respondents Jonathan Cerbo
executed a counter-affidavit interposing the defense that the shooting was accidental. On October 6, 1993, the
3
rd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabunturan-Mawab, Davao, after a preliminary investigation, found “sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief” that the crime of murder has been committed by private respondent
Jonathan Cerbo and resolved to forward the entire records of the case to the provincial prosecutor at Tagum, Davao.
After [an] information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo, petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy, daughter of the
victim Rosalinda Dy, executed an affidavit-complaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing
supported by a supplemental affidavit of Elsa B. Gumban, alleging “in addition” to her previous statement that: In
addition to my said sworn statement, I voluntarily and freely aver as follows:
‘a) I vividly recall that while my mistress Rosalinda Go and I were in the office of Billy Cerbo at about 11:45 a.m. on
August 30, 1993, Mr. Cerbo personally instructed me to fetch the food from the kitchen [and to bring it] to the office
instead of the dining room.
‘b) While bringing the food, Mr. Cerbo again instructed me to place the food [o]n a corner table and commanded me
to sit behind the entrance door and at the same time Mr. Cerbo positioned Rosalinda [on] a chair facing the entrance
door for an easy target.
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‘c) Immediately after Rosalinda was shot, Mr. Billy Cerbo called his son Jonathan who was running, but did not and
ha[s] never bothered to bring Rosalinda to a hospital or even apply first aid.
‘d) To my surprise, Mr. Billy Cerbo, instead of bringing Rosalinda to the hospital, brought her to the funeral parlor and
immediately ordered her to be embalmed without even informing her children or any of her immediate relatives
xxx.’ Annex G, Rollo, p. 40.)
Private respondent Billy Cerbo Submitted a counter-affidavit denying the allegations of both petitioner Alynn Plezette
Dy and Elsa B. Gumban. On or about April 8, 1994, Prosecutor Protacio Lumangtad filed a “Motion for leave of court to
reinvestigate the case” (Annex I. Rollo, pp43-44) which was granted by the respondent judge in an order dated April
28, 1994. In his resolution dated May 5, 1994, Prosecutor Lumangtad recommended the filing of an amended
information including Billy Cerbo ‘xxx as one of the accused in the murder case xxx’. Accordingly, the prosecution filed
an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arrest was later issued on May 27,
1994. Private respondent Billy Cerbo then filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued
without probable cause. On June 28, 1994, respondent Judge issued the first assailed order dismissing the case against
Billy Cerbo and recalling the warrant for his arrest. An order is hereby issued DISMISSING the case as against Billy
Cerbo only.The prosecution is hereby ordered to withdraw its Amended Information and file a new one charging
Jonathan Cerbo only. Private Prosecutor Romeo Tagra filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
respondent judge in his second assailed order dated August 18, 1994
ISSUE Whether or not a preliminary investigation part of the trial
HELD No. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-
grounded belief than an offense has been committed and that accused is probably guilty thereof. By reason of the
abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a
judicial pronouncement of acquittal.
Hegerty V CA 409 SCRA 205
FACTS Respondent Allan Nash alleged that petitioner Rodney Hegerty, together with the deceased Don Judevine and James
Studenski, invited him to invest in a foreign exchange scheme with a guaranteed return of 10.45% per annum on the
money invested. From July 1992 to November 28, 1997, Nash invested a total of US$236,353.34. Sometime in
December 1997, Hegerty informed Nash that all his investments had been lost after he lent a portion of the investment
to Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., of which he was a stockholder. Initially, Hegerty offered to return to Nash half of
his total investment, but later on withdrew the offer. After his demands were ignored, Nash filed a complaint-affidavit
against Hegerty before the City Prosecutor of Manila for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. For
his part, Hegerty denied making any invitation to Nash to invest his money in any foreign exchange scheme. Neither did
he divert any portion of such investment to the Swagman Group of Companies. He, however, admitted his
acquaintance with Judevine and Studenski but denied that they were his business partners. He likewise disclaimed any
knowledge of or participation in any of the receipts and cash vouchers presented by Nash supposedly as proofs of his
investments. The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for estafa against Hegerty for insufficiency of
evidence. Upon receipt of a copy of the said resolution on June 16, 1999, counsel of Nash filed a motion for
reconsideration. On May 8, 2000, Nash himself received a copy of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration. On May 19, 2000, Nash filed an appeal with the Department of Justice (DOJ), however, the same was
dismissed for having been filed out of time. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied again for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period of ten (10) days. Undaunted, Nash filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that the DOJ acted in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed his appeal and denied his motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE WON a preliminary investigation a judicial or an executive function
HELD The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive
Crimproc cases 3rd batch 8

function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where
he is not convinces that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments.
Yusop V Sandiganbayan 352 SCRA 587
FACTS Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint
3
filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an
Order
4
dated September 19, 1995, naming the following as respondents: benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, Pelaez
Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The Order also required respondents,
within ten days from receipt thereof, to submit their counter-affidavits and other pieces of controverting evidence.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution dated January 15, 1998, recommending the
prosecution of "the aforenamed respondents" for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in
relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was
included as one of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in
the Order of September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation. Accordingly, two
Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation of Section
3-a of RA 3019) and 24525 (unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code). On April 16, 1998, an Order
of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On the same day, he filed a "Motion To Remand
Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation." In Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-
graft court. On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again on the lack of preliminary
investigation. In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion,
because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. 24525 was concerned.
On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been accorded
preliminary investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the Sandigabayan rejected his claim and proceeded with the
arraignment.
ISSUE Whether the Sandiganbayan, despite being informed of the lack of preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner,
In Criminal Case No. 24524, committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment?
HELD Petition is partly meritorious remanded in Sandiganbayan for conduct of Preliminary investigation. This provision
cannot justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for conducting preliminary investigation.
The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely with the finality of orders, directives and decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman -- not the deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary investigation. Moreover,
petitioner cannot be bound by the Ombudsman's January 15, 1998 Resolution, which recommended the filing of
charges. He was not a party to the case and was not accorded any right to present evidence on his behalf. In any
event, even the Ombudsman agrees that petitioner was deprived of this right and believes that the basic rudiments of
due process are complied with."
19
For its part, the Sandiganbayan opted to remain silent when asked by this Court to
comment on the Petition.
Romualdez v Sandiganbayan 385 SCRA 436
FACTS The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed an information
before the anti-graft court on July 12, 1989 charging Romualdez with violation of Sec. 5, Republic Act No. 3019 as
amended. The information states that on or about and during the period from July 16 to July 29, 1975, Romualdez,
brother-in-law of President Marcos, former president of the Philippines, did then and there willfully and unlawfully,
and with evident of bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interest and/or that of others, intervene directly or
indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and
controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the
majority of stocks of which is owned by former Pres. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to
the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including structures, buildings,
shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as
the Engineer Island Shops including some equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed
by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P 5, 000, 000.00. Romualdez argues that he
Crimproc cases 3rd batch 9

enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a high-ranking naval officer ----- specifically, as naval aide-
de-camp – of former President Marcos. He relies on Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which
states that:
“The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts
done by him or by other pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.”
ISSUE Whether or not pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution, Romualdez is immune from criminal prosecution.
HELD No. As aptly pointed out by Sandiganbayan, the provision in Sec. 17, Art Vii of 1973 Constitution is not applicable to
Romualdez because the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime happened in
1975. In Estrada vs Desierto, the SC explained that executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a
President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while
sitting in office. Romualdez’s reasoning fails since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as
president. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives “are not acts of the State, and the officer
who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.”
Honasan v Panel of Prosecutor DOJ 427 SCRA 46
FACTS An affidavit-complaint was filed before the DOJ by Mantillano charging Senator
Honasan and others for the offense of coup d’etat. Consequently Honasan
questionedthe OMB-DOJ Circular which according to Honasan the source of the purported powerof the DOJ to conduct preliminary
investigation,since there was no publication of the said circular.
ISSUE Whether or not there is a need of publication.
HELD Petitioner's contention is not plausible. In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay the court ruled that only circulars and
regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the
general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provision, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its
penalties: said precedent, to date, has not yet been modified or reversed. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES
NOT contain any penal provision or prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any, under pain or penalty.
In the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453 (1986), the Honorable Court ruled that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular
between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the
DOJ and of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-
001 DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general. Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's
submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 has to be published.
Uy v Sandiganbayan
FACTS Petitioner Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for
Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of official documents and violation of RA 3019. The
petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and
that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense.
The court ruled that :
1. It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a regular
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in
Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, “Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police and
further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines”

2. As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the “rank” requirement stated in
Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts , as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that “In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
Crimproc cases 3rd batch 10

corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding
information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for reconsideration was
filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor filed, which was denied.
The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its
decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.
ISSUE Whatis the extent of the authority of the Ombudsman in conducting preliminary investigation?
HELD The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases
involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses
committed by public officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests the
Ombudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, thus:
“Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.--The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases. Section 11
grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman under the latter’s
supervision and control, the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Margarejo v People 365 SCRA 190
FACTS Sometime in May 12, 1998, more or less 4:00 o’clock in the morning, at Bgy. Sta. Lourdes, City of Puerto Princesa,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control during
election period the following firearms and ammunitions, without first securing the written permit from the COMELEC
to possess the same, which act is in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3064 in relation to Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Before arraignment, motions to quash the afore quoted informations were filed by
petitioners. In the motion to quash filed in Criminal Case No. 14353, petitioners asserted that, “the facts charged in
the Information did not constitute an offense, there being no allegation that `no other crime was committed,’ which is
an essential element of the offense penalized by PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294”. And in the motion to quash filed
in Criminal Case No. 14354, petitioners claimed that, "… the City Prosecutor had no authority to file the information in
said case since COMELEC, which has the exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses, was
conducting its own preliminary investigation for the same act complained of.
ISSUE WON the COMELEC have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute all election
offenses under the OEC?.
HELD YES. “SEC. 2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution Arms of the Government. – The Chief State
Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants are hereby given continuing authority, as
Crimproc cases 3rd batch 11

deputies of the Commission, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the
election laws which may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the Commission or its duly
authorized representatives and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the
Commission whenever in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the
Commission, promote the common good, or when it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by
the Commission.”
In the absence of any revocation of the aforequoted authority by COMELEC, the city prosecutor’s “continuing
delegation” to prosecute Criminal Case No. 14354 stays. At this point, we also take notice that no less than the
counsels for the parties manifested that the COMELEC en banc has deferred further investigation of E.O. No. 98-
170.
[14]
It has also come to our attention that the said election offense principally involves the disqualification and
culpability of the late Gov. Salvador P. Socrates and does not therefore fall squarely with the one before us.
[15]
Thus,
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 14354 must likewise continue.
As regards the third and final issue raised, the same may not be resolved without a full blown trial. Petitioners
argue that P/Supt. F.C. Dimayuga, as Chief of Police of Puerto Princesa City, had no authority to set up check points by
virtue of COMELEC Resolution No. 2968.
[16]
Consequently, the fruits of that allegedly unlawful search are inadmissible.
The Petitioners are wrong. First of all, there is no showing that it was P/Supt. Dimayuga who set up the COMELEC
Checkpoint at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. What is stated in his affidavit is that they were conducting
a COMELEC Checkpoint. “Conducting” may very well mean, manning a duly set up checkpoint. Second, it is hard to
make any determination as to whether the checkpoint in question was sanctioned by either the Commander or the
Director of the AFP or the PNP, respectively. Considering that frantic/emergency calls for assistance were sent to
concerned government agencies and the local media through radio transceivers as early as the previous day, we
cannot discount the possibility that the questioned checkpoint may have been sanctioned by the proper
authorities. Third, the counter affidavit of the Petitioners contradicting the allegations of P/Supt. Dimayuga’s affidavit
only bolster the need for trial in order to ferret out the truth.
Petitioners are reminded that questions of fact are not permitted under Rule 65, the inquiry being limited only to
the issue of whether or not the public respondent – the respondent judge in this case – acted without or in excess of
his jurisdiction.
[17]

All these considered, no capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic actions equivalent to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction may be validly attributed to the respondent’s refusal to quash the
informations in question. Petition dismissed.
Oporto v Monserate 356 SCRA 443
FACTS The case is an administrative complaint
[1]
charging Judge Eddie P. Monserate (hereafter, “Judge Monserate”),
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur with “ignorance of the law, harassment and grave
abuse of discretion.” The MTC judge conducted a preliminary investigation despite the fact that the criminal complaint
and the statements of the witnesses were not under oath and certified.
ISSUE Whether or not the judge may be held administratively liabe?
HELD Yes. Respondent Judge Eddie P. Monserate guilty of gross ignorance of the law and resolve to IMPOSE upon him a FINE
in the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt with more severely
Bautista v Sandiganbayan 332 SCRA 126
FACTS The office of the Ombudsman ordered accused to submit a counter-affidavit in answer to an anonymous and unsigned
letter-complaint. Accused complied and after conducting the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman charged him
with violation of the Anti-Graft anf Corrupt Practices Act.
Crimproc cases 3rd batch 12

ISSUE WON the information filed against accused may be quashed on the ground of defect in the preliminary investigation.
HELD No. The petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan of 13 March 1998 denying petitioner Franklin P.
Bautista's Motion to Quash in Crim. Case No. 24276 and its Resolution of 9 October 1998 denying reconsideration are
AFFIRMED. Consequently, public respondents Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and the Office of the Ombudsman are
directed to proceed with the hearing and trial of Crim. Case No. 24276 against petitioner until terminated.
Sasot v People 462 SCRA 138
FACTS An information was filed against Sasot for possible violation of Art. 189 of the RPC onunfair competition. Sasot filed for
motion to quash the information on the grounds that there was nooffense as the NBA Properties Inc. is a foreign
corporation not doing business in the Philippines and
could therefore have no standing to sue. Sasot’s Motion to Quash Information was denied by RTC
and CA, hence this certiorari. SC held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the
denial of a motion to quash an information.
ISSUE Is a special civil action for
certiorari
the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information?
HELD NO. The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial
of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial
without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial
on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.Thus, petitioners
should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to
trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional
circumstances in the present case such that immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari should be permitted.

Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time the alleged criminal
acts were committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, and nowhere is there any mention of the
defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to
quash.

Acomplaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by
complainant’s affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any
fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a
notary public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits.
 Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure grounds for quashing an information:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the
offense charged.
 Even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect
of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.
 Also cited in this case is La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez which is similar to the present case where it was
Crimproc cases 3rd batch 13

held that if prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the
Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no longer the
petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act against the State. It is the
latter which is principally the injured party although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue
would become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case. We cannot allow a possible violator of our
criminal statutes to escape prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a
crime has no standing to sue.