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Case#100

BUSTAMANTE VS. AREVALO
73 Phil 635

FACT:
The testatrix in this case executed two wills, one on January 9, 1936, and the other on October 2, 1937. In the
first will, the testatrix specifically referred to seven parcels of land of considerable value and to certain
personal properties. Three of these parcels of land and all the personal properties are given to Amando
Clemente, another three to Ariston Bustamante, and the seventh parcel to Petrona Arevalo and Carmen Papa.
In the second will, the testatrix particularly referred to only five parcels of land and certain personal
properties, all of which are give to Ariston Bustamante, as her universal heir. The second will does not make
mention of two of the three parcels given to Amando Clemente under the first will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the later will, whose probate is herein approved, has entirely revoked the earlier will.

HELD
NO. The two wills can be reconciled, the first should be considered revoked only in so far as it is inconsistent
with the second. As the second will was executed only twenty-one months after the first, the testatrix, who
has been conclusively shown to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the later will, could not have
forgotten that she owned two other parcels of land, especially if they are of considerable value. Even the
lawyer who drafted the second will was aware that the testatrix owned the said two parcels, because they
were included in the inventory made of her properties in connection with the administration proceedings of
the estate of her deceased husband. This omission could have been made only on purpose, and, coupled with
the circumstance that the section will does not expressly revoke the first which has not been burned, torn,
cancelled or obliterated, inevitably leads to the inference that the testatrix in face intended to make the first
will effective as to the two parcels of land above referred to.
Section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
No will shall be revoked, except by implication of law, otherwise than by some will, codicil, or other
writing executed as provided in case of wills; or by burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the
same with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction.
x x x x x x x x x
If partially conflicting, that of the latter date will operate to revoke the former so far as the provisions
of the two are conflicting or incompatible, and in such case both wills are entitled to probate. (68
Corpus Juris 805.)

Where there is no revocation in a later will of all former wills, two separate and distinct wills may be probated,
especially when the probating of one only of the instruments would leave an intestacy as to part of the estate.
This rule applies even though the later instrument states that it is the last will and testament of the testator, as
the use of such words in a later instrument does not of itself revoke a prior will. (Id. p. 885.)


Case#101
DIAZ V. DE LEON
G.R. No. 17714
May 31, 1922

Topic/Doctrine: Revocation of a will

FACTS:
Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the requirements under the
law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to him. As it was returned, he
instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was
asked by his physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed.


ISSUE:
WON there was a valid revocation of the will?

HELD:
Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or change the
provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the witnesses and the
mother superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will which was presented
for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament of testator.




Case#102
GAGO VS. MAMUYAC
G.R. No. L-26317
January 29, 1927

Topic/Doctrine: Revocation of a will

FACTS:
Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27,
1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16,
1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground
of the existence of the second will. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The
oppositors alleged that the second will presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will
was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document.
Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the testator. The
lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

ISSUE:
WON there was a valid revocation of the will

HELD:
Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will cannot be
found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen,
the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or
destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it
can no longer be found after his death.


CASE#103
MOLO v MOLO
90 PHIL 37
ANGELO; 1951

NATURE
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal admitting to probate the last will and testament of
the deceased Mariano Molo y Legaspi executed on August 17, 1918.

FACTS
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of Rizal, without
leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the
herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz,
Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi,
deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918,
and another executed on June 20, 1939. THE LATTER WILL CONTAINS A CLAUSE WHICH EXPRESSLY REVOKES
THE WILL EXECUTED IN 1918.
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition, seeking the
probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no opposition, the will was
probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to
probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their
evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner
failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February 24, 1944, filed
another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, in the same court.
Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is
now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the
manner required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked.

ISSUE
WON the declaration of nullity of a subsequent will by the probate court (the 1939 will in this case, which
purports to revoke the 1918 will) would have the effect of resurrecting the prior will.

HELD
YES
This is the DOCTRINE OF DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION. The failure of the new testamentary disposition,
upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and
HENCE PREVENTS THE REVOCATION OF THE ORIGINAL WILL. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in
place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is
dependent upon the valid execution of a new will."
A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it
was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the
making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is
void (Samson vs. Naval, 41 Phil., 838)..
THE THEORY ON WHICH THIS PRINCIPLE IS PREDICATED IS THAT THE TESTATOR DID NOT INTEND TO DIE
INTESTATE. AND THIS INTENTION IS CLEARLY MANIFEST WHEN HE EXECUTED TWO WILLS ON TWO DIFFERENT
OCCASIONS AND INSTITUTED HIS WIFE AS HIS UNIVERSAL HEIR. THERE CAN THEREFORE BE NO MISTAKE AS TO
HIS INTENTION OF DYING TESTATE.





CASE#104
CUA v VARGAS
506 SCRA 374,
October 31, 2006


FACTS:
The late Paulina Vargas left behind a parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters in Virac, C atanduanes. A
Notarized Extra-judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by Paulina’s nine (9) heirs, namely: Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas,
JuanVargas, Zenaida Matienzo, Rosario Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, portioning
and adjudication among themselves the lot in question in equal shares. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did
not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The ExtraJudicial Settlement among Heirs was
published in the Catanduanes Tribune. An Extra-judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by the
same heirs over the same property and also with the same equal sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and
Rosario signed the document and their respectiveshares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner
herein. According to Gloria Vargas, one of respondents herein, she came to know of the ExtraJudicial Settlement
among Heirs with Sale only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished sometime and she likewise claimed
she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs involving the same property had been published in the
Catanduanes Tribune. After knowing of the sale of the 55 sq. meters to the petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property
but to no avail. Thus, she filed a case for the annulment of Extra-judicial Sale and Legal Redemption of the lot. The MTC and RTC
ruled in favor of the petitioners but the CA reversed the decision of the lower courts and declared that the Extra-judicial
Settlement Among Heirs and Extra- judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were void and without legal effect.

ISSUE:
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial
settlement and partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published.

HELD:
NO. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who
do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has
been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to
participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed
as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs. This is not to
say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the
estate. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner
of their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same.


CASE#105
DOROTHEO vs. CA
320 SCRA 12

FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro and Aniceta. Aniceta died in 1969
without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Lourdes, claiming to have taken care of Alejandro
before he died, filed a petition for probate of Alejandro’s will. In 1981, the will was admitted to probate but
private respondents did not appeal from the said order. In 1983, upon motion of the private respondents, the
trial court ruled that the will was intrinsically void and declared private respondents as the only heirs of the
late spouses.

HELD: Probate proceedings deal generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated
particularly on these aspects:

•Whether the will submitted is indeed the decedent’s last will and testament
•Compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills
•The testamentary capacity of the testator
•And the due execution of the last will and testament. Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a
determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution.

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will
has been authenticated.

Doctrine: It does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testaments is always
intrinsically valid













CASE#278
GONZALEZ v CFI OF MANILA
1

104 SCRA 161
AQUINO

NATURE
Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her
complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserva troncal,
the properties which her mother Filomena Roces inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda

FACTS
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died in Manila on June 17, 1933. He was
survived by his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions
by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were
represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which
she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication,
Filomena Roces succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held
proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two hand-written identical documents wherein she disposed of the
properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and
Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all).
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the
properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children
inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order
dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of
Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a
motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be
inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito,
Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action
against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a
declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her
holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs.
Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
The lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzalez. I

ISSUES
1. Whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code,
formerly article 811.

2. Whether Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in her will in favor of her
grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.






.
HELD
1. YES
The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly,
she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda
2. NO
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable
properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not
form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition
mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from the
prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives
within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not
select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their
share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of
the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a
glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.