1

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ROANE COUNTY, TENNESSEE

FREDERICK MICHAEL BORMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 14-CV-36
)
v. )
)
LARRY KEVIN PYLES-BORMAN, )
)
Defendant. )


BRIEF OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN SUPPORT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TENNESSEE’S MARRIAGE LAWS


INTRODUCTION

Tennessee statutes regulating marriage are set forth in Chapter 3 of Title 36
of the Tennessee Code. See generally Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-3-101 to -505. The claims
of Plaintiff, Frederick Michael Borman, concern two separate Tennessee laws
defining marriage; he asks this Court to declare Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18 and Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-3-113 (“Tennessee’s Marriage Laws”) unconstitutional under (1) the
Equal Protection Clause and (2) the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution. (Brief of Plaintiff, p. 2.)
Both claims fail. First, Plaintiff’s equal-protection argument is defeated by
binding Supreme Court precedent in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), which
stands for the proposition that state bans on same-sex marriages do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Regardless, however, same-sex marriage claims are subject
only to rational-basis scrutiny, see, e.g., Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433,
438 (6th Cir. 2012), and Tennessee’s Marriage Laws satisfy this low threshold.
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Second, Plaintiff’s full-faith-and-credit argument is defeated by the public policy
exception, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court and the Tennessee
Court of Appeals. See e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979); In re Riggs, 612
S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. App. 1980).
LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and Defendant, Larry Kevin Pyles-Borman, were married in Iowa in
2010. (Brief of Plaintiff, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff has now petitioned for divorce. (Brief of
Plaintiff, p. 1.) Tennessee’s Marriage Laws recognize only marriage between one man
and one woman. The Tennessee Code provides:
(a) Tennessee's marriage licensing laws reinforce, carry forward, and
make explicit the long-standing public policy of this state to recognize
the family as essential to social and economic order and the common
good and as the fundamental building block of our society. To that end,
it is further the public policy of this state that the historical institution
and legal contract solemnizing the relationship of one (1) man and one
(1) woman shall be the only legally recognized marital contract in this
state in order to provide the unique and exclusive rights and privileges
to marriage.

(b) The legal union in matrimony of only one (1) man and one (1) woman
shall be the only recognized marriage in this state.

(c) Any policy, law or judicial interpretation that purports to define
marriage as anything other than the historical institution and legal
contract between one (1) man and one (1) woman is contrary to the
public policy of Tennessee.

(d) If another state or foreign jurisdiction issues a license for persons to
marry, which marriages are prohibited in this state, any such marriage
shall be void and unenforceable in this state.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113.


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Similarly, the Tennessee Constitution provides:
The historical institution and legal contract solemnizing the
relationship of one (1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only legally
recognized marital contract in this state. Any policy or law or judicial
interpretation, purporting to define marriage as anything other than the
historical institution and legal contract between one (1) man and one (1)
woman, is contrary to the public policy of this state and shall be void
and unenforceable in Tennessee. If another state or foreign jurisdiction
issues a license for persons to marry and if such marriage is prohibited
in this state by the provisions of this section, then the marriage shall be
void and unenforceable in this state.

Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18.

On March 7, 2014, Plaintiff provided notice to the Attorney General of his
intention to challenge the constitutionality of Tennessee’s Marriage Laws, namely,
Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113, and “any other provision of
Tennessee law purporting to prohibit the Court from granting [Plaintiff]
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a divorce
on the grounds that the parties’ valid Iowa marriage was a same-sex rather than an
opposite-sex marriage.”
On May 1, 2014, the Attorney General filed a Motion to Intervene for the
limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of Tennessee’s Marriage Laws. On
May 6, 2014, this Court granted the Motion and set a briefing schedule.
ARGUMENT

I. TENNESSEE’S MARRIAGE LAWS DO NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution “prohibits
discrimination by government which either burdens a fundamental right, targets a

1
The notice contained a typographical error in that it challenged laws prohibiting this Court from
granting a divorce to “Defendant.”
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suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than others similarly situated
without any rational basis for the difference.” Rondigo, L.L.C., v. Twp. of Richmond,
641 F.3d 673, 681-82 (6th Cir. 2011). Because Tennessee’s Marriage Laws do none of
these things, they do not deny equal protection.
A. Plaintiff’s Equal-Protection Claim Fails Because Tennessee’s
Marriage Laws Do Not Discriminate Against Him.

The fundamental premise of Plaintiff’s equal-protection claim is that
“Tennessee law treat[s] valid same-sex Iowa marriages ‘as second class marriages’
that will not be recognized by Tennessee” and that “Tennessee will grant a divorce
for an opposite-sex couple who are residents of Tennessee and were married in Iowa.”
(Brief of Plaintiff, p. 5.) But these assertions are incorrect. The plain language of
Tennessee’s Marriage Laws clearly states that Plaintiff’s marriage is but one of many
types of marriages not recognized by the State. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113(d) (“If
another state or foreign jurisdiction issues a license for persons to marry, which
marriages are prohibited in this state, any such marriage shall be void and
unenforceable.”) (emphasis added). Included in that group, to be sure, are same-sex
marriages, but also included are other marriages that Tennessee law prohibits. See
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-3-101 & -102. See also Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18; Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-3-113(b) (recognizing only the union of one man and one woman as
marriage).
Plaintiff is not treated any differently by Tennessee’s Marriage Laws than his
peers in the similarly situated class of persons whose marriages are prohibited within
Tennessee, so Plaintiff’s claim that only same-sex marriages are “second class” is
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inapt. Out-of-state same-sex marriages are not singled out for different treatment.
Tennessee’s Marriage Laws treat out-of-state same-sex marriages exactly the same
as any other out-of-state marriage that is prohibited in Tennessee.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he is suffering
disparate treatment from the similarly situated class of persons with out-of-state
marriages that are not recognized under Tennessee’s Marriage Laws, his equal-
protection claim must fail.
B. Plaintiff’s Equal-Protection Claim Fails In Any Event Because
Tennessee’s Marriage Laws Satisfy the Rational-Basis Test.

Even if it were correct for Plaintiff to compare himself to opposite-sex couples
with out-of-state marriages that are recognized in Tennessee, and even if the
constitutionality of Tennessee’s Marriage Laws ultimately depends upon the
constitutional validity of Tennessee’s definition of marriage as the union of one man
and one woman, Plaintiff’s equal-protection claim still fails. The decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), stands for the
proposition that a state law limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause;
2
Baker is binding on this Court and compels the
conclusion that Plaintiff’s equal-protection claims cannot succeed. See, e.g., Jackson
v. Abercrombie, 884 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1088 (D. Haw. 2012) (“Baker is the last word

2
Baker so holds by virtue of the Supreme Court’s dismissal, for want of a substantial federal question,
of an appeal from the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Such a dismissal constitutes a
disposition on the merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). The Minnesota Supreme Court
had held in Baker that: “The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is not offended
by a state’s classification of persons authorized to marry. There is no irrational or invidious
discrimination.” Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (1971).
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from the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of a state law limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples and thus remains binding on this Court.”). In any
event, Plaintiff’s equal-protection claim fails because Tennessee’s Marriage Laws do
not burden a fundamental right, do not target a suspect class, and do not discriminate
without a rational basis.
1. There Is No Fundamental Right to Same-Sex Marriage.
To qualify as a fundamental right, “such rights must be ‘deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition,’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that
‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’” Does II & III v. Munoz,
507 F.3d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977), and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). Given the
Supreme Court’s reluctance to expand the list of fundamental rights, the Court has
also required “a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Id.
The concept of same-sex marriage is not “deeply rooted” in this Nation’s history
and tradition; same-sex marriage was unknown in the laws of this Nation before
2003. See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that “[i]t is beyond
dispute that the right to same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition” and noting that no State permitted same-sex marriage until
2003). And while Plaintiff has broadly asserted a fundamental right to marry, he is
actually claiming a narrower right: the right to marry someone of the same sex. See
Jackson, 884 F.Supp.2d at 1071 (“Carefully describing the right at issue, as required
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by both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, the right Plaintiffs seek to exercise
is the right to marry someone of the same sex.”).
Supreme Court decisions recognize the right to enter into a legally recognized
marriage only with a qualified person of the opposite sex. See Jackson, 884 F.Supp.2d
at 1095 (“Significantly, the Supreme Court cases involving the fundamental right to
marry all involved opposite-sex couples. Consequently, the Supreme Court, in
discussing the fundamental right to marry, has had no reason to consider anything
other than the traditional and ordinary understanding of marriage as a union
between a man and a woman.”); see also Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1306
(M.D. Fla. 2005) (“Although the Supreme Court has held that marriage is a
fundamental right, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, no federal court has
recognized that this right includes the right to marry a person of the same sex.”).
Plaintiff cannot escape the history and meaning of the right to marry, which has
always been tied to the procreative purposes of marriage between a man and a
woman. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”);
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (Marriage “is the foundation of the family
and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress”).
Carefully described, Plaintiff’s asserted right is the novel and narrow right to marry
a person of the same sex, which is not a fundamental right.


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2. Sexual Orientation Is Not a Suspect Class.
Under Sixth Circuit precedent, it is well settled that sexual orientation “is not
a suspect class in this circuit.”
3
Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v.
City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 292-94 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Davis v. Prison
Health Services, 679 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that “this court has not
recognized sexual orientation as a suspect classification” and applying rational basis
review); Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir. 2006)
(stating that “homosexuality is not a suspect class in this circuit”). The Supreme
Court’s decisions in Windsor and in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), do not
conflict with this precedent. See Jackson, 884 F.Supp.2d at 1102 (concluding that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence was not irreconcilable with the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that homosexuality is not a suspect class).
Furthermore, same-sex marriage bans do not discriminate on the basis of
gender. See Jackson, 884 F.Supp.2d at 1098 (“an opposite-sex definition of marriage
does not constitute gender discrimination”). Under Tennessee’s Marriage Laws,
“[m]en and women are treated identically . . . ; neither may marry a person of the
same sex.” Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 988 (Wash. 2006). In other words,
“[w]omen, as members of one class, are not being treated differently from men, as

3
Tennessee courts have not addressed this issue. However, the Supreme Court has never recognized
sexual orientation as a suspect classification for equal-protection purposes, and with the exception of
the Second Circuit in Windsor and the Ninth Circuit, all other circuits that have addressed the issue
have ruled likewise. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008); Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524
F.3d 1103, 1114 n.9 (10th Cir. 2008); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir. 2004); Lofton v.
Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004); Veney v. Wyche, 293
F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 2002); Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2002);
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 685 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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members of a different class.” In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
2004); see also Bishop v. United States, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, at 49-50 (N.D. OK
Jan. 14, 2014) (“Common sense dictates that the intentional discrimination occurring
in this case has nothing to do with gender-based prejudice or stereotypes, and the law
cannot be subject to heightened scrutiny on that basis.”) In fact, the Supreme Court
has never found a sex-based classification where the law in question did not have a
disparate impact on one sex or the other. Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F.Supp.2d
861, 876-77 (C.D. Cal. 2006), affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by
Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006).
3. Tennessee’s Marriage Laws Have a Rational Basis.
Under rational-basis review, a law is presumed constitutional, and “[t]he
burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negate every
conceivable basis which might support it.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)
(internal quotations omitted); see also Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir.
2001) (stating that a statute is subject to a “strong presumption of validity” under
rational-basis review and will be upheld “if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis.”).
A court conducting a rational-basis review does not sit “as a super legislature
to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations” but asks only
whether there is some conceivable rational basis for the challenged statute. Heller,
509 U.S. at 319; see also Gallaher v. Elam, 104 S.W.3d 455, 461 (Tenn. 2003) (“Our
inquiry into legislative choice usually is limited to whether the challenged
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classifications have a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest.”) Under
rational-basis review, it is “‘constitutionally irrelevant [what] reasoning in fact
underlays the legislative decision.’” R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)
(quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)). In enacting Tennessee’s
Marriage Laws, the General Assembly and the citizens of Tennessee had “absolutely
no obligation to select the scheme” that a court might later conclude was best. Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. A.T. & S.F.R. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 477 (1985). See McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961) (“State legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that in practice, their laws
result in some inequality.”). And Tennessee “has no obligation to produce evidence to
sustain the rationality of its action; its choice is presumptively valid and ‘may be
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’” TriHealth,
Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 430 F.3d 783, 790 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting FCC v. Beach
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
The presumption that a law is constitutional is even stronger with regard to
laws passed by the citizens themselves at the ballot box, and the constitutional
provision that is part of Tennessee’s Marriage Laws was passed by Tennessee voters.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1991) (applying rational-basis review
and noting that the Court was “dealing not merely with government action, but with
a state constitutional provision approved by the people of Missouri as a whole” and
therefore the “constitutional provision reflects . . . the considered judgment . . . of the
citizens of Missouri who voted for it.”). In adopting the marriage amendment to the
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Tennessee Constitution, “[Tennessee] voters exercised their privilege to enact laws
as a basic exercise of their democratic power” Schuette v. Coal. To Defend Affirmative
Action, Integration and Immigration Rights and Fight for Equal. By Any Means
Necessary (BAMN), 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1636 (2014) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.).
And “[i]t is demeaning to the democratic process to presume that the voters are not
capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.” Id. at
1637.
The State does not bear the burden to prove a rational basis; “‘[t]he existence
of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed.’” American Exp. Travel
Related Services Co., Inc. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685, 693 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)). The “heavy burden of
‘negat[ing] every conceivable basis which might support [the enactment]’” must be
placed on Plaintiff. Id. at 694 (quoting Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir.
2000)).
Tennessee’s Marriage Laws have a rational basis in law and thus do not violate
equal protection. “[M]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race.” Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[Marriage] is the foundation of the family in
our society.”); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (Marriage “is the foundation
of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress.”). Marriage can simply not be divorced from its traditional procreative
purpose. See Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 897
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(1st ed. 1828) (marriage “was instituted . . . for the purpose of preventing the
promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, for promoting domestic felicity, and for securing
the maintenance and education of children”); see also Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2718
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“there is no doubt that, throughout human history and across
many cultures, marriage has been viewed as an exclusively opposite-sex institution
and as one inextricably linked to procreation and biological kinship”). The promotion
of family continuity and stability is certainly a legitimate state interest, see Nordinger
v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 13, 17 (1992), and Tennessee’s Marriage Laws expressly
recognize the family “as the fundamental building block of our society.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-3-113(a).
Obviously, though, “[s]ame-sex couples cannot naturally procreate.” Jackson,
884 F.Supp.2d at 1112. Biology alone, therefore, provides a rational explanation for
Tennessee’s decision not to extend marriage to same-sex couples. See Citizens for
Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 867 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that state
constitutional amendment recognizing marriage only between a man and a woman
was rational “based on a ‘responsible procreation’ theory that justifies conferring the
inducements of marital recognition and benefits on opposite-sex couples, who can
otherwise produce children by accident, but not on same-sex couples, who cannot”);
Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d. 364, 369 (Mont. 2012) (Rice, J., concurring) (“Beyond
these reasons of family, societal stability, governance and progress, as important as
they are, courts analyzing marriage have focused upon even more compelling reasons:
its exclusive role in procreation and in insuring the survival, protection and thriving
13

of the human race.”); see also Jackson, 884 F.Supp.2d at 1113 n.36 (citing cases)
(“Many courts have credited the responsible-procreation theory and held that there
is a rational link between the capability of naturally conceiving children—unique to
two people of opposite genders—and limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).
4

Again, a court does not review a statute’s wisdom or desirability but considers
only whether it has a rational basis. And there is nothing irrational about limiting
the institution of marriage to the purpose for which it was created, by embracing its
traditional definition. To conclude otherwise is to impose one’s own view of what a
State ought to do on the subject of same-sex marriage. See Bruning, 455 F.3d at 867-
68 (“Whatever our personal views regarding this political and sociological debate, we
cannot conclude that the State’s justification ‘lacks a rational relationship to
legitimate state interest.’”) (internal quotations omitted). “This case is not about how
the debate about [same-sex marriage] should be resolved. It is about who may resolve
it.” BAMN, 134 S.Ct. at 1638. Marriage is the province of the individual states, and
in 2006 Tennessee voters resolved the debate for Tennessee.
II. TENNESSEE’S MARRIAGE LAWS DO NOT VIOLATE THE FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.

The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution provides:
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and

4
Accidental pregnancies are often difficult on both parents and children, and doubly so when one
parent is subsequently left to care for the child as a single-parent without the support of their partner.
See Dean v. Compton, No. M1998-00052-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 329351 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2000);
In re D.D.V., No. M2001-02282-COA-R3-JV, 2002 WL 225891 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2002); Kathryne
B.F. v. Michael B., No. W2013-01757-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 992110 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2014).
Tennessee certainly has an interest in ensuring that accidental pregnancies are more likely to occur
within a stable family unit bound by marriage.
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judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Plaintiff argues
that Tennessee’s Marriage Laws violate this Clause and that it requires that his Iowa
marriage to Defendant must be recognized in Tennessee. (Brief of Plaintiff, pp. 5-6.)
This is not so. First, the Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot work to invalidate
state law. Second, and in any event, “[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
require a State to apply another State’s law in violation of its own legitimate public
policy.” Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-22 (1979); see also In re Riggs, 612 S.W.2d
461, 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (“[A] final judgment in a sister state is ordinarily
conclusive upon the merits in every other state . . . however, we are not obliged to
give full faith and credit to any judgment of a state which we hold to be violative of
Tennessee's public policy or the Federal Constitution.”); Blackwell v. Haslam, No.
M2012-01991-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 3379364, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2013)
(“[A] forum state may decline to give full faith and credit to a sister state's judgment
if doing so would be contrary to the forum state's fundamental interests.”). In Riggs,
the Tennessee Court of Appeals declined to extend full faith and credit to a Georgia
termination-of-parental-rights order and adoption decree that were valid in that state
but determined to be in violation of Tennessee public policy and the Federal
Constitution. Riggs, 612 S.W.2d at 463-64, 69.
Tennessee public policy is “found in its constitution, statutes, judicial
decisions, and applicable rules of common law.” Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845,
851 (Tenn. 1998). Tennessee has both a constitutional and statutory provision that
clearly express Tennessee’s public policy regarding marriage: Tenn. Const. art. XI, §
15

18 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113. And Tennessee’s Marriage Laws do not permit
recognition of marriages from other States that are prohibited in Tennessee,
including same-sex marriages. Under the public policy exception to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, therefore, Tennessee is not obligated to recognize Plaintiff’s
marriage.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject Plaintiff’s constitutional
challenge to Tennessee’s Marriage Laws.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

____________________________
KATHRYN A. BAKER
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
General Civil Division
P.O. Box 20207
Nashville, TN 37202-20207
(615) 741-7630
BPR No. 031958






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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been forwarded
by first-class U.S. Mail, postage paid, to:

Mark N. Foster, Esq.
P.O. Box 192
Rockwood, Tennessee 37854
Attorney for Plaintiff

Larry Kevin Pyles-Borman
P.O. Box 204
Harriman, Tennessee 37748


this _____ day of May, 2014


____________________________________
KATHRYN A. BAKER
Assistant Attorney General

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