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CASE DIGEST

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR


COUNCIL (JBC)
G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.


FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or
seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V.
Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that
the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that
they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice
to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a
result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and
published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the
Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next
step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their
sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno
in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President
its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either
the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist,
or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A
precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998
of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch
62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as
the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the
exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period
therein fixed.


ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.

3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.

4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the
shortlist of nominees by the JBC.



HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by
the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases,
suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law
or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by
the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and
so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.

2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or
controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already
commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list
to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief
Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that
the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it
has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing
President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination,
because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the
short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The
resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are
preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are
reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.

3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to
meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness
indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were
not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their
intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen,
Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers
vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt
with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4
(1), Article VIII.

4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when
the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or
officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a
particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the
plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant
to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the
performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not
discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.


















Caltex Vs. Palomar (Case Digest) G.R. No. L-
19650

Facts: In 1960, the petitioner, Caltex (Philippines) Inc., launched a promotional scheme called
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a
hooded gas pump of each Caltex Station will dispense within a specific period. Such contest is open
to all motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. There is no required fee or consideration, and
there is no need for the contestants to purchase the products of Caltex. The forms are available upon
request at each Caltex Station and there is a sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be
deposited. Then, seeing the extensive use of mails for publicizing and transmission of
communication purposes, Caltex sent representatives to the postal authorities for advance clearing
for the use of mails for the contest. But then, the Postmaster General, Enrico Palomar, denied the
request of Caltex in view of Sections 1954 (a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The aforesaid sections prohibits the use of mail conveying any information concerning non-mailable
schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme. Consequently, Caltex invoked a judicial
intervention by filing a petition of declaratory relief against the Postmaster General, ordering the
Postmaster General to allow the petitioner to use the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the
public and that the aforesaid contest is not violative of the Postal Law.

Issue:
Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of
the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein.

Held:
No. Caltex may be granted declaratory relief, even if Enrico Palomar simply applied the clear
provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest. For, construction
is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law with respect to its application to a given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

In this case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably required an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used therein. Also, the Court is tasked to look beyond the fair
exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element that the law is seeking to prevent or
prohibit.
Published: January 28, 2011

Source: http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/law/2108497-caltex-vs-palomar-case-
digest/#ixzz2XQAjw19Q






[G.R. No. 153866. February 11, 2005]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY
(PHILIPPINES), respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Business companies registered in and operating from the Special Economic Zone in Naga,
Cebu -- like herein respondent -- are entities exempt from all internal revenue taxes and the
implementing rules relevant thereto, including the value-added taxes or VAT. Although export
sales are not deemed exempt transactions, they are nonetheless zero-rated. Hence, in the
present case, the distinction between exempt entities and exempt transactions has little
significance, because the net result is that the taxpayer is not liable for the VAT.
Respondent, a VAT-registered enterprise, has complied with all requisites for claiming a tax
refund of or credit for the input VAT it paid on capital goods it purchased. Thus, the Court of
Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that it is entitled to such refund or
credit.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the May 27, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 66093. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of
merit.
The Facts
The CA quoted the facts narrated by the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), as follows:
As jointly stipulated by the parties, the pertinent facts x x x involved in this case are as
follows:
1. [Respondent] is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines, with principal office address at the new
Cebu Township One, Special Economic Zone, Barangay Cantao-an, Naga, Cebu;
2. [Petitioner] is sued in his official capacity, having been duly appointed and empowered to
perform the duties of his office, including, among others, the duty to act and approve claims
for refund or tax credit;
3. [Respondent] is registered with the Philippine Export Zone Authority (PEZA) and has been
issued PEZA Certificate No. 97-044 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 66, as amended, to
engage in the manufacture of recording components primarily used in computers for export.
Such registration was made on 6 June 1997;
4. [Respondent] is VAT [(Value Added Tax)]-registered entity as evidenced by VAT Registration
Certification No. 97-083-000600-V issued on 2 April 1997;
5. VAT returns for the period 1 April 1998 to 30 June 1999 have been filed by [respondent];
6. An administrative claim for refund of VAT input taxes in the amount of P28,369,226.38 with
supporting documents (inclusive of the P12,267,981.04 VAT input taxes subject of this
Petition for Review), was filed on 4 October 1999 with Revenue District Office No. 83, Talisay
Cebu;
7. No final action has been received by [respondent] from [petitioner] on [respondents] claim
for VAT refund.
The administrative claim for refund by the [respondent] on October 4, 1999 was not acted
upon by the [petitioner] prompting the [respondent] to elevate the case to [the CTA] on July
21, 2000 by way of Petition for Review in order to toll the running of the two-year
prescriptive period.
For his part, [petitioner] x x x raised the following Special and Affirmative Defenses, to wit:
1. [Respondents] alleged claim for tax refund/credit is subject to administrative routinary
investigation/examination by [petitioners] Bureau;
2. Since taxes are presumed to have been collected in accordance with laws and regulations, the
[respondent] has the burden of proof that the taxes sought to be refunded were erroneously
or illegally collected x x x;
3. In Citibank, N.A. vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 459 (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that:
A claimant has the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of his or her claim for tax
credit/refund.
4. Claims for tax refund/tax credit are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer.
This is due to the fact that claims for refund/credit [partake of] the nature of an exemption
from tax. Thus, it is incumbent upon the [respondent] to prove that it is indeed entitled to
the refund/credit sought. Failure on the part of the [respondent] to prove the same is fatal
to its claim for tax credit. He who claims exemption must be able to justify his claim by the
clearest grant of organic or statutory law. An exemption from the common burden cannot be
permitted to exist upon vague implications;
5. Granting, without admitting, that [respondent] is a Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)
registered Ecozone Enterprise, then its business is not subject to VAT pursuant to Section 24
of Republic Act No. ([RA]) 7916 in relation to Section 103 of the Tax Code, as amended. As
[respondents] business is not subject to VAT, the capital goods and services it alleged to have
purchased are considered not used in VAT taxable business. As such, [respondent] is not
entitled to refund of input taxes on such capital goods pursuant to Section 4.106.1 of Revenue
Regulations No. ([RR])7-95, and of input taxes on services pursuant to Section 4.103 of said
regulations.
6. [Respondent] must show compliance with the provisions of Section 204 (C) and 229 of the
1997 Tax Code on filing of a written claim for refund within two (2) years from the date of
payment of tax.
On July 19, 2001, the Tax Court rendered a decision granting the claim for refund.


Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Decision of the CTA granting the claim for refund or issuance of a
tax credit certificate (TCC) in favor of respondent in the reduced amount of P12,122,922.66.
This sum represented the unutilized but substantiated input VAT paid on capital goods
purchased for the period covering April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999.
The appellate court reasoned that respondent had availed itself only of the fiscal
incentives under Executive Order No. (EO) 226 (otherwise known as the Omnibus Investment
Code of 1987), not of those under both Presidential Decree No. (PD) 66, as amended, and
Section 24 of RA 7916. Respondent was, therefore, considered exempt only from the
payment of income tax when it opted for the income tax holiday in lieu of the 5 percent
preferential tax on gross income earned. As a VAT-registered entity, though, it was still
subject to the payment of other national internal revenue taxes, like the VAT.
Moreover, the CA held that neither Section 109 of the Tax Code nor Sections 4.106-1 and
4.103-1 of RR 7-95 were applicable. Having paid the input VAT on the capital goods it
purchased, respondent correctly filed the administrative and judicial claims for its refund
within the two-year prescriptive period. Such payments were -- to the extent of the
refundable value -- duly supported by VAT invoices or official receipts, and were not yet
offset against any output VAT liability.
Hence this Petition.
Sole Issue
Petitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the refund or issuance of Tax Credit Certificate in
the amount of P12,122,922.66 representing alleged unutilized input VAT paid on capital goods
purchased for the period April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.









Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest
Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support
of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the
1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18.
the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing
initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to
implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion
on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the
initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying
with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.












Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15385 June 30, 1960
ALEJANDRA BUGARIN VDA. DE SARMIENTO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFA R. LESACA, defendant-appellant.
Juan R. Arbizo for appellee.
Pastor de Castro for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J .:
On December 31, 1949, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Zambales praying
for the rescission of the contract of sale executed between her and defendant for failure of the latter
to place the former in the actual physical possession of the lands she bought.
After issues were joined, the parties submitted the case for decision upon the following stipulation of
facts: that on January 18, 1949, plaintiff bought from defendant two parcels of land for P5,000; that
after the sale, plaintiff tried to take actual physical possession of the lands but was prevented from
doing so by one Martin Deloso who claims to be the owner thereof; that on February 1, 1949,
plaintiff instituted an action before the Tenancy Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice
to oust said Martin Deloso from the possession of the lands, which action she later abandoned for
reasons known only to her; that on December 12, 1949, plaintiff wrote defendant asking the latter
either to change the lands sold with another of the same kind and class or to return the purchase price
together with the expenses she had incurred in the execution of the sale, plus 6 per cent interest; and
that since defendant did not agree to this proposition as evidenced by her letter dated December
21,1949, plaintiff filed the present action.
On April 11, 1957, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the deed of sale entered into between
plaintiff and defendant rescinded, and ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P5,000,
representing the purchase price of the lands, plus the amount of P50.25 which plaintiff spent for the
execution and registration of the deed of sale, with legal interest on both sums from January 18,
1949. Defendant, in due time, appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the case was certified to us on
the ground that the questions involved are purely legal.
The issue posed by appellant is whether the execution of the deed of sale in a public document
(Exhibit A) is equivalent to delivery of possession of the lands sold to appellee thus relieving her of
the obligation to place appellee in actual possession thereof.
Articles 1461 and 1462 of the old Civil Code provide:
ART. 1461. The vendor is bound to deliver and warrant the thing which is the subject-matter
of the sale.
ART. 1462. The thing sold shall be deemed delivered when the vendee is placed in the
control and possession thereof.
If the sale should be made by means of a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the subject-matter of the contract unless the
contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred from such instrument.
From the above it is clear that when a contract of sale is executed the vendor is bound to deliver to
the vendee the thing sold by placing the vendee in the control and possession of the subject-matter of
the contract. However, if the sale is executed by means of a public instrument, the mere execution of
the instrument is equivalent to delivery unless the contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred from
such instrument.
The question that now arises is: Is there any stipulation in the sale in question from which we can
infer that the vendor did not intend to deliver outright the possession of the lands to the vendee? We
find none. On the contrary, it can be clearly seen therein that the vendor intended to place the vendee
in actual possession of the lands immediately as can be inferred from the stipulation that the vendee
"takes actual possession thereof ... with full rights to dispose, enjoy and make use thereof in such
manner and form as would be most advantageous to herself." The possession referred to in the
contract evidently refers to actual possession and not merely symbolical inferable from the mere
execution of the document.
Has the vendor complied with this express commitment? she did not. As provided in Article 1462,
the thing sold shall be deemed delivered when the vendee is placed in the control and possession
thereof, which situation does not here obtain because from the execution of the sale up to the present
the vendee was never able to take possession of the lands due to the insistent refusal of Martin
Deloso to surrender them claiming ownership thereof. And although it is postulated in the same
article that the execution of a public document is equivalent to delivery, this legal fiction only holds
true when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the
vendor into those of the vendee. This is what we said in a similar case:
The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing is
considered to be delivered when it is placed "in the hands and possession of the vendee."
(Civ. Code, art. 1462.) It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public
instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but in
order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the
vendor shall have such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material
delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership
and right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no
impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by
the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is
sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have
the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through
another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of
another will, then fiction yields to reality the delivery has not been effected. (Addison vs.
Felix and Tioco, 38 Phil., 404; See also Garchitorena vs. Almeda, 48 Off. Gaz., No., 8, 3432;
3437)
The next question to resolve is: Can plaintiff rescind the contract of sale in view of defendant's
failure to deliver the possession of the lands?
We are inclined to uphold the affirmative. While defendant contends that rescission can be availed of
only in the cases enumerated in Articles 1291 and 1292 of the old civil Code and being a subsidiary
remedy (Article 1294) it can only be resorted to when no other remedy is available, yet we agree
with plaintiff's contention that this action is based on Article 1124 of the same Code, which provides:
Art 1124. The right to resolve reciprocal obligations, in case one of the obligors should fail to
comply with that which is incumbent upon him, is deemed to be implied.
The person prejudiced may choose between exacting the fulfillment of the obligation or its
resolution with indemnity for losses and payment of interest in either case. He may also
demand the resolution of the obligation even after having elected its fulfillment, should the
latter be found impossible.
Undoubtedly in a contract of purchase and sale the obligation of the parties is reciprocal, and, as
provided by the law, in case one of the parties fails to comply with what is incumbent upon him to do
, the person prejudiced may either exact the fulfillment of the obligation or rescind the sale. Since
plaintiff chose the latter alternative, it cannot be disputed that her action is in accordance with law.
We agree with the trial court that there was no fraud in the transaction in question but rather a
non-fulfillment by the plaintiff-appellee C.N. Hodges of his obligation, as vendor, to deliver
the things, which were the subject-matter of the contract, to the defendant-appellant Alberto
Granada, as purchaser thereof (article 1461, Civil Code), and place them in the latter's control
and possession (article 1462, Civil Code) which was not done. Inasmuch as the obligations
arising from the contract of purchase and sale, Exhibit A, which was entered into by the
plaintiff-appellee and the defendant-appellant, are reciprocal and the former had failed to
comply with that which was incumbent upon him, the latter has the implied right to resolve
them, and he may choose between exacting from the vendor the fulfillment of the obligation
or its resolution with indemnity for damages and payment of interest in either case (article
1124, Civil Code). Inasmuch as the defendant-appellant had chosen to rescind the aforesaid
contract of purchase and sale in his cross-complaint, there arose the necessity on the part of
the plaintiff-appellee, to return the purchase price with interest thereon, and on the part of the
defendant-appellant, to restore the things which were the subject-matter thereof, in case he
had received them (article 1295, Civil Code). (Hodges vs. Granada, 59 Phil., 429, 432; See
also Pabalan vs. Velez, 22 Phil., 29; Addison vs. Felix and Tioco, supra; Rodriguez vs.
Flores, 43 Off. Gaz., No. 6, 2247.)
Wherefore the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant.







San Miguel Corporation vs CA Case Digest
San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 146775
January 30, 2002

Facts: On 17 October 1992, the Department of Labor and Employment conducted a routine
inspection in the premises of San Miguel Corporation in Sta. Filomena, Iligan City. In the course of
the inspection, it was discovered that there was underpayment by SMC of regular Muslim holiday
pay to its employees. DOLE sent a copy of the inspection result to SMC and it was received by and
explained to its personnel officer Elena dela Puerta.

SMC contested the findings and DOLE conducted summary hearings on 19 November 1992, 28
May 1993 and 4 and 5 October 1993. Still, SMC failed to submit proof that it was paying regular
Muslim holiday pay to its employees. Hence, Director IV of DOLE Iligan District Office issued a
compliance order directing SMC to consider Muslim holidays as regular holidays and to pay both its
Muslim and non-Muslim employees holiday pay within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the order.
SMC appealed but it was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the employees are entitled with regular Muslim holiday pay.

Ruling: The employees are entitled to regular Muslim holiday pay. Muslim holidays are provided
under Articles 169 and 170, Title I, Book V, of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, which states: Official Muslim holidays. The following are
hereby recognized as legal Muslim holidays:

(a) 'Amun Jadd (New Year), which falls on the first day of the first lunar month of Muharram;

(b) Maulid-un-Nab (Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad), which falls on the twelfth day of the third
lunar month of Rabi-ul-Awwal,

(c) Lailatul Isr Wal Mi'rj (Nocturnal Journey and Ascension of the Prophet Muhammad), which
falls on the twenty-seventh day of the seventh lunar month of Rajab:

(d) 'd-ul-Fitr (Hari Raya Puasa), which falls on the first day of the tenth lunar month of Shawwal,
commemorating the end of the fasting season; and

(e) 'd-ul-Adh (Hari Raya Haji),which falls on the tenth day of the twelfth lunar month of Dh'l-Hijja.

Art. 170 provides the provinces and cities where officially observed. (1) Muslim holidays shall be
officially observed in the Provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North
Cotabato, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, and Zamboanga and in such other Muslim provinces and cities
as may hereafter be created; (2) Upon proclamation by the President of the Philippines, Muslim
holidays may also be officially observed in other provinces and cities.

The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article 94 of the Labor Code, which
provides: Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular
holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid
a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate;

However, there should be no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as regards payment of
benefits for Muslim holidays. The Court reminds the respondent-appellant that wages and other
emoluments granted by law to the working man are determined on the basis of the criteria laid down
by laws and certainly not on the basis of the worker's faith or religion.

At any rate, Article 3(3) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 also declares that ". . . nothing herein shall
be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim." In addition, the 1999 Handbook on
Workers' Statutory Benefits states considering that all private corporations, offices, agencies, and
entities or establishments operating within the designated Muslim provinces and cities are required
to observe Muslim holidays, both Muslim and Christians working within the Muslim areas may not
report for work on the days designated by law as Muslim holidays.









Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Edwin Cuizon and Erwin Cuizon
G.R. No. 167552 April 23, 2007Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
Eurotech is engaged in the business of importation and distribution of various European
industrialequipment. It has as one of its customers Impact Systems Sales which is a sole proprietorship
ownedby Erwin Cuizon.
Eurotech sold to Impact Systems various products allegedly amounting to P91,338.00. Cuizonssought to buy
from Eurotech 1 unit of sludge pump valued at P250,000.00 with Cuizons making adown payment of
P50,000.00. When the sludge pump arrived from the United Kingdom, Eurotechrefused to deliver the same
to Cuizons without their having fully settled their indebtedness toEurotech. Thus, Edwin Cuizon and Alberto
de Jesus, general manager of Eurotech, executed a Deedof Assignment of receivables in favor of Eurotech.
Cuizons, despite the existence of the Deed of Assignment, proceeded to collect from Toledo PowerCompany
the amount of P365,135.29. Eurotech made several demands upon Cuizons to pay theirobligations. As a
result, Cuizons were able to make partial payments to Eurotech. Cuizons totalobligations stood at
P295,000.00 excluding interests and attorneys fees.
Edwin Cuizon alleged that he is not a real party in interest in this case. According to him, he wasacting as
mere agent of his principal, which was the Impact Systems, in his transaction with Eurotechand the latter
was very much aware of this fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Edwin exceeded his authority when he signed the Deed of Assignment thereby binding
himself personally to pay the obligations to Eurotech
HELD:
No.
Edwin insists that he was a mere agent of Impact Systems which is owned by Erwin and that his status as
such is known even to Eurotech as it is alleged in the Complaint that he is being sued in his capacity as the
sales manager of the said business venture. Likewise, Edwin points to the Deed of Assignment which clearly
states that he was acting as a representative of Impact Systems in said transaction.
Art. 1897. The agent who acts as such is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he
expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice of his
powers.
In a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation
or on behalf of another with the latters consent. Its purpose is to extend the personality of the principal or
the party for whom another acts and from whom he or she derives the authority to act. The basis of agency
is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his
authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal.
elements of the contract of agency: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the
relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as
a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority
An agent, who acts as such, is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts. There are
2instances when an agent becomes personally liable to a third person. The first is when he expresslybinds
himself to the obligation and the second is when he exceeds his authority. In the last instance,the agent can
be held liable if he does not give the third party sufficient notice of his powers. Edwindoes not fall within any
of the exceptions contained in Art. 1897.
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a managing agent may enter into any contracts thathe
deems reasonably necessary or requisite for the protection of the interests of his principalentrusted to his
management.
Edwin Cuizon acted well-within his authority when he signed the Deed of Assignment. Eurotechrefused to
deliver the 1 unit of sludge pump unless it received, in full, the payment for ImpactSystems indebtedness.
Impact Systems desperately needed the sludge pump for its business sinceafter it paid the amount of
P50,000.00 as downpayment it still persisted in negotiating with Eurotech which culminated in the execution
of the Deed of Assignment of its receivables from Toledo Power Company. The significant amount of time
spent on the negotiation for the sale of the sludge pump underscores Impact Systems perseverance to get
hold of the said equipment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
Aggrieved by the adverse ruling of the trial court, petitioner brought the matter to the Court of
Appeals which, however, affirmed the 29 January 2002 Order of the court a quo. The dispositive
portion of the now assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, finding no viable legal ground to reverse or modify the conclusions reached by the
public respondent in his Order dated January 29, 2002, it is hereby AFFIRMED.
24

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution
promulgated on 17 March 2005. Hence, the present petition raising, as sole ground for its allowance,
the following:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT
RESPONDENT EDWIN CUIZON, AS AGENT OF IMPACT SYSTEMS SALES/ERWIN
CUIZON, IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE, BECAUSE HE HAS NEITHER ACTED BEYOND
THE SCOPE OF HIS AGENCY NOR DID HE PARTICIPATE IN THE PERPETUATION OF A
FRAUD.
25

To support its argument, petitioner points to Article 1897 of the New Civil Code which states:
Art. 1897. The agent who acts as such is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts,
unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party
sufficient notice of his powers.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the effect of ERWINs act of
collecting the receivables from the Toledo Power Corporation notwithstanding the existence of the
Deed of Assignment signed by EDWIN on behalf of Impact Systems. While said collection did not
revoke the agency relations of respondents, petitioner insists that ERWINs action repudiated
EDWINs power to sign the Deed of Assignment. As EDWIN did not sufficiently notify it of the
extent of his powers as an agent, petitioner claims that he should be made personally liable for the
obligations of his principal.
26

Petitioner also contends that it fell victim to the fraudulent scheme of respondents who induced it
into selling the one unit of sludge pump to Impact Systems and signing the Deed of Assignment.
Petitioner directs the attention of this Court to the fact that respondents are bound not only by their
principal and agent relationship but are in fact full-blooded brothers whose successive contravening
acts bore the obvious signs of conspiracy to defraud petitioner.
27

In his Comment,
28
respondent EDWIN again posits the argument that he is not a real party in interest
in this case and it was proper for the trial court to have him dropped as a defendant. He insists that he
was a mere agent of Impact Systems which is owned by ERWIN and that his status as such is known
even to petitioner as it is alleged in the Complaint that he is being sued in his capacity as the sales
manager of the said business venture. Likewise, respondent EDWIN points to the Deed of
Assignment which clearly states that he was acting as a representative of Impact Systems in said
transaction.
We do not find merit in the petition.
In a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another with the latters consent.
29
The underlying principle of the
contract of agency is to accomplish results by using the services of others to do a great variety of
things like selling, buying, manufacturing, and transporting.
30
Its purpose is to extend the personality
of the principal or the party for whom another acts and from whom he or she derives the authority to
act.
31
It is said that the basis of agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of
the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if
they were personally executed by the principal.
32
By this legal fiction, the actual or real absence of
the principal is converted into his legal or juridical presence qui facit per alium facit per se.
33

The elements of the contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish
the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the
agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his
authority.
34

In this case, the parties do not dispute the existence of the agency relationship between respondents
ERWIN as principal and EDWIN as agent. The only cause of the present dispute is whether
respondent EDWIN exceeded his authority when he signed the Deed of Assignment thereby binding
himself personally to pay the obligations to petitioner. Petitioner firmly believes that respondent
EDWIN acted beyond the authority granted by his principal and he should therefore bear the effect
of his deed pursuant to Article 1897 of the New Civil Code.
We disagree.
Article 1897 reinforces the familiar doctrine that an agent, who acts as such, is not personally liable
to the party with whom he contracts. The same provision, however, presents two instances when an
agent becomes personally liable to a third person. The first is when he expressly binds himself to the
obligation and the second is when he exceeds his authority. In the last instance, the agent can be held
liable if he does not give the third party sufficient notice of his powers. We hold that respondent
EDWIN does not fall within any of the exceptions contained in this provision.
The Deed of Assignment clearly states that respondent EDWIN signed thereon as the sales manager
of Impact Systems. As discussed elsewhere, the position of manager is unique in that it presupposes
the grant of broad powers with which to conduct the business of the principal, thus:
The powers of an agent are particularly broad in the case of one acting as a general agent or
manager; such a position presupposes a degree of confidence reposed and investiture with liberal
powers for the exercise of judgment and discretion in transactions and concerns which are incidental
or appurtenant to the business entrusted to his care and management. In the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, a managing agent may enter into any contracts that he deems reasonably necessary or
requisite for the protection of the interests of his principal entrusted to his management. x x x.
35

Applying the foregoing to the present case, we hold that Edwin Cuizon acted well-within his
authority when he signed the Deed of Assignment. To recall, petitioner refused to deliver the one
unit of sludge pump unless it received, in full, the payment for Impact Systems indebtedness.
36
We
may very well assume that Impact Systems desperately needed the sludge pump for its business since
after it paid the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as down payment on 3 March 1995,
37
it
still persisted in negotiating with petitioner which culminated in the execution of the Deed of
Assignment of its receivables from Toledo Power Company on 28 June 1995.
38
The significant
amount of time spent on the negotiation for the sale of the sludge pump underscores Impact Systems
perseverance to get hold of the said equipment. There is, therefore, no doubt in our mind that
respondent EDWINs participation in the Deed of Assignment was "reasonably necessary" or was
required in order for him to protect the business of his principal. Had he not acted in the way he did,
the business of his principal would have been adversely affected and he would have violated his
fiduciary relation with his principal.
We likewise take note of the fact that in this case, petitioner is seeking to recover both from
respondents ERWIN, the principal, and EDWIN, the agent. It is well to state here that Article 1897
of the New Civil Code upon which petitioner anchors its claim against respondent EDWIN "does not
hold that in case of excess of authority, both the agent and the principal are liable to the other
contracting party."
39
To reiterate, the first part of Article 1897 declares that the principal is liable in
cases when the agent acted within the bounds of his authority. Under this, the agent is completely
absolved of any liability. The second part of the said provision presents the situations when the agent
himself becomes liable to a third party when he expressly binds himself or he exceeds the limits of
his authority without giving notice of his powers to the third person. However, it must be pointed out
that in case of excess of authority by the agent, like what petitioner claims exists here, the law does
not say that a third person can recover from both the principal and the agent.
40

As we declare that respondent EDWIN acted within his authority as an agent, who did not acquire
any right nor incur any liability arising from the Deed of Assignment, it follows that he is not a real
party in interest who should be impleaded in this case. A real party in interest is one who "stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."
41
In
this respect, we sustain his exclusion as a defendant in the suit before the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is DENIED and the Decision dated 10
August 2004 and Resolution dated 17 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
71397, affirming the Order dated 29 January 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Cebu City,
is AFFIRMED.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Cebu City, for the
continuation of the proceedings against respondent Erwin Cuizon.

























American Home v Chua G.R. No. 130421. June 28, 1999
C.J. Davide

Facts:
Chua obtained from American Home a fire insurance covering the stock-in-trade of his business. The
insurance was due to expire on March 25, 1990.
On April 5, 1990, Chua issued a check for P2,983.50 to American Homes agent, James Uy, as payment for
the renewal of the policy. The official receipt was issued on April 10. In turn, the latter a renewal certificate.
A new insurance policy was issued where petitioner undertook to indemnify respondent for any damage or
loss arising from fire up to P200,000 March 20, 1990 to March 25, 1991.
On April 6, 1990, the business was completely razed by fire. Total loss was estimated between P4,000,000
and P5,000,000. Respondent filed an insurance claim with petitioner and four other co-insurers, namely,
Pioneer Insurance, Prudential Guarantee, Filipino Merchants and Domestic Insurance. Petitioner refused to
honor the claim hence, the respondent filed an action in the trial court.
American Home claimed there was no existing contract because respondent did not pay the premium. Even
with a contract, they contended that he was ineligible bacue of his fraudulent tax returns, his failure to
establish the actual loss and his failure to notify to petitioner of any insurance already effected. The trial
court ruled in favor of respondent because the respondent paid by way of check a day before the fire
occurred and that the other insurance companies promptly paid the claims. American homes was made to
pay 750,000 in damages.
The Court of Appeals found that respondents claim was substantially proved and petitioners unjustified
refusal to pay the claim entitled respondent to the award of damages.
American Home filed the petition reiterating its stand that there was no existing insurance contract between
the parties. It invoked Section 77 of the Insurance Code, which provides that no policy or contract of
insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and until the premium thereof has
been paid and the case of Arce v. Capital Insurance that until the premium is paid there is no insurance.

Issues:
1. Whether there was a valid payment of premium, considering that respondents check was cashed after
the occurrence of the fire
2. Whether respondent violated the policy by his submission of fraudulent documents and non-disclosure of
the other existing insurance contracts
3. Whether respondent is entitled to the award of damages.

Held: Yes. No. Yes, but not all damages valid. Petition granted. Damages modified.

Ratio:
1. The trial court found, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that there was a valid check payment by
respondent to petitioner. The court respected this.
The renewal certificate issued to respondent contained the acknowledgment that premium had been paid.
In the instant case, the best evidence of such authority is the fact that petitioner accepted the check and
issued the official receipt for the payment. It is, as well, bound by its agents acknowledgment of receipt of
payment.
Section 78 of the Insurance Code explicitly provides:
An acknowledgment in a policy or contract of insurance of the receipt of premium is conclusive evidence of
its payment, so far as to make the policy binding, notwithstanding any stipulation therein that it shall not be
binding until the premium is actually paid.
2. Submission of the alleged fraudulent documents pertained to respondents income tax returns for 1987 to
1989. Respondent, however, presented a BIR certification that he had paid the proper taxes for the said
years. Since this is a question of fact, the finding is conclusive.
Ordinarily, where the insurance policy specifies as a condition the disclosure of existing co-insurers, non-
disclosure is a violation that entitles the insurer to avoid the policy. The purpose for the inclusion of this
clause is to prevent an increase in the moral hazard. The relevant provision is Section 75, which provides
that:
A policy may declare that a violation of specified provisions thereof shall avoid it, otherwise the breach of an
immaterial provision does not avoid the policy.
Respondent acquired several co-insurers and he failed to disclose this information to petitioner.
Nonetheless, petitioner is estopped from invoking this argument due to the loss adjusters admission of
previous knowledge of the co-insurers.
It cannot be said that petitioner was deceived by respondent by the latters non-disclosure of the other
insurance contracts when petitioner actually had prior knowledge thereof. The loss adjuster, being an
employee of petitioner, is deemed a representative of the latter whose awareness of the other insurance
contracts binds petitioner.
3. Petitioner is liable to pay the loss. But there is merit in petitioners grievance against the damages and
attorneys fees awarded. There was no basis for an award for loss of profit. This cannot be shouldered by
petitioner whose obligation is limited to the object of insurance.
There was no fraud to justify moral damages. Exemplary damages cant be awarded because the defendant
never acted in a reckless manner to claim insurance. Attorneys fees cant be recovered as part of damages
because no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.

What is STATUTE?
ranging facts illustrative of the condition and resources of a state. The subject is sometimes divided
into (1) historical statistics, or facts which illustrate the former con- dition of a state; (2) statistics of
population; (3) of revenue; (4) of trade, commerce, and navigation; (5) of the moral, social, and
physical condition of the people. Wharton.
What is an act?
The term encompasses not only physical actssuch as turning on the water or purchasing a gun
but also refers to more intangible acts such as adopting a decree, edict, law, judgment, award, or
determination. An act may be a private act, done by an individual managing his or her personal
affairs, or it may be a public act, done by an official, a council, or a court. When a bill is favorably
acted upon in the process of legislation, it becomes an act.

Legislation (or "statutory law") is law which has been promulgated (or "enacted") by a
legislature or other governing body, or the process of making it. (Another source of law is judge-
made law or case law.) Before an item of legislation becomes law it may be known as a bill, and may
be broadly referred to as "legislation" while it remains under consideration to distinguish it from
other business. Legislation can have many purposes: to regulate, to authorize, to proscribe, to provide
(funds), to sanction, to grant, to declare or to restrict.
A bill is a proposed law under consideration by a legislature.
[1]
A bill does not become law until it
is passed by the legislature and, in most cases, approved by the executive. Once a bill has been
enacted into law, it is called an act or a statute.










Case Digest: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez and Mathay
G.R. No. L-17931 28 February 1963
Ponente: Concepcion, J.

FACTS:
On July 1, 1959, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2609 (Foreign Exchange margin Fee Law), the
Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% foreign exchange
transactions. Petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc., a manufacturer of resin glues, had
bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde raw materials for the
said glues and were thus paying for the margin fees required.
Relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the said bank declaring that the
separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from the said fee, the petitioner
sought for a refund of the margin fees that had been paid. This was denied by the Auditor of
the said Bank stating that the claim was not in accord with the provisions of section 2,
paragraph XVIII of R.A. 2609.
ISSUE: Whether urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee
HELD/RULING:

Urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from law.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of
section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange
for the importation of the following:
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard
when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. (Emphasis
provided.)
Urea formaldehyde is different from urea and formaldehyde, the former being a finished
product. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde
instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. The courts cannot speculate that
there had been an error in the printing of the bill as this shall violate the principle of separation
of powers. Shall there have been any error in the printing, the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.



EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as
Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN

Facts:

Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4
th
district of Leyte as
against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent
moved for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order,
petitioners proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of
soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon
motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared
respondents proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to
subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondents proclamation was valid.
2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

HELD:
1. The respondents proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet
been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the
petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual
basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not
represent the electorates choice.
2. Since the validity of respondents proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the
Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying
petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending
finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review
resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondents
eligibility was not the issue.
3. The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction
on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its (Comelecs) Decision be
obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office
which merits recognition regardless of personal judgment or opinion.
























Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta
Facts:

On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found
violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided that
from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed by
Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code

Issues:

1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void
2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.

Held:

1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the later
law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled
in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. Vehicular Traffic is not defined and
no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.

Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.