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ULP

G.R. No. L-12429 February 27, 1961


ERMIDIA A. MARIANO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE ROYAL INTEROEAN LINE! "#e$%$&%'&e (a)a-*%$a-+a&%,)aar, L%'$e$ N. -. A./,er0a.1 a$0
(. -. #AMERLING, defendants-appellants
Lower court:
right to discipline his employees, his normal prerogative to hire or dismiss them. The prohibition is
directed only against the use of the right to employ or discharge as an instrument of discrimination,
interference or oppression because of one's labor or union activities.;
Supreme ourt:
onsidering that the appellee's dismissal by the appellants, because of charges preferred against the
appellant manager with the managing directors of the appellant company in !ong"ong, #not connected
with or necessarily arising from union activities,# did not constitute unfair labor practice; that this is the
same cause of action upon which her claim for recovery of damages in the ewe at bar is predicated; and
that despite the employees' right to self-organi$ation, the employer still retains his inherent right to
discipline his employees, #his normal prerogative to hire or dismiss them,# the appellee has no cause of
action against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-22323 O4,ober 31, 1967
RE+56LI !A-ING! 6AN# "$o7 RE+56LI 6AN#1, petitioner,
vs.
O5RT OF IND5!TRIAL RELATION!, RO!ENDO T. RE!5ELLO, 6EN(AMIN (ARA, FLORENIO
ALLA!A!, DOMINGO 6. (OLA, DIO!DADO !. MENDO8A, TEODORO DE LA R58, NARI!O
MAARAEG, a$0 MA5RO A. RO-ILLO!, respondents.
The %uestion is whether the &an" committed the act charged in the complaint. 'f it did, it is of no
conse%uence, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive law, what the act is denominated (
whether as a restraint, interference or coercion, as some members of the ourt believe it to be, or as a
discriminatory discharge as other members thin" it is, or as a refusal to bargain as some other members
view it, or even as a combination of any or all of these.
)
*or howsoever it may be characteri$ed, the
&an"'s conduct in discharging the respondent employees constituted an unfair labor practice.
G.R. No. 12923: No)e.ber 6, 1997
THE HONG#ONG AND !HANGHAI 6AN#ING OR+ORATION EM+LOYEE! 5NION,
petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LA6OR RELATION! OMMI!!ION AND THE HONG#ONG AND !HANGHAI
6AN#ING OR+ORATION, LTD., respondents.
T*e Labor o0e 0oe/ $o, u$0er,a&e ,*e %.;o//%b<e ,a/& o= /;e4%=y%$> %$ ;re4%/e a$0
u$.%/,a&e <a$>ua>e ea4* %$4%0e$, 7*%4* 4o$/,%,u,e/ a$ u$=a%r <abor ;ra4,%4e. Ra,*er, %,
<ea)e/ ,o ,*e 4our, ,*e 7or& o= a;;<y%$> ,*e <a7?/ >e$era< ;ro*%b%,ory <a$>ua>e %$ <%>*,
o= %$=%$%,e 4o.b%$a,%o$/ o= e)e$,/ 7*%4* .ay be 4*ar>e0 a/ )%o<a,%)e o= %,/ ,er./.
14
G.R. No. 144319 (u<y 17, 2226
+HILOM EM+LOYEE! 5NION, ;e,%,%o$er,
)/.
+HILI++INE GLO6AL OMM5NIATION! a$0 +HILOM OR+ORATION, re/;o$0e$,/.
The right to stri"e, while constitutionally recogni$ed, is not without legal constrictions. +rticle
,-./e0 of the Labor ode, on prohibited activities, provides:
1o person engaged in pic"eting shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or
obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares.
The Labor ode is emphatic against the use of violence, coercion, and intimidation during a
stri"e and to this end prohibits the obstruction of free passage to and from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes. + pic"eting labor union has no right to prevent employees of
another company from getting in and out of its rented premises, otherwise, it will be held liable
for damages for its acts against an innocent by-stander..,
The sanction provided in +rticle ,-./a0 is so severe that any wor"er or union officer who
"nowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a stri"e may be declared to have
lost his employment status..2
&y insisting on staging the prohibited stri"e and defiantly pic"eting 3hilcom's premises to
prevent the resumption of company operations, the stri"ing employees have forfeited their right
to be readmitted...
.. 345 declared the stri"e during the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings at the
16&.
7n )8 1ovember )998, while a conciliation meeting was being held at the 16& in 16&-
1:-1S );-.2<-98, 345 went on stri"e. 't should be noted that in their meeting on ))
1ovember )998, both 3hilcom and 345 were even #advised to maintain the status %uo.#.<
Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of Section -, &oo" =, :ule
>>'' of the 7mnibus :ules 'mplementing the Labor ode, which e?plicitly obliges the parties to
bargain collectively in good faith and prohibits them from impeding or disrupting the
proceedings..- The relevant provision of the 'mplementing :ules provides:
Section -. onciliation. @ ? ? ? ?
Auring the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act which may disrupt or impede the early
settlement of dispute. They are obliged, as part of their duty, to bargain collectively in good faith,
to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings called by the regional branch of the
&oard. ? ? ? ?
+rticle ,-./a0 of the Labor ode also considers it a prohibited activity to declare a stri"e #during
the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the same stri"e.#
Lamentably, 345 defiantly proceeded with their stri"e during the pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
ruling
The bottom line is that 345 should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery
provided for in the &+.<) 'n disregarding this procedure, the union leaders who "nowingly
participated in the stri"e have acted unreasonably. The law cannot interpose its hand to protect
them from the conse%uences of their illegal acts.<,
+ stri"e declared on the basis of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance
committee as stipulated in the &+ of the parties is premature and illegal.<2
G.R. No. 79724 (u<y 19, 19:9
R566ER@ORLD "+HIL!.1, IN. a$0 EL+IDIO HIDALGO, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LA6OR RELATION! OMMI!!ION "THIRD DI-I!ION1 a$0 NE!TOR
MALA6ANAN, respondents.
The two issues to be resolved in the instant case are: /)0 whether or not the dismissal of
respondent 6alabanan is tainted with unfair labor practice; and /,0 whether or not a Bust and
valid cause e?ists for the dismissal of private respondent 6alabanan.
Ce believe that the foregoing contentions are impressed with merit. +rt. ,.D of the Labor ode,
3A 1o. ..,, as amended, provides:
+rt. ,.D. Unfair labor practices of employers. 't shall be unlawful for an
employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
/a0 To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the e?ercise of their right to
self-organi$ation;
? ? ?
The %uestion of whether an employee was dismissed because of his union activities is
essentially a %uestion of fact as to which the findings of the administrative agency concerned
are conclusive and binding if supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence has been
defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade%uate to support a
conclusion. 't means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in
issue can be reasonably inferred /3hilippine 6etal *oundries, 'nc. v. ourt of 'ndustrial
:elations, et. al., 1o. L- 2.9.D-.9, 6ay )<, )989, 9; S:+ )2<0. The findings of the Labor
+rbiter on the non-e?istence of unfair labor practice on the part of the company are more in
accord and supported by the evidence submitted by the parties in the instant case, to wit:
omplainant had stated that he was a member of the monthly salaried
employees union affiliated with T53+S. !e, however, offered no proof to support
his allegation. 'n fact, no evidence was presented to prove the e?istence of such
union. Ce /noteE from the records that, as the usual practice, in cases li"e this
one, complainant is usually supported by the union of which he is a member. +nd
ordinarily, the union itself is impleaded as a co- complainant. Such
circumstances, surprisingly, FareE not present in this case. 'n fact, complainant
categorically alleged that he had solicited the services of the 3+*L5 Labor 5nion
in filing this case. 't is, indeed, surprising that complainant had to solicit the help
of a labor union /3+*L50 of which he was not a member instead of soliciting the
aid of the labor union /T53+S0 of which he was allegedly a member. These
circumstances alone FdestroyE the credibility of complainant's allegations. /p. ,),
:ollo0.
1owhere in the records can Ce find that the company actually performed positive acts to
restrain the union participation of private respondent. *or one, it is doubtful whether 6alabanan
was really engaged in the organi$ation of a labor union affiliated with the federation T53+S. The
only evidence presented by him to prove this contention is his affidavit and that of his father. 't is
therefore, not in accordance with ordinary e?perience and common practice that the private
respondent pursued his battle alone, without the aid and support of his co-members in the union
and his federation especially in a case of serious nature as this one involving company
intervention with union activity.
+s a rule, it is the prerogative of the company to promote, transfer or even demote its
employees to other positions when the interests of the company reasonably demand it. 5nless
there are instances which directly point to interference by the company with the employees' right
to self-organi$ation, the transfer of private respondent should be considered as within the
bounds allowed by law. *urthermore, although private respondent was transferred to a lower
position, his original ran" and salary remained undiminished, which fact was not refuted or
%uestioned by private respondent.
'n view of the foregoing conclusions of the Labor +rbiter, Ce are compelled to agree with the
latter that the petitioner company did not commit any unfair labor practice in transferring and
thereafter dismissing private respondent.
The remaining issue to be resolved on this point is whether the dismissal of respondent
6alabanan was for a Bust and lawful cause. +rticle ,D, of the Labor ode, as amended,
provides:
+rticle ,D,. Termination by employer. ( +n employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following Bust causes:
? ? ?
b0 Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
? ? ?.
3etitioner contends that private respondent 6alabanan was guilty of gross negligence when he
caused the posting of incorrect entries in the stoc" card without counter chec"ing the actual
movement status of the items at the warehouse, thereby resulting into unmanageable
inaccuracies in the data posted in the stoc" cards. The respondent ommission correctly ruled:
3enultimately, even assuming for the sa"e of argument that herein complainant
'posted entries in the stoc" card without counter chec"ing the actual movement
status of the items at the warehouse, thereby resulting in an inaccurate posting of
data on the stoc" cards,# to our impression does not constitute as a Bust cause for
dismissal. :ecords show that he was only transferred to the 'nventory ontrol
Section on September ), )9D2 and was not so familiar and e?perienced as a
stoc" cler", and prior to his transfer, the record shows no derogatory records in
terms of his performance. !is failure to carry out efficiently his duties as a stoc"
cler" is not so gross and habitual. 'n other words he was not notoriously
negligent to warrant his severance from the service. onsidering that there is
nothing on record that shows that he wilfully defied instructions of his superior
with regards to his duties and that he gained personal benefit of the discrepancy,
his dismissal is unwarranted. /p. ,-, :ollo0.
't does not appear that private respondent 6alabanan is an incorrigible offender or that what he
did inflicted serious damage to the company so much so that his continuance in the service
would be patently inimical to the employer's interest. +ssuming, in gratia argumenti that the
private respondent had indeed committed the said mista"es in the posting of accurate data, this
was only his first infraction with regard to his duties. 't would thus be cruel and unBust to mete
out the drastic penalty of dismissal, for it is not proportionate to the gravity of the misdeed.
'n fact, the promotion of the private respondent from the position of ordinary cler" to production
scheduler establishes the presumption that his performance of his wor" is acceptable to the
company.
't is worthy to note that the prerogative of management to dismiss or lay-off an employee must
be done without abuse of discretion, for what is at sta"e is not only petitioner's position, but also
his means of livelihood. This is so because the preservation of the lives of the citi$ens is a basic
duty of the State, more vital than the peservation of corporate profits /4uro-Linea, 3hils., 'nc. v.
1L:, L-8<8D,, Aecember ), )9D8,)<- S:+ 890.
The law regards the wor"er with compassion. 7ur society is a compassionate one. Chere a
penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by the wor"er should
not be visited by the supreme penalty of dismissal. This is not only because of the law's concern
for the wor"ing man. There is in addition, his family to consider. +fter all, labor determinations
should not only be secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem /+lmira, et al., v. &*
Goodrich 3hilippines, 'nc., et al., G.:. 1o. L-2.98., Huly ,<, )98., <D S:+ ),;0.
+7:A'1GLI, the petition is A'S6'SS4A for lac" of merit. !owever, the decision of the public
respondent is hereby 67A'*'4A to the effect that petitioner company is ordered to reinstate
private respondent 1estor 6alabanan to the position of stoc" cler" or substantially e%uivalent
position, with the same ran" and salary he is enBoying at the time of his termination, with three
years bac"wages and without loss of seniority rights and benefits appurtenant thereto.
Should the reinstatement of the private respondent as herein ordered be rendered impossible
by the supervention of circumstances which prevent the same, the petitioner is further ordered
to pay private respondent separation pay e%uivalent to one /)0 month's salary for every year of
service rendered, computed at his last rate of salary.
S7 7:A4:4A.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-!uino, ""., concur.
:epublic of the 3hilippines
!5+REME O5RT
6anila
S471A A'='S'71
G.R. No. 74429 O4,ober 7, 19:6
65LLETIN +56LI!HING OR+ORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. A5G5!TO !. !ANHE8, RE!ENIANO 6. TRA(ANO, +RIMITI-A .
6ATER6ONIA, ROLANDO G. OLALIA, I!IDRO !. MOLINA, ED5ARDO .
MORALE!, 8AARIA! F. FLORE!, (R., +EDRO M. GALLO, LORETO F. MI(ARE!,
L5I! 6. ILAGAN, ERNE!TO O. -ALDE8, E5GENIO L. RI-ERA, 6EN(AMIN 6.
6ERNA!, LORETO D. DE LO! REYE!, 6ONIFAIO A. !OTELO, FE F. ARRE,
FELI+E R. OLARTE, RAYMOND T. RI-ERA, !TE@ART . AHO, DOMINADOR -.
5RAY, FERNANDO !. LA8ARO, ERNE!TO L. 6A5TI!TA, -IENTE O. A6ANILLA,
(O!E 6. 6ERNAL, RAMIRO A. NE6RE!, ALANTARA !. DE LA +A8 a$0 L5I! F.
GARIA, respondents.
'n the light of the factual bac"ground of this case, Ce are constrained to hold that the
supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not, under the law, form a supervisors
union, separate and distinct from the e?isting bargaining unit /&450, composed of the
ran"-and-file employees of the &ulletin 3ublishing orporation. 't is evident that most of
the private respondents are considered managerial employees. +lso it is distinctly
stated in Section )), :ule ' ', of the 7mmibus :ules 'mplementing the Labor ode, that
supervisory unions are presently no longer recogni$ed nor allowed to e?ist and operate
as such.
+rticle ,.- of the Labor ode e?plicitly e?cludes managerial employees from the right of
self-organi$ation, the right to form, Boin and assist labor organi$ations. + perusal of the
Bob descriptions corresponding to the private respondents as outlined in the petition,
clearly reveals the private respondents to be managers, purc#asing officers, personnel
officers, property officers, supervisors, cas#iers, #eads of various sections and t#e li$e.
The nature of their duties gives rise to the irresistible conclusion that most of the herein
private respondents are performing managerial functions /3etition, pp. <--; :ollo, pp. --
80. Their responsibilities inherently re%uire the e?ercise' of discretion and independent
Budgment as supervisors. They possess the power and authority to lay down or e?ercise
management policies. 6anagerial employees are those vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and e?ecute management policies andJor to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively
recommend such managerial actions. +ll employees not falling within this definition are
considered ran"-and file employees /+rticle ,), /"0, Labor ode0. Ce further find very
plainly stressed in Section )), :ule '', &oo" = of the 7mnibus :ules implementing the
same Labor ode, that #+ll e?isting supervisory unions and unions of security guards
s#all, upon t#e effectivity of t#e Code, cease to operate as suc# and t#eir registration
certificates s#all be deemed automatically cancelled ... %embers of supervisory unions
&#o do not fall &it#in t#e definition of managerial employees s#all become eligible to
'oin or assist t#e ran$-and- file labor organization and if none e(ists, to form or assist in
t#e forming of suc# ran$-and-file organizations.) /4mphasis supplied0.
Chat is pointed out under the law, is that employees who discharge managerial
functions, as well as the supervisory employees who do not yet fall within the definition
of managerial employees, are prohibited from organi$ing themselves into a labor union
constituted for the purpose of acting as a collective bargaining unit. To sanction the
recognition of the Supervisors 5nion of private respondents, which parado?ically or
inadvertently received a registration certificate from the 6inistry of Labor, would be for
this ourt to accept and tolerate a manifest violation of the Labor ode. The rationale
for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would
belong to or be affiliated with a 5nion, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to
the 5nion in view of evident conflict of interests. The 5nion can also become company-
dominated with the presence of managerial employees in 5nion membership.
The reference made by private respondents to said case of +damson and +damson
versus ': /supra0, and the pronouncements made therein that #supervisory employees
of an employer cannot Boin any labor organi$ation of employees under their supervision
but may validly form a separate organi$ation of their own# no longer can be invo"ed for
the benefit of private respondents. +s aptly countered by the petitioner in its
manifestation dated Hune ,, )9D-, submitted through its counsel:
,. +damson K +damson vs. ':, ),8 S:+ ,-D. 'n %uoting from this
decision of this !onorable ourt, private respondents intentionally deleted
the phrase #under the 'ndustrial 3eace +ct# obviously to mislead this
!onorable ourt into believing that up to now supervisors still have the
right to form unions. This right has been disallowed, disauthori$ed and
discontinued under +rticle ,.- of the 1ew Labor ode and Section )),
:ule ''. &oo" *ive of the 'mplementing :ules. /:ollo, p. );-0
'ndeed, the 'ndustrial 3eace +ct or :epublic +ct D8<, referred to in said damson, et al.
vs. C*+ case, became effective on Hanuary )8, )9<2. 't has, however, been superseded
and supplanted by the present Labor ode which too" effect on Hanuary ), )98<. Chat
should be applied now are the specific provisi ns of the 7mnibus :ules 'mplementing 
the Labor ode which have been already above-%uoted /supra0. 'n fact, no less than the
public respondents herein, represented by the present Solicitor General, in this regard,
even state in their omment to the 3etition, the following:
The only issue determinative of the present controversy is whether or not
the supervisors in petitioner company may form a union for purposes of
collective bargaining separate and distinct from that of the ran"-and-file
unit.
*t is our submission t#at t#ey may not. The 1ew Labor ode recogni$es
two principal groups of employees, namely, managerial and the ran"-and-
file group. Thus, +rt. ,), /"0 provides:
6anagerial employee' is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to
lay down and e?ecute management policies andJor to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall,, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to
effectively recommend such managerial actions. ll employees not falling
&it#in t#is definition are considered ran$ and file employees for purposes
of t#is ,oo$. /4mphasis supplied0
'n amplification of the afore%uoted provisions of the law, Sec. )) of :ule '',
&oo" = of the 7mnibus :ules 'mplementing the Labor ode did away with
e?isting Supervisors 5nion, classifying the members thereof as neither
managerial or ran"-and-file employees depending on the wor" they
perform. 'f they discharge managerial functions they are prohibited from
forming or Boining any labor organi$ation. 'f they do not perform
managerial wor", they may Boin or assist the ran"- and-file union and, if
none e?ists, they may form one such ran"-and-file organi$ation. *rom
these, one can readily infer that the law no longer recogni$es supervisory
5nions.
+ perusal of the Bob descriptions of private respondents as outlined in the
petition shows that most of them do not perform managerial wor". !ence,
although not %ualified to organi$e a labor union of their own, they may Boin
the certified ran"-and-file organi$ation in the ompany, which has a
current collective bargaining agreement to e?pire on Huly )<, )9D8.
*inally, it is averred by petitioner that the resort to stri"e by private respondents is
untimely and premature because of the pendency of a case with the 6inistry of Labor
doc"eted as 1:-L:A-.-)---DD which private respondents themselves filed and which
is for direct certification of said supervisors union as the bargaining representative of the
supervisors. This assertion of petitioner should be up held. +rticle ,-<, paragraph , of
the Labor ode e?pressly provides that #no sta$e or loc$-out s#all be declared ... during
t#e pendency of cases involving t#e same grounds for t#e stri$e or loc$-out.) /4mphasis
supplied0.
Ce are not persuaded by private respondents' submissions. The main issues in this
case are the legality of a supervisory union and the certificate of registration issued
therefor, and the validity of a threatened stri"e by members of such union. The matter of
the retirement of the four retirees is only an incident to the case. 't may not be used to
s"irt the real %uestion of the legality of the organi$ation of a supervisors union.
3arenthetically, it is said that three out of the retirees, 6essrs. Garcia, de la 3a$ and
&ernal collected their retirement benefits /:ollo, p. -<0, rendering the alleged ill-motives
behind their retirement untenable. This matter cannot be invo"ed by private
respondents herein as an indication of union busting practice of petitioner, absent any
showing of protest by the said retirees themselves.
Section .. ( The 763+1I, at its option retire an employee or wor"er
who has rendered ,< years of service or who has reac#ed t#e age of -.
years in his last birthday by paying him full benefits provided in Section )
of this +rticle.
The aforestated sections e?plicitly declare, in no uncertain terms, that retirement of an
employee may be done upon initiative and option of the management. +nd where there
are cases of voluntary retirement, the same is effective only upon the approval of
management. The fact that there are some supervisory employees who have not yet
been retired after ,< years with the company or have reached the age of si?ty merely
confirms that it is the singular prerogative of management, at its option, to retired
supervisors or ran"-and-file members when it deems fit. There should be no unfair labor
practice committed by management if the retirement of private respondents were made
in accord with the agreed option.
't is even more untenable for private respondents to suggest that the #sudden
promotion# of the supervisors union members to e?ecutive positions was intended to
remove them from the coverage of or from membership in the supervisory union. The
promotion of employees to managerial or e?ecutive positions rests upon the discretion
of management. 6anagerial positions are offices which can only be held by persons
who have the trust of the corporation and its officers. 't is the prerogative of
management to promote any individual wor"ing within the company to a higher position.
't should not be inhibited or prevented from doing so. + promotion which is manifestely
beneficial to an employee should not give rise to a gratuitous speculation that such a
promotion was made simply to deprive the union of the membership of the promoted
employee, who after all appears to have accepted his promotion.
:epublic of the 3hilippines
!5+REME O5RT
6anila
*':ST A'='S'71
G.R. No. L-33999 (a$uary 26, 19:9
FORT5NATO DA. 6ONDO petitioner,
vs.
O5RT OF IND5!TRIAL RELATION!, +HILI++INE NATIONAL RAIL@AY! a$0
LI6ERTADO !. A!TRO, respondents.
3etitioner presented evidence in the ': to show that, in derogation of his seniority,
ran", competence, and fitness, and because he did not belong to any labor union,
private respondents discriminated against him by promoting and appointing Simeon
6endo$a on Huly ), )9-, to the position of :oad *oreman of the engineering
Aepartment, instead of him.
+nswering the complaint, the private respondents alleged that petitioner was not ne?t-
in-ran" to the position of :oad *oreman; that based on individual wor" merits and the
:evised ivil Service :ules, that the position of General :oad *oreman was later
abolished; that the reorgani$ation was for the best interest of the company+s aptly put
by the ':, the issue in this case is whether or not the private respondents were guilty
of unfair labor practice under Section . /a0 /.0; of :epublic +ct D8<, otherwise "nown as
the 'ndustrial 3eace +ct, which provides:
S4. .. Unfair /abor 0ractices. (
/a0 't shall be unfair labor practice for an employer:
??? ??? ???
/.0 To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organi$ation; ... /+s amended by :.+. 1o. L-22<;, approved
Hune )8, )9-)0.
'n dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice, the ': found that the alleged
discriminatory acts against the petitioner did not arise from union membership or activity
because he was not in fact a union member.
3etitioner's allegation that be was discriminated against to force him to Boin a labor
organi$ation is unconvincing since no specific union was mentioned in his complaint. 't
is unbelievable that the private respondents would harass and oppress him to force him
to Boin any labor union for Ce do not see how that can possibly be advantageous to the
former.
:epublic of the 3hilippines
!5+REME O5RT
6anila
S471A A'='S'71

G.R. No. L-913:2 De4e.ber 29, 19:6
RAFAEL ENRIA5E8 a$0 -IRGILIO EARMA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORA6LE RONALDO 6. 8AMORA, THE HONORA6LE 6LA! F. O+LE, NATIONAL
LA6OR RELATION! OMMI!!ION, AR6ITER NE!TOR LIM, +HILI++INE AIR LINE!, AIR
LINE! +ILOT A!!OIATION OF THE +HILI++INE! a$0 ORTI8? GRO5+, B respondents.

3etitioners' contentions are unmeritorious.
+n employee has no inherent right to seniority. !e has only such rights as may be based on a
contract, a statute, or an administrative regulation relative thereto F<) .H.S. <D- citing
Trailmobile o. vs. Chirls, -8 S. t. 9D,, 22) 5.S. .;, 9) L.4d. )2,D and other casesE. Seniority
rights, which are ac%uired by an employee through long-time employment, are contractual and
not constitutional. !ence, the discharge of such employee, thereby terminating such rights,
would not violate the onstitution F<) .H.S. <D8 citing Cic"s vs. Southern 3acific o., ),) *.
Supp. .<.E.
Chen the pilots tendered their respective retirement or resignation and 3+L immediately
accepted them, both parties mutually terminated the contractual employment relationship
between them thereby curtailing whatever seniority rights and privileges the pilots had earned
through the years. !ence, contrary to petitioners' contention, loss of seniority rights was not a
penalty for their precipitate retirement or resignation. :ather, it was the e?pected conse%uence
of the acceptance of their retirement or resignation.
The pilots' mass action was not a stri"e because employees who go on stri"e do not %uit their
employment. 7rdinarily, the relationship of employer and employee continues until one or the
other of the parties acts to sever the relationship or they mutually act to accomplish that purpose
FCords and 3hrases, =ol. .;, )9-. ed., p. .-< %uoting Litchen vs. G.:. !erberger's 'nc., )).
1.C. ,d -., -8, ,-, 6inn. )2<E. +s they did not assume the status of stri"ers, their #protest
retirementJresignation# was not a concerted activity which was protected by law F*irst 1ational
&an" of 7maha vs. 1.L.:.&., .)2 *. ,d 9,)E. 3etitioners cannot, therefore, validly claim that 3+L
committed an unfair labor practice because, having voluntarily terminated their employment
relationship with 3+L, they were not dismissed.
6oreover, the issue of whether the retirementJresignation of +L3+3 members on Aecember ),,
)98; was a concerted activity protected by law was put to rest in C#avez vs. %artinez, L-2<,;-
which was decided by this ourt on +pril )<, )988 together with ir /ine 0ilots ssociation of
t#e 0#ilippines vs. Court of *ndustrial +elations, L-228;<. Ce pronounced therein that:
3arenthetically, contrary to +L3+3 FGaston'sE argument that the pilots'
retirementJresignation was a legitimate concerted activity, citing Section ,FlE of the
'ndustrial 3eace +ct which defines 'Stri"e' as 'any temporary stoppage of wor" by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial dispute', it is worthwhile to
observe that as the law defines it, a stri"e means only a 'temporary stoppage of wor"'.
Chat the mentioned pilots did, however, cannot be considered in the opinion of this
ourt, as mere 'temporary stoppage of wor"'. 1#at t#ey contemplated &as evidently a
permanent cut-off of employment relations#ip &it# t#eir erst&#ile employer, t#e
0#ilippine ir /ines. 'n any event, the dispute below having been certified as e?isting in
an industry indispensable to the national interest, the said pilots' ran" disregard for the
compulsory orders of the industrial court and their daring and calculating venture to
disengage themselves from that court's Burisdiction, for the obvious purpose of satisfying
their narrow economic demands to the preBudice of the public interest, are evident
badges of bad faith.
3etitioners asseverate that their retirement or resignation was a #sham# for there was #no
honest or genuine desire to terminate the employee relationship with 3+L# F:ollo, p. <22E. Ce
perceive, however, that the unorthodo? manner by which the pilots aired their demands against
3+L, even if it was allegedly only a bluff calculated to bring favorable results, e?posed them to
the ris" that 3+L would act accordingly and ta"e their #sham# retirement or resignation seriously,
as what happened in this case.
3etitioners' insistence that they were not advised of the legal conse%uences of their #protest
retirementJresignation# cannot hold water considering that they are highly educated. 4nri%ue$
obtained his &achelor of Science degree from the 3hilippine 6ilitary +cademy and too" two
years of graduate studies in &usiness +dministration at the 5niversity of the 3hilippines F:ollo,
p. 88E. 4?pert legal advice was available to him as his father is a retired Bustice of the ourt of
+ppeals who also appears as one of petitioners' counsel in this case. 7n the other hand,
4carma too" three years and one semester of a commerce course and went through a two-year
course in the 3hilippine +ir *orce *lying School F:ollo, p. 9,E. =erily, they are not the ordinary,
illiterate laborers that they purport to be in this case.
The issue of whether forfeiture of seniority and other privileges is within the coercive and
punitive powers of the ourt of 'ndustrial :elations and, after its dissolution, of the labor arbiter
and the 1ational Labor :elations ommission, is of no moment in this case considering that
petitioners lost their seniority rights not by virtue of the labor arbiter' order and its affirmance by
the 1ational Labor :elations ommission, the Secretary of Labor and the 7ffice of the
3resident but by the operative act of their retirement or resignation.
4nri%ue$ and 4carma were, therefore, new employees with entirely new seniority ran"ings when
they were readmitted by 3+L on Hanuary )D, )98) and Hanuary ),, )98), respectively. ertainly,
3+L was merely e?ercising its prerogative as an employer when it imposed two conditions for
the reemployment of petitioners inasmuch as hiring or rehiring policies are matters for the
company's management to determine in the absence of an anti-union motivation F6etropolitan
Life 'ns. o. vs. 1.L.:.&., 28) *. ,d <82E.
C!4:4*7:4, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby dismissed. The public
respondents' orders and decision are hereby affirmed subBect to the modification that petitioners
are granted full retirement and separation benefits with legal interest from their accrual until
petitioners are fully paid. 1o costs.
S7 7:A4:4A.
2eria 3C#airman4, lampay, 0aras and 2eliciano, ** ""., concur.
Gutierrez, "r., "., too$ no part.
:epublic of the 3hilippines
!5+REME O5RT
6anila
*':ST A'='S'71
G.R. No. L-:7672 O4,ober 13, 19:9
@I!E AND O., IN., petitioner,
vs.
@I!E C O., IN. EM+LOYEE! 5NION-NAT5 AND HONORA6LE 6IEN-ENIDO G.
LAG5E!MA, %$ *%/ 4a;a4%,y a/ )o<u$,ary Arb%,ra,or, respondents.
't is to this class of employees who were e?cluded in the #bargaining unit# and who do not derive
benefits from the &+ that the profit sharing privilege was e?tended by petitioner.
There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as the situation of the union
employees are different and distinct from the non-union employees.
9
'ndeed, discrimination per
se is not unlawful. There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not
similarly situated.
:espondent union can not claim that there is grave abuse of discretion by the petitioner in
e?tending the benefits of profit sharing to the non-union employees as they are two /,0 groups
not similarly situated. These non-union employees are not covered by the &+. They do not
derive and enBoy the benefits under the &+.
The grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the employees outside the #bargaining unit#
falls under the ambit of its managerial prerogative. 't appears to have been done in good faith
and without ulterior motive. 6ore so when as in this case there is a clause in the &+ where the
employees are classified into those who are members of the union and those who are not. 'n
the case of the union members, they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the
&+ contract which constitute the law between the contracting parties.
:
&oth the employer and
the union members are bound by such agreement.
:epublic of the 3hilippines
!5+REME O5RT
6anila
T!':A A'='S'71
G.R. No. :2737 !e;,e.ber 29, 19::
+HILI++INE GRA+HI ART! IN., IGMIDIO R. !IL-ERIO AND ARLO! A6AL, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LA6OR RELATION! OMMI!!ION, RO!ALINA M. +5L+5LAAN AND EMELITA
!ALONGA, respondents.

G5TIERRE8, (R., J.:
'n 7ctober, )9D., the petitioner corporation was forced by economic circumstances to re%uire its
wor"ers to go on mandatory vacation leave in batches of seven or nine for periods ranging from
)<, 2;, to .< days. The wor"ers were paid while on leave but the pay was charged against their
respective earned leaves.
+s a result, the private respondents filed complaints for unfair labor practice and discrimination.
The principal issue now before the ourt is the forced vacation leave without pay whether or not
it is unfair labor practice and if not an unfair labor practice, whether or not it was tainted with
arbitrariness.
The ourt is convinced from the records now before it, that there was no unfair labor practice.
+s found by the 1L:, the private respondents themselves never %uestioned the e?istence of
an economic crisis but, in fact, admitted its e?istence. There is basis for the petitioner's
contentions that the reduction of wor" schedule was temporary, that it was ta"en only after
notice and consultations with the wor"ers and supervisors, that a consensus was reached on
how to deal with deteriorating economic conditions and reduced sales and that the temporary
reduction of wor"ing days was a more humane solution instead of a retrenchment and reduction
of personnel. The petitioner further points out that this is in consonance with the collective
bargaining agreement between the employer and its employees. The ourt, therefore, agrees
with the Solicitor General in his submission that:
There is also no showing that the imposition of forced leave was e?ercised for
the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under special
laws or under valid agreements. +s the records show, petitioners instituted the
forced leave due to economic crisis, which private respondents do not even
%uestion. /3osition 3aper F3rivate :espondents'E, dated Huly )9D<, p. ,0
Li"ewise the forced leave was enforced neither in a malicious, harsh, oppressive,
vindictive nor wanton manner, or out of malice or spite. +part from private
respondents concurrence that the forced leave was implemented due to
economic crisis, what only #hurts# /ibid.0 them #is that said management's plan
was not even discussed in the grievance procedure so that the 5nion members
thereof may well be apprised of the reason therefor.# /*bid.0
0 b
The decision to resort to forced leaves was, under the circumstances, a management
prerogative. The wor"ers' claim of non-resort. to the grievance machinery is negated by their
failure to initiate steps for its employment.
+s stressed by the Solicitor General:
The statutory law on grievance procedure provides that:
+:T. ,-). Grievance mac#inery. Chenever a grievance arises
from the interpretation or implementation of a collective
agreement, including disciplinary actions imposed on members of
the bargaining unit, the employer and the bargaining
representative shall meet to adBust the grievance. Chere the
grievance procedure as provided herein does not apply,
grievances shall be subBect to negotiation, conciliation or
arbitration as provided elsewhere in this ode /Labor ode
/4mphasis supplied0
+s the law stands, both employers and bargaining representative of the
employees are re%uired to go through the grievance machinery in case a
grievance arises. +nd though the law does not provide who, as between labor
and capital, should initiate that said grievance be brought first to the, grievance
machinery, it is only logical, Bust and e%uitable that whoever is aggrieved should
initiate settlement of the grievance through the grievance machinery. To impose
the compulsory procedure on employers alone would be oppressive of capital,
notwithstanding the fact that in most cases the grievance is of the employees.
'n the case at bar, when petitioners sent notice to complainants, no grievance
between petitioners and private respondents that need be threshed out before
the grievance machinery has yet materiali$ed. &ut then, private respondents,
who received such notice and being aggrieved thereof, instituted a case before
the Labor +rbiter for unfair labor practices and discrimination, prior to any referral
to the grievance machinery, which they are e%ually mandated to go through and
under the circumstances they were better situated to initiate; li"ewise, petitioners
even prayed before the Labor +rbiter that the complaint be dismissed andJor
referred to the grievance machinery. /3osition 3aper /3etitioners'0, dated ,. Huly
)9D<, p. 80 Thus, petitioner should not be faulted if the grievance machinery was
in any way by-passed. /:ollo, pp. -.---0
C!4:4*7:4, the petition is hereby G:+1T4A. The Hune )9, )9D8 resolution of the 1ational
Labor :elations ommission is set aside and the +pril 9, )9D- decision of the Labor +rbiter is
:4'1ST+T4A.
S7 7:A4:4A.
2ernan, C."., 2eliciano, ,idin and Cortes, ""., concur.
:epublic of the 3hilippines
!5+REME O5RT
6anila
*':ST A'='S'71
G.R. No. L-93919 February :, 19:9
!AN MIG5EL 6RE@ERY !ALE! FORE 5NION "+TG@O1, petitioner,
vs.
HON. 6LA! F. O+LE, a/ M%$%/,er o= Labor a$0 !AN MIG5EL OR+ORATION, respondents.
/orenzo 2. %iravite for petitioner.
*sidro 5. moroso for Ne& 6an %iguel Corp. 6ales 2orce Union.
6iguion +eyna, %ontecillo 7 8ngsia$o for private respondent.

GRIDO-AA5INO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the 7rder dated *ebruary ,D, )9D; of the 6inister of Labor in
Labor ase 1o. +H6L-;-9-89, approving the private respondent's mar"eting scheme, "nown as
the #omplementary Aistribution System# /AS0 and dismissing the petitioner labor union's
complaint for unfair labor practice.
7n +pril )8, )98D, a collective bargaining agreement /effective on 6ay ), )98D until Hanuary 2),
)9D)0 was entered into by petitioner San 6iguel orporation Sales *orce 5nion /3TGC70, and
the private respondent, San 6iguel orporation, Section ), of +rticle '= of which provided as
follows:
+rt. '=, Section ). 4mployees within the appropriate bargaining unit shall be
entitled to a basic monthly compensation plus commission based on their
respective sales. /p. -, +nne? +; p. ))2, :ollo.0
'n September )989, the company introduced a mar"eting scheme "nown as the
#omplementary Aistribution System# /AS0 whereby its beer products were offered for sale
directly to wholesalers through San 6iguel's sales offices.
The labor union /herein petitioner0 filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in the 6inistry of
Labor, with a notice of stri"e on the ground that the AS was contrary to the e?isting mar"eting
scheme whereby the :oute Salesmen were assigned specific territories within which to sell their
stoc"s of beer, and wholesalers had to buy beer products from them, not from the company. 't
was alleged that the new mar"eting scheme violates Section ), +rticle '= of the collective
bargaining agreement because the introduction of the AS would reduce the ta"e-home pay of
the salesmen and their truc" helpers for the company would be unfairly competing with them.
The complaint filed by the petitioner against the respondent company raised two issues: /)0
whether the AS violates the collective bargaining agreement, and /,0 whether it is an indirect
way of busting the union.
'n its order of *ebruary ,D, )9D;, the 6inister of Labor found:
... Ce see nothing in the record as to suggest that the unilateral action of the
employer in inaugurating the new sales scheme was designed to discourage
union organi$ation or diminish its influence, but rather it is undisputable that the
establishment of such scheme was part of its overall plan to improve efficiency
and economy and at the same time gain profit to the highest. Chile it may be
admitted that the introduction of new sales plan somewhat disturbed the present
set-up, the change however was too insignificant as to convince this 7ffice to
interpret that the innovation interferred with the wor"er's right to self-organi$ation.
3etitioner's conBecture that the new plan will sow dissatisfaction from its ran"s is
already a preBudgment of the plan's viability and effectiveness. 't is li"e saying
that the plan will not wor" out to the wor"ers' FbenefitE and therefore management
must adopt a new system of mar"eting.
The dispositive part of the 6inister's 7rder reads:
C!4:4*7:4, premises considered, the notice of stri"e filed by the petitioner,
San 6iguel &rewery Sales *orce 5nion-3TGC7 is hereby dismissed.
6anagement however is hereby ordered to pay an additional three /20 months
bac" adBustment commissions over and above the adBusted commission under
the complementary distribution system. /p. ,-, :ollo.0
The petition has no merit.
3ublic respondent was correct in holding that the AS is a valid e?ercise of management
prerogatives:
9(cept as limited by special la&s, an employer is free to regulate, according to
#is o&n discretion and 'udgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring,
wor" assignments, wor"ing methods, time, place and manner of wor", tools to be
used, processes to be follo&ed, supervision of wor"ers, wor"ing regulations,
transfer of employees, wor" supervision, lay-off of wor"ers and the discipline,
dismissal and recall of wor". ... /1L5 vs. 'nsular La Iebana o., , S:+ 9,.;
:epublic Savings &an" vs. ': ,) S:+ ,,-, ,2<.0 /3erfecto =. !ernande$,
Labor :elations Law, )9D< 4d., p. ...0 /4mphasis ours.0
4very business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. 'n the process, it may adopt or
devise means designed towards that goal. 'n +bbott Laboratories vs. 1L:, )<. S:+ 8)2, Ce
ruled:
... 4ven as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also
protect the right of an employer to e?ercise what are clearly management
prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to
achieve its purpose cannot be denied.
So long as a company's management prerogatives are e?ercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this ourt will uphold
them /L=1 3ictures Cor"ers vs. L=1, 2< S:+ ).8; 3hil. +merican 4mbroideries vs.
4mbroidery and Garment Cor"ers, ,- S:+ -2.; 3hil. :efining o. vs. Garcia, )D S:+ ));0.
San 6iguel orporation's offer to compensate the members of its sales force who will be
adversely affected by the implementation of the AS by paying them a so-called #bac"
adBustment commission# to ma"e up for the commissions they might lose as a result of the AS
proves the company's good faith and lac" of intention to bust their union.
C!4:4*7:4, the petition for certiorari is dismissed for lac" of merit.
S7 7:A4:4A.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and %edialdea, ""., concur.
G.R. No. 76959 October 12, 1987
ABBOTT LABORATORIES (PHILIPPINES, IN!., "#$ %AI&E !. 'I!TA (et)t)o#er*,
+*.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS !O&&ISISON "#$ ALBERT BOBA,ILLA
re*(o#$e#t*.
T-e .")# )**/e )# t-)* c"*e )* 0-et-er or #ot A1bert Bob"$)11" co/1$ be +"1)$12
$)*.)**e$ 3ro. -)* e.(1o2.e#t o# t-e 4ro/#$ o3 )#*/bor$)#"t)o# 3or re3/*)#4
to "cce(t -)* #e0 "**)4#.e#t.
5e "re co#*tr")#e$ to "#*0er )# t-e "6r."t)+e.
T-e -)r)#4, 7r)#4, tr"#*3er, $e.ot)o#, "#$ (ro.ot)o# o3 e.(1o2ee* -"* bee#
tr"$)t)o#"112 I$e#t)7e$ "* " ."#"4e.e#t (rero4"t)+e */b8ect to 1).)t"t)o#*
3o/#$ )# 1"0, " co11ect)+e b"r4")#)#4 "4ree.e#t, or 4e#er"1 (r)#c)(1e* o3 3")r
(1"2 "#$ 8/*t)ce. T-)* )* " 3/#ct)o# "**oc)"te$ 0)t- t-e e.(1o2er9* )#-ere#t
r)4-t to co#tro1 "#$ ."#"4e e:ect)+e12 )t* e#ter(r)*e. E+e# "* t-e 1"0 )*
*o1)c)to/* o3 t-e 0e13"re o3 e.(1o2ee*, )t ./*t "1*o (rotect t-e r)4-t o3 "#
e.(1o2er to e;erc)*e 0-"t "re c1e"r12 ."#"4e.e#t (rero4"t)+e*. T-e 3ree
0-o o3 ."#"4e.e#t to co#$/ct )t* o0# b/*)#e** ":")r* to "c-)e+e )t*
(/r(o*e c"##ot be $e#)e$. (See ,"#4"# +*. N"t)o#"1 L"bor Re1"t)o#*
!o..)**)o#, 127 S!RA 7<6.
A* " 4e#er"1 r/1e, t-e r)4-t to tr"#*3er or re"**)4# "# e.(1o2ee )* reco4#)=e$
"* "# e.(1o2er9* e;c1/*)+e r)4-t "#$ t-e (rero4"t)+e o3 ."#"4e.e#t.
5e "4ree 0)t- t-e L"bor Arb)ter9* co#c1/*)o#* t-"t>
Sett1e$ )* t-e r/1e )# t-)* re4"r$ t-"t "# e.(1o2er, e;ce(t 0-e# c)te$ b2
*(ec)"1 1"0*, -"* t-e r)4-t to re4/1"te, "ccor$)#4 to -)* o0# $)*cret)o# "#$
8/$4.e#t, "11 "*(ect* o3 e.(1o2.e#t, 0-)c- )#c1/$e*, ".o#4 ot-er*, -)r)#4,
0or? "**)4#.e#t*, (1"ce "#$ ."##er o3 0or?, 0or?)#4 re4/1"t)o#* "#$
tr"#*3er o3 e.(1o2ee* )# "ccor$"#ce 0)t- -)* o(er"t)o#"1 $e."#$* "#$
re@/)re.e#t*. T-)* r)4-t Ao0* 3ro. o0#er*-)( "#$ 3ro. t-e e*t"b1)*-e$ r/1e
t-"t 1"bor 1"0 $oe* #ot "/t-or)=e t-e */b*t)t/t)o# o3 8/$4.e#t o3 t-e
e.(1o2er )# t-e co#$/ct o3 -)* b/*)#e**, /#1e** )t )* *-o0# to be co#tr"r2 to
1"0, .or"1* or (/b1)c (o1)c2 (NLU +*. I#*/1"rBCeb"#" Tob"cco !or(., 2 S!RA
92D, 9E1F "#$ Re(/b1)c S"+)#4* B"#? +*. !o/rt o3 I#$/*tr)"1 Re1"t)o#*, 21
S!RA 226, 2E5.
...
It "((e"r)#4, t-ere3ore, t-"t t-e or$er to tr"#*3er co.(1")#"#t )* b"*e$ /(o#
" 8/$4.e#t o3 -)* e.(1o2er Abbott, 0-)c- 8/$4.e#t to tr"#*3er )* )# t-e 0)t-
" co.("#2 (r"ct)ce 0-)c- )* #ot co#tr"r2 to 1"0, .or"1* or (/b1)c (o1)c2,
-e#ce, be2o#$ t-e co.(ete#ce o3 t-)* o6ce to @/e*t)o#, t-e re3/*"1 o3
co.(1")#"#t to obe2 t-e 1"03/1 or$er o3 Abbott )* 4ro** )#*/bor$)#"t)o# G "
+"1)$ c"/*e 3or $)*.)**"1.
!o.(1")#"#t "1*o "11e4e$ t-"t -)* tr"#*3er 0"* " $e.ot)o#. Ho0e+er, #o
e;(1"#"t)o# 0"* 4)+e# ./c- 1e** "#2 e+)$e#ce (re*e#te$ )# */((ort o3 t-e
"11e4"t)o#. O# t-e ot-er -"#$, )t )* c1e"r t-"t t-ere 0"* #o c-"#4e )#
co.(1")#"#t9* (o*)t)o# "#$ *"1"r2, (r)+)1e4e* "#$ be#e7t* -e 0"* rece)+)#4
0-)1e )# &"#)1". 5)t- re*(ect to t-e *"1e* co..)**)o#, Abbott c1").e$ t-"t
-"$ co.(1")#"#t "cce(te$ t-e "**)4#.e#t, -e co/1$ -"+e e"r#e$ .ore
bec"/*e t-e *"1e* (ro*(ect* )# t-e !"4"2"# Terr)tor2, 0-)c- co.(r)*e*
N/e+" ')=c"2", I*"be1" "#$ !"4"2"# Pro+)#ce 0ere ./c- -)4-er t-"# t-e
terr)tor2 "**)4#e$ to -). )# &"#)1". Be*)$e*, t-e "**)4#.e#t o:ere$ "#
).(ort"#t "+e#/e 3or 3/t/re (ro.ot)o#, re*(o#$e#t co#c1/$e$. (((. 6B9,
L"bor Arb)ter9* $ec)*)o#.
T-ere3ore, Bob"$)11" -"$ #o +"1)$ re"*o# to $)*obe2 t-e or$er o3 tr"#*3er. He
-"$ t"c)t12 4)+e# -)* co#*e#t t-ereto 0-e# -e "cce$e$ to t-e (et)t)o#er*9
(o1)c2 o3 -)r)#4 *"1e* *t": 0-o "re 0)11)#4 to be "**)4#e$ "#20-ere )# t-e
P-)1)(()#e* 0-)c- )* $e."#$e$ b2 t-e (et)t)o#er*9 b/*)#e**.
B2 t-e +er2 #"t/re o3 -)* e.(1o2.e#t, " $r/4 *"1e*."# or .e$)c"1
re(re*e#t"t)+e )* e;(ecte$ to tr"+e1. He *-o/1$ "#t)c)("te re"**)4#.e#t
"ccor$)#4 to t-e $e."#$* o3 t-e)r b/*)#e**. It 0o/1$ be " (oor $r/4
cor(or"t)o# 0-)c- c"##ot e+e# "**)4# )t* re(re*e#t"t)+e* or $et")1 .e# to
#e0 ."r?et* c"11)#4 3or o(e#)#4 or e;("#*)o# or to "re"* 0-ere t-e #ee$ 3or
(/*-)#4 )t* (ro$/ct* )* 4re"t. &ore *o )3 */c- re"**)4#.e#t* "re ("rt o3 t-e
e.(1o2.e#t co#tr"ct.
:epublic of the 3hilippines
!5+REME O5RT
6anila
41 &+1
G.R. No. L-22323 !e;,e.ber 27, 1967
RE+56LI !A-ING! 6AN# "$o7 RE+56LI 6AN#1, petitioner,
vs.
O5RT OF IND5!TRIAL RELATION!, RO!ENDO T. RE!5ELLO, 6EN(AMIN (ARA,
FLORENIO ALLA!A!, DOMINGO 6. (OLA, DIO!DADO !. MENDIOLA, TEODORO DE LA
R58, NARI!O MAARAEG a$0 MA5RO A. RO-ILLO!, respondents.
/ic#auco, 0icaso 7 gcaoili and +. 6antayana for petitioner.
G. 9. 2a'ardo for respondents.

A!TRO, J.:
+t the instance of the respondents, prosecutor +. Tirona filed a complaint in the ': on
September )<, )9<D, alleging that the &an"'s conduct violated section ./a0 /<0 of the 'ndustrial
3eace +ct which ma"es it an unfair labor practice for an employer #to dismiss, discharge or
otherwise preBudice or discriminate against an employee for having filed charges or for having
given or being about to give testimony under this +ct.#
The &an" moved for the dismissal of the complaint, contending that respondents were
discharged not for union activities but for having written and published a libelous letter against
the ban" president. The court denied the motion on the basis of its decision in another case
)
in
which it ruled that section ./a0 /<0 applies to cases in which an employee is dismissed or
discriminated against for having filed #any charges against his employer.# Chereupon the case
was heard.
'n )9-;, however, this ourt overruled the decision of the ': in the +oyal *nterocean
case and held that #the charge, the filing of which is the cause of the dismissal of the employee,
must be related to his right to self-organi$ation in order to give rise to unfair labor practice on the
part of the employer,# because #under subsection < of section ./a0, the employee's /)0 having
filed charges or /,0 having given testimony or /20 being about to give testimony, are modified by
'under this +ct' appearing after the last item.#
,
The &an" therefore renewed its motion to
dismiss, but the court held the motion in abeyance and proceeded with the hearing.

'nstead of stifling criticism, the &an" should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances. Good faith bargaining re%uired of the &an" an open mind and a sincere desire to
negotiate over grievances.
))
The grievance committee, created in the collective bargaining
agreements, would have been an appropriate forum for such negotiation. 'ndeed, the grievance
procedure is a part of the continuous process of collective bargaining.
),
't is intended to
promote, as it were, a friendly dialogue between labor and management as a means of
maintaining industrial peace.
The &an" defends its action by invo"ing its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-
organi$ation of employees is not unlimited,
)2
as the right of an employer to discharge for cause
).
is undenied. The 'ndustrial 3eace +ct does not touch the normal e?ercise of the right of an
employer to select his employees or to discharge them. 't is directed solely against the abuse of
that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self-organi$ation.
)<
&ut the difficulty arises
in determining whether in fact the discharges are made because of such a separable cause or
because of some other activities engaged in by employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
)-
't is for the ':, in the first instance, to ma"e the determination, #to weigh the employer's
e?pressed motive in determining the effect on the employees of management's otherwise
e%uivocal act.#
)8
*or the +ct does not underta"e the impossible tas" of specifying in precise and
unmista"able language each incident which constitutes an unfair labor practice. :ather, it leaves
to the court the wor" of applying the +ct's general prohibitory language in the light of infinite
combinations of events which may be charged as violative of its terms.
)D
+s the ircuit ourt of
+ppeals puts it:
Aetermining the legality of a dismissal necessarily involves an appraisal of the
employer's motives. 'n these cases motivations are seldom e?pressly avowed and
avowals are not always candid. There thus must be a measure of reliance on the
administrative agency "nowledgeable in labor-management relations and on the Trial
4?aminer who receives the evidence firsthand and is therefore in a uni%ue position to
determine the credibility of the witnesses. Chere 4?aminer and &oard are in agreement
there is an increased presumption in favor of their resolution of the issue.
)9
Chat we have Bust essayed underscores at once the difference between +oyal
*nterocean and /a$as ng 0ag$a$aisa on the one hand and this case on the other. 'n +oyal
*nterocean, the employee's letter to the home office, for writing which she was dismissed,
complained of the local manager's #inconsiderate and untactful attitude#
,;
( a grievance which,
the court found, #had nothing to do with or did not arise from her union activities.# 1or did the
court find evidence of discriminatory discharge in /a$as ng 0ag$a$aisa as the letter, which the
employee wrote to the mother company in violation of the local company's rule, denounced
#wastage of company funds.# 'n contrast, the e?press finding of the court in this case was that
the dismissal of the respondents was made on account of the letter they had written, in which
they demanded the resignation of the ban" president for a number of reasons touching labor-
management relations ( reasons which not even the &an"'s Budgment that the respondents
had committed libel could e?cuse it for ma"ing summary discharges
,)
in disregard of its duty to
bargain collectively.
'n final sum and substance, this ourt is in unanimity that the &an"'s conduct, identified
as an interference with the employees' right of self-organi$ation, or as a retaliatory action,
andJor as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning
and intendment of section ./a0 of the 'ndustrial 3eace +ct.
+7:A'1GLI, the decision of Huly ., )9-, and the resolution of +ugust 9, )9-, of the
ourt of 'ndustrial :elations are affirmed, at petitioner's cost.