In this case, the petitioners questioned the constitutionaity of the follwing pr

ovisions of RA 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A.
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354,
361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
a.) whether or not a. Section 4(a)(1) ( Illlegal Acces) failed to meet the Stric
t Scrunity Standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights
of the people?
The court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of str
ict scrunity standards since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is being jeop
ardized. What is punished in this section is the Act of accessing the computer s
ystem of another without right.
b) Whether or not Section 4(a)(3) (Data Inference) suffers from Overbreadth Doct
rine which instills fear and deterent effect in the guaranteed freedom of speech
and expression.
Section 4(a)(3) does not suffer from Overbreadth Dctrine since the purpose of w
hich is not to encroach the aforementioned guaranteed freedom. It merely punishe
s what essentially is a form of vandalism.
c) Whether or not Section 4(a)(6) ( Cyber- squatting) violates the equal protect
ion clause by causing the person who uses his real name to suffer as those who u
se alias?
The court says that it is not the name itself that is being punished but the use
of it for evil purpose.
d) Whether or not Section 4(b)(3) (Identity Theft) vioalted the constitutional
rights of due process to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedo
m of the press?
The court does not agree because: (1)The law only punishes those who acquire or
use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage, (2)
The said section does not infringe into guarateed freedom of speech since it mer
ely regulates the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying d
ata of another, and (3) it does not violate freedom of press since it only prohi
bits the access of one's published information for illegitemate purpose.
e)Whether or not Section 4(c)(1) (Cybersex) violated the freedom of expresssion
since it expresses that private communication of sexual characted between husba
nd and wife or consenting adults constitues a crime?
The law does not intend to penalize private showing between two private persons.
What the law punish is punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornog
raphy for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and po
rnography, i.e., by webcam.
f) Whether or not Section 4(c) (2) unconstitutional?
g) Wheter or not Section 4 (c) (3) unconstitutional?