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Case Study Analysis: Briefly identify Hewlett-Packard's ‘strategic agenda’, i.e.

what are
the fundaental !uesti"ns and #r"$les that c"ncern "rgani%ati"ns and their successful
de&el"#ent' ()**)+.

,&er&iew "f the C"#any

Hewlett Packard is the w"rld's leading #r"ducer "f test and easureent
instruents and the w"rld's third largest c"#uter c"#any. -t has $ec"e a a."r #layer
in the #ers"nal c"#uter arket, and at in a /000 sur&ey was the si1th $iggest in ters "f
arket share, ha&ing "&ed u# fr" f"urteenth largest in /00). -t is als" the sec"nd
largest #layer in the c"#uter w"rkstati"ns arket, and h"lds the d"inant #"siti"n in
the laser #rinter $usiness.

2he c"#any was the "nly a."r c"#uter anufacturer which reained #r"fita$le
during the recessi"n. 2he c"r#"rati"n e#l"ys 03,)** staff w"rldwide, "f which )*,)**
are e#l"yed in 4ur"#e and ),*** in the 56 (in the 56 C"#uter Systes
,rgani%ati"n+. 5nder#inning the Hewlett Packard culture is the HP 7ay, de&el"#ed $y
f"unders Bill Hewlett and 8a&e Packard, which e#hasi%es clearly stated and agreed
"&erall "$.ecti&es $ut gi&es #e"#le the freed" t" w"rk t"wards these g"als in ways they
deterine $est f"r their "wn areas "f res#"nsi$ility (/000+.

2he HP 7ay is #r"$a$ly $est illustrated fr" a nu$er "f w"rds and c"nce#ts e1tracted
fr" Hewlett Packard’s "wn #u$licati"ns. 2hese are l"&e "f the #r"duct, l"&e "f the
cust"er, inn"&ati"n, !uality, "#en c"unicati"n, c"itent t" #e"#le, trust,
c"nfidence, inf"rality, teaw"rk, sharing, "#enness, aut"n"y, res#"nsi$ility ( )**/+.

,ther #illars "f the HP 7ay include an e#hasis "n selecting indi&iduals "n the $asis "f
their creati&ity and their enthusias, and the need f"r c""#erati"n $etween "rgani%ati"nal
le&els. A s"#histicated #erf"rance anageent #r"cess and clear "rgani%ati"nal &alues,
t"gether with a single status culture, has $r"ught str"ng identificati"n with the c"#any
"n the #art "f e#l"yees.

Hewlett Packard $reaks u# units that gr"w $ey"nd a certain $enchark. Hierarchy and
status are ta$"". 4&en the c"#any #resident "nly reluctantly t""k that title. Any 9#erks9
"r status sy$"ls are iediately dis#ensed with. 2he #lants are #eri"dically #"lled
an"ny"usly t" ensure that the c"#any li&es u# t" its ideals (/00)+. 2he "rgani%ati"n
has traditi"nally had a decentrali%ed structure, $ut with the gr"wth "f the c"#uter
$usiness a "re centrali%ed a##r"ach was taken t" reflect the systes nature "f the
$usiness.




Backgr"und "f the Case Study

:ark Hurd is credited t" $e "ne "f the f"rerunners wh" tried t" turn ar"und a s#rawling,
;0* $illi"n techn"l"gy c"#any, f"ll"wing years "f lackluster #erf"rance. ,ne year
after he t""k the ."$ as chief e1ecuti&e "fficer at Hewlett Packard, f"ll"wing the f"rced
de#arture "f the flashy $ut flawed Carly <i"rina, :r. Hurd has started t" re&i&e the
f"rtunes "f a legendary Silic"n =alley fir.

2he new chief e1ecuti&e is an understated "#erati"ns geek, the ty#e "f anager that
e1cels at HP, the e#it"e "f an engineering-dri&en c"#any. >=isi"n with"ut e1ecuti"n is
n"thing,' he says. >7hene&er any"ne asks e a$"ut &isi"n, - get &ery ner&"us. ?"u'&e
g"t t" $e a$le t" tie it $ack t" strategy@ y"u'&e g"t t" tie acc"unta$ility t" things.' :r
Hurd #refers t" stand when he talks rather than sit@ he wears cris#ly kn"tted ties while his
anagers are all"wed "#en-c"llared shirts. At A0 years "ld, his hair is cr"##ed sh"rt and
e&ery strand is #erfectly in #lace, as "ne ight e1#ect fr" a an wh" s#ent the #ast )B
years ascending the ranks "f a century-"ld $usiness in 8ayt"n, ,hi" called CCDE
"riginally Cati"nal Cash Degister.

7hen :ark Hurd ."ined Hewlett-Packard, what he f"und was a fir s#read thin with
any units l"sing "ney and #r"##ed u# $y the sales "f #rinter-ink cartridges. -ts
acti&ities s#anned $"th the c"nsuer and $usiness arket, selling e&erything fr" high-
end s"ftware t" flat-#anel tele&isi"n screens. ?et instead "f shedding $usiness units, :r.
Hurd has decided t" (in his w"rds+ >d"u$le d"wn' "n his $ets, and si#ly d" "re "f the
sae, $ut $etter.

,&er the #ast year he has re"rgani%ed HP int" three ain di&isi"ns: enter#rise c"#uting
and ser&ices@ general tech hardware (such as PCs, handheld de&ices and the like+@ and
iaging and #rinting. 2he c"#any h"#es t" ca#itali%e "n trends such as c"#uting "n
the "&e, and the gr"wing deand f"r #rinting, including s"#histicated c"ercial
#rinting.

Clearly-defined c"r#"rate &alues, &isi"n, and strategic #lanning are the key
eleents in the rearka$le gr"wth achie&ed $y Hewlett-Packard. <"r nearly half a
century, re&enue and earnings ha&e gr"wn at a c"nsistent rate "f )*F #er year, #r"#elling
HP fr" a sall anufacturer t" the ranks "f the leading ultinati"nals (/00G+.

2he first strength "f Hewlett Packard’s #lanning #r"cess is &isi"n.
2heir strategic #lanning is guided $y a clear &isi"n "f what Hewlett-Packard is and where
the c"#any heading. 2his $r"ad sense "f directi"n f"cuses the c"#any’s any #r"duct
gr"u#s and di&isi"ns. -t hel#s e1#lain the sustained success Hewlett Packard had since
their ince#ti"n.

2his &isi"n is c"unicated in se&eral ways. -n #art it reflects what they call the
9HP 7ay.9 2hese are a set "f fi&e &alues enunciated $y their f"unders. 2hey are: (/+ trust
and res#ect f"r indi&iduals, ()+ c"itent t" high le&el achie&eent and c"ntri$uti"n,
(H+ unc"#r"ising integrity, (A+ teaw"rk, and (B+ fle1i$ility and inn"&ati"n.

Hewlett Packard’s #lanning is als" guided $y "re s#ecific l"ng-range g"als.
2hese are called H"shins. H"shin is a Ia#anese w"rd eaning 9a shining #iece "f etal
that #"ints the directi"n,9 in "ther w"rds--a c"#ass (/00G+. 2hese H"shins are n"t
h"ll"w #r"n"unceents. 2hey're dee#ly felt $usiness "$.ecti&es that cascade d"wn
thr"ugh the "rgani%ati"n. 4ach $usiness unit translates the H"shin int" ters that reflect
its "wn issi"n.

2he sec"nd strength "f Hewlett-Packard’s strategic #lanning is that it's
decentrali%ed. Hewlett-Packard has nearly //),*** e#l"yees in //* nati"ns. 2heir
arketing reaches e&en "re #laces. Hewlett Packard sells "&er JG,*** #r"ducts and
ser&ices in )B* c"untries. C" central "ffice c"uld anage detailed #r".ecti"ns f"r all
these far-flung units, thus the need f"r decentrali%ati"n. 2he results "f this decentrali%ed
a##r"ach ha&e $een i#ressi&e.

2heir #r"duct di&isi"ns are fully functi"ning gl"$al $usinesses with their "wn
research and de&el"#ent, arketing, adinistrati"n, sales and su##"rt. 2hey f"r the
nucleus "f Hewlett-Packard, and are the #riary dri&ers "f its gr"wth and #r"fita$ility.
S" Hewlett Packard’s #lanning is ulti-$usiness.

2he third strength "f Hewlett Packard’s strategic #lanning #r"cess is that it
e#hasi%es inn"&ati"n. 2his c"itent sha#es all the c"#any’s #lans and their
de&"ti"n t" research and de&el"#ent. And it's $een "ne "f the keys t" the c"#any’s
success in the ra#idly changing w"rld "f high techn"l"gy.

2he ne1t and f"urth strength "f Hewlett Packard’s #lanning #r"cess is that it is
res#"nsi&e t" the needs and e1#ectati"ns "f their cust"ers. 2his !uality, like the "thers
already enti"ned, is crucial t" the c"#any’s success. 2he c"#any $elie&es that they
will c"ntinue t" gr"w "nly if they g" $ey"nd si#ly satisfying the needs "f their clients
and w"rk t" delight the.

2he fifth strength "f strategic #lanning at Hewlett Packard is that it is c"nstant. -t's
dri&en $y the calendar and $y e&ents. And this t"" has $een a secret "f the c"#any’s
success. As a result "f this a##r"ach the c"#any is always in a #lanning "de. Hewlett
Packard reinf"rces this #lanning #r"cess $y easuring, at each stage, the #r"gress ade
t"ward their "$.ecti&es. 2hey als" reinf"rce this #lanning $y linking e#l"yee
c"#ensati"n -- and "ther regular acti&ity -- t" results.

Analysis and 8iscussi"n

-n each and e&ery line "f $usiness, the entre#reneurs c"#ete with each "ther is
the sale "f their #r"ducts "r ser&ices. 2hus, we can see that c"#etiti"n is $asic in a
syste. 2his is seen in the case "f Hewlett Packard. 2he instituti"n "f free #u$lic
enter#rise i#lies freed" "n the #art "f any entre#reneur t" enter any field "f $usiness
and t" c"#ete with th"se already esta$lished therein f"r the fa&"r "f the $uyers in the
arket.

C"#etiti"n is a risk that the c"#any has t" face. 7hat the c"#any needed t" d" was
t" i#leent the right strategies t" $e a$le t" "&erc"e this c"#etiti"n. -n the case "f
Carly <i"rina, she wasn’t a$le t" guide the c"#any t" "&erc"e this risk, as well as
any "thers.

Disk is always #resent in #ri&ate enter#rise. ,f greatest i#"rtance is the risk "f c"#lete
failure K "f $ankru#tcy K in which case the entre#reneur stands t" l"se all "f his
in&estent. -n the case "f the s"le #r"#riet"rshi# "r #artnershi# he ay #"ssi$ly als" l"se
his #ers"nal #r"#erty and sa&ings ( )**/+. 2his is "ne risk that a c"#any w"uld ne&er
want t" face. All "ther risks that are n"t #r"#erly anaged w"uld e&entually lead t" this.
-f Hewlett Packard was n"t a$le t" ake a g""d turnar"und, it w"uld ha&e started t" g"
$ankru#t, "r at least "ne "f its $ranches w"uld ha&e.

2his risk is a#t t" $e greater when a new $usiness is $eing launched than after it is well
esta$lished. A siilar danger e1ists, h"we&er, when an "ld c"ncern fails t" kee# a$reast
"f the ties and l"ses "ut t" newer, "re wide awake c"#etit"rs ()**/+. Herein we see
again the r"le "f c"#etiti"n in $ringing a $usiness u# "r d"wn. And :r. Hurd has
$r"ught Hewlett Packard u# K fr" his re"rgani%ati"n "f the c"#any t" integrati"n, this
new chief e1ecuti&e has definitely #layed his cards right.

At all ties a fir ust $e aware "f the risks that are inherent in c"#etiti"n K chances
f"r l"ss thr"ugh shifts in the #rice le&el, changes in style and fashi"n, and the a##earance
"f su$stitutes "n the arket that s"eties render #resent "dels "$s"lete. C"nsuers
c"uld switch fr" an "rdinary #rinter t" a three-in-"ne #rinter alth"ugh the "rdinary
#rinter is still a new "ne and has n" defects. Als", c"nsuers c"uld switch t" a chea#er
#rinter "f an"ther c"#eting $rand $ut with the sae !uality. 2here is always a risk
in&"l&ed in the use "f su$stitutes f"r aterials f"rerly used.

2he a##earance "f inn"&ati&e c"#etiti"n in the #ast c"u#le "f decades has arkedly
enhanced the risk as#ects "f entre#reneurshi# in all ec"n"ic areas. 2w" "ther fact"rs are
n"tew"rthy as c"ntri$ut"rs t" risk. 2hese are aut"ati"n, which in&"l&es the su$stituti"n
"f echanical f"r huan eff"rt with a fre!uently resulting reducti"n in c"st@ and
electr"nic data #r"cessing thr"ugh the use "f c"#uters, which #erits "f the asse$ling
and use "f large a"unts "f &ital inf"rati"n $y anageent.

7ith the #r"liferati"n "f techn"l"gy-"riented $usinesses, it is a##r"#riate t" first take a
l""k at the distinguishing characteristics "f this ty#e "f enter#rise. <irst is the nature "f
techn"l"gy itself, as an asset "f the $usiness and als" as a &ital ingredient "f the #r"duct
deli&ered. 2he sec"nd characteristic relates t" the &ari"us "#ti"ns a&aila$le f"r #r"fita$le
utili%ati"n "f the techn"l"gy assets, and the r"le that these "#ti"ns can #lay in the
de&el"#ent "f an effecti&e strategy f"r the $usiness ( /00J+.

2hese tw" characteristics differentiate techn"l"gy-dri&en $usinesses fr" "thers, such as
retail esta$lishents, restaurants, &ari"us ser&ice #r"&iders, and s" "n. 2he failure t"
rec"gni%e these &ery real differences can ser&e t" liit the #"tential f"r success in these
$usinesses. 2his is n"t s" a #r"$le with Hewlett Packard as the c"#any kn"ws that it
is a largely techn"l"gically dri&en c"#any.

<"r th"se c"#anies una$le "r unwilling t" utili%e either "r $"th "f these fact"rs, the risk
"f falling $ehind c"#etiti&ely ay $e seri"us. L""d thing Hewlett Packard is already
utili%ing these. -t is really a ust f"r c"#anies t" $e techn"l"gically ade#t.

2echn"l"gy is "ne "f the "st accessi$le assets a&aila$le t" the entre#reneur. -n additi"n
t" the "$&i"us a##r"ach "f in&enting the techn"l"gy "neself, there are any "utside
s"urces, such as "ther $usinesses, c"lleges and uni&ersities, g"&ernent agencies, and
indi&iduals.

2here are als", it sh"uld $e added, a ulti#licity "f eth"ds f"r tracking d"wn
techn"l"gy fr" these "ther s"urces, including catal"gs, trade sh"ws, agents, and $"th
f"r-#r"fit and n"n#r"fit instituti"ns. -t is als" w"rth n"ting that while these assets are n"t
usually a&aila$le "n a n"-c"st $asis, the financial ters f"r access can $e &ery attracti&e,
with little "r n" u#-fr"nt #ayent re!uired in s"e cases (/00J+.

Pr"$a$ly the "st c""n a##licati"n "f techn"l"gical assets is t" ser&e as the $asis f"r
the ca#ti&e anufacture "f a #r"duct f"r sale. -n s"e cases, this in&"l&es a new #r"duct@
in "thers, it in&"l&es a new, and #resua$ly $etter, way "f anufacturing an e1isting
#r"duct. -n either case, c"erciali%ati"n "f the techn"l"gy will yield financial $enefits,
either thr"ugh sales "f a new #r"duct, in the first instance, "r thr"ugh higher argins "n
sales "f e1isting #r"ducts, in the sec"nd instance. 7hile $"th ay entail techn"l"gical
risk, the new #r"duct "#ti"n will als" in&"l&e arket risk. Ce&ertheless, this is the "st
c""n entre#reneurial a##r"ach t" the c"erciali%ati"n "f techn"l"gical assets
(/00J+.

-ncreases in techn"l"gy ha&e resulted in increased skill le&els f"r s"e #ractices and
#r"cesses, and deskilling in "thers. At Hewlett Packard, engineers ust "&e fr"
re#airing indi&idual #ers"nal c"#uters and #rinters t" w"rking "n netw"rks, a
significant .u# in skill le&el (/000+.

-n an increasing nu$er "f instances, es#ecially in this gl"$al ec"n"y, techn"l"gical
assets are finding use as 9trading chi#s9 in ."int &entures "r strategic alliances. C"nsider,
f"r e1a#le, the case "f an entre#reneur seeking t" utili%e a new techn"l"gy "n a
w"rldwide $asis.

-n "ne's h"e c"untry the techn"l"gy can $e a##lied as discussed in the #receding
#aragra#hs@ h"we&er, in an area "f the w"rld where the c"#any d"es n"t n"w "#erate,
the a##r"ach is c"nsidera$ly "re c"#le1. ,ne a##r"ach that has $een taken $y s"e
entre#reneurs is t" de&el"# a ."int &enture with an "rgani%ati"n that already has a arket
#"siti"n in the area in !uesti"n. 2he techn"l"gy "wned $y the entre#reneur will ser&e as
all "r #art "f the e!uity c"ntri$uti"n t" the ."int &enture, and the #artner's arket #"siti"n
will acc"unt f"r an"ther #"rti"n "f the e!uity in the &enture. 2his, "f c"urse, is "nly "ne
e1a#le "f ."int &entures (I=s+ "r alliances wherein an effecti&e $usiness strategy entails
the use "f techn"l"gy instead "f financial assets ()**/+.

Ad&ances in techn"l"gy ha&e theref"re draatically altered the $asis "f c"#etiti"n in
any industries, "st es#ecially that which deals with techn"l"gy. 2he rate "f
techn"l"gical change--that is, the intr"ducti"n "f new techn"l"gy such as '#ers"nal
c"#uters, cellular #h"nes, fi$re "#tics, the -nternet, assi&e data$ases, MACs (l"cal
area netw"rks+, artificial intelligence, &irtual reality, satellite trans#"nders and
telec"nferencing' --has sh"rtened #r"duct life cycles and de&el"#ent cycles (/000+.

2his is s" true in Hewlett Packard wherein #r"ducts $ec"e "$s"lete "nly in a anner "f
"nths. C"nsuers then are always l""king f"r s"ething new. 7hat is $"ught si1
"nths ag" c"uld $e c"nsidered $y the c"nsuer as "$s"lete and theref"re w"uld need a
new re#laceent. 2his is n"t !uesti"na$le since at the rate techn"l"gy is dri&ing change
in "ur s"ciety, it is &irtually e&eryday that new #r"ducts are in&ented.

2he s#eed "f techn"l"gical diffusi"n--the rate at which techn"l"gical inf"rati"n is
a$s"r$ed int" the industry--is als" increasing, enc"uraging c"#ying and increased
c"#etiti"n in the f"r "f 'e t""' #layers. 2hese issues ha&e large i#licati"ns f"r
"rgani%ati"ns which are techn"l"gy-intensi&e, such as Hewlett Packard.

-n any large c"#anies with di&ersified #r"duct lines, Hewlett-Packard included, the
c"nce#t "f decentrali%ati"n has $een e1tended t" the #"int where each #r"duct line
$ec"es the $asis "f a "re "r less sei-aut"n""us di&isi"n. -n such a situati"n the
res#"nsi$ility f"r designing, #r"ducing, and selling its #r"duct line and "f aking a #r"fit
is gi&en t" the di&isi"n anageent. 2he Leneral :"t"rs C"r#"rati"n, Leneral 4lectric
C"#any and -B: are .ust s"e "f the c"#anies that f"ll"w this #ractice.

2he rati"nale $ehind this #ractice is that these c"#anies ha&e $ec"e t"" large and their
#r"duct line t"" &aried f"r a centrali%ed anageent t" su#er&ise satisfact"rily. 4ach
di&isi"n theref"re acts as th"ugh it were an inde#endent c"#any.

All large c"#anies, h"we&er, d" n"t l""k with fa&"r "n such a #ractice "f di&isi"n
within the "rgani%ati"n. ,ther large c"#anies fa&"r the ad"#ti"n "f a functi"nal ty#e "f
c"ntr"l structure. 7ith this s"rt "f arrangeent, a c"#any’s #hysical "#erati"ns ay $e
dis#ersed, $ut the anagerial c"ntr"l f"r all "f its different "#erati"ns is centrali%ed. 2his
eans that a single sales f"rce sells all "f its different #r"ducts and anufacturing #lants
are directed fr" the h"e "ffice.

Such an arrangeent f"cuses the res#"nsi$ility centering "n the #resident "f the
c"#any. -n a large c"#any, this d"es n"t s"und &ery g""d. 2his c"ncentrati"n "f
res#"nsi$ility ay "&er$urden the chief e1ecuti&e with su#er&is"ry duties, lea&ing hi
t"" little tie f"r creati&e thinking and acting. -t als" tends t" create a sh"rtage "f
#"tential anagers $ecause "f the centrali%ing auth"rity at the t"#.

7hat has c"ntri$uted uch t" the success "f Hewlett Packard when :r. Hurd t""k "&erN
:ainly it is his decisi"n aking #r"cess that has hel#ed the c"#any sur&i&e and #r"s#er
des#ite increasing c"#etiti"n. He all $ut ade the right decisi"ns f"r the c"#any.

-n the #ast few years a nu$er "f things ha&e c"e int" $eing that ha&e $r"ught the
decisi"n-aking #r"cess int" a shar#er f"cus. <"r the #urely echanical side, the ra#id
and e1tensi&e de&el"#ent "f high-s#eed c"#uters and data #r"cessing #r"cedures ha&e
added ieasura$ly t" the !uantity "f inf"rati"n a&aila$le t" the e1ecuti&e ()**/+.

2his w"uld s#ecifically ena$le :r. Hurd t" $ase his decisi"ns "n far greater a"unts "f
rele&ant data than e&er $ef"re. By ha&ing &ast a"unt "f inf"rati"n regarding a certain
atter, :r. Hurd w"uld $e a$le t" analy%e and #ick the right ch"ice, thus aking c"rrect
decisi"ns which are f"r the g""d "f the c"#any.

2he a$ility t" ake c"rrect decisi"ns in $usiness has l"ng $een rec"gni%ed as a #rie
attri$ute "f successful anageent and there is theref"re a need f"r in!uiry int" the
decisi"n-aking #r"cess. 7ith the gr"wth "f large c"r#"rati"ns, with their &ast res"urces
in the areas "f finance, #r"ducti&e ca#acity, and an#"wer, and the increased te#" "f
c"#etiti"n, the #"ssi$le c"nse!uences "f unwise decisi"ns, $"th "n the c"#anies
in&"l&ed and "n the ec"n"y generally, ha&e ser&ed t" f"cus attenti"n "n further research
and studies "n the t"#ic ()**/+.

Hewlett Packard is seen $y #ractiti"ners and acadeics as a #e"#le anageent
$enchark, yet there are still c"ncerns raised a$"ut integrating the ra#idly changing
$usiness i#erati&es with the huan res"urce systes t" create a easure "f c"ntinuity
and c"nsistency (/000+.

Hewlett Packard c"uld $e descri$ed as ha&ing a uni!ue 'cultured' s"ft "del "f huan
res"urce anageent, in that HD c"nsiderati"ns were an intrinsic #art "f the c"r#"rate
strategy and anageent style, rather than $eing grafted "nt" it. 2his created a situati"n
where HD: #ereated the culture "f the "rgani%ati"n, and the wh"le way in which
#e"#le "#erated, $ec"ing '"wned' $y e&ery"ne, n"t the HD functi"n itself--'the
"wnershi# "f anaging #e"#le and #racticing the HP 7ay (which is already descri$ed in
the #re&i"us #aragra#hs+ is a line anageent-"wned functi"n' (seni"r anager+.

<"r instance, the :anaging 8irect"r articulated the si1 key #r"cesses f"r the "rgani%ati"n
as 'cust"er f"cus, #lanning #r"cess, "rder generati"n, #r"duct generati"n, "rder
fulfillent, #e"#le fulfillent'. 2he e#hasis #laced in this "del "n de&el"#ent,
fulfillent, and !uality is indicati&e "f the s"ft "del.

-n Hewlett Packard, #e"#le c"nsiderati"ns were seen as a fundaental c"#"nent "f the
$usiness strategy itself. Acc"rding t" the case study, $y aking anagers and the sales
f"rce "re acc"unta$le and $y enc"uraging cr"ss-selling, the fir has increased the
a"unt "f e1tra #r"ducts it sells al"ngside its hardware. 2he $usiness strategy e#l"yed
$y :r. Hurd f"cuses n"t "nly "n #r"cesses $ut "n #e"#le as well. 2his #r"&ed t" $e
suited well t" the c"#any and its e#l"yees.

An i#"rtant fact"r c"ncerning the i#leentati"n "f #erf"rance anageent
#r"cesses is the degree "f change the "rgani%ati"n is underg"ing and the e1#erience "f
change the "rgani%ati"n has had. At Hewlett Packard, "#erating in the c"#uter $usiness
f"r twenty-fi&e years has gi&en the fir a l"ng hist"ry "f change anageent and a
decentrali%ed anageent style, which has resulted in a fle1i$le #erf"rance
anageent syste, a$le t" c"#e with changing circustances.

7ith this c"ntinuity and c"nsistency, the e1#ectati"ns "f e#l"yees reain relati&ely
sta$le. 2he enduring culture, e1e#lified $y the HP 7ay, als" #r"&ides c"ntinuity in
ters "f &alues which in turn reinf"rce desired $eha&i"urs (/000+.

A nu$er "f fact"rs a##ear t" ha&e c"ntri$uted t" this turnar"und that is ha##ening t"
Hewlett Packard under the anageent "f :r. Hurd. A#art fr" arket changes, new
#r"duct launches, and c"st-cutting easures, the le&el "f $ureaucracy within the
c"#any was als" attacked. A c"#any that had $een started $y entre#reneurial
engineers, ad&isers urged that it had $ec"e t"" centrali%ed.

-n additi"n, new ideas were $eing s!uashed if they a##eared t"" un"rth"d"1. Hewlett
Packard’s res#"nse was t" return t" a decentrali%ed structure that ga&e freed" $ack t"
the indi&idual $usiness units. 2his decentrali%ati"n argua$ly hel#ed "ne $usiness di&isi"n
t" take "ff in $usiness ters and ca#ture a significant #r"#"rti"n "f a new #r"duct arket
( /000+.

2he achie&eents "f an "rgani%ati"n are the result "f the c"$ined eff"rts "f each
indi&idual in the "rgani%ati"n w"rking t"ward c""n "$.ecti&es. 2hese "$.ecti&es
sh"uld $e realistic, sh"uld $e clearly underst""d $y e&ery"ne in the "rgani%ati"n, and
sh"uld reflect the "rgani%ati"n's $asic character and #ers"nality ( /00)+. 2hese sentences
clearly irr"r what is ha##ening at Hewlett Packard under :r. Hurd as chief e1ecuti&e.

C"nclusi"n

,rgani%ati"n eans that anageent endea&"rs t" achie&e its "$.ecti&es $y
directing the eff"rts "f the #e"#le under its su#er&isi"n. 2his #r"cedure is a necessity
whether it $e a large "r a sall c"#any. 2his has $een taken seri"usly $y :r. Hurd as
chief e1ecuti&e "f Hewlett Packard. 7hile the success "f a Hewlett Packard ay $e
attri$uted t" any "ther causes, the skills with which :r. Hurd directs and anages the
"rgani%ati"n is "ne "f the a."r fact"rs in the #"siti&e end result.

Pr"$a$ly the "st f"re"st res#"nsi$ility "f anageent at all le&els, $ut
es#ecially t"# anageent K that "f :r. Hurd, is the aking "f decisi"ns. -n any, if n"t
"st, instances, the decisi"ns that chief e1ecuti&e "fficers ha&e in&"l&e the aking "f
ch"ices $etween tw" "r "re alternati&e c"urses "f acti"n. 2he c"#any theref"re rests
"n whether :r. Hurd will ch""se the right decisi"n "r n"t. 2hankfully, :r. Hurd has
en"ugh e1#erience and #erha#s #lenty "f references that ena$led hi t" ake the right
decisi"ns and hel#ing Hewlett Packard succeed
Dead "re: htt#:OOi&ythesis.ty#e#ad.c"OterP#a#erPt"#icsO)**0O/)Ocase-study-analysis-
$riefly-identify-hewlett#ackards-strategic-agenda-ie-what-are-the-fundaental-
!u.htlQi1%%)iDMiA3?R
The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
A failure in decision support system and human factors management
$y Ieff <"rrest
:etr"#"litan State C"llege
INTRODUCTION
2his article discusses the en&ir"nental and huan decisi"n aking fact"rs that were
ass"ciated with the launching "f the S#ace Shuttle Challenger "n Ianuary )J, /0J3.
Sh"rtly after launch, the Shuttle e1#l"ded destr"ying the &ehicle and all crew e$ers.
2he cause and c"ntri$uting fact"rs that lead t" the Challenger tragedy are e1#l"red in
detail. <"cus is #laced "n CASA's use "f a gr"u# decisi"n su##"rt syste (L8SS+
eeting t" ake the decisi"n t" launch.
41a#les are included that sh"w h"w c"ntri$uting fact"rs such as ulti#le #ri"rities and
deands influenced CASA fr" "#erating in a res#"nsi$le and ethical anner. Pr""f that
CASA used a flawed data$ase in its L8SS and h"w it isanaged the L8SS eeting is
als" "ffered. <inally, the ina$ility "f each L8SS e$er t" &"te an"ny"usly "n the
decisi"n t" launch is discussed as a critical fact"r that, had it $een all"wed, #r"$a$ly
w"uld ha&e #re&ented the Challenger tragedy.
THE SHUTTE !"# $ISSION
En%ironmental &actors# Societal Impacts
2he S#ace Shuttle Challenger B/-M was the )Bth issi"n in CASA's S2S #r"gra. ,n
Ian. )J, /0J3, S2S B/-M e1#l"ded sh"rtly after lift"ff, destr"ying the &ehicle and all "f its
se&en crew e$ers.
2he S2S B/-M issi"n was t" de#l"y the sec"nd 2racking and 8ata Delay Satellite and
the S#artan Halley's C"et "$ser&er. Para"unt t" this issi"n was crew e$er S.
Christa :cAuliffe - the first S#ace Shuttle #assengerO"$ser&er #artici#ating in the CASA
2eacher in S#ace Pr"gra (cf. S/T+. :s. :cAuliffe w"uld ha&e c"nducted li&e
educati"nal $r"adcasts fr" the Shuttle and transitted the t" classr""s thr"ugh"ut
the w"rld.
2he l"ss "f life and the uni!ue #"siti"n that sy$"li%ed Christa :cAuliffe as the first
ci&ilian w"rking as a teacher in s#ace had a #r"f"und i#act "n s"ciety and its attitude
t"ward CASA and the 5.S. S#ace #r"gras.
As this article will e1#l"re, the tragic decisi"n t" launch S2S B/-M was $ased "n l"ng
ter c"ntri$uting fact"rs and the use "f a flawed gr"u# decisi"n su##"rt syste that was
further aggra&ated $y its related isanageent. 2he "utc"e "f this acti"n created
c"sts t" s"ciety in ters "f life, res"urces and #u$lic istrust. CASA su$se!uently
e1#erienced years "f set$ack f"r its related scientific research and "#erati"ns.
'AC()ROUND
Human &actors # Contri*uting to a Tragedy
Alth"ugh the destructi"n "f the Shuttle Challenger was caused $y the hardware failure "f
a s"lid r"cket $""ster (SDB+ 9,9 ring, the huan decisi"n t" launch was, in itself,
flawed. 2he res"luti"n t" launch was $ased u#"n faulty gr"u# decisi"n su##"rt
inf"rati"n and further aggra&ated $y the related isanageent "f that inf"rati"n.
H"we&er, as in "st trans#"rtati"n accidents, there are usually "ther c"ntri$uting fact"rs
that hel# t" create an en&ir"nent leading t" istakes and failures. 2heref"re, a $rief
re&iew "f the c"ntri$uting fact"rs leading t" the Challenger destructi"n is in "rder.
En%ironmental &actors # Demands on the Space Shuttle
2he #r"cess "f 9selling9 the Aerican #u$lic and its #"litical syste the need f"r a
reusa$le s#ace trans#"rtati"n syste $egan in the late /03*'s. C"nce#tually, the S#ace
Shuttle was intr"duced during the crest "f the successful A#"ll" issi"n. 5nlike the
A#"ll" issi"n, the S#ace Shuttle was a##r"&ed as a eth"d f"r "#erating in s#ace,
with"ut a fir definiti"n "f what its "#erati"nal g"als w"uld $e (S)T #g. H+. Here is the
first c"ntri$uting fact"r. 2he Shuttle was de&el"#ed as a utility with"ut a fir a##licati"n.
2heref"re, su##"rt f"r such a #r".ect, $"th #"litically and ec"n"ically, was n"t &ery
str"ng. 2" gain #"litical su##"rt it was s"ld as a #r".ect with a 9!uick #ay"ff9 (cf., S)T+.
Additi"nal su##"rt was gained $y "ffering the Shuttle #r"gra t" the ilitary as a eans
t" increase nati"nal security and t" industry as a t""l t" "#en new c"ercial
"##"rtunity. Scientists argued t" the Aerican #e"#le that the Shuttle w"uld $e an
9Aerican ="yage9 (S)T #g. /*+ with great scientific gain. Ll"$ally, the Shuttle was s"ld
as a #artnershi# with the 4ur"#ean S#ace Agency (4SA+ and as a eans t" i#r"&e
nati"nal and s"cial relati"ns $y c"$ining #e"#les "f different nati"nalities, races and
se1es wh" w"uld ser&e as crew e$ers.
2he #r"cess used t" de&el"# ec"n"ic, #"litical and s"cial su##"rt f"r the shuttle
intr"duced the sec"nd c"ntri$uting fact"r called heter"gene"us engineering. 2hat is, the
Shuttle engineering and anageent decisi"ns were ade t" eet the needs "f
"rgani%ati"nal, #"litical, and ec"n"ic fact"rs as "##"sed t" a single entity issi"n
#r"file with s#ecific g"als (S)T #g. 0+. ,nce functi"nal, the Shuttle $ecae e1#"sed t"
"#erati"nal deands fr" a ultitude "f users. 2he Shuttle n"w had t" li&e u# t"
CASA's #r"ises. C""rdinating the needs "f #"litical, c"ercial, ilitary, internati"nal
and scientific c"unities #laced iense #ressures "n the Shuttle anageent tea.
<irst, #"litical #ressure t" #r"&ide a relia$le, reusa$le s#ace &ehicle with ra#id turn
ar"und tie and de#l"yent seri"usly hindered the a$ility f"r effecti&e systes
integrati"n and de&el"#ent. Sec"ndly, it was n"t feasi$le t" c"nstruct any c"#lete
anageent su##"rt systes (:SS+ that c"uld c"nsider all "f the fact"rs ass"ciated with
such a di&erse gr"u# "f en&ir"nental &aria$les. 2hird, additi"nal uncertainty and l"w
CASA e#l"yee "ral was created when the Deagan Adinistrati"n #ushed f"r the
Shuttle t" $e declared 9"#erati"nal9 $ef"re the 9de&el"#ental9 stage had $een
c"#leted S)T.
After s#ending $illi"ns "f d"llars t" g" t" the ""n, C"ngress e1#ected the Shuttle
#r"gra t" $e financially self-su##"rti&e (S)T #g. /B+. 2his f"rced CASA t" "#erate as a
#seud" c"ercial $usiness. 2heref"re, the en&ir"nent within CASA #receding the
Challenger launch was "ne "f c"nflict, stress, and sh"rt cuts S)T.
NASA
Decision Support System +DSS, # En%ironmental Effects
2he #r"$a$ility f"r disaster was gr"wing higher as increasing deands were $eing #laced
"n CASA .ust #ri"r t" the Challenger launch S)T. A false sense "f security was felt $y
CASA "fficials, with twenty-f"ur successful Shuttle issi"ns t" their credit. Iust #ri"r t"
the S2S B/-M launch, CASA was an "rgani%ati"n filled with internal strife and territ"rial
$attles(SHT, #g. A/)+. :angers "#erated in an en&ir"nent "f 9"&erl"ad and tur$ulence9
SHT. -n sh"rt, CASA was characteri%ed as ha&ing a 9disease 9 (SHT #g.A/A+ "f decay and
destructi"n.
As incredi$le as it ay see, it w"uld a##ear that CASA had n" f"ral 8SS #r"gra
initiali%ed f"r the Shuttle "#erati"ns $ef"re the Challenger launch. 4&idence is str"ng that
decisi"ns were ade #riarily $y 9satisficing9 and c"nsci"us 9uddling thr"ugh.9
S#ecific characteristics "f decisi"n aking at the tie c"nsisted "f sh"rt cuts,
c"#r"ise and "#erati"nal heuristics (9"#erati"nal heuristics@ t" canni$ali%e e1isting
#arts9 as defined $y Iaran and 6"u%in SHT #g. A/A+. -n sh"rt, CASA was "#erating in
a #hase "f sei-unc"ntr"lled decisi"n aking while trying t" ser&e the ilitary, industry
and internati"nal research "rgani%ati"ns with a s#ace &ehicle that had $een declared
"#erati"nal $ef"re c"#leti"n "f the de&el"#ental stage SAT.
CASA used decisi"n aking $y default as its #riary 8SS. -ts "rgani%ati"nal $"undary
was highly #"litical and "#en f"r ani#ulati"n $y any entity that c"uld e1ert #"litical
#"wer. 5#"n declaring the Shuttle 9"#erati"nal,9 the Deagan Adinistrati"n re"&ed the
"ti&ati"n "f CASA e#l"yees t" anage and left the with the i#ressi"n that
decisi"n aking w"uld $e ade $y directi&e fr" #"litical s"urces.
2he declarati"n "f 9"#erati"nal9 status was the critical turning #"int f"r CASA and its
anageent "f Shuttle "#erati"ns. C"#lacency $egan t" gr"w a"ng e#l"yees and
safety c"nsiderati"ns were traded f"r tie s#ent "n kee#ing the Shuttle "n schedule and
9the client "f the day9 satisfied. 2his was the en&ir"nent .ust $ef"re the launch "f S2S
B/-M.
THE DECISION TO AUNCH
)roup Decision Support System +)DSS, # Situational Analysis
A gr"u# su##"rt syste did e1ist $etween CASA and related de&el"#ers "f the Shuttle.
<"cus in this discussi"n will $e #laced "n 2hi"k"l - the su$c"ntract"r directly res#"nsi$le
f"r the de&el"#ent "f the SDB 9,9 rings. 2he L8SS syste $etween CASA and
2hi"k"l c"nsisted "f sae-tieOdifferent-#lace c"nference r""s e!ui##ed with a
c"nnected and distri$uted c"#uter interface. S#eaker #h"nes with audi" "nly were als"
a&aila$le.
,n the e&ening "f Ianuary )G, /0J3, 2hi"k"l was #r"&iding inf"rati"n t" CASA
regarding c"ncerns f"r the ne1t day's #lanned launch "f S2S B/-l. 2hi"k"l engineers were
&ery c"ncerned that the a$n"rally c"ld te#eratures w"uld affect the 9,9 rings t"
n"n#erf"rance standards. 2he issi"n had already $een canceled due t" weather, and,
as far as CASA was c"ncerned, an"ther cancellati"n due t" weather was unthinka$le (SAT
#g. )H+. B"th #arties were already aware that the seals "n the SDB needed u#grading $ut
did n"t feel that it was critical. 2h"ugh the inf"rati"n #r"&ided $y the L8SS (with an
ass"ciated e1#ert syste+ sh"wed that the 9,9 rings w"uld #erf"r under the #redicted
te#eratures, 2hi"k"l engineers !uesti"ned their "wn testing and data that were
#r"graed int" the L8SS. 2hus "n the e&e "f the Challenger launch, CASA was $eing
inf"red that their L8SS had a flawed data $ase.
At this #"int, CASA re!uested a definiti&e rec"endati"n fr" 2hi"k"l "n whether t"
launch. 2hi"k"l re#resentati&es rec"ended n"t t" launch until the "utside air
te#erature reached BHU <. 2he f"recast f"r <l"rida did n"t sh"w te#eratures reaching
this $aseline f"r se&eral days. CASA res#"nded with #ressure "n 2hi"k"l t" change their
decisi"n. CASA's le&el --- anager, :r. Mawrence :ull"y, res#"nded t" 2hi"k"l's
decisi"n $y asking, 9:y L"d, 2hi"k"l, when d" y"u want e t" launch, ne1t A#rilN9 (SAT
#g. )A+.
After this c"ent the 2hi"k"l re#resentati&es re!uested fi&e inutes t" g" "ff-line fr"
the L8SS. 8uring this #eri"d the 2hi"k"l anageent re!uested the chief engineer t"
9take "ff his engineering hat and #ut "n his anageent ca#,9 suggesting that
"rgani%ati"nal g"als $e #laced ahead "f safety c"nsiderati"ns SAT. 2hi"k"l reentered the
L8SS and rec"ended that CASA launch. CASA asked if there were any "ther
"$.ecti"ns fr" any "ther L8SS e$er, and there was n"t.
)roup Support System # Critical Analysis
2here is little d"u$t that the en&ir"nent fr" which CASA and its affiliated de&el"#ers
"#erated #r"&ided an "##"rtunity f"r significant huan err"r. Ce&ertheless, CASA and
2hi"k"l had a 9g"lden9 "##"rtunity t" a&"id disaster during their L8SS eeting $ef"re
the S2S B/-M launch. 2he f"ll"wing fact"rs are "ffered as #"tential e1#lanati"ns f"r what
created the flawed L8SS and the ass"ciated isanageent "f its inf"rati"n:
First, 2hi"k"l was aware "f the 9,9 ring #r"$le at least se&eral "nths $ef"re the
Challenger launch. H"we&er, the g"al was t" stay "n schedule. CASA was ade aware "f
the #r"$le $ut it was 9d"wn-#layed9 as a l"w risk situati"n. Here is the first eleent "f
flawed inf"rati"n that was in#ut int" the L8SS. -f CASA had $een aware "f the
significance "f the 9,9 ring situati"n, they #r"$a$ly w"uld ha&e gi&en "re credence t"
the ad&ice "f the 2hi"k"l engineers' rec"endati"ns. H"we&er, the data transitted
during the L8SS eeting fr" 2hi"k"l did say that it w"uld $e safe t" launch f"r the
f"recasted te#eratures. CASA was frustrated "&er the c"nflicting ad&ice fr" the sae
s"urce.
Second, the decisi"n t" delay a Shuttle launch had de&el"#ed int" an 9unwanted9 decisi"n
$y the e$ers "f the Shuttle tea SBT. -n "ther w"rds, suggesti"ns ade $y any gr"u#
e$er that w"uld ultiately su##"rt a scheduled launch were et with #"siti&e su##"rt
$y the gr"u#. Any suggesti"n that w"uld lead t" a delay was re.ected $y the gr"u#.
Third, all e$ers "f the L8SS felt that they sh"uld li&e u# t" the 9n"rs9 "f the gr"u#.
Alth"ugh the 2hi"k"l engineers were fir "n their rec"endati"n t" scru$ the launch,
they s""n changed their #resentati"n "f "$.ecti"ns "nce threatened with the #"ssi$ility "f
$eing e1#elled fr" the #r"gra (as suggested $y a CASA adinistrat"r wh" was
9a##alled9 at a c"#any that w"uld ake such a rec"endati"n $ased "n the data
a&aila$le+ SBT.
Fourth, 2hi"k"l $ecae highly susce#ti$le t" 9gr"u#think9 when they re!uested a $reak
fr" the L8SS. At this #"int they $ecae insulated, c"nducted #ri&ate c"n&ersati"ns
under high stress and were afraid "f l"sing #"tential future re&enue sh"uld they disagree
with CASA. All these fact"rs are c"nsidered #rie t" the f"rulati"n "f 9gr"u#think9
SBT.
Fifth, all #arties were afraid "f #u$lic and #"litical res#"nse t" an"ther launch
cancellati"n (there had already $een si1 cancellati"ns that year+. 4ach #arty $egan t"
rati"nali%e that #ast success e!ualed future success SBT.
Finally, the L8SS was seri"usly flawed. As already enti"ned, the data $ase c"ntained
err"ne"us inf"rati"n regarding the 9,9 rings. -deas, suggesti"ns and "$.ecti"ns were
s"licited $ut n"t an"ny"usly. -ndi&iduals wh" de#arted fr" the gr"u# n"rs were
signaled "ut as unwelc"e e$ers. An agenda was ne&er defined and CASA was
theref"re sur#rised $y the 2hi"k"l #resentati"n. C"nflict anageent was a&"ided $y
CASA's d"inati"n "f the entire eeting. CASA, at ties, $ecae &ery asserti&e and
intiidating. C"nsidering CASA's attitude, n" gr"u# e$er "r indi&idual was willing t"
$e held acc"unta$le f"r any c"ent "r decisi"n SBT.
2he setting f"r such an i#"rtant L8SS eeting was als" ineffecti&e. C"nsidering that a
s#eaker #h"ne and CP5 "de was used, it was easy f"r CASA t" d"wn-#lay the
#ers"nal "#ini"ns "f the 2hi"k"l engineers. -f the eeting c"uld ha&e $een held at the
sae #lace f"r all e$ers, the "utc"e ight ha&e $een different. At the end "f the
eeting CASA, &ery reluctantly, suggested that they w"uld still cancel the launch if
2hi"k"l insisted. C" res#"nse fr" 2hi"k"l was ade and the CASA "fficials c"uld n"t
see the e1#ressi"n "f 9self-cens"rshi#9 that was $eing c"unicated "n the face "f each
2hi"k"l engineer SBT.
Perha#s the "st significant flaw in the L8SS was when 2hi"k"l re!uested a #ri&ate fi&e
inute eeting with its "wn e$ers. 5# t" this #"int 2hi"k"l had stayed with its
rec"endati"n t" cancel the launch. ,nce disc"nnected, 2hi"k"l $ecae an is"lated
e$er and the L8SS failed alt"gether. ,nce rec"nnected, 2hi"k"l had changed its
#"siti"n and "ffered the g" ahead t" launch with"ut any "$.ecti"n.
CONCUSIONS
The Critical Human &actor # Need for -oting Tool
:any c"nclusi"ns ay $e drawn as t" the #riary cause and c"ntri$uting fact"rs
ass"ciated with the Challenger tragedy. -t is the "#ini"n "f this auth"r that regarding the
L8SS and decisi"n t" launch the a$ility "f each e$er t" ha&e &"ted an"ny"usly was
the key fact"r that w"uld ha&e aintained the integrity "f the L8SS and the !uality "f
the decisi"n.
-t has $een sh"wn that .ust after 2hi"k"l's #resentati"n t" CASA, "st "f the L8SS
gr"u# e$ers were &ery c"ncerned with the 9,9 ring situati"n and $elie&ed that the
"#ini"ns e1#ressed $y 2hi"k"l engineers were cause f"r seri"us c"nsiderati"n "f launch
cancellati"n SBT. H"we&er, "nly selected seni"r "fficials were all"wed t" &"te their
9"#ini"n9, which they did &er$ally and at the re!uest "f CASA. <r" the research
c"nducted "n this #a#er, the auth"r $elie&es that had a uni&ersal an"ny"us &"te $een
c"nducted "f the t"tal L8SS e$ershi#, a decisi"n t" cancel the launch w"uld ha&e
$een ade.
2he fact"rs which lead t" the Challenger incident can $e traced $ack t" the ince#ti"n "f
the shuttle #r"gra. CASA and 2hi"k"l failed t" aintain a !uality assurance #r"gra
thr"ugh :SS, as was initiated "n the A#"ll" #r"gra, due t" ulti#le s"urce deands
and #"litical #ressures. 2he L8SS used f"r the launch decisi"n c"ntained inaccurate data.
4ngineering e$ers "f the L8SS did n"t $elie&e in the testing #r"cedures used t"
generate the data c"#"nents in the L8SS. And, the entire eeting was isanaged.
2he decisi"n t" launch the Challenger Shuttle and its su$se!uent destructi"n had a a."r
affect "n s"ciety and the anageent "f "ur s#ace #r"gra. Challenger's uni!ue issi"n
and the death "f Christa :cAuliffe "#ened the d""r f"r discussi"n and research "n h"w
anagers use 8SS t" ake decisi"ns that will affect #u$lic trust.
A&TER$ATH
Ethics and $SS.DSS # Human &actors $anagement
A c"#lete discussi"n "f ethical decisi"n aking is $ey"nd the sc"#e "f this article.
H"we&er, the !uesti"n "f h"w CASA and 2hi"k"l anaged ethical c"nsiderati"ns is
central t" the decisi"n t" launch the Challenger Shuttle and, theref"re, deser&es a $rief
"&er&iew.
2he first area "f ethical c"ncern is the area "f inf"rati"n accuracy. 2he fact that $"th
CASA's and 2hi"k"l's anagers had little regard t" the c"ncerns "f 2hi"k"l's engineers is
&ery distressing. All e$ers "f the gr"u# ade a decisi"n kn"wing that the decisi"n
was $ased "n flawed inf"rati"n. A sec"nd c"ncern is that the decisi"n ade #ut safety
last and "#erati"nal g"als first. ,nly "ne e$er "f the L8SS e1#ressed seri"us c"ncern
f"r the #"tential l"ss "f life SBT. Additi"nally, "#en and free c"unicati"n $ef"re and
during the L8SS eeting was disc"uraged thr"ugh such gr"u# dynaics as ind
guarding, direct #ressure and self-cens"rshi# SBT. -ndi&iduals wh" kn"w "f a situati"n
that, unless acted u#"n with integrity ight cause s"cial har, ha&e a res#"nsi$ility t"
c"ntact any auth"rity that will anage and c"ntr"l that situati"n in the $est interest "f the
#u$lic (SAT 97histle$l"wing, #g. HA+.
Huan fact"rs analysis and anageent science ha&e $egun t" define the inc"r#"rati"n
"f :SSO8SS as a s"cially res#"nsi&e way "f c"nducting $usiness (S3T #g. J)3+. 2his is
es#ecially true f"r g"&ernent agencies and large #u$lic #r".ects like the Shuttle
#r"gra. -t c"uld $e argued that L8SS techn"l"gy had n"t e&"l&ed t" the le&el "f
effecti&eness that was needed t" su##"rt the Challenger #r".ect. 2he success "f the 8SS
used in the #ri"r A#"ll" issi"n sh"ws that this was n"t the case. -n the Challenger
#r"gra s"cial and ethical decisi"n aking was discarded f"r the sake "f c"st, schedule
and "utside en&ir"nental deands.