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VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, (Petitioner) v. REY C.

ALCAZAR, (Respondent)

FACTS:
Veronica Cabacungan and Rey Alcaraz got married on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G.
Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence.
After their wedding, they lived in Reys parents for 5 days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Then
they returned to Manila, but Rey did not live with Veronica in her home in Tondo.
Rey then left for Riyahd on 23 October 2000 where he was working as an upholsterer. He never
contacted his wife either by phone or letter since he left.
About a year and a half, Veronica was informed by her co-teacher that her husband is coming home.
But she was surprised that respondent did not go directly to her in Tondo but to his parents house
in Mindoro instead.
Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had
been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage
with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article
45 of the Family Code. Respondent has been uncooperative to the investigation. Dr. Tayag testified
that Rey was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder; hence, it is a sufficient ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
x x x x
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
RTC denied petition of petitioner. CA also denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marriage obligations
HELD: SC denied.
Ratio:
The action originally filed was annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family
Code. Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate
denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse.
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically
incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-
examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before
respondent left for abroad.
Petitioner was actually seeking for declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the
latters psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code. The Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Tayag did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior that showed that respondent indeed
had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a personality
disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband.