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THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW II

CASES AND DOCTRINES, Arellano University School of Law aiza ebina / 2014


Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
SJS v. PINEDA
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008

FACTS: These are petitions arising from the question of the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other
personalities. Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., seeks to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 for being unconstitutional in that they
impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution. SJS or Social Justice Society on the other
hand, seeks that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sections / Paragraphs of RA 9165 in question are unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a
law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing
COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.

No. The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while
mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. It is justifiable. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well-being
of the citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." Petitioner has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III,
Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.

RATIO: In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. The unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the
constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

While there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, authorities are agreed though that the right
to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power. The constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the
school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW II
CASES AND DOCTRINES, Arellano University School of Law aiza ebina / 2014


Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
PEOPLE V. PONFERADA
G.R. No. 101004, March 17, 1993

FACTS: Raul Raul Ponferada was convicted in RTC Leyte for violating Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He was charged with delivering six (6) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, which are prohibited drugs, to a Narcom Informant. His
companion, Eduardo Boyet Beltran remained at large. However, the accused assails the credibility of prosecution witnesses Sgt. Rabuya and CIC Mallari for
their failure to identify him with certainty. He contends that the testimonies of the two principal government witnesses are diametrically opposed in identifying
him. Sgt. Rabuya claimed that it was accused Raul Ponferada or alias "Raul" who made the transaction with poseur-buyer Mallari. While on the other hand,
Mallari testified that it was Eduardo Beltran or alias "Boyet" who sold to him the six (6) sticks of marijuana cigarettes. With this contention, he seeks that he be
acquitted of the charge against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused be acquitted

HELD: Yes. In order to sustain conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the element of sale must be unequivocally established. Also, what the law proscribes is
not only the act of selling but also, albeit not limited to, the act of delivering. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana required merely the
consummation of the selling transaction. What is important is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused. In the case at bar, poseur-buyer
Mallari identified Eduardo Beltran alias "Boyet" as the person who sold to him the six (6) sticks of marijuana cigarettes. There was no evidence linking Raul
Ponferada to the sale of marijuana cigarettes. A careful perusal of the evidence reveals that the prosecution witnesses miserably failed to prove that the
accused-appellant delivered said marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer CIC Mallari. While Sgt. Rabuya identified alias "Raul" or Raul Ponferada as the one
who transacted with Mallari, the latter positively and categorically identified alias "Boyet" or Eduardo Beltran as the person who sold and delivered to him the
marijuana cigarettes. The contention of Sgt. Rabuya that the accused Raul Ponferada changes his aliases from "Boyet" to "Raul" so as to mislead the
government agents in identifying him is a mere afterthought. Such fact was divulged by Sgt. Rabuya for the first time only when he was made to explain the
discrepancy between his testimony and affidavit as to who transacted with the poseur-buyer. In his testimony, he identified that person as Raul Ponferada or
alias "Raul" while in his affidavit, he identified said person as Eduardo Beltran or alias "Boyet".

RATIO: The identities of the accused are points so material in the evidence of the prosecution that failure to mention the switching in their aliases, as he
belatedly claims was a tactic employed by the accused to mislead the authorities, cannot be taken merely as insignificant.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW II
CASES AND DOCTRINES, Arellano University School of Law aiza ebina / 2014


Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
PEOPLE V. VILLAHERMOSA
G.R. No. 186465, June 1, 2011

FACTS: Lorie Villahermosa, was charged with violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12, Article II of RA 9165. There are three separate informations of the criminal case
for the sale, and possession of dangerous drugs, in this case, Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), and possession of paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs. The said illegal drugs were recovered from the accused through a buy-bust operation conducted by the PDEA and MADAC inside the Manila South
Cemetery in Makati City. A telephone call from a concerned citizen to the PDEA reporting that the accused is involved in the rampant selling of illegal drugs in
the area prompted this action from the authorities. Silverio, a MADAC operative and PO2 Tizon, a PDEA officer, were assigned as poseur-buyer and arresting
officer, respectively. During the consummation of the sale between Silverio and the accused, the latter took out two small plastic sachets from her pocket
containing white crystalline substance and handed the same to Silverio, who in turn handed her the marked money. With that, Tizon introduced himself as a
PDEA officer and arrested the accused, and at the same time, the rest of the members of the buy-bust team hiding nearby followed the arrest. PO2 Tizon then
recovered from her six more small plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, the buy-bust money consisting of four pieces of P100.00 peso bills
and the following drug paraphernalia that were inside the plastic bag appellant was carrying at the time of her arrest, to wit: 14 pieces of unused transparent
plastic sachets, three disposable lighters, an improvised tooter and five strips of aluminum foil. Afterwards, the accused was brought to MADAC Cluster 3 Office
at the barangay hall of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Makati City, for investigation. The items recovered from the accused were all properly marked and photographed
and was later on sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory, which all tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accuseds drug test also yielded a
positive result. Appellant denied all the charges against her. Nevertheless, she was still convicted for violation of RA 9165, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

HELD: Yes. The prosecution clearly established beyond reasonable doubt appellants guilt for the offense of illegal sale of shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation
of Section 5, Article II of RA. 9165. The testimony of Silverio clearly established in detail how his transaction with appellant came about commencing from the
moment he approached appellant and expressed his intention of buying the goods appellant was selling, i.e., shabu, until the time appellant handed him the
two small plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, which upon examination yielded positive results to the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, and in exchange to that he handed appellant four pieces of P100.00 peso bills marked money amounting to P400.00 that
consummated the sale transaction between him and appellant.

The appellants guilt for the crime of illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug, in clear violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, has also been duly
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Incident to her lawful arrest resulting from the buy-bust operation, appellant was further found to have
in her possession six more small plastic sachets of shabu which were presented and identified to be the same objects recovered from appellant in court. In
addition, there is no evidence to show that appellant had the legal authority to possess the six small plastic sachets of shabu recovered from her. It has been
jurisprudentially settled that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi. In this case, appellant miserably failed to explain her absence of knowledge or animus possidendi of the shabu recovered
from her.
THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW II
CASES AND DOCTRINES, Arellano University School of Law aiza ebina / 2014


In the same vein, it cannot be denied that on the occasion of her arrest for having been caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, a plastic bag was also
recovered in her possession containing the following drug paraphernalia, to wit: 14 pieces of unused transparent plastic sachets, three disposable lighters, an
improvised tooter and five strips of aluminum foil. Possession of the same was in clear violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165.

RATIO: In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu in this case, the following elements must concur: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and the consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The commission of the offense of illegal
sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the
seller. Thus, what is material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation
in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. Such proof is present in this case.

In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, e.g., shabu, on the other hand, it must be shown that: (1) the accused is in possession of an item
or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. These circumstances of illegal possession are obtaining in the present case.

In violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 was already consummated the moment appellant was found in possession of the said articles without the
necessary license or prescription. What is primordial is the proof of the illegal drugs and paraphernalia recovered from the petitioner.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW II
CASES AND DOCTRINES, Arellano University School of Law aiza ebina / 2014


Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
PEOPLE V. JUMAO-AS
G.R. No. 101334, February 14, 1994

FACTS: On 24 February 1990, at around six o'clock in the morning, while Pat. Rolando Cejuela was on his tour of duty as armorer and as roving guard at the
Bagong Bahay Rehabilitation Center, he saw Evangeline Jumao-as approach the waste and rain water exit of the BBRC compound. From his post, about 15 feet
away, Pat. Cejuela noticed that Evangeline momentarily stood by the water exit and then, very quickly, inserted a wrapped article. After asking Evangeline
what it was that she had placed inside the hole, the latter did not answer and just hastily left towards a store across the compound. Pat. Cejuela then hurriedly
descended from the tower and immediately retrieved the wrapped article. Suspecting it to contain dried marijuana leaves, he went to confront Jumao-as. The
latter denied the accusation. Pat. Cejuela invited Jumao-as to go with him inside the BBRC compound where she was interrogated by a certain Cpl. Capao.
Afterwards, the retrieved article was submitted for examination to the PC Crime Laboratory. It was later on reported that the article was "positive for
marijuana." An information for violation of Section 4, Article II, of R.A. 6425 (Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs), as amended, was thereupon filed against appellant Jumao-as by Prosecutor Virginia Palanca-Santiago. Jumao-as denied the accusation contending that
the information filed by the prosecution did not adequately cover the essential elements of the offense charged against her.

ISSUE: Whether or not the essential elements of the crime charged have sufficiently been established by the prosecution

HELD: No. In All that Pat. Cejuela declared was that the accused-appellant had approached the waste and rain water exit at the BBRC compound, placed
something thereat and then huriedly left. Pat. Cejuela only conjectured that the said drugs must have been intended to be passed on to appellant's common-
law husband, Carlito Estomago, then a detainee at BBRC. Except for this speculation, there was utterly nothing else introduced on this score. The prosecution
has failed to prove that appellant "delivered" the dangerous drug to her common law husband. It has also failed to prove that appellant "knew" that what she
delivered was a dangerous drug.

RATIO: Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for the proof required by law to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. It
should so be, for as the Court there did further observe, the conviction for a criminal offense must be based on clear and positive evidence.

Section 2(f), Article I of RA 6425, as amended, defines the word, "deliver," to mean, a person's act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another
personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration."

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW II
CASES AND DOCTRINES, Arellano University School of Law aiza ebina / 2014


Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
PEOPLE V. LOPEZ
G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008

FACTS: Accused Narciso Agulay Y Lopez was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City as guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride more popularly known as "shabu." A buy-bust operation took place on 24 August 2002, after an informant arrived at Police
Station 5 and reported to the Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) that a certain "Sing" had been selling shabu at Brgy. Sta. Lucia, in Novaliches,
Quezon City. PO2 Herrera was assigned as poseur-buyer and was given a P100.00 bill, which he marked "RH," his initials. A pre-operation report bearing
control No. 24-SDEU-02 was made and signed by Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Palaleo Adag dated 24 August 2002. The buy-bust team rode in two vehicles, a
Space Wagon and a Besta van, with a group of police officers inside. They stopped along J.P. Rizal St., Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, Quezon City. PO2 Herrera and his
informant stepped down from their vehicle and walked. The informant pointed the target pusher to PO2 Herrera. They approached and after being introduced
to Sing, PO2 Herrera bought shabu using the marked P100.00 bill. Sing gave a small plastic sachet to PO2 Herrera who, thereafter, scratched his head as a
signal. The other police companions of PO2 Herrera, who were deployed nearby, then rushed to the crime scene. PO2 Herrera grabbed Sing and then frisked
him. PO2 Herrera recovered two (2) plastic sachets from Sings pocket. He also got the marked money from Sing. Afterwards, the seized items were properly
marked, although not photographed, and were sent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory of the Central Police District in Quezon City for
chemical analysis and was found to be positive to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. The accused denied the charge against
him and contended that he was illegally arrested and was a victim of frame-up and extortion. He maintains that the prosecution failed to establish all the
essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of shabu. The defense contends there is a clear doubt on whether the specimens examined by the chemist and
eventually presented in court were the same specimens recovered from accused-appellant because there was no physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: Yes. In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of
the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses proved that all the elements of the crime have been established: that the buy-bust operation took place, and that the shabu subject of the sale was
brought to and identified in court. Moreover, PO2 Herrera, the poseur-buyer, positively identified accused-appellant as the person who sold to him the sachet
containing the crystalline substance which was confirmed to be shabu.

Accused-appellant contends his arrest was illegal, making the sachets of shabu allegedly recovered from him inadmissible in evidence. Accused-appellants
claim is devoid of merit for it is a well-established rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
considered a valid "warrantless arrest," in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court. Considering that the legitimacy of the
buy-bust operation is beyond question, the subsequent warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure, were permissible. The search, clearly being
incident to a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity. Thus, contrary to accused-appellant's contention, the contraband seized from him, having been
obtained as a result of the buy-bust operation to which the defense failed to impute any irregularity, was correctly admitted in evidence.

THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW II
CASES AND DOCTRINES, Arellano University School of Law aiza ebina / 2014


The prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Section 21,19 Article II
of RA 9165 will not discharge accused-appellant from his crime. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

It is significant to note that accused-appellant stated in his demurrer to evidence that the specimens submitted for laboratory examination were not the three
plastic sachets that were allegedly recovered by the poseur-buyer PO2 Raul Herrera, which may thus be construed to be an implied admission. Accused-
appellants allegation that he is a victim of a frame-up, which has been held as a shop-worn defense of those accused in drug-related cases, is viewed by the
Court with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, frame-up is an allegation that can easily be concocted. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear
and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts of government officials. Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse him of
such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of
witnesses shall prevail over that of the accused-appellant. Apart from his defense that he is a victim of a frame-up and extortion by the police officers, accused-
appellant could not present any other viable defense.

RATIO: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

While the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents should not by itself prevail over the presumption of
innocence, for the claim of frame-up to prosper, the defense must be able to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption of
regularity.

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THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW II
CASES AND DOCTRINES, Arellano University School of Law aiza ebina / 2014


PEOPLE V. SARCIA
G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009

FACTS: This is a criminal case finding the accused Richard Sarcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against a five year old girl
sometime in 1996. Among the several issues in the case, one of which is the accuseds contention that he was still a minor at the time of the commission of the
offense and thus entitles him to qualify for automatic suspension of sentence pursuant to RA 9344. He was already 24 years old during the hearing of the said
case. The prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed. The lower court and the CA rejected his claim and
convicted him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the death penalty, respectively.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can qualify for automatic suspension of sentence

HELD: No. When accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his appeal before this Court, RA 9344, the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively.
The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that
time, in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of age.

Sec. 38 of RA 9344 provides that automatic suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. Nonetheless, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child
reaches the maximum age of 21. To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the
effectivity of RA 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be
entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children. The case was remanded to the
court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.

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