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5.

1
5. 2
vi i i l l l ustrati ons
4.26 Lesbian feminist typification: JEB, 'Mara. Broomes Island,
Maryl and. 1976'
Veronica Lake: startlingly unreal sensuality
Hard-boiled looks: Dick Powell in Marder My Sweet
(usA
1945)
Butch dyke (Ruth Gillette) confronts hard-boiled hero
(Humphrey Bogart) in In a Lonely P/ace (USA 1950)
Smart butch Jo (Barbara Stanwyck) in A Wctlk on the Wild
,Slde
(USA
1962)
5.5 Vicious dyke (Kate Murtagh) puts hypodermic into hero
(Robert Mitchum) in Farewell My Lolely (USA 1976) 62
5.6 Fastidious queen (Peter Lorre) and immaculate femme
fatale (Mary Astor) in The Maltese Falcon (USA l94l) 63
5.7 Fastidious and immaculate young men (Farley Granger
(right) and John Dall) with mentor (James Stewart) in
Rope (USA 1948)
64
5.8 Elegant queen (Clifton Webb) and luxury milieu in Zaara
(usA 1944)
65
6.1 Victim'. PH and Mickie, queer false leads 73
(t.2
Victim: Fullbrook, Calloway and Farr, all queer 14
13. I Orderly rows, full light, debate the white meeting in Simba 132
I 3.2 Loose formation, darkness, yelling - the black uprising in
Simba
134
13.3 A marginal but foregrounded black figtre in Jezebel 137
13.4 Jazebel: the red (dark) dress at the white ball 139
14. I Li i an Gi sh
150
f 4.2 Lars Hanson and Lillian Gish in The Scarlet Letter
(usA 1926)
153
| 5. I fllsic ( Lillian Gish) and the Klan in The Birth oJ a Nation
( l er s) 160
f 5.2 15,7
' l ' hc
Bi rth d a Nal l orz: Si l as (George Si egmann) and
l i l si c (l i amc cnl al gements)
168-69
I shoLrkl l i kc to thl nk l nd ackttowl cdge the fol l owi ng for sti l l s or other
i l f r r sl l r r t i t r r r sr l t l r l Sl i l l s, I ) ost cr s i t t r cl Dcsi gn ( l i gur es 4. 1, 4. ' 7. 4. 8, 4. 9, 4. 14,
4, | 5. 4, | 7. 4, I t t , 4. 20, 4. 2l , 4. 22, 5, l . 5. 2, 5. 3, 5. 4, 5. 5. 5. 6, 5. 7. 5, 11. 61. ( , ' ?,
l l , l , L1, . 1, 1. 1. , 1. 1. 1, 4) , , l l i l t t ut l
( i l l d
l l i t g l i t oks
( l i gt t l t x' 1, . r l .
' l ' J' 1,
4 . 15,
' 1, l o
) ,
41
56
57
59
6l
Chapter 1
l ntroducti on
The essays collected here all deal, through particular instances, with the
cultural representation of social groupings. This is 'images of analysis of
the kind thit has burgeoned in the past twenty years, starting with work on
women and black people, spreading to other marginalized or oppressed
groups, such as ethnic minorities, lesbians and gay men, the disabled and
ihe aged, and now beginning, with studies on men, to encompass dominant
or majority groups. These essays were part of that traJectory.
The impulse behind the writing of them was political. It sprang from
lhc lceling that how social groups are treated in cultural representation is
part and parcel of how they are treated in life, that poverty, harassment,
icll'-hatc ind discrimination
(in housing,
jobs,
educational opportunity
i[rd so on) are shored up and instituted by representation. The resonances
ol' thc tcrnr 'representation' suggest as much. How a group is represented,
prriscntod over again in cultural forms, how an image of a member of a
grrrLrp is takcn as representative of that group, how that group is repre-
nutttod in thc scnse of spoken lor and on behalf of (whether they repre-
r10 l. sltcirk lirr themselves or not), these all have to do with how members
ol'gloups scc thcmselves and others like themselves, how they see their
pl rrec i ri soci cty. thci r ri ght to the ri ghts a soci ety cl ai ms to ensure i ts
cl l i zurn, l kl rrrl l y rc+rcsentati on, representati veness, representi ng have to
do rtl so wi l h how othcrs scc ntembers of a group and thei r pl ace and
t' l gl tl l , ol l tots wl to hi tvc thc power to affect that pl ace and those
l l ghl l , l l ow wc ttl tj sccn cl ctcrmi nes i n part how we are treated; how we
l tul l
()l l tct$ i s l rttscd on l tttw wc scc them; such seei ng comes from
t ' gt ' Fr ( t | | l l r l i ( | r 1,
i l ' ho
ts;tt' el cttl trl i ott ol wol l l cl l ttnd othot opprcsscd gl oups was, and by
Itt(l l tl u ri l l l l i n, rt rol crrl l css ptl ttl do ttl ' i nsttl l s Angcr. cl cspai t or contempt
I l l t pi e l \ t ol N ' l t t t t t gu ol ' wr i l i l l g hl l l ct t t t t t l so l r l ock l ci t l i nvcst i gat i on'
Mt t gh l nr r r gt ' t t t l ul yr i i l t t uut t t t t ot t l y l o t l ct l t r r l t l l nl l e l hl l l cvcl yl hi l l S i s t hc
t t t nr s nr l l t ' r i i r l l r r Wl ! 1,
' l ' l t t
t ' t l l t {t t l t cl l t l t r g t l i r r t l l y t t bt t t t l r t t r , : l t l c( l l l cl i v0
Wt l l : i l l Fl h l r r a l i l l l e l r r r l t hr r r r kr r , r nt t l r r , r l i l l [ ,
[ ol l l h, ul l y,
l l i r i t t t pr t t ' l t t t t l
5. 3
5. 4
4
I
t l t l l r t hr r c l l t g l l l ' F r l l ' l t l l l l $el ul ' wl t L l r t t l l l t t r ' t ' r l r l r t l l ' t t ' t t r l l l t i ' r l hy
2 Tho Mfl l tor of l ml tgos
l ntroductl on 3
co' si ( l cr . i l l i o' s
l l l i t t gct
' ) ol . c
nci t r l y i t l l l l c e( ) ' l l ) l r xi l v
l ' t ( l f l l t Ni vf ' c$s, r nu
rci tl
Pol i ti i ri tl
di l l i cul l y, ol ' t.cpt.cscn ti tt i o s.
' l ' hi s
ntcans, l i rst ol ' i l l l , stressi ng that rcprcscnti tl i ons
i uc
l ]|.eso
l i tl i ons,
al wuys and ncccssari l y entai l i ng thi use of tLe codes and corvcntrons oI the
available cultural forms ofpresentation.
Such lorms restrict and shnpe what
can be said by and/or about any aspect of reality in a given place in a given
society at a given timq but if that seems like a limitatio*n on ,uyirrg, ,t n ulro
what makes saying possible at all. Cultural forms set the wider terms ol.
limitation and possibility for the (re)presentation
of particularities
and we
have to understand how the latter are caught in thi former in order to
understand why such-and-such gets (re)presented
in the way it does. With_
out understanding
the way images function in terms of, say, narrativg genre
orspectacle, we don't really understand why they turn oui the way they do.
Secondly, cultural forms do nol have singli determinate meanings
_
people make sense of them in different ways, according to the cultural
(including
sub-cultural) codes available to them. For insiance, people do
not necessarily read negative images of themselves as negative. One of the
firsf_ publications
to point this out was Ann Kaplan's coliection on women
in fiIn noir_( 1978 ). which suggested that it was possible to be inspired rather
tnan ofiended by lmages that had been assumed to be, and probably were
culturally encoded as, negative, that there was something exhiiaratingabout
the way femmes fatales in film noir give men the run_aro"und and exude such
incandescent power. Much work since then has stressed the multiple ways in
which audiences make sense of images. In stressing complexity a'nd contra-
dictoriness at the point of reception, however, iam not sulgestrng ttrat
p_eople can make representations
mean anything they want th!"m to mean.
We are all restricted by both the viewing and thJreading codes to which we
have access (by virtue of where we are situated in the world and the social
order) and by what representations there are for us to view and read. The
prestige ofhigh culture, the centralization of mass cultural productlon,
the
literal poverty of marginal cultural production:
these are aspects of the
power relations of representation
that put the weight ofcontrj over repre_
scntation on the side of the rich, the white, the male, the heterosexual.
Acknowledging
the complexity of viewing/reading practices in relatron to
ropresentation does not entail the claim that there is equality and freedom
in thc regime of representation.
Thirclly, what is re-presented in representation is not directly reality itself
but other representations.
The analysis of images always neeis to see how
nlly given
instance is embedded in a network of other instances. Agarn, as
with.thc point about reception abovg I need to draw back from some ofthe
oonclusions that might appear to follow from saying this, even while insist_
ing th t it is so. By emphasizing the textuality of representation
I am not
rl gui ng that tcxts are al l xhere i s i n the worl d, i hat there i s nothi ng ofwhi ch
foproscntattons:l rc rcprescntati ons. Thi s i s di l i cul t terri tory. I accept that
ot t c r r l t pr r : l t ct t t l s r cr r l i l y ot t l y l l r l ougl r l cl . r t csct t l i r ( i or t s ol ' r ' cal i t y, t hl ough
l cxl s, di scoul sc, i rnagcs; thcl c i s no such thi ng as unnrcdi atcd access to
l crrl i l y. l l ul bccaLrso orrc cau scc rcal i ty onl y through representati on, i t does
nol Iol l ow that onc docs not sce rcal i ty at al l . Parti al sel ecti ve, i ncompl ete,
l i rrrri rpoi n(ol vi cw vi si on of somethi ng i s not no vi si on of i t whatsoever.
' l ' l rc
conrpl cx, shi l l i ng busi ness ol re-presenti ng, reworki ng, recombi ni ng
r'(.!l) rcson tatiors is in tension with the reality to which representations refer
irtrd which thcy allect. This is evident in three ways. Firstly, reality sets
lirnits to what, barring idiosyncratic examples, humans can make it mean.
( li) nlistilkc a cow for a hat is notjust an error in logic.) Secondly, reality is
rrlwrrys rllorc cxtensive and complicated than any system of representation
crrr
;.rossibly
con.rprehend and we always sense that this is so representa-
liorr rrevcr 'gets' reality, which is why human history has produced so many
tlillcrcnt and changing ways oftrying to get it. Thirdly, representations here
rrrrd rrow have real consequences for real people, notjust in the way they are
llcirlcd els indicated above but in terms of the way representations delimit
rrnrl cnable what people can be in any given society.
'l'his
last poi11t is most sharply suggested by the case of lesbians and gay
nrcn, Many would agree that the categories of'lesbians' and 'gay men' are
tto( givcn by reality. Most societies recognize sexual relations between
ntcnrbcls ol'the same sex, whether or not they proscribe, institutionalize or
olcvirtc them, but only a minority have an idea of persons who habitually,
cxcl Lrsi vel y and' by nature' have such rel ati ons. Thi s i s an i mportant poi nt,
ht:clusc it indicates the malleability of human sex activity, the possibility of
ohirrgc. llut we live in this society at this time, where some people do feel
lhrt( lhoy 'are' lesbian or gay, and often enough to wish to make common
cnusc wilh others who feel the same. It is true that such identities arc nevcr
lcllly 0s comprehensive as they claim that rnany lesbians and gay men, for
inst ncc, do not recognize themselves in the identities claimed either within
losbia n/gay oultures or by the lesbian/gay movements but it is also the case
lllnt onc czmnot live outside the society, the network of representations, in
which onc finds oneself. Negative designations of a group have negative
sors0cluclrccs for the lives of members of that grouping, and identifying
wi l h that groupi ng, however much i t doesn' t' get' al l of what one i s person-
rlly o[ oll ol'what everyone in that grouping is, none the less enables one to
lry to clralrg0 the circumstances of that socially constructed grouping.
'l'hc
r.rasc o1'lcsbians and gay men presents in sharp form what is none the
less irnothcr general characteristic ol representation, namely that it consti-
tutcs tlrc vcry social grouping that it also re-presents. (This is why I prefer
' l l roupi ng' to' gror.rp' , si nce the l atter seems more fi xed and gi ven, the for-
m0t sIrl sscs thc busi ncss of constructi on.) Ethni c representati on for
i nstrrrrec i s l uscd not on i ncvi tabl e catcgori es pre-exi sti ng human con-
nci oLrsrrr:ss l rrrt on l l rc ol gani zati on ol ' perccpti on. To take two exampl es: to
! ' ol br l o soul conc r r s' ncr o' ( hl ack) i n nor t hcr n I t al y i s l i abl c [ o be t aken as
4 Tho Mal l or ol l mogog
l ntroductl on 5
l l l c l t i ng l hi t t t l r c
; r cl . son
i s l t unr soul hcr n l t r r l yl i r l i gl r t _ski I l t ( f ( 1, l ) l l t ck_
i dcnri l i ccl l i i ,rd o| nri nc rbuntl trrar. hc was tr.catctr as wi ri tc wrr,r rrc vi si toti
Al )' i ca. tl thni ci ty i s i n thc eye of the cul t[r.e. Even thc catcgodcal scx di s_
t|trction male: I'emale (and not just
the gender distinction m-ascuhne: f-emi_
nrnc) may not be the bottom line of how we must represent humans, as
JudithButler (1990)
among others argues. In saying this, howevel I give no
ground to those who say that there is no reality except representation itself.
There are variations in skin colouq there are genit;l diFerences, there are
different sexual practices
reprcsentation is the organization ofthe percep_
tion of these into comprehensibility,
a comprehinsibility
that is
-always
fiail, coded, in other words, human.
The complexity of representation
lies then in its embeddedness in cul-
tural forms, its unequal but not monolithic relations of production
and
reception, its tense and unfinished, unfinishable relation to the reallty to
which it refers and which it affects. It also lies, finally, in its comprehensive-
ness. Women, ethnic minorities, gay people and so on are not the only ones
to,be social groupings; everyone belongi to social groupings;
indeed we all
belong in many groupings, often antagonistic to oni anoth'eror at ttre least
implying very different accesses to power. The groupings
that have tended
not to get addressed in
,images
of work, however, aie those with most
access to power: men, whites, heterosexuals, the able_bodied. The problem
with not addressing them as such is that they then function as simply the
human_norm, without specificity and thus without a specifiable ielation to
power. Latterly the study of the representation of menind masculinity has
become a growth industry, but there is still next to no work on whites,
heterosexuals or the able-bodied. Such work, adumbrated in a couple of
pleces here, seeks to make normality strangg that is, visible and spiciflc.
This must not imply, howevel an equivalence between such images and
those of women and other oppressed groupings. The project of taking
normality strange and thus ultimately decentring it muit not seem to say
that this has already taken place, that now
-u."-ulioity,
whiteness, hetero_
sexuality and able-bodiedness are just
images of identity alongside all
othem. That rnay be the point we wish to reach but we are not there yet. As
in all others issues of representation,
we must not leave the matter ofpower
oul ol'account any more than the matter of representation itself
'1'hc
cssays that follow have not been altered from their original publication
cxccpt lbr minor errors. This second edition alters from thJfirst only in that
lhr: chaptcl on the sad young man has been removed (and can now be found
nltrry.I'ltc
('ultura
ol
Quaers
(Routledge
2001)) and that three new chapters
l]l'",i ll""i
atklctl (Scrial.
Kitling. Lillian Gish, The Birth of a Nation); sug_
gcsl i o|l s l i )r l i rl thcr rcadi ng have been updated. Wi th a col l ecti on l i ke thl s
rf,.r1 i nn,]."i tt1o to cknowl edgc al l those who contri buted to the wri ti ng
ol l l r cr n, but I shoLr kl l i kc t r ) t hank t hosc who comnt i ssi oncd, cdi l cd r r ni
cncot r t i r gcd l hcnl : Sl r i r h l l cnl on, . l i nr
( bok,
l >hi l i p l ) ot l cl . Cl ui s Cr anl und,
l ,i rl l y
(i l oss. ' l i rny
I l ru l ol tl , .l i m tl i l l i cr, Marti n l -l umphri es, Ri chard Ki ng
i rntl f l cl cn
' l ' ayl or' .
Cl hLrck Kl ci nharrs and Jump Cal , Kobena Mercer, Andy
Mctcrrl l b. Sal l y Townsenci , ard Armond Whi te.
Itl ,)trDRItNCES
lf Lrl lcr', .f ud i tlr ( I 990) Ge nde r Trou b Ie, London/New York: Routledge.
Krrplirn, E. Ann (ed.) (1978) Wouen in Film Noir, London: British Film Institute.
ir
Chapter 2
ln a word
Many people put a great deal ol energy into cleansing language. A col-
league of mine is tireless in her use of 'chairperson' in the face of almost
everyone else's implacable use of 'chairman'. Jesse Jackson has headed a
campaign to make everyone use 'African-American', a campaign that
seems to be working, at least as far as the liberal press in the States is
concerned. It is one ofthe more astonishing achievements of 1970s politics
that queers now find themselves called by a term they themselves nomin-
ated, gay.
Struggling over words is one of the most immediate, practical, day-to-
day forms of what may be broadly characterized as left cultural politics.
They are at one end of a continuum that includes attention to presentation
across the board, the now widely granted centrality ofidentity as a basis for
activity, ideologically inflected reviewing ofthe arts and the increased stress
on the role of consciousness and culture in our general understanding of
why and how things are as they are and how to change them. The term
'cultural politics' to cover all that is itself inadequate. In some ways, the
venerable socialist reference to'the struggle for hearts and minds'is better,
because more concrete and inclusive, but it had its own drawback. It tended
to imply that there is 'real politics'and a correct way, to which socialists had
to persuade people (their hearts and their minds) to assent, whereas 'cul-
tural politics' sees all aspects ofthe life of the heart and mind as themselves
political and all politics as emotional and ideological. 'Culture'is not
just
the vehicle whereby you win people over to something else that rs not
culture culture is politics, politics is culture.
There is no doubt in my mind about the imporlance ofthis development.
It is not excessively sweeping to observe that the overwhelming reason for
the failure of socialism so far, from what we now observe in Eastern
Europe, is not a failure ol presentation but the desperate inadequacy of a
politics that was not about where people were at in their hearts and minds,
what they wanted, what fulfilled them. Yet for all that, there is ir plohltrtn
about cLrl tural pol i ti cs ancl i t i s wel l i l l ustratccl by thc probl crrts
()l
Nl rl l !8l ol
ovct' wot(l s.
ln a word 7
Insisting on chairperson, African-American, gay, is a drip-drip-drip that
we have to keep up, yet there's something unsatisfactory about it too. It's
not so much its slowness and the seeming inertia of language but the way
there nearly always turns out to be something off about the words and
terms we want to get established. We rnay succeed in some measure in
bringing about the change in vocabulary, but how about the rneanings and
feelings, the minds and hearts?
The feminist project is in some ways different from that ofethnic minor-
ity or lesbian/gay interventions. Changing'man' to 'person'and so on is
about rendering language gender-neutral so that we come to see most
human functions as
just
that, human, not male. For ethnic minorities, les-
bians and gay men and other groups (the elderly/senior citizens/people of
the third age, for instance, or the disabled/physically challenged/ differently
abled), on the other hand, it is more a question ofgetting new terms estab-
lished to describe who we are. It is this word project that I want to focus on
here.
I had better come straight out with one ofthe things that set me thinking
about this: I have never liked the word'gay'. It's still the word I would usc
antl wish to have used to describe myself and those like myself, but all the
sanrc it cmbarrasses me I'm not giving ground to those who always said
thll thc gay movement had 'spoilt' the word 'gay', had 'deprived the lan-
guugc ol'a very useful word' by associating it with sexual peculiarity - thosc
poopl c an: vcry wel come to have back' queer' ,' bent' ,' pervert' and al l thc
olhcl vcry useful words that were in danger of going out of all but homo-
phobi c conrmi ssi on. Nor am I goi ng al ong wi th the l i kes of Ri chal d
Ingrttnts, who opi ncd i n a recent Sunday newspaper that most ol the gays
Itc k nr,:w wclc not gay but miserable (as well any gay man knowing hinr
nl l gh( b0). l t' s
j ust
that to me ' gay' i s a rather tri vi al word, too mucl r
tuggo$ti ng onl y l i rn-l ' un-l i rn, not adequal e to the compl exi ti es and vari cd-
nou ol boi ng , . . gay. No word coul d cver do erl l that, but' gay' f' eel s l i kc a
rl cl i nti tuti on, un i nsi stcncc on onc aspcct.
' l ' ho
l l l cl nu(i vcs ul c no bct[cr, ol ' coursc. The ' homo' words, cl ui to apart
l i ' om tho l orrnod l ccl whct! one wants a ool l oqui al tefm to tl i p ol l ' thc
m( t ut h, ol r ch ht t vc
( hci r pr obl cms, ' l l or noscxual ' i s t oo cmphat i cal l y scxual .
wl th no rl l bul i vc or soci ul l i ng; ' honro-erol i c' i s kxr broatl , trxr wi tl ol y (and
ur ol l l l l y) r ppl l s( l
( o
t r r y l i bi di nr l l y 0h0r ' gcd conl r ct l r ct wccn
; r copl c
ol ' t hc
IttRl ! tgr
(rttch
tN l i tl hol s ttnd rttns, c()rr([ct spol ' ts, nrr.:n i n l i nc poci ng);
' homophl l o' h
l rxr rrl rn by-prr nr Ity, not $cxurl cnough, rrnd l rrywl ry n0v0r'
oes5ht o[, 1' ha l l tutogy ol ' r' ocl ui rni ng honrophobi c worth, turni ng thcnr
dhoottoottl ngl y l t 0k ol l i ocl oty, [s In l hs
(l ul l nnt
unc ol "l i rggo(' urrtl ' rl rocr"
by mrny netivhtl,
(losr
nol rl(l rueh wor(ll ol' rllorriltionr ol' oddnorrrr untl
mtfglnsllty, $nd only tounrlr
Ffiru(l
lo gHy nr6|l who
(lon' l
l' ool uxhunrorl ol'
helttg qrteer,
' (Jt y' hAr
dnl rl h!r
prl rhl ern l {xr, B0nl !
l r!0pl e
f l t c i l l o u| l | ! l y l r) h0l l l
8 The Mattor of l mag!s
won.lcll rtnd mcr (and I have a sense that in North America this is rncrcas-
ingly so among lesbians/gay women themselves), but feminist lesbians have
generally resisted this. However, 'lesbian' instead is not a straightforward
issue. I remember a meeting at the Birmingham Gay Centre about changing
its name (as was agreed) to the Lesbian and Gay Centre. Most of the men
present, well trained or genuinely committed to lesbians deciding for them-
selves what they should be called, were happy enough to go along with the
change. The strongest voices raised against it came from women, generally
older, generally more identified with the bar scene, for whom 'lesbian' was
the term 'they', the doctors and psychologists, had always used against
women such as themselves. One said that she'd rather be called 'bent' than
'lesbian'. A word with such a positive ring lor one group ofwomen sounded
very negative to another.
This example suggests that there is only a limited extent to which we can
make words feel to everyone how we want them to feel. Words come
trailing clouds of connotation that are very hard to shake oll Take the
history of progressive terms to describe US Americans of African descent.
Each new term introduced seemed to break through the hatred and preju-
dice enshrined in the prevalent vocabulary, yet each term itself was
revealed to be oppressive, requiring a new term to supersede it. 'Negro',
ficr instance, drew from an aspirantly objective description of differences
between peoples and was adopted, notably by the Harlem Renaissance, in
a spirit of'taking pride in one's race'. It was the way in which one (who-
ever one was) was positive about African-Americans at that time, yet it
was founded on biological notions of race that seem the epitome of reac-
tion now, especially in the light of where racial pride can lead in Aryan
hands. 'Coloured' at first sight seemed to avoid this, no longer conjuring
up notions of blood ancestry yet not only did it still focus on a biological
diflerence (skin), it also had the effect of suggesting that there were nor-
mal people and 'coloured' ones, as if all people do not share the quality of
being some colour or other. 'Black', by ineluctably suggesting the counter
term 'white', avoided this by insisting that black people are l/zls colour; it
stood against the associations of blackness with evil, insisting that black
people take pride in their colour. Yet it seems that 'black' too may have
run its course, perhaps because 'black' is still so widely used in connection
with the bad, perhaps because it too still focuses on skin. The same is true
of the socially generous 'people of color' (including all non-WASP
groups), which still implies a norm of uncoloured whiteness. 'African-
American'is the first genuinely cultural label, but, apart from being such a
nrouthlul, may run aground on old problems about the 'Africanness'
ol ' Af i can-Anrcri cans, an Afri canness i n whi ch many Afri cans do not
rccogni zc thcmscl ves and whi ch nrany Afri can-Ameri cans do nol i n l i tct
r cl l l c
( ( ) .
' l ' l t c
l t i sl ot ' i cr ol pol i ( i cr r l wol r l chr r nl l c sccl n l t l wl t vs l o I n, l l r i r l l r r ! l t l , l n
l n a word I
l l i r l l
t l r i s ht s
( o
do wi t h havi ng
( o
havc a wot t l at al l . Whi t c peopl c,
l rcl cl oscx Lra l s, thc abl c-botl i ccl , ti o uot gcncral l y go around worryi ng over
wl ri rt
(o
cal l thcurscl ves and havc themsel ves cal l ed. Havi ng a word for
orrcscl l and onc' s group, maki ng a pol i ti cs out ofwhat that word shoul d be,
(lrirws irttcntior'r to and also reproduces one's marginality, confirms one's
pl i rcc or,rtsi tl c ol ' power and thus outsi de of the mechani sms of change.
llirvirrg a word also contains and fixes identity. It is significant to most
nspccts ol ' who I am that I am gay but al l the same i t i s onl y part ofwho I
r nri yct tho label, and the very real need to make a song and dance about it,
ir lirrblc kr suggest that it is all that I am, that it explains everything about
rrrc. ll lrls thc ellect of suggesting that sexuality is fixed, that it consists of
t'lcirl rrnchanging categories, which is untrue both lor individuals and for
lhe historical constructions ofsexuality. Similarly 'disabled' lumps together
rtll lirrns ol'dcpzrrture from a physical norm, as if these all lorm one com-
nor cxpcticnce which determines what needs to be known by and about
tlisublcd pcople. We will always feel frustrated by having to have words to
oxpruss oul social identity, even while that social identity means that we do
l l trl ocrl havc to have words for i t.
'l'hc
liustlation means that we will almost certainly get fed up with the
wor'ds lhirt wc u$e and see the negative associations creep back in. This has
lllo lo
(lo. howcver, with the fact that words do not necessarily change
t' (.l l i l y. 77x,,!t,? now uses the word' gay' , but wi thj ust the same hatred as i t
woltl(l lllrvc uscd
'queer' or 'pervert'. No amount of changing the terms to
rlorclibc Ali icln-Americans will change attitudes, as long as material con-
tllllorrs kccp Alj ican-Americans overwhelmingly in the
jobs,
housing and
eon(l i l i ()ns l i t l i tr ' ni ggel s' . As l ong as the materi al real i ty ofa soci al group
t' Fl l l ri ns onc ol ' oppressi on, the word used to descri be i t wi l l sooner or l ater
Itocorrrc r.:ontirnrinr(ed by the hatred and self-hatred that are an inescapable
i poul
()l
oppl cssi orl .
' l ' l to
l i nri tati ons ol ' word pol i ti cs are of a pi ece wi th those of the i ntel -
l oel t|l l l i rHhi ons tt tho other end ofthe conti nuum of cul tural pol i ti cs. Just
ttr l cl l pl rrcti eul pol i ti cs has taken on the i mportance ofwords, ofpresenta-
l[rn ttnrl r'hololic, so much radical intellectual work in recent years has
l i rettrod i tn ul tcnti on on di scourse, on the way real i ty i s percei ved through
ltl(l Nltnpo(l by sor,illly oonstructed ways of making sense of reality. This
l nt6l l o{l url wotk was muoh nccdcd: i t has broken wi th tendenci es to thi nk
ol ' tsl tl l ty ri out tl totc. scparatc l i om consci ousness and cul ture; though
ol l ett l hrrttghl ol ' n$ unti -humani st i n i ts rej ecti on of moral i zi ng about
httnttttt donl i ny, i l i $ i tl l i tct pnrl i rundl y humani st i n i ts stress on the human
l h(' l ol ' l he eul l unrl
(:r)0$(fucl i orl ol our l i vcs. I t i s a pol i ti cal and i ntel l ectual
tl nl te! l hrl
' {l tottl (l
i l l ttt(l tt$ i t) good stcrd ag i nst any revi val of' sci enti fi c'
Fol l tl ei
wi th l hci r wal l
(l r)ctttl l cnl c(l i rtl tLtnti tn conscqucnccs. Yet word pol i t-
[ , r t t t t r l r l i n' ot l t r *e
( l i t l c( ] l t t Nc t t t t t t l t c t i sk ol t hi nki ng t hat wol ds and di s-
u{I i e t I t l l l l t i , t c l r , ol ' I ' r r l gt ' l l i r r g l l t t t l wr t t t l s t t nd di sct t t t t scs i l r 0 i l t l cnl Pt s
10 Tho Mattor ol l mages Chapter 3
to make sense of what are not themsel ves words and di sr.:otttscs: botl i es,
l'eelings, things.
What we are called and what we call ourselves matter, have material and
emotional consequences, but we can expect too much ofwords. Changing
them is a necessary but not a sufficient part of politics. We change the
world through words, but not through words and culture - or, come to that,
bread alone. It has to be both.
Marxism Todny (Iune 1991)
The role of stereotypes
'l'lta
wold 'slcrcotype' is today almost always a term of abuse. This stems
l't'onr llrc wholly
.justified
objections ol various groups - in recent years,
hlttekr, womcn and gays, in particular - to the ways in which they find
lhotlt clvc$ stcrcotyped in the mass media and in everyday speech. Yet when
Wtl tol l ,i ppnrunn coi ned the term, he di d not i ntend i t to have a whol l y and
Iteuortttt'ily
po.jorative connotation. Taking a certain ironic distance on his
Ittb,ioet, l,ipltl1]an none the less lays out very clearly both the absolute
nl($rully lbl urrd the usefulness of, stereotypes, as well as their limitations
tttttl kl ool ogi cl l i mpl i cati ons:
A
pttlloln ol' stereotypes is not neutral. It is not merely a way of
tIbrtituting ordcr for the great blooming, buzzing confusion of reality. It
It not nrclcly a slrort cut. It is all these things and something more. It is
lho
gttrttrtntoc of our self-respect; it is the projection upon the world
ol'oul own sense of our own value, our own position and our own
tlght*'l'hc $tcreotypes are, therefore, highly charged with the feelings
thnt ttt'o rtttuchcd to them. They are the fortress of our tradition, and
bphlntl itr dulbnscs we can continue to feel ourselves safe in the position
. w0 ocoupy.
(1956: 96)
lAb
oett hogln lo un(lclstand something of how stereotypes work by follow-
In5 up lho idotts ntiscd by Lippmann - in particular his stress on stereotypes
Er
(ll
un oxlcting proocss, (ii) a ' shol t cttt' , (iii) referring to ' the world' , and
(lvl
erpte*lng' our' vrlucs lnd bclicl' .s. The rcst of this essay is structured
lmund thoto toplon, concluding with somc torrtativc remerrks on the rele-
VERE! ol' whlrt h[$ gonc bolirt' c to thc rcpresentation of alcoholism.
Thnru5horrt, I r ovc ltolwoun lhc nroro sociologicll concern of Lippmann
(ltow rl!I!otype( l!nclion in nor,rill thought) und lhc spccilic acsthotic corl-
E!fllr
(ltow rlFrdolypot l\tnollott in ll(rliotls) lhnl ntttttl ttlso lrc introtlucccl
Inlo ltty eonrlrlelnllon ol' nrctllu rcprcre n lul iotlH,
' l' hc pruitiott ltr.:ltind rtll
Lx*.
--e
12 The Matter of l mages
these considerations is that it is not stereotypes, as an aspect ol human
thought and representation, that are wrong, but who controls and defines
them, what interests they serve.
AN ORDERING PROCESS
Stereotypes as a form of 'ordering' the mass of complex and inchoate data
that we receive from the world are only a particular form to do with the
representation and categorization of personsr of the wider process by
which any human society, and individuals within it, make sense of that
society through generalities, patternings and 'typifications'. Unless one
believes that there is some definitively 'true' order in the world which is
transparently revealed to human beings and unproblematically expressed in
their culture a belief that the variety ol orders proposed by different
societies, as analysed by anthropology and history, makes dificult to sus-
tain this activity of ordering, including the use of stereotypes, has to be
acknowledged as a necessary, indeed inescapable, part of the way societies
make sense of themselves, and hence actually make and reproduce them-
selves. (The lact that all such orderings are, by definition, partial and
limited does not mean that they are untrue partial knowledge is not false
knowledge, it is simply not absolute knowledge.)
There are, howeve! two problems about stereotypes within this perspec-
tive. Firstly, the need to order 'the great blooming, buzzing confusion of
reality' is liable to be accompanied by a belief in the absoluteness and
certainty of any particular order, a refusal to recognize its limitations and
partiality, its relativity and changeability, and a corresponding incapacity to
deal with the fact and experience of blooming and buzzing.
Secondly, as the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, amongst
others, on the 'social construction of reality' stresses, not only is any given
society's ordering of reality an historical product but it is also necessarily
implicated in the power relations in that society as Berger and Luckmann
put it, 'he who has the bigger stick has the better chance of imposing his
definitions of reality' (1967: 127).I shall return below to these two prob-
lems of Lippmann's lormulation - order (stereotypes) perceived as absolute
and rigid, order (stereotypes) as grounded in social power.
A SHORT CUT
Lippmann's notion of stereotypes as a short cut points to the manner in
which stereotypes are a very simplg striking, easily-grasped form of repre-
sentation but are none the less capable of condensing a great dcal ol com-
pl ex i nl ' ormati on and a host of connol ati ons. As T. E. Pcrl ti rl s l tol r' s i tt hor
kcy al t i cl c
' l t ct hi nki ng Sl ct col ypcs' . t hr : ol i cr r ohsct vcr l
' r l l t pl l cl t y'
ol '
sl crc{)l yl xs i s rl cce;tl i v0:
The role of stereotypes 13
to refer 'correctly' to someone as a'dumb blonde', and to understand
what is meant by that, implies a great deal more than hair colour and
intelligence. It refers immediately to /zer sex, which refers to her status in
society, her relationship to men, her inability to behave or think ration-
ally, and so on. In short, it implies knowledge of a complex social
s ucrure.
(1919:139)
'flre
same point emerges from Arnold S. Linsky's analysis (1970 1) of the
rcpresentation of the alcoholic in popular magazines between 1900 and
| 966, where changing depictions of alcoholics are shown to express com-
plcx and contradictory social theories not merely of alcoholism but of free
wi l l and determi ni sm.
R I t TN RENCE
l,ippnrann refers to stereotypes as a projection on to the'world'. Although
Itc is not concerned primarily to distinguish stereotypes from modes of
I'cpttscntation whose principal concern is not the world, it is important lor
tlfl lo do so, especially as our focus is representations in media
fictions,
wltich nre aesthetic as well as social constructs. In this perspective,
Hlr,,rcotypcs are a particular sub-category of a broader category of flctional
clnfflctcrs, the type. Whereas stereotypes are essentially defined, as in
l,ippnrunn, by their social function, types, at this level of generality, are
pr'lnrllily clclined by their aesthetic function, namely, as a mode of charac-
lalinrtion in fiction. The type is any character constructed through the use
ol'l lbw inrnrodiately recognizable and defining traits, which do not change
ot' tlcvclop' through the course ofthe narrative and which point to general,
l'srullcnt I'caturcs of the human world
(whether these features are con-
ueDtttrtl i zcd as uni versal and eternal , the' archetype' , or hi stori cal l y and
gttl l unrl l y
spcoi l i o, ' soci al types' and ' stereotypes' a di sti ncti on di scussed
helow),r
'l'ho opposite of the type is the novelistic characte! defined by a
mul tl pl i ci ty ol ' ttai ts that are onl y gradual l y reveal ed to us through the
t.l ol tt' ri c ol ' thc nfl rr ti vo, a narrarti ve whi ch i s hi nged on the growth or devel -
opnont ol ' thc uhi [actct' and i s thus centred upon the l atter i n her or hi s
unl qtts Ind i vi tl urrl i l y, l tthol than poi nti ng outwards to a worl d.
In ttttt' r*oci cl y, i l i s thc novcl i sti c character that i s pri vi l eged over the type,
Ittl ' l he 0bvi 0Lrs I0l $on th t oUl soci cty pl i vi l eges at any rate, at the l evel of
l oghl fhul ot' i r: l hu i ntl i vi tl trLrl ovcl thc col l ecti ve or the mass. For thi s
fgstol l , l hc tl ut,i ()ti ty
()l ' l i eti onN l hl tt i tdtl rcss thcnrsel ves to general soci al
l uel l errd l rev$t' l h{l uNl l o r:ntl ttp l cl l i ng l ho stot' y ol ' t parti cul ar i ndi -
vkl ttttl , herrst t' r,l ttt' nl ttg rl rci ttl i rrttel l o pur' 0l y
|rotsonttl
ttnd psychol ogi cal
Ol l !t ,
( l t l l e
wg l t r l r l t . | . r r r t t t t t *r ' l vr ' t t l l l l c r ' f l l l ci el l l l l l i or l t t t t r l t l cl i l l i ( i ol l ol '
14 The Matter of l mages
social categories - e.g. alcoholics we have to consider what is at stake in
one mode of characterization rather than another. Where do we want the
emphasis of the representation to lie on the psychological (alcoholism as
a personal problem), on the social (alcoholism as an aspect of society) or in
some articulation of the two? The choice or advocacy of a more novelistic
or a more typical representation implicitly expresses one or other of these
emphases.
THE EXPRESSION OF VALUES
It is Lippmann's reference to oar tradition, and indeed his use of'our' and
'we' throughout the passage quoted, that takes us into the most important,
and most problematic, issue in stereotyping. For we have to ask, who
exactly are the 'we' and 'us' invoked by Lippmann? - is it necessarily you
and me?
The effectiveness of stereotypes resides in ihe way they invoke a
consensus. Stereotypes proclaim, 'This is what everyone - you, me and us,
thinks members of such-and-such a social group are like', as if these
concepts of these social groups were spontaneously arrived at by all
members of society independently and in isolation. The stereotype is taken
to express a general agreement about a social group, as if that agreernent
arose before, and independently of, the stereotype. Yet for the most part it is
from
slereotypes that we get our ideas about social groups. The consensus
invoked by stereotypes is more apparent than real; rather, stereotypes
express particular definitions of reality, with concomitant evaluations,
which in turn relate to the disposition of power within society. Who pro-
poses the stereotype, who has the power to enforce it, is the crux of the
matter - whose Iradition is Lippmann's 'our tradition'?
Here Offin E. Klapp's distinction between stereotypes and social types is
helpful. ln his book Ileroes, Villains and Fools (1962) Klapp defines social
types as representations ofthose who'belong'to society. They are the kinds
of people that one expects, and is led to expect, to find in one's society,
whereas stereotypes are those who do not belong, who are outside of one's
society. In Klapp, this distinction is principally geographic i.e. social types
of Americans, stereotypes of non-Americans. We can, however, rework his
distinction in terms ofthe types produced by different social groups accord-
ing to their sense of who belongs and who doesn't, who is 'in' and who is
not. Who does or does not belong to a given society as a whole is then a
function of the relative power of groups in that society to define themselves
as central and the rest as 'other', peripheral or outcast.
In fictions, social types and stereotypes can be recognized as distinct by
the di fferent ways i n whi ch they can be used. Al thoLrgh consl ru( l (,(l i corl o-
graphi cal l y si mi l arl y Lo thc way stcrcotypcs i l l c eonsl rr( l o(l
(i r' ,
n l dw vgt' -
bal ant l vi st r r l l [ i r i l s i uc usct l l o si gr r r r l l l r c cl l r f l ( ' l r , r l . not ' t r t l l Vl t cl t l l t hr ,
The role of stereotypes 15
used in a much more open and flexible way than can stereotypes. This is
nrost clearly seen in relation io plot. Social types can figure in almost any
kind of plot and can have a wide range of roles in that plot (e.g. as hero, as
villain, as helpeq as light relief, etc.), whereas stereotypes always carry
within their very representation an implicit narrative. Jo Spence has argued
in the context of the representation of women that, despite the superficial
variety of images, they all carry within them an implicit narrative pattern:
visual representations which may appear to deal with diverse ideas but
which are all aimed at women tend to act as part ofan implicit narrative.
'fhis
has a'beginning'and a 'middle' (birth, childhood, marriage, family
lilb) but there is only minimal representation ofits'end', of growing old
i tntl tl yi ng.
( 1980: 2e 45)
In an article dealing with the stereotyping of gays in films, I tried to show
Itow tlrc use of images of lesbians in a group of French films, no matter
whrrl kind of film or ofwhat'artistic quality', always involved an identical
Ffol
firnction (1977: 33 5). Similarly, we surely only have to be told that we
flfc
going to see a film about an alcoholic to know that it will be a tale either
ol' nortlid dccline or of inspiring redemption. (This suggests a particularly
inlorosling potential use of stereotlpes, in which the character is con-
llt'ttulg(|. lrt the level of dress, performance, etc., as a stereotype but is
tlollbcnrlcly
given a narrative function that is not implicit in the stereotype,
thttn thlowing into question the assumptions signalled by the stereotypical
l uonogl uphy, )
' l ' l to
l oci rrl typc/stcreotype di sti ncti on i s essenti al l y one of degree. It i s
nllot ttll vcty hrlrd to draw a line between those who are
just within and
lhoro rlolirtitcly trcyond the pale. This is partly because different social cat-
!gori o[ ovcrhrp o.g. men ' bel ong' , bl acks do not, but what ofbl ack men? It
h ul ro bccfl usc sonl c ol ' tl rc categori es that the soci al type/stereotype di s-
tl nutl nn kcops uprrt t oannot l ogi cal l y be kept apart i n thi s way. The obvi ous
gtsl pl oi hcl c urc nrcn and women, and i t i s thi s that causes T. E. Perki ns to
Efc0t
tho rl l xti ncti ou
(l t)7t):140 l ). As appl i ed to men and women, the
mtl l sl typc/rl ctcol ypo
(l i sl i ncti on i rnpl i cs that uren have no di rect experi ence
!fwonl en l tr(l l hnl th0r0 ooul (l bc a soci cty conrposed enti rel y ofmen: both
Ef tl tere rl s vi rl uul l y i nrponsi bl c. Yr.:t i l scoms to me that what the di sti nc-
tl cn Fol ntl
to, ttr* rtppl i od l () w()nl cn i tnd nrcn. i s a tendency of patri archal
l hFught ' t o Ht l cl npl l o nl r l n( ui t ) l hc i nt possi bl o. by i nsi st i ng on t l r e' ol her -
ni l t ' of wont !t l t t t d t l l ct l
( t ) t t ' l t l hct ' l hl "ol l t ct ' ncss' ol ' womcn. nr cn bei ng i n
l f t f l dt uhy
l l t e l t t t t t t t t t t | | ot ' | l l l o whl eh wont ( t l t t r c' {) l hut ' ) i n t ho l i r cc ol ' t hci r
nC{! 9l l hl ' y r , , 0l l l l h0f l l h}l r I n l t hl ot y I l l ( l H( xJl r l y, ( ' l ' l t t ' t l i nt i ncl i ol r t l t t cs t r l so
ftftf l tl pdt' l l tr I rettl reptttttl l ott l tt i l rcl ttl ttt l tt ttl t' ttl t' ttl |i , i ' u' l l ru l i rcl ol ' tnIl u
-
16 The Matter of lmages
and female 'preserves': the pub, the beauty salon, the study, the kitchen,
etc.) What the distinction also maintains is the rzbsolr.ile difference between
men and women, in the face oftheir actual relative similarity.
This is the most important function of the stereotype: to maintain sharp
boundary definitions, to define clearly where the pale ends and thus who is
clearly within and who clearly beyond it. Stereotypes do not only, in concert
with social types, map out the boundaries of acceptable and legitimate
behaviour, they also insist on boundaries exactly at those points where in
reality there are none. Nowhere is this more clear than with stereotypes
dealing with social categories that are invisible and/or fluid. Such categories
are invisible, because you cannot telljust from looking at a person that she
or he belongs to the category in question. Unless the person chooses to
dress or act in a clearly and culturally defined manner (e.g. the working-
class man's cloth cap, the male homosexual's limp wrist) or unless one has a
trained eye (as those dealing with alcoholics have?), it is impossible to place
the person before one, whereas many social groups - women and men,
different races, young and old are visibly different, and this difference can
be eradicated only by disguise. Social categories can be
fluid,
in the sense
that it is not possible in reality to draw a line between them and adjacent
categories. We make a fuss about and produce stereotypes about - the
difference between women and men, yet biologically this is negligible com-
pared to their similarity. Again, we are led to treat heterosexuality and
homosexuality as sharply opposed categories of persons when in reality
both heterosexual and homosexual responses and behaviour are to some
extent experienced by everybody in their life. Alcohol use is clearly in this
category it is notoriously difncult to draw the line between harm-free and
harmful drinking. But stereotypes can.
The role of stereotypes is to make visible the invisible, so that there is no
danger of it creeping up on us unawares; and to make fast, firm and separ-
ate what is in reality fluid and much closer to the norm than the domrnant
value system cares to admit.
In the widest sense, these functions of rendering visible and firm can be
connected to Lippmann's insistence on stereotypes as ordering concepts,
and to the tendency towards rigidity that may be implied by this. All soci-
eties need to have relatively stable boundaries and categories, but this stabil-
ity can be achieved within a context that recognizes the relativity and
uncertainty of concepts. Such a stability is, however, achieved only in a
situation of real, as opposed to imposed, consensus. The degree of rigidity
and shrillness of a stereotype indicates the degree to which it is an enforced
representation that points to a reality whose invisibility and/ol lluidity
threatens the recei ved defi ni ti ons of soci ety promotcd by tl rosrr wi l h l hc
bi ggest sti cks. (E.g. i l womcn i trc not so vcty di l l cl cl rt l i rrrrr rrrt'
, why ttr.c
l hr : y sr r bol t l i ni r l er l ' / ; i l r r l cohol i snr i s r r ol so r , r r r i l y r l i nt i l gr r l r l r er l l l l m t ogi l t l
The role ol stereotypes 17
drinking, can we be so comlortable in our acceptance of the latter and
condemnation of the former?)
In this perspective, and speaking very tentatively, what is striking about
the current media representation of alcoholism is its absence. It seems no
longer to be identified as a key social personal problem, to be marked
stereotypically as beyond the pale of 'normal' behaviour. Rather it hardly
seems to be there at all. This may be related to the development of mari-
iuana use as a focus of media/'public' concern dope addicts are among the
most shrill of today's stereotypes. In this context, all alcohol use seems
redolent of old-fashioned values, and especially of 'masculine' values set
against the 'effeminacy' of'hippie' culture. To this one would add the
cnormous financial involvement of the alcohol industry in the leisure
industries, of which the media are a key part, and in particular the reliance
of television and cinema on advertising revenue (which, in the current legal
situ:rtion, cannot come from marijuana promotion but can, and does, from
tulcohol promotion).
If we look back at the cinema, however, it is fairly clear that the alcoholic
tficl serve to distinguish clearly alcohol use from abusg as if a definite line
could be drawn, in order to legitimate the 'social' use of alcohol. This
inclutles the legitimation of excessive consumption, drunkenness and other
ttlcohol-induced anti-social behaviour, since it is possible, by the use of
rtcruolypes, to see this as distinct from 'real' alcholism. The question that
tltt{.:lr an analysis poses is, in whose interest was this distinction maintained?a
It'ttttt .f irn Cook and Mike Lewington (eds) Images of Alcoholism, London:
l l t' i ti sh l ,' i l m l nsti tute
(1979)
NO' l ' l ,l s
| | conllnc nysoll hcre to the discussion of stereotypes as a form of represenling
ll6t'Nonr,
Ilthough thc word itsell (especially in adjectival form) is also used to r.efer
ttt ldotts. bchuviour'. scttinlls. ctc,
I l l l t i rttporl l urt kr sl r' oss tl i c rol c ol ' conceptual i zati on i n the di sti ncti on berween, on
l l l 0 Intc hur(1, l r' chcl y;l cs, and, on thc otl rc4 soci al and stereotypes, si nce what may
ho l r(l l l bul c(l l o 1yDo i ts uni vcrsal and ctcrrr{l trai t, hcncc maki ng i t archetypai .
mtty onl y bc rr hi sl ol i crrl l y rnd cul turi tl l y spcci l i c tr.ri t mi sundcrstood as a uni vcrsal
0l l tl !tcfnl l l I[i t i t i N, ul l 0[ rrl l . l hc tcudcncy ol don]i ni tnt val uc systcms i n soci cti c$
k) pu$ l hui r vl rl l cH o{l ' fl r Ini vor' $ul l y |d ctcl nal l y vi rl i d.
I l l y pfl l tl l t(hy I nrul l l hu tl tou8hl l yntonr thut l ogi ti url tcs thc powor ol ' n1cn and thc
tl l htt(l l l tl tl l ort l ' wrttttsn i tt Noci cl y l
(l o
not nrofl D l l nl ( i 1 i s ncccssari l y and si nrpl y
how I l l t $ l l t l r r k ol ' wol r cr r , r r l l l r or r gh i l i r I n ovo| whol n] i ng ( l ct 0r nl i ni t nt
on t h t .
i l l l h l ttl erentl l ttt l o ol s l hl rl l l rr, l l tl trol l ntl rBl |y l rrH hc0rr unxi oUs to t,0i nl i )rca l hc
Vl Fw l h l nl rohol hu l r tr rl tl l rrl rl hcnm url l crcrl hy rr rrri nol i ty ol ' thc popul rrti orr.
IHl hdf tl tttt vnrl $l l sr ul ' l l tfl t, whl el r l rryol r,l rrrl ghl r.xpur' l rrrrr,,r, i n vrrryi rrg rl ngrucn,
rl l l l pl t l tt tl l r' rttl l rtl rl rl l l l r! l oo nl l (' l t l oo ol l l n A pl r,vcrrl l vc pol hry brrl r,rl
ttFttn l l tF l l l Fr vl 6w l rl ghl wt,l l he, ttItturl l tl tr,rl r,htg l Ivel x ol t' r rrHrrrrrIti rr (rrrrrl
4