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The United StatesPakistan relations refer to the international, historical, and cultural bilateral
relationship between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States of America.
Roughly two months of its independence after the departure of the subcontinent by Great Britain,
the United States established relations with Pakistan on 20 October 1947.
The United States was amongst the first nations to have established relations with Pakistan in
late 1940s, but since then, relations have been centered on the United States' extensive economic,
scientific, and military assistance to Pakistan. Allying with the U.S. during the Cold war against
the USSR, Pakistan was an integral in CENTO and SEATO both alliances opposed the Soviet
Union and Communism. Relations were soured in the 1970s with the left-oriented PPP led
government which came in power in 1971. However, the closely coordinated military
cooperation deepened in the 1980s against Soviet expansion in Central Asia. After the
disintegration of USSR, and Pakistan's subsequent return to democracy, the relations once again
became cold with the U.S. imposing an economic embargo against Pakistan during the most of
the 1990s
A relationship spanning over 65 years, both partners have sustained it, sometimes happily, other
times not so happily. Many in the U.S. government and quite a number of independent analysts
continue to express the view that U.S. strategic interests are inextricably linked with a stable Pakistan
that can effectively implement the governments writ to all of its territory and assist the United States
with efforts to stabilize Afghanistan thereby contribute to the stability in the region.
For America, on a deadline to move her combat forces out of Afghanistan, this is a crucial point. So
much so, that according to a local report, A diplomatic source revealed that Washington intended to
shape its future relationship with Islamabad on the basis of latters approach towards Afghanistan, India
and the region as a whole, in addition to its commitment to fighting terrorism at home. (Published
October 16, 2013) Whether or not America will be moving out is a debatable issue. Those opposing
Pakistan have pointed out that Pakistan is a fragile state, ridden with deeply entrenched problems
including life-threatening terrorism issues, dependence on foreign donors to keep the economy afloat,
(Of the $5.1 billion in total aid committed for Pakistan in 2010, about 24% was from multilateral
agencies and 76% from bilateral sources: US being the largest bilateral donor) corruption hurting rates
of both domestic and foreign investments and lack of transparency leading to a lack of accountability to
state a few. US has tried to work its way around the problem of aid filtering to the grass root levels by
channeling more money directly to Pakistani officials and local groups while scaling back use of US aid
contractors. (USA Today, October 2, 2009)
Energy shortage is one of the most bitingly crucial factors hurting the Pakistan economy. America had
released a relief of much needed $16.5 million for the repairs of power grid. In mid-2012, Congress
released $280 million in new assistance for Pakistans energy sector; these funds were to provide

support for projects at Mangle and KurramTangi. (DAWN March 5, 2013) FATA a much ignored and
backward area in Pakistan needs more educational institutions, better healthcare, more micro-
investment and generally an improved quality of life for its people. A senior USAID official estimated
that, for FY2001-FY2007, about 6% of U.S. economic aid to Pakistan was allocated for projects in the
FATA. (Report: Susan B. Epstein&K. Alan Kronstadt July 1, 2013)

October 22, 2013 Yasmeen Aftab Ali
Since the beginning of 2012, various political parties along with the military command of the country,
met and held discussions on restoring Nato supplies. Diplomats from United States also tried to reduce
the friction.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said that the supplies were blocked without any pressure and will be
restored with consensus.

Moreover, Nato Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen urged Pakistan to reopen Nato ground
supply routes to Afghanistan. However, Rasmussen also said that Pakistan had not been invited to the
crucial 25th Nato summit to be held in May in Chicago.

Simultaneously, US Senator John Kerry, a leading proponent of US aid for Pakistan, said that Pakistan
needs to be more cooperative, in order to eliminate Taliban sanctuaries from the country.

However, top Pakistani leaders decided to meet on May 15, in order to discuss ending a blockade of
foreign military supply routes into Afghanistan and repairing US relations, signaling a rapprochement
ahead of a Nato summit.

Simultaneously, in a sudden shift in events, Nato, on May 15, said that it will invite President Zardari to
the alliances summit in Chicago, after the countrys foreign minister proposed reopening its Afghan
border to Nato military supplies. President Zardari accepted the invitation and decided to attend the

However, on May 18, US lawmakers in the House of Representatives debating the National Defense
Authorization Act voted 412-1 for an amendment that could block up to $650 million in proposed
payments to Pakistan unless Islamabad lets coalition forces resume shipment of war supplies across its

However, on the same day, four containers laden with supplies for the US Embassy in Kabul crossed into
Afghanistan from Pakistan via Torkham border post.

A local official while confirming supplies to the US Embassy via Torkham said he could not say when the
cargo had been transported.

Pakistan government has never put restriction on the transportation of supplies for the diplomatic
missions, including the American Embassy in Kabul, a senior official, who was dealing with the matter,

Ban on the transportation of Nato supplies is still intact.

Simultaneously President Zardari arrived in Washington on May 19 to attend the Nato summit in
Chicago. However, both the countries were unable to strike a conclusive deal on the restoration of Nato
supplies as the summit ended.

In a fresh warning to Pakistan, a Senate panel on May 23 approved a foreign aid budget for next year
that slashes US assistance to Islamabad by more than half and threatens further reductions if it fails to
open supply routes to Nato forces in Afghanistan.

Sen Patrick Leahy, a Democrat and the chairman of the subcommittee, and the panel s top Republican,
Sen Lindsey Graham, said money for Pakistan was cut 58 per cent as lawmakers questioned Islamabad s
commitment to the fight against terrorism.

Moreover, the Senate Appropriations Committee, on May 24, voted to cut aid to Pakistan by a symbolic
$33 million $1 million for each year of jail time handed to Shakil Afridi, a Pakistani doctor who
allegedly assisted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in finding Osama bin Laden.

The September 11 attacks on New York and Washington and the ensuing U.S.-led war on
terrorism have given Pakistans military dictator, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, an opportunity to
improve the relationship between Washington and Islamabad. That relationship had experienced
a steep decline in the 1990s, as the end of both the Cold War and the common struggle against
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan eroded the perception of shared strategic interests.
Moreover, while it was losing its strategic significance to the United States, Pakistan was coming
under the control of an assertive military-religious nexus that promoted anti-American radical
Islamic forces at home and abroad.
Since September 11, General Musharraf, whose regime had been the main source of diplomatic
and military support for the terrorist Taliban ruling neighboring Afghanistan, has portrayed his
regime as an ally of Washington in its counterterrorism campaign. Musharraf, though, headed a
military clique that brought an end to his nations short democratic experience, assisted radical
Islamic terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir, pressed for a war with India, advanced
Pakistans nuclear weapons program, and presided over a corrupt and mismanaged economy.
Despite that record, he is being hailed by the Bush administration as a courageous and
visionary leader who is ready to reorient his country toward a pro-American position and adopt

major political and economic reforms. In exchange for his belated support, Musharraf has been
rewarded with U.S. diplomatic backing and substantial economic aid.
Musharrafs decision to join the U.S. war on terrorism didnt reflect a structural transformation
in Pakistans policy. It was a result of tactical considerations aimed at limiting the losses that
Islamabad would suffer because of the collapse of the friendly Taliban regime in Kabul.
Rejecting cooperation with Washington would have provoked American wrath and placed at risk
Pakistans strategic and economic interests in South Asia.
Some cooperation between the United States and Pakistan is necessary to wage the war against
terrorism, but that cooperation must not evolve into a new long-term strategic alliance.
Washington should view Pakistan, with its dictatorship, failed economy, and insecure nuclear
arsenal, as a reluctant supporter of U.S. goals at best and as a potential long-term problem at