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Facts: Petitioners were among the more than sixty permanent employees of the Provincial Engineering Office,
Province of Agusan del Sur, who were dismissed from the service by then Governor Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. when
the latter assumed office, allegedly to scale down the operations of the said office.
On July 11, 1988, a petition
for reinstatement was filed by petitioners before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), docketed as MSPB
Case No. 91-1739, alleging that Governor Paredes was motivated by political vengeance when he dismissed them
and hired new employees to replace them. It appears that during the pendency of the petition for reinstatement,
Governor Paredes issued Memorandum Order No. 3-A dated March 20, 1989 providing for the hiring of casual
employees to replace the dismissed employees, allegedly due to exigency of service. The MSPB required Governor
Paredes to comment on the petition. On February 1, 1989, the governor specifically denied the allegations of
petitioners that their dismissal was illegal. Subsequently, an amended petition and an amended answer were filed
by the parties. Hearings were conducted by the Civil Service Regional Office No. X, Cagayan de Oro City, where
both parties were represented by their respective counsels. The last hearing was held on June 29, 1990, after
which the parties submitted their respective memorandum together with their evidence.
On January 29, 1993, the MSPB rendered a decision holding that the reduction in work force was not done in
accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and ordering the reinstatement of petitioners
Pursuant to a Motion for Clarification filed by petitioners, the MSPB issued an Order dated April 19, 1993 which
directed the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur pay petitioners their back salaries and other money benefits
for the period that they had been out of the service until their reinstatement.
In another motion dated May 24,
1993, petitioners sought an order directing the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur to reinstate them and
declare as invalid the appointments of those who replaced them. On June 24, 1993, the Provincial Governor of
Agusan del Sur was ordered to reinstate the dismissed employees.
The Governor continued to refuse to
implement the order to reinstate.
ISSUE: whether respondent COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment of back wages of
illegally dismissed employees by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has been decreed pursuant to
a final decision of the Civil Service Commission.
RULING: The case at bar brings to the fore the parameters of the power of the respondent COA to
decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds.
Undoubtedly, the exercise of this power
involves the quasi-judicial aspect of government audit. As statutorily envisioned, this pertains to the
"examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities".
The process of government audit is adjudicative in
nature. The decisions of COA presuppose an adjudicatory process involving the determination and resolution of
opposing claims. Its work as adjudicator of money claims for or against the government means the exercise of
judicial discretion. It includes the investigation, weighing of evidence, and resolving whether items should or
should not be included, or as applied to claim, whether it should be allowed or disallowed in whole or in part. Its
conclusions are not mere opinions but are decisions which may be elevated to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party
accordingly, the fundamental requirements of procedural due process cannot be violated in
proceedings before the COA. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a
notice of the proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are not
hide bound by technical procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to disregard the basic demands of due
Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a
trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of due process.
It would be
unfair for COA to hold former Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners amounting to
millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense. Our rulings
holding that public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are
premised on said officials having been sued both in their official and personal capacities.
Facts: Case is a petition for certoriari to annul the order of the CFI of Quezon City directing the NBI and the DFA to
take the proper steps in order that accused Suntay, allegedly in the US, be brought back to the Philippines, so that
he may be dealt with in accordance with law; and of prohibition to enjoin the DFA Secretary from canceling the
petitioner’s passport without previous hearing. On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor
of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City,
alleging that on June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia Nubla, with lewd design, somewhere near the UP
compound in Diliman and had carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia being a minor of 16 years old. On Dec. 15, 1954,
after investigation, Asst City Atty recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City
Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred
to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.However, this order was not
implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of the proceeding in order that the issues raised may
be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955 counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that
the action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court
reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955 the respondent Secretary denied counsel's request and on
15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition. Petitioner’s Claim: while the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised
until after hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and
protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.
Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior hearing
Ruling: The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order
of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the
accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is not
beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. the respondent Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary
must take to compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred against
him. True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already
issued may not be exercised at whim. But here the petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal charge for
seduction and although at first all Assistant City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the complaint previously
subscribed and sworn to by the father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no final action had been
taken by the City Attorney of Quezon City as the case was still under study. And as the Solicitor General puts it,
"His suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate
attemption his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of
the law should join together to bring him back to justice." In issuing the order in question, the respondent
Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise
of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out. Hearing would have been proper and necessary
if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder
of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to
have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an
undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe
dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not
violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot
be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in
order to comply with the due process of clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex
parte would be violative of the said clause. The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.
130. De Bisschop vs. Galang
Facts: George de Bisschop (Bisschop), an American citizen, was allowed to stay in the country until 1
August 1959 as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc. (Bissmag), of which he is
president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a
letter dated 10 July 1959. However, this application was denied by the Commissioner of Immigration – in
view of damaging reports of Immigration Officer Benjamin De Mesa to the effect that Bissmag is a
gambling front and that Bisschop is suspected of tax evasion – in a communication of 10 September 1959
and Bisschop was advised that he should depart within 5 days. Bisschop’s counsel requested a copy of
the decision. The legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied that, where the result of an
application for extension is a denial, no formal decision, order, or resolution is promulgated by the Board
for reasons of practicability and expediency. Bisschop then filed this petition for prohibition. The TC
granted the petitioni, ordering the Board to refrain from arresting Bisschop and that it should first
conduct formal hearings.

Issue: Are the Commissioners of Immigration required to conduct formal hearings on all applications for
extension of stay of aliens? – NO.

Ruling: Since CA 613 (Philippine Immigration Act of 1940) is silent as to the procedure to be followed in
these cases, the Court is inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review
the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings
in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency.
This would not violate due process because the letter instructing Bisschop to depart is a mere formality, a
preliminary step. The requirement to leave before the start of deportation proceedings is only
an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take
steps for his expulsion. Furthermore, a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative
proceedings. Due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by
means of which the government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or
administrative, which is as much due process of law. A day in court is matter of right only in
judicial proceedings and not necessarily in administrative proceedings. The use of the word “decision”
in Sec. 81 of the Immigration Act refers to the number of “votes” necessary to constitute the decision of

131. Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al.

FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and
dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent
Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task
of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or
violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably
forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other
hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the
river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist
from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar, however, with preliminary
injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial Court on petition for certiorari, but it was
dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of
the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's
subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order
of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In
addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time,
the CA said that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result

in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic,
"larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved
for reconsideration, without success.

Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with
law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and the ex parte Order and the
Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and
Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review the Decision and
Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v.
Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition,
petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex
parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence
that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which
exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner
Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the
River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex
parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the
inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed
such a threat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that
Solar had been denied due process by the Board.

HELD: The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful
authority of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
regulations in situations like here. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to
protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to
the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise
of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari.
It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as
Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the
Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to
the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of
Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

132. Graciano Indias v Phil. Iron Mines, Inc.

1. 23 Jun 1954: Petitioner Indias filed before the CIR a complaint against his former employer respondent
PHL Iron Mines for unfair labor practice. He alleged that he was unjustly terminated from work because of
his union activities (he participated in a strike led by one Pedro Venida) and that the justification given by

the company should not be given credit since his quarrel with a co-employee happened outside work
hours and outside the work premises. He prayed for reinstatement.
2. Respondent PHL Iron Mines, on the other hand, contended that Indias was terminated for just cause, it
having been found that the latter committed grave misconduct due to his violent temper when he
quarreled with a fellow employee (Apolonio Umaga) in Jose Panganiban (a poblacion, aka town), leading
to a court action for less physical injuries against Indias. Respondent also set up a counterclaim for P2000.
3. Hearings were conducted by Atty. Tabigne in which both parties appeared with counsels. After the
presentation of evidence, Tabigne rendered a report recommending dismissal of the complaint. His
reason was that the charge of unfair labor practice was not substantiated by evidence and that the grave
misconduct due to Indias’ violent temper was a violation of the company’s rules and regulations which
says that underground laborers should possess good behavior as norms of conduct to avoid any untoward
incident in the underground tunnels. Such violation was found a valid cause for Indias’ dismissal. CIR
adopted the recommendation and adopted the ff. order:
“Hearing Examiner Mr. Tabigne recommends the dismissal of this case on the
ground that the evidence by the complainant did not support the charges of unfair labor
practice. The facts are stated in the Hearing Examiner's dated May 16, 1955.
After a perusal of the record of the case, the Court finds no sufficient justification
for modifying said recommendation, findings and conclusions, and consequently, this
case is hereby dismissed.
4. Hence, this petition for review.


1. WON the CIR made a wrong finding of fact in holding that there was just cause in Indias’ dismissal *No+
 SC is not a trier of facts. The findings of the hearing officer should be given credit and should be
affirmed since it is the one in a better position to determine the truthfulness of the allegations.

2. WON CIR may issue an order dismissing a case without stating the facts and the law in support thereof

Indias’ Arguments
 The order should be voided for having violated the 1935 Constitution ( “No decision shall be rendered
by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based. *Art. VIII, Sec. 12+”) and Sec. 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court stating that a court decision
shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

SC Ruling
 While it is true that the order does not make its own discussion of evidence or its own findings of
fact, such is not necessary if the court –as in the CIR in this case –is satisfied with the report of the
examiner/referee which already contains the full discussion of the evidence and findings of fact based
thereon. CIR approved the report of the hearing officer “after a perusal of the record of the case”
which should give a presupposition that it had examined the evidence and found no justification for
any modification of the findings. It is purposeless to repeat what the examiner has already found
when the court is in full accord with it. Suffice it to say that a new discussion of evidence or its own
findings of fact is necessary if the court disagrees with the report, because in such case the court
must state its reasons for disagreement. As had been held in Manila Trading & Supply Co. v Phl Labor
“When the CIR refers a case to a commissioner for investigation, report, and
recommendation, and at such investigation the parties were duly represented by
the Board and not to a written decision. Were the intention of the lawmaker otherwise, it would have
expressly stated it because the law, in fact, enumerates when a written decision is necessary. Prohibition
may not be granted because there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to Bisschop in
the form of habeas corpus. Prohibition is, after all, not favored by the courts and will only be granted in
cases of extreme necessity.

counsel, heard or at least given an opportunity to be heard, the requirement of due
process has been satisfied, even if the court failed to set the report for hearing, and a
decision on the basis of such report, with the other evidence of the case, is a decision
which meets the requirement of a fair and open hearing.”