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Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual

Exploitation in Rotherham
1997 - 2013
Alexis Jay OBE


This Independent Inquiry was commissioned by Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council in
October 2013. Its remit, covering the periods of 1997- 2009 and 2009 - 2013, is appended.

The Inquiry applied the definition of child sexual exploitation which is used in Government
guidance and is set out in Appendix 4, paragraph 48 of this report. The methodology
included reading a wide range of minutes, reports and case files. We also interviewed over a
hundred people, either individually or in groups. I agreed with the Chief Executive that the
cut-off point for file reading would be the end of September 2013, and that any evidence
available to me up till June 2014 would be included in the report. A confidential email and
Freepost address was set up. A list of those interviewed is also appended.

At the beginning of the Inquiry, I agreed with the Chief Executive that I would refer to him
without delay any instances of individual children where I considered that their
circumstances needed urgent attention, or where there was immediate risk. I also agreed to
advise him of anything I encountered of a potentially criminal nature, which I would also refer
to the Police.

I was assisted in the Inquiry by Kathy Somers, independent consultant and Associate of the
Care Inspectorate in Scotland. Specialist expertise was provided by Sheila Taylor and her
team at the National Working Group Network on Child Sexual Exploitation, who also carried
out cross reading of a small number of files.

Alexis Jay OBE
21 August 2014

Table of Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 1
1. Background .................................................................................................................. 3
2. Chronology of key events ........................................................................................... 7
3. Inspections and External reviews 1998-2013 ........................................................... 15
4. The scale of child sexual exploitation in Rotherham .............................................. 29
5. The children who were victims of sexual exploitation. ........................................... 35
6. Children and Young Peoples Services .................................................................... 45
7. Safeguarding .............................................................................................................. 57
8. The response of other services and agencies ......................................................... 69
9. The Risky Business Project ...................................................................................... 79
10. Three Early Reports ................................................................................................... 83
11. Issues of ethnicity ...................................................................................................... 91
12. Workforce Strategy and Financial Resources ......................................................... 97
13. The Role of Elected Members and Senior Officers of the Council ....................... 101
14. Recommendations ................................................................................................... 117
Appendix 1: Terms of Reference for the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual
Exploitation 1997 - 2013 ................................................................................................. 121
Appendix 2: Methodology ............................................................................................. 125
Appendix 3: List of interviewees ................................................................................... 127
Appendix 4: Legal and Policy Context ......................................................................... 131
Appendix 5: Recommendations from earlier reports collated by the Safeguarding
Board ............................................................................................................................... 149


Executive Summary

No one knows the true scale of child sexual exploitation (CSE) in Rotherham over the years. Our
conservative estimate is that approximately 1400 children were sexually exploited over the full
Inquiry period, from 1997 to 2013.

In just over a third of cases, children affected by sexual exploitation were previously known to
services because of child protection and neglect. It is hard to describe the appalling nature of the
abuse that child victims suffered. They were raped by multiple perpetrators, trafficked to other
towns and cities in the north of England, abducted, beaten, and intimidated. There were examples
of children who had been doused in petrol and threatened with being set alight, threatened with
guns, made to witness brutally violent rapes and threatened they would be next if they told anyone.
Girls as young as 11 were raped by large numbers of male perpetrators.

This abuse is not confined to the past but continues to this day. In May 2014, the caseload of the
specialist child sexual exploitation team was 51. More CSE cases were held by other children's social
care teams. There were 16 looked after children who were identified by childrens social care as
being at serious risk of sexual exploitation or having been sexually exploited. In 2013, the Police
received 157 reports concerning child sexual exploitation in the Borough.

Over the first twelve years covered by this Inquiry, the collective failures of political and officer
leadership were blatant. From the beginning, there was growing evidence that child sexual
exploitation was a serious problem in Rotherham. This came from those working in residential care
and from youth workers who knew the young people well.

Within social care, the scale and seriousness of the problem was underplayed by senior managers.
At an operational level, the Police gave no priority to CSE, regarding many child victims with
contempt and failing to act on their abuse as a crime. Further stark evidence came in 2002, 2003 and
2006 with three reports known to the Police and the Council, which could not have been clearer in
their description of the situation in Rotherham. The first of these reports was effectively suppressed
because some senior officers disbelieved the data it contained. This had led to suggestions of cover-
up. The other two reports set out the links between child sexual exploitation and drugs, guns and
criminality in the Borough. These reports were ignored and no action was taken to deal with the
issues that were identified in them.

In the early 2000s, a small group of professionals from key agencies met and monitored large
numbers of children known to be involved in CSE or at risk but their managers gave little help or
support to their efforts. Some at a senior level in the Police and children's social care continued to
think the extent of the problem, as described by youth workers, was exaggerated, and seemed
intent on reducing the official numbers of children categorised as CSE. At an operational level, staff
appeared to be overwhelmed by the numbers involved. There were improvements in the response


of management from about 2007 onwards. By 2009, the children's social care service was acutely
understaffed and over stretched, struggling to cope with demand.

Seminars for elected members and senior officers in 2004-05 presented the abuse in the most
explicit terms. After these events, nobody could say 'we didn't know'. In 2005, the present Council
Leader chaired a group to take forward the issues, but there is no record of its meetings or
conclusions, apart from one minute.

By far the majority of perpetrators were described as 'Asian' by victims, yet throughout the entire
period, councillors did not engage directly with the Pakistani-heritage community to discuss how
best they could jointly address the issue. Some councillors seemed to think it was a one-off problem,
which they hoped would go away. Several staff described their nervousness about identifying the
ethnic origins of perpetrators for fear of being thought racist; others remembered clear direction
from their managers not to do so.

In December 2009, the Minister of State for Children and Families put the Council's childrens
safeguarding services into intervention, following an extremely critical Ofsted report. The Council
was removed from intervention thirteen months later.

The Rotherham Safeguarding Children Board and its predecessor oversaw the development of good
inter-agency policies and procedures applicable to CSE. The weakness in their approach was that
members of the Safeguarding Board rarely checked whether these were being implemented or
whether they were working. The challenge and scrutiny function of the Safeguarding Board and of
the Council itself was lacking over several years at a time when it was most required.

In 2013, the Council Leader, who has held office since 2003, apologised for the quality of the
Council's safeguarding services being less than it should have been before 2009. This apology should
have been made years earlier, and the issue given the political leadership it needed.

There have been many improvements in the last four years by both the Council and the Police. The
Police are now well resourced for CSE and well trained, though prosecutions remain low in number.
There is a central team in children's social care which works jointly with the Police and deals with
child sexual exploitation. This works well but the team struggles to keep pace with the demands of
its workload. The Council is facing particular challenges in dealing with increased financial pressures,
which inevitably impact on frontline services. The Safeguarding Board has improved its response to
child sexual exploitation and holds agencies to account with better systems for file audits and
performance reporting. There are still matters for childrens social care to address such as good risk
assessment, which is absent from too many cases, and there is not enough long-term support for the
child victims.


1. Background
1.1 The Metropolitan Borough of Rotherham is situated in South Yorkshire, about eight
miles from Sheffield. The Borough includes Rotherham itself and the outlying towns
of Maltby, Rawmarsh, Swinton and Wath on Dearne. More than half of its area is
rural. Its population is 258,400. Around 8% of residents are from black and minority
ethnic groups. 23% of properties are council rented. Most of the traditional
industries from the 19
and 20
centuries have vanished. After a period of decline in
the 1980s and 90s, the local economy has grown steadily and the Borough has
benefited from inward investment in the fields of technology and light engineering.
Nevertheless, there is a wide range of deprivation in the Borough and stark
inequalities between some of the areas within it. Unemployment is well above the
UK average. The take-up of all welfare benefits is higher than the English average,
as are the levels of free school meals and limiting long-term illness.
1.2 The Council comprises 63 elected members, of whom there are 49 Labour, 2
Conservatives, 10 UKIP and 2 Independents. Prior to the local elections in May
2014, there were 57 Labour, 4 Conservatives, 1 UKIP and 1 Independent.
1.3 The earliest reference to sexual exploitation of children reported to the Inquiry was
about children in a children's residential unit in the early nineties.
1.4 Until 2004, responsibility for overseeing and coordinating a multi-agency response to
child sexual abuse and exploitation lay with the Area Child Protection Committee. In
early 2005, this responsibility passed to the Local Safeguarding Children Board (the
Safeguarding Board), which was established by the Children Act 2004. Its task is to
co-ordinate the actions of agencies represented on the Board and to ensure their
effectiveness in safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children in its area.
1.5 In Rotherham, the first Council service to develop a special concern for child sexual
exploitation (CSE) was the Risky Business youth project. Founded in 1997, it worked
with young people between 11 and 25 years, providing sexual health advice, and
help in relation to alcohol and drugs, self-harm, eating disorders, parenting and
budgeting. By the late 90s, it was beginning to identify vulnerable girls on the streets
of the town. Its relationship with any young person was voluntary on both sides. It
was part of the Council's Youth Services, though it derived its funding from various
sources in its early years. One of its main functions was the provision of training to
voluntary and statutory agencies working in the field, to magistrates, the Police,
schools and foster carers.
1.6 Within children's social care
, the sexual exploitation of young people was first
recognised as a Executive Director in 2001, though there were many known cases of
CSE in the years before then. Risky Business would refer to children's social care

The term childrens social care is used throughout the report to refer to the social services provided to children
and young people. These had various departmental titles over the years, and are now named Children and
Young Peoples Services.


any young person who gave rise to serious concerns and might require statutory
intervention. Between 2001 and 2002, Risky Business participated in a Home Office
research pilot whose aim was to find out the most effective approaches to street
prostitution. Local agencies challenged the content of the draft report produced in
2002 and questioned its evidence base. While it commended Rotherhams training
and fostering programmes, the draft research report contained significant criticisms
of the Police and the local authority.
1.7 Social work with the victims of sexual abuse and exploitation had been undertaken
largely through the Child Protection Unit and Senior Practitioners. Specialisation
became more developed in the early 2000s with the establishment of the
Safeguarding Children Unit and the Key Players group. Cases of sexual abuse were
managed by qualified social workers under the supervision of their team leaders or
locality managers. Strategy meetings were independently chaired by the
Safeguarding Children Unit.
1.8 The organisational structure of the Council changed in 2005, with the separation of
adult social services from children and families' social services. The new Department
of Children and Young Peoples Services was created.
1.9 In 2003, the Area Child Protection Committee received reports about runaway
children and the work of Risky Business. A presentation on sexual exploitation was
made to a special seminar for councillors in November 2004. This presentation was
explicit about known perpetrators, their ethnic origins, and where they operated.
Similar presentations were made to other groups, including the Safeguarding Board,
over the following weeks. As a result, the Leader of the Council set up a 'Task and
Finish Group' to consider safe travel, safe houses, witness protection, training and
publicity to raise public awareness of the issue. Senior councillors attended a
conference on child sexual exploitation held in Rotherham in April 2006. A training
session for councillors was arranged in June 2007 and a further conference in 2011.
1.10 Around late 2003, the Sexual Exploitation Forum was set up. It was multi-agency and
met monthly to consider individual cases of children who were being sexually
exploited or at risk of exploitation.
1.11 Between 2007 2013, the Police undertook a series of operations, jointly
coordinated and designed to investigate cases of suspected child sexual exploitation,
although only one resulted in prosecution and convictions. Operation Central in 2008
investigated groups of men believed to be involved in child sexual exploitation. It
ended in 2010 with five convictions. In the same year, Child S was murdered.
Operation Czar, begun in 2009, led to the issuing of abduction notices, but no
convictions. Operation Chard in 2011 led to abduction notices and 11 arrests but no
convictions. In the summer of 2012, Operations K-Alphabet and Kappa began, again
joint investigations with children's services. Later that year, Operation Carrington
investigated the risks to young people in central Rotherham. In 2013, a police


operation into historic CSE in Rotherham was announced.
1.12 In October 2012, the Chief Constable gave evidence on child sexual exploitation to
the Home Affairs Select Committee. In January 2013, the Chief Executive and
Executive Director for Young People's Services gave evidence. The Select
Committee's report was published in June, and was critical of the Council and the
Police in Rotherham, particularly for the lack of prosecutions over a number of years.
1.13 In August 2013, the Police and Crime Commissioner announced three reviews of
child sexual abuse in the South Yorkshire Police area. In September, the Council
announced it would commission this Independent Inquiry.
1.14 A series of audits, reviews, assessments and inspections of the Councils
safeguarding and child protection services were conducted over this period. The
Social Services Inspectorate (SSI) and later Ofsted conducted regular inspections,
planned or unannounced, notably a full inspection in 2003, a follow-up in 2004, a full
inspection in 2008, a monitoring visit in 2009, an unannounced inspection in August
2009, a full inspection in 2010, an unannounced inspection in 2011, and an
unannounced review of child protection services in August 2012. Following the
inspection in 2009, the Minister of State for Young People and Families issued to the
Council a Notice of Requirement to Improve its childrens services. The Notice was
removed in January 2011.
1.15 Apart from Ofsted, childrens safeguarding services were regularly subject to scrutiny
in the form of Joint Area Reviews (JAR), Annual Performance Assessments, periodic
thematic audits, and studies by the Councils Scrutiny and Services Improvement
Panels. Serious Case Reviews were undertaken as required. The Serious Case
Review on Child S, whilst judged 'excellent' by Ofsted, was criticised by Michael
Gove, former Secretary of State for Education, and by The Times newspaper for the
number of redactions the public version contained.
1.16 In 2013 the Leader of the Council formally apologised to the victims of CSE for the
response of the Council's safeguarding services for children and young people, up
until 2009.
1.17 In addition to the unpublished 2002 Home Office research report, other significant
reports relating to the exploitation and abuse of children in Rotherham included two
reports by Dr Angie Heal in 2003 and 2006, an external assessment of childrens
services by Children First (2009), Barnardos Practice Review (2013), and a
diagnostic review by the Chair of the Safeguarding Board (2013).
1.18 From 2003 to the present, articles have appeared in the Times Newspaper critical of
the response to child sexual exploitation on the part of South Yorkshire Police and
the Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council.



2. Chronology of key events
A summary of important events in the history of child sexual exploitation in

Risky Business project launched.
December 1998
Draft guidance from the Home Office covering Children involved in prostitution.
January 1999
Communication from South Yorkshire Police giving the policy and procedures for the
protection of children who are being sexually abused through prostitution.
February and March 1999
The Social Services (Children and Families) Committee received a report on the
Home Office draft guidance. The sub-committee of the Area Child Protection
Committee (ACPC) received the draft guidance and the police guidance to officers re
child sexual exploitation.
The Council funded Risky Business. Funding was maintained and then increased in
June 2002
Meetings took place between the Police, the Chief Executive of Rotherham Borough
Council and senior staff of Education and Social Services on the subject of the Home
Office research report.
December 2002
The ACPCs sub-committee considered a report on runaway children and the
protection of children experiencing, or at risk of sexual exploitation.


August 2003
Dr Heal, Strategic Drugs Analyst, produced her first report Sexual Exploitation, Drug
Use and Drug Dealing: the current situation in South Yorkshire. The report was
circulated to all agencies in the Rotherham Drugs Partnership.
September 2003
The ACPC approved revised procedures and protocols relating to the sexual
exploitation of children.
The Sexual Exploitation Forum began its work towards the end of 2003.
November 2004 and early 2005
Presentations on the sexual exploitation of children were made to the Councils
Childrens Executive Group, the Children and Young Peoples Board and the
Safeguarding Board. It was decided that a Task and Finish Group be set up on this
subject, chaired by the Leader of the Council. An Action Plan was called for.
The Task and Finish Group decided to arrange a seminar for all Council members, a
Partners Away Day, and major publicity to raise the awareness of the risks of sexual
exploitation amongst parents, young people and the community. A group would
consider child safety, witness protection, safe travel and issues around licensing and
April 2005
A seminar for all Council members was organised on the subject of child sexual
exploitation. 30 elected members attended. CSE would be a principal theme in the
3-year Community Safety Strategy.
The new department of Children and Young Peoples Services was created,
incorporating previous education functions and children and families social services.
Councillor Shaun Wright was appointed Cabinet Member for Children and Young
Peoples Services.
May 2005
An audit of 87 CSE cases was carried out by the Police on behalf of the Sexual
Exploitation Forum.


June 2005
The Forum was dealing with over 90 CSE cases and the decision was taken to
reduce the number of cases being discussed.

November 2005
The Chair of the Children and Young Peoples Voluntary Sector wrote to the Chief
Executive, asking how the Task and Finish Group had progressed and offering to
contribute to its work. The reply has not been traced.
A conference on the sexual exploitation of children was held in Rotherham in March
Dr Heal, Strategic Drugs Analyst, produced her second report Violence and Gun
Crime: Exploitation, Prostitution and Drug Markets in South Yorkshire. The report
was circulated to all agencies in the Rotherham Drugs Partnership.
The funding for Risky Business was increased. The Safeguarding Board approved
revised procedures and an Action Plan for responding to the sexual exploitation of
children and young people in Rotherham.
August 2006
The Children and Young Peoples Scrutiny Panel called for an updated report on
safeguarding around sexual exploitation.
Three month secondment from National Childrens Homes. The secondee began to
review referral, assessment, planning etc. relating to the Action Plan. She worked
with Risky Business and senior managers of Children and Young Peoples Services.
January 2007
The Council appointed an Assistant Safeguarding Manager with responsibility for
CSE services.
The Director, Targeted Services, took on the management of Risky Business.
April 2007
A Strategic Management Team was established to co-ordinate police and social care
input to an investigation of grooming and sexual abuse of young boys. Over 70
alleged victims were identified and an adult male was convicted of offences against


10 children. The judge commended the joint work that resulted in the prosecution
and conviction of the offender.
June 2007
Shaun Wright, Cabinet Member for Children and Young Peoples Services, received
a report on the Protection of Young People from Sexual Assault in Rotherham. The
report was referred to the Children and Young Peoples Scrutiny Panel and to the
Safeguarding Board. It was decided that a training seminar would be held in July for
Council members.
December 2007
The Sexual Exploitation Forum heard that Risky Business was inundated with
referrals, all of them under 18 years. Some were looked after children. The project
was under pressure from those who had referred the children.
Operation Central was set up to investigate men believed to be involved in sexual
exploitation. Inter-agency activity was coordinated through the Sexual Exploitation
Forum, with input from the Police, Children and Young Peoples Services and Risky
Business. Four young people were witnesses at the subsequent trial, with
appropriate support. Five men were subsequently convicted.
Funding for Risky Business was increased.
June 2008
The Safeguarding Board received the annual report on the protection of young
people in Rotherham from sexual exploitation. Membership of the Steering Group
was expanded to include health and voluntary sector representatives. The main
service in this field continued to be Risky Business. It would now promote multi-
disciplinary working, group work, a drop-in centre and weekend work.
Work had started involving taxi drivers and licensed premises on the preventive

July 2008
A new Executive Director of Children and Young Peoples Services was appointed.
Shaun Wright, Cabinet member, received the annual report on the protection of
young people in Rotherham from sexual exploitation. He called for a further report
on the budget of Risky Business and the likely future pressures on the project. He


received a further report on the protection of young people from sexual exploitation in
November 2008.
Statutory guidance on safeguarding children and young people from sexual
exploitation was received.
January 2009
Shaun Wright, Cabinet member, received a report by the Director of Targeted
Services on the progress of arrangements to protect young people from sexual
May 2009
An external assessment of Children and Young Peoples Services, commissioned
from Children First, was published.
Autumn 2009
Ofsted rated Rotherham childrens services inadequate on the grounds that the
safety of children could not be assured. Three areas for priority action were noted.
September 2009
The Local Safeguarding Children Board received a report on the resource
implications of the growing demands on the service in relation to sexual exploitation.
October 2009
A new Chief Executive was appointed.
December 2009
The Minister of State served an Improvement Notice on Rotherham Council.

January 2010
Operation Czar began a joint Police and Children and Young Peoples Services
investigation involving multiple perpetrators and victims. Abduction notices were
made, taxi licences were revoked, but no convictions followed.
February 2010
A Lessons Learned review of Operation Central was commissioned.


April 2010
The Safeguarding Board set up the formal Child Sexual Exploitation sub-group.
May 2010
Councillor Paul Lakin became the Lead Member for Children and Young Peoples
September 2010
The post of specialist CSE Safeguarding Co-coordinator was created and located
within the Childrens Safeguarding Unit.
November 2010
Operation Central trial ended with five convictions. Child S was murdered, and a
Serious Case Review was commissioned by the Safeguarding Board.
December 2010
The support of the Safeguarding Board was sought to the principle of establishing a
multi-agency team to address issues of sexual exploitation. The Director of
Community Services in Children and Young Peoples Services emphasised to the
Board that the Risky Business service should be further enhanced.
January 2011
Operation Chard began, a joint investigation into multiple perpetrators and victims.
Arrests and abduction notices were made, and taxi licences were revoked. One
case was referred to the Crown Prosecution Service, but the decision was taken not
to proceed.
Rotherham Childrens Services were removed from Government intervention.
April 2011
A large regional conference reviewed the lessons learned from Operation Central.
The Risky Business project was transferred from Youth Services to Childrens
Safeguarding Services.
December 2011
A man was convicted and sentenced to 17.5 years for the murder of Child S.
The Safeguarding Board was assured by Council officers that Rotherham was ahead
of other areas in its work on the sexual exploitation of young people.


May 2012
The Serious Case Review on Child S was published. The Times newspaper alleged
a cover-up on account of the redactions.
July and August 2012
Operation K-Alphabet, a joint CSE investigation with Sheffield Police began,
focusing on a perpetrator who lived in Rotherham. A second investigation, operation
Kappa began. Several other police operations were underway to investigate and
prosecute suspected perpetrators.
August 2012
Ofsted rated Rotherhams child protection services as adequate commending
significant improvements.
September 2012
The Times reported an alleged cover-up from 1997 to 2010.
The new specialist CSE service was co-located with the Rotherham Police Public
Protection Unit with two qualified social workers.
October 2012
The Chief Constable, South Yorkshire Police, attended the Home Affairs Select
The Overview and Scrutiny Management Board reviewed lessons learned from the
Child S Serious Case Review.
November 2012
Operation Carrington began a joint investigation focusing on Eastern European
children who were being sexually exploited/at risk.
January 2013
The Chief Executive and the Executive Director of Children and Young Peoples
Services gave evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee.
June 2013
The Executive Director of Children and Young Peoples services advised the Cabinet
on the publication of the Home Affairs Select Committee report Child Sexual
Exploitation and the response to Localised Grooming. The Cabinet was told that


between 2003 and 2009 we fully acknowledge that our services should have been
September 2013
Barnardos completed a Practice Review, which had been commissioned by
Rotherham Borough Council as an initial high-level review of its CSE services.
Councillor Roger Stone, Leader of Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council,
announced that an Independent Inquiry into CSE in Rotherham would be held. He
apologised unreservedly to young people who had been let down by the
safeguarding services which prior to 2009 simply werent good enough.
Shaun Wright, the Police and Crime Commissioner, announced three reviews of
CSE, including an HMIC inspection, an additional team of detectives and other
specialists to investigate allegations of historic child abuse in South Yorkshire, and
the Chief Crown Prosecutor to review all historic CSE cases across South Yorkshire
in which the Crown Prosecution Service was involved. Criminal charges were to be
The incoming Chair of the Local Safeguarding Children Board initiated a CSE
November 2013
HMIC report on South Yorkshire Polices handling of CSE was published.
December 2013
The Safeguarding Board Chairs Diagnostic Report was published.


3. Inspections and External reviews 1998-2013

Inspections frequently commend the Council for its commitment to safeguarding
young people, and its efforts to develop multi-agency responses to child sexual
exploitation. However, reports contain serious criticisms, some of which are repeated
over the 15-year period. Those that occur most frequently relate to the quality of
referrals and assessments, the late provision of reports, the standard of records and
reports, and weaknesses in performance management. These included lack of
monitoring, inadequate supervision and the absence of sound information systems.
The Council was served with an Improvement Notice by the Minister of State for
Young People and Families in December 2009, which was lifted in January 2011. In
subsequent inspections and reviews, its multi-agency approach to CSE and the
specialist team were praised.

3.1 In the first part of this chapter, we summarise the findings of inspections by Ofsted,
the Social Services Inspectorate and the Commission for Social Care Inspection. For
ease of reference, the findings of reports are described (where possible) under
standard headings. We then look at other external reviews which were undertaken
between 2009 and 2013.
3.2 The Social Services Inspectorates report (2003) refers back to the joint review of
social services in Rotherham held in 1998. The review commended the Council on
its realistic strategic plans, its partnership with health, its good relations with users
and carers, and its culture of continuous improvement. It called for action in the
following areas:
a) Quality of response:
The standard of assessment and decision-making must be improved
Information about the supply and demand for services should be carefully
Agreement should be reached on specific thresholds to achieve the best
outcomes for children; and
b) Recording - Standards of recording should be made more consistent.

3.3 The Social Services Inspectorate (SSI) conducted an inspection of childrens
services in February 2003. It found a situation of extremes. It welcomed examples
of innovation, moves towards integrated services and new preventive strategies. The
Area Child Protection Committees procedures were up to date. However, core
services were under pressure and this was not fully appreciated by the Council.
There were serious lapses in initial response, child protection and looked after
children systems. Some services were in short supply, compounded by staff vacancy


3.4 Other findings included the following:
a) Quality of Response:
Referral and assessment teams were responding too slowly and
inappropriately to some child protection referrals
Initial and core assessments were not completed on time. They should draw
on information from other agencies and family history
Child protection conferences were often delayed
Many reports failed to assess the risks to children and their families
Urgent action by management was needed to ensure the safety and security
of children
Child protection plans and reviews were variable in quality and lacked a focus
on outcomes for the children;
b) Policy and Resources - The Council did not fully appreciate the severe pressures
under which core services were operating;
c) Management
Performance management, information systems and quality assurance
arrangements did not identify the lapses which were occurring
Individual casework and decision-making must be more carefully monitored
Management information was not routinely used to assess performance as
part of a performance management culture
Monitoring gave too little information about operational performance and the
achievement of key targets
Supervision was not tackling drift in planning and lack of procedural
The role of senior practitioners was not clear;
d) Training
Some frontline staff and interviewing officers were not sufficiently skilled to
cope with the complexity of referrals
More staff should attend training in equal opportunities, racial awareness,
complaints and customer care;
e) Recording
The structure of case files should be reviewed to promote effective work with
The inspection criticised many aspects of case-recording
The planning and management of investigations were not recorded as a
considered process; and
f) Openness, Equality


While there were examples of good inter-agency work, the Council was not
intervening early enough with other agencies to support families
There were examples of good work, but more should be done to seek the
families views of services
Parents were often given insufficient notice of case conferences. Reports
were not shared with them
A racial equality scheme had been published and an Ethnic Minorities
Development worker appointed. However, the quality of data on gender and
ethnicity was uneven
Services did not respond consistently to the cultural needs of minority ethnic
3.5 The inspectors had been informed that the Police were often reluctant to engage
jointly with the Council in investigations. In one instance, when Police had
investigated, the decision that the Crown Prosecution Service would not proceed with
criminal charges had taken nine months.

3.6 The Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) conducted a follow-up
inspection of childrens services in June 2004. The report declared that Rotherham
was heading in the right direction. Good progress had been made. The positive
findings were as follows:
a) Quality of response:
Responses to referrals were more effective and timely
Internal audits had improved systems, fewer cases were unallocated and
fewer children were on the register
Assessments and reviews were much improved
Policies and procedures had been updated
The front-desk service and the teams new structure were commended; and
b) Management
Strong senior leadership and an improvement team had been a catalyst for
There were plans for more co-located, multi-agency services
Progress on an integrated agenda would lead to improved services.
3.7 Findings that were more negative included:
a) Policy and Resources
Office accommodation for frontline staff should be improved


Childrens services needed a higher profile and additional funding to address
the agenda of change and development;
b) Management
Monitoring systems were not embedded, so that progress was not
While more managers were working to a high standard, some middle
managers were insufficiently aware of what was happening at the frontline.
They had a weak grip on the quality of practice
The creation of a multi-agency co-located service should be accelerated,
together with some restructuring;
c) Training
Some staff did not understand the new action plan and could not make the
changes to practice which were required
Some staff did not see the need for change and lacked capacity for it. Staff
needed training and support to make necessary changes
Staff needed training in the new computer systems;
d) Recording - The standard of recording should be improved; and
e) Openness, Equality - Along with other agencies, service-users should be better
consulted and involved in the development of services.
3.8 There was no mention of the sexual exploitation of children in the follow-up
inspection of June 2004, nor in any of the previous inspection reports of which the
Inquiry team has a copy.
3.9 The Annual Performance Assessment in December 2005 recommended that core
assessments be improved and that further efforts be made to agree threshold criteria
for children at risk.
3.10 A Joint Area Review took place in 2006. The report included a recommendation
that the timescales for core assessments be improved. It commended the effective
systems for sharing information about, and responding to children at risk of domestic
violence, sexual exploitation and substance abuse.... through the Risky Business
project. The JAR included the comment that children and young people appeared to
be safe from abuse and exploitation. As far as we know, this is the first mention of
CSE in an inspection report.
3.11 An inspection report on Rotherhams Youth Services of the same date included a
similar finding.


3.12 The Commission for Social Care Inspections Annual Performance Reviews in
2007 and 2008 reported that the Councils record in Delivering Outcomes was
Good; its Capacity for Improvement was Promising.
3.13 The reports required that the timescales for the completion of core assessments be
improved. They found that management oversight of looked-after children had not
ensured that they had been safeguarded.

3.14 Ofsted conducted an unannounced inspection of contact, referral and assessment
arrangements in August 2009. It found three areas for priority action:
a) Quality of response - The completion of social care assessments was deemed
particularly weak;
b) Policy and Resources - The wide range of work undertaken by locality social
workers undermined their capacity to safeguard vulnerable children; and
c) Management:
Performance management systems and auditing policies did not ensure that
managers could exercise their decision-making and supervisory
Information systems did not provide current and accurate information on
contacts, referrals, investigations, assessments and plans.
3.15 These three areas were of sufficient concern that the safety of children could not be
assured. In consequence, Rotherhams childrens services were rated poor.
3.16 On 16 December 2009, Dawn Primarolo MP, Minister of State for Young People and
Families, wrote to the Leader of the Council, serving an Improvement Notice on the
Council. Improvements were required in the timing, recording and quality of initial
and core assessments; in performance management, auditing, scrutiny and quality
assurance; in training and staff supervision; in the management of vacancy rates and
staff workloads.
3.17 Ofsted conducted an inspection of safeguarding and looked after children in July
3.18 Safeguarding services were deemed to be adequate in their overall effectiveness
and capacity for improvement. The partnership between childrens social care, the
Police and the voluntary sector was carrying out effective and creative work to
prevent sexual exploitation, with cross-agency training.


3.19 The report commended the following initiatives:
a) Policy and Resources:
The Maltby Linx Young Womens project which worked with those who might
be at risk of sexual exploitation
The Integrated Youth Support service where the lesbian, gay and bisexual
group could meet in a safe place and receive support
The Junction, commissioned by Barnardos, which was directed towards
those who might pose a sexual risk to other young people
The nursing service which was undertaking joint assessments in childrens
homes and promoting better understanding of sexual health and relationships;
b) Management - There was effective, creative multi-agency work to prevent sexual
exploitation, coordinated by officers from the Police and social care. Although
deemed to be no more than adequate, the partnership between childrens social
care, the Police and voluntary sector monitored children missing from care, from
home and school, and was alert to sexual exploitation, bullying and forced
3.20 Ofsted published its Annual Assessment of Rotherhams Childrens Services in
December 2010. The report acknowledged the work that had been done to bring
about the improvements which had been required by previous inspections:
a) Quality of Response - While more initial and full assessments were being carried
out on time, the quality of planning and reviews was inadequate, and there was
inconsistency in the practice of fieldwork teams;
b) Recording - The quality of recording was inadequate; and
c) Openness, Equality - The inspection of safeguarding had found good examples
of involving children in the design of services, but the views of the children were
not yet routinely heard at child protection conferences.

3.21 Rotherhams childrens services were removed from Government intervention in
January 2011.
3.22 Ofsted conducted an unannounced inspection of contact, referral and assessment in
May 2011.
a) Policy and Resources - The report noted the high level of referrals of domestic
violence that were made by the Police to childrens social care. This pressure
led to delays in screening them;
b) Management
Quality audits, case monitoring and performance assessment had improved


The multi-agency partnerships, co-located with social workers, had led to
more comprehensive assessments of need and risk
The regularity and quality of supervision were variable, sometimes poor;
c) Training - Newly qualified social workers did not have access to professional
development programmes; and
d) Openness, Equality - The views of young people were more often sought in
planning services for them.
3.23 Ofsteds Annual Childrens Services Assessment took place in November 2011.The
Council was commended for having invited a peer challenge team to review its
safeguarding services. (The peer challenge review is described later in this chapter).
These services were showing improvements. Other comments and
recommendations related solely to education services.

3.24 Ofsted conducted an inspection of Rotherhams arrangements for the protection of
children in July 2012. The findings were:
a) Quality of Response:
The overall effectiveness of the arrangements to protect children was
considered to be adequate
Information about missing children and children at risk of sexual exploitation
was being shared at an early stage and the work was well coordinated
There was good collaborative work between the local authority and the Police
resulting in a targeted approach to tackling sexual exploitation
The success of this approach was being strengthened by the commitment to
create a team of qualified social workers based within the Public Protection
The inspection called for child-focused risk assessments in cases of domestic
abuse and greater challenge of the safeguarding system;
b) Management - With specific reference to the sexual exploitation of children, the
report commended the specialist multi-agency team to support children at risk;
c) Openness, Equality - There should be careful evaluation of the feedback
received from children and parents subject to child protection.
3.25 The inspection found that the Local Safeguarding Children Board had become more
effective, having established multi-agency sub-groups protecting children at risk of
sexual exploitation. A recent serious case review had been considered to be
excellent by Ofsted. In order to provide a stronger challenge in key areas of child
protection, the Board planned to sharpen its priorities and commission multi-agency
case audits.


Other external reviews
3.26 In the rest of this chapter, we summarise the findings of external reviews, together
with the review conducted by the Independent Chair of the Safeguarding Board in
Children Firsts Rotherham Review of Childrens Services, 2009
3.27 The Borough Council and NHS Rotherham commissioned Children First to undertake
a review of Children and Young Peoples Services following the negative judgements
made in the 2008 Annual Performance Assessment letter. The Assessment had
shown deterioration in its overall rating of the services. The sexual exploitation of
children was not mentioned either in the Assessment letter or in the Children First
Review. In the latter, it was covered by the remit: To assess the effectiveness of
safeguarding arrangements to ensure that sound and safe practices were in place to
protect vulnerable children and young people.
3.28 The Review commended senior councillors and managers for their commitment to
achieving the best outcomes for children and young people, and it endorsed many of
the initiatives that the Council and partner agencies had taken in recent years. It
recalled the efforts which had been made to achieve truly integrated working with
partner agencies around the Change for Children agenda, and concluded that this
highly ambitious project had led to a loss of focus on the overall strategic aim and
the clarity of its message. It recommended that there be a review of the vision,
purpose, function and delivery of services to reflect local experience and national
3.29 In commending the current Action Plan, the Review drew attention to the excessive
number of teams and panels, which could lead to confusion and increased risk.
There was confusion about line management and accountability for outcomes; self-
evaluation and quality assurance lacked rigour and effective challenge; information
was not adequately monitored or used for performance improvement.
3.30 While supporting the move towards an integrated model of services, the Review
thought that the Borough could do more. Staff should be fully trained to understand
the models implications; procedures should be directed towards its effective
application; the relationship between central services and locality teams was
confused and should be clarified.
3.31 The Review expressed concern that childrens social care in Rotherham was
inadequately funded, not least its high-risk services. The very high rate of referrals
reflected the social conditions in many parts of the Borough, the chronic neglect, the
poor standards of child care, the level of domestic violence and drug abuse, all of
which had a direct impact on the welfare and safety of children.


Lessons learned review - Operation Central, 2010
3.32 The report was commissioned by the Local Safeguarding Children Board in April
2010 and submitted at the end of July 2010. It was carried out by Malcolm Stevens,
Justice Care Solutions. Its aim was to examine how individuals and agencies worked
together on CSE, and to make recommendations with a view to improving liaison and
identifying lessons to be learned.
3.33 Operation Central investigated alleged CSE offences committed against many girls
by males aged 20-29. Charges were brought in respect of four girls aged 12-16. At
the time of the review, a criminal trial was underway at the Crown Court, hence there
were some limitations on the evidence that could be used in the report. The
defendants were eight local men of Asian origin. Five were convicted.
3.34 The evidence suggested that CSE in Rotherham was extremely serious. The report
praised the Safeguarding Board for seeking to identify, adapt, adopt and improve.
The report relied on transcripts of interviews by the Police with victims, scrutiny of
inspections, reports and other records.
3.35 The Police were said in the review to have shown patience, care and empathy in
helping the girls relate their stories. The report described the grooming techniques
used towards the girls. It was clear that the offences under Operation Central
represented a small proportion of current CSE offences in the Borough. Any
connection between the offences and illicit substance abuse was said to be
peripheral and tenuous. There appeared to be no link with prostitution. Apart from
the gift of a mobile phone, victims received no reward or inducement. The report
deplored the BNPs campaign based on the Asian origin of the perpetrators.
3.36 Emma Jackson, a survivor, said that few practitioners understood what went on.
Risky Business was helpful and trustworthy.
They didnt listen to me...they must be trained to understand CSE better and
intervene earlier. There should be more people like Risky Business.
3.37 The review looked at one case (Child 3) in detail. Findings included:
a) Information from the school, social care, police and the youth service was not
submitted to the Strategy meetings;
b) key indicators were missed;
c) Strategy meetings recommendations were not acted upon;
d) the Youth Offending Team was always absent from Strategy meetings;
e) social care was inadequately represented; failings in consistency and seniority of
f) follow-up meetings were cancelled or postponed; too little priority was given to
the CSE concerns of Risky Business and the police PPU;


g) agencies did not know which others, if any, were involved in a case;
h) Child 3 was treated as a criminal; and
i) there was over reliance on Strategy meetings rather than effective case
management at locality level.
3.38 Risky Business was well thought of by young people. It was helpful to the Police. It
attended all Strategy meetings and had good working relations with the PPU and
Safer Neighbourhood Teams. Its location was unsuitable and its specialist computer
systems were not operational. The police PPU was well integrated within the CSE
networks and worked well with Risky Business and social care teams.
3.39 The report sought a greater role for Risky Business in ensuring that whatever actions
were necessary were actioned in a way acceptable to victims. A multi-agency team
should be built around Risky Business to specialise in tackling CSE (prevention,
protection, disruption, training, support, supervision). Still in the context of Risky
Business and the CSE team, the report talked of better co-ordination, management,
monitoring and intelligence, but this was not a recommendation for more resources.
It even suggested that Risky Business should pursue, support and co-ordinate
childrens entitlement to compensation.
3.40 In addition to the above, the report sought better support for, and protection of
witnesses at the Crown Court. Other recommendations related to:
a) Victims wishes to be obtained throughout the trial and afterwards;
b) Likewise, parents views should be obtained;
c) The function and conduct of Strategy meetings to be reviewed;
d) The Youth Offending Team should be more involved in CSE proceedings; and
e) Staff working directly with CSE cases to be offered counselling.
The Safeguarding Peer Challenge, 2011
3.41 This was organised by the Local Government Association in November 2011. Its
findings were:
a) Quality of Response - On safeguarding services, it called for a stronger focus on
outcomes for children, on the effectiveness of the services in making a difference
to childrens lives;
b) Management:
The report commended strong political and managerial leadership
Roles and responsibilities of the several Boards and Partnerships should be
clarified and their plans and expectations made more widely known;
c) Openness and Equality The report commended:
the level of partnership and joint working with the voluntary sector


a commitment to user engagement and the safeguarding of children.

Barnardos Rotherham Practice Review report, October 2013
3.42 In August 2013, Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council commissioned Barnardos
to undertake an initial high-level review of CSE services. The review covered the
effectiveness of inter-agency working; the current model of service delivery; the
training strategy; the sharing of information and the multi-agency risk assessment
model. The report commended agencies and Council members for their commitment
to addressing CSE and their plans to widen the inter-agency partnership to include
businesses, social landlords and local communities. It suggested further extension of
the partnership to include hotels and B&Bs, taxis and public transport, food outlets,
shopping centres, pubs and clubs.
3.43 The report drew attention to the severe pressures under which the CSE specialist
team was working. The team was still in the development phase. A named,
designated manager should be made responsible for the day-to-day work of the
team. Senior managers were making heavy demands relating to performance
management and data-collection, some of which did not relate to CSE. Management
of the team was made more difficult by the differing priorities of its constituent
members. At all levels, staff were feeling over-managed. There was additional
anxiety arising from recent media interest, the Home Affairs Select Committee and
the threat of inspection.
3.44 Further progress was recommended in the integration and training of professionals in
the identification and prevention of CSE, within the overall embrace of the
Safeguarding Board. Multi-agency working called for the removal of barriers that
were based on stereotypical viewpoints of police, health and social care.
Engagement with young people and their families required a different approach from
traditional policing and social work methods, and different operational processes.
3.45 The report noted that an inter-agency communications strategy was being devised. It
called for further improvements in the analysis of information relating to the victim,
the offender and the location; and for staff training to ensure that the system worked
effectively. The outreach work should be expanded to become more clearly targeted,
more assertive, and more directed towards early intervention. The report listed the
services in health and education that should contribute to this process. Through a
train the trainer approach, training should be extended to all faith groups and
communities including the business community.

Rotherham Local Safeguarding Children Board Review of the response to
child sexual exploitation in Rotherham December 2013
3.46 This report was compiled at the initiative of Steve Ashley who took up his
appointment as Independent Chair of the Board in September of that year. He was


assisted in the study by a small group of independent persons with wide experience
in this field. The terms of reference were to review the way in which members of the
Safeguarding Board co-operate together and contribute to the Boards work; the
effectiveness of their current plans; and the benchmarking of Rotherhams services
against national standards. The terms included the provision of proposals for the
governance of the Safeguarding Board in relation to child sexual exploitation (CSE)
and a review of progress made against the recommendations of earlier inspections
and reports.
3.47 The review gave an overview of the current arrangements. It was sensitive to the
great pressures to which the Borough Council had been subject in recent months and
the effect which these pressures had upon staff at all levels. It recognised the efforts
that had been made since 2010 to improve the response that the Council and its
partner agencies had made towards child sexual exploitation. It recorded the
determination that staff were showing towards the attainment of excellence in this
difficult work.
3.48 The report understood the reasons for the creation of a specialist multi-agency team
dealing with CSE, and it suggested that the team should, in time, become integrated
within the mainstream of childrens services.
3.49 The review put forward cogent arguments for the improved management of the multi-
agency CSE team. As the paper suggested, the CSE team had been set up in a
hurry at a time of considerable turmoil. A new management structure would
strengthen accountability and remove the ambiguities that existed in the present
3.50 The review team considered the governance structures to be difficult to understand.
This lack of comprehension extended to staff at all levels. The team also found
confusion about the roles and responsibilities of the several bodies functioning within
the system. There was a risk of overlap between the various groups and sub-groups,
leading to blurred accountability. The membership of some could be reduced with
3.51 The current action plan was deemed to be too complicated and lacking a clear focus
on outcomes for children. It should be a more workable document setting priorities
that were truly achievable. Again many staff did not appear to understand the plan or
its significance. Although the review did not state this explicitly, it implied that
preparation of the plan had been absorbing a disproportionate amount of
management time, more of which should have been devoted to ensuring high quality
work with children and families at the one-to-one level.
3.52 The review supported the absorption of Risky Business into the multi-disciplinary
safeguarding structure. It talked of Risky Business as having failed because of the
weight of expectations placed upon it. It recommended that the CSE team should


forge closer links with the Integrated Youth and Support Service (IYSS) to ensure
that the Prevent approach to the work be maintained and developed.

HMIC independent Assessment of South Yorkshire Polices Response to Child
Sexual Exploitation, 2013
3.53 In August 2013, the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) for South Yorkshire
Police asked Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabulary to provide an independent
assessment of the arrangements made by South Yorkshire Police to protect children
from sexual exploitation, and to make recommendations. The report dealt with
issues of leadership, strategies, structures, processes, training, intelligence and
innovation. It identified strengths and weaknesses under each heading, and listed
actions to be undertaken in the short, medium and longer terms.
3.54 The report found all staff to be conscientious, enthusiastic and focused on providing
good outcomes for the children with whom they work. More staff had been
dedicated to CSE. The force had improved its engagement with other agencies
working in this field and had co-operated with them in developing strategies for
preventing children becoming victims of CSE; for protecting those at risk; and for
supporting children in all situations. It had done good work in schools, particularly in
relation to internet safety. All 1700 frontline staff had received training in CSE work.
The report commended South Yorkshire Polices comprehensive action on the sexual
exploitation of children.
3.55 The PCC and the Chief Constable had stated that the protection of children from
sexual exploitation was a top priority for the force. The report found, however, that
this had not been translated into operational activity on the ground at local level.
Local resources were not fully supporting investigations of CSE. Many staff felt that
senior and middle managers were more focused on dealing with offences such as
burglary and vehicle crime. Since there were no operational targets for dealing with
CSE, it lost out to crimes that were governed by them. Many officers and staff were
confused about the messages that they received from senior leaders about CSE, to
the extent that they did not know who had overall responsibility for this aspect of their
work. Staff in the Public Protection and CSE units were working in crowded offices;
they were ill equipped and were struggling to manage their caseloads. In
Rotherham, these caseloads were deemed to be especially hard to manage.
3.56 The report called on South Yorkshire Police to improve the auditing and recording of
its response to CSE; to evaluate the effect of the changes which it was making,
especially in relation to its protective work; and to apply research and analysis to
support police work on CSE, together with improved monitoring of the internet for
evidence of it.



4. The scale of child sexual exploitation in Rotherham

No one knows the true scale of sexual exploitation in Rotherham over the years. Our
conservative estimate is that there were more than 1400 victims in the period covered
by the Inquiry, and an unknown number who were at risk of being exploited. Child
victims of sexual exploitation make up a tiny proportion of contacts and referrals to
childrens social care, but they constitute a very significant proportion of the children
at risk of serious injury and harm. Even in 2014, young people told us they would be
reluctant to come forward for help because they would feel ashamed or afraid. Many
more females than males have been identified as having been sexually exploited, and
there must be concern about under-reporting of exploitation of young males. Some
children are exposed to exploitation when they become looked after. And some
exploited children are used by perpetrators to gain access to looked after children. It
is a matter of particular concern when children are placed out of their home area.
This is a cross boundary issue that requires clear agreements between Councils in
the interest of safeguarding all looked after children.
The Scale of the Problem in Rotherham
4.1 Childrens social care introduced CSE as a category for referral in 2001. However,
many exploited children were wrongly categorised as being out of control. Prior to
January 2013, the Police did not have a separate category for CSE. Neither agency
had compiled reliable data that the Inquiry could use to estimate the scale of the
problem over time. There was good information about cases open to the CSE team
or co-worked by them, but information about other children being supported by
childrens social care was not easily obtained.
4.2 In the chart above we summarise what we were able to find out about caseloads and
contacts received by childrens social care. The data must be treated with caution.
The figures were not collected or presented in a systematic way from year to year.
Nevertheless, the chart gives a broad indication of the scale of the problem as
reflected in childrens social care records.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Reported activity on CSE cases (Children's social care)
Estimated caseload Contacts


4.3 The Inquiry was given a list of 988 children known to childrens social care, or the
Police. 51 were current cases and 937 historic. We read 66 case files in total.
4.4 We took a randomised sample of 19 current and 19 historic cases. In 95% of the
files sampled, there was clear evidence that the child had been a victim of sexual
exploitation. Only two children (5%) were at risk of being exploited rather than
victims. From the random samples, we concluded that it was very probable that a
high proportion of the 988 children were victims.
4.5 A further 28 case files were read. 22 were historic cases sampled from lists of
suspected victims in police operations, including Central, Czar and Chard. Three
were current cases brought to our attention during the course of the Inquiry, and
three were historic cases of children who had been highlighted by national media. All
28 children were victims of sexual exploitation.
4.6 To help reach an overall estimate of the problem, we used reports to the Local
Safeguarding Children Board (formerly the ACPC) and Council committees. We
examined minutes of the Sexual Exploitation Forum and minutes of independently
chaired Strategy meetings where individual children were discussed. These included
inter-agency discussions about hundreds of children who had suffered, or were at
serious risk of sexual exploitation. We also had access to lists, and sometimes
summary descriptions, of many hundreds of children who were supported by Risky
Business, individually or in group sessions.
4.7 Taking all these sources together, the Inquiry concluded that at least 1400 children
were sexually exploited between 1997 and 2013. This is likely to be a conservative
estimate of the true scale of the problem. We are unable to assess the numbers of
other children who may have been at risk of exploitation, or those who were exploited
but not known to any agency. This includes some who were forced to witness other
children being assaulted and abused.
4.8 During the Inquiry, senior managers in childrens social care commented to us that
CSE comprises a very small proportion of the total contacts/referrals to childrens
social care just over 2%. One manager was reported in a recent minute of the
Child Sexual Exploitation sub-group as saying that agencies need to retain a sense
of proportionality with regard to child sexual exploitation, as it only actually accounts
for 2.3% of the Councils safeguarding work in Rotherham. Although it is a very
important issue, child neglect is a much more significant problem. This is not an
appropriate message for senior managers to give. We fully support the view
expressed by police officers responsible for CSE in Rotherham It may be 2% of
referrals but these children are a high proportion of the children most at risk of
serious injury and harm.
4.9 In 2013, South Yorkshire Police received 157 reports concerning child sexual


exploitation in Rotherham. Police activity
since 2012 was as follows:
Prosecutions Cautions No further
action (CPS)

No further
action (D.I)

2012 8 0 0 2 7
2013 9 2 0 7 17
1 0 0 0 6
4.10 Child sexual exploitation became the focus of attention in Rotherham in the late
1990s, when the Risky Business project was established. Several experienced
workers told us that they had come across examples of child sexual exploitation from
the early mid 1990s onward, and there was awareness at that time that looked after
children in local residential units were at risk of being targeted.
4.11 At the time of the Inquiry there was no standardised reporting of child sexual
exploitation that would allow reliable judgements about whether child sexual
exploitation was more or less prevalent in Rotherham than in other parts of the
country and the very nature of the problem means that accurate reporting will
continue to be a challenge. It seems likely that the existence of the Risky Business
project, its ability to attract referrals directly from children and parents affected by
sexual exploitation, and the attention given to child sexual exploitation at a multi-
agency level over the years meant that the problem would have been more visible in
Rotherham than in some other parts of the country.
4.12 Many of the young people we met knew victims of CSE, either family members or
young people they knew from school. They gave examples of children being bullied
and ostracised at school because they were involved in sexual exploitation, and also
knew children who became looked after and were placed far away from Rotherham.
They told us that children would be reluctant to seek help because they would be
ashamed and also afraid that they would be placed out of the area far away from
their families and friends. One young person told us that gang rape was a usual
part of growing up in the area of Rotherham in which she lived.
Risk Factors
4.13 Risk factors for CSE are increasingly well understood. The majority of children whose
files we read had multiple reported missing episodes. Addiction and mental health
emerged as common themes in the files. Almost 50% of children who were sexually
exploited or at risk had misused alcohol or other substances (this was typically part of

The figures do not include offences against Rotherham children who were trafficked to other areas; these are
recorded in the area where the offence took place
Decision taken by Crown Prosecution Service
Decision taken by Detective Inspector, South Yorkshire Police
2014 figures are for Quarter 1 only.


the grooming process), a third had mental health problems (again, often as a result of
abuse) and two thirds had emotional health difficulties. There were issues of
parental addiction in 20% of cases and parental mental health issues in over a third
of cases. Barriers to accessing specialist counselling and/or mental health services
for children and young people were a recurrent theme. This was a feature in current
as well as historic cases.
4.14 In just over a third of cases, children affected by sexual exploitation were previously
known to services because of child protection and child neglect. There was a history
of domestic violence in 46% of cases. Truancy and school refusal were recorded in
63% of cases and 63% of children had been reported missing more than once.
4.15 We cover looked after children in Chapter 6.
4.16 Generally, there has been relatively low reporting of sexual exploitation of young
males, with the exception of the police operation and a criminal conviction in 2007 of
an offender who abused over 80 boys and young men. Over the years, this was
identified at inter-agency meetings and in CSE plans as an issue that required
attention in Rotherham. That continues to be the case today.
4.17 Six of the CSE teams caseload at May 2014 were male, and 45 female.
4.18 We read the files of ten boys who were groomed and abused by the lone male
prosecuted and sentenced in 2007, and a further seven files of boys/young men who
were his alleged victims. Following the trial, childrens social care considered only
two of the ten victims to meet the threshold for social care, although many had been
raped and at least one was suspected of being involved in abusing other child
victims. So far as we could ascertain from the files, none of these children was
referred to Risky Business, and only one was referred for specialist counselling,
where there was a long waiting list. One of the children who failed to meet the
threshold for social care went on to become a serious sex offender, convicted of the
abduction and rape of young girls.
4.19 The Inquiry team did a detailed analysis of four cases involving young boys. We
reviewed one young teenager with the specialist team from the National Working
Group Network. Several issues emerged from the latter case, including:
a) the importance of making sure that judgments about child sexual exploitation are
consistent and gender neutral, for example by asking if the same level of risk
would be acceptable if the child was the opposite gender;
b) supporting children to explore their sexuality in safe ways, including building links
and referral pathways to local LGBT projects that could provide appropriate
information and advice; and


c) understanding the extreme danger children could put themselves in when they
made contact with predatory adults because they did not know where else to find
out about their sexuality. This needed to be better reflected in risk assessments.



5. The children who were victims of sexual exploitation.

The impact of sexual exploitation on the lives of young victims has been absolutely
devastating, not just when they were being abused, but for many years afterwards.
Here we describe how the lives of these children were affected by the trauma they

5.1 The primary source of evidence for this chapter derives from 66 case files read by
the Inquiry team. This was checked against minuted case discussions, letters from
and interviews with parents, and a small number of interviews with young people who
had been sexually exploited.
5.2 Meetings of the Sexual Exploitation Forum discussed individual children, as did
independently chaired case conferences and Strategy meetings. Their minutes were
often detailed, and covered many hundreds of children, and a significant number of
suspected perpetrators. These were inter-agency meetings where information and
assessments were validated or contested by professionals from the different
organisations. The Inquiry team has also checked its evidence against the findings
in other reports, notably those in the 'Home Office report' summarised in chapter
10. No contrary evidence was found in any of these sources.
5.3 The Inquiry team concluded that the case files and the other sources described
above contained accurate information about the experiences of the child victims.
5.4 The cases described in this chapter are very typical of many of the files we read and
were chosen to give a fair reflection of what many victims experienced. They include
some, but by no means all, of the most serious cases we read. All of the children
described in this section were under the age of 16 when they were first abused.
Every effort has been made to protect the identity of the victims and minor details
have been omitted or altered where necessary. Quotes throughout this chapter are
taken directly from what children and their parents said or wrote.
5.5 In this part of the report, we have not specified the ethnicity of the victims or the
perpetrators. In a large number of the historic cases in particular, most of the victims
in the cases we sampled were white British children, and the majority of the
perpetrators were from minority ethnic communities. They were described
generically in the files as Asian males without precise reference being made to their
Experiences of Exploited Children
5.6 It is difficult to describe the appalling nature of the abuse that the victims of sexual
exploitation in Rotherham have endured over the years. Victims were raped by
multiple perpetrators, trafficked to other towns and cities in the North of England,
5.7 abducted, beaten and intimidated. Some of their experiences were described in


national media reports. We read three case files that had been covered by the media,
and considered the reporting to be accurate.
5.8 We read cases where a child was doused in petrol and threatened with being set
alight, children who were threatened with guns, children who witnessed brutally
violent rapes and were threatened that they would be the next victim if they told
anyone. Girls as young as 11 were raped by large numbers of male perpetrators,
one after the other.
Whats the point I might as well be dead.
5.9 In two of the cases we read, fathers tracked down their daughters and tried to
remove them from houses where they were being abused, only to be arrested
themselves when police were called to the scene. In a small number of cases (which
have already received media attention) the victims were arrested for offences such
as breach of the peace or being drunk and disorderly, with no action taken against
the perpetrators of rape and sexual assault against children.
5.10 There are numerous historic examples (up to the mid-2000s) of children being
stalked by their abusers, and some extreme cases of violent threats or actual
assaults on the victims and their families.
5.11 One parent, who agreed to her child being placed in a residential unit in order to
protect her, wrote to childrens social care expressing her fears for her daughters
safety. She described her despair that instead of being protected, her child was
being exposed to even worse abuse than when she was at home:
My child (age 13) may appear to be a mature child, yet some of her actions
and the risks to which she constantly puts herself are those of a very immature
and nave person. She constantly stays out all night getting drunk, mixing with
older mature adults, and refuses to be bound by any rules.
5.12 One child who was being prepared to give evidence received a text saying the
perpetrator had her younger sister and the choice of what happened next was up to
her. She withdrew her statements. At least two other families were terrorised by
groups of perpetrators, sitting in cars outside the family home, smashing windows,
making abusive and threatening phone calls. On some occasions child victims went
back to perpetrators in the belief that this was the only way their parents and other
children in the family would be safe. In the most extreme cases, no one in the family
believed that the authorities could protect them.
5.13 Many of the victims were unable to recognise that they had been groomed and
exploited, and some blamed themselves not just for their own abuse, but for what
happened to other victims.
5.14 There have been a small number of successful prosecutions for offences against
individual children. The courage required of children to give evidence against their
attackers has been rightly commended, but the challenges cannot be


underestimated. Many other children refused to give evidence and/or withdrew
statements as a direct result of threats, intimidation and assaults against them or
their families. Overall, the small number of prosecutions and convictions has been
disproportionate to the numbers of children abused and the seriousness of the
offences committed against them.
5.15 The process of grooming has been well documented in national reports and
research. Many of the cases we examined showed classic evidence of grooming.
Many of the children were already vulnerable when grooming began. The
perpetrators targeted childrens residential units and residential services for care
leavers. It was not unusual for children in residential services and schools to
introduce other children to the perpetrators.
I know he really loves me (about a perpetrator convicted of
very serious offences against other children)
5.16 Many of the case files we read described children who had troubled family
backgrounds, with a history of domestic violence, parental addiction, and in some
cases serious mental health problems. A significant number of the victims had a
history of child neglect and/or sexual abuse when they were younger. Some had a
desperate need for attention and affection.
He may have other girlfriends but I am special
5.17 Schools raised the alert over the years about children as young as 11, 12 and 13
being picked up outside schools by cars and taxis, given presents and mobile phones
and taken to meet large numbers of unknown males in Rotherham, other local towns
and cities, and further afield. Typically, children were courted by a young man whom
they believed to be their boyfriend. Over a period of time, the child would be
introduced to older men who cultivated them and supplied them with gifts, free
alcohol and sometimes drugs. Children were initially flattered by the attention paid to
them, and impressed by the apparent wealth and sophistication of those grooming
Boys gave me drink and drugs for free I was driven around in fast cars.
5.18 Many were utterly convinced that they were special in the affections of a perpetrator,
despite all the evidence that many other children were being groomed and abused by
the same person. Some of the victims were never able to accept that they had been
groomed and abused by one or more sexual predators. A key objective of the
perpetrators was to isolate victims from family and friends as part of the grooming
5.19 Over time, methods of grooming have changed as mobile technology has advanced.


Mobile phones, social networking sites and mobile apps have become common ways
of identifying and targeting vulnerable children and young people and we heard
concerns from local agencies in Rotherham that much younger children were being
targeted in this way. A number of the recent case files we read demonstrated that by
unguarded use of text and video messaging and social networking sites, children had
unwittingly placed themselves in a position where they could be targeted, sometimes
in a matter of days or hours, by sexual predators from all over the world. In a small
number of cases, this led to direct physical contact, rape and sexual abuse with one
or more perpetrators. The comment was made that grooming could move from
online to personal contact very quickly indeed. One of the most worrying features is
the ease with which young children aged from about 8-10 years can be targeted and
exploited in this way without their families being aware of the dangers associated
with internet use.
5.20 Several social work practitioners told us that they were aware of the problem of the
sexual exploitation of children in Rotherham from the early to mid-1990s, although it
was not well recognised or understood and was often described as child prostitution.
By the late 1990s, Rotherham was one of a relatively small number of places where
the problem was being addressed. In 2000, Risky Business delivered training on the
sexual exploitation of children to many local agencies, and there was a growing
awareness of the seriousness of the problem locally and the numbers of children and
young people affected.
5.21 Child A (2000)
was 12 when the risk of sexual exploitation became known. She
was associating with a group of older Asian men and possibly taking drugs. She
disclosed having had intercourse with 5 adults. Two of the adults received police
cautions after admitting to the Police that they had intercourse with Child A. Child A
continued to go missing and was at high risk of sexual exploitation. A child protection
case conference was held. It was agreed by all at the conference that Child A should
be registered. However, the CID representative argued against the category of
sexual abuse being used because he thought that Child A had been 100%
consensual in every incident. This was overruled, with all others at the case
conference demonstrating a clear understanding that this was a crime and a young
child was not capable of consenting to the abuse she had suffered. She was
supported appropriately once she was placed on the child protection register.
5.22 Child B (2001) was referred to Risky Business by her school when she was 15 years
old. By that time, she had been groomed by an older man involved in the exploitation
of other children. Child B loved this man and believed he loved her. He trafficked
her to Leeds, Bradford and Sheffield and offered to provide her with a flat in one of
those cities. A child protection referral was made but the social care case file
recorded no response to this. The case was discussed at regular Key Players

The year in brackets is the year is when sexual exploitation is first known to have occurred, or when the risk of
exploitation was identified.


meetings (no records of these meetings have survived). Within just a few months,
Child B and her family were living in fear of their lives. The windows in their house
were put in. She and her family received threats that she would be forced into
prostitution. Child B was assaulted by other victims at the instigation of the
perpetrator. An attack on her older sibling by associates of the perpetrator resulted in
him being hospitalised with serious injuries. Child B also required hospital treatment
for injuries she sustained. A younger child in the family was threatened and had to go
into hiding so that the perpetrators could not carry out threats against her. Child B
and her mother refused to have anything more to do with the Police, because they
believed the Police could do nothing to protect them. Child B had been stalked and
had petrol poured over her and was threatened with being set alight. She took
overdoses. She and her family were too terrified to make statements to the Police.
By the time Child B was 18, her family situation had broken down and she was
homeless. She referred herself to childrens social care, and was given advice about
benefits. No further action was taken. This child and her family were completely
failed by all services with the exception of Risky Business.
5.23 Child C (2002) was 14 when sexual exploitation was identified. She was referred
several times to childrens social care between 2002 and 2004 because of family
breakdown. She was described as being out of control. Her mother voiced her
concerns about Child C being sexually active, going missing and repeated incidents
of severe intoxication when she had been plied with drink by older males. Several
initial assessments were carried out and some family support was offered. The case
was then closed. The social workers assessment was that Child Cs mother was not
able to accept her growing up. In fact, she was displaying what are now known to be
classic indicators of child sexual exploitation from the age of 11. By the age of 13,
she was at risk from violent perpetrators, associating with other victims of sexual
exploitation, misusing drugs, and at high risk. She was referred to Risky Business
whose staff identified these risk factors and addressed them through a planned
programme of preventive work.
5.24 Child D (2003) was 13 when she was groomed by a violent sexual predator who
raped and trafficked her. Her parents, Risky Business and Child D herself all
understood the seriousness of the abuse, violence and intimidation she suffered.
Police and childrens social care were ineffective and seemed to blame the child. A
core assessment was done but could not be traced on the file. An initial assessment
accurately described the risks to Child D but appeared to blame her for placing
herself at risk of sexual exploitation and danger. Other than Risky Business,
agencies showed no comprehension that she had been groomed at 13, that she was
terrified of the perpetrators, and that her attempts to placate them were themselves a
symptom of the serious emotional harm that CSE had caused her. Risky Business
worked very hard with Child D and her parents. None of the other agencies
intervened effectively to protect her, and she and her parents understandably had no
confidence in them.


5.25 Child E (2004) became a looked after child when she was aged 12. She had an
abusive family background and her parents had mental health problems. She
became a victim of child sexual exploitation while she was looked after in a local
childrens unit. Her looked after file could not be traced, although minutes from
looked after reviews were accessed on the Risky Business file. Child E was
described as very nave, and desperate for affection. She was very vulnerable to
coercion and was sexually exploited when a looked after child by adult males she
thought were her boyfriends. Notes from the childrens unit files at the time suggest
there was a level of chaos surrounding the care of Child E and other children in the
unit, with staff powerless as older children in the residential units introduced younger
and more vulnerable children like Child E to predatory adult males who were
targeting childrens homes.
5.26 Whilst looked after, she was prematurely moved into semi-independent
accommodation, where she became even more at risk of harm. She was then
admitted to a residential adolescent mental health unit after she suffered a psychotic
episode. There is evidence on the file that at that point every effort was made by
social care staff to support her and find a suitable care placement. She was found a
specialist foster placement at the age of 16, and benefited from a supportive and
caring environment. Whilst there was some evidence of positive outcomes when she
was 16, the longer term outcomes for this child are not known.
5.27 Child F (2006) was a victim of serious sexual abuse when she was a young child.
She was groomed for sexual exploitation by a 27-year-old male when she was 13.
She was subjected to repeated rapes and sexual assaults by different perpetrators,
none of whom were brought to justice. She repeatedly threatened to kill herself and
numerous instances of serious self-harm were recorded in the case file, including
serious overdoses and trying to throw herself in front of cars. Social workers worked
to protect Child F after she was referred by the Police. There was good cooperation
between childrens social care services, the Police, Risky Business and acute
hospital services, where doctors were seriously concerned about her because of the
number and seriousness of hospital admissions over such a short time, many
associated with serious drug misuse and self-harm. There was evidence in the file of
social workers, frontline managers and Risky Business workers doing everything
possible to help Child F. She was eventually placed in secure care, where she
stayed for several months. During this time she was kept safe and a process of
therapeutic intervention began.
5.28 Child F was supported to return home, but because her family moved out of the area,
we do not know what the outcomes were for her.
5.29 Child G (2007) went missing twice in quick succession when she was 14. Referrals
were made by the Police to childrens social care but these were not followed up.
She was then groomed and raped by a predatory male who was later convicted and
sentenced. There was serious concern that she was at risk of suicide around the


time of her rape and the subsequent court case. The case was kept open during
criminal proceedings, but closed thereafter with no record of the outcomes for Child
G, who was then 16 years old.
5.30 Child H (2008) was 11 years old when she came to the attention of the Police. She
disclosed that she and another child had been sexually assaulted by adult males.
When she was 12, she was found drunk in the back of a car with a suspected CSE
perpetrator, who had indecent photos of her on his phone. Risky Business became
involved and the Locality Team did an initial assessment and closed the case. Her
father provided Risky Business with all the information he had been able to obtain
about the details of how and where his daughter had been exploited and abused, and
who the perpetrators were. This information was passed on to the authorities.
Around this time, there were further concerns about her being a victim of sexual
exploitation. She was identified as one of a group of nine children associating with a
suspected CSE perpetrator. Her case had not been allocated by childrens social
care. The Chair of the Strategy meeting expressed concern about her and
considered she needed a child protection case conference. This does not appear to
have been held. Three months later, the social care manager recorded on the file
that Child H had been assessed as at no risk of sexual exploitation, and the case
was closed. Less than a month later, she was found in a derelict house with another
child, and a number of adult males. She was arrested for being drunk and disorderly
(her conviction was later set aside) and none of the males were arrested. Child H
was at this point identified as being at high risk of CSE. Risky Business, social care
workers and the Police worked to support Child H and her father and she was looked
after for a period. She suffered a miscarriage while with foster carers. Her family
moved out of the area and Child H returned home. Some of the perpetrators were
subsequently convicted.
5.31 Child I (2009) was 11 years old when she was raped and sexually assaulted. Her
attacker was convicted. Her older sister was a victim of CSE. Child I regularly went
missing and was subjected to rape and sexual assaults by older males. She became
a looked after child because of concerns for her safety. She was further abused and
exploited while she was looked after. She was placed out-of-area and repeatedly
went missing, trying to get back to Rotherham. This made her even more vulnerable
and she was repeatedly abused. She suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, self-
harmed and at times became suicidal. Child I continues to be supported but despite
the best efforts of childrens social care services, the trauma she has suffered has
resulted in lasting emotional and psychological damage.
5.32 Child J (2009) had a long history of neglect and child protection. She was 11 years
old when she was identified as being at risk of sexual exploitation as well as sexual
abuse within her family. Her older sister was a victim of sexual exploitation and the
perpetrators were successfully prosecuted. Key information about Child J is missing
from the electronic social care file. When she was 14 years old it was suspected she
was visiting the homes of adult male strangers and possibly coercing other children


to accompany her. A Strategy meeting chairperson clearly identified action that
needed to be taken to protect Child J. There is no evidence on the file that
appropriate action was taken. There was virtually nothing recorded on the file about
the risks she faced, despite information being held elsewhere in childrens social care
that she was accompanying her older sister to high-risk situations where she was
exposed to exploitation by adult males.
5.33 Child K (2011) was groomed by a known sex offender via Facebook when she was
13. Around that time, she required treatment at Accident and Emergency when she
was taken there in an extremely intoxicated state. Since then, there has been a
pattern of high-risk behaviour, with Child K having older boyfriends who are
vulnerable. She frequents known hotspots with other young people at risk. She has
been missing with other children although her parents do not report this and do not
know where she is. Child K is very resistant to accepting help from the CSE team
who tried hard to engage with her and her family and to offer support to prevent
further sexual exploitation.
5.34 Children L and M (2012) were two young people from a minority ethnic community.
They were part of a group of children who were at risk of sexual exploitation,
investigated by the Police as part of Operation Carrington. A number of children at
the same school were reported to be getting into cars with strangers, and getting paid
in return for performing sex acts. Child L and Child M had frequent missing episodes
and their families struggled to report them missing. This was partly because of
language difficulties, but also because of cultural factors. The two children were at
high risk of exploitation. The CSE team worked hard to engage with these young
people and their families, to communicate the risks of sexual exploitation and provide
them with education through group work and on a one to one basis. These two
cases highlight the extreme difficulty of supporting children and their families when
there are major language and cultural barriers, as a result of which neither the child
nor parent is willing to disclose what is happening. The Police and social care
workers in the CSE team were acutely aware of these difficulties and worked hard to
overcome them.
5.35 Child N (2013) was 12 when extremely indecent images of her were discovered on
the phones of fellow students. There were suspicions that older men and one
woman had groomed her via Facebook. Her family were very shocked by photos
and video images that had been taken of her, and have co-operated fully with the
Police and the support offered by the CSE team. Child N was very angry at the
agencies trying to help her. She showed no understanding of the risks of online
contact with strangers and was not willing to disclose anything about those who have
groomed and exploited her.
5.36 Child O (2013) was 13 when concerns about sexual exploitation emerged. She was
wandering around Rotherham late at night, often in the company of an older girl who
was a known victim of sexual exploitation. She was found in Sheffield on one


occasion. She was often angry and violent towards family members, and they did
not seem able to protect her. She was very active on social media sites and had
acquired many adult associates whom she perceived to be her friends. She posted
information online about a video she had seen of another child being sexually
assaulted. The suspected perpetrator made contact with her and threatened if she
said anything she would be the next victim. She was beaten up but neither she nor
her parents were willing to disclose this to the Police. The risks to Child O were
understood and documented by the CSE team, and a programme of preventive work
was put in place. Nevertheless, Child O remained secretive about where she was
when missing and whom she associated with. She continued to be at risk of
5.37 It is important to emphasise that even when agencies intervened appropriately to
protect and support children and young people, the impact sexual exploitation had on
them was absolutely devastating. Time and again we read in the files and other
documents of children being violently raped, beaten, forced to perform sex acts in
taxis and cars when they were being trafficked between towns, and serially abused
by large numbers of men. Many children repeatedly self-harmed and some became
suicidal. They suffered family breakdown and some became homeless. Several
years after they had been abused, a disproportionate number were victims of
domestic violence, had developed long-standing drug and alcohol addiction, and had
parenting difficulties with their own children, resulting in child protection/children in
need interventions. Some suffered post-traumatic stress and other emotional and
psychological problems, often undiagnosed and untreated. Some experienced
mental health problems.
5.38 With a very small number of exceptions, there was little or no specialist counselling
or appropriate mental health intervention offered to child victims, despite their acute
distress. In those cases where psychological or psychiatric assessments were
carried out, children were diagnosed as suffering severe post-traumatic stress.
Specialist assessments also identified that where a child had on-going contact with a
perpetrator, this was likely to be a direct result of the psychological damage that had
been inflicted, rather than something the victim could control.
5.39 In a number of the cases we read, children and young people had pregnancies,
miscarriages and terminations. Some had children removed under care orders and
suffered further trauma when contact with their child was terminated and alternative
family placements found. This affected not just the victims themselves, but other
siblings who had developed attachments to the baby. However, there were other
cases where vulnerable and sometimes very young mothers were able, with
appropriate long-term support, to recover and successfully care for their children.
5.40 For the victims of sexual exploitation the judgment of outcomes therefore has to be


qualified by recognition of what they have endured and the lasting harm this is likely
to have caused to most of them.
5.41 For the reasons given above, there are very few good outcomes to be found in the
files for the victims of sexual exploitation, even when the quality of intervention was
good. This was true in some of the current open cases.


6. Children and Young Peoples Services

There was evidence of a good level of engagement with individual children, both by
the Risky Business project and more recently by members of the CSE team. Children
and their parents were consulted and kept informed. There was very good access to
the services provided by Risky Business over many years through the outreach
nature of their work. With the integration of the project into the CSE team, the
capacity to provide open access was diminished. Several people expressed regret
about this to the Inquiry.

Thresholds for social care had in the past been unacceptably high. While this had
improved through the efforts of the co-located CSE team, there are currently
insufficient resources in the team to meet all the demands made on it, and the team is
unable to provide enough preventive input to sustain children after they have been

Risky Business made referrals to childrens social care but in the early years, the
response in terms of assessments, risk assessments and safeguarding was rarely
good enough. At that time, there was a lack of clarity in inter-agency meetings that
discussed individual children alongside more strategic issues, with no clear direction
provided by senior managers.

In the historic cases, assessment and care planning by childrens social care tended
to be more systematic and of a higher standard for looked after children than for
other children.

The quality of response by childrens social care is better now than it was in the past
in relation to assessment and care planning. However, there are weaknesses in risk
assessment and risk management, which need to be addressed with some urgency.

Many of the current sexual exploitation cases are complex and time consuming, with
the risk of staff resources becoming overstretched. Preventive work with children
after incidents of exploitation is being squeezed. There has been a rise in online
grooming and exploitation and this is placing new and challenging demands on

In the past, local residential units were targeted by perpetrators of sexual exploitation
and were overwhelmed by the problem. Some children placed out-of-area for their
own protection were failed by services. High priority should be given to adopting a
more strategic approach to out of authority placements, and improving the quality of
response to this group.

There are some excellent services in Rotherham including the Bridges project for
care leavers, the Rowan Centre for school age mothers and a range of youth work
services, although the latter had been reduced as a result of financial cutbacks.

Even today, there is little, if any, post-abuse counselling and support for victims. This
is a major gap, given the long-term damage caused by sexual exploitation.


Engagement with Children and Young People

6.1 There was evidence of agencies engaging positively with children and young people,
both historically through the Risky Business project and currently through the CSE
team. In 81% of the cases we scrutinised, children were seen on their own at key
stages of assessment, care planning and delivery and they (or their parents) were
consulted and kept informed. There was evidence of services actively seeking to
take the childs view into account in 79% of cases.
6.2 Childrens social care used a child friendly workbook entitled Relationships and
Staying Safe to help children and their workers to discuss some of the complex
issues around relationships and child sexual exploitation. This was originally
developed by the Risky Business project, and completed workbooks were in some of
the files we read. This was an excellent and practical example of engagement with
children to help them understand risks and keep themselves safe.
Access to Services
6.3 Access to Risky Business services over the years appeared in the main to have been
good. The project received referrals from the Police, childrens social care, schools
and health workers. Parents and their children also self-referred to the project. For
example, over the 18 month period January 2004June 2005, 35% of Risky Business
referrals were from childrens social care, 20% were self-referrals or referrals by
parents, 9% were from the Police and 7% were from schools. This fluctuated from
year to year. Sometimes the Police were the main source of referrals, and at other
times, schools.
6.4 Historically, access to childrens social care was much more problematic. In part, this
was because Risky Business was viewed as the main service for children who were
being sexually exploited, with the result that children and young people were often
signposted to Risky Business at the stage of initial contact, rather than being routed
through Strategy meetings and S47
6.5 Inspection reports described how over many years, childrens social care services
were typically understaffed and overstretched, and struggling to cope with demand.
6.6 There was evidence in many files that prior to 2007, child victims from around the
age of eleven upwards were not seen to be the priority for childrens social care,
even when they were being sexually abused and exploited. The emphasis on
protection of very young children to the exclusion of CSE victims has been identified
in other reports
as a national trend rather than a Rotherham specific issue.

Percentages given throughout this chapter are for all files read. Figures for current files are given in brackets
where these are noticeably different.
Section 47 of the Children Act 1989 places a duty on LAs to investigate and make inquiries into the
circumstances of children considered to be at risk of significant harm and, where these inquiries indicate the
need, to decide what action, if any, it may need to take to safeguard and promote the childs welfare.
E.g. Rochdale serious case reviews


Nevertheless, this lack of priority resulted in many Rotherham children failing to get
the help and protection they needed.
6.7 The outreach nature of the Risky Business project meant that sexual exploitation was
visible as a problem in Rotherham from the late 1990s. The CSE team has some
capacity to provide outreach, and this is of a high standard. Members of the team
confirmed that at the present time there is no pro-active service that is accessible
and has the capacity to reach out to children who are being exploited but are not yet
in contact with services.
6.8 We were told by the Executive Director of Strategic Services that the Integrated
Youth Support Service provided outreach support to vulnerable young people who
have been exploited or are at risk of CSE. However, youth workers told us that
preventive work they had previously carried out with vulnerable groups of female and
male teenagers, including those from minority ethnic communities, was no longer
offered because of cutbacks. Work was in progress for IYSS to have a greater
involvement with the CSE team in order to improve access to sexual health services.
6.9 The Inquiry concluded that an important dimension of the services offered in the past
by Risky Business had been reduced or possibly lost. Accessibility is one of the key
elements in reaching out to children who are sexually exploited or being groomed,
and this needs to be done in ways that young people will engage with and trust.
Every effort should be made to increase this capacity, building on the work currently
done by youth workers and the GROW
worker in the CSE team. This is important
because sexual exploitation by its very nature tends to be a hidden problem.
Assessment and Care Planning
6.10 Over the years, assessment and care planning attracted negative comment in many
of the inspections of Rotherham childrens social care.
6.11 The figures given in this chapter cover historic social care files, Risky Business files
and cases currently open to childrens social care. We comment on the current
position where it differs significantly from the overall.
6.12 Many of the Risky Business files we read demonstrated a good level of care
planning, with written goals and progress towards them recorded in a systematic
way. The figures and ratings given in this chapter cover Risky Business and social
care historic files, taken together. Without the Risky Business files, the ratings given
below would have been poorer.
6.13 Historically and at the present time, assessment and care planning was systematic if

GROW (Women Making Informed Choices) is a local voluntary organisation. Its INVOLVE project is focused
on CSE. It employs a worker who is based in the joint CSE team. The GROW worker provides one-to-one
emotional and practical support, helps to enable and support disclosures of CSE, and offers further support
during investigations and prosecutions.


a child was looked after. In historic cases, the quality of assessment and care
planning for looked after children was markedly better than for other children, where
assessments were often weak, unsatisfactory or missing from the files. It was
commonplace to find no care plan if children were not looked after or subject to child
protection procedures. Chronologies were evident only as part of the preparation for
court proceedings.
6.14 There was evidence of improved practice in assessment and care planning in the
open cases in our sample.
6.15 There was a chronology in fewer than half the cases (43%) where it would have been
appropriate to have one and most chronologies were out of date, with significant
gaps. It is likely that the absence of structured chronologies contributed to key
information being missed when decisions were made.
6.16 There was an assessment on file in 73% of cases (n=44)
. The timing of the most
recent assessment was in keeping with the needs of the child in over 71% (n=34) of
cases. There was an assessment on file in all of the 23 currently open cases that we
6.17 The overall quality of assessments was good or very good in 63% of all cases,
adequate in 23% and weak or unsatisfactory in 14%. The quality of assessments in
open cases was good or very good in 76% of cases and adequate in the remaining
6.18 There was a care plan on file in 63% of cases (n=40), 80% for open cases. There
was evidence that the services and care received by the young person followed the
content of the care plan in over 90% of cases. Where there was a care plan, it
mostly set out the desired outcomes for the child or young person (74% care plans),
and there were SMART
objectives in 75% of care plans.
6.19 In some of the current and recently closed cases that we read, there seemed to be a
presumption that short-term intervention was an appropriate response. For example
some children were offered attendance at one or two group sessions designed to
raise awareness of CSE. However, once there is evidence that a child has been
sexually exploited, the presumption should be that the child and his/her family are
likely to need sustained support and safeguarding over a considerable period of time,
to make sure the child is protected.
6.20 We noted that in the final quarter of 2013, a third of the CSE teams cases had been
closed. This was a high turnover of cases in a short period, and required further
management investigation. We read seven of these cases, and judged that several
of them had been closed prematurely, without all risks being adequately addressed.

n= the number of cases where it was possible to give a rating
SMART = objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time related.


In these instances the children could have benefited from longer term intervention by
the CSE team.
6.21 We met childrens social care staff and police officers in the joint CSE team. They
were child-focused, enthusiastic and clearly committed to the safeguarding of
exploited and at risk children. They described the pressures and stresses of dealing
with child sexual exploitation. They told us that they did not feel under pressure to
close individual cases. Nevertheless they acknowledged that the level of on-going
preventive work they were able to offer children once the immediate risk of sexual
exploitation had been addressed was far less than they would wish.
6.22 Managers need to give further attention to making sure there is an appropriate level
of resources available to support continuing preventive work with children who have
been exploited, especially in cases where the child or his/her parents would be
unlikely to disclose behaviours that would put the child at risk of harm.
6.23 The volume of new work being handled by the CSE team was significant, and the
team manager felt under pressure to ensure that there was throughput of work, so
that new cases could be allocated. The team also co-worked cases with staff in
other parts of childrens social care, when their input was required, and they did a
considerable amount of preventive work with schools and with a range of community
6.24 Many of the individual cases were complex and time consuming, with the risk of staff
resources becoming overstretched, and preventive work with children after incidents
of exploitation was being squeezed. There was a rise in online grooming and
exploitation that was placing new and challenging demands on services, and these
cases too were complex and high risk.
6.25 Several managers commented to us that the present situation was not sustainable in
terms of the wide range of expectations and pressures on the CSE team. This was
not a view shared by the Executive Director of Childrens Services. Nevertheless, this
issue featured in the findings and recommendations of two recent independent
. The Inquiry considers it imperative that issues around the remit,
management and workload of the CSE team are properly addressed. For this reason
we have included a further recommendation on this subject in this report.
Risk Assessment and Management
6.26 Historically, Risky Business used a standard reporting format to record judgements
about risk. These were not available in all cases, but the risk forms we saw on the
projects files were of an acceptable quality.
6.27 In the historic childrens social care files, it was clear that the risks associated with

Barnardos Rotherham Practice Review (October 2013) and the Safeguarding Boards Review of the response
to child sexual exploitation in Rotherham (December 2013) both described in Chapter 3


child sexual exploitation were in the main not well understood or responded to. This
improved from around 2007, and a further marked improvement was evident from
2010. Prior to 2007, it was exceptional to find a risk assessment in the case files,
and minutes of Strategy meetings suggested that childrens social care and the
Police adopted an approach of minimal intervention.
6.28 Prior to 2012, minutes of Strategy meetings about child sexual exploitation were held
centrally and were not recorded on the childs social care file. This was a seriously
flawed system and childrens social care managers should be credited with changing
it in 2012.
6.29 The Sexual Exploitation Forum started meeting around late 2003 and discussed
individual children up until around 2007. Again, there was no record of these
discussions and decisions on the childs file. Front line workers and managers
responsible for the case would not have been present at such meetings. This led to
confusion between the strategic responses to sexual exploitation and risk
assessment and management in individual cases.
6.30 There was a risk assessment on file in 73% of cases. As with assessments and care
plans, Risky Business and the current open cases pulled up the overall results.
Overall, we judged the quality of risk assessments to be good or very good in 34% of
cases, adequate in 17% of cases and weak or unsatisfactory in 47% of cases
6.31 When we examined current cases, there was a risk assessment on file in 59% of our
sample. The proportion of missing assessments (41%) was unacceptably high. The
proportion judged to be good quality was 18%, 27% were judged to be adequate and
54% were weak or unsatisfactory.
6.32 When we looked at the extent to which risk had been identified, responded to and
reduced in currently open cases, the results were more encouraging. 75% were
judged to be adequate or better. This suggests to us that there was a better
standard of professional judgements and response to risk than was apparent from
the quality of the risk assessments on the files.
6.33 Work was already in progress to improve the quality and consistency of risk
assessments. An operational protocol had been agreed by Children and Young
Peoples Services and the Police and was approved by the CSE sub-group in June
2014. This built on learning from audits of CSE cases (described in Chapter 7) and
set clear responsibilities and timescales for risk assessments to be completed in
open and new cases. It formalised the arrangement that risk assessments would
always be carried out jointly by childrens social care and the Police, as is current
practice in the joint CSE team. The protocol also introduced regular sampling of risk
assessments by managers.
6.34 We raised concerns with senior managers about two open and two historic cases
where we considered the quality of risk management and decision making to have


been extremely poor. In one of the historic cases, a disclosure made by the child five
years ago was in the file but appeared not to have been actioned or reported to the
Police. This required further investigation by the Council and we understand this is
already taking place.
6.35 We also reviewed two historic and three open cases with a specialist team from the
National Working Group Network. In the three open cases, there was a clear
consensus between the Inquiry file reader and the National Working Group Network
that the risk was considerably higher than that suggested by the numeric scoring tool
and recorded on file.
6.36 We read several open cases where children were looked after out-of-area, one of
which was reviewed in detail with a team from the National Working Group Network.
We recommended to senior managers that there should be an externally facilitated
review of one of these cases so that there could be learning by all agencies from this
6.37 We concluded that there were significant weaknesses in risk assessment and risk
management. These should be addressed if children are to be properly
safeguarded. In particular, high priority should be given to making sure that there is
a risk assessment on the file of every child at risk of sexual exploitation.
Management action was needed to improve the quality of risk assessments. This
should build on some very good audit work that has already been undertaken.
Risk Assessment Tool
6.38 Joint assessments were carried out by social workers and police officers in the joint
CSE team. The risk assessment tool is based on a widely used numeric scoring
system. It was based on the Barnardos best practice model and adopted across
South Yorkshire in October 2013.
6.39 Staff in the CSE team were child-focused, enthusiastic and clearly committed to the
safeguarding of exploited and at risk children. They reported difficulty in reconciling
the outcome of the numeric scoring system with their professional judgements of risk
and singled out the sexual health section as being particularly problematic.
6.40 The manager of the CSE team and social workers in the team said that they
struggled to use the risk assessment tool, because it recorded risks only where there
was hard evidence. This meant that sometimes children they considered to be at risk
had scores that were too low.
6.41 The numeric scoring tool should be kept under very close review. A particular area
of concern is that workers and the CSE team manager reported to us that they find it
difficult to capture risks using the numeric tool. We read a significant number of
cases in which the numeric risk assessment tool understated the risks to the child.


6.42 Gathering information in CSE cases is difficult for a number of reasons, including the
possibility that children may not see themselves as victims and may be reluctant to
disclose, or there is denial on the part of parents. Lack of hard evidence should not
equate to an assumption of no risk or low risk, especially if a child has a history of
being exploited and is unable to disclose what he/she is experiencing.
6.43 We discussed the risk assessment tool with representatives of the Police and
childrens social care, as well as with operational managers and staff working in the
CSE team. Managers were clear that the numeric scoring system was an aid to, but
did not replace, professional judgements about risk. This is clearly stated in the
recently approved operational procedure. We were told that work had been
undertaken on the risk assessment tool to address the tensions between numeric
scoring and professional judgement. This involved amending some categories and
allowing for the assessor to override the score where necessary.
6.44 Operational managers were confident that management decisions and professional
judgements would be used to adjust the level of risk where necessary. We were told
that risk was not measured solely by the numeric scoring tool. At the time of the
Inquiry, there was not as yet a system for making sure that this was clearly recorded
in the risk assessment stored on the childs electronic case file. It is essential that
the childs file clearly records the most up-to-date professional judgement of risk,
especially when this may be higher than the score recorded on the numeric tool. We
were told that changes have now been made to introduce a dialogue box and that
risk assessments are collated by the police analyst using a software analytical tool.
6.45 Some very good work was in progress to improve the management of high-risk
cases. The joint CSE team had established a Group Assessment and Progression
(GAP). This group met regularly to oversee and review risk assessment and risk
management of all high-risk cases. The police analyst was supporting the work of
this group. We examined the minutes of one GAP meeting, and considered that
there had been very thorough discussions about the childrens needs and the risks
they faced.
6.46 The recently approved operational protocol ensured that social workers responsible
for the child were invited to attend the GAP meeting. It is imperative that in all cases
a note of this GAP discussion is entered in the risk assessment section of the childs
case file. The responsibility for this needs to be clearly defined, so that the most
recent information about risk is always available to those accessing the childs file.
6.47 We refer to quality assurance and continuous improvement in the next chapter and
how some excellent audit work is helping to improve performance on risk. The
implementation of the new operational procedures will require close monitoring.
Sampling of CSE cases should be carried out until such time as there is evidence of
improved consistency and quality in the assessment and management of risk.


Services for Looked After Children
6.48 From the mid-1990s there were concerns about childrens homes being targeted for
the purposes of child sexual exploitation. From the residential case files we read, it is
clear that for a long period thereafter some local residential units were overwhelmed
by the problem of child sexual exploitation. Children who were exploited before they
became looked after continued to be exploited, and were often at even greater risk of
harm. Other children became exposed to sexual exploitation for the first time whilst
they were looked after in childrens homes. There were examples of an exploited
child acting as the conduit for perpetrators to gain access to other looked after
children. This happened in local residential units as well as in out-of-area
placements, and it appears to have occurred in one of the current cases we read.
There was no appropriate management response to the problem of children being
exposed to exploitation whilst in the care of the Council. Nor did we find that elected
members as corporate parents were advised of the scale and gravity of the problem.
6.49 Historically, information about looked after children affected by CSE is patchy. There
was not yet a well-developed system for tracking the impact of CSE on them. One
reason for this may be that operational managers believed that CSE should be
managed through looked after children processes. For example, in July 2005, 90
children were being discussed by the Sexual Exploitation Forum. A management
decision was taken to remove from the list all children who were looked after or on
the child protection register. A standard letter was to be sent to their social workers
reminding them to consider sexual exploitation in future work with the child. With
hindsight, this was a serious error of judgement. Services for looked after children
were stretched at the time and practice was uneven. It was unlikely that frontline
staff had the knowledge or skills to deal with organised sexual exploitation. It also
made it impossible to gauge the nature and scale of the problem, particularly in
residential units.
6.50 One response, then and now, was to place children in residential units outside the
Rotherham area, in the hope that this would reduce the risk of harm from sexual
exploitation. We read some cases where this had been successful for particular
children. There were examples of children being placed in secure care as the last
and only option to protect them from perpetrators, and in several cases such a
placement proved to be beneficial in protecting the children and in creating the
opportunity to work therapeutically with them. There were also examples of out-of-
area foster placements being very positive for the children. However, there were
many examples of out-of-area residential placements actually increasing the risks to
exploited children, with an escalation of missing episodes as they tried to return to
their home and sometimes to their abusers.
6.51 In July 2014, there were 16 children who were looked after on account of sexual
exploitation. Six were in out-of-area placements (one in secure care and another
waiting for a secure placement). Three were in out-of-area foster placements; and


three in in-house (local) foster placements. One of the 16 children was at home;
another in an in-house residential placement; and two in semi-independent living
6.52 A strategic approach to protecting looked after children who are sexually exploited, or
at risk, should now be addressed as a matter of urgency by the Child Sexual
Exploitation sub-group. The strategy should aim to ensure that out-of-area
placements do much more than simply move the problem elsewhere. It should
identify the current range of services available for children who are exploited or at
serious risk; and identify the contribution of foster-carers, substitute families, secure
care and local residential units. It should include risk-assessing potential placements
for the individual child and for other vulnerable children. The strategy should also be
bound into the Councils role as corporate parents.
6.53 This is not an issue that Rotherham can deal with on its own. Cross-boundary
solutions must be found. Children who are exploited are routinely being placed in
out-of-area placements across the country. Unless Councils can develop sound
strategic agreements with other authorities, these children will continue to be
exploited and abused, and may become the conduit for perpetrators to gain access
to other children in the same placement.
Leaving Care Services
6.54 Services provided by the Bridges project
were of a high quality over many years,
and workers had a great deal of experience of supporting children who had been
sexually exploited. After-care workers told us that from their perspective, the quality
of support for exploited children had improved greatly in recently years. The project
received very good support from the managers of the CSE team, both childrens
social care and the Police. After-care workers also commented that children who
had been looked after out of the authority faced major difficulties at the point of
leaving care. They found it difficult to get support in the area where they had been
living, and had great difficulty re-settling in Rotherham, which was often their only
option if they required assistance with housing and other supports. Again, this
should form part of a strategic approach to meeting the needs of looked after children
who are affected by child sexual exploitation.
Youth Services
6.55 Historically, Rotherham had a good network of local youth services that was part of
the range of preventive services accessed by children who were exploited or at risk.
Youth Services played an important role in identifying and supporting children and
young people involved in or at risk of CSE. The wider youth service was also active
in this area, with projects such as the Youth Start counselling service. This was a
valuable resource for many children affected by sexual exploitation.

The Bridges project was provided by NCH until April 2014, when it transferred to the Council.


6.56 The Cabinet considered a review of Youth Services in February 2011. Under 'Risks
and Uncertainties', the report stated:
'Without this integrated working, we risk retreating again into silos of provision
to tackle some of our most stubborn challenges - youth crime, teenage
pregnancies, NEETs
, sexual exploitation, adolescent drinking and
associated disorder. Past experience and current evidence tell us that this is
much less effective, and in many cases pointless'.
6.57 We met several experienced and skilled youth workers who voiced serious concerns
about the severity of the cutbacks in the youth services and specifically how it was
impacting on their work with vulnerable young people.
Services for Young Mothers
6.58 The Rowan Centre provides education, support and childcare to pregnant schoolgirls
and young mothers from the Rotherham area. Babies are cared for on-site during
the day whilst mothers receive their education.
6.59 We read the case files of several CSE victims who received education and support
from the Rowan Centre. It was clear that the Centre provided a highly personalised,
child-focused approach and was able to engage with, and support, girls who had
become pregnant while they were being sexually exploited. The Centre had been a
positive experience for these girls, several of whom were able with support to
successfully parent their children. There was also evidence of good collaboration
between the Risky Business project and the Centre, with both services providing
support to victims for as long as this was required.
6.60 There were historic and current issues regarding liaison between the Rowan Centre
and childrens social care. It was evident from several historic files that there was
tension around the thresholds that childrens social care applied. As a result children
who were considered highly vulnerable by the Centre did not get help. Staff at the
Centre told us that high thresholds for social care mean that some pregnant girls and
young mothers do not currently receive the support they need.
6.61 To address these issues, childrens social care should introduce a mechanism for
reviewing cases with the Rowan Centre where there is a difference of opinion about
Post Abuse Support
6.62 There appeared to be very little by way of specialist support services, in the form of
mental health, counselling and psychological services for children and young people

Not in Education, Employment or Training


who had been sexually exploited. Many suffered post-traumatic stress and endured
lasting psychological and emotional damage that diminished their capacity to lead
normal lives. One survivor told us:
Sexual exploitation is like a circle that you can never escape from.
6.63 We came across a number of cases where children and young people needed and
wanted specialist counselling and support. They were unable to access services
because of long waiting lists and gaps in services. We learned that at the time of the
Inquiry, the Children and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) deleted
childrens names from the waiting list if they missed the first appointment. This
approach is entirely unsuited to the needs of CSE victims and it should be changed.
We were told by the parent of a survivor who needed help when she was over 16 that
he had to pay privately for this service, as there was at least a six month waiting list
for an appointment. This was too long in the life of a young woman who had
experienced such trauma.


7. Safeguarding

Over the years, there were good inter-agency structures in place to deal with sexual
exploitation. As early as 1998, police procedures, also adopted by childrens social
care, identified the victims as children and the prosecution of perpetrators as a
priority. Under the auspices of the Safeguarding Board and its predecessor, the Area
Child Protection Committee, there was a good range of strategies, policies and
procedures applicable to child protection and specifically to CSE. These were of
generally good quality and had been developed on an inter-agency basis. The
weakness was that the Safeguarding Board rarely seemed to check whether they were
being implemented and whether they were working. The challenge function of the
Safeguarding Board did not appear to have been fully exercised.

Over many years an impressive amount of training on CSE was carried out,
encompassing a wide spectrum of interests in the community.

From 2008 onwards, annual CSE plans were produced and presented to the
Safeguarding Board and to the Lead Member for Children and Young People.

The Child S Serious Case Review commissioned by the Safeguarding Board sparked
a debate about redactions in such reports and whether absolute transparency should
take precedence over protecting the confidential details of children. Whilst we
agreed that some of the redactions in the Child S review were unnecessary or could
have been differently presented, we did not believe that a charge of cover up by the
Safeguarding Board was justified.

Strategies, Policies and Procedures
7.1 The Children Act 2004 established Local Safeguarding Children Boards. They bring
organisations together to safeguard and promote the welfare of children through
mutual co-operation. They are required to co-ordinate and ensure the effectiveness
of their members' services, to develop policies and procedures for the safeguarding
of children, to undertake reviews of serious cases and to produce an annual report.
The range of their responsibilities extends to training, recruitment, publicity and the
setting of thresholds for intervention. While Safeguarding Boards do not have the
power to direct other organisations, they do have a role in making clear where
improvement is needed.
7.2 Prior to the establishment of Safeguarding Boards in 2004, the principal
responsibilities were undertaken by Area Child Protection Committees (ACPCs). The
Inquiry had access to minutes of the Safeguarding Board, We saw very few of the
Area Child Protection Committee minutes. Approximately 40 sets of minutes from
both were read.
7.3 There were good inter-agency structures to deal with CSE over the period covered
by the Inquiry. These linked in to the Safeguarding Board or its predecessor. Officer
groups included the Key Players (late 90s to around 2003), the Sexual Exploitation
Forum, the Sexual Exploitation Steering Group and the current Safeguarding Board
CSE sub-group, which is supported by an operational Silver group.


7.4 We also read minutes of the Sexual Exploitation Forum and the current CSE sub-
group. Neither the Council nor the Police were able to trace minutes of the Key
Players meeting. This is particularly troubling because the minutes included records
of decision making in individual cases. These minutes, or relevant extracts from
them, were not placed in individual childrens social care files. This means that
children who want information about their past, in terms of what happened to them
and why, would be denied this information.
7.5 One of the major flaws in inter-agency meetings in the early years was confusion of
responsibilities for strategic responses and decision making on individual children.
This persisted until around 2007, when a dedicated manager for CSE was appointed.
7.6 The Safeguarding Board and the Area Child Protection Committee did a considerable
amount of work in developing inter-agency strategies, policies and protocols on
safeguarding and CSE from as early as 2001. They also oversaw the provision of
extensive training.
7.7 Strategies, polices and procedures were developed within the framework of
Government guidance in Working Together to Safeguard Children and extensive
work was done on issues such as:
a) childrens safety an inter-agency steering group was established in 2005
following a report on bullying and racism in schools and took forward a number
of initiatives to improve childrens safety; and
b) domestic violence a strategy was developed in 2006 and took forward work on
Hidden Harm (protecting children from drug misusing parents and carers)
7.8 As early as 1998, South Yorkshire Police issued a paper Protecting children who are
being sexually exploited through prostitution. Its procedures governed the practice
of the Police and were adopted by childrens social care. The paper clearly set out
the risks to the physical, emotional and psychological health of children who engaged
in prostitution or were victims of sexual exploitation. It recognised the links between
prostitution and crime, drug abuse, violence and murder, and urged that a high
priority be given to the problem. Children under the age of 18 were to be regarded
as children in need, protected under law. The priority for the Police was to identify
and prosecute offenders. There is evidence from this Inquiry that suggests that
these precepts were not always followed.
7.9 By April 2001, the Area Child Protection Committee procedures included a chapter
Protecting children who are being sexually abused through prostitution. The
procedures largely reiterated those of 1998. They were revised in 2003.
7.10 A report to the Safeguarding Board in 2005 repeated the statement in the child abuse
procedures that 'prostitution is a form of sexual exploitation involving payment or


reward. The implied equivalence of child sexual exploitation with child prostitution
was common in the 1990s and should not have persisted until 2005. It suggested
that payment or reward was always involved and it made no mention of the criminal
nature of the activity. It might even imply that the child's consent mitigated its gravity.
7.11 The Safeguarding Board frequently sought an agreed, practical definition of child
sexual exploitation in order to ensure consistency of approach by its members. Even
as late as October 2013, the CSE sub-group was discussing concerns about the
distinction between sexual abuse and sexual exploitation, fearing that the terms were
used interchangeably. At the very least, disparities would affect the accuracy of
performance figures, but they might have had more profound implications for
Missing Children
7.12 The protocol on Missing Children, launched in 2005, aimed to focus agencies minds
on the risks to which such children were exposed. They undertook responsibility for
managing its implementation and reviewing it in the light of experience. The protocol
was decentralised into local strategies with a view to engaging General
Practitioners, Accident and Emergency Departments and community groups. Local
campaigns were envisaged, overseen by those working in each area. Rotherham
was the only policing district in the Force to respond formally to the problem, through
its Community Safety Unit, by visiting young runaways when they returned.
7.13 The Action Plan on Missing Children was frequently reviewed in subsequent years.
The Police submitted regular statistical evidence. In 2008, the Children and Young
Peoples Scrutiny Panel discussed the topic. The following year, Rotherham scored
14 out of a possible 15, based on a self-assessment against national indicators.
7.14 Agencies worked together on possible links between missing children and sexual
exploitation. An official visited schools to talk to year-6 pupils about running away.
An inter-agency Action Group met frequently to maintain a watching brief. The
Borough commissioned the charity Safe@Last to interview children who had been
missing. Many missing children were identified through fraudulent benefit claims.
The subject featured large in the work plan, which the Exploitation sub-group
submitted in 2010. The plan engaged voluntary and other agencies in addressing
the problem that had become more severe in Rotherham over recent years. The
Boroughs proportion of missing looked-after children was higher than the national
average, and there had been a sharp increase in the numbers of missing children in
their mid-teens.


Plans to Tackle Sexual Exploitation
7.15 At the end of 2005, the Safeguarding Board approved a comprehensive action plan
which covered inter-agency planning and procedures; work in schools; preventive
methodologies; the provision of advice to young people; services to young men and
boys at risk of sexual exploitation; systems of recording and analysis; the gathering
of evidence and the support of child witnesses. Sexual exploitation was regarded as
a priority in the Stay Safe section of the Children and Young Peoples single plan.
7.16 Responding to Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham, compiled by the Police and
childrens social care in 2005, imposed the common assessment form on referrals,
set up Strategy meetings on cases of significant harm, and stressed the importance
of identifying all adults involved in any referral. The paper retained the clause giving
advice to the young person on two occasions before proceeding to caution or
prosecution; also the clause making a case conference dependent on the parents
having encouraged the young persons behaviour. It reiterated the need to
investigate and prosecute those who coerce, exploit or abuse children.
7.17 In October 2006, the multi-agency sexual exploitation procedures had been
completed and circulated. Almost all of the specific objectives of the comprehensive
action plan had been achieved. Membership of the group overseeing the action plan
had been enlarged to include the voluntary sector and health services.
7.18 In 2008, the Safeguarding Board began to formulate policies and procedures relating
to the exploitation of boys and young men. Concern about this issue had been
expressed as far back as 2002. A staff member was now deployed to research the
nature, context and extent of the exploitation, the degree to which boys were
affected, and the range of services that should be provided.
7.19 Over the following months, procedures were compiled or revised on missing children,
children who were trafficked, children who harm others, and safeguarding girls and
young women at risk of abuse through genital mutilation. Safeguarding Children
Guidance was a new policy designed for Madrassahs, Mosques and supplementary
schools. In 2009, it was proposed that the procedures relating to CSE should be
revised to conform to new national guidance on the safeguarding of children.
Sheffield had taken an initiative in this direction with a view to agreeing procedures
common to both authorities. Later that year, Rotherham was described as having
taken the most proactive approach to dealing with the issue of child sexual
exploitation, compared with other areas. This assessment was endorsed by the
findings of the Offender Management Inspection a couple of years later.


7.20 The Children and Young Persons Plan 2010-2013 brought together a number of
inter-connected strategies under four broad headings: prevention, early intervention,
tackling inequality and education. Strategies on organised or multiple abuse and
sexual exploitation were tabled at this time.
7.21 In 2010, the Safeguarding Board approved further policies on the forced marriage of
young people; honour-based violence; organised, multiple abuse; the management
of people who pose a risk to young people; and safeguarding children from sexual
exploitation. It was planned to update all policies and procedures twice a year. A
company called TriX was commissioned to maintain the Safeguarding Board's library
of policies and procedures.
7.22 Policies and procedures were revised again in 2011. It was intended that staff would
refer to the procedures on-line rather than using paper versions. The website gave a
single version of the procedures, regularly updated and accessible to all. In the
same year, the Practice Resolution Protocol was developed in response to the need
for a systematic process for challenging professional practice.
7.23 In December 2012, there were calls for a shared clear definition of referral processes
and threshold criteria to be agreed by all agencies. This suggests that debates on
these topics in 2005 and subsequent years remained unresolved. It was also
proposed that a suitable shared multi-agency recording system for CSE be devised,
to include information about adults who may be linked to children at risk of abuse or
Representation and Accountability
7.24 The current CSE sub-group has served to reduce a problem which has beset the
Safeguarding Board from its early days - that of sheer size. In the interests of
inclusiveness, Board membership has progressively increased. Fewer than 20
people attended its first meetings. As meetings become larger the more difficult it is
for the Chair to give due weight to the varying interests represented, to encourage full
and open debate and reach definitive conclusions which attract the agreement of all
present. In addition, the Chair has the responsibility to ensure that decisions are
acted upon, timeously and to a high standard. Not only does this make the task
difficult for a part-time Chair, but it also raises questions about the concept of
accountability as applied to such a large, disparate group of people. It is not the place
of the Inquiry to explore those questions further. It is sufficient to be reminded that
accountability for successful outcomes is a central feature of good child protection
work. The concept of 'shared accountability' which some apply to the work of
Safeguarding Boards is dubious and potentially dangerous.
7.25 The issue of thresholds typifies a problem which the Safeguarding Board and its
predecessor faced from the early years - that of ensuring compliance with


agreements on the part of all of its members. The child protection procedures and
protocols produced during the late 1990s and early 2000s were of generally good
quality, but adherence to them within the membership was variable. Similar problems
attended the training programmes. Inter-agency training on CSE was instituted in the
early 2000s, particularly on awareness raising. This was commended by the Leader
of the Council who called for its extension, but the level of take-up was often low.
Poor take-up was not universal, but its frequency called into question the authority
that the Safeguarding Board exercised over its members. Likewise considerable time
and energy was expended on devising good policies and procedures in the mid to
late 2000s, but there was rarely any reporting back or checking by the Safeguarding
Board on whether they were being implemented or were working.
7.26 Under the Children Act 2004 and subsequent regulations, Local Safeguarding
Children Boards have a responsibility towards the training of persons who work with
children or in services affecting the safety and welfare of children. All agencies
providing such services have a like responsibility to ensure their effectiveness
through the provision of training. It is clear that the Safeguarding Board in
Rotherham took this responsibility very seriously.
7.27 From the late 1990s onwards, Risky Business delivered training programmes on
CSE for youth workers and others on an inter-agency basis. The training was
coordinated through the Key Players group. Priority was given to a multi-agency
model that would promote networking and help agencies to understand others roles
and responsibilities. The training sessions were well received, in particular training
delivered by young survivors - this was described as having had a huge impact. The
training was open to voluntary agencies and was well publicised.
7.28 Over the years, the Safeguarding Board faced a number of recurrent problems
related to training. Agencies gave varying priority to the training; attendance was
sometimes poor; the costs of the programme often exceeded its budget; it was
difficult to recruit an adequate pool of trainers. In 2005, it was proposed that a
charging system be introduced whereby agencies were billed for non-attendance.
7.29 The demand for training in CSE was ever increasing, as was its scope. The Leaders
Task and Finish Group called for more awareness training, especially in CSE; the
Safeguarding Boards training sub-committee undertook training around the conduct
of serious case reviews; training in child protection was launched for mosque and
community representatives; and housing, licensing and other staff were included in
the programme. Risky Business even trained dog walkers and park rangers.
7.30 By the end of 2006 it was clear that the overall training programme could not be
expanded unless capacity was increased, and the new budget meant the


cancellation of 106 trainer days that had been delivered the previous year. In
response, the Safeguarding Board made further efforts to impose a more structured
method of identifying and meeting the needs for training within its membership.
7.31 The development of e-learning was encouraged. Members of the Safeguarding
Board had all registered and viewed the course. The feedback was excellent. E-
learning was considered to be valuable in meeting the needs for induction within
isolated agencies that had limited access to training; it would also help residential
staff who worked shifts. All agencies were asked to nominate staff who would benefit
from e-learning, as part of their induction or refresher training.
7.32 In 2007, the Police asked Risky Business to contribute to the training of all newly
recruited police officers. 3-day training courses were also delivered for senior police
officers. The sexual exploitation of children featured in these programmes.
7.33 By 2008, the scope of the training programme had further increased to include
safeguarding children with disabilities; the care of children with sexually harmful
behaviour; the assessment of parental mental health; attachment theory; forced
marriages and public law. Between 2007 and 2008, Risky Business delivered training
on CSE to five comprehensive schools, to Police Community Safety Officers, to
youth workers, to foster carers and to magistrates. In future, this training would form
part of the standard package for all new magistrates. Many courses were now
modular in form and more flexible than in the past. A training package was designed
specifically for school staff to deliver, so spreading the material more widely and
more economically.
7.34 By 2012, it seemed that child sexual exploitation had become a standard feature in
the planning of training programmes. A training package in CSE was designed for
Muslim community leaders; and the Safeguarding Board provided a training course in
the identification of indicators relating to CSE. In March 2013, it was reported that all
schools, including faith schools, had signed up for training related to CSE. Members
of the Safeguarding Board devoted time to the discussion of the National Working
Group Networks e-learning package on CSE.
Scrutiny and Challenge
7.35 Not unreasonably, the minutes of the Safeguarding Board meetings focus on
decisions rather than the details of debate. Nevertheless, over the years there
appears to have been a failure to challenge policies, priorities and performance,
especially those of statutory agencies. This judgement featured in the Ofsted report
of 2012 and was cited by the Home Affairs Select Committee. One task of the Board
is to 'ensure effectiveness', to question, to scrutinise, to demand and assess
evidence. In the past this function does not seem to have been fully exercised. The
establishment of the CSE sub-group has gone some way to correcting this. Quality


assurance has been strengthened, processes of performance monitoring and
recording have improved, and clearer leadership demonstrated. In 2013, the
incoming Board Chair commissioned his own 'diagnostic' of how CSE was being
addressed, further confirming the intention to make the Board a more dynamic and
mutually accountable body.
7.36 The parent of a CSE survivor was approached by a senior officer of the Council to
become a lay member of the Safeguarding Board in 2010. He told the Inquiry that he
found action on some important issues too slow, suggesting that the Board did not
take the issue of CSE seriously enough. He reported that they had many good
debates, but disagreement was never reflected in the minutes. He resigned from the
Board in 2012.
7.37 While this report carries criticisms of the work of the Safeguarding Board over the last
10 years, the Inquiry considers that the several Chairs and members should be
recognised for the work they have done, in the face of increased demand, frequent
resourcing issues, and exposure to the attentions of the press and other media.
Compliance with Best Known Practice
7.38 We have seen that over the period covered in the Inquiry, there has been a
fundamental shift at national as well as local level in the way child sexual exploitation
is defined and understood. What was viewed in the late 1990s as the problem of
child prostitution is now correctly defined as an issue of inter-agency responsibility for
safeguarding children.
7.39 The Inquiry was asked to comment not just on best practice as understood today, but
to reflect on whether past practice would have met the test of best known practice at
that time.
7.40 There is little doubt that the Risky Business project and the Home Office research
project that was underway in 2001/02 had a central focus on the safeguarding of
children who were victims or at risk of sexual exploitation. The Risky Business
project was ahead of its time. Some people we spoke to would argue that such a
service could only be fully effective if it was located in the voluntary rather than the
local authority sector.
7.41 Prior to 2007 the operational response of childrens social care, together with that of
the Police, would have fallen short of any accepted definition of best practice as
understood at the time. One exception was the work of the Key Players group.
Government guidance was clear at that time that CSE was to be dealt with as an
issue of safeguarding children. However, many child victims in Rotherham were not
dealt with through safeguarding procedures. From other reports
on the problem of



child sexual exploitation, it would appear that this failure was not unique to
7.42 From about 2007, with the appointment of a dedicated manager for CSE, there was
an improved focus on safeguarding children who were being exploited. This was
evidenced in child sexual exploitation strategies and action plans and in a clear
pathway for referral to childrens social care. Nevertheless, safeguarding of
individual children who were being exploited or at risk remained extremely variable.
This was in line with wider weaknesses in the delivery of childrens social care in
Rotherham, evidenced in inspections over the years.
7.43 Professional supervision of childrens social care staff plays an important role in
ensuring a high quality of social work practice and good case management. A
comprehensive supervision policy should provide the employer and employee with a
framework within which each will understand their obligations regarding
accountability for work, professional development and personal support.
7.44 There is little information about the quality of supervision available to children's social
care staff in the early years of the Inquiry period.
7.45 In 2008, Children and Young People's Services produced a report on casework
supervision, outlining its role and function and why it was important. There was also a
report to the Safeguarding Board in that year informing members that there had been
an increase in the ratio of service managers to practitioners in order to improve
quality through supervision and support.
7.46 By 2010, an Action Plan was in place to address the provision, frequency and quality
of staff supervision.
7.47 In 2011, the Child S Serious Case Review made recommendations about the
supervision of children's social care staff and youth services staff. The former
required that all staff knew who was responsible for their case supervision and that
there was clear accountability for their work. The latter referred to Risky Business
staff, who should be the subject of greater management oversight and supervision.
The Risky Business staff were incorporated in the central CSE team, following the
publication of the Child S report.
7.48 Inspection reports on children's social care over the Inquiry period included several
references to the quality and frequency of supervision. It was criticised in 2003 and
2009 and again in 2011, when Ofsted described it as 'variable' and sometimes 'poor'.
7.49 The workforce strategy developed by children's social care from 2010 seemed to be
the first effective initiative taken to address the quality of supervision, particularly for
newly qualified workers. The current supervision policy for social workers is clear,


comprehensive and specific about frequency and content.
7.50 The evidence from file reading shows that in answer to the question 'Was the impact
of worker supervision evident in the case file?', the impact of supervision was seen in
54% of all the cases we read, and in 88% of open cases. This demonstrates a good
improvement over time in the quality of supervision provided to social work staff.
However, it also shows the considerable shortfalls that existed in historic cases,
where in some instances social workers must have lacked the necessary support to
work effectively with very complex cases of sexual exploitation.
Quality Assurance and Continuous Improvement
7.51 Many of the cases we read were about a very serious level of sexual exploitation. It
was striking that apart from a Lessons Learned review, there appeared to have
been no systems in place for agencies to learn lessons from serious CSE cases in
which children had been failed. The apparent absence of active learning by any of
the agencies in the most serious cases may have contributed to repetition of poor
7.52 The Lessons Learned review was produced during the Operation Central criminal
trial. It was therefore not a full lessons learned review. The intention was to follow it
up after the criminal proceedings had finished. This does not appear to have
happened. We also considered that the original review was weak in that it examined
one case only, although charges were brought in respect of four children. There was
also a much wider group of children identified in Operation Central who had been
sexually exploited but whose cases did not get to court. It would have been
appropriate to identify lessons to be learned from what happened with this group as
7.53 One of the potential areas for improvement should have been retrospective learning
from the police operations Czar and Chard that failed to result in any prosecutions.
We could find no evidence of agencies jointly reviewing what had happened in these
cases, and learning lessons for the future.
7.54 At the time of the Inquiry, there was one post dedicated to quality assurance of
safeguarding. Half this member of staffs time was spent working for the
Safeguarding Board and the other half for childrens social care. A case file audit tool
had been developed. It was based on best practice elsewhere. The audit form had
been revised and streamlined. It was comprehensive and well designed.
7.55 Different approaches to case file audits had been tested to find out what worked best.
Childrens social care carried out an audit of 14 child sexual exploitation cases in
May 2014.


7.56 We examined two cases that had been recently audited and considered the audit
process to be relevant, comprehensive and an example of good practice.
7.57 Learning is already underway as a result of the themed audit of CSE cases,
particularly around the areas of:
a) risk assessments missing in some cases;
b) delay in updating risk assessments;
c) quality of risk assessments; and
d) examples of good practice.
7.58 The emphasis that Rotherham is now giving to quality assurance and continuous
improvement in relation to child sexual exploitation is an extremely positive
development. The achievements to date are considerable and we recommend that
those in authority ensure that quality assurance work in respect of CSE will continue
to be appropriately resourced and supported, as a key factor in practice
Serious Case Review
7.59 The Safeguarding Board commissioned only one Serious Case review involving
CSE. That was the report on Child S, who was murdered in 2010 at the age of 17.
There has been some dispute over the motivation for her murder, and whether CSE
played any part in it. There is no doubt she was at risk of CSE when she was young
and that she had been in contact with some of the worst perpetrators.
7.60 The author, Professor Pat Cantrill, was asked by the Safeguarding Board to examine
the victim's circumstances and the services' response from 2008. The Safeguarding
Board requested that the report be redacted to protect the children involved, prior to
publication, and Professor Cantrill carried out the redactions herself.
7.61 The question of redactions in this report became very contentious and directly
involved the former Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove. He wrote to the
Safeguarding Board to say that some of the redactions were unnecessary. There
followed an unedifying set of exchanges between the Department for Education (DfE)
and the Chair of the Safeguarding Board. At one point, the DfE lost a copy of the
Serious Case Review. This contained revised redactions completed by the
Safeguarding Board.
7.62 Any review of services provided to protect children from physical and sexual abuse
and exploitation is undoubtedly and properly a matter of public interest. However, the
public interest must be balanced against considerations of the future well-being of
any children and young people mentioned in the review. The Overview report on
Child S had two principal purposes; first to describe and assess the conduct of the
professionals and others who had a responsibility towards her and her family, and


second to indicate clearly the lessons to be learned so that such tragic events would
be prevented in future. For both purposes, the paramount concern must be for the
welfare of children.
7.63 The young people in the family concerned had their lives ahead of them. We should
help them to put aspects of their past behind them and develop into responsible
citizens. The Overview report talked of many aspects of their lives in some detail. It
is our strong view that it would not be beneficial that this should be put into the public
domain and remain there for evermore. For most of the children's 'misdemeanours'
no formal charges were laid. The unredacted report therefore discloses information
that would otherwise be protected.
7.64 This is a difficult issue, which merits serious debate. The Home Affairs Select
Committee has recommended that the victim, or their family, or an independent
person' should have the right of redaction of serious case reviews. We recommend
that the Department of Education should not demand the removal of redactions
without giving thought to the implications for all of the children concerned. Whatever
policy is determined on redactions, nothing must be allowed to inhibit the author of
the report or detract from the honesty and integrity of the review and its findings.
7.65 The selection of redactions is a matter of judgement. In alleging a 'cover-up, the
Times newspaper cited a small number of redactions where reference to officials was
made. In each case we found that either the redaction was unnecessary, or the event
in question had limited significance to the thrust of the report, or the reference to
officials could have been retained with dexterous editing of the paragraph in
question. We do not believe, however, that a charge of cover-up by the author or the
Safeguarding Board can be justified.
7.66 The principle that the childs welfare must be the paramount consideration is explicitly
stated in Government guidance
and this should inform all future debate and policy
on redactions.

Working Together to Safeguard Children (March 2012)


8. The response of other services and agencies

This chapter concentrates on the response to CSE from agencies including the
Police, schools, taxis and licensing, Health and the Crown Prosecution Service.
Historic policing issues are dealt with throughout the report. We acknowledge the
priority given by the Police at the present time to protecting child victims and taking
action against the perpetrators. It was not within the scope of the Inquiry to conduct
in depth investigations into these service areas, but we are able to make some
observations based on the evidence obtained. In some instances, the content is
mainly descriptive, due to the limited amount of historic information available, and the
absence of reference to CSE, as opposed to child protection, in records and files.

South Yorkshire Police
8.1 We deal with the response of South Yorkshire Police at some length throughout this
report. While there was close liaison between the Police, Risky Business and
childrens social care from the early days of the Risky Business project, there were
very many historic cases where the operational response of the Police fell far short of
what could be expected. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. The Police had
excellent procedures from 1998, but in practice these appear to have been widely
disregarded. Certainly there is evidence that police officers on the ground in the
1990s and well beyond displayed attitudes that conveyed a lack of understanding of
the problem of CSE and the nature of grooming. We have already seen that children
as young as 11 were deemed to be having consensual sexual intercourse when in
fact they were being raped and abused by adults.
8.2 We were contacted by someone who worked at the Rotherham interchange in the
early 2000s. He described how the Police refused to intervene when young girls who
were thought to be victims of CSE were being beaten up and abused by perpetrators.
According to him, the attitude of the Police at that time seemed to be that they were
all undesirables and the young women were not worthy of police protection.
8.3 By 2007, there was evidence that the Police were more pro-active in tackling CSE.
Senior police officers had established good liaison arrangements with Risky Business
and progress was being made in protecting the children and investigating the
8.4 The Police were commended by the trial judge, along with childrens social care, for
their handling of a successful prosecution in 2007. Shortly thereafter, work began on
what would eventually lead to the successful prosecution of five offenders in 2009 as
part of Operation Central, brought about by excellent joint working between the
Police, Risky Business and childrens social care.
8.5 We interviewed many serving police officers at different levels of seniority during the
fieldwork for the Inquiry. It was clear that tackling child sexual exploitation was now a
priority for South Yorkshire Police and we describe elsewhere their contribution to the


inter-agency response.
8.6 There were a number of recent and on-going police operations to investigate and
prosecute perpetrators of CSE. Some of these were run jointly with childrens social
care. They included investigations into historic abuse cases, one a Rotherham
investigation and a second a Yorkshire-wide operation. There have been recent
operations to target suspect hotels and limousine companies and an operation was
underway looking at high-risk missing children. Joint training of hotel managers had
resulted in one perpetrator being caught with two under-age girls.
8.7 A police analyst is now based in Rotherham, and produces a well presented monthly
report on CSE. This provides detailed information about progress under the strategic
objectives for CSE Prevent, Protect and Pursue. This has greatly improved the
quality of the information the CSE sub-group receives for monitoring purposes.
8.8 We considered that the Police were now appropriately resourced to deal with child
sexual exploitation and had a clear focus on prevention, protection, investigating and
prosecuting the perpetrators. We also found that police officers on the ground had a
good child-centred focus and demonstrated a commitment to continuous
improvement. Senior police officers were keen to develop the joint CSE team and
were supportive of a single management arrangement similar to what is in place in
Sheffield. They considered that this would strengthen the operation of the team.
8.9 Schools were a key element in the frontline of protecting children from sexual
exploitation. Perpetrators targeted schools and there was evidence in the files
(historically and up to the time of the Inquiry) that schools were proactive in alerting
Risky Business, childrens social care and the Police to signs and evidence of
8.10 From its inception, Risky Business provided training programmes to schools with a
view to raising young people's awareness of CSE and its dangers and giving them a
chance to voice concerns about their own situation. Workshops in schools covered
grooming and the internet. These programmes were maintained throughout the
2000s. By 2009 it was said that the demand for training on the part of schools was
increasing markedly, although funding was a constraint for some. In 2012, the CSE
team was working with 14 secondary schools. In the following year, the Safeguarding
Board was told that exemplary work had been done with schools regarding CSE and
that all schools, including faith schools, were signed up to the training.
8.11 Throughout this period, there were close working relationships between Risky
Business and the Education Welfare Service. For example, in 2005 the Service was
working with six girls who had been referred by Risky Business, and it had identified
18 girls for referral to Risky Business on account of concerns about sexual
exploitation. The work of the Education Welfare Service in identifying young people


at risk was commended by the Safeguarding Board in December 2012.
8.12 In December 2009, the Safeguarding Board received a policy paper Safeguarding
Children Guidance for Madrassahs, Mosques and Supplementary Schools', which
extended the scope of training and awareness-raising still further. There was also
regular discussion of Children Missing from Education, in which the Education and
Health services were working closely to locate missing children and to reduce the
risks to which they might be exposed. In 2011, the effects of EU migration on school
admissions and referrals to children's social care were reported to the Safeguarding
Board. The number of Roma people in Rotherham was steadily increasing, as were
concerns about child protection and child sexual exploitation within this group.
8.13 The young people we met in the course of the Inquiry were scathing about the sex
education they received at school. They complained that it only focused on
contraception. Some who had experienced Risky Business awareness-raising about
CSE thought it was very good, particularly when a survivor spoke to them about her
experience. They thought the sex education was out of touch and needed to be
8.14 It is only recently that schools have been directly represented as members of the
Safeguarding Board. In earlier years their interests were represented by senior
officers of the Council, but they participated in sub-groups. Some found it difficult to
attend, and this became an issue along with failure of some schools to complete
Section 11 audits.
8.15 The report of the unannounced inspection by Ofsted in 2013 praised the advice given
by schools and children's centres in relation to child protection. Many schools had a
Child Exploitation and Online Protection Co-ordinator working with staff, parents and
carers, and the largest proportion of referrals to the sexual exploitation team came
from schools.
Taxis and Licensing
8.16 One of the common threads running through child sexual exploitation across England
has been the prominent role of taxi drivers in being directly linked to children who
were abused. This was the case in Rotherham from a very early stage, when
residential care home heads met in the nineties to share intelligence about taxis and
other cars which picked up girls from outside their units. In the early 2000s some
secondary school heads were reporting girls being picked up at lunchtime at the
school gates and being taken away to provide oral sex to men in the lunch break.
8.17 A diagram and backing papers supplied to the Police in 2001 by Risky Business
linked alleged perpetrators with victims, taxi companies and individual drivers.
8.18 In the Borough at present there are 1200-1300 licensed taxi drivers, though they may
not all be active. There are also well over 100 licensed taxi operators. The licensing


of the vehicles and drivers is the responsibility of the local authority. There are
statutory tests that must be complied with before a driver licence may be granted.
The primary concern is for the 'fit and proper' test of the individual, although there is
no legal definition of what this means. In Rotherham, applicants are obliged to obtain
an enhanced disclosure from the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS). The DBS
check uses the same Police National Computer (PNC) information as the standard
check but also includes a check of police intelligence records held locally. Any
information held locally can at the discretion of the Chief Officer of Police be
disclosed on the certificate.
8.19 The occupation of 'taxi driver' is a notifiable occupation. If a taxi driver is arrested or
charged or convicted or is the subject of an investigation then the Licensing Authority
is informed. The Licensing Authority may immediately suspend or revoke the licence
if it is in the interests of public safety to do so. In 2010, the Council decided to locate
all matters of temporary suspension with the relevant director, rather than with a less
senior member of staff.
8.20 The Responsible Authorities meetings in Rotherham were introduced in 2006 to
share and discuss matters in relation to licensed premises such as late night
takeaways, but they were later extended to include other matters related to licensing
such as taxi and private hire licensing and safeguarding issues. Taxis are a standing
item on the meeting's agenda. They are now held once every eight weeks with
members including the Police, Fire, Child Safeguarding, Public Health and others. In
March 2005, the Council's Task and Finish Group on CSE asked that discussions
take place about safe travel, though there is no record of what specific actions
followed. In June 2008 the Safeguarding Board learned that work had started
involving taxi drivers and licensed premises as part of the preventive agenda by
encouraging recognition and referral of young people thought to be at risk of sexual
8.21 The Safeguarding Unit convened Strategy meetings from time to time on allegations
involving taxi drivers. We read some of the most serious, from 2010, and were struck
by the sense of exasperation, even hopelessness, recorded as the professionals in
attendance tried to find ways of disrupting the suspected activity. Strategy meetings
about one specific taxi firm had been held on four occasions in a seven week period.
The minutes of one meeting record a total of ten girls and young women, three of
whom were involved in three separate incidents of alleged attempted abduction by
taxi drivers. The seven other girls had alleged that they were being sexually exploited
in exchange for free taxi rides and goods. Two of the girls involved were looked after
children. The Licensing Enforcement Officer took the step of formally writing to the
Police following the incidents of alleged attempted abductions by drivers, complaining
about the Police failure to act. In one incident, a driver accosted a 13-year-old girl.
She refused to do what he asked and reported this to her parents who followed the
taxi through the town, where they managed to identify the driver and dialled 999 for
assistance. According to the Licensing Enforcement Officer, the Police did not attend


until later and took no action. In his email to the Police he stated that 'a simple check
would have revealed that the driver had been arrested a week previously in Bradford
for a successful kidnapping of a lone female.' He concluded by acknowledging that
police priorities were not the same as Licensing, but he 'should not be holding this
together on his own'.
8.22 A further issue of safeguarding concerned those taxi firms which had a contract with
the Council to transport some of the most vulnerable children to various resources
within the authority. Some of the Councils difficulty was that they did not always have
the drivers' names when allegations were made. Nor did they have a list of the
drivers who transported children as part of the Council contract.
8.23 Following a review undertaken in 2012, the Council's Housing and Neighbourhood
Services developed a formal procedure for the referral and communication of
concerns about the safeguarding of children and vulnerable adults. This replaced a
more informal arrangement. A plan for child safeguarding training for taxi drivers has
also been put together with Sheffield City Council. Once finalised, it is intended that
the training package will be delivered to all new applicants in Rotherham. This will be
mandatory as part of the application process, and the existing drivers will be targeted
in a phased way. The Council has also produced a 'Taxi Driver's Handbook', which
includes CSE and safeguarding issues.
8.24 We were advised that four CSE related cases of taxi drivers had resulted in
revocation of licence since 2009. They worked for four different companies. In one
instance, the driver was arrested for sexual offences and supplying a controlled drug
to a 15 year old girl. The CPS decided not to charge him, due to the perceived
unreliability of one of the prosecution witnesses and the driver requested that the
immediate suspension of his licence be lifted. However, the Licensing Board fully
revoked the suspended driver licence. Council licensing staff described their relations
with the taxi trade as being very difficult on occasions, but they had always taken
the right course of action on safeguarding issues. They worked closely with the
Police, mostly on 'soft' intelligence, since written information tended to be much
8.25 In a number of different meetings, the Inquiry talked to 24 young people, aged 14-25,
who lived in the Council area. One of the main items for discussion with them was
safe transport. When asked about taxis, there was an immediate and consistent
response from the young women and men on every occasion. All avoided the use of
taxis if at all possible. Their parents and partners strongly discouraged, even forbade,
them from being on their own at night in a taxi, unless it was a company they
personally knew. The girls described how on occasions they would be taken on the
longest, darkest route home. One said the driver's first question would be 'How old
are you, love?'. All talked about the content of their conversation quickly turning
flirtatious or suggestive, including references to sex.


8.26 All the young people we met preferred to use the bus, despite their nervousness and
dislike of the Rotherham Interchange, which they described as attracting drug
dealers, addicts and people involved in a range of criminal activity. Many of these
people congregated outside the Bus Station. The young people described their sense
of intimidation and 'running the gauntlet' to get to their buses.
8.27 The use of limousines for purposes of sexual exploitation was raised by a number of
people as a historic and current issue. It was also discussed at the Safeguarding
Board in 2011. Such vehicles with more than 8 seats are nationally regulated by the
Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency. In Rotherham, they have recently been seen
waiting for young girls outside school gates. The Police have targeted limousine
companies as part of organised operations to prevent sexual exploitation.
Crown Prosecution Service
8.28 It has not proved possible to follow up any individual cases where there were
references to the Crown Prosecution Service in files and minutes dating back to
1997. We were told that those in the CPS before 2010 who would have dealt with
CSE had all retired. For much of the period under review, the Police would cite the
requirements of the CPS and their unwillingness to charge alleged perpetrators as
the main reason so few prosecutions were pursued. In 2003, an SSI inspection noted
that when Police had investigated and referred a case to the CPS, it had taken them
nine months to decide not to proceed with the case.
8.29 The Crown Prosecution Service has recently undergone some internal
reorganisation, which means that the CPS in Sheffield no longer deals with serious
sexual offences, including CSE. A unit in Leeds and one in Hull now cover the South
Yorkshire Police area.
8.30 Within the Safeguarding Board minutes, there was rarely reference to the CPS. It
was noted in September 2011 that in relation to Operation Chard, it would be useful
to know how the CPS had reached its conclusion on the case. The Board
subsequently invited a representative from the CPS to discuss Operation Chard.
8.31 In June 2013, it was noted by the Safeguarding Board that they had sought
representation from the CPS to serve on the CSE sub-group. By the end of 2013, no
representative had been secured.
8.32 Senior police officers reported that the CPS had been much more helpful in CSE
cases in their recent experience.
8.33 There are many issues that have been raised in other reports about the protection
and support of child witnesses. These will be addressed in the new national policy
and guidance for Police and the Crown Prosecution Service that will be drawn up by
the College of Policing. It will include a checklist of support services that a victim of
CSE ought to be offered following the decision to prosecute the case. It has been


proposed elsewhere that this checklist should include, at the very least, pre-trial
therapy, a pre-court familiarisation visit and a chance to meet the prosecuting
barrister. In addition, all victims of CSE should be offered the services of an
Independent Sexual Violence Adviser who is trained in court processes and,
wherever possible, the same person should support the victim throughout the trial.
8.34 One survivor told us that victims who were witnesses needed much more support to
help them through the whole process from the beginning. For some, it could be the
fourth or fifth time they had been involved as witnesses. Very little was offered by
way of support after a trial.
8.35 The Home Affairs Select Committee proposed that the CPS should review all
prosecutions in CSE to identify barriers to taking cases forward, and outline best
practice in supporting victims. It also recommended that the CPS should review
recent cases to identify the key factors that led to successful prosecution.
8.36 In October 2013, the Director of Public Prosecutions at that time, Keir Starmer,
revised the CPS guidance on child sexual exploitation to set out a clear, agreed
approach which prosecutors would take to tackle cases of child sexual abuse. A list
of stereotypical behaviours previously thought to undermine the credibility of young
victims was included to dispel the associated myths when bringing a prosecution.
These included:
The victim invited sex by the way they dressed or acted
The victim used alcohol or drugs and was therefore sexually available
The victim didn't scream, fight or protest so they must have been consenting
The victim didn't complain immediately, so it can't have been a sexual assault
The victim is in a relationship with the alleged offender and is therefore a
willing partner
A victim should remember events consistently
Children can consent to their own sexual exploitation
CSE is only a problem in certain ethnic/cultural communities
Only girls and young women are victims of child sexual abuse
Children from BME backgrounds are not abused
There will be physical evidence of abuse.
8.37 All of the above elements have been referred to at some point in historic files we
read, usually as reasons given by the Police or the CPS for not pursuing suspected
perpetrators. This guidance was welcomed by many of the main organisations, both
statutory and voluntary, dealing with CSE.


8.38 Effective partnership working with health was a key priority for the Local
Safeguarding Board, as it was for its predecessor, the Area Child Protection
Committee. Over the past ten years, the health service had been well represented at
meetings of the Safeguarding Board by the hospital services, the Primary Care Trust,
the Director of Nursing, the Director of Public Health and the Nurse Consultant on
Safeguarding Children, amongst others. Strategic planning on CSE from a health
perspective has been difficult to glean from historical records in the early part of the
Inquiry period, although evident from individual files.
8.39 In the early 2000s, the Rotherham Health Professionals Child Protection Forum was
established. In late 2005 an audit was conducted into the referrals made by health
services to the children's social care Front Desk. It was found that the quality of
referrals made by health visitors and other professionals was poor, but the response
of childrens social care was little better.
8.40 The Children First review of Children's Services in 2009 found that partnership
working with NHS Rotherham had been well developed and represented 'highly
advanced and ambitious practice'. It paid tribute to the leadership provided by the
then chief executives of the two organisations, and to the ambition to create an
integrated locality structure. However, implementation had proved difficult and the
vision needed to be 'refreshed'. Aspects of the integrated locality model were later
reversed. This is referred to in more detail in Chapter 13.
8.41 In November 2013, the Children, Young People and Families Partnership was
advised of progress made in creating care pathways and safeguarding reporting
mechanisms for young people accessing sexual health services in Rotherham.
Protocols in relation to under-16 children attending the Genito-Urinary Medicine
(GUM) and Contraceptive and Sexual Health (CaSH) clinics already included
screening for sexual exploitation. These would be developed to raise the profile of
CSE and to capture concerns about possible sexual exploitation, as well as
'algorithms' for referral to the newly appointed sexual exploitation nurse.
8.42 The Service Manager responsible for the CSE team told us that the appointment of
the nurse to the team is one of the most positive initiatives in recent years, and gave
examples of how this has speeded up childrens access to appropriate health care.
8.43 The Inquiry interviewed the Director of Public Health, who had lengthy experience of
both the Safeguarding Board and the Area Child Protection Committee. In his view,
earlier meetings showed that there was general awareness of sexual abuse rather
than sexual exploitation, and that sexual abuse was associated with individual
perpetrators rather than with groups. In his opinion, physical abuse seemed to take
higher priority. Awareness of sexual exploitation, especially in relation to the older
age group of girls, came later towards the end of the decade. It had taken some time
for the girls involved to be recognised as victims, and the justice system had some


way to go in ensuring support and protection for victims and witnesses. He thought
there had been a marked improvement over the past two or three years, with earlier
intervention, better conducted risk assessments and agencies working more closely
together, as epitomised by the interdisciplinary CSE team.
8.44 A number of those interviewed, including health professionals, commented on the
complexity of the current health structure and its implications for accountability.
There are several 'health organisations' within the NHS, who are represented at the
Safeguarding Board and in other multi agency forums. These included Clinical
Commissioning Groups, NHS (England), the Rotherham Hospital Trust, the RDASH
Mental Health Trust, as well as the Director of Public Health located within the
Council, and Public Health (England). This made it difficult to establish a single point
of contact or a single representative, who could report back and consult with other
parts of the service. Similarly, commissioning new services was complicated by the
fragmentation of the various health bodies.
8.45 Both the Director of Public Health and two NHS Rotherham staff thought that local
agencies should provide more consistent and longer term counselling and other
supports to victims of sexual exploitation.



9. The Risky Business Project

The Risky Business project was the first public service in Rotherham to identify and
support young people involved in child sexual exploitation. It operated on an
outreach basis, working with large numbers of victims, as well as those at risk. The
Council is to be commended for its financial commitment to the project and its work
for most of its existence. From 2007, the project worked effectively with the Police on
Operation Central. But it was too often seen as something of a nuisance, particularly
by children's social care and there were many tensions between the two. There were
allegations of exaggeration and unprofessional approaches by the project, none of
which have been substantiated by this Inquiry. Management failed to address these
problems and to enforce proper joint working and effective co-ordination so that the
most was made of their distinctive contributions. The Risky Business project was
incorporated within Safeguarding from 2011 and subsequently became part of the co-
located joint CSE team in 2012.

9.1 Risky Business was a small team of youth workers, set up in 1997, following
concerns by local staff about young people being abused through prostitution. After
the project was established, a CSE inter-agency network was developed by voluntary
and statutory agencies. In 1998, a small survey distributed by this network, identified
70 young women and 11 young men under 18 who were involved in exploitation, or
prostitution as it was then termed. Area Child Protection Committee protocols were
drafted and two regular meetings were established, which were later merged into a
group known as 'Key Players'. ACPC training on sexual exploitation was first
delivered following the launch of the procedures in November 2000. Risky Business
contributed to all of these initiatives.
9.2 The Risky Business project aimed to provide support to young people in Rotherham,
aged between 11 and 25 years, with two main purposes:
a) To offer advice and information to young people in relation to sexual health,
accommodation, drugs and alcohol, parenting and budgeting, eating disorder,
self-harm and abuse; and to promote their self-esteem and self-assertiveness.
b) To offer training in sexual exploitation, abuse and related matters to schools and
to agencies and individuals working with young people.
9.3 For some years after its foundation, the funding of Risky Business was uncertain,
though eventually the Council acknowledged its important work and increased its
core budget.
9.4 Risky Business adopted an outreach approach, based on community development
principles. That is, it started where the young person was; it concerned itself with the
whole person and addressed any issues that the young person brought to the
relationship; it did not prescribe or direct. Its methods were complementary to those
of the statutory services. Its success depended upon the skills of the individual
worker and the level of trust which young people were willing to commit to it. Its
operations could be volatile, unpredictable, and even risky. Nevertheless, it was
performing a function which services with statutory responsibilities could not fully


replicate. Any semblance of the statutory worker had to be set aside in order to
create and retain trust.
9.5 In a report in 2008 on the Protection of Young People in Rotherham from Sexual
Exploitation, it was stated that Risky Business 'continues to be the main service
available to young people. It takes referrals, undertakes assessments of risk and
directly intervenes to manage and reduce risk by working with young people and
other agencies to devise and deliver exit plans'.
9.6 The key role played by Risky Business in the success of Operation Central was
acknowledged by many, including the Police. The 'Lessons Learned' independent
review (2010) reflected that its work was highly thought of by the young victims, and
that it had good working relations with the Police. It even proposed a greater role for
the project in ensuring that necessary actions were carried out in a way acceptable to
victims. Recognising the value of the soft intelligence held by Risky Business, the
District Commander (2006 - 2010) arranged for the project staff to be given training in
intelligence gathering.
9.7 The Council also placed high value on the training programmes which Risky
Business provided to schools, seeking to raise young peoples awareness of sexual
exploitation and its dangers; and it encouraged the extension of these programmes
to a wide range of groups, formal and informal, within the community. The
presentations on sexual exploitation that were given to councillors and senior officials
in 2004-5 derived mainly from the work of Risky Business.
9.8 From an early stage, problems arose in the relationship between Risky Business and
children's social care, particularly with regard to individual young people whose
needs were thought by Risky Business to fall within the remit of the statutory
services. It was essential that the relationship be built on mutual understanding and
the preservation of the strengths of each. There would always be the inherent
difficulty of transferring a young person from a non-statutory to a statutory service; of
achieving the transition to the status of client, particularly if the young person
regarded social workers with apprehension.
9.9 The task of dealing with issues between Risky Business and childrens social care
lay with management. Given the subsequent histories of some of the young people
who were affected, it is tragic that in so many instances management failed to do so.
There were too many examples of young people who were properly referred by Risky
Business to childrens social care and who somehow fell through the net and were
not treated with the priority that they deserved. It is almost as if the source of the
referral from Risky Business was a pretext for attaching lower importance to it.
9.10 Interviews with managers in post at that time (around mid 2000s) confirm this view.
'They were regarded as a group of youth workers who were treading on their territory'
said one. Another senior manager 'disbelieved' what Risky Business presented,


describing it as almost 'professional gossip'. Tensions manifested themselves in a
number of ways, and particularly in individual cases. All agreed that relationships
were not good between the project and childrens social care. Managers of childrens
social care wished to bring the project firmly into a child protection approach, whilst
project staff wanted to advocate on behalf of the girls involved and protect their
9.11 Childrens social care would complain that the referral was not accompanied by the
detailed information, which was necessary for its acceptance. Serious criticism of the
Risky Business record keeping is referred to elsewhere in this report, in particular in
the findings of the Child S Serious Case Review. Having read a sample of the Risky
Business records, this inquiry did not find these criticisms justified. Where records
were available, they were detailed and well kept. They were judged to be equivalent
to the standard of many of the contemporaneous children's social care records on
children in need. Child protection and looked after children files were of a higher
9.12 Several people interviewed were of the view that the project's success, particularly in
Operation Central, was one of the causes of professional jealousy, which led to them
being assigned a lesser role in Operation Czar and for children's social care staff to
take the lead with the individual girls involved. This proved to be a serious
misjudgement, as is referred to in Chapter 13.
9.13 It is not the intention of this overview to overstate the achievements of Risky
Business. Its staff readily acknowledge that they made mistakes and that their
enthusiasm and frustration may sometimes have led them into breaking rules and
frequently getting into trouble. There were periods when relationships between Risky
Business and the statutory agencies were poor, and a less confrontational approach
might have strengthened joint working. A senior person from another local voluntary
organisation commented that single-issue projects always faced the risk of focusing
on their own issue to the exclusion of others. However, for many years Risky
Business was the only service within the Council to consistently recognise the gravity
of child sexual exploitation in the Borough and the severe damage that it was causing
to young people. By its nature, the projects style made a bad fit with the more
structured services involved. The failure of management to understand and resolve
this problem has been a running flaw in the development of child protection services
relating to sexual exploitation in Rotherham.
9.14 The project has now been incorporated within the joint CSE team. It is doubtful
whether its original ethos and style of working can survive this absorption into the
statutory system, where it is firmly located in a child protection model. The grounds
for the move included the belief that Risky Business lacked managerial and risk
assessment skills, the rigour of case management supervision, procedures, risk
management plans, defined roles and responsibilities, and office systems. All of
which fails to recognise the quality of their work with individual children, and their


distinctively different professional role, and entirely misses the point.

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10. Three Early Reports

A chapter of a draft report on research into CSE in Rotherham, often referred to as
'The Home Office Report', was written by a researcher in 2002. It contained severe
criticisms of the agencies in Rotherham involved with CSE. The most serious
concerned alleged indifference towards, and ignorance of, child sexual exploitation
on the part of senior managers. The report also stated that responsibility was
continuously placed on young people's shoulders, rather than with the suspected
abusers. It presented a clear picture of a 'high prevalence of young women being
coerced and abused through prostitution.' Senior officers in the Police and the
Council were deeply unhappy about the data and evidence that underpinned the
report. There was a suggestion that facts had been fabricated or exaggerated. Several
sources reported that the researcher was subjected to personalised hostility at the
hands of officials. She was unable to complete the last part of the research. The
content which senior officers objected to has been shown with hindsight to be largely
accurate. Had this report been treated with the seriousness it merited at the time by
both the Police and the Council, the children involved then and later would have been
better protected and abusers brought to justice. These events have led to suspicions
of collusion and cover up.

Dr Heal's reports present a vivid and alarming picture of the links between sexual
exploitation, drugs, gangs and violent crime in Rotherham from 2002 to 2006. They
were widely distributed to middle and senior managers in all key agencies. There is
no record of any formal, specific discussion of these reports in Council papers, in
ACPC minutes or in the Rotherham Safeguarding Children Board minutes made
available to the Inquiry.

10.1 The reports covered in this chapter indicate the extent of knowledge and research
about CSE in Rotherham which was available to the agencies involved during the
earlier part of the Inquiry period.
The Home Office Research
10.2 The Home Office Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) initiated a number of research
projects throughout England in 2001, aimed at providing an evidence base on
tackling street prostitution. They reviewed services that were working to protect
young people at risk or actively involved in prostitution. Three projects in Bristol,
Sheffield and Rotherham, made up the 'young people and prostitution' part of the
research. Each of the three had its own focus. The Rotherham focus was on
perpetrators. This required a significant amount of 'profiling' to be done. It also drew
heavily on ten case studies of known victims in the town. The Rotherham research
was based on Risky Business, and the researcher was appointed by the Council on
behalf of the local partners and was based in Council premises.
10.3 The Bristol and Sheffield projects were funded from January 2001 until March 2003,
and the Rotherham project from January 2001 until July 2002. The final report on the
research from the Home Office included a footnote, stating that Rotherham was not
funded for the second year due to 'implementation problems'. The University of
Luton's final evaluation report did not include the Rotherham project.

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10.4 A document headed 'Chapter Four: Key Achievements of the Home Office Pilot '
was made available to the Inquiry by the Council. It referred to the evaluation results
of the pilot in Rotherham, though the town is not named. It provided a descriptive
background to CSE within the town going back to 1996, drawing on the work of Risky
Business, which is referred to in the report as 'the project'. The rest of the report
containing the overview of the aims and objectives of the pilot, literature review,
methodology and recommendations, is missing.
10.5 The report was not dated but we understand that it was written in 2002.
10.6 The present Chief Executive and Executive Director of Children's Services saw the
report referred to below for the first time in 2012.
10.7 The report gave due credit to good practice where it occurred and noted
improvements which had taken place over the period of the research. These
a) the raised profile of abuse through prostitution;
b) the revision of the Missing Persons procedure;
c) the post of Sexual Exploitation Co-ordinator was created (though unclear
whether it was ever filled);
d) the Keepsafe project was a valuable initiative;
e) more inter-agency meetings were held to share concerns about young people
affected by exploitation;
f) methods of recording CSE were improved;
g) CSE became a key objective for the ACPC for 2002-2003; and
h) Multi-agency training was provided to a wide range of agencies, but was not
taken up by the Police or local magistrates.
10.8 The examples of poor practice and negative attitudes were far more prevalent. These
a) Awareness of CSE and interest in it were not widespread. Effective interventions
were lacking;
b) Some professionals were working as individuals rather than seeking inter-
agency solutions;
c) Information was not being shared with the Police, and Strategy meetings were
not being called by childrens social care;
d) The 'mapping exercise' devised by Risky Business that cross-referenced a large
amount of data on victims and perpetrators was not well received by the Police.
No charges were brought against alleged perpetrators, nor was any investigation

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e) The Police had responded reluctantly to missing person reports, as a 'waste of
time'. Some young women had been threatened with arrest for wasting police
f) The young women concerned were often seen by the Police as being deviant or
promiscuous. The adult men with whom they were found were not questioned;
g) A database was developed to provide consistent recording of CSE-related
information across agencies. Owing to a dispute between these agencies, it was
not used;
h) Possibly as a result of their experience, parents were often not reporting a
missing child since they saw it as a waste of time;
i) Professionals were reluctant to be named as a source of information in
prosecution, fearing for their safety. Some Police said that if young people were
not prepared to help themselves by making complaints against their abusers and
giving evidence, they would take no further action on the case;
j) Despite ACPC procedures, there was no consistent way of addressing the issue
of CSE. Many professionals were unaware of it; and
k) Some professionals were cautious about working together and sharing
information. Some feared an increase in workload. Some, especially the Police,
made personal judgements about the young women involved.
10.9 According to the researcher, attempts to raise many of the concerns described above
with senior personnel were met with defensiveness and hostility.
10.10 The researcher gave the Inquiry an account of her mounting frustration and concern
at the lack of action to pursue the perpetrators, despite monthly meetings with the
Police at which the project provided intelligence about the men concerned. She also
had concerns regarding the lack of action taken to protect young people at risk and
was conscious that the end of the pilot was in sight, with no positive progress in
these areas. There were continuing incidents of serious abuse being perpetrated
against vulnerable children.
10.11 She described a particular case that was 'the final straw'.
In 2001, a young girl
who had been repeatedly raped had tried to escape her perpetrators but was terrified
of reprisals. They had allegedly put all the windows in at the parental home and
broken both of her brother's legs 'to send a message'. At that point, the child agreed
to make a complaint to the Police. The researcher took her to the police station office
where she would be interviewed in advance in order to familiarise her with the place
and the officer who would be conducting the interview. Whilst there, the girl received
a text from the main perpetrator. He had with him her 11-year old sister. He said
repeatedly to her 'your choice'. The girl did not proceed with the complaint. She
disengaged from the pilot and project and is quoted by the researcher as saying 'you
can't protect me'. This incident raised questions about how the perpetrator knew

This case is also mentioned in Chapter 5. It was one of the case files read independently by the Inquiry team,
and the details given by the researcher were found to be accurate.

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where the young woman was and what she was doing.
10.12 Following this incident, the researcher described how she discussed what to do next
with her manager and others in the project and pilots Steering Committee. It was
agreed that she should put her concerns in writing to the Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire Police and the Rotherham District Commander of Police. This letter was
approved by her manager and the steering group before being hand-delivered to
Rotherham Police Station. The Inquiry had access to this letter. According to the
researcher, this resulted in a meeting with the District Commander and senior
Council officials at which she was instructed never to do such a thing again. The
content of her letter was not discussed.
10.13 Prior to completion of the draft report, the researcher had to submit her data to the
Home Office. When senior Council and police officers saw it, the Council suspended
the researcher on the basis that she had committed 'an act of gross misconduct' by
including in the data minutes of confidential inter-agency meetings. A formal meeting
took place the following week at which the researcher was reinstated after she was
able to show that the minutes had in fact been handed to the Home Office evaluators
by her manager. It was agreed that she would receive a positive reference from the
Council when her temporary contract terminated. The Council also paid for
counselling. She spent the remainder of her time working on policies and procedures,
in a room on her own, forbidden access to the girls involved and not allowed to
attend meetings or have access to further data.
10.14 According to the researcher, a request, made via her manager, from senior council
officials and the District Commander was that she edit the data sent to the Home
Office evaluator, and remove or rewrite several sections that they judged to be
inaccurate or exaggerated. The District Commander had a different recollection,
namely that at the time she suggested editing out any identifying information about
the children involved before the report was circulated to other agencies. The Inquiry
had access to copies of the researchers case studies. These were all appropriately
anonymised to protect the identity of the victims.
10.15 The researcher told the Inquiry that she verified the accuracy of her findings and sent
the report including the Chapter 4 referred to above, to the Home Office evaluators
and senior officials on the last day of her employment, without incorporating any of
the changes proposed by the officers concerned. Funding for the second year of the
pilot was withheld by the Home Office and Rotherham was excluded from the final
research report because of implementation problems.
10.16 The District Commander of Police (2001-2005) remembered the 'Home Office' report,
and its criticisms of the Police, but recalled nothing of any 'row' surrounding it, nor
anything to do with action taken against the researcher. The Head of Function for
Safeguarding at the time and several others, including the Chief Executive (see
Chapter 11), recalled the Police and senior Council officers as being very angry

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about it.
10.17 The researcher's line-manager, who chaired the meeting to discuss the alleged gross
misconduct thought the whole incident had been badly handled and the researcher
had been very badly treated. She confirmed that there was a great deal of personal
hostility and anger towards the researcher and her work on the part of senior people.
10.18 Much of what was contained in this report, and in particular the criticisms and
concerns of the research officer, has been confirmed by the Inquiry from other
sources. The Inquiry case-file reading exercise covered six out of those ten cases
that formed her case studies. Apart from a very small number of minor details (e.g. a
slight variation in the date of an event), we found the cases studies to be entirely
consistent with our own reading of the files, and we considered them to evidence a
high standard of professional judgement and accuracy. The secrecy around this
report, the discrepancies in the accounts we received from senior people and the
treatment of the researcher were all deeply troubling to the Inquiry team. They have
inevitably led to suspicion of collusion and intended cover-up. If the senior people
concerned had paid more attention to the content of the report, more might have
been done to help children who were being violently exploited and abused.
Reports by Dr Angie Heal, Strategic Drugs Analyst
a) Sexual Exploitation, Drug Use and Drug Dealing: Current Situation in South
Yorkshire (2003)
b) Violence and Gun Crime: Links with Sexual Exploitation, Prostitution and
Drug Markets in South Yorkshire (2006).
10.19 In 2002, South Yorkshire Police and their partners appointed Dr Angie Heal, a
strategic drugs analyst, to carry out research on drug use, drug dealing and related
problems in the county. She was based with South Yorkshire Police and did this
research in the period 2002-2006. She produced several 'stand alone reports,
including the two referred to here, as well as six-monthly updates. The two reports
had a similar format of looking at the overall position in South Yorkshire, as well as
examining each of the four policing areas separately i.e. Rotherham, Doncaster,
Barnsley and Sheffield.
10.20 As a minimum, these reports went to each South Yorkshire Police District
Commander, Chief Superintendents and Superintendents in Specialist Crime
Services (CID) and Community Safety. They also went to Drug Action Coordinators,
NHS and voluntary sector drug agencies as well as organisations working with
children and adults involved in exploitation and prostitution. They also went to the
Central Government office for the North East. Latterly, they were also sent to the
Partnership Police Inspectors who were attached to each local authority Community
Safety Partnership, as well as the Principal Community Safety Officers in each of the
local authorities in the county. It became clear to Dr Heal at an early stage that there
were important links between drugs, drug dealing and child sexual exploitation, which

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she continued to highlight to her funding partners in her reports and updates
throughout her employment as a researcher.
10.21 In November 2004, a presentation on sexual exploitation was made to the
Rotherham Executive Group for Children and Young People's Services. According to
Council papers, the information pack provided to those attending drew on Dr Heal's
2003 report, as well as two other relevant documents. The Inquiry asked the
Council if the 2003 report had been considered by the Council, and the response was
that no reference to the report could be found.
10.22 The main findings of the 2003 report were:
a) most of the men in South Yorkshire who were involved in the sexual exploitation
of young people for the purposes of prostitution were also believed to be
involved in drug dealing. They might also be involved in rape, violence, gun
crime, robbery and other serious criminal offences;
b) Rotherham was described as not having a 'street scene' but there were a
'significant number of girls and some boys who are being sexually exploited';
c) Some of the young women who were being sexually exploited were subject to
violence, rape, gang rape, kidnap, carrying drugs, dealing drugs, and found in
situations where firearms were present;
d) Four brothers who had been targeting young women for their own and others'
gratification were identified as the main focus of concern for Risky Business;
e) The Police recalled one 12-year old who described being taken to a hotel by
some men and being made to watch while her 14-year old sister had sex with
them. They spoke of another young girl who was doused in petrol as a threat
against reporting sexual offences. Another 14-year old was selling drugs for one
of the main perpetrators, who had been very violent towards her and her mother.
This man's brother tried to strangle another young girl;
f) A significant number of the girls involved got pregnant; and
g) Anger, depression and acts of self-harm by the girls involved were evident in
many from a very early stage.
10.23 The main findings of the 2006 report were:
a) The situation in 2006 in Rotherham was described as continuing 'as it has done
for a number of years', with an established sexual exploitation scene which was
very organised and involved systematic physical and sexual violence against
young women;
b) It also involved young women being trafficked to other towns and cities
predominantly in the north;
c) The level of intimidation, physical beatings and rape amongst exploited girls was
considered by multi-agency staff to be very severe and their situation to be very
serious. None of the perpetrators were believed to use substances which would
contribute to such levels of violence;

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d) It was reported that a number of workers in the town involved with the issue
believed that one of the difficulties which prevented CSE being dealt with
effectively was the ethnicity of the perpetrators;
e) The author emphasised the importance of the attitude taken to these crimes and
to the victims, particularly by the Police and childrens social care;
f) The most significant recent development had been a rise in reports of guns
being seen rather than used by men involved in CSE in Rotherham and
Sheffield; and
g) There had been a high-profile media campaign about the trafficking from Eastern
Europe of young women and girls for the purposes of prostitution. Whilst
laudable in itself, the abuse of local girls for the same purpose appeared to be
largely ignored.

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11. Issues of ethnicity

Issues of ethnicity related to child sexual exploitation have been discussed in other
reports, including the Home Affairs Select Committee report, and the report of the
Childrens Commissioner. Within the Council, we found no evidence of childrens
social care staff being influenced by concerns about the ethnic origins of suspected
perpetrators when dealing with individual child protection cases, including CSE. In
the broader organisational context, however, there was a widespread perception that
messages conveyed by some senior people in the Council and also the Police, were
to 'downplay' the ethnic dimensions of CSE. Unsurprisingly, frontline staff appeared
to be confused as to what they were supposed to say and do and what would be
interpreted as 'racist'. From a political perspective, the approach of avoiding public
discussion of the issues was ill judged.

There was too much reliance by agencies on traditional community leaders such as
elected members and imams as being the primary conduit of communication with the
Pakistani-heritage community. The Inquiry spoke to several Pakistani-heritage
women who felt disenfranchised by this and thought it was a barrier to people coming
forward to talk about CSE. Others believed there was wholesale denial of the problem
in the Pakistani-heritage community in the same way that other forms of abuse were
ignored. Representatives of women's groups were frustrated that interpretations of
the Borough's problems with CSE were often based on an assumption that similar
abuse did not take place in their own community and therefore concentrated mainly
on young white girls.

Both women and men from the community voiced strong concern that other than two
meetings in 2011, there had been no direct engagement with them about CSE over the
past 15 years, and this needed to be addressed urgently, rather than 'tiptoeing'
around the issue.

Ethnic Minorities and Safeguarding Issues
11.1 Census information from 2011 showed that Rotherham had nearly 8000 people with
Pakistani or Kashmiri ethnicity, or 3.1% of the Borough population, an increase from
2% in the previous census. 77% of this population lived in one of three central wards
of Rotherham. There are eight mosques in Rotherham. There were few references in
any minutes to ethnic minorities or migrant families until 2006, when concern was
raised at the Safeguarding Board about the living conditions of migrant families.
Young people were thought to be at risk of physical or sexual abuse for a variety of
reasons. Some had been separated from their own families. There were also issues
of poverty, forced marriage and child abduction. In the early months of 2005, twelve
cases of forced marriage had been dealt with in Rotherham - the highest in the South
Yorkshire Police area. Of particular concern was the young age of many of the girls
11.2 As has been stated many times before, there is no simple link between race and
child sexual exploitation, and across the UK the greatest numbers of perpetrators of
CSE are white men. The second largest category, according to the Children's
Commissioner's report, are those from a minority ethnic background, particularly

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those recorded as 'Asian'. In Rotherham, the majority of known perpetrators were of
Pakistani heritage including the five men convicted in 2010. The file reading carried
out by the Inquiry also confirmed that the ethnic origin of many perpetrators was
Asian. In one major case in the mid-2000s, the convicted perpetrator was Afghan.
Latterly, some child victims of CSE and some perpetrators had originated from the
Roma Slovak community, with a steady increase in the number of child protection
cases involving Roma children, though mainly in the category of neglect. Work with
Roma families was one of the six priorities of the Child Sexual Exploitation sub-group
of the Safeguarding Board in 2012. The Roma population in Rotherham was
proportionately much larger than in bigger areas such as Bradford and Manchester.
11.3 By March 2012, the child protection profile was showing that Rotherham had more
than double the English average for Roma Slovak families being referred under
Section 47 of the Children Act 1989.
The Early Years
11.4 Dr Heal, in her 2003 report, stated that 'In Rotherham the local Asian community are
reported to rarely speak about them [the perpetrators].' The subject was taboo and
local people were probably equally frightened of the violent tendencies of the
perpetrators as the young women they were abusing. In her 2006 report she
described how the appeal of organised sexual exploitation for Asian gangs had
changed. In the past, it had been for their personal gratification, whereas now it
offered 'career and financial opportunities to young Asian men who got involved.
She also noted that Iraqi Kurds and Kosovan men were participating in organised
activities against young women.
11.5 In her 2006 report, she stated that 'it is believed by a number of workers that one of
the difficulties that prevent this issue [CSE] being dealt with effectively is the ethnicity
of the main perpetrators'.
11.6 She also reported in 2006 that young people in Rotherham believed at that time that
the Police dared not act against Asian youths for fear of allegations of racism. This
perception was echoed at the present time by some young people we met during the
Inquiry, but was not supported by specific examples.
11.7 Several people interviewed expressed the general view that ethnic considerations
had influenced the policy response of the Council and the Police, rather than in
individual cases. One example was given by the Risky Business project Manager
(1997- 2012) who reported that she was told not to refer to the ethnic origins of
perpetrators when carrying out training. Other staff in childrens social care said that
when writing reports on CSE cases, they were advised by their managers to be
cautious about referring to the ethnicity of the perpetrators.

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Officer Involvement
11.8 All the senior officers we interviewed were asked whether ethnic considerations
influenced their decision making. All were unequivocal that this did not happen.
However, several of those involved in the operational management of services
reported some attempts to pressurise them into changing their approach to some
issues. This mainly affected the support given to Pakistani-heritage women fleeing
domestic violence, where a small number of councillors had demanded that social
workers reveal the whereabouts of these women or effect reconciliation rather than
supporting the women to make up their own minds. The Inquiry team was confident
that ethnic issues did not influence professional decision-making in individual cases.
11.9 Frontline staff did not report personal experience of attempts to influence their
practice or decision making because of ethnic issues. Those who had involvement in
CSE were acutely aware of these issues and recalled a general nervousness in the
earlier years about discussing them, for fear of being thought racist.
11.10 Good work was done by officers in developing a protocol on child protection issues in
the mosques in 2008. Each mosque appointed a designated person responsible for
child protection, and training was provided for imams and others. The current chair of
the Rotherham Council of Mosques had made strenuous efforts to widen
representation on his Council to include women and demonstrated a strong personal
commitment to dealing with child protection and CSE. He was disappointed not to
have had any contact from the Safeguarding Board in the past, but was encouraged
by recent discussions.
Political Engagement.
11.11 The issue of race, regardless of ethnic group, should be tackled as an absolute
priority if it is known to be a significant factor in the criminal activity of organised
abuse in any local community. There was little evidence of such action being taken
in Rotherham in the earlier years. Councillors can play an effective role in this,
especially those representing the communities in question, but only if they act as
facilitators of communication rather than barriers to it. One senior officer suggested
that some influential Pakistani-heritage councillors in Rotherham had acted as
11.12 Several councillors interviewed believed that by opening up these issues they could
be 'giving oxygen' to racist perspectives that might in turn attract extremist political
groups and threaten community cohesion. To some extent this concern was valid,
with the apparent targeting of the town by groups such as the English Defence
League. The Deputy Council Leader (2011-2014) from the Pakistani-heritage
community was clear that he had not understood the scale of the CSE problem in
Rotherham until 2013. He then disagreed with colleague elected members on the
way to approach it. He had advocated taking the issue 'head on' but had been
overruled. He was one of the elected members who said they thought the criminal

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convictions in 2010 were 'a one-off, isolated case', and not an example of a more
deep-rooted problem of Pakistani-heritage perpetrators targeting young white girls.
This was at best nave, and at worst ignoring a politically inconvenient truth.
11.13 Both the Council and the Police used traditional channels of communication with the
Pakistani-heritage community for many years on general issues of child protection.
There seemed, from all accounts, to be very few, if any, specific discussions of CSE,
though this was difficult to verify. These contacts were almost exclusively with men.
Pakistani-heritage Women and Girls
11.14 One of the local Pakistani women's groups described how Pakistani-heritage girls
were targeted by taxi drivers and on occasion by older men lying in wait outside
school gates at dinner times and after school. They also cited cases in Rotherham
where Pakistani landlords had befriended Pakistani women and girls on their own for
purposes of sex, then passed on their name to other men who had then contacted
them for sex. The women and girls feared reporting such incidents to the Police
because it would affect their future marriage prospects.
11.15 The UK Muslim Women's Network produced a report on CSE in September 2013
which drew on 35 case studies of women from across the UK who were victims, the
majority of whom were Muslim. It highlighted that Asian girls were being sexually
exploited where authorities were failing to identify or support them. They were most
vulnerable to men from their own communities who manipulated cultural norms to
prevent them from reporting their abuse. It described how this abuse was being
carried out. 'Offending behaviour mostly involved men operating in groups . . . The
victim was being passed around and prostituted amongst many other men. Our
research also showed that complex grooming hierarchies were at play. The physical
abuse included oral, anal and vaginal rape; role play; insertion of objects into the
vagina; severe beatings; burning with cigarettes; tying down; enacting rape that
included ripping clothes off and sexual activity over the webcam.' This description
mirrors the abuse committed by Pakistani-heritage perpetrators on white girls in
11.16 The Deputy Children's Commissioners report reached a similar conclusion to the
Muslim Women's Network research, stating 'one of these myths was that only white
girls are victims of sexual exploitation by Asian or Muslim males, as if these men only
abuse outside of their own community, driven by hatred and contempt for white
females. This belief flies in the face of evidence that shows that those who violate
children are most likely to target those who are closest to them and most easily
accessible.' The Home Affairs Select Committee quoted witnesses saying that cases
of Asian men grooming Asian girls did not come to light because victims 'are often
alienated and ostracised by their own families and by the whole community, if they go
public with allegations of abuse.'

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11.17 With hindsight, it is clear that women and girls in the Pakistani community in
Rotherham should have been encouraged and empowered by the authorities to
speak out about perpetrators and their own experiences as victims of sexual
exploitation, so often hidden from sight. The Safeguarding Board has recently
received a presentation from a local Pakistani women's group about abuse within
their community. The Board should address as a priority the under-reporting of
exploitation and abuse in minority ethnic communities. We recommend that the
relevant agencies immediately initiate dialogue about CSE with minority ethnic
communities, and in particular with the Pakistani-heritage community. This should be
done in consultation with local women's groups, and should develop strategies that
support young women and girls from the community to participate without fear or

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12. Workforce Strategy and Financial Resources

From 2009, the Council achieved a significant reversal of its long-standing vacancy
problems with the development of an effective workforce strategy. The Council was
coping with severe cost pressures as a result of cutbacks and other changes to local
authority funding. Despite this, it has protected expenditure on childrens
safeguarding and improved its position from the lowest spend per head to the
average, when compared with its benchmarking partners. At the time of the Inquiry it
was facing a very difficult budgetary position for the foreseeable future.

Recruitment, Retention and Workforce Development
12.1 From the early 2000s, Rotherham started to experience problems in the recruitment
of social workers, whilst facing budgetary pressures, high levels of demand, and
increasing complexity of work, including CSE. The Social Services Inspectorate
commented in a 2003 report on the serious vacancy levels, and there were regular
reports to the Lead Member on the impact on services of staff shortages. This
became very acute in 2008-09.
12.2 The present Executive Director of Children's Services recalled that at the time of her
appointment in 2008 the vacancy rate was at its worst at 43%. At the time of the
Ofsted inspection in 2009, it was in excess of 37% of the establishment posts and
more than one in every two team manager posts was also vacant. Both social worker
and manager unfilled posts were covered by agency staff, with the additional
expense and other difficulties this created. There is no doubt that these workforce
problems lay at the core of the quality of practice issues judged to be 'inadequate' by
12.3 In parallel with this there was a shortage of experienced children and families' social
workers in the wider marketplace. In Rotherham, in keeping with other councils, there
was a stable group of social workers in specialist posts such as Fostering and
Adoption, but a deficit in the frontline child protection and children in need posts.
12.4 The DfE set targets for Rotherham to reduce its vacancy rate to 15% or less by
December 2010. The Council was successful in meeting these targets and for the
last three years it has maintained a low vacancy rate. For 2013 this was 4%, against
an all England average of 12%.
12.5 There were several elements to the development of the Council's successful
workforce strategy. One has been the systematic strengthening of links with the local
universities which train social workers, with specific targeting of children's social work
in the provision of practice placements. This was in recognition of the fact that good
local authority placements often lead newly qualifying workers to work for that
authority. Social workers we spoke to commented that their lecturers at university
recommended Rotherham very highly for placements because of the quality of
experience they would receive.

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12.6 Another important strand in the retention strategy was investment in intensive
support of newly qualified social workers. This approach, entitled the Assessed and
Supported Year in Employment, involves caseload protection and the use of Social
Work Practice Consultants, who enhance the traditional line management
supervision process. The feedback from social workers about this support was
extremely positive.
12.7 A third element in the strategy was the Council's investment in Continuous
Professional Development, which offered team managers sponsorship to undertake
the University of Sheffield's MA in professional practice, as well as other personalised
learning options, including Team Manager Learning Sets.
12.8 The Council deserves recognition for its successful 'turnaround' in vacancy rates,
which has created a stable workforce and significantly reduced reliance on agency
staff. This was due to a carefully planned and implemented workforce strategy. The
social workers and team managers we met spoke highly of Rotherham as an
employer, and especially about the learning and development opportunities they had.
All would recommend it as a place to work.
Financial Resources
12.9 For the earlier years of the Inquiry, the department of social services had an
integrated budget for children and adults. Few financial records were available,
specifically about children's social care. However, other reports provide some
relevant data.

12.10 For the period 2000/01 to 2002/03:
a) the budget for children's social care, whilst increasing in cash terms, decreased
in its proportion of the total budget for social services by 0.7 per cent;
b) in the same period the children's social care budget had been overspent by
nearly a million pounds in two years. This was largely explained by unpredictable
levels of expenditure on placements for children outside the Borough;
c) the Council had progressively increased its children's social care budget
compared with the Standard Spending Assessment (SSA) but the percentage
expenditure was still below the England average, placing Rotherham third lowest
in its comparator group; and
d) gross expenditure on looked after children was just above the national average
but the numbers of LAC were some 26% above the national average.
12.11 The SSI report from which the above data was drawn concluded that patterns of
expenditure in children's social care did not promote preventive services.
12.12 Financial records available thereafter show that from 2005/2008:

Social Services Inspectorate Report Feb 2003, & Rotherham data sources.

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a) the Children and Young People 's Safeguarding budget performed more or less
on target;
b) from then to 2012/13, there were overspends in every year;
c) savings taken from this line year on year were disproportionately lower than the
percentage taken from other Council services, and investments in children's
services were significantly higher; and
d) in the 2014/15 financial year there were no planned investments for any Council
12.13 The combined effect of changes to local authority funding in England has been a
dramatic reduction in resources available to Rotherham and neighbouring Councils.
By 2016, Rotherham will have lost 33% of its spending power in real terms compared
to 2010/11. The comparison for the whole of England is a reduction of 20%, and for
a Council like Buckinghamshire, only 4.5% reduction. These figures highlight the
extreme pressure that reductions in public spending are placing on Councils such as
Rotherham, which is faced with high demands for vulnerable children and families
services, associated with significant levels of poverty and deprivation.
12.14 The report commissioned by the Council and NHS Rotherham from Children First in
2009 considered the issue of Childrens Services funding in some depth, drawing on
2008/09 data. Amongst it conclusions were:
a) the Council had invested considerably in school provision, health and foster care
b) with the exception of adoption services, spending on children's social care was
c) spending on looked after children was especially low, possibly risky;
d) at the same time the activity levels for children's social care showed referrals to
be very high, but accompanied by lower levels of assessments and reviews;
e) in comparison to the benchmarking group of authorities, expenditure on
residential, fostering and family support services was in the lower quartile; and
f) the additional needs of Slovakian/Roma children and families should be
reviewed each year.
12.15 The reports available to the Inquiry did not tell us how well senior managers
quantified unmet need and its associated costs or whether this information was
presented to members in each annual budget. It was therefore hard to determine if
council members had a realistic understanding of the cost of meeting the needs of
vulnerable children, the impact of rising demand, and the fact that funding in
Rotherham was at a very low base.
12.16 The Executive Director of Children's Services (2008 to date) thought that in the past
too much emphasis had been placed by senior safeguarding staff on financial
resources being the solution to all of the service's problems, rather than also looking
at what could be done to improve efficiency and practice. The Lead Member for

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Children and Young People's Services (2005-2009) indicated he had become
increasingly concerned about the underfunding of safeguarding services during his
time in office, and was frustrated by the lack of response to this from other members.
12.17 From 2009 the Council demonstrated support for the Children and Young People's
Service and particularly children's safeguarding by affording the service protection in
extremely difficult budgetary circumstances. Budgeted expenditure on Rotherham
childrens social care increased in real terms by 31.8% in the four years to 2013.
This compared with an average increase of 2.6% for its benchmarking group.
increase in expenditure on childrens safeguarding is reflected in its relative position
in the benchmarking group. In the four years to 2013/4, it went from having the
lowest spend (406 per child) to being at the median of the group (604 per child).
12.18 Spend on youth services has been severely reduced from 2.4m in 2010/11 to
1.85m in 2012/13.

Rotherhams statistical neighbours or benchmarking comparators for childrens safeguarding services include
Barnsley, Tameside, Wigan, Wakefield, St Helens, Redcar and Cleveland, Doncaster, Dudley, Telford and
Wrekin and Hartlepool.

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13. The Role of Elected Members and Senior Officers of
the Council

In the early years there seems to have been a prevalent denial of the existence of
child sexual exploitation in the Borough, let alone its increasing incidence and
dangers. By 2005, it is hard to believe that any senior officers or members from the
Leader and the Chief Executive downwards, were not aware of the issue. Most
members showed little obvious leadership or interest in CSE for much of the period
under review apart from their continued support for Risky Business. The possible
reasons for this are not clear but may include denial that this could occur in
Rotherham, concern that the ethnic element could damage community cohesion,
worry about reputational risk to the Borough if the issue was brought fully into the
public domain, and the belief that if that occurred, it might compromise police

For much of the time, senior officers did little to keep members fully informed of the
scale and seriousness of the problem, on occasion telling members they believed it
was exaggerated. In the early years a small group of frontline professionals from the
Council, the Police and Health worked together on CSE, both on individual cases and
on issues such as multi-agency procedures. They alerted senior staff to the scale of
the abuse but were met with disbelief and left with little management support for the
good work they were trying to do. There are reports that senior staff conveyed that
sexual exploitation and the ethnicity of perpetrators should be played down. This
seemed to be reinforced by the Police. The source of this attitude cannot easily be
identified. Concern about the resources CSE could consume; greater priority given to
the protection of younger children; professional jealousies, and personal attitudes of
some Council staff and the Police towards the girls involved have all been cited as
reasons for the failure to address the seriousness and scale of the problem.

The prevailing culture at the most senior level of the Council, until 2009, as described
by several people, was bullying and 'macho', and not an appropriate climate in which
to discuss the rape and sexual exploitation of young people. From late 2009, the Chief
Executive and the Lead Member took a strong personal interest in tackling child
sexual exploitation.

13.1 This chapter examines the leadership and management contribution of elected
members and senior officers of the Council during the period 1997 - 2013, and how
their actions may have impacted on the way in which CSE was handled within the
The Chief Executives
13.2 From 1997 to date, there were five chief executives of the Council, plus one other
who 'acted up' in the role for brief periods. All were interviewed in the course of the
Inquiry. Three issues were common to all their statements. These were:
a) that the overriding priority of the Council for much of that time was economic
regeneration and addressing unemployment;
b) that the Council rarely had enough resources to meet the needs of its population;

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c) that the service priority for improvement in the earlier years was education, and
particularly schools.
13.3 The two chief executives in post until 2000 could recall nothing about CSE being an
issue during their tenure.
13.4 The Chief Executive (2001-2003) described himself as 'genuinely shocked and
surprised' at what had emerged in Rotherham. He had no recollection of it being a
major issue. His memory of the Risky Business project was also slight, regarding it
as being on the margins of the Council's activity. He did recall that the Home Office
research and report were treated as 'anecdotal, using partial information and not
methodologically sound' and that the Police were very angry about it.
13.5 His successor (2004-2009) was aware of Risky Business and the presentations that
were made to Council members and others. Taking account of the advice he
received, he recognised that there was a problem of CSE in Rotherham but he had
no reason to believe that the problem was greater than anywhere else. He had a
vague recollection about the 'Task and Finish' group, chaired by the Council Leader.
He did not recall hearing of Angie Heal 's reports in 2003 and 2006. He was the first
chair of the Rotherham Children's Safeguarding Board, for a period of 18 months, but
CSE did not feature much in the Board's work at that time. He described tensions
amongst the main agencies, mostly between the NHS and childrens social care.
There were stark differences in thresholds for intervention, in which CSE was not
mentioned as a priority. A main focus of his time in office as Chief Executive was to
improve external partnership working, which he believed had been achieved by 2009.
External partnership had been 'poor' with the Council perceived as overbearing and
too dominant. He believed that relations with the Police, and other agencies, had
improved markedly during his five years. He could not recall his Director of Education
raising concerns with him in 2004 about the police response to problems in
secondary schools, as referred to below.
13.6 The present Chief Executive took up post in October 2009. He reported that at the
time of his appointment, CSE was not mentioned by members as one of the key
challenges he would face. Nor did the previous Chief Executive alert him to the issue.
Nor were other major problems such as the Council's budget crisis raised. The
Ofsted report that led to the Government putting the Council's childrens safeguarding
services into 'intervention' in December 2009 did not specifically mention CSE. He
knew about it in the context of safeguarding, and Operation Central. He also became
aware of the issue at the time of the murder of Child S, when the senior investigating
police involved were adamant that it was not linked to CSE, but was an honour
killing. That was the message that the Council Leader followed. The next relevant
event for him was Operation Chard, in which there were 11 arrests but no
13.7 His own early assessment was that the Council was not self aware or willing to face
all of the problems it had. The approach generally was 'not to rock the boat'. When

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he arrived, he thought that the whole of childrens social care seemed to be in denial
about its problems. Several people confirmed that the Chief Executive took a direct
interest in the change and improvement process required in the Children and Young
People's Service from 2010 onwards. Several managers described the Chief
Executive, the Lead Member and the Executive Director of Children's Services as
having provided excellent support during a difficult period.
Children and Young People's Services
13.8 From 1997 to 2005, there was a Department of Social Services in the Council.
Following legislation, children's and adult social services were split, and children's
social care was combined with education, to form a Department of Children's
Services. There was one Director of Social Services in post from the late 1990s until
2005, and two subsequent Directors of Children's Services, the second of whom is in
post at the time of writing. All were interviewed for the Inquiry.
13.9 From 2004 to 2009, there was one Director of Safeguarding. From 2009 to date,
there have been four post holders, with a fifth appointed to take up post from August
13.10 All of the above were interviewed for the Inquiry with the exception of one of the
Directors of Safeguarding.
13.11 From the late 1990s, there was an increasing knowledge and awareness of CSE
amongst a small number of frontline staff. The multi-agency Key Players Group was
set up to maintain an overview of the situation and continued until 2003. It was
chaired by the ACPC Child Protection Co-ordinator. They discussed individual cases
and also tried to map networks of perpetrators from available intelligence. None of
the minutes of meetings of this group have survived, as referred to previously in this
13.12 We spoke to some members of the Key Players Group, and gained the impression of
dedicated professional people who understood the severity of the problem and were
not listened to. They drafted the first set of inter-agency procedures for CSE, which
were adopted by the Area Child Protection Committee. They had high hopes that this
recognition was going to lead to senior people in their agencies giving the issue more
attention and more resources. It did not. 'From then on, it all seemed to go
backwards. You were made to feel you were making a fuss about these girls, said
one member. There was general disbelief in the problem they described. Senior
managers 'slimmed down' the membership and revised the remit, and another
opportunity was lost for the agencies concerned to confront the true scale of the
issue and give it the support it needed.
13.13 In 2001-2002, the Director of Education (2001-2005) was one of the first senior
officers to raise concerns about CSE with the Police. The heads of three secondary
schools had told her of their concerns about young girls being picked up at the school

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gates by taxi drivers and their suspicions were that this was for the purpose of abuse.
Police watched the schools in unmarked cars for a period of time but the problem
persisted. She described raising this three times with the Police at a senior level. On
the last occasion she described how she was shown a map of the north of England
overlaid with various crime networks including 'Drugs', 'Guns', and ' Murder'. She was
told that the Police were only interested in putting resources into catching 'the ring
leaders' who perpetrated these crimes. She was told that if they were caught, her
local problems would cease. She found this an unacceptable response, which
ignored the abuse of children. Her Chair at the time also raised the issue with the
Police, according to this officer. The District Commander (2001-2005) could not recall
these conversations but was aware of the police action with secondary schools.
13.14 From an early stage, children's social care managers seemed reluctant to accept the
extent of the problem of CSE within the Borough. There were constant difficulties
over the allocation of referrals from Risky Business. In 2004, the Sexual Exploitation
Forum minutes indicated concerns raised by Risky Business that some referrals they
were making to childrens social care were being reclassified e.g.'Teenager out of
control'. A further minuted example was that of a project worker attempting to make
a referral and being told that she had to have witnessed the incident herself as third
party information would not be accepted. The long-standing tensions between the
Risky Business project and childrens social care are described in Chapter 9. As
already stated, the clear responsibility for resolving these tensions lay with those in
charge of childrens social care and youth services, who failed to do so over many
13.15 From 2003 onwards, Directors of Safeguarding were regularly reporting problems
with recruitment and retention of social workers in a series of reports to their Lead
13.16 They described the negative impact this was having on services. These acute
staffing problems persisted in one form or another until 2010. A 2003 Social Services
Inspectorate report found that core services were under pressure and this was 'not
fully appreciated by the Council'. This was compounded by staff vacancies.
Children's social care received one star gradings in 2003 and 2004.
13.17 In 2004, a report was taken to the Cabinet Member for Social Services advising that
vacancy levels meant that it was not possible to allocate a number of cases, and that
the budget would be overspent. It was recommended that monthly rather than
quarterly reports be submitted in order to monitor concerns.
13.18 In December 2005, a joint paper from Police and Children and Young People's
Services was taken to the Safeguarding Board proposing significant changes to the
Rotherham service delivery response to CSE. It was recommended that Risky
Business become a multi agency resource by September 2006, and that the Sexual
Exploitation Forum become more strategic, limiting the discussion of individual

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cases. It was also agreed that the Forum would produce an Annual Report each
13.19 The Police carried out an audit of 87 files in 2005, which resulted in them proposing
that large numbers of girls be removed from the Sexual Exploitation Forum
monitoring process. Risky Business challenged the factual accuracy and
completeness of some of the information in the audit, raising serious concerns about
many of the girls involved, where it was recommended they be removed from
monitoring. The Police reason for removing several girls from monitoring was they
were pregnant or had given birth. All looked after children were removed from the list.
Several of the cases removed from monitoring were read by the Inquiry and we found
Risky Business concerns to be valid. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the
Police, supported by children's social care, were intent on reducing the number of
names on Forum monitoring for CSE.
13.20 The minutes of the Sexual Exploitation Forum in 2005 and 2006 showed continuing
tensions between Risky Business and children's social care over the removal of girls
from Forum monitoring if they became child protection cases or were followed up by
childrens social care. There were also concerns recorded about Strategy meetings
not being convened when Risky Business requested them. A report to the
Safeguarding Board in June 2007 stated that there were no children on the Child
Protection Register due to issues of sexual exploitation and only two children looked
after by the local authority had been identified as at risk of sexual exploitation. Given
the large number of referrals for CSE known about within the statutory agencies at
that time, and the seriousness of the circumstances of individual children, confirmed
by the Inquiry's file reading, these figures suggest that the council was failing to use
its statutory powers to protect these children. There is no record in the minutes of any
challenge to these figures.
13.21 By 2008-09, more committed and focused leadership of CSE was apparent in the
CYPS. The appointment in 2007 of a part time lead for CSE contributed to this. The
person appointed was seen by all of those involved as a positive influence on the
difficulties between Risky Business and the children's social care staff, especially in
getting individual cases allocated. She was described by one interviewee as
providing 'a straight pathway to social work.
13.22 She told the Inquiry that it was certainly conveyed by senior managers in the CYP
service that the extent of CSE was being exaggerated. A divide amongst senior
managers was also obvious. CSE was not seen as a priority at that time, especially
by some operational locality managers, who also thought Risky Business were
exaggerating, and had a high volume of competing priorities to meet. Her
unequivocal view was that the project accurately reflected the scale and seriousness
of the problem, even if their presentation was sometimes unorthodox.
13.23 From 2005 onwards, the post of Director of Safeguarding was the strategic and

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operational head of the children and families service, reporting to the Executive
Director of Children's Services, who should be assumed to have owned overarching
responsibility for the service response to CSE. However, in the structure of children's
services at that time, others at the same level had their own interests and
responsibilities that overlapped with safeguarding, such as the directors for
performance management and youth services. There were seven directors in total.
'A lot of in-fighting' amongst them was reported to the Inquiry. In the present
structure, there are two directors reporting to the Executive Director of Children's
13.24 The Children Act (2004) required all local authorities to establish integrated childrens
services by April 2008. The Director of Childrens Services (2005 2008) continued
the development programme initiated by her predecessor. This was a local
interpretation of the vision contained in the Government guidance Every Child
Matters. The focus was on the delivery of co-located services and management
within localities. Seven localities were created, each with two managers who
supervised childrens social care. It appeared that frontline staff whose jobs were
affected were not ready for the culture change that the reorganisation required. This
reorganisation was reported to consume a large amount of staff time and energy. It
was seen by some, both internally and in outside agencies, as diverting staff from
their core function of delivering quality services. It began in 2005 and was not
concluded by the time the Director of Childrens Services left in 2008. At that point,
integration of frontline services was still in progress. Some of the managers
appointed were not professionally qualified social workers and some who were
lacked child protection experience.
13.25 The Annual Performance Assessment letter for Children and Young Peoples
Services in 2005 stated that staff turnover and sickness absence in social services
were too high. This was addressed by various recruitment initiatives. By 2007,
turnover of social workers had improved and vacancy levels had dropped to 14%, but
this was not sustained. In mid-2008, the vacancy rate was reported as over 40% at
its worst, and in 2009 was 37%.
13.26 The Ofsted Joint Area Review report in 2006 was very positive. However, it
contained the astonishing statement that it appeared that vulnerable children and
young people are kept safe from abuse and exploitation. This was not qualified in
any way. From the evidence described in Chapter 5 of this report, this was not an
accurate reflection of the situation, and may have served to give false reassurance to
those running the service.
13.27 Ofsteds evaluation of childrens social care, which had been previously rated as
Good, started to decline. In the period April 2007 March 2008, covered by the
2008 Annual Performance Assessment, it was judged overall as Adequate.
Specifically, Management of Children and Young Peoples Services was judged
Adequate. Important weaknesses included that management oversight of looked

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after children had not ensured they had been fully safeguarded.
13.28 Set against a background of rising demand, high vacancies amongst social workers
and their managers, and reliance on agency staff to cover frontline posts, the
persistence with the reorganisation at that time might be seen as ill judged. Several
managers described the situation around 2007 onwards as chaotic. Other frontline
staff expressed the same view; the service appeared to have lacked the capacity to
implement a radical and highly complex reorganisation; and there was co-location but
no agreed line management arrangements. Waiting for the formal transfer of staff to
be agreed created organisational inertia, according to some. In the end the process
was not completed.
13.29 The current Executive Director of Children's Services had supported the integration
model of her predecessor but in 2009 determined it was not working and that 'the
basics' were not right. The Council and NHS Rotherham commissioned Children First
to carry out an external review of children's services. Reporting in May 2009, one of
the overall findings of the review was that 'Recent restructures have served to create
a complex and excessive number of teams and panels, which can lead to confusion
and increase risk. These require urgent rationalisation so that management lines
and performance accountabilities are absolutely clear and understood. The number
of panels relating to vulnerable children must be reviewed and rationalised to ensure
clarity, simplicity and manageable structures for all staff.'
13.30 The 2009 report also looked at Rotherham's resourcing of children's services, in
comparison to its benchmarking group. It found that the Council had very high levels
of expenditure on schools and nursery schools, but in contrast spending on most
children's social care services was relatively low, with spend on looked after children
especially low. The report questioned whether the resourcing of some high-risk
services was sufficient.
13.31 The first police operation in Rotherham to address multiple perpetrators of CSE was
Operation Central, in 2008. This was commended by many as an excellent example
of joint working between the Council and the Police.
13.32 Following the success of Operation Central, in 2009 the Police initiated Operation
Czar. On this occasion, children's social care would take a leading role and Risky
Business was told to close all its cases of young people who were to be included in
this Operation as childrens social care would allocate them to social workers. Apart
from the questionable practice of fracturing the relationships of these girls with Risky
Business staff, the evidence from file reading showed that some of those victims
were amongst the most serious cases of child sexual exploitation.
13.33 Operation Czar was not a success. It is not clear who precisely amongst the senior
officers took the decision to involve children's social care as the lead, without proper
preparation at the frontline, but it proved unwise in the event. The Executive Director

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of Children's Services (2008 to date) described how they 'tried to use the same
methodology and approach as Central, but it didn't work'. She was asked to secure
funding for two extra social workers for the operation, which she did.
13.34 Children's social care staff had no previous experience of this activity. The girls did
not trust them. They removed some of these girls from home and then returned them
within days, and many became closed cases very quickly after the Operation was
over, leaving them with no support. One young social worker involved described the
authority as 'a scary place to be in 2009'. She was 21, newly qualified and had never
had a practice placement in a local authority. About Operation Czar, she said
nobody knew what they were supposed to be doing. Just firefighting. We attended
loads of meetings. We were always ten paces behind the perpetrators. Everyone
involved wanted to do a good job on Czar but it was all badly managed.' Some
Abduction Notices were served, but there were no arrests.
13.35 By late 2009, when the Minister of State served an Improvement Notice on the
Council for its children's safeguarding services, there is no doubt that the systems
and operations for protecting Rotherham's children were unsafe. The Director of
Safeguarding (2010-11) described what she found on taking up post. There were
significant vacancies; a lot of agency staff were being used; there was a lack of
management oversight; poor accountability for casework; poor monitoring of
unallocated work; poor monitoring of assessment times; looked after children lacked
plans in some instances; quality of practice was generally weak and the complexity of
cases was very high; the quality of professional supervision was poor, sometimes
provided by managers who were not social work qualified. Staff were overwhelmed,
and disempowered, and felt senior staff were 'invisible'. Despite this context, she saw
no complacency about CSE. The Inquiry concluded that the quality and extent of
children's social care support to the young people who were victims or at risk must
surely have suffered.
13.36 There ensued a great deal of work to reform systems and put in place quality
assurance and performance management processes. The structure of the service
was revised; professional supervision of social workers was provided only by social
work managers who were experienced in child protection. Social workers who were
in post in 2009 described the experience now to be unrecognisable because of
these improvements.
13.37 Following the publication of the Home Affairs Select Committee report in June 2013,
a report to the Cabinet by the Executive Director of Children's Services stated that
'Tackling the sexual exploitation of children and young people remains the highest
priority for Rotherham Borough Council'. It also recommended that a quarterly report
on progress against the local child sexual exploitation Action Plan be brought to

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Role, Remit and Location of the CSE team
13.38 A Safeguarding Coordinator for CSE was appointed in 2010. She had an unhelpful
beginning in her role, with seven changes of manager in her first year in post. She
subsequently took over responsibility for the childrens social care staff in the newly
established CSE team.
13.39 We met the staff group and managers in the joint CSE team and were impressed by
their motivation and obvious commitment to the children they were working to
protect. Several people in childrens social care told us that the role and remit of the
team needed to be clarified as a matter of urgency, and this was long overdue.
There were no protocols setting out how the team should interface with other parts of
the childrens social care. The Service Manager responsible for the team did not
know whether the team had a written remit.
13.40 At the time of the Inquiry, the team was short staffed because of staff illness. The
Service Manager responsible for the team considered that adequate cover
arrangements had been made but this was not a view shared by those directly
responsible for managing team members. The team has three qualified social
workers but deals with a significant number of complex cases as well as offering
preventive services, and co-working cases with other teams. Several experienced
managers told us that the current arrangements are not sustainable and action
needed to be taken to resolve this.
13.41 By contrast, the police officers responsible for CSE in Rotherham considered that the
police input to the CSE team was extremely clear and well understood. The police
function in the team is well resourced (6 detectives) and has a clear focus. We
learned that joint work is sometimes delayed because childrens social care is under-
resourced compared to the police capacity. From the evidence, we were satisfied
that at the time of the Inquiry, CSE was well resourced by the Police and suitably
responsive to need.
13.42 There was considerable support from the Police for strengthening the social care
resources in the team and moving from a co-located to a jointly managed team. The
Police also viewed the establishment of the Multi-agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH),
scheduled to take place in August 2014, as a major opportunity to improve and
strengthen safeguarding work in Rotherham and all agencies should make this a
13.43 We received some comments that it was impossible for a small team to deal with all
CSE issues, and important that the whole of childrens social care had the capacity to
safeguard exploited children. This was raised as an issue in the recent diagnostic
report completed by the Safeguarding Board Chair. We share the concerns many
expressed that in the absence of a central team, the focus on child exploitation would
become diluted.

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The Role of Elected Members
13.44 In 2004-2005, a series of presentations on CSE were first made to councillors and
then other relevant groups and agencies, led by the external manager of Risky
Business, from Youth Services. The presentations were unambiguous about the
nature and extent of the problem. They included the following information:
a) a description of CSE in Rotherham and its impact on children as young as 12;
b) the scale of the problem;
c) the exercise of control through drugs, rape and physical force. In Rotherham,
55% of such children had used heroin at least once per week; 40% had been
raped; 73% had sexual health problems; 33% had attempted suicide. Most had
self harmed; and
d) the section on perpetrators mentioned an Asian family involved with taxi firms,
and identified 50 people, 45 of whom were Asian, 4 were white, and 1 African-
13.45 Attendees were provided with background information listing the known addresses of
alleged activity, including hotels and takeaways in Rotherham. It also included taxi
companies alleged to be involved, and case studies of three girls. In total, Risky
Business supported 319 girls on either a one to one or group work basis over an 18-
month period from April 2004 until October 2005. The presentation was made at the
end of 2004 to the Rotherham Children and Young People's Board, with six
councillors present, including the Leader. The following April, a further presentation
was made to 30 councillors. The explicit content meant that by 2005 few members
or senior officers could say 'we didn't know'. Similar material had been passed to the
Police in 2001 by Risky Business on behalf of the local agencies.
13.46 In response to these growing concerns about sexual exploitation in Rotherham, a
Task and Finish group was set up in December 2004, chaired by the Leader of the
Council. Only one minute of its meetings (March 2005) was available, though other
minutes contained references to this group's work. The March minute listed a
number of actions including multi agency training, a local publicity campaign and
appointing a Co-ordinator on the issue, though this did not seem to happen until
2007. In November 2005, the Chair of the Children and Young Peoples Voluntary
Sector Consortium wrote to the Chief Executive, expressing concern at the problem
of child sexual exploitation in Rotherham and recalling that members of the
Consortium gave evidence to the Task and Finish Group on March 2. The
Consortium had not been represented at any meetings after that. She requested a
progress report on the Group's work. The Chief Executive's reply has not been found.
In late 2005, the Group agreed that more awareness training around CSE needed to
be provided within the child protection training programme. There is no further record
of this group's meetings or its outputs or how it ceased to exist.
13.47 At several points from the early 2000s onwards, members increased the funding to

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Risky Business, in recognition of its valuable work. Members also responded to the
funding pressures experienced by children's social care over many years by affording
protection to the service when significant savings were required, in particular from
2008 onwards. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Rotherham started at a low
base of funding for childrens social care, compared to its neighbours, and whatever
protection afforded did not fully compensate for the underlying lack of investment and
rising demand.
13.48 The Lead Member for CYP (2005 - 2010), who later became the South Yorkshire
Police and Crime Commissioner, was aware of CSE from the outset of his tenure,
and believed that reports on the subject which he regularly received as Lead Member
were taken seriously and acted upon by the Council in conjunction with the Police.
This was stated in his written evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee in
2013, where he also stated that race was never presented to him by staff or agencies
as an obstacle to investigating offences.
13.49 In 2006, a Conservative councillor requested a meeting with the Council Leader at
which he expressed his concerns about CSE. This had come to his attention via
constituents. He told the Inquiry that the Council Leader advised him the matters
were being dealt with by the Police and requested that he did not raise them publicly.
13.50 Latterly, in 2012/13 further CSE training sessions for councillors were organised with
the attendance being 60 out of 63 councillors.
13.51 Interviews with senior members revealed that none could recall the issue ever being
discussed in the Labour Group until 2012. Given the seriousness of the subject, the
evidence available, and the reputational damage to the Council, it is extraordinary
that the Labour Group, which dominated the Council, failed to discuss CSE until then.
Some senior members acknowledged that that was a mistake. Asked if they should
have done things differently, they thought that as an administration they should have
tackled the issues 'head on', including any concerns about ethnic issues.
13.52 The terms used by many people we spoke to about how those in authority (members
and some officers) dealt with CSE were sweeping it under the carpet, turning a
blind eye and keeping a lid on it. One person said of the past the people above
just didnt want to know.
13.53 In September 2013, the Council Leader apologised 'unreservedly' to those young
people who had been let down by the safeguarding services, which prior to 2009
'simply weren't good enough'. He reiterated that the safeguarding of young people
was the Council 's highest priority and announced that an independent inquiry would
be held.
The Scrutiny Function
13.54 Overview and scrutiny committees may make recommendations to the Council's

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Executive. Under other legislation the Councils scrutiny committee may also make
recommendations to other local bodies. Many scrutiny functions have a process by
which recommendations are monitored to check on their implementation. This is
seen as one of the principal ways in which to ascertain the impact that scrutiny has
on local services. In 2005, the Children's and Young People's Scrutiny Panel was
set up. This included up to 12 elected members. In 2006, the Looked After Children
Scrutiny Sub-Panel was set up, with 11 elected members. It was disbanded in 2010
and replaced by the Corporate Parenting Group, with six elected members. There
was also an Overview and Scrutiny Management Board, which reviewed what all the
separate scrutiny panels were discussing. Since 2012, there are four Select
Commissions for scrutiny, replacing the previous panels. Each non-executive
councillor is entitled to be a member of at least one of four of the Select
13.55 The Chair of the Children and Young People's Select Commission has been in that
role for the past eleven years. She attended the members' seminar on CSE in 2005
and knew about the Leader's Task and Finish Group. She was confident that she had
challenged officials, but over the years she had faced obstacles to her work as Chair.
When the majority of members belonged to one party, it was not easy for a
Commission to maintain its total independence. In her experience, agenda items
were too often presented as faits accomplis, already wrapped and sealed. She
recalled raising the issue of CSE in 2008 with the Lead Member and the Director of
Children's Services, specifically about why certain things had not been done. She
described how she was given assurance that all was in hand and that she would be
informed on a 'need to know' basis. Again, in 2009, she reported that she asked for
information about CSE and received the same message. She was confident,
however, that the recent appointment of new senior members would lead to more
open and effective scrutiny within the Council.
13.56 A meeting of the Overview and Scrutiny Management Board took place in October
2012, and was largely devoted to the Child S Serious Case Review. The minute
reflects one example of rigorous challenge of the issues raised by the review.
13.57 The Inquiry Team has read the minutes and proceedings of the various member
groups that have an interest in child sexual exploitation, including meetings of the
Council, the Cabinet and the Lead Member for Children and Young People's
Services. While acknowledging that reading minutes is not the same as witnessing
the meetings themselves, we gained two broad impressions. The first is that the
same item seemed to have to go through an inordinate number of council meetings
and other bodies before gaining acceptance. Admittedly, there is a 'need to know' in
many instances, but more important is the possibility that this arrangement blunts
accountability. An issue or responsibility that belongs to everybody effectively
belongs to nobody, and in the case of sexual exploitation of children in Rotherham,

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accountability was key.
13.58 Even more significant is the apparent lack of effective scrutiny exercised by these
several groups or bodies, and least of all by the Scrutiny Panels. Scrutiny in its
widest sense is an essential component of Cabinet government. Rarely does it
appear from the minutes that councillors have held officers to account by checking
the evidence for proposals or asking whether their ends could be met in other ways.
It may be that the minutes are written in bland, non-specific, language, but that does
nothing to reassure the public that genuine accountability is being exercised. It is
important that councillors test proposals by reference to their broad experience and
their knowledge of the Borough and their own constituents. There should be nothing
threatening about this; good officers should welcome challenge as a central part of
local democracy.
13.59 The Inquiry team found several instances where important issues were not reported
to members. As has been described, senior officers of the Council were made aware
of the increasing seriousness of CSE from an early stage, and members' seminars
were arranged in 2004-05. Yet in July of 2005, the sexual exploitation of young
people failed to feature in a report to the Cabinet Member for CYPS entitled 'State of
the Nation, intended to summarise the main issues for children's services in the
Borough, along with strengths, weaknesses and risks.
13.60 Some people we interviewed suspected that a small number of those with political
authority in the Council had links to the perpetrators of CSE through taxi firms and
other business or family interests. We were told by the Police that there was no
evidence to support these suspicions.
Organisational Culture
13.61 Organisational culture is a powerful force that guides decisions and actions. It has a
potent effect on the organisations well-being and effectiveness. The Council has a
duty to provide effective corporate services. In relation to CSE, the long-term benefit
of children will only be served by Council departments working together in a spirit of
shared commitment and mutual confidence.
13.62 Executive 'leaders' play a large part in defining organisational culture by what they
say and what they do. In this respect, leaders such as senior officers and members in
a Council should model good behaviour for their staff groups and others in setting the
tone for their shared endeavour to deliver the best possible services. This includes
values, attitudes and working language.
13.63 As far back as 1998, the then Chief Executive was able to say that senior women
officers in the Council were not readily accepted either by officers or members. The
Chief Executive from 2004 to 2009 had no sense of a particularly 'macho' culture but
was aware that a small number of senior councillors could be aggressive and
intimidating to officers.

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13.64 The Leader of the Council, from 2000 to 2003, agreed that the culture overall was
'macho' and sexist. He referred specifically to three members accessing adult
pornography on council computers, which he had to deal with. He also referred to
the bullying behaviour of some members towards the then Chief Executive, probably
because he and the Chief Executive were attempting to improve and modernise a
council which was underperforming, which had a very traditional culture, which was
'slow to change' and which had come to the attention of inspectors and government
(albeit mainly for school buildings rather than childrens safeguarding). One of the
current Cabinet members who had been in the Council since 1999 also agreed with
the description of bullying and strong male dominance. The Deputy Leader (2011
2014) also agreed. Of the group of people interviewed, many confirmed this
13.65 A succession of senior officers, past and present, male and female, who were
interviewed for the Inquiry raised the negative culture as being an issue from 1997 to
2009. Their remarks and some of the less offensive quotations from a small number
of senior officers and members are given below:
'The member barometer re sexual matters was skewed'
'It was a very grubby environment in which to work'
'A colleague was told she ought to wear shorter skirts to meetings and she'd
get on better'
'A senior member said on four occasions in public places "you women are
only fit for cooking, washing and darning"
'A senior member said I know what I'd like to do to you if I was ten years'
'A senior member asked me if I wore a mask while having sex'
13.66 One of the senior managers in Safeguarding stated that she wrote to a previous
Chief Executive more than once about the conduct of members, but the Inquiry was
unable to obtain copies of these letters from the Council.
13.67 A senior officer was described by several people as being bullied and badly treated
until the arrival of the present Chief Executive who took action on this behaviour.
13.68 In October 2009, the outgoing Director of Safeguarding wrote to the Chief Executive
referring to a recent budget meeting chaired by the Lead Member for Children and
Young Peoples Services. The following account is taken from her letter. A senior
officer present, not from Safeguarding Services, was quoted as saying that in his
professional view Rotherham had too many looked after children and this accounted
for a significant part of the overspend. When challenged for his evidence for this
assertion he is described as becoming aggressive and antagonistic. He was asked

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to stop shouting. He responded by saying that shouting was the only way to get
through to these people and he persisted for over an hour, swearing frequently, with
no intervention from the Chair, according to the letter. The Director of Safeguarding
described the experience as being 'intimidating, humiliating, bullying and entirely
professionally unacceptable.' She concluded by saying she only felt able to put this in
writing because she was leaving the authority.
13.69 The existence of such a culture as described above is likely to have impeded the
Council from providing an effective, corporate response to such a highly sensitive
social problem as child sexual exploitation.

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14. Recommendations
14.1 As a consequence of several reviews, reports and inspections over the last two
years, the Council, its partners and the Safeguarding Board are already in receipt of
many recommendations for improvement in their approach to CSE. The
Safeguarding Board has brought these together into a single document. It includes
the recommendations from the CSE Diagnostic Report, the Barnardos CSE Practice
Review, the HMIC South Yorkshire Police Response to CSE, and the report of the
Office of the Childrens Commissioner. The document is reproduced in Appendix 5.
14.2 The Inquiry took the view that it was unnecessary to repeat the recommendations
listed in these reports. We have identified 15 areas which we consider should be a
14.3 It should also be noted that the National Working Group Network on Tackling Child
Sexual Exploitation has also recently produced a Summary of Recommendations for
All Agencies, from a range of reports, inquiries, serious case reviews and research.
This provides a helpful checklist, which could be used by the Council and its partners
in conjunction with the list compiled by the Safeguarding Board.
Risk assessment
Recommendation 1: Senior managers should ensure that there are up-to-date risk
assessments on all children affected by CSE. These should be of consistently high
quality and clearly recorded on the childs file.
Recommendation 2: The numeric scoring tool should be kept under review.
Professional judgements about risk should be clearly recorded where these are not
adequately captured by the numeric tool.
Looked after children
Recommendation 3: Managers should develop a more strategic approach to
protecting looked after children who are sexually exploited. This must include the
use of out-of-area placements. The Borough should work with other authorities to
minimise the risks of sexual exploitation to all children, including those living in
placements where they may become exposed to CSE. The strategy should include
improved arrangements for supporting children in out-of-area placements when they
require leaving care services.
Outreach and accessibility
Recommendation 4: The Council should make every effort to make help reach out
to victims of CSE who are not yet in touch with services. In particular, it should make
every effort to restore open access and outreach work with children affected by CSE
to the level previously provided by Risky Business.

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Joint CSE team
Recommendation 5: The remit and responsibilities of the joint CSE team should be
urgently decided and communicated to all concerned in a way that leaves no room
for doubt.
Recommendation 6: Agencies should commit to introducing a single manager for
the multi-agency CSE team. This should be implemented as quickly as possible.
Recommendation 7: The Council, together with the Police, should review the social
care resources available to the CSE team, and make sure these are consistent with
the need and demand for services.

Collaboration within CYPS
Recommendation 8: Wider childrens social care, the CSE team and integrated
youth and support services should work better together to ensure that children
affected by CSE are well supported and offered an appropriate range of preventive

Ongoing work with victims
Recommendation 9: All services should recognise that once a child is affected by
CSE, he or she is likely to require support and therapeutic intervention for an
extended period of time. Children should not be offered short-term intervention only,
and cases should not be closed prematurely.

Post abuse support
Recommendation 10: The Safeguarding Board, through the CSE Sub-group, should
work with local agencies, including health, to secure the delivery of post-abuse
support services.

Quality Assurance
Recommendation 11: All agencies should continue to resource, and strengthen, the
quality assurance work currently underway under the auspices of the Safeguarding

Minority ethnic communities
Recommendation 12: There should be more direct and more frequent engagement
by the Council and also the Safeguarding Board with women and men from minority
ethnic communities on the issue of CSE and other forms of abuse.
Recommendation 13: The Safeguarding Board should address the under-reporting
of sexual exploitation and abuse in minority ethnic communities.

The issue of race
Recommendation 14: The issue of race should be tackled as an absolute priority if it
is a significant factor in the criminal activity of organised child sexual abuse in the

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Serious Case Reviews
Recommendation 15: We recommend to the Department of Education that the
guiding principle on redactions in Serious Case Reviews must be that the welfare of
any children involved is paramount.

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Appendix 1: Terms of Reference for the Independent
Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation 1997 - 2013

1. That it be conducted by an independent person with appropriate skills, experience
and abilities who has not previously been employed by or undertaken work, either
directly or indirectly, for Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council, nor is a relation of
any member or officer of the Council past or present. Prior to appointment the
independent person will be required to sign a declaration to that effect. The person
should be on a list of reputable persons recommended to the Council by the Local
Government Association.
2. That the author is able to commission such specialist support that they may need to
fulfil the terms of reference specifically relating to social care practice regarding child
sexual exploitation and that any such person engaged also be required to meet the
terms set out in 1 above and sign a declaration to that effect. Commissioning of such
support shall be in consultation with the Chief Executive and within the budgetary
limits agreed.
3. That the author be supported by the Councils Monitoring Officer, who will provide
relevant legal advice and commission specialist advice if considered necessary, and
by the Councils Director of Human Resources in relation to arranging such
interviews with members and officers that the independent person requires.
4. That the Inquirys status is non-statutory. The consequence therefore is that
witnesses who no longer work for the Council may only be interviewed with their
consent. Current serving officers and members will be required to give evidence to
and support the inquiry.
5. That the Inquiry is undertaken in a way that is responsive to the wishes and needs of
young people that may have been subject to sexual exploitation in the past.
6. The inquiry has two distinct elements.
1997 to December 2009
7. Through a process of reviewing an appropriate selection of child sexual exploitation
case files from the period the Inquiry will:
a) Analyse social care practice, information gathering, data recording, data-sharing
(specifically between the Council and South Yorkshire Police) and decision

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b) Consider the application of child sexual exploitation policies, procedures and
best practice as they existed at the time.
c) Consider managerial and political oversight, leadership and direction, operational
management practice including supervision, support and guidance and the roles
and responsibilities of other parties including the Police, Crown Prosecution
Service, health services, schools, parents, family and the Local Safeguarding
Children Board.
d) Consider emerging evidence, intelligence or trends, how they were
communicated within the Council and with other agencies and the speed and
way in which Council service delivery was adjusted to respond.
e) Identify who in the Council knew what information when and determine whether
that information was used effectively and in the best interests of protecting young
f) Examine the extent to which other forms of regulatory control available to the
Council and others (for example activities such as licensing and environmental
health) were used to inform the safeguarding of children from sexual exploitation.
g) Ensure that the cases reviewed will include those identified in the national press.

8. The objectives of this element of the review are:
a) To consider whether the Council when exercising its statutory and non-statutory
powers could have done more to protect young people from child sexual
exploitation and whether the range of options available was in any way limited by
the actions of other agencies.
b) To consider whether young people were adequately protected from the risks of
sexual exploitation and if not to identify the factors that led to the failure to
adequately protect them, including the part played by other agencies.
c) To consider specifically whether there is any evidence of the Council, or any
other agency, not taking appropriate action as a consequence of
concerns regarding racial or ethnic sensitivities.
d) Make recommendations that can be used by the Council and others to ensure
that any of the mistakes of the past are not repeated

December 2009 to January 2013
9. Through a process of both reviewing an appropriate selection of child sexual
exploitation case files and considering evidence placed within the public domain
regarding safeguarding services within Rotherham (including Ofsted Inspections and
Serious Case Reviews) throughout the period the Inquiry will:
a) Examine whether there is recent and current evidence that recommendations
regarding the lessons learned and which have been identified in the first part of
the review have been or are in the process of being implemented by the Council.

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b) Consider whether there is recent and current evidence the Council has or is in
the process of implementing Government policy relating to child sexual
exploitation that has been issued within the period.
10. The objectives of this element of the review are:-
a) To consider whether the Council when exercising its statutory and non - statutory
powers could have done more to protect young people from child sexual
exploitation and whether the range of options available was in any way limited by
the actions of other agencies.
b) To consider whether there is evidence of necessary improvements to the
Councils services and the extent to which the improvements are becoming
c) To consider whether there is evidence that the pace of any such improvement is
appropriate to the extremely serious nature of previous historic failings to the
Council's safeguarding services in general, and child sexual exploitation
practices in particular.
d) To consider specifically whether there is any evidence of the Council, or any
other agency not taking appropriate actions as a consequence of
concerns regarding racial or ethnic sensitivities.
e) To make recommendations that can be used by the Council and others.

Performance Management and Governance
11. The terms of reference will be discussed with the author, prior to the Inquiry being
undertaken. Any suggested additions or amendments will be considered by and
made at the discretion of the Chief Executive and subsequently reported to Cabinet.
12. A draft report and final report will be available by dates to be agreed in writing at the
date the Inquiry is commissioned
13. The Inquiry report will be the bona fide opinion of the author and will be endorsed as
14. The Inquiry report shall be provided in a format that can be made publicly available.
The author shall ensure that the Councils requirement to maximise transparency is
met. It is acknowledged that sensitive or confidential information may be referred to
in the report and the author should use an appropriate referencing system to ensure
the anonymity of clients and that all legal requirements regarding confidentiality and
data protection are met.
15. Throughout the duration of the conduct of the inquiry the author shall report on
progress to the Chief Executive at the end of each week, in a manner to be agreed in

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16. The identification of cases for review and of officers, members and other contributors
for interview shall be entirely at the discretion of the author. However the
Council requires that the number and breadth of files reviewed will be sufficiently
representative to provide a robust basis for the analysis. Any arrangements for files,
record keeping, minutes, interviews to be arranged on request by
the Monitoring Officer and/or the Director of Human Resources.
17. The author shall consider, and consult with the Chief Executive upon, the
appropriateness of seeking evidence from the victims of child sexual exploitation.
18. The final report will be delivered to the Chief Executive, who will report it to Cabinet
together with the Councils response. Both reports will be made public.

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Appendix 2: Methodology
Reading the files
1. We read a total of 66 case files as part of the fieldwork for the Inquiry. These were
selected as follows:
a) A randomised sample of the CSE caseload as at 30 September 2013 (19 out of
51 cases a 37% sample)
b) Three other current cases brought to the attention of the Inquiry team during the
course of the fieldwork.
c) 22 historic cases of victims sampled from police operations, including Central,
Czar and Chard.
d) The case files of three children who were the subject of national media
e) A randomised sample of 19 other historic cases, taken from a list of 937 names
of children associated with CSE. The names were provided to the Inquiry by
childrens social care, or the Police.
2. In the majority of cases, we read both the Risky Business and the childrens social
care files. We also had access to residential case files and records kept by foster
carers for many of the looked after children. In a small number of cases, the
childrens social care file could not be traced.
3. Five cases from the total sampled by the Inquiry were reviewed by the National
Working Group Networks specialist team. There was a high level of consistency in
the judgements made by the Inquiry Teams file reader and the team from the
National Working Group Network.
4. The Inquiry had access to the minutes about individual children discussed at the
Sexual Exploitation Forum between 2004 and 2006. We also read large numbers of
minutes of Strategy meetings about individuals and groups of children, as well as
suspected perpetrators, from the early 2000s onwards. The numbers of children
discussed in all these minutes ran to many hundreds of children who were being
exploited, as well as others who were at serious risk.
5. Minutes of discussions about individuals and groups of children by the Key Players
meeting (late 90s to around 2004) could not be traced for the purposes of the Inquiry,
and could not be scrutinised.
6. In the course of reading files, we had sight of internal correspondence identifying
children who had been sexually exploited, and the concerns their parents had
expressed. We read correspondence in the files where parents had detailed their
childrens experiences and their concerns about inadequate responses by the
statutory agencies. We were also contacted by several parents via the confidential
email and Freepost addresses.

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Document analysis
7. The Inquiry team studied a very large number of Rotherham Council Committee
minutes, and papers and minutes of the Safeguarding Board and its predecessor, the
Area Child Protection Committee.
8. We also read relevant national and local reports produced by external agencies.
Details are given in Chapters 2 and 3, and in Appendices 4 and 5.
Fieldwork interviews
9. We interviewed a large number of people from local agencies. We give a list of these
in Appendix 3
. In summary, the Inquiry covered:
Meeting /Interview No
Individual interviews with current staff of Rotherham Borough Council 27
Staff met in a group meeting with the joint CSE team 9
Staff met in group meetings (team managers, independent reviewing officers
& conference chairs, social workers, residential managers and personal
advisors with the Bridges project)
Individual interviews with former staff of the Borough 18
Current elected members 6
Former elected members 5
Serving police officers 7
Former police officers 4
Young people met (Care Leavers Group, Youth Cabinet representatives and
Focus group of young people and others)
Specialists from the National Working Group Network (4 meetings) 4
People from other agencies, voluntary organisations and community groups 14

The Council provided the Inquiry with the dates when people were employed in Rotherham.

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Appendix 3: List of interviewees

Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council
Martin Kimber Chief Executive
Joyce Thacker Executive Director, Children and Young People's Services
Jacqueline Collins Director of Legal Services
Warren Carratt Service Manager (Strategy, Standards and Early Help)
Catherine Eshelby Principal Practitioner
Chris Brodhurst-Brown Head of Integrated Youth Support Services
Zafar Saleem Community Engagement Manager
Waheed Akhtar Community Engagement Officer
Clair Pyper Interim Director of Safeguarding Children and Families
Claire Edgar Team Manager, Sexual Exploitation Team
Lynne Grice-Saddington Manager, Rights-to-Rights Service
Joanne Robertson Finance Manager
Pete Hudson Chief Finance Manager
David Richmond Director of Housing and Neighbourhood Services
Alan Pogorzelec Business Regulation Manager
Linda Alcock Safeguarding Unit Manager
Phil Morris Business Manager, Safeguarding Board
Kevin Stevens Safeguarding Quality Assurance Officer
Chris Seekings Quality Assurance Officer
Louise Pashley Practice Manager, Bridges Project
Kelly White Service Manager
Kerry Byrne Partnership and Youth Development Manager
Lorraine Lichfield Strategic Lead Education OTAS & Exclusions
Jo Smith Head of the Rowan Centre
John Radford Director of Public Health
Joanna Saunders Head of Health Improvement
Anna Clack Public Health Specialist

Group Meetings of staff
Independent Reviewing Officers and Conference Chairs
Social Workers
Residential Managers
Team Managers
Child Sexual Exploitation Team
Bridges Project Personal Advisors

Former staff
Erica Leach Child Protection Co-ordinator (1998-2003)
(worked for the Council 1986-2010)
John Gomersall Director of Social Services (1999-2006)
(worked for the Council 1973-2006)
Ged Fitzgerald Chief Executive (2001-2003)
Mike Cuff Chief Executive (2004-2009)
John Bell Chief Executive (1986-1998)
Alan Carruthers Chief Executive (1999-2000)
Sonia Sharp Director of Children's Services (2005-2008)

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Di Billups Executive Director of Education (2001-2005)
Lynn Burns Interim Director of Safeguarding (2009-2010)
Pam Allen Director of Safeguarding (2004-2009)
(worked for the Council 1996-2009)
Jackie Wilson Head of Function (2002-2007)
(worked for the Council 1996-2007)
Gani Martins Director of Safeguarding (2010-2011)
Simon Perry Director of Targeted Services (2008-2011)
(worked for the Council 2001-2011)
Viv Woodhead Assistant Safeguarding Manager (2007-2012)

& Former staff of the Risky Business project

Elected Members
Councillor Roger Stone Leader
Councillor Paul Lakin Deputy Leader
Councillor Caven Vines
Councillor Ann Russell
Councillor John Turner
Councillor John Doyle

Former Elected Members
Jahangir Akhtar
Brian Cutts
Maurice Kirk
Mark Edgell
Shaun Wright

South Yorkshire Police
Jason Harwin District Commander
Phil Etheridge Temporary Detective Superintendent
Matt Fenwick Detective Superintendent
Claire Mayfield Temporary Detective Inspector
Dave Walker Detective Sergeant, Sexual Exploitation Team
Mark Monteiro Detective Inspector
Malcolm Coe Temporary Detective Sergeant

Former Police Officers
Christine Davies District Commander (2001-2005)
Matt Jukes District Commander (2006-2010)
Richard Tweed District Commander (2010-2012)
Stephen Parry Chief Superintendent (2001-02)

Young People
Care leavers group
Youth Cabinet representatives
Focus group of young people
Individual survivors

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National Working Group Network
Sheila Taylor MBE CEO
Bina Parmar Specialist Team Member
Mike Hand Specialist Team Member
Ray McMorrow Specialist Team Member

Steve Ashley Chair Rotherham Safeguarding Children Board
Professor Pat Cantrill Author of Serious Case Review Overview Report (Child S)
Saghir Alam Chair, Rotherham Council of Mosques
Neil Penswick Ofsted
Gary Smith Former lay member, the Safeguarding Board
Khalida Luqman Tassibee Project, Rotherham
Parveen Qureshie Managing Director, United Multicultural Centre, Rotherham
Mr Abassi Rotherham Diversity Forum
Azizzum Akhtar Rotherham Ethnic Minority Alliance
Angie Heal Author and researcher
Zlakha Ahmed Chief Executive, Apna Haq
Tracey Haycox Director of Children and Young Peoples Services, Safe@Last
Catherine Hall Lead Nurse, Clinical Commissioning Group
Mark Marriott Crown Prosecution Service

The Inquiry interviewed several other people who did not wish to be identified, as well as
those who contacted the Inquirys confidential email and Freepost addresses.

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Appendix 4: Legal and Policy Context
1. A timeline is set out below demonstrating how policy, statute and guidance have
developed in relation to the issue of child sexual exploitation (CSE) over the last two
decades. The timeline also refers to criminal prosecutions related to CSE which
have been reported in the media within that period. Of significance is the
terminology used to describe this social problem, moving from a description of child
prostitution to one of child sexual exploitation. This chapter has been largely
adapted and updated from the work of Jennifer Moss (2012). The National Working
Group Network for Sexually Exploited Children intends to publish the full text on its
website, and to keep it updated.

2. The Child Abduction Act 1984 Section 2 states that it is a criminal offence if a
person without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, takes or detains a child under
the age of 16 so as to remove him from the lawful control of any person having lawful
control of the child or so as to keep him out of the lawful control of any person
entitled to lawful control of the child. It carries a penalty of imprisonment. The Act
abolished the crime of child stealing and restricted the offence of kidnapping
children. Offenders can be arrested and prosecuted for this Section 2 offence
without a complaint from the victim.
3. Child Abduction Warning Notices are issued under this legislation in relation to
children and young persons who persistently go missing and place themselves at
significant risk of harm by forming associations and relationships with inappropriate
individuals, sometimes much older than themselves. In so doing they can leave
themselves vulnerable, particularly to sexual or physical exploitation. A child/young
person may go missing repeatedly and nearly always be found to have been in the
company of the same adult, deemed inappropriate to be associating with them. In
order to disrupt the criminal or undesirable activities of adults associating with young
people, police can serve Child Abduction Warning Notices, formerly known as
Harbourers Warning Notices. These Notices tend to be used where
arrest/prosecution for any substantive offences is not available or is inappropriate at
that time. A Child Abduction Warning Notice identifies the child/young person and
confirms that the suspect has no permission to associate with or to contact or
communicate with the child. If the suspect continues to do so, they may be arrested
and prosecuted for an offence under Section 2 of the Child Abduction Act 1984 or
Section 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1989.

4. In 1994, Barnardos set up the UKs first child sexual exploitation programme in
Bradford. There are now 21 centres nationally, dedicated to turning around the lives
of thousands of sexually exploited young people. All this began as a pilot project,

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developed into Streets and Lanes working with child prostitutes, and is now known
as Turnaround. Kay Kelly, who has worked for the Bradford project for 12 years,
looks back to her first years with Streets and Lanes: The reality wasnt recognised.
These young people werent seen as victims. They were very much seen as
perpetrators themselves and treated as adult prostitutes. Of course they werent,
because they were all under the legal age for consent.

5. CROP the Coalition for the Removal of Pimping - was founded in 1996. This is
a child protection charity based in West Yorkshire. It is driven by the experiences
and needs of affected parents, and describes itself as the only UK organisation to
specialise in working alongside the parents, carers and wider family of child sexual
exploitation victims.

6. One of the first successful CSE criminal prosecutions to be taken was in Leeds in
1997, when two men were convicted, although twenty men were investigated. Since
that date there have been over 20 such court cases and a number of men convicted
of offences relating to CSE activity.

7. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Section 17 of this Act places a duty on a local
authority to do all it can do to prevent crime and disorder in its area. Section 17 is
aimed at putting crime and disorder reduction at the heart of local decision making; it
is a key component in the work of the Safer Communities Partnership, Drug Action
Team, Youth Offending Team, the Childrens Trust and the Local Safeguarding
Children Board (LSCB). Section 115 provides any person with a power but not an
obligation to disclose information to responsible public bodies such as the local
authority and the Police. The ability to share data does not override safeguards for
disclosure of personal data in other legislation or in common law such as defamation,
data protection and duties of confidentiality.
8. The Data Protection Act 1998. The Act allows for disclosure without the consent of
the data subject in certain conditions, including for the purposes of the prevention or
detection of crime, or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders; and where
failure to disclose would be likely to prejudice those objectives in a particular case.
Data are defined in section 1 of the Act as, inter alia, Information in a form in which
it can be processed by equipment operating automatically in response to instructions
given for that purpose.

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9. Working Together to safeguard children: a guide to inter-agency working to
safeguard and promote the welfare of children was first published in 1999. This
guidance has subsequently been revised in 2006 and 2010 and was reissued in
2012. Working Together sets out how organisations and individuals should work
together to safeguard and promote the welfare of children and young people in
accordance with the Children Acts 1989 and 2004.

10. Supplementary guidance to Working Together was issued by the Department of
Health (which had responsibility for policy on childrens services at that time) in May
2000, entitled Safeguarding Children Involved in Prostitution. This was
superseded by new guidance issued by the Department for Education and Skills in
11. Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) is the name given to
arrangements in England and Wales for the responsible authorities tasked with the
management of registered sex offenders, violent and other types of sexual offenders,
and offenders who pose a serious risk of harm to the public. The responsible
authorities of the MAPPA include the National Probation Service, HM Prison Service
and England and Wales police forces. MAPPA is coordinated and supported
nationally by the Public Protection Unit within the National Offender Management
Service. MAPPA was introduced by the Criminal Justice and Courts Services Act
2000 and was strengthened under the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
12. MAPPA legislation does not provide the lawful authority for exchanging information
on non-MAPPA persons. However, many police forces have taken steps to agree
local protocols with partner agencies for providing risk assessment and management
of these individuals outside of MAPPA. The MARAC process Multi Agency Risk
Assessment Conference Process - is part of a coordinated community response to
domestic abuse, which aims to:
share information to increase the safety, health and well-being of
victims/survivors adults and their children;
determine whether the alleged perpetrator poses a significant risk to any
particular individual or to the general community;
construct jointly and implement a risk management plan that provides
professional support to all those at risk and reduces the risk of harm;
reduce repeat victimisation;
improve agency accountability; and
improve support for staff involved in high-risk domestic abuse cases.
13. The focus of the MARAC is the protection of the high-risk victim of domestic abuse.
A meeting is convened to share information and enable an effective risk

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management plan to be developed. It does not address the issue of intelligence
sharing within the CSE risk environment.
14. Its someone taking a part of you: a study of young women and sexual
exploitation. Jenny Pearce, Mary Williams, and Cristina Galvin. National Childrens
Bureau (NCB), 2002.
15. Based on 55 case studies, conducted in partnership with the NSPCC, the study
considers the choices and opportunities available to young women who are at risk of,
or are experiencing, sexual exploitation. It presents young womens accounts of their
experiences, identifies three categories of risk: at risk of sexual exploitation;
swapping sex for accommodation, money, drugs or other favours in kind; and selling
sex. It recommends interventions that could take place at each stage to support the
young women concerned. A summary of this report is available: The choice and
opportunity project: young women and sexual exploitation (PDF).
2000 2004

16. In 2000 the death of 8 year old Victoria Adjo Climbi occurred in the London
Borough of Haringey. The subsequent Inquiry into Victorias death was chaired by
Lord Laming. The findings of the Inquiry (encapsulated within the Laming Report)
were damning, not only about individual practice failings, poor or non-existent inter-
agency working and the lack of focus on the child, Victoria, but also, for the first time,
about the failure of senior managers in various organisations to account for the
shortcomings of their departments and their resistance, in most cases, to accept
responsibility for them. There then followed the Every Child Matters initiative, the
introduction of the Children Act 2004 and the creation of the Office of the Childrens
17. Every Child Matters; Change for Children followed from the Government Green
Paper entitled Every Child Matters. The subsequent Children Act was passed in
November 2004. For children and young people there are five stated outcomes
embedded within this framework that are seen as key to well-being in childhood and
later life. These are: being healthy, staying safe, enjoying and achieving, making a
positive contribution and achieving economic well-being. These five outcomes
constitute the focus of Government attention for all school pupils.
18. The Children Act 2004 raised the degree of accountability, especially at local
authority level. It brought all local government functions of childrens welfare and
education under the statutory authority of local Directors of Childrens Services.
The Act also required local authorities to appoint a Lead Member for childrens
services, and it placed a statutory duty on authorities to establish Local
Safeguarding Children Boards. These Boards were given powers to investigate
and review inter-agency failings. They have a responsibility to promote the safety

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and care of all children and a proactive role to target particular groups of vulnerable
children, and by engaging in responsive work to protect children who are suffering, or
are likely to suffer significant harm. They co-ordinate the activities of Board
members and ensure their effectiveness.
19. In 2002 there was recognition by Staffordshire Police that there was a CSE issue in
the Stoke on Trent Policing division and Operation Sorcerer was launched. This
identified 47 victims of CSE.
20. Following the murder of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman, an inquiry was set up in
2003 under Sir Michael Bichard. The Bichard Report suggested that when
assessing under-18s at risk of sexual exploitation professionals should consider the
following points in deciding whether to refer to police or childrens services:
age or power imbalances;
coercion, bribery, overt aggression or the misuse of substances as a
whether the childs own behaviour, because of the misuse of substances,
places him/her at risk so that he/she is unable to make an informed choice
about any activity;
whether any attempts to secure secrecy have been made by the sexual
partner, beyond what would normally be considered usual in teenage
whether the sexual partner is known to one of the agencies; and
whether the child denies, minimises or accepts concerns.
21. In November 2003, a Blackpool teenager, Charlene Downes, disappeared. She
was believed to have been subject to sexual exploitation. Charlene has never been
seen since this time and is believed to have been killed by her abuser/s. A
subsequent investigation revealed endemic sexual abuse in the town and the
Project Awaken Team was set up as a response. The team brought together
professionals from licensing, social services, education and police. It aimed to root
out and arrest the abusers before they did serious harm, and to protect children from
exploiters. Officers targeted what they called honey pots, likely to attract both
children and offenders, such as takeaways, amusement arcades and the pier, which
Charlene visited the night she vanished. The Guardian journalist Julie Bindel wrote
in May 2008 Early on in the investigation, police became aware that Charlene and a
number of other girls had been targeted by abusers active in the town. It emerged
that the girls had been swapping sex for food, cigarettes and affection. Police are
certain that Charlene was sexually abused by one or more men, over a period of time
before she went missing, and that her death was linked to the abuse.
22. In 2012, the trial of two men accused over Charlenes murder was halted when the
jury failed to reach a verdict. The subsequent retrial collapsed owing to concerns
over a key prosecution witness. Both men were cleared of the charges. The case is

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still open.
23. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 replaced older sexual offences laws with more
specific and explicit wording. It also created several new offences such as non-
consensual voyeurism, grooming, abuse of position of trust, assault by penetration
and causing a child to watch a sexual act. The Act covered offences committed by
UK citizens whilst abroad. It also updated and strengthened the monitoring of sex
offenders under the Sex Offenders Act 1997.
sections 47 to 50 prohibit child prostitution;
sections 52 and 53 prohibit pimping for financial gain; and
sections 57 to 59 create offences relating to sex trafficking.
24. Prostitution of children or child prostitution is the commercial sexual exploitation of
children in which a child performs the services of prostitution, for financial benefit.
The term normally refers to prostitution by a minor, or person under the legal age of
majority. Human trafficking is the illegal trade of human beings for the purposes of
commercial sexual exploitation or forced labour.
25. Children and Families: Safer from Sexual Crime. The Sexual Offences Act
2003 was published by the Home Office in May 2004.
26. Operation Parsonage in Keighley, West Yorkshire during 2003, the Police
interviewed 33 girls aged between 13 and 17 years. Up to 50 men were believed to
have been involved in the exploitation of young girls in the area. Ten men were
charged with offences and two convicted.
27. Lord Lamings report: Keeping Children Safe. The Governments response to
The Victoria Climbi Inquiry Report and Joint Chief Inspectors Report Safeguarding
Children. Published in 2003, the report found that many of the reforms brought in
after Victoria Climbis death in 2000 had not been implemented.
28. In 2004, Anna Hall made a documentary Edge of the City for Channel 4. It is a film
dealing with, among other matters, CSE in Keighley. The film originally started as a
documentary about Bradford Social Services Department but became controversial
when it highlighted the areas problem of CSE.
29. The Lost Teenage was a CROP document examining the impact of child sexual
exploitation on children and young people as they move into adulthood.

30. Work in Progress, Parents, Children and Pimps: Families Speak Out About
Sexual Exploitation by Aravinda Kosaraju is the title of a further document
published by CROP in 2005. This is described as A comprehensive research report,

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together with parents personal accounts, which details CROPs work, the
demographic profile for families supported by CROP, the nature and impact of sexual
grooming and exploitation, and the interventions required to end sexual exploitation.
31. Who are the Victims? is a CROP article published in 2005 which questions who
the victims of sexual exploitation are and the ways in which different channels and
agencies can help victims of sexual exploitation.
32. Sexual Exploitation as a Business is another documentary from CROP in 2005,
described as A document analysing the child sexual exploitation processes and the
criminal networks involved.
33. Intervention orders, introduced by section 20 of the Drugs Act 2005, can be
attached to ASBOs to tackle anti-social behaviour arising from drug misuse. These
and other orders may be used in CSE cases where there is also drug or alcohol
misuse and anti-social behaviour associated with wider CSE behaviour.
34. In April 2006 there was a prosecution in Blackpool for the multiple rape of a 16 year
old girl by four men. Two of the men, illegal immigrants, were jailed as a result of the
prosecution. The victim and a friend were given alcohol at an Indian restaurant
before being taken to an attic and assaulted. One victim said she was abused by
four men.
35. The first revision of Working Together to Safeguard Children occurred in 2006.
36. Trafficking in our Midst Parallels Between International and National
Trafficking is a 2006 documentary by CROP highlighting the parallels between
international and national trafficking covering the role of the UK Human Trafficking
Centre, legislation, prosecution, organised crime, scale of the problem and
responding to the similarities of victim impact.

37. An Oldham CSE case was prosecuted in June 2007. The case concerned the
grooming and abuse of 20 girls in the Oldham area. 20 men were arrested and three
were charged with rape. Eventually, two convictions for abduction were secured. It
was reported in 2011 that since 2007 over 21 Oldham girls had been sexually
exploited in incidents of roadside grooming. An Oldham man was convicted in
September 2011 for grooming and in April 2012 a case involving 11 men from
Oldham and Rochdale came to trial.
38. In August 2007 Peter Connolly known as Baby P died at the hands of his carers in
Haringey London. Peters death resulted in criminal convictions, two Serious Case
Reviews and a further review of safeguarding procedures nationally.

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39. In August 2007, following a Blackburn CSE court case, two Pakistani nationals aged
46 and 32 were jailed for 7 years and 8 months on charges including abduction,
sexual activity with a child and supplying drugs. Girls in the care of social services in
Blackburn were targeted and offered to brothers, uncles and friends for sex.
40. Barnardos published a Pilot Study Sexual Exploitation Risk Assessment
Framework (SERAF) in October 2007.
41. Review of Social Services Responses to Safeguarding Children from Sexual
Exploitation, a CROP document, was published.
42. In January 2008 a Sheffield CSE criminal case saw the conviction of two men for
sexual offences against young girls. The court described the relationships as
exploitative, coercive and possessive.
43. In a further Oldham CSE court case in April 2008, two men were convicted of
offences against a 14 year old runaway girl.
44. In October 2008, the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF)
published Information sharing. Further guidance on legal issues. This gives
information on the pieces of legislation which may provide statutory agencies and
those acting on their behalf with statutory powers to share information. The guidance
is for practitioners who have to make decisions about sharing personal information
on a case-by-case basis, whether they are working in the public, private or voluntary
sectors or providing services to children, young people, adults and/or families. The
guidance is also for managers and advisors who support these practitioners in their
decision making and for others with responsibility for information governance. It
the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention of Human Rights;
common law duty of confidentiality;
Data Protection Act 1998; and
specific legislation containing express powers to share information.
45. In November 2008 following a Manchester CSE court case, two men were convicted
of offences against three vulnerable 15 year-old girls. Also in November 2008 in
Blackburn, two men were convicted of offences against two 14 year-old girls.
46. In December 2008 the publication of the Ofsted report into the death of Peter
Connolly resulted in public scrutiny regarding safeguarding practice. This saw
increasing numbers of referrals to childrens social care; more children becoming the
subjects of child protection plans; and a rise in the number of children being taken
into local authority care. As a result, professional safeguarding priority was to ensure

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that the dangers to younger children at risk of neglect and physical harm were
assessed and reduced.
47. Gathering evidence of the sexual exploitation of children and young people: a
scoping exercise. Sue Jago and Jenny Pearce, University of Bedfordshire 2008.
This reports a study commissioned by the Government to look at the way in which
local partnerships (including Local Safeguarding Children Boards and police forces)
tackle the sexual exploitation of children and young people through the disruption
and prosecution of offenders. It covers the multi-agency approach, the foundation for
effective evidence gathering, developing a disruption plan, preparing a prosecution
case, and awareness raising, training and guidance.
48. In 2008, The National Working Group Network developed the following definition
which is utilised in UK Government guidance and policy.
The sexual exploitation of children and young people under 18 involves
exploitative situations, contexts and relationships where young people (or a third
person or persons) receive something (e.g. food, accommodation, drugs, alcohol,
cigarettes, affection, gifts, money) as a result of performing, and/or others
performing on them, sexual activities. Child sexual exploitation can occur through
the use of technology without the childs immediate recognition, for example by
persuading them to post sexual images on the internet/mobile phones with no
immediate payment or gain. In all cases, those exploiting the child/young person
have power over them by virtue of their age, gender, intellect, physical strength
and/or economic or other resources. Violence, coercion and intimidation are
common, involvement in exploitative relationships being characterised in the main
by the child or young person's limited availability of choice resulting from their
social/economic and/or emotional vulnerability.

49. In 2009 Operation Shelter focused on identifying children missing from care in
Stoke on Trent. This investigation identified 20 girls who had been reported missing
on 750 occasions and led to Operation Microphone. This resulted in the successful
conviction of a Stoke on Trent man involved in CSE.
50. In March 2009 The Protection of Children in England: A Progress Report by
Lord Laming was published.
51. April 2009, in Blackburn, two men were convicted of offences against a 12 year old
52. The Statutory guidance on children who run away and go missing from home
or care was published in July 2009 by the Department for Children, Schools and

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53. In July 2009, a total of 4 men in Skipton were found guilty of 28 sexual offences
against a child aged 12-15 years. Three other men were cleared of all charges.
54. A 21-year old man was convicted in August 2009 of the rape of a boy in what was
described as a brutal sex attack. It is understood that he attacked the boy, aged 12,
after approaching him in a takeaway in Whalley Range, Manchester.
55. In August 2009 the Government introduced Early identification, assessment of
needs and intervention The Common Assessment Framework (CAF) for
children and young people: A guide for practitioners.
56. 2009 also saw the publication by the Department for Children, Schools and Families
of Safeguarding Children and Young People from Sexual Exploitation:
Supplementary guidance to Working Together to Safeguard Children. This guidance
provided Local Safeguarding Children Boards and their partners with a framework for
developing strategic and frontline responses to child sexual exploitation.
57. Child Sexual Exploitation: a Compendium of Training, by Aravinda Kosarju and
Dalia Hawley was published by CROP in 2009. This was a compendium of available
specialist training on child sexual exploitation in England and Wales compiled by
CROP as part of the research and development work funded by the Department for
Children, Schools and Families. It is based on a six month survey/audit of CSE
training conducted during 2008-09.
58. In May 2009 the Government published its Action Plan to tackle child sexual

59. Project Topsail was set up to assess the landscape of child exploitation in
60. In February 2010, a Rochdale CSE case came to court. A 16 year-old girl agreed to
go to a house where she was given whisky and possibly sleeping medication before
being raped several times by three members of a gang, two of whom used a whisky
bottle to further degrade her. A fourth man took pictures of the abuse. The victim
was later found wandering the streets, dazed.
61. In June 2010, Tim Loughton MP and Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for
Children and Families announced a review of child protection, led by Professor
Eileen Munro. At the same time he announced that LSCBs would be required to
publish Serious Case Review reports unless there were compelling reasons for this
not to happen.
62. In June 2010 a Nelson CSE court case involved two men being convicted of
offences against three girls.

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63. A National Picture of Child Sexual Exploitation and Specialist Provisions in the
UK was published by the National Working Group Network for sexually exploited
children and young people.
64. The two Baby P Serious Case Reviews of November 2008 and March 2009 were
published in 2010 with identifying details removed.
65. During August 2010 a Rochdale criminal prosecution heard that an independent
school pupil, aged 14, from Rochdale, went missing from home for several days on
two occasions. She was spotted in the town centre, groomed and fed a diet of
alcohol and drugs before being forced to have sex with numerous Asian men in flats
and to work on the streets as a prostitute. She was finally found after she
approached a couple in the street in Manchester and asked them for help. Nine
Rochdale men were convicted of offences against a child.
66. In September 2010 a Preston CSE court case followed Operation Deters
investigation of child sexual exploitation involving girls and older men in Preston.
Two men groomed two girls aged 13 and 15 for several months after initially pulling
up in a car and befriending them.
67. The Munro Review: Part One: A Systems Analysis was published in October
2010. This paper outlined the actions which were being taken to improve
management, co-ordination and practice. It recognised the problems caused by
widespread restructuring and financial cuts. It called for local authorities to have the
confidence to develop their own approaches to child protection. A degree of
uncertainty and risk must be accepted.
68. In November 2010 a Rotherham CSE court case came to trial; five sexual
predators were convicted of grooming three girls, two aged 13 and one 15, all under
childrens social care supervision, before using them for sex. The victims were
offered gifts, car rides, cigarettes, alcohol and cannabis. Sex took place in cars,
bushes and the play area of parks. A mortgage adviser who drove a BMW and
owned several properties, promised to treat a 13-year old like a princess. Another
man pulled the hair of a 13-year old and called her a white bitch when she tried to
reject his attempt to strip her. Eight men were charged and three were cleared of all
charges. One victim, aged 13, said: They used to tell me they loved me and at the
time I believed them. I was a little girl.
69. November 2010, a Derby court case, in which 9 men were convicted of grooming
and abuse in three separate trials. Operation Retriever, involving more than 100
police officers, identified 27 victims. 22 were white, three black and two Asian.
70. Derby CSE Serious Case Review Executive Summary was published in November

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71. In January 2011 Puppet on a String The urgent need to cut children free from
sexual exploitation was published by Barnardos. This report found that despite
new national guidance, in most local authorities child sexual exploitation was not
recognised as a mainstream child protection issue. This report called on the
Secretary of State for Education to take the lead in ensuring a fundamental shift in
policy, practice and service delivery in England.
72. In March 2011 Youth Gangs, Sexual Violence and Sexual Exploitation, A
Scoping Exercise for The Office of the Childrens Commissioner for England
was published by Professor J. J. Pearce & Professor J. M. Pitts from The University
of Bedfordshire Institute for Applied Social Research.
73. May 2011 the Munro Review of Child Protection. Final Report: A Child Centred
System was published. This set out proposals for reform which were intended to
enable professionals to make the best judgements about the help to be given to
children, young people and families. It did not, however, explicitly address issues of
child sexual exploitation.
74. In June 2011 Letting Children be Children Report of an Independent Review
of the commercialisation and sexualisation of childhood was published by Reg
Bailey. This Review aims to assess how children in this country are being pressured
to grow up too quickly, and sets out some of the things that businesses and their
regulators, as well as Government, can do to minimise the commercialisation and
sexualisation of childhood.
75. Out of Mind, Out of Sight; breaking down the barriers to understanding child
sexual exploitation was published by the Child Exploitation and Online Protection
Centres (CEOP) in June 2011.
76. In August 2011, a Bradford court case concerned the grooming and abuse of 13-
year old Asian girl. August 2011 also saw the trial and sentence of Stephanie Knight
and the East Lancashire Rape Gang at Burnley Crown Court. Knight was
convicted of conspiracy to rape.
77. October 2011, Whats going on to Safeguard Children and Young People from
Sexual Exploitation? How local partnerships respond to child sexual
exploitation by Sue Jago, with Lorena Arocha, Isabelle Brodie, Margaret Melrose,
Jenny Pearce and Camille Warrington, University of Bedfordshire. This research
project explored the extent and nature of the response of LSCBs to the 2009
Government guidance on safeguarding children and young people from sexual
exploitation. This found that where the guidance had been followed, there were
examples of innovative practice to protect and support young people and their
families and to investigate and prosecute their abusers. However, the researchers

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found that the delivery of that dual approach to child sexual exploitation was far from
the norm.
78. In October 2011 the Childrens Commissioner launched a two-year inquiry into
Child Sexual Exploitation in Gangs and Groups.
79. Published in October 2011, Safeguarding Children who may have been
Trafficked. Practice Guidance was guidance updated from the original publication
of 2007. It was updated to reflect developments such as the introduction in April
2009 of the National Referral Mechanism and the duty on the UK Border Agency to
safeguard and promote the welfare of children, which came into force in November
2009. It delivered a key commitment in the Governments Human Trafficking
Strategy, published in July 2011. It was intended to help agencies and their staff
safeguard and promote the welfare of children who may have been trafficked. It was
supplementary to, and should be used in conjunction with the Governments statutory
guidance: Working Together to Safeguard Children.
80. In November 2011, Strategy for Policing Prostitution and Sexual Exploitation
was published by the Association of Chief Police Officers. This report confirmed that:
In the case of children and young people, the emphasis is always on safeguarding
the young person and on the proactive disruption and prosecution of their abusers.
81. In November 2011 in response to the earlier Barnardos report, the Department for
Education produced Tackling Child Sexual Exploitation: National Action Plan.
This brought together, for the first time, actions by the Government and a range of
national and local partners to protect children from CSE. The Action Plan considers
sexual exploitation from the perspective of the child. It highlights areas where more
needs to be done and sets out specific actions which Government, local agencies
and voluntary and community sector partners need to take.
82. These actions include:
work with the Association of Chief Police Officers, health professional bodies
and the Social Work Reform Board to make sure child sexual exploitation is
properly covered in training and guidance for frontline professionals;
LSCBs to prioritise child sexual exploitation and undertake robust risk
assessments and map the extent and nature of the problem locally;
support organisations like Rape Crisis and local sexual assault referral
centres to improve services for young victims. The Plan also included
measures to raise awareness by improving sex and relationships education in
schools and helping parents know what tell-tale signs to look out for;
the Police, the Crown Prosecution Service, judges and magistrates to support
young witnesses and victims, and increase the use of special measures in
court to ease the stress and anxiety of criminal proceedings on young people;

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the criminal justice system to come down hard on perpetrators and make sure
victims and their families get the right support. The Plan brings together
commitments from the Home Office, Ministry of Justice and the Crown
Prosecution Service, including:
o a new sentencing regime, including mandatory life sentences for anyone
convicted of a second very serious sexual or violent crime;
o in group or gang related cases, trial judges should consider how to
minimise the trauma for witnesses by considering whether there is need
for repeat cross-examination in the witness box.
83. November 2011, the Channel 4 programme Britains Sex Gangs focused on CSE
in Bradford and London.
84. Missing Children and Adults; A Cross Government Strategy was published by
the Home Office in December 2011. The strategy outlines the three key objectives to
provide the right foundations for any effective local strategy to tackle this issue:
prevention reducing the number of people who go missing, including
prevention strategies, education work and early intervention in cases where
children and adults repeatedly go missing;
protection reducing the harm to those who go missing, including a tailored,
risk-based response and ensuring agencies work together to find and close
cases as quickly as possible at a local and national level; and
provision providing support and advice to missing persons and families by
referring them to agencies promptly and ensuring they understand how and
where to access help.


85. In the Brierfield child sexual grooming case of January 2012 a sixth man was
charged with conspiracy to rape.
86. In May 2012, as a result of the Operation Span in Rochdale, 9 men were convicted
and jailed. Two men were acquitted. The men at the centre of the trial were from
Rochdale and Oldham. Offences ranged from rape, trafficking, conspiracy to engage
in sexual activity with a child, sexual assault and sexual activity with a child. This
case was the first prosecution in Britain of the offence of Trafficking within the UK for
a sexual offence. Sentences ranged from 19 years to 4 years.
87. Also in May 2012, a Carlisle CSE criminal case saw a Carlisle takeaway manager
jailed for 15 years for attempting to recruit four girls aged between 12 and 16 into
88. Tackling child sexual exploitation. Helping local authorities to develop

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effective responses was published in 2012 jointly by Barnardos and the Local
Government Association.
89. The trial of two men in Rochdale involved four victims.
90. An Oldham man was found guilty of the systematic rape of a three-year-old girl over
a period of 14 years until she was 17. He was jailed for 19 years as one of nine men
involved in the Rochdale sex-ring convicted of conspiracy to engage in sexual activity
with a child and trafficking a child within the UK.
91. Following the verdicts in the Rochdale child sexual exploitation case, the Secretary of
State asked the Deputy Childrens Commissioner to report to him urgently on
emerging findings from her inquiry into Child sexual exploitation in gangs and
groups. He asked that the report focus particularly on risks facing children living in
childrens homes. The report was published on 3 July together with the
Governments response to its recommendations, which were accepted in full. The
action announced by Government also took account of the Joint All Party
Parliamentary Groups (APPG) Report into Children who Go Missing from Care
which was issued on 18 June. The APPG report emphasised the need to tackle
failings in arrangements to safeguard children in residential care, and made
recommendations similar to those of the Deputy Childrens Commissioner.
92. The Government directed the following immediate action in response:
making sure there is a clearer picture of how many children go missing from
care, and of where they are, by improving the quality and transparency of
ensuring childrens homes are properly protected and safely located by
removing barriers in regulation, so that Ofsted can share information about
the location of childrens homes with the Police, and other relevant bodies as
helping children to be located nearer to their local area by establishing a task
and finish group to make recommendations by September on strengthening
the regulatory framework on out-of-area placements; and
establishing a further expert working group to look at the quality of childrens
homes. This would review all aspects of the quality of provision in childrens
homes, including the management of behaviour and appropriate use of
restraint, and the qualifications and skills of the workforce.
93. In July 2012, the Government published a Progress report on the implementation
of the Tackling child sexual exploitation action plan and a short step-by-step
guide on what frontline practitioners should do if they suspect a child is being
sexually exploited.
94. July 2012, as a result of Bradfords criminal investigation into CSE, ten men were

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arrested on suspicion of committing serious sexual offences in the area.
95. In August 2012, a CSE criminal case in Telford found that four teenage girls had
been sexually abused and forced into prostitution by two Shropshire brothers. The
jury was told that the youngest girl, 13, was raped, and another was repeatedly sold
as a prostitute, sometimes to four men at a time.
96. In September, as a result of Operation Rockferry, Reading Crown Court passed
sentence on a paedophile ring.
97. In September at Derby Crown Court, five men were found guilty of paying for the
sexual services of a child; three others admitted the same charge. The men, who
acted independently of each other, targeted girls aged between 14-17 in Derby from
care homes or difficult backgrounds.
98. On 24
September 2012, The Times reported Andrew Norfolks investigation into
CSE in Rotherham.
99. In September, a Rochdale man was sentenced for the rape of 16-year old girl.
100. In September, as a result of Operation Bullfinch in Oxford, nine men were accused
of involvement in a child sex-trafficking ring involving six girls over an 8-year period.

101. In March 2013, Working Together to Safeguard Children was published by the
Government. This paper reiterated that the childs needs were paramount and the
childs needs and wishes must be put first; that all professionals should share
information and discuss any concerns about a child with partner agencies; that
initiatives must be based on evidence and available data. The guidance required
LSCBs to publish local protocols for assessment and a threshold document
specifying the criteria for referral for assessment and the level of early help to be
provided. It imposed duties towards safeguarding on a wide range of agencies.
LSCBs had to maintain a local learning and improvement framework shared across
partner agencies. A national panel of independent experts would advise LSCBs on
the initiation and publication of Serious Case Reviews.
102. In June 2013 The Home Affairs Select Committee report was published. Its 36
sections endorsed recommendations of earlier papers. Children must be seen as
victims, not perpetrators, and the concept of consent must be challenged. There
should be widespread training in recognizing signs of grooming and exploitation.
Reports and other documents should be in a standard format to facilitate
comparisons for scrutiny purposes. The right of redaction should rest with the victim
or family or an independent person, not the Safeguarding Children Board.
103. The report recommended improvements to the justice system, the treatment of

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victims, the support given to them throughout the judicial process, their cross-
examination, the importance of the language used in court, the need for specialist
courts with trained judges, prosecutors, ushers.
104. Accident and Emergency Departments should link more closely with Safeguarding
Children Boards in relation to children up to 16 years; likewise sexual health
services. The mental health implications of CSE must be recognised in practical
measures. The voluntary sector in this field must be adequately funded.
105. Agencies should acknowledge the suspected model of localised grooming of young
white girls by men of Pakistani heritage, instead of being inhibited by the fear of
affecting community relations. People must be able to raise concerns without fear of
being labelled racist. Offenders communities should do more to report and tackle
the issue. Outreach work towards them is essential. Multi-agency Safeguarding
Hubs should be set up, linked to the Crown Prosecution Service.
106. In October 2013, Ofsted published its Review of the Local Safeguarding Children
Board. This was a consultation relating to the framework within which future
inspections of LSCBs would be conducted by Ofsted.
107. 13 November 2013. The final report from the Office of the Children's
Commissioner's Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Gangs and Groups was
published. The report criticised services for persistently failing to safeguard children
and being in denial about the scale of the issue. It found only 6% of Local
Safeguarding Children Boards were complying with key government guidance on
tackling CSE. Although it recognised local good practice, the report concluded that
there were serious gaps in the knowledge, practice and services required to tackle
CSE, despite 'heightened alert'. The report instead proposed a new framework, 'See
Me, Hear Me', for those who commission, plan or provide protective services. The
report was accompanied by two other reports from the Inquiry, which highlighted the
risk to young people and the complexities around their understanding of sexual

108. In February 2014, the Childrens Commissioner published Sex without consent. I
suppose that is rape how young people understand consent to sex, and in April
Rights4me, a young persons guide to working together to safeguard children.
109. In January 2014, the Department of Health published the Health Working Group
report on child sexual exploitation. The report made eleven recommendations
covering the identification and treatment of victims; training and e-learning; the co-
ordination of services; commitment to multi-agency teams and the role of school

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Appendix 5: Recommendations from earlier reports
collated by the Safeguarding Board

Safeguarding Board CSE Diagnosic Report 2013
1. The RLSCB to review the 2013-16 Business plan and annual plan to produce a more
dynamic, user-friendly report for 2013-14.
2. The LSCB to review and refresh the multi-agency CSE procedure.
3. To conduct a multi-agency internal review of structures and governance and produce
clear charts detailing roles, responsibilities and lines of accountability.
4. The CSE sub group to review the CSE action plan and ensure it is a practical and
useful tool for delivery of strategic actions and its actions and milestones follow
SMART principles.
5. RLSCB Chair to provide the opportunity for improved governance and stronger
challenge of the CSE action plan at RLSCB meetings
6. A review of the role, membership and future direction of the CSE Sub Group and
Silver Group needs to be undertaken.
7. To move the multi-agency CSE Team to a more suitable location.
8. The CSE Team should develop a closer working relationship with the Integrated
Youth and Support Service and have specific service pathways in place to support
these arrangements.
9. That the role of the CSE Team and its remit and responsibilities need to be reviewed,
defined and communicated to all stakeholders.
10. Consideration be given to the appointment or secondment of a senior manager to
manage the CSE Team in its entirety and to take the lead role in CSE management
in the Borough.
11. A formal tasking and coordinating process should be adopted by the CSE Team.
12. Process mapping needs to be undertaken and CSE pathways developed so that
there are clear workflows between the various teams within Childrens Social Care,
the Early Help Assessment Team and other services in a position to respond to lower
level CSE referrals.
13. A needs assessment and mapping exercise should be undertaken in relation to the
provision of post-sexual abuse support utilising existing commissioning frameworks.
14. The local authority, as corporate parent for looked after children, to provide the

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RLSCB with assurance that Looked After Children and Young People placed out-of-
area who go missing receive timely return home interviews which contribute to risk
assessments and safety plans.
15. A more formal and SMART performance management system needs to be
established under the governance of the Local Safeguarding Children Board.
16. Regular use of Victim / Service User profiling should be utilised to further understand
the needs across the Borough and the multi-agency service response that is
17. An agreed risk assessment tool, which is fit for purpose, should be developed and
implemented as soon as possible.
18. A programme of multi-agency auditing should be introduced in order to evaluate the
effectiveness of service provision and outcomes for children and young people at risk
of CSE.
19. A longer term training and awareness strategy is required in order to keep the
workforce skilled and knowledgeable year on year.
20. The Rotherham Children and Young Persons Improvement Panel under the
governance of the RLSCB monitor national reports, inspections and reviews to
ensure that where appropriate recommendations from those reports form part of
RLSCB processes.
Barnardos CSE Practice Review
21. We recommend that all key managers and Council members revisit the vision and
strategy to establish if the original intentions are effective and delivering the expected
22. A clear media and communication strategy be developed that all agencies and key
personnel share and work towards.
23. A named designated manager be identified to manage the day-to-day activities and
shape service delivery of the CSE specialist colocated team.
24. In line with the action plan, the positioning of a police analyst within the co-located
CSE team.
25. The CSE specialist co-located team to undertake monthly team building and clinical
supervision in order to assist in the teams development and understanding of
various disciplines and to support the relatively new team in bonding together,
understanding each others roles and developing a shared model of work in practice
to meet the needs of sexually exploited young people.

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26. The implementation of a South Yorkshire wide CSE Risk Assessment tool.
27. Development of a participation strategy for young people and families involved/ at
risk of CSE.
28. It is recommended that the training strategy be widened and adopt a train the
trainer approach to include all faith groups and communities, including the local
business community.
29. Annual review of service provision as a way of ensuring that the CSE action plan and
CSE strategy are implemented and are effective.
HMIC South Yorkshire Police Response to CSE
30. The force should review the management of cases by staff in the dedicated child
sexual exploitation teams, and ensure this always complies with statutory child
protection guidance.
31. The force should communicate and explain to the PCC, staff and other interested
parties the delay in deploying the ten additional child sexual exploitation officers to
the districts.
32. Failure to fill a vacant post in the Rotherham team that manages sex offenders
means that the remaining officers face an unmanageable workload. The force should
review the team to ensure that it has sufficient staff to manage sex offenders in line
with national guidance.
33. The force should review the staffing arrangements within the Hi-Tech Crime Unit, to
ensure these are sufficient to manage effectively the demands of a thorough and
comprehensive child sexual exploitation strategy.
34. The force should audit its response to child sexual exploitation, to assess whether
the changes it is making are having the desired effect (i.e. of improving outcomes for
children), and to identify any further work that is required.
(Within 3 months)
35. The force should review its internal communication regarding child sexual
exploitation and ensure that clear, consistent messages are passed to all officers and
staff. The messages should ensure that everyone knows which chief officer is the
lead on tackling child sexual exploitation.
36. The force should review the tool used to assess the risk of child sexual exploitation to
ensure it provides the best possible reflection of the level of risk faced by victims.
This could involve additional training for those using the tool, or a change to the

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scoring mechanism used to calculate the level of risk.
37. The force should translate the PCCs strategic priorities into operational delivery on
the ground.
38. The force should review the workloads of all staff within public protection units to
ensure they have the capacity to manage effectively the cases they are allocated.
(Within 6 months)
39. The force should review its training plan to ensure all staff develop and sustain a
good understanding of child sexual exploitation.
40. The force should review the processes in place to respond to child sexual
exploitation in all four districts, with a view to creating greater uniformity, and
ensuring all areas attain the high standards achieved in the Sheffield district.
41. The force should review the operation of its local intelligence units to ensure child
sexual exploitation is thoroughly supported by an intelligence approach.
42. The force should review how it could make better use of research and analysis to
support strategies to tackle child sexual exploitation.
43. The force should review how it monitors the internet for evidence of child sexual
exploitation to ensure intelligence opportunities are not being overlooked.
44. The force and its partners should examine how it can more efficiently manage the
handling of child sexual exploitation information and intelligence. In particular, the
difficulties in sharing information within the multi-agency teams at Doncaster and
Rotherham (because of incompatible information and intelligence IT systems) should
be resolved.
If only someone had listened Office of Childrens Commissioner
45. The Department for Education should review and where necessary, revise the
Working Together guidance on CSE (DCSF, 2009). This should include a review of
the definition of CSE.
46. Every Local Safeguarding Children Board should take all necessary steps to ensure
they are fully compliant with the current Working Together guidance on CSE (DCSF,
47. Every Local Safeguarding Children Board should review their strategic and
operational plans and procedures against the seven principles, nine foundations and
See Me, Hear Me Framework in this report, ensuring they are meeting their
obligations to children and young people and the professionals who work with them.
Gaps should be identified and plans developed for delivering effective practice in

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accordance with the evidence. The effectiveness of plans, procedures and practice
should be subject to an ongoing evaluation and review cycle.
48. There need to be nationally and locally agreed information-sharing protocols that
specify every agencys and professionals responsibilities and duties for sharing
information about children who are or may be in need of protection. At the national
level, this should be led and coordinated by the Home Office through the Sexual
Violence Against Children and Vulnerable People National Group. At the local level,
this must be led by LSCBs. All member agencies at both levels must be signatories
and compliance rigorously monitored.
49. Problem profiling of victims, offenders, gangs, gang-associated girls, high-risk
businesses and neighbourhoods and other relevant factors must take place at both
national and local levels. The Home Office, through the Sexual Violence Against
Children and Vulnerable People National Group, should lead and coordinate the
development of a national profile. Local Safeguarding Children Boards should do the
equivalent at the local level.
50. Every local authority must ensure that its Joint Strategic Needs Assessment includes
evidence about the prevalence of CSE, identification and needs of high-risk groups,
local gangs, their membership and associated females. This should determine
commissioning decisions and priorities.
51. Relationships and sex education must be provided by trained practitioners in every
educational setting for all children. This must be part of a holistic/whole-school
approach to child protection that includes internet safety and all forms of bullying and
harassment and the getting and giving of consent.
52. Through the Sexual Violence against Children and Vulnerable People National
Group, the Government should undertake a review of the various initiatives being
funded by the Home Office, Department for Education, Department of Health and
any others as relevant, in order to ensure services are not duplicated and that
programmes are complementary, coordinated and adequately funded. All initiatives
should be cross-checked to ensure that they are effectively linked into child
protection procedures and local safeguarding arrangements.