Araneta vs Dinglasan

First Emergency Powers Cases
FACTS: Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential
buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal
from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3
other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against
EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to
prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ‘49-‗50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking
EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING
Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all EOs
passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and
that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular
session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC
is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may
―consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.‖ Such acts were to be good only
up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, ―unless sooner amended or
repealed by the National Assembly.‖ Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in
order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

Rodriguez vs Gella

Political Law – Second Emergency Powers Cases
FACTS: Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the
sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for
relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other
calamities. These EO‘s were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress
passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War
and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO‘s are valid.

HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO‘s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective.
The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA
671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he
feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the
intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For ―while Congress might
delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it
would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought
not to be the law.‖ Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is
necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal
cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency
created under the Act is coupled with interest.

People vs Vera

Political Law – Delegation of Powers
FACTS: Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the
SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for
probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed
the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another
request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has
no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that
the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the
Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this
also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of
the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.

HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of
penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion
which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity
so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This
Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation
officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system
of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is
instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA

FACTS: A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against
the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which
stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority
had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless,
POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.

HELD: No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ... "The
governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment
of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details
which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on
the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

US vs Ang Tang Ho

Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies
FACTS: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary
circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on
20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice
dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The
said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6
of August 1919. On 08
August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Ho‘s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of
the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a
law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard
of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard
policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without
the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion
that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in
all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the
judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in
all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event.

Ynot vs IAC

Police Power – Not Validly Exercised
FACTS: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the
law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as
the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was
then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard
or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of
police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption
based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of
the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Tablarin vs Gutierrez

FACTS: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988.
However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private
respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petiti on for
Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The
petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the
Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT
as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for
taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on
the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previously scheduled.

ISSUE: Whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional
principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be
followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education

HELD: The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative
agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. The standard may be either
expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to
be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.
In this case, the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: ―the standardization and
regulation of medical education‖ and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that
these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.

Pelaez vs Auditor General

Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
FACTS: From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities –
this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the
Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality,
[township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein,
may divide any province into one or more subprovinces…The VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special
civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez
claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA
2370 which provides that barrios may ―not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed‖ except by
Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board ―upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected‖ and the ―recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated.‖ Pelaez argues, accordingly: ―If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he
create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?‖ The Auditor
General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from
the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the
new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez‘ argument, which is that the statutory
denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of
the RAC.

HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law;
and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.

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