Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1
2
5
Table 6 (continued)
Model 1 (Dependent Variable=VRDI) Model 2 (Dependent Variable=CHANGE)
I II III I II III
t
a
t t t t t
Panel C: 1996 Data
Constant 97.9 5.799** 65.0 3.416** 65.3 3.546** 7.104 0.866 10.4 1.159 9.51 1.045
H2 ASCT (+) 8.745 1.752* 8.764 1.789* 0.856 0.296 0.909 0.308
H3 BIG6 (+) 3.427 0.983 0.625 0.309
H3a AUDREP (+) 4.944 1.575 2.058 1.298
H4 G100 (+) 10.579 2.306* 9.874 2.117* 2.380 0.993 2.786 1.163
Control SIZE 8.664 6.893** 5.420 3.609** 5.393 3.713** 0.484 0.774 0.807 1.193 0.621 0.901
Control IND 23.5 6.261** 23.189 6.388** 22.6 6.397** 3.149 1.441 3.174 1.450 3.063 1.414
Control TOP20 0.021 0.245 0.019 0.233 0.024 0.301 0.037 0.949 0.037 0.854 0.032 0.774
Control NEWS 2.624 0.737 1.671 0.489 2.167 0.635 0.170 0.116 0.096 0.063 0.042 0.027
Control ISSUE 1.804 0.468 1.279 0.335 1.631 0.432 1.301 0.482 1.227 0.468 0.973 0.381
Control LEV 21.980 2.611** 16.011 1.876* 15.958 1.858* 4.615 1.074 4.717 0.921 5.052 0.998
F Statistic 22.242 F Statistic 17.021 F Statistic 17.382 F Statistic 1.041 F Statistic .789 F Statistic .942
Signicance 0.000** Signicance 0.000** Signicance 0.000** Signicance 0.402 Signicance 0.631 Signicance 0.492
Adj. R
2
0.451 Adj. R
2
0.482 Adj. R
2
0.488 Adj. R
2
0.001 Adj. R
2
0.013 Adj. R
2
0.003
The regression equations reported are:
Model 1: (OLS)
VRDI Constant
1
ASCT
2
BIG6
3
AUDREP
4
G100
5
IND
6
SIZE
7
TOP20
8
NEWS
9
ISSUE
10
LEV "
i
Model 2: (OLS)
CHANGE Constant
1
ASCT
2
BIG6
3
AUDREP
4
G100
5
IND
6
SIZE
7
TOP20
8
NEWS
9
ISSUE
10
LEV "
i
where: VRDI=Voluntary reporting disclosure index; CHANGE=Change in a rms VRDI between consecutive years; ASCT=Firm has an employee who is a member
of the ASCT (1=yes; 0=no); BIG6=Firms audit rm is a Big 6 audit rm (1=yes; 0=no); AUDREP=Firms audit rm is represented on accounting standard setting
boards (1=yes; 0=no); G100=Firm is aliated with the Group of 100 (1=yes; 0=no); IND (control)=Firm is engaged in mining/oil activities (1=yes; 0=no); SIZE
(control)=Natural log of total assets; TOP20 (control)=% shares held by Top20 shareholders; NEWS (control)=Firm with reported news item (1=yes; 0=no); ISSUE
(control)=Firm made a share issue in the proceeding year (1=yes; 0=no); LEV (control)=Firms total liabilities divided by total assets; "
i
=error term.
a
The Breush-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity for Models 1 and 2. The reported t statistics are calculated with heteroskedasticityconsistent
variance estimators as in White (1980).
* Signicant at the 5% level, one-tail test.
** Signicant at the 1% level, one-tail test.
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t
y
2
9
(
2
0
0
4
)
9
5
1
2
5
1
1
9
1995 with SIZE, IND, NEWS and ISSUE all sta-
tistically signicant.
40
The explanatory power of
the regression increases to 49% when the hypo-
thesised variables are included.
41
The fact that
ASCT and G100 aliation are positive and sta-
tistically signicant in 1995, and the 1995 VRDI
change is signicantly positively associated with
ASCT and G100 membership indicates that ASCT
and G100 aliated rms, subsequent to the
release of the ASCT Industry Statement, exhibit
greater quantity (and quality)
42
in their derivative
nancial instrument disclosures than rms with no
ASCT or G100 aliation. The ASCT and G100
variables are signicant in the CHANGE model
(Model 2) for 1995 only, however, and are sig-
nicant only in 1995 for an unreported logistic
model where rms are classied as disclosers or
non-disclosers. The 1996 results indicate the
ASCT and G100 aliated rms continue to dis-
close more than non-ASCT rms, but the increase
in disclosures from 1995 do not dier between
ASCT and non-ASCT aliated rms or G100 and
non-G100 aliated rms.
Overall, the results of Model 2, testing for the
change in voluntary reporting between consecutive
years, support all hypotheses except those relating
to auditor aliation. As reported in Table 6, Panel
B, for the 1995 reporting year the best model
(specication III) has an adjusted R
2
of 0.34 with
the variables ASCT (hypothesis 2), G100
(hypothesis 4) and IND, NEWS and ISSUE all
statistically signicant at the 5% level or better.
The evidence suggests that these variables oer
plausible explanations for the signicant change in
derivative nancial instrument reporting in 1995.
In 1994, only IND is consistently statistically sig-
nicant at the 5% level or better. By 1996 how-
ever, the best CHANGE models adjusted R
2
is
only 0.001 (specication I) with no variable statis-
tically signicant for any specication of Model 2
(Table 6, Panel C).
Sensitivity analysis
Additional tests were performed using three
alternative samples: Sample 1 includes only rms
that retrospectively identify themselves as deriva-
tive users pursuant to their 1998 mandatory
nancial derivative disclosures; Sample 2 includes
only rms with annual report data available for
every year spanning 19921996; and Sample 3
comprises rms satisfying both Sample 1 and
Sample 2 criteria, namely rms retrospectively
identied as derivative users with annual report
data available for every year spanning 19921996.
The univariate results reported in Table 3 are
generally robust to the dierent sample selections.
Similarly, Table 4 univariate tests relating to
changes in rms voluntary nancial derivative
disclosures and Table 6 multivariate tests are also
generally robust to dierent sample selections. It is
particularly noteworthy that the most robust
results are those for 1995 disclosure levels and the
change in those levels from 1994 to 1995.
43
Conclusion
Analysing derivative nancial instrument dis-
closures by rms in an environment that is unre-
gulated but subject to increased scrutiny provides
insight into the necessity of mandating disclosures.
Increased probability of mandated disclosure
requirements, combined with pressure on nancial
statement preparers to be professionally respon-
sible in relation to derivative nancial instrument
40
With the exception of ISSUE, these control variables are
signicant in the expected direction.
41
Using a multiple hierarchical regression to compare speci-
cation I (control variables) and specication II (control and
reputation proxy variables), the change in the R
2
is statistically
signicant at the 1% level for both Models 1 and 2.
42
Researchers often assume the positive association between
quantity and quality. As noted by Botosan (1997) this seems a
reasonable assumption given that managers have reporting
reputations and legal liability constraints.
43
Using Sample 1 potentially overcomes the bias of classify-
ing non-users as non-disclosing rms, however it potentially
introduces another bias by assuming the user status in 1998 is
consistent with that of previous periods. The results of the re-
run multivariate models are entirely consistent with the results
reported in Table 6. For Models 1 and 2, only size and industry
are statistically signicant in 1994. In 1995, ASCT, G100, size
and industry are statistically signicant for both models. For
the 1996 period, ASCT, G100, size and industry are statistically
signicant for Model 1, and only industry is statistically sig-
nicant for Model 2.
120 K. Chalmers, J.M. Godfrey / Accounting, Organizations and Society 29 (2004) 95125
disclosures, appears to have precipitated a change
in the number and quality of disclosures across the
19921996 nancial reporting time window. This
paper examines how standards of nancial
reporting evolve, possibly in response to changing
societal norms and institutional pressures. Up
until 1995 only 41 rms precommitted themselves
to an ex ante disclosure policy. After the release of
ED65 and the ASCT Industry Statement (an ex
ante eort to coerce increased disclosures), 96
(105) rms voluntarily disclosed the information
in 1995 (1996). Assuming the disclosures are value
relevant, this suggests that mandating derivative
nancial instrument disclosures is not redundant,
as the propensity to voluntarily disclose was not
forthcoming prior to disclosure requirements
being put forward by a professional organisation
or the accounting standard setters.
The theoretical underpinning of this paper is
that attempts to preserve or enhance reputation
may provide an explanation for voluntary deriva-
tive nancial instrument reporting. Managers
legitimacy and reputation concerns combined with
institutional pressures confronting them to be
responsive to information demands appear to be
eective conduits for attaining enhanced dis-
closures. Reputation costs confronting managers
are proxied by a rms aliations with profes-
sional bodies such as the ASCT and G100, in
addition to the rms auditors reputation. It is
predicted the presence of such aliations pro-
motes derivative nancial instrument disclosures.
Statistically signicant results are obtained for all
variables except auditor aliation, suggesting that
the decision to voluntarily disclose derivative
nancial instrument information is associated with
the preservation or enhancement of reputation status
aorded by professional aliations. While it is pos-
sible that our measures proxy for something other
than reputation and the importance of legitimacy,
the results are consistent with the prediction that
reputation considerations are associated with dis-
closure policies. A positive association is found for
the control variables size, industry, and to a lesser
extent media attention and voluntary derivative
nancial instrument disclosures. A rms leverage,
a control variable grounded in costly contracting
theory, is not a signicant predictor of derivative
nancial instrument disclosures.
Further research could use triangulation to
assess these arguments in other contexts where
disclosure regimes alter, going through a transi-
tional stage before being mandated. For example,
interviews with managers can provide insights into
the views of those making the disclosure decisions.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the com-
ments and suggestions of two anonymous referees,
Michael Bradbury, and participants at the KPMG
workshop session at the University of Queensland,
the 2000 AAA Annual Conference, and the 1999
AAANZ Conference for their comments on earlier
drafts of this paper. The authors also appreciate
the nancial support provided by the University of
Tasmania.
K. Chalmers, J.M. Godfrey / Accounting, Organizations and Society 29 (2004) 95125 121
Appendix A. Components of the voluntary reporting disclosure index (VRDI) for derivative instrument
disclosures
Information Reference in
ED65
Reference in
Industry Statement
Score
Policy information disclosures
Does the rm specify its hedging policy? 1 (0)
Does the rm specify the objectives for holding
or issuing derivative nancial statements?
Par 52 Part A 1 (0)
Does the rm specify the accounting policies and
methods adopted for derivative instruments
(other than foreign currency hedges)?
Par 43a Part A 1 (0)
Does the rm specify their policy in giving
(or obtaining) collateral, security and credit
arrangements?
Par 66b Part A 1 (0)
Does the rm generally specify how they
monitor and control the risk associated with
derivatives?
Part A 1 (0)
Does the rm specify specic nancial controls
in place to monitor the risks?
Part A 1 (0)
Risk information
Does the rm segregate information by risk
categories (i.e. interest rate risk, credit risk)?
Part B 1 (0)
Does the rm provide the following information
for its derivative instruments?
Principal, stated value, face value, notional
value or other similar amount
Par 43bi Part B 1 (0)
Date of maturity Par 43biii Part B 1 (0)
Weighted average/ eective interest rate Par 43bii/ Par 55b Part B 1 (0)
Does the rm specify to whom they have credit
risk exposure?
Par 66ci Part B 1 (0)
Does the rm comment on their estimated credit
risk at reporting date?
Par 66a Part B 1 (0)
Net market value information
Does the rm provide net market value
information of derivative instruments?
Par 78a Part B 1 (0)
Does the rm specify the methods adopted in
determining net market value?
Par 78b & c Part B
(only for trading
activities)
1 (0)
Maximum possible total score 14
122 K. Chalmers, J.M. Godfrey / Accounting, Organizations and Society 29 (2004) 95125
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