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Koha Digest # 24 (1994

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ESSAY PARALLELS by REXHEP ISMAJLI Albania was proclaimed an independent state in 1912, while the process of the consolidation, the international recognition and the determination of the borders of this state lasted longer. During this time, there were problems which arose from the following factors: 1. Independence was proclaimed, but the organization of the state requested much more efficacy, experience, knowledge and work, than Albanians had at that time; finally, any start faces serious problems; the Albanian political elite was formed on the old Ottoman and dysfunctional system, the social, production and property relations were of the Ottoman empire which was dismantling, including the so called "general mentality", the inherited psychology, in times when the new proclaimed state was entering totally different meshing; 2. The Albanian state was proclaimed, but it hadn't determined borders; it was proclaimed in Vlorë, because it couldn't be proclaimed in Prizren, Durrës or any central town; the resulted projection of the National Movement after the proclamation of independence was the creation of the "integral ethnic Albania", while the neighboring countries had in the meantime conquered much Albanian space and territory and expressed more appetites for more land. The London Ambassadors' Conference (Dec. 1912 -July 1913) had decided to create the sovereign Principate of Albania, with civil and financial administration of an international commission, with a gendarmery organized by foreign officers, etc. The Florence Protocol had determined the borders, which had left out over half of the "Integral Ethnic Albania". In 1914, the Statute of Albania was adopted in Vlorë. It contained 206 articles, and the great powers had accordingly recognized Albania as a constitutional state of an inheriting throne. They had appointed Wilhelm zu Wied as Prince of Albania, and he was not able to stabilize the country even though he was recognized by the neighbors. After some months, he was forced to flee. The burst of the world war had brought additional problems, whereas the strengthening of Esad Pashë Toptani and the rebelling Islamist movement had just opened the way for the foreigners to penetrate even deeper into Albanian lands. And then came the period when foreign armies entered the Albanian lands permanently. Some of the authors who claim that in this time of passiveness, in fact, the just created Albanian state was dismantling; the independent state was converting into a geographical expression. As an author says, "its existence was more an ideal than real affirmation", were almost right. In the Peace Conference, the neighbors didn't give up on their appetites, they discussed the issue as if it were unsolved, while the Albanian representatives fearing that they would lose
The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.

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what once had been recognized to them, insist on the fact that Albania had been recognized de iure, and that its borders had been determined in 1913. There were also requests to get the occupied lands back, to organize a plebiscite, reunite the lands, and give a mandate to the USA in Albania, but none of those happened. The totally realistic threat of the neighbors to grab whatever is left didn't stop, therefore the requests of the Albanian representatives expressed mainly in pro memoirs of different groups, but also of international instances, were often interpreted as a price to pay to assure the status quo. Different authors stress different elements of great importance for the creation of the borders defined in 1913. It is sure that the Great Powers, as well as other wider interests and many other things have influenced this. However, for us who are not historians, from this distance and without the pretension to analyze the issue, one thing seems very important: somewhere after 1918, as if a strong patriotic movement revived, the one that celebrated the National Assembly in Durrës and went a step forward with the "Lushnje Congress" (Jan.- Feb.1920), which adopted very important decisions regarding the future of the country, and thus, very strongly, it was proven to itself and the world, that Albania had an owner and that it had seriously decided to follow the path of the further development of the country. Naturally, at the beginning it seemed as if this movement was to adopt a plan to defend the existing borders, continuing its efforts also in the domestic plan with the democratic movement which culminated in 1924. It was, to say, a total revival of the whole Albanian society, or at least this is what can be perceived from the literature, whose the effects in the international plane were also noticed. The internal organization gave a strong incitement to go ahead. Thus, the treatment of the Albanian borders, at least of those defined in 1913, changed rapidly. It was another thing whether Albania, as a half, was capable of going forward so rapidly in order to do something more serious for the other half remaining outside. Since the purpose of this essay is not history, can we learn a lesson from this period, now and here? We are where we are, the situation is as it is, meanwhile the "international community" is taking its time. It is true that organizations of the civil life, education, solidarity and partially health-care, affirmed us as an association which is capable to self-organize and live independently. On the other hand, the repression came increasing, while the others seemed to have accepted our level of self-organization as something very natural. A silence has been created. Let's just remember the "ideal affirmation" of Albania of the '20-ies. What must we do in order to have more than this "ideal affirmation"? The rearrangement of the Balkans' space is going slowly and it could take directions which we won't like. There are no doubts that these directions will be influenced by factors far away from us, and there is also no doubt that there are things that depend on us. Could we say that we have accomplished our tasks if he haven't respected the rhythm? Are the newspapers the place where we, not only articulate our wishes, what we can do, when and how to do it, but the only place for competent discussion? It is not hard to conclude that the celebration of the constitutive meeting of the Parliament is linked to many dangers, as is the existence of the Albanians. But how to get rid of the dilemmas which are signalized by the non-celebration of this meeting in regard to our aims in the future? Is a substitution possible? Are we sure that we can manage without it? There sure must be other paths, but the institutional canalization of the political life can't be replaced. -2-

Parliamentarian ambivalence?

MACEDONIA XHELADIN MURATI, Vice-Chairman of the Macedonian Parliament: WE ASKED FOR WHAT WE DESERVE AS A PEOPLE by SELADIN XHEZAIRI / Shkup KOHA: What has been achieved in the past four years of the parliamentarian life of Macedonia - looked upon from the angle of the realization of the requests of the Albanians? MURATI: I wouldn't say requests of the Albanians, but rather the determinations of the PPD, which emerged from the program of the party. Our determinations have different phases of realization therefore they don't allow the banality: "we have requests, you must accept them". Even if the requests would be accepted, it doesn't mean they will be realized. Our experience so far, the political practice and the factive situation prove that even the requests of the Albanians and their realization represent a process to be fulfilled in phases. I could say that some battles have been won, that the political a and juridical terrain has been conquered in several issues, however the composition of the parliament is an enormous problem which disables the final realization. Many processes have been opened in education, science, information, the increase of the number of Albanians in the institutions of the system, ministries, economic institutions, etc. Despite a defeatism, the first two phases have been accomplished in a clumsy manner, however, they represent the proof of our political action. These processes will be terminated successfully by the new group of MP's which will come to the parliament after the second elections. KOHA: What were your concrete requests, what was fulfilled and what was not? MURATI: We asked for what we deserve as a people, what belongs to us. However the changes in the policy of the national equality which are a part of the PPD program, were not accomplished the way they should have. We have requested the status of a constituent nation of Macedonia for the Albanians, on which the solution of all our problems depends; the expansion of the information space (Radio, TV, newspapers); the establishment of an Institute of Albanian traditional cultural, historic, language, literature studies; the establishment of the Faculty of Pedagogy; the expansion of the high school education network; the increase of number of spaces for Albanian children in kindergartens; the official use of the Albanian language; the change of the Constitution; the inclusion of Albanians in the local and central governmental organs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia; the use of national symbols, etc. Some not so small results and realizations are not to be underestimated. The most important thing is the basic posture which sees the determined strategy of action of the PPD inside the democratic institutions of the system and not the democracies of the meadows. KOHA: Maybe in this plane, the Parliament, when it came to the realization of the requests and interests of the Albanians, turned into a "barometer" of the inter-ethnic relations in the -3-

negative sense of the word. Why? MURATI: The Macedonian Parliament was used by the Macedonian MP's to present program speeches, which in essence deny the Albanian factor, reject our legitimate requests for freedom and equality. Thus, the parliament has been a ring of rough and wild struggle against the Albanians, and, unfortunately, each request of ours was used as an excuse for the discussions about the inter-ethnic relations, and they contributed the increase of tensions. Their purpose was to force the Albanians MP's to leave the Parliament and the ministers to leave the government, to create a chaos, ie. to exclude the Albanians from the institutions of the system, to destabilize the situation and declare them as the perpetrators and the ones that have caused a war. Even more, the parliament has served as a public place to scold, offend and disdain the Albanians, to force them to go out on the streets. The Albanian MP's answered to all accusations and defended our issue, the just policy and our requests with dignity. Thus the model of traditional nationalism, not to say the official nationalism, to keep the relations between people as tense as possible, tended to continue with the Communist practice to declare Albanians as the guilty for everything wrong that happens and to consider the Albanian requests as nationalistic, as ungrounded requests against democracy. But the composition of the Parliament was such that the MP's considered Macedonia as a national state, always forgetting that it was a multi-national multi-cultural state which should develop the freedom and equality of all its citizens, without threatening the national identity of the Albanians too.

MACEDONIA A CHALLENGE TO FEEL THE PULSE by IBRAHIM MEHMETI / Shkup If there was distrust of the Albanians about the results of the census, which was overcome in July due to the efforts of the Group of European experts, what has happened last week, definitely has sealed the distrust among the Albanians in relation with the results of the census. An information published in "Nova Makedonija", considered a serious newspaper, which presented, as claimed, unofficial results of the census, created confusion among the public and caused harsh reactions. The informations states that Macedonia has 2.001.368 inhabitants, and that only 420 thousand are Albanians (about 21%). What has caused special interest was the fact according to which only 300 thousand of the total number of Albanians are citizens with proper status (!?), while 120 thousand Albanians, meaning one third of the Albanians, have their legal status still undefined in the country where they live, which definitely is a challenge whose end is very hard to see. This was announced in the reaction of the largest Albanian political party PPD, one of the governmental coalition partners, which stated that it will consider nil the results of the census, if the Statistical Institute of Macedonia does not respect the Law on the Census, especially emphasizing the fact that out of 192 employed in this Institute, only one is Albanian and because of his qualifications, has no -4-

influence whatsoever. On the other hand, the Ethnologists' Association of Macedonia, without even waiting for the denial or verification of the "unofficial" facts, made a press release stating that the figures of the census only prove that the Albanians are not autochthonous, but are colonizers who came to Macedonia in times of the Ottoman Empire, which is actually the posture of wider Macedonian circles regrading the Albanian issue in Macedonia. The others, who reacted to PPD's reaction, the unofficial data provided is relevant proof that the Albanians should definitely say good-bye to the idea of having an Albanian University (!?). New reactions will surely be expected, both from the People's Democratic Party and the PPD fraction (Thaçi), the latter being the one which was decisively against the participation of Albanians in the census, without the prior regulation of issue of citizenship. Now, the publication of the unofficial results clearly proves that the manipulations with the number of Albanians in Macedonia enter a new phase, even a rougher one than before. On the other hand, the published number of 420 thousand, represents a special challenge. There are no doubts that there is a enormous disproportion between the figures manipulated with by Albanians (800 thousand) and these ones, but at the same time there are very strange relations even within the official figures. In 1981, according to the census there were 380 thousand Albanians (19,8%). In 1991, even though the Albanians boycotted the census, the Statistical Institute "counted" 427.313 Albanians, based on "scientific methods". And now, three years later, almost the same figure appears which "verifies" the calculations of the Institute, which always has stated to be "generous" towards the Albanians. At the same time, it comes out that in 13 years the number of Albanians has increased only 1%, which is contrary to the official theses about the hyper-birthrate of the Albanians. Going back to the results of the census, they should have been published by the end of July, but because of the "objective reasons" this deadline was extended and according to the Statistical Institute they will be published on October 15. The fact that one day later the first round of elections should start, throws a new light on this "endless game" of the number of Albanians. How casual is this, it is hard to say, but it is evident that the deadline for the results was extended 90 days and the elections are to be celebrated two weeks earlier, and thus these dates have only a 24 hours distance, which anyhow belong to the pre-electoral silence. The main issue in whole this matter is the citizenship certificate and the total number of Albanians, which is a considerable electorate in Macedonia. What would happen if the new appointed Electoral Commission decides that the right to vote belongs only to the citizens of Macedonia can be imagined but, however, it is almost sure that the number of the potential Albanian electorate will be reduced drastically. Further on, this issue will cause most probably a division within the electorate into two. Whether this is the main purpose of the Macedonian political circles or is it a challenge to feel the pulse of the Albanians before the electoral war, soon will be seen.

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ECONOMY KOSOVA IN A BLOCK by IBRAHIM REXHEPI / Prishtina Since January, when the application of Avramovic's program started, Kosova's economy, mainly the state owned and the mixed (where the state still has 51% of the shares) experienced the influx of 40 million dinars (or German marks according to the official rate). All of it was done with the purpose to restart production, reengage the capital objects and the restart of life, but without over 140 thousand Albanian workers. The opposite occurred: Trepça works on and off; the Electric Power Plant produces electricity enough only for the households; Sharr in Hani i Elezit will produce cement enough to finish the construction season; Ferronikel after losing the first furnace, lost the second one just recently. This means that out of all aspirations of the Serbian regime only one was accomplished: the radical change of the ethnic structure of the employed and the creation of economic insecurity among the Albanian population. It was proven that economy can't stand so many dictates and that it has its rules of behavior. This doesn't depend so much on the invested money, as much as on the created conditions of labor in the circumstances imposed by the market. However, this self-proclaimed Yugoslavia can't create such an atmosphere, because many things were destroyed during hyper-inflation, the period of transformation of property was characterized with massive plunder and the stimulation of criminality, and above all stands the embargo which suffocates all pores in economy. The producing capacity of electric energy is six times bigger that is the present level of production. Despite the fact that this volume of production is not needed, the electric power plant is not capable of offering more electric energy to the market. Several days ago, one of the repaired blocks of Kosova B started operating, but it will not be able to produce the 340 megawatt/hours of electric energy. It will produce 27,3% less. However, the amount of 250 megawatt/hours will be enough to provide with electricity all the households in Kosova. This ascertainment should be taken with reserve, because the very much amortized net of distribution could fall apart during winter time and cause black-outs and lack of heat. But, in no other option will we remain without electricity, since the main consumers Trepça, Sharr and Ferronikel have stopped being that. The hotels and tourism won't lose much either, for they don't function either. Prishtina used to have 1000 beds at the disposal of the guests, now only 230 of them are usable; it had 4200 seats in restaurants and cafes, and now only 940 of them are employable. Or taking another data published by the official Serbian sources: in the first four months of this year, 16 thousand overnight stays were evidenced in Kosovan hotels. Out of this number, only 600 were not guests from Serbia and Montenegro, meaning that on a daily basis, there was only one foreigner spending a night in Prishtina. This is the reason why the hotels, private or public, are more cost-effective if they are closed down, instead of accumulating losses and serving as headquarters for police and military forces. The dilemma of the workers of Ferronikel in Gllogovc was solved in the beginning of August. There is no more need to go to work, for both furnaces are completely out and God knows when will they be reactivated again. One of the furnaces never actually did work, -6-

however it served as a spare for the other one. Now, the defect is so serious and there are no chances for it to be repaired for the time being. What's worse, about 2 million tons of metal are frozen (worth 12,5 million dollars), and can't be used nor sold. Ferronikel was destroyed on purpose! The Serb and Montenegrin workers tried to present it as a diversion of the Albanians and this is why they wrote petitions to many officials in Serbia requesting investigations to be conducted. The reply of the authorities was negative, for there were no grounds, they claimed. The fact that the enterprise was destroyed purposely is easily proven: the enterprise was not ready to restart the production; all Albanian managers and engineers were dismissed; there were no sufficient spare parts, necessary to keep the production going. The Serbian managers knew this, and they consciously did it. When it comes to Trepça, it is very indicative that the Serbian mining and metal industry officials met twice to decide that the Trepça's Lead Mill should restart the production. How, if two thirds of the employed work in the administration? The officials also said that they would provide the enterprise with 30 thousand tones of lead concentrate to be refinished in Trepça. Where from, if there are no stocks in Serbia? Smuggling maybe? Or maybe the idea is to do what had been done in Ferronikel. Anyways, it is very indicative why the Lead Mill and not the mines in Stari Trg or Novo Brdo? Serbia is at war, or rather is helping the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and it needs the lead, as one of the most important substances of the military industry. The bigger the production of lead, the bigger the possibility to produce weapons and ammunition, since this metal can't be sold elsewhere, because of the blockade. The lack of effect of the measures for the revitalization of the economy in Kosova is also confirmed by the official data. If the data is trustworthy, then in August, the industrial production has increased everywhere in the so called Yugoslavia but in Kosova. In the first six months of this year, 500 state owned enterprises had evidenced losses worth 582 million German Marks, 542 of them being in substance. Even though in June, a four member family needed 400 DEM to fulfil its elementary needs, the workers in Kosova received, in average, five times less. Despite these movements, which maybe in some occasion would be an expression of the present conjuncture, it is evident that the private economy is much more effective and flexible than the state economy in the circumstances in which business is developed.

INTERVIEW IVOR ROBERTS, Charge D'Affairs of the British Embassy in Belgrade AWAITING THE DIALOGUE AND CSCE MONITORING Interviewed by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina Mr. Roberts is considered to be one of the biggest experts of the Albanian issue at the Foreign Office. He has recently been appointed as Charge D'Affairs of the British Embassy in -7-

Belgrade, and has visited Kosova several times. Last week he was in Kosova again, and we took the opportunity to ask him about many issues, the Balkans' crisis, the Greek-Albanian conflict, the conversations between Hogg and Milosevic, and the postures of the British Government regarding Kosova... KOHA: Since you are an expert on the Balkans, especially of the Albanian issue, maybe we could start with a general question - would you characterize the war in Former Yugoslavia as the "Third Balkans' War"? ROBERTS: Yes, I believe it is a third Balkans' war, and even more expanded than the previous two, if you take into account the intervention of the international community to try and safeguard the peace, and the inclusion of the mediators from Russia, USA, the European Union and the UN. If this is how this Balkans' war could be described, and which is not hard to do, then it has involved almost all the bigger countries. KOHA: There are already many serious accusations for the wrong policy of the West in the Yugoslav crisis. We are witnessing the division of Bosnia on ethnic grounds. Recently, President Rugova requested the regulation of confederative relations of the Kosova Albanians with Albania, similar to the case of the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia. Do you think that Bosnia created a precedence, a criteria for the Balkans? ROBERTS: What has happened in Bosnia should serve as an example which should not be seen anywhere in the world. It was one of the most terrible and destructive European wars since 1945 and all of us could learn endless lessons from all the mistakes we have made. I think that our policy, before all, concentrated on negotiations, humanitarian relief for the victims of war and the prevention of the expansion of the conflict, as much as it was possible. And according to these "criteria" I think we have done well. Naturally, you could say that we haven't achieved the full end of war, which could be understood as a failure of the West. There is no doubt that we have made mistakes, but they were all good willing and regardless of what the others could say, the mistakes were not a result of any interest. Our purpose was to bring stability and peace in the other part of our continent. Regarding your specific question, I would say that the lesson of the Bosnian war is upsetting and I wouldn't like to see it applied in any other part of the region. We must be realistic about the situation we found ourselves in Bosnia, and observe it from the most humane position, seeking urgent detention of war and negotiating decisions. KOHA: Apart from the tensions in the north, the Albanian-Greek tensions occurred, and if the permanent Greek-Macedonian conflict is added to this, then this seems it is getting the dimension of a Balkans' crisis? ROBERTS: I think that these are not indispensably linked. The Balkans have unfortunately a traditional reputation of instability, tensions, violence and we, in the international community, are trying to sort out this reputation among the states that have a conflict, such as Albania and Greece, and again I stress, this could not have any links to what is happening in the north. The hostilities between neighbors are very much disliked and we have called upon both parties to show as much restraint as possible, to prevent the situation from deteriorating. We will continue to exert pressure, on Albania through of friendly relations, and on Greece through the NATO and the EU, making sure that the tensions will diminish and the conflict be solved peacefully and reasonably according to CSCE procedures. -8-

KOHA: During his last visit to Kosova, Mr. Hogg insisted on the indispensability of the negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade. However, so far we have not witnessed any serious effort of the Serbian side for dialogue. Do you think that after the new Milosevic's "cooperating" policy toward the West, the chances for a dialogue will be bigger? ROBERTS: I think that now we are turning a new page in our relations with the authorities here. So far, many Western countries were critical towards Milosevic, but also the majority of the states acknowledges his last decision regarding the Bosnian Serb leadership as a courageous and positive step which contributes the process of reaching the peace. I believe that Milosevic will soon see a reward coming for this, in the form of concrete measures, as would be easing up the sanctions. It seems as if now Milosevic, by understanding that he must make use of a great portion of his authority to achieve peace which could spread in the whole region, and thus help the initiation of the necessary dialogue in Kosova, and bringing an end to the repression here. And these are measures warmly wished and which would be applauded. KOHA: Mr. Hogg declared a very strange thing after meeting Milosevic, that Milosevic was willing to acknowledge the autonomy of Kosova. On the other hand, Albanians aim at independence and the Republic... ROBERTS: Milosevic should be asked about his postures. I can speak about the postures of my government. I was present in the meeting between Milosevic and Hogg, and he spoke in favor of the idea of the autonomy, even though not being specific about details. Mr. Hogg has made it clear in many occasions, that the autonomy the Albanians had, as the one of the 1974 Constitution, would be a real and adequate form for the people of Kosova and that we do not support the independence of Kosova, and that the problem of Kosova should be solved within the borders of Serbia, and this rule (on not changing the borders - our remark) should not be changed with non peaceful means and without mutual consent. KOHA: But you know that Yugoslavia doesn't exist any longer and neither does the 1974 Constitution. Then how do you think that such an autonomy could be applied? ROBERTS: When I mentioned this I didn't think, naturally, that such a Constitution should be rewritten absolutely. But if you remember the first Article of that Constitution, it stated that Kosova was a constituent of the SFRY- which doesn't exist any more- and a constituent of Serbia - which exists, as part of what today is known as the FRY, even though it is not recognized as such. This means that something should be reformulated. Anyhow, it is not our duty to describe the precise measures of what should be done, but what we are talking about is an autonomy with expanded elements which Kosova had according to the 1974 Constitution, and we would wish it would be enjoyed by the people of Kosova now! KOHA: Allow me to still remain in this topic. Lets ignore the Albanian negation of the autonomy. Do you really think that Milosevic would agree with such an autonomy? ROBERTS: We are hoping very much he will. I can't speak on behalf of Mr. Milosevic, but anyhow, this is our wish! KOHA: Next month there will be elections in Macedonia. Some analysts are fearing that this could destabilize Macedonia and the whole region...

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ROBERTS: I will reveal you a "secret". In two hours I will be making my first official visit to Macedonia, therefore I hesitate to give any evaluations on the state which I haven't visited yet. Anyhow, looked upon generally, I wouldn't observe the elections as a concept of destabilization, but as a sane and democratic concept. KOHA: Would you like to say anything more... ROBERTS: Yes, regarding the CSCE mission in Kosova. It is another element I would like to connect to your question regarding the autonomy and Milosevic, is that I really can't anticipate his attitude towards specific proposals, but the posture of my government is very much grounded on the autonomy of the 1974 type. What I would like to say is that the long-term return of the CSCE observers group to Kosova is very important, and we believe that at the same time, this is in the interest of Serbia and also in the interest of the people of Kosova.

KOSOVA THE RIGHT LEFT, THE LEFT RIGHT by DUKAGJIN GORANI / Prishtina Among others, the First LDK Convention celebrated in March 1991, ended also with the following message: "This Convention gave a serious blow to the Marxists-Leninists, whose strategy was 'to conquer the fortress from the inside'". Based on a not very adequate automatism, the 'Marxist-Leninist' syntagma has always implied almost all the former political prisoners of Kosova, especially those who are active in the political scene. These people were then given the message by this Convention, that if they want to become active in politics according to the established manners in 1990 - "they could establish their own political party, and not infiltrate inside the LDK", which had already gained the unanimous support of the people. Four years and a half later, all of those who supported the quoted ascertainment, have left, were expelled or resigned the LDK, gradually being replaced by those whom the doors of the political fortress of the LDK had been closed. Which, still has the unanimous support of the people. Not entering any conclusion about what kind of people of Kosova is this, lacking of principle, and which considers totally unimportant who was and who is composing the convincingly largest party in Kosova (?!?) - then the question arises whether the political left and right really exist among the Kosova Albanians, or of how vital importance is the existence and the cultivation of such a political polarity for an ordinary Kosovan? Finally, why were the resignations of the members of the presidency of the LDK interpreted by the political couloirs, among others also as a victory of the political left in Kosova, ie. the defeat of the right wing, which has not been defined so far and it is not known who represents - 10 -

it? There is no doubt that the line of the former Albanian political prisoners of Kosova inside the LDK, which has acted so far with considerable homogeneousness and according to the proper political regulations, is bearing the "left" inscription as a baggage of past times and the appertaining of one part of it inside the patriotic illegal organizations which were national-democratic or Marxist-Leninist, which however, as final reference of their political programs had taken the former regime in Albania. Until the moment this regime fell, when in principle, the transitory phase of the elimination of ideological concepts from politics started. A public which tends to generalize and classify in categories, considers them as the political leftists of Kosova. Where are, within these positions, the democratic rightists of Kosova? Resigning? Inside the former LDK? It is well known that the largest part of the original membership of the LDK was composed of complete units of the then League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Socialist League of Working People, which on statutory bases had an expressed leftists attribute. As a party which denied the membership to Marxists-Leninists, the LDK allowed the public to, itself, define it as a centrist, rightist, royalist, or any kind of party. Finally, nothing else could be expected from the party of the "three options". Why should the ideological conversion be valid for only one of the parties involved? According to this, the leftist former political prisoners are defined by the couloirs as groupings which support the totalitarian method of eliminating a political opponent and the full secrecy in action inside the party. Thus, it seems as if it were forgotten that much before the former political prisoners entered the LDK, the "rightists" of the LDK Presidency (who since long are resigning), inaugurated or helped the dissolution of complete political institutions, starting from the idea of the Democratic Forum and up to the Coordinating Body. As long as there was such a cadres' structure, the LDK presented itself "only" as one political party, which banned many thing in the conceptual plane. However, these days, we have the opportunity to hear about the option on the urgent creation (restoration) of the "right wing" inside the LDK - thus disputing the LDK concept of being something between a political party or a "center of the national movement"(!?). How much could it be spoken of the "right" or "left" polarity within this context? Having it clear that the recent resignations in the LDK are, first of all, a reflection of the revolt of a part of the Presidency regarding the discontent with the functioning of the Bukoshi Government - then it comes out that in this political Darwinism of the struggle for power and survival, the only thing that could be exactly defined is the constant struggle of groupings (which are many), and which escalate and disappear depending on the support of two basic instances which (it is said) are the only that function - the Presidency and the Government. This game has another name. Chess.

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KOSOVA THE END OF THE ACCLAMATION LEADERSHIP by BATON HAXHIU / Prishtina The Kosovan political reality has recently proved the thesis of the lack of engagement of the LDK and the lack of efforts of its membership to overcome the created situation. It was feared that the July Convention would bring realignment in the Central Board and considerable fractions within this party. The unity and the visual acclamation didn't last much, and the same day the Board met, three resignations were offered. Fehmi Agani, Edita Tahiri and Engjëll Berisha resigned. In order to clarify the dilemmas to the Kosovan public and to safeguard the professional correctness, all processes should go back to the moment when the conflict between LDK and Bukoshi was openly published. The resignation of Ramush Tahiri a year earlier, had announced the first sparks of the misunderstandings within the Government of Unity. This resignation was a consequence of the isolation of the political structure of the LDK. At that time, all meetings of the Government were done between Premier Bukoshi and a part of the presidency of the LDK. The unexpected resignation of vice-premier Tahiri, who was representative of the Albanian Christian-Democratic Party (although this party gave up on Tahiri), announced that the LDK wanted the monopoly in all the structures of the movement and had achieved to suffocate all political factors of that time. The isolation of this party resulted with the restriction of the front by discovering "enemies and opponents" among co-nationals and the others. Such a logic forgot the pivot of the political actions and the whole energy was concentrated on dealing with oneself, propagating the false unity as a populist factor, which for one people with only one newspaper, "Bujku", was easy to immunize the whole situation in every aspect by creating a "political culture" of faith, which had taken dimensions of joking with the blind public. The media, for any political event, had a specialized group on censorship, which proclaimed the solution of the national issue this or the next Spring and inactivating any free political action with the explanation that the strategy of such action seeks full secrecy. Then came the accusation of Bukoshi towards the LDK, that "in the LDK, bureaucratic forces have been created with the tendency of fighting and stopping the Movement". It was then said that Bukoshi's interview was written by Mehmet Kraja, who after this interview left the post of head of Kosova's Office in Tirana. Inside the LDK, first groupings which accused Bukoshi of misusing the Fund, giving uncontrolled statements, detaching from Kosova's reality and luxurious life he had in Ulm, Germany, had been created. The majority of the witnesses of this event state that President Rugova did not want to get involved in this conflict, and as it seems, was the balancer of the created problems. It was then said that the person who most insisted on the destitution of Bukoshi was Ali Aliu. The political couloirs which were well informed, weres almost certain that Bukoshi had to leave his post. In one meeting of the Presidency of the LDK, in October last, it was said that President Rugova was given the mandate to discharge Bukoshi. He, not only didn't do this, but he was accompanied by Bukoshi in all meetings he had in several countries in Europe. The fact that something was going wrong couldn't be hidden at all, but as Bukoshi couldn't be replaced, the creation of double ministries and two or three political groupings appeared. One - 12 -

grouping was headed by Agani and it included Ali Aliu, Edita Tahiri, Skënder Blakaj, Anton Kolaj and Rexhep Gjergji and Bukoshi's group which functioned silently. On the other hand, the group of the former political prisoners acted quietly, and was sure that it would have a very good results in the LDK Convention, and it was also said that this grouping had the support of Bukoshi, or were rather playing the game of "when two quarrel - the third wins". But the truth is that it was expected that the LDK Convention would sort out the things especially after the promise of the President proper who was insisting on the approval of his list. Agani and the non formal group had conditioned Rugova with a list which had to be approved, otherwise they would leave the party. The Convention passed silently, without any problems and acclamation. Dissatisfied with the composition of the Board (rumors claimed that Edita Tahiri had gotten only 22 votes and she couldn't be elected to the Board, but it is not known what happened later), the grouping of the six members of the old Presidency insisted on having fixed lists and have some problems solved with Presidential decrees. Some days before that and on the same day of the Convention, one of the six had confidentially declared that Mujë Krasniqi, Bukoshi's representative in Prishtina, together with Zenel Kelmendi and several others, had agitated and accused the group of the six of their alleged connections to Belgrade, especially Edita Tahiri and Agani. This proves, claims an ex-member of the presidency, that the political set-ups started with serious accusations for treason and collaboration with Serbia. All of this was silenced. From the time when the Convention was held, two months passed and the fragility of the movement called LDK, appeared in Kosova. The Kolaj-Zogaj case occurred, which was nothing else but a good direction of the actors from Kosova and Ulm, ie. the Bukoshi-LDK conflict got the first blow. The division of the political actors in Kosova started intensifying, whilst the media, for the first time started penetrating the deepness of the conflict which was offered by the actors of the "political reality of Kosova". It was expected that President Rugova would arbitrate in the conflict which openly divided the public. The least expected was to have a stop to public contests and stop throwing the dirty laundry. Weak to do anything in this respect, Rugova declared to a friend of his, that he was not willing to get involved in the problems that others had created. Rugova was expected to do something, because of his competencies and because everyone called on him for intervention. The problems started coming out from the Tirana Office and started getting the banal color of a political struggle inside the party, with negative consequences for all of those who had put their trust on the leadership of a movement of historic importance. The media even evidenced uncontrolled statements which had the importance of a state secret. Once again, since Bukoshi was not being replaced, and unable to create a commission which would control the expenses of the Government of Kosova, the masses in Kosova and Switzerland had to be animated with Anton Kolaj's interview which, according to first hand sources, had been prepared by Ali Aliu in Prespa in cooperation with the "Zëri" editorial board. The interview was unexpected, because there was an agreement that the conflict should be silenced. Even in a Press Conference, "KOHA's" journalist was accused as insinuator and foreboder when he uncovered the Tirana case. This interview deteriorated even more the relations between the president and the informal group lead by Agani, which insisted on the discharge of Bukoshi. This interview was also published to animate President Rugova to make effective decisions about the created problems. All of it was conditioned with the eight deposited resignations of the members of the presidency of the LDK, which insisted that Bukoshi had to leave. It is said that where the money is, there is the power, therefore it was understandable why Rugova was not insisting to - 13 -

remove Bukoshi. Not because he didn't want to do this, as a friend of Rugova says, but the only reason was the money which Bukoshi is controlling. In the meantime, the group of political prisoners was consolidating to, finally, "take over the fortress from the inside". Also, it is said that all their actions are known by and linked to Adem Demaçi, who according to mongers, wants to go back to politics actively. The meeting of the Board was prepared to take the calming contours and stabilize the situation. Rugova had thought of electing the 15 members by decree, but afraid that this would cause consequences, he had given up. The only option which he preferred was the list with 16 members which should have been elected from the President's list, which was conditioned by the six members of the old Presidency. This was done because all the old members wanted to resign just because they didn't want to be part of a voting the epilogue of which was well known. Rugova had promised that his list would go through, but not only that this list was not approved, but the closest people of the president weren't elected in the Presidency. According to witnesses, Rugova had insisted his list to be approved and that he had even declared "if you don't want to adopt this list, go ahead, establish a new party". However, the further development of this meeting, as has been the case until now, has forced President Rugova to give up of the threats and show his indetermination to clarify and solve the problems as he had promised. In reality, all members of the old Presidency didn't want to become candidates because they knew how the voting would end, but Rugova had promised them that they would be elected. The candidacy of the six was a result of Rugova's promise that they would be part of the new Presidency. However, several days later, Rugova "deceived" the six, and his indetermination allowed that his 16 members' list be expanded to 26. It was almost certain who the candidates would be, for the group of the former political prisoners was dominating in the Board. Two members of the Board didn't want to become candidates: Engjëll Berisha, who with full honesty declared later to KOHA that he didn't even know that he had been elected to the Board and that he hadn't even been participant of the Convention. He also said that "I don't want to participate in a labor which I don't know and I am not able to achieve. I am ill and I wouldn't like my membership in the Presidency to be manipulated with. Therefore I don't want to be a candidate at all, and this is why I have no need to resign, for I am not member of that Presidency. I was placed there by force and for someone's interest", concluded Berisha. The second one to reject the candidacy was Adil Pireva, which was very indicative and was interpreted by many as a bluff of the former political prisoners in order to balance with Berisha, from Rugova's wing. The new elected Presidency could be evaluated as the weakest so far. Cynics would add that this composition would be good for a branch or sub-branch, because it doesn't fulfil the professional criteria and is very unconvincing for both the domestic and international public. The local political analysts consider that this presidency is unable to stand the difficult situation. What's more, this presidency would be the Presidency of divisions and the dilemmas. It is said that the largest part of members of this Presidency are a result of an agreement and the influence of Bukoshi. Both Agani and Edita Tahiri, in their letters of resignation state that this Presidency is not of the continuity, which is in full contradiction to what Rugova declared the next day in his regular press conference. To tell the truth, this sentence was a little bit shocking, especially after three members of the presidency resigned and after Avni Spahiu was becoming the fourth one to announce that he didn't want to be part of this Presidency. - 14 -

The former political prisoners, annoyed with what was happening, declared that they were not the ones to blame for the created situation, because the problems remain between Agani and Bukoshi and that they were supporting the President, which according to them, is totally innocent for what has happened so far. On the other hand, the group of the six is of the opinion that all the fault relies on the indetermination of the President, who is really responsible for the present situation. His assistants also have objections to his statement in the press conference regarding the resignations, when he said that those are normal processes and that they will be further discussed in the Board. The old Presidency had lost much of its authority and had almost no creativity and there is no doubt that it should have been renewed with people who know how to and can work. However, the dilemma about how could such a presidency be elected, remains. Is this organized by someone, or is it a result of democratic processes, ie. the voting? At first sight, yes. But rumors state that this new Presidency with soon ask for Rugova's responsibility. If the flow of events continues this way, it would be logical to have Demaçi, whose authority is indisputable in this Presidency, take over the chairmanship. The created problems can be overcome if Rugova takes a clear posture regarding the situation. Based on the present experiences, it is more likely to expect an attempt to find a balance, than to have a clear posture. Analysts speculate with two options: on Monday, when the Board will discuss the resignations, the Presidency will split in two or the President will amortize the activities of the parties, by strengthening the cabinet and the state institutions. The second one is maybe more likely to happen, because it would create a new political quality. Taking into account that Rugova is indecisive in his actions, it could be possible to have the creation of a Decision-Making Center which would function as a state political institution. Automatically, all these conflicts would stop. Another option is in the game, and this is that the President, because of his loneliness and the lack of possibility to solve the problems, could resign on his post at the LDK. But, finding himself in a sandwich of polemics and political contests, "as innocent as he is", he could easily declare himself in favor of a more preferable solution - the extraordinary Convention of the LDK and the dissolution of the Presidency. The biggest mistake of the President until now is that he has institutionalized the LDK and has given it state-hood attributes. This has been taken advantage of very well for personal attributes, because the only space of communication so far was the national-political, which has been concentrated within the LDK. But this of course draws the present situation, when the crisis in the LDK is treated as a crisis of all Albanian institutions which aimed at the establishment of the Republic of Kosova. It has almost become usual to repeat that such mistakes in politics are unforgiven. It has also become a habit not to learn anything form the mistakes, but let them occur again and then suffer the consequences.

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KOSOVA LDK: ONE-WAY TICKETS by ASTRIT SALIHU & BATON HAXHIU / Prishtina In the continuation of changes and resignations in the LDK, the last ones were the most shocking to the public. If the resignations are irrevocable, then none of the founders of the LDK is member of the new Presidency. The reasons why the founders left, are not known, the only thing that is repeated is that all the ones that left were not satisfied with the created situation. It is also said that the indetermination of Rugova to solve the problems on time, is the main reason why they left. In order to try and explain the reasons why all the president's men left, herewith we present a series of facts discussed and interpreted by their fellow political activists and opponents. Fehmi Agani: Sociologist, author of many theoretical books on politics. Since the beginning of the activities of the LDK he was the ideologist of the party and the man who gave the ideological orientations to the party. He was the first man regarding the contact groups, starting from The Hague Conference and up to the Geneva Conference, and concretely in the group concerning education. He was a sort of unofficial port-parole of the LDK, starting from the LDK press conferences which started on Jan. 19, 1990 and has presented to the public the majority of the Declarations of the LDK. His ability is to balance different waves in the LDK, always surviving in the position of the second man in the LDK. He usually acted in the shadow, without any pomposity, no charisma, but always having under full control the internal logistics of the party. He is cold-blooded, tolerant, courteous, he has a specific sense of humor and above all, has a specific nose. Jusuf Buxhovi: One of the founders of the LDK and one of the first ones to leave the party. His presentations in the beginning were energic, and his opponents think that he is a hasty, controversial person, a kind of a German in our environment". He is known for being the main opponent of the "left groupings" inside the LDK, and main supporter of the creation of the right wing in the party. Mehmet Kraja: Also one of the first founders who fell out form the formation along the way, but who has preserved his activity "under the governmental umbrella", usually reserved for the journalists of the culture department of "Rilindja". He is known for "fractionism and intolerance". He is also known to have prevented the foundation of the Democratic Forum, the attempt to create the first political alliance of Albanian political forces after the downfall of the autonomy of Kosova, together with Ali Aliu and Bujar Bukoshi. His name is also linked to the most recent affair in the Kosova Office in Tirana. He is "the man who has promoted the discourse to anathematize the political opponents inside the Kosovan alternative". Ali Aliu: One of the founders of the LDK and the activists with the biggest competencies since the beginning. He is usually blamed for the division of the Albanian Lobby in the USA by establishing the LDK branch there. He is also in the group opposing the standpoints of the Premier. His big political force gradually was reduced to the level of the representative of Kosova in Tirana. Right now, he is not active and resides in Macedonia, place of origin. Bujar Bukoshi: Became active in the beginning through the lobby of the "medics" and - 16 -

penetrated to the post of secretary as a "loyal and energic" person. Because of these characteristics and his "courage", by initiative of Rugova, he was elected Premier. Many of his political opponents claimed that "he was not capable of running the post" and now is accused of "privatizing the government and has even the courage of contradicting the President". His last presentation is in the line of the strong posture and he is "requesting a third option". His name is linked to "the rebelling discourse which opposes the moderate line inside the LDK" and the "last changes in the party" are attributed to this. Anton Kolaj: One of the isolated in 1989, found himself a place in the Presidency and became vice-chairman. As a determined person and outstanding worker in the field, he was given "delicate tasks" of great importance. After the accusation of the Serbian authorities that he had been involved in the "creation of the Ministry of Defense of Kosova", he was forced to flee, first to Europe and then to USA. Recently, he had seen himself involved in the affair of the "Kosovan embassy" in Tirana on behalf of the "anti-Bukoshi lobby". Alush Gashi: Became active in the party after the Faculty of Medicine closed down. He was Dean of the faculty in times of the massive intoxication of children. He had resided some time in the USA and during his activity in the party he has established many contacts with foreigners and Albanians aborad. He was known as "the President's man". His opponents have usually linked his name to his familial pedigree, "his father used to be a member of the secret police". Edita Tahiri: She was activated in the senior leadership after her activity in Prizren. She is part of the people (along with Alush Gashi and Shaqir Shaqiri) who have mostly dealt with international contacts. Her opponents link her to a spying affair in Prizren, which later was used as reason for accusation and blackmail in times of the last elections. Tahiri resigned demonstratively after she got re-elected in the presidency. In the party circles she is considered as "an unclear person, at times linked to Bukoshi's line, at times to Agani's". Selatin Novosella: One of the well known organizers of the 1968 demonstrations and a former political prisoner. His non election in the presidency is linked to the interpretations of people trying to explain the differences between the "political prisoners of 1968 and 1981". Sabri Hamiti: The intellectual part of the LDK is connected to his name. Known for his nationalist position. His opponents consider that he "lead the Llap lobby in the LDK". Before he was considered the closest man to Rugova. His behavior and posture was considered by some as "prepotency" whilst by others as "pride". His posture was proven in the "Convention of silence" where he insisted on discussion.

EDITORIAL HAPPY 1989! by VETON SURROI Ibrahim Rugova was chairman of the Writers' Association of Kosova in 1989, and many remember him for the statements he was giving to foreign journalists, fully in discordance with what the local political and party authorities were saying about Kosova. In general, at - 17 -

that time, people who spoke openly against the regime could be counted with the fingers of one hand, and almost the whole opposition could be divided in two: in people that in a relative liberty gathered enough courage to speak out loud against the government and in those who because of their words and actions against the regime found themselves behind the bars. Amongst these, the principal were the ones who had participated in the organization of demonstrations of 1981 and Adem Demaçi, who was undergoing a public project of gaining the image of "Public Enemy # 1". The Kosova of Albanians after almost four years and a half of semi-legalized pluralism is rapidly going towards 1989. Ibrahim Rugova, who in the seat of the Writer's Association finds it hard to define his function and continues expressing what he thinks publicly, is still on the scene. The same individuals are still speaking out loud, escaping from any mutual link, as Dracula from the cross. And there is still the group of people who had ended in prison for their speech or actions, and who were set free. But are not free yet. Naturally, many things have changed. The Yugoslavia of 1989 has been replaced by undefined creatures this year, and which will probably not be defined in the next one either. The former leaders who pretended to safeguard the Socialist Yugoslavia, have replaced their missions (they have survived), and in the meantime a terrible war which is still going on, started. But in Kosova, things haven't changed. Kosova continues living in a state of emergency (anti-Constitutional, illegal, inhuman - name it as you wish). Based on the recent formulations of the Serbian policy and its interests, it is going back from an issue of potential war focus to the political ring of the region with the most drastic violations of human rights in Europe. The occupation of Kosova by Serbia again takes the form of a political issue and not the highest level of a potential war zone, which it had in the past two or three years. In these conditions words can be heard, same as in 1989. And they are evidenced, as they were then. Anyhow, today's words, when the sediment inside the Albanian policy is exposed, will cause special attention. But, this shouldn't worry as much as the possibility that in Kosova, after four years, the present and the future depends on the intellectual courage of individuals to declare themselves against the government and the organization inertia of people who once, for their speech and action, were placed behind bars and were identified as a group only based on this part of their biography.

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